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THE LEGAL STATUS OP NIGERIAN WOMEN
with special reference to marriage. E.E.A. Amechi
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of the research was to collect 
and collate the relevant evidence of the legal status of 
Nigerian women in marriage and family life.
The research was motivated by the relative lack of 
information on all aspects of women’s life. Although a 
voluminous literature on the Nigerian peoples exists, references 
to women are incidental - necessary but insignificant adjuncts 
to discussions of and about men. No substantial legal work 
on Nigerian women has so far been published. It is in the 
absence of any comprehensive previous study of the legal 
status of women in marriage that the present work finds its 
justification.
Women’s status in the three types of legally re­
cognized marriages in Nigeria is examined in detail.
The thesis is divided into five parts. Part one, 
consisting of two chapters, is introductory, and covers the 
historical and legal background necessary for the proper appre­
ciation of the topics discussed later.
In part two, the status of women in customary law 
marriage is examined. The types of marriage, dowry, and the 
incidents and dissolution of customary marriage are dealt 
with in six chapters.
The impact made on women’s status by foreign forms of 
marriage is discussed in part three. Chapter IX covers 
marriage according to Islamic law, while women’s status in 
statutory marriage in relation to the formation, incidents 
and dissolution of marriage forms the subject matter of 
chapters X and XI.
The property rights of married women are dealt with 
in part four. In chapter XII, women’s property rights during 
marriage are discussed, while in chapter XIII, their rights 
of succession to property are examined.
Part five is the concluding part.
The research methods embraced intensive reading in 
the relevant libraries and archives in London and Nigeria, 
supplemented by six months of field-work in selected areas of 
Nigeria.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1. The Nature and Scope of the Thesis
A. The statement of the problem
The main purpose of this study was to collect and 
collate the relevant evidence of the legal status of Nigerian 
women in relation to marriage and family life. This involved 
four subsidiary tasks:-
(I) to present and analyse evidence of the legal status of
Nigerian women in marriage in the "traditional"^ society;
(II) to examine the changes wrought on the traditional status
of women in marriage by the impact of two world religions -
Islam and Christianity - each with its peculiar laws of
marriage, and mode of social conduct;
(III) to examine the effects of colonization, urbanisation, and
industrialization, and the consequent changes in the
2traditional patterns of society;
(IV) to set up criteria for the evaluation of the present
legal status of Nigerian women in marriage, taking 
cognizance of inequalities of status vis-a-vis the 
position of Nigerian men, and also as compared with 
women in other countries;
1. As used in this thesis, "traditional" generally refers to 
the historical period before 1900. Traditional institutions 
laws, and relationships are, however, found existing at the 
present time with little or no change in certain rural 
communities, and often underlie the pattern of living of 
many urban societies. Where information refers to the past 
only, this is indicated by the use of the past tense in the 
text; otherwise "traditional" includes the pattern of 
society still existing in most rural areas of Nigeria.
2. "Industrialization" is a term conveying in general terms 
the growth in a society mainly agrarian, of modern industry
- footnote continued
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(V) to evaluate the status of Nigerian women according to
the criteria proposed and to draw conclusions therefrom.
B . The purpose of the investigation
D. Amaury-Talbot, the wife of the administrative
officer P. Amaury-Talbot, who worked in Southern Nigeria, wrote
of Ibibio women of the former Eastern -Region of Nigeria, in
the first decade of the present century. Commenting on the
"vexed question of the hour" she stated that
"whether we sympathise with or decry the feminist 
movement, the fact remains that, for good or ill, 
a spirit of restlessness has swept over the women 
of the world. A stirring and quickening has come 
to them, rousing a consciousness of power long latent 
which, rightly directed, may suffice to destroy pit­
falls and sweep clean those foul places which now 
surround the path of the poor and weak, but which, 
wrongly guided might lead along unlovely roads to 
sex antagonism and barren hate."^
More than fifty years later, the same "vexed question", engaged
the.' attention of the international community, and led Janeway
to remark that
"the division of the world by sexes, challenged a 
century or more ago by the militants of the first
Footnote continued from previous page:
with all its attendant circumstances and problems, economic 
and social, while "urbanization" may denote a diffusion of the 
influences of urban centres to a rural hinterland - A Dictionary 
of the Social Sciences. Urbanization is traditional among certain 
Nigerian communities, for example, the Yorubas, see William 
Bascom, "Urbanization Among the Yoruba". The American Journal 
of Sociology, 1955, No. LX, pp. 446-54. In this thesis "urban­
ization" implies a complex process of social change character­
ized by the creation of large urban centres, migration from 
rural areas, and the settlement of workers in towns, with a 
relatively higher material standard of living especially in 
the provision of pipe-borne water, electricity, etc., while 
"industrialization" is a term covering in general terms, the 
growth, in a society mainly agrarian, of modern industry, with 
all its attendant circumstances and problems, economic and social, 
see D.C.Coleman, "Industrialization", A Dictionary of the Social 
Sciences, Tavistock Publications, 1964, Akin L. Mabogunje, 
Urbanization in Nigeria, (London: University of London Press Ltd. 
1968), pp. 33-^3.
1. D. Amaury-Talbot, Woman1s Mysteries of a Primitive People:
The Ibibios of Southern Nigeria, (London: Frank Cass and 
Co. Ltd., 1915, new imp. 1966;, p. 239.
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wave of feminism, still endures and what’s more 
still prevails in spite of new attacks upon it.”^
These are two of the many opinions on the contin­
uation of what has unquestionably been the longest struggle 
(the slowest revolution?) known to mankind. The two statements 
may be contrasted with that made by Evans-Pritchard, the 
renowned anthropologist, who was convinced that the eternal 
question of women’s inequality was no longer with us. This 
belief led him to make the following statement:
’’Gone also are the days of vigorous feminism and anti­
feminism which formed part of that battle in which the 
protagonists of all so-called progressive movements and 
their opponents were mixed up in a general melee. Can 
any younger person today read Virginia Woolf’s 
Three Guineas without wondering what could have been the 
cause of so much indignation? Surely, these are, as 
Mrs. Fawcett says in her autobiography, ’issues which
are dead and gone’. The way is now cleared for a consider­
ation of how women’s position in society varies... with 
types of culture and social structure without having to 
take up the cudgels on behalf of anybody or anything."2
This statement smacks of male chauvinism, and demonstrates the
attitude of men generally to the feminist movement. It is ironic
that the lecture in which this sentiment was expressed was
Q
being delivered in honour of a leading feminist of her day.
History has proved Evans-Pritchard wrong, and less 
than twenty years after he had sung its valediction the ’’question’’ 
has been resuscitated from the coma into which it had fallen
due to the cataclysm of two world wars, to become one of the
most important issues of the 1970s.
The importance of the study of women’s position 
in society is evidenced by the fact that the United Nations, 
in response to the legitimate yearnings of women, declared 1975 
as the year for all countries to Join in working to promote the 
status of women throughout the world - ’’International Women’s 
Year” .
1. Elizabeth Janeway, Man’s World: Woman’s Place: A Study in 
Social Mythology, ('London: Penguin Books, 1977), p.9
2. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Position of Women in Primitive 
Societies and Other Essays in Social Anthropology, (London: 
Faber and Faber Ltd., 1965), p.AO.
3. "The Fawcett Lecture”, 1955-6 delivered on 25 October 19559 
at Bedford College, University of London in honour of the 
memory of Mrs. Millicent Garrett Fawcett.
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As In the case of women from other, countries, the 
position of African women in.marriage and the. family has for 
hiore- thari two - centuries'’"been a topic' of controversy. Basically, 
there are two diametrically opposite schools of thought.
The first, and perhaps more voluble school regards 
African women as little better than the slaves of their men­
folk, especially their husbands, creatures to be bought and 
sold at the whim and caprice of father and husband; household 
drudges devoid of their own opinions, or unable to express them 
even if they exist.
Thus Basden, a former missionary in the service of 
the C.M.S. at Onitsha for seventeen years, says of the Igbo 
wife:
11A wife ordinarily has no rights, either over herself 
or her possessions, not excluding her children. She is 
part and parcel of her husband's property”. ^
He makes no distinction between the position of a female slave
and that of a wife for he states that
"A woman in a state of slavery, whether by birth, capture 
or purchase is in a very unenviable position... Bond and
free have but one characteristic in common, viz. they are
the burden-bearers of the country. Women have but few 
rights in any circumstances, and can only hold such 
property as their lords permit.’^
The protagonists of the opposite school forcibly 
maintain that the position of the African woman before she 
became the victim of colonization, with its evil influences 
and innovations, was an enviable and traditionally honoured
one. In many cases the African woman, it is argued, tradition­
ally possessed equal rights with African men, legal rights 
which remained fond dreams of their European counterparts.
1. G.T.Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, (London: Prank Cass 
and Co. Ltd., 1921, new imp. 19bo), p.32
2. Ibid., p. 88. See also Mary H. Kingsley, West African 
Studies, (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1899)* p.^39;
”the rule of a husband over his wife is likened to that of 
a constitutional monarch, that of a man or woman over a 
slave to that of an absolute monarch”; and William P. 
Livingstone, Mary Slessor of Calabar, 10th edition,(London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), p.221; ”women have no proper 
status in the community being simply the creatures of man 
to be exploited and degraded - his labourer, his drudge, 
the carrier of his kernels and oil, the boiler of his nuts” .
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In spite of its erosion, this school maintains, her position 
continues to be an exalted one and calls for no liberation.
. \ Thus-Bas den's-"view of'.the Igbo woman may be directly- contrasted
with that of Horton who wrote in 1868:
"Among the Egboes [Igbos] women hold a very superior 
rank in the social scale; they are not regarded, as among 
other heathen tribes, as an inferior creation and doomed 
to perpetual degradation, but occupy their 1 rightful 
status in societyT"
Similarly,Uchendu, writing a century'later, in 1965, notes:
"The African woman regarded as a chattel of her husband, 
who has made a bridewealth payment on her account, is 
not an Igbo woman, who enjoys a high socioeconomic and 
legal status. She can leave her husband at will, abandon 
him if he becomes a thief, and summon him to a tribunal, 
where she will get a fair hearing.. She marries in her 
own right and manages her trading capital and her profits 
as she sees fit."2
Thus the verbal battle has been endlessly pursued by 
various writers - anthropologists, lawyers, missionaries, 
administrative officers - and similar partisans - as to the 
status of African women. Most of the. arguments with reference 
to the legal status of African women in general, and Nigerian 
women in particular, have been largely assertions and counter- 
assertions of opinions, generously spiced with sentiments.
Not many are based on ascertained facts. The biblical Israel­
ites were unable to make bricks without straw. Similarly, any 
scientific conclusion must be based on an examination of adequate 
relevant facts.
Here the student of African law is confronted with her 
first major difficulty - the obvious lack of material on which 
any valid assessment can be based. This problem is acute in 
the areas of African customary law.
1. James Africanus Horton, West African Countries and Peoples, 
1868, with an introduction by George Shepperson(Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1969),p.l56.
2. Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria,(New York; 
Holt,Rinehart and Winston, 1965)>p.87.
BLifiSj
3. T.O.OlawaleA The Nature of African Customary Law,(Manchester: 
Manchester IJniversity Press, 1956, 3rd imp. 1972),p. 1
54
The problem assumes double dimensions when the African law in
question relates to a study of women. There has traditionally
been a dearth of. academic literature on •••the position: of- all
women. - '
In 1 9 5 5 Evans-Pritchard was unable to find any book
which could be regarded as a sociological study of the status of
1 2women in modern English society. McGregor was emphatic that 
no such book existed at that time. The position has improved 
considerably within the last few decades, so much so that Read , 
writing in 1963 on ’’Women Status and Law Reform”, found a "spate 
of literature" specifically concerned with the status of women. 
The fact remains, however, that there are many areas relating 
to women which are still virgin fields for research. This is 
particularly true of African women, although they too have 
received a share of the general upsurge of writings on women.
It is appropriate here to review the motley crowd who 
have contributed to writings on Nigerian women.
First in the field are the writings of travellers and 
explorers, who, according to Jeal , wrote books for public 
entertainment and, "while they made the public gasp with 
stupefaction at the hilarious absurdity, barbarity or pure 
nonsense of native customs", were "worse than useless for a 
reader wanting to discover more about the African way of life". 
He accused Mungo Park and others of using native customs out of 
context simply as extravaganzas - "vignettes of local colour to 
add spice to already spicy stories".
There may be more than a grain of truth in this 
^criticism; nevertheless, these writings are important, and
1. See Evans-Pritchard, 1965, op.cit., pp. 43-44.
2. 0 .R.McGregor, "The Social Position of Women in England, 
1850-1914: A Biography", The British Journal of Sociology, 
1955, Vol. 6,pp. 48-60 at pp. 48-50.
3. See James S. Read, "Women Status and Law Reform" in Changing 
Law in Developing Countries, edited by J.N.O.Anderson, 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), pp.210-39 at p.210 Cf. 
Virginis Woolf, A Room of One’s Own, (London: Hogarth Press, 
1931), P. 63.
4. Jim Jeal, Livingstone. (London: Book Club Associates, 1973), 
p.4l; See William Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of 
the Coast of Guinea, Divided into the Gold, the Slave and
cont. overleaf.
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generations of students have benefitted from them. In most 
cases, they are the only evidence of the social life of the 
people at the relevant period.
Next in line were the missionaries. Their books were
less dramatic, and perhaps more authentic, since in most cases
they had lived in close proximity to the people over prolonged
periods. The missionaries have made a vital contribution
towards the elevation of womenrs status, especially in the field
of education, and marital life, and for this reason, if for no
other, their writings form a valuable contribution. Unfortunately,
the importance of their contributions is often clouded by the
unflagging but misdirected zeal with which they often pursued
their main purpose in life - to convert the heathen African.
They thought that the best way of achieving this aim was to
stress and exaggerate the alleged depravity of native life.
Africans were invariably described as "congenital indolent liars"
whose nudity and tribal customs were barbarous and who treated
their women as beasts of burden. According to Jeal:
"even those missionaries who retained their philanthropic 
love for the rnoble savage1, and managed to some extent 
to continue to love the man while hating his habits, 
were inevitably patronizing”. ^
The colonial administrator, of whom O.K. Meek and 
P. Amaury-Talbot were prototypes, also contributed to our 
knowledge of Nigerian women. Their efforts were sparked off 
belatedly by a growing appreciation in Europe of the value of 
a systematic study of social factors as a basis for legislative 
and administrative action. The projection of this conception 
from the domestic field into that of colonial policy resulted 
in a series of studies and surveys which could generally be 
described as fragmentary and pragmatic.
Footnote 4 continued from previous page:
the Ivory Coasts,1705,(Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 4th edition, 1967)3 
p. 117: "The Negroes are all without exception Crafty, Villanous, 
and Fraudulent, and very seldom to be trusted”.
1. Jeal, Livinstone, 1973* p. 53.
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The colonial administrators, in order, to achieve 
their goal, elicited the aid of trained social anthropologists.
The- latter, ■having entered the-field relatively ■ late;>■ made 
strenuous efforts to compensate for lost time by hyper­
productivity.
Undoubtedly, excellent monographs on the laws and 
customs of the people were produced by colonial anthropologists, 
but much of their contribution was overshadowed by the sense of 
racial superiority evidenced by such emotive terms as 
"primitive", an ambiguous term which meant Simple*, pre- 
technical, exotic or strange in European eyes (implying a 
judgement of African societies as being somehow morally inferior). 
As a result of this, says Shorter, "anthropology received a bad 
name after political independence". ^
Last, but by no means least, are the works, of 
educated Nigerians in various fields.
Unfortunately, not much information about women can 
be gleaned from most of these writings. The information given,
if any, is fragmentary, limited in scope and variable in
reliability. In vital areas, information is largely non-existent, 
thus rendering any conclusion thereon suspect. Information on 
the status of women generally can only be gleaned from the 
scientific writings here and there of a handful of anthropolo­
gists, missionaries, and, to a lesser extent, lawyers. In 
most cases, the activities, rights and duties of women have 
been subordinated to preoccupation with the activities and 
affairs of the ruling oligarchy - men.
Kessler notes that "male activities which constitute 
the public life of the culture, are more visible to the
anthropologist, and are thus more likely to be documented than
2the private domain in which women carry on their activities".
1. Aylward Shorter, African Culture and the Christian Church:
An Introduction to Social and Pastoral Anthropology, (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1973), p.4. *
2. Evelyn Kessler, Women: An Anthropological View, (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976) p.9. '
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Ardener suggests that the reason for the lack of Information
on women is that "no anthropological book with women in the
title sells".1
Whatever the reason may be for the lack of information
on women, the fact remains that although a voluminous literature
exists on the Nigerian peoples, references to women as such
are incidental, necessary but insignificant adjuncts to the
discussions of, and about men.
In the field of law, no substantial work has been
published on Nigerian women. There are two articles on the
legal status of Moslem women in the Northern States, which deal
2
only with women under Islamic law. There is also an unpublished
Q
dissertation on "Women’s Rights in Property in Nigerian Law".
It is in the absence of any comprehensive previous 
study of the legal status of Nigerian women in marriage, therefore, 
that the present work finds its justification.
C . The scope of the thesis
The focus of this study is limited to the legal status
It
as defined below of Nigerian women in marriage only. The-
relationships between the spouses, and to a lesser extent, the
relationships between them and their families are dealt with.
Not everything legal is dealt with, and other aspects of
women’s status, such as political, economic, educational or
social, are not examined, except in so far as they are directly
5
relevant to women’s legal status in marriage.
1. Edwin Ardener, "The Problem Revisited", in Perceiving Women, 
edited by Shirley Ardener,(London: Malaby Press, 1975),p.20
2. See Ma’aji Asa Shani, "The Status of Muslim Women in the 
Northern States of Nigeria", Journal of the Centre of Islamic 
Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No.2,pp.39-52; and Muhammad Yahaya, 
"The Legal Status of Moslem Women in the Northern States of 
Nigeria", Journal of the Centre of Islamic Legal Studies,
Vol. 1, No.2, pp. 1-38.
3. See J.O.Akande, "Women’s Rights in Property in Nigerian Law", 
(Master’s thesis, Lagos University, 1968).
4. See below p. 102.
5. See further below, p-; 103.
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Lowie^has correctly pointed out that the treatment
of women in society is one thing, their legal status in that
society another, while the character and extent of their labours
belong to a distinct category. Whatever correlations exist
between any of these aspects are empirical. Conceptually they
are diverse, and, very often, diametrically opposite. For
example, in Elizabethan England, married women, distinctly
2
subordinate to men in legal rights to property , or in political 
■5
status , nevertheless received considerable repect from their 
menfolk, especially among the upper classes.
The thesis concentrates on the legal position of women 
in relation to the formation, duration, dissolution and 
incidents of marriage. The current dispute regarding women’s  ^
marital roles is analysed in terms of the traditional marital 
relationship, in order to discover-to what extent the relation­
ship has been changed by the introduction of new forms of 
marriage laws, and by social modernization. It examines in 
detail womenTs status in the three types of marriages legally 
recognised in Nigeria - marriages according to customary law, 
Islamic law,and under the Nigerian Marriage Act . (or marriages
c
recognized in Nigerian law as valid, monogamous marriages).
1. Robert H. Lowie, Primitive Society, (London: Routledge and 
Sons Ltd., 1921, 2nd imp. 1929), p. 178.
2. See further, Chapter XII below; see also Courtney S. Kenny, 
The History of the Law of England as to the Effects of 
Marriage on Property and on the Wife's Legal Capacity, 
(London: Reeves and Turner, 1879).
3. Marian Ramelson, The Petticoat Rebellion: A Century of 
Struggle for Women’s Rights, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1967)7
4. Throughout this thesis the word "Act" replaces "Ordinance”
with reference to Federal Nigerian statutes in force in
1961, wherever the latter word was used prior to 1961; see
Designation of Ordinances Act, 1961, s.2(1); No. 57 of 1961,
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
5. Monogamous marriages contracted under the Nigerian Marriage 
Act, or recognized as valid marriages according to Nigerian 
law are referred to as "statutory marriages" throughout 
this thesis.
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With reference to customary law marriages, attention 
is focussed on the marriage laws which apply to a significant 
proportion of the population. Laws-which affect only- a very • 
small minority of Nigerian women have not been dealt with in 
any detail. This approach has been dictated by the impractic­
ability of dealing with all the diverse customary laws relating 
to marriage which obtain in the more than two hundred and fifty 
communities in Nigeria.^" Factors which influenced the choice
of communities for this study are stated in detail below, in
2the section dealing with the research methodology employed , 
but the general aim has been primarily to state the laws which 
govern the majority of women in Nigeria, and which can be 
considered fairly representative.
Two periods are covered in this research:-
(a) from the latter half of the nineteenth century to the end 
of the century, i.e. 1850-1900, herein referred to as the 
"historic” period; and
(b) from 1 January 1900,. to the present time: the modern period
The period 1850 was chosen, because it reveals the 
position of women, sufficiently unadulterated by Western foreign 
influence, to estimate their status in the society before the 
advent of colonization, but yet late enough to obtain reasonably 
reliable and adequate oral data. Relevant data culled from 
earlier literature has been included.
The second period heralded profound changes as it . 
introduced British jurisdiction, and with particular reference 
to the topic of this thesis, the years since 1900 introduced 
one of the most momentous changes - the introduction of English 
law and statutory marriage to other parts of the country besides 
Lagos and its environs, and other coastal areas.
1. See further below, pp. 78-79*
2. See below,pp. 62-66.
3. English law was introduced into some parts of the country 
before 1900. It was formally introduced into Lagos from 
4 March 1863 by Ordinance No. 3 of 1863*
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In addition to the introduction of English law and 
a new type of marriage, the structural transformation of the 
. Nigerian society resulting, from colonial r u l e i n c r e a s e d .urban­
ization, industrialization, religious and educational changes, 
and other social factors also affected women*s status.
D. Methodology
Phase One
This phase involved nine months of intensive reading 
in the relevant libraries in London, during which opportunity 
was taken to peruse books, reports, articles, documents, etc. 
written by travellers, missionaries, government officials, 
social anthropologists, lawyers, historians and others, for 
information relating to the status of Nigerian women.
Opportunity was also taken during this period to read 
all relevant reported cases decided in the Supreme Court, and 
the High Courts of Nigeria, which were available in the libraries 
in London.
Archival work in the Public Record Office in London 
yielded valuable information on the status of women before 1900, 
and during the early colonial period. The most valuable 
information obtained here was the correspondence between the 
administrators in the Gold Coast Colony (Ghana and Lagos) and 
the Colonial Office in London, in relation to the Gold Coast 
Marriage Law. The correspondence contained in C.0.879/20 
revealed the historical antecedents of the Marriage Act, 1884; 
the present Marriage Act, 1914, of Nigeria is a facsimile of 
the Marriage Ordinance, 1884.
The reasons which prompted the enactment of the law,
and the views of the various administrators in London and the
Colony, as well as the comments thereon of the local communities, 
are of vital importance to any discussion of the Nigerian 
Marriage Act, and of statutory marriage as a whole.
Phase Two
To supplement the written materials, it was decided
to undertake fieldwork in Nigeria for a period of six months.
Fieldwork, a well-known method of investigation among 
social anthropologists, is relatively new to lawyers, who have 
been mainly content to peruse legal treatises, statutes, and
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judicial decisions in cloistered law chambers and libraries. 
This pattern of legal study has now been changed, and the legal 
profession generally, .agrees: that laws -are; not .divorced :from 
the society in which they operate.1 To promote a better under­
standing of the legal principles involved, the law as administ­
ered by the courts, and handed down in judicial decisions, must 
be viewed against the background of the law as actually 
practised by the communities concerned. For a valid analysis 
of certain aspects of law, for example, marriage, or the law 
of property, time needs to be spent in ascertaining the current 
operation of the law in society. In many cases, as will be
later seen, there are wide divergencies between the law as
2prescribed in legislation , or as enunciated by the courts, 
and the law as actually practised by the community. This 
phenomenon is especially apparent in the realm of customary 
law, which is mainly unwritten, and the determination of which 
can only be ascertained by the current practice of the majority 
of the particular society.
The courts enforce what they believe the law is, or 
should be, which may be very different from the actual law 
observed by the community.
1. See Pound^ Sociological Jurisprudence:(London: 1907), 
p. 615: "To this end it is the duty of teachers of law 
while they teach scrupulously the law that the courts 
administer, to teach it in the spirit and from the stand­
point of the political, economic and sociological learning 
of today. It is their task to create in this country, a 
true sociological jurisprudence, to develop a thorough 
understanding between the people and the law, to ensure 
that the common law remains what its exponents have always 
insisted it is - the custom of the people, the expression 
of their habits of thought and action as to the relations 
of men with each other."
2. In this repect, see the report of Alain Levasseur, "The 
Modernization of Law in Africa with particular reference 
to Family Law in the Ivory Coast" in Ghana and the Ivory 
Coas_t. edited by Philip Foster and A.R"! Zolberg, (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 116; family 
legislation decreed in 1964 (Law 64.375 etc., 7 October
1964) for the Ivory Coast failed completely in its purpose 
and became ffantasy lawT because the people ignored its . 
provisions. See also Marlene Dobkin, "Colonialism and 
the Legal Status of Women in Francophonic Africa",31 
Cahiers d fEtudes Africalnes. Vol. 8, 1968,pp. 390-405.
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In a study of this kind, it is important not only 
to determine what the law is, or what the actual practices of 
the^ . people are,. but as far as. possible;, also to, ascertain the 
society's views as to what the law should be in the future, 
since law is never static/
It was with these aims in mind that a period of 
fieldwork was planned, embracing investigation in selected 
areas in Nigeria. It was important to study the majority of 
Nigerian women, and for this reason Igbo, Yoruba and Moslem 
areas were chosen. The Igbos, Yorubas, and the three main 
Moslem communities - the Hausas, Pulanis and Kanuris - together 
accounted for 67 per cent of the population in 1953 and 70.5 
per cent in 1963.1 The Igbo town of Onitsha, Ibadan, a Yoruba 
town, and Maiduguri, a predominantly Kanuri town, were chosen 
for visits, (see Map 1)
Why were these particular places chosen?
(a) Onitsha was chosen mainly for personal reasons. Onitsha 
is the hometown of my husband and it was envisaged that I would 
be given maximum help by his relatives and friends there, since, 
following the Nigerian custom, I am considered to be the wife 
of every Onitsha indigene, young or old, male or female. This 
hope was realized, and, had it not been for this fact,'it would 
have been almost impossible to obtain information from the 
Onitshas, a rather proud and conservative people, in the 
relatively short period of time available. Often my visit 
received cold courtesy, even bordering on courteous antagonism, 
which quickly evaporated and was replaced by profuse shouts of 
"anon" ("welcome") when my identity was disclosed.
Additionally, Onitsha is a large market town (reputed 
to have one of the largest markets in West Africa), and had 
been one of the first places to be "christianised" among the 
Igbo communities. The indigenous population live in villages 
in the older part of the town, which existed before the advent
1. See Population Census of Nigeria, 1952-19533 Summary Tables, 
p.7; North, p. 26; East, pp7l8-19; West,p.l8; and Population 
Census of Nigeria 1963, Vol. 3* p. 10.
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of Europeans. The fieldwork was carried out in two of these 
villages, Umudei and Ogboli.
(b) The situation of the oldest Nigerian university, and the 
National archives made Ibadan an obvious choice. Ibadan also 
has several Customary Courts including a Customary Cour-c of 
Appeal. In addition, it is the largest town in West Africa,
and its women are fairly representative of Yoruba women in the
Southern States.
(c) MaidugUri was chosen for several reasons:
(i) it is one of the oldest Islamic communities in Northern 
Nigeria.
(ii) in spite of this, the Kanuri, who dominate this town,
are not as well-documented as other Moslem groups, for example,
the Hausas or the Fulanis.
(iii) the town has a Sharia Court of Appeal, and a University.
(iv) my curiosity was aroused by the following description
of Kanuri women given by Migeod, who spent twenty-five years
in Africa in order to make ethnological studies of the African
peoples. He wrote of Kanuri women in 1923:^
n... it is important to note that Kanuri women have 
always been independent. Leo Africanus went so far 
as to say the Bornuese had their wife in common.
Shehu Lamino tried to coerce them into more seemly
behaviour, but had to drop it. There is a Sudan
proverb that the wiles of women are ninety-and-nine, 
and if there be another Satan alone knows it. The 
maker of the proverb must have had Bornu women in 
his mind. There is said by the surrounding peoples 
to be nothing of a carnal nature that the Bornu women 
do not know and practise. Such past-masters naturally 
have an independent spirit."
I was intrigued by this description and wanted to know something
more of these women who had been subjected to centuries of
Islamic law influence, and who could still be described thus.
The opportunity to see whether they had changed or not, simply
could not be missed.
1. William H. Migeod, Through Nigeria to Lake Chad,(London: 
Heath Cranton Ltd., 1924), p.111.
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(d) Lastly, but by no means least, I knew a few officials
in, Maiduguri,.a very important consideration when a Christian
woman intends t o •Interview Moslem wdmen on such a sensitive '
topic as marriage.’*'
Although short visits of one week’s duration were
paid to three other areas, they were not originally planned,
but were dictated by events in the field, (see Map 1)
During the fieldwork in Onitsha, non-Onitsha-Igbos
alleged that Onitsha is not a typical Igbo town, and that the
laws of the people are not representative of Igbo customary 
2
laws. It was also claimed that, because of the relatively 
low dowry paid for an Onitsha wife, the marital relationship 
is not very stable and that an Onitsha woman usually terminates 
her marriage at the slightest provocation. I therefore decided 
to visit two remote Igbo ruralJ villages in Nsukka, where 
traditional family life has remained relatively intact, in 
order to draw comparisons. It may be noted here that as far 
as marriage laws are concerned, the allegations proved untrue, 
as will be seen later.
I was also advised to visit Eket, an extremely rural 
Ibibio area. Books were written by the well-known ethnographer
-1. Even with official help, I had to wait for one week before
I was given a permit, issued from the Governor’s office, to 
conduct interviews with the people. Once this permit was 
granted, however, considerable assistance and encouragement 
were given, and grateful thanks are hereby recorded to all 
the parties concerned.
2. Smock states that in the mid-1930s, many groups, especially 
those of Onitsha, Arochuku and Oguta rejected the name Ibo
as applying to themselves; see Audrey C. Smock, Ibo Politics: 
The Role of Ethnic Unions in Eastern Nigeria, (Harvard 
University Press, 1971),p.B; see also Austin J. Shelton,
The Igbo-Igala Borderland» (New York: University of New York 
PressJ 1971),p.7.
3. About 90 per cent of the reported population of Nigeria
lived in rural areas in 1953, and 85 per cent in 1963. In
the 1963 Census an urban area was defined as one with a
population of 20,000 or more inhabitants - see The Population 
Census of Nigeria 1963, Vol. 3, Preface: last paragraph.
65
MAP 1
STATES 1976= SHOWING AREAS OF FIELD WORK
( KANO STATE 
i -Z'
f 1-
— • KADUNA STATE / /  <
S-') S) *0 ft DAIIPUI CTATP 1
. n r- v
NIGER STATE ^
^v-. ( ^  J \ >
r  I FC.T. /  PLATEAU STATE
SOKOTO STATE BORNO STATE ^
Maiduguri
KWARA U 
STATE \ v
v - ^  GONGOLA 
STATE
 ..s’*'.OYO STATE ✓ I
Ibadan • v
it ! ONDO r >
1 ,  STATE j
OGUN
BENUE STATE 
Nsukka
r\S. BENDEL \ STATE
Onitsna
./I nlSUiftTva fif ^ w ^  y —i «II . ^
Ca n a m b r a '  '
STATE/N £
f  PC.T : FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
IMO 1  
t. STATE . <*> .
•X-6> 1 L ★  AREAS OF FIELD WORK
, Calabar "
RIVERS STATE
66
and colonial administrator Amaury-Talbot and his wife^ about
the women in Eket. It was. envisaged that useful comparisons
might be-made between the marital status of women when they
wrote, at the beginning of the century and at the present time.
My weekTs stay in Eket revealed major differences
between the laws of Eket and another Ibibio group, the Efik of
Calabar. Several Eket informants pointed out these differences.
For example, whereas Eket women do not inherit their deceased
father's property, if he dies intestate, Efik daughters share
equally with sons, and may even become heads of families, an
impossible eventuality among the Eket or Igbo people. Another
2attraction was the fact that Mary Slessor , the famous feminist, 
had devoted her life to the improvement of Calabar women.
Calabar was one of the first places to be "christianised” and 
useful comparisons could be drawn between the women there and 
Pnitsha women.
1. Several people interviewed in Eket remembered Talbot, but 
unfortunately, no-one could remember his wife. Informants 
remembered Talbot with hostility. They said he had slapped 
a native Chief, who had tried to explain that a boy whom 
Talbot alleged had taken a shot at him, was. only aiming at 
birds with his slinging shot. The boy had been up a tree 
and had not seen him passing. The people of Eket instituted 
a civil action against Talbot in the Calabar Court for this 
outrage, but dropped the action when he agreed to pay 
compensation to the Chief. Because of this incident, it 
was alleged he did not stay long in the Eket area.
(Recorded interview with Chief Atai, Ndon Afaha, held on
16 August, 19779 at his home in Eket.)
2. Mary Slessor arrived in Calabar in 1876, and devoted her 
life to the improvement of women's status in many different 
parts of the Cross River, including Calabar and Okonyong. 
Because of her influence in Okonyong, she was appointed 
Vice-Consul for Okonyong by Sir MacDonald. She was Customary 
Court Judge in Calabar, and the Court she used, as well as 
many of the other buildings she erected, are still used 
today. Her-memory is revered by Calabar people, both men 
and women - for a full length biography see Mary Slessor
of Calabar, (W.P. Livingstone, 1918, 4th edition 1935; 
see also,Carol Christian and Gladys Plummer, God and One 
Redhead: Mary Slessor of Calabar, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1970), and the official tribute paid to her 
memory in the Nigeria Gazette, 21 January 1915 5 reproduced 
in Allan Burns, History of Nigeria,7th edition, (London:" 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 10th imp. 1969)3p.268.
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Two weeks were spent in Lagos, but this was for the 
purpose of collection national statistics, and recording 
unreported decisions of the Lagos High Courts and the Supreme 
Court situated there.
No systematic pattern was maintained, nor could it 
be maintained, during fieldwork, since each area presented 
different opportunities, but the following methods were used 
in each of the main areas visited and, to a lesser extent, in 
the other minor areas:
(a) Visits to courts: visits to courts ranked high among the 
priorities in every area visited, especially visits to 
Customary Courts.^- Decisions of Customary Courts are not 
reported, and opportunity was therefore taken to obtain as 
many Customary Court decisions as possible.
(b) Interviews: Interviews formed a major part of the field­
work in each area, except Lagos. The persons interviewed were 
chosen mainly on account of their ages, preference being given 
to older people; and their sex; women being preferred to men.
The aim of these interviews was to verify or contra­
dict, as far as possible, statements made by early writers.
Many of the older people interviewed had actually experienced 
some of the laws recorded as existing before 1900, and were 
therefore able to give personal experience of the operation of 
these laws in the society, and the changes which had taken place. 
For example, a 104-years-old Eket informant recalled the 
punishment which had been given to men who committed adultery 
when she was a young girl, and the effect such punishment had on 
the morality of the people. Laws and traditions handed down 
to them by their parents were also valuable in estimating the 
position of women in the traditional society.
Interviews with most of the older people were tape- 
recorded. They were given an opportunity to relate their 
marital history, prompted by relevant questions. Wherever 
necessary local interpreters were employed.
1. For a brief description and jurisdiction ot the various 
courts in Nigeria see below, Chapter II, pp. 157-161..
)
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(c) Questionnaires: In addition to personal interviews,
questionnaires, were distributed to literate, persons, mainly 
students: from universities, training colleges,.and colleges . 
of technology. Research assistants were employed in Onitsha, 
Ibadan, and Maiduguri to interview illiterate persons, using 
the questionnaire for this purpose. Most of the older people 
whose marital history was used for statistical purposes, were 
interviewed by this method. Their answers were recorded in the 
questionnaires by the interviewers.
One of the main purposes of the questionnaires was to 
obtain information as to the role society expects women to 
play in marriage in future, the type of marriage that is 
considered most suitable for Nigeria, and how best to ensure 
marital stability. Many of the questions were therefore 
designed, not only to show what the position of women was in 
the traditional society, or to what it is at present, but as a 
sort of opinion poll intended to mirror the views of the 
society as to the future. The views of the younger generation 
in this repect are most important.^
(d) Primary and Secondary schools in Enugu, Calabar, and 
Maiduguri were visited. The children were asked to write essays 
on the status of women in Nigeria. In most cases their 
answers were interesting and revealed careful thought. 
Discussions with teachers in and out of school were also held 
wherever possible.
(e) Interviews were held with village chiefs, native rulers, 
and other people knowledgeable about the customary laws of 
their areas, in order to determine whether the rules of law 
gleaned from decided court cases accorded with the practice 
of the people in the various societies. Opportunity was taken 
at these interviews to pose, for solution, controversial 
questions of law selected from the literature and decided cases.
1. See further Chapter XIV, pp. 512-51^.
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(f) Newspapers, both current and. filed, were read, and items 
of interest extracted. The opinion columns were particularly 
useful., in this respect
Statistics were collected from the newspapers of 
changes of names by women1, and letters of administration 
granted to wives in relation to the estate of their deceased 
husbands.
(g) Popular literature, such as novels, plays and short stories
written by local authors were read. Onitsha market literature
which is dominated by non-professional writers, was especially
useful in revealing the popular culture of the people.
p(h) Social Welfare Departments. Visits were paid to the 
Social Welfare Departments of every area visited, except Lagos.
Among the social services rendered by these 
Departments is "Matrimonial Conciliation and Family Casework", 
in which the traditional methods of arbitration and reconcil­
iation in family affairs are adopted by specially trained 
Social Welfare Officers. Although their statutory authority 
is limited to the welfare of children and young persons under 
the Children and Young Persons Act, 19^6^ ,these Departments 
deal with the victims of marital conflict, both old and young, 
especially where the welfare of children is involved. They
1. See Chapter VII below, p. 551.
2. In 19^1, a report was made to the Nigerian Government on the 
need for systematic treatment of young offenders, by 
organised social case work. On the adoption of this report 
by Government in 19^2, a Social Welfare Officer was appointed 
but the scope of his activities was limited to Lagos Colony. 
Following the enactment of the Children and Young Persons 
Act, 19^3, the services were extended to the North, East
and West and were much improved. In 1953-56, each Regional 
Government set up its own Department of Social Welfare 
Services - see Annual Report of the Department of Social 
Welfare Services, Western Region (including Lagos) 1953-5^> 
pp. 1-2; Annual Report of the Social Welfare Department of 
the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1955-56; Policy for Local 
Government - Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1956, Sessional Paper 
No. 2 of 1956 and the recommendationsof the Ashridge 
Conference on Social Development, August 1951.
3. Cap. 32, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958; and 
similar statutes of the same title for other parts of 
Nigeria.
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handle cases of deserted or deserting wives., neglected widows, 
paternity disputes, and marital disputes generally. Where 
reconciliation is possible, attempts" are made to effect this, ■ 
often with the aid of the village chief or extended family of 
the spouse concerned. Where reconciliation is impossible, the 
Social Welfare Officers concentrate on making the best possible 
arrangements for the children concerned,in order to prevent 
delinquency. They may enforce maintenance payments for 
children by resort to the courts.
The files of cases they have dealt with provide a 
mine of information on the laws and social practices of the 
different communities, and reveal to a greater extent than 
court cases, the position of the ordinary women in marriage 
and family life. Women who cannot afford the expense of a 
court action increasingly resort to the Social Welfare 
Departments for assistance with their marital problems.
2. The Historical Background
A. History of Nigeria
(I) Introductory
The Portuguese were the first European explorers to 
land in what is now Nigeria. They made their first appearance 
there in 1472. For the next three hundred years, traders from 
various nations visited the area, but no settlements were made, 
the chief purpose of the visits being trade in human cargo.^ 
After the abolition of the slave trade in 1807^,
1. See Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria, 4th edition, 
(London: Faber and Faber,1978), pp.49-58; A.F.C. Ryder,
"Dutch Trade on the Niger Coast during the Seventeenth 
Century",3»Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria,
1965, No.2,pp.197-98; Colonial Report, 1953»P*132;
K. Onwuka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 
1830-1885,(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), Chapter I.
2. The slave trade was abolished by Denmark in 1802; by Britain 
in 1807; U.S.A. 1808; Sweden, 1813; Netherlands, 1814; see 
Crowder, op. cit., p. 100; Burns, History of Nigeria, op.cit. 
p. 77.
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British influence progressed steadily, not only on the coast­
line between Lagos and Calabar, but gradually into, the interior 
as well. • By the exertions- of Mungo Park, Richard Lander,
Dr. Barth, and numerous other explorers, many of whom lost their 
lives in the attempt, the course of the Niger and the existence 
of the Pulani kingdom in the interior became known. By i860, 
trade was established along the banks of the rivers Niger and 
Benue.^
2
At this time, of course, Nigeria did not exist.
What existed was a multiplicity of tribal groups living in semi­
isolation in various parts of the country at different levels of 
cultural attainment and with different political systems.
British influence was established.and consolidated in 
jthree main areas, each under a different kind of administration.
"1. See Mungo Park, Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa, 
(London: 1799); Crowder, op.cit., pp.106-36; Richard Lander, 
Records of Captain Clappertonfs Last Expedition to Africa, 
(London: 1830, Vol.l; Richard Lander and John Lander,
Journals of an Expedition to Explore the Course and Termin­
ation of the Niger, (London: 1832); A.P. Mockler-Ferryman, 
British West Africa, (London: 1900),pp.120-93•
2. The name "Nigeria" was allegedly coined for the agglomera­
tion of pagan and Mohammedan States which were previously 
under the Royal Niger Company between the Western Sudan and 
the Bight of Benin, by Flora Shaw, who afterwards became 
Lady Lugard, in a letter she wrote to the London Times(8 
January 1897), see Nigeria Handbook,1926, Chapter 1; James 
S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965),p.44; 
Kirk-Greene,"Who coined the Name Nigeria?", West Africa,
22 December 1956; but see S.I. Edokpayi, "The Name Nigerian" 
West Africa, 16 March 1957, who argues that the word 
"Nigeria" had in fact been used in 1859-60, by William Cole 
in his "Journal of an African Timber Trader of Life in the 
Niger", and that it was Saunders Otley and Company of 
London who first gave press publication in 1862 to the word 
"Nigeria".
3. See Burns, History of Nigeria, 1969, pp. 24-64; Colonial 
Report, 1953,pp. 135-38; Crowder, 1978, op.cit., p.139;
Thomas Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical 
Anthology, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), ppl-6;
John Hatch, Nigeria: A History, (London: Heinemann Educational 
Books, 1971) pp.10-16, 17-76.
72
These were:
(a) the colony of Lagos under the control of the Colonial 
•Office;
(b) the Niger Coast Protectorate under the Foreign Office;
(c) the Royal Niger CompanyTs sphere of administration.^"
(II) The Colony of Lagos
With the decline of the slave trade after 1807, the
traffic in palm oil and other tropical products rapidly
increased, and the visits of naval ships, and later of the
British Consul at Fernando Po, gave the British considerable
prestige and influence among the tribes inhabiting the
2
Nigerian coastline.
In 1851, British support was given to the exiled
king of Lagos, who, in return, pledged himself to abolish the
slave trade in Lagos, which was at that time, the chief slave
■3
market in West Africa. Finding himself powerless against the
slave-dealing faction, his son, King D^cerno of Lagos, ceded
the territory to the British in 1861, and the British Colony
4
of Lagos came into being the following year.
1. Crowder, 1978, pp. 139-70; Burns, 1969, op_. cit. ,pp. 115 
et al.
2. See Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1956, 
Chapter III et al; Hope Masterton Waddell, Twenty-Nine 
Years in the West Indies and Central Africa: A Review of 
Missionary Work and Adventure 1829-1658, 2nd edition,
(1863,London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1970), Chapter XXI 
et al; C.W.Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and its Rulers, 
"[London: Oxford University Press, 1961) Chapters II and III; 
Crowder 1978, pp. 98-138, esp.p.125; Burns, History of 
Nigeria, 1969, p. 297.
3. Newbury, 1961, pp. 46-48.
4. See Treaties, 17 June and 19 July 1861, Hertslet, XI(1864), 
pp. 37-39; see also Parliamentary Papers, 1862: Papers 
relating to the Occupation of Lagos, LXI, p.339; Alan C. 
Burns, History of Nigeria, 6th edition (London: George Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 8th imp., 1963), p.126; T.O.Elias,Nigerian 
Land Law, 4th edition(1951, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., Sweet and Maxwell, 1971), p.2; Attorney General 
of Southern Nigeria v. John Holt [1910] 2 N.L.R.l; Amodu 
Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Province, [1921] 3, N.L.R.- 21; 
Oduntan Onisiwo v. Attorney General of Southern Provinces 
[1912J 2 N.L.R. 77.
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On 13 March 1862, a new entity officially called the 
"Settlement of Lagos" was established. On 19 February 1866, 
the Settlement of.Lagos was merged with Sierra Leone,,Gambia, 
and Gold Coast into what was known as the "West African Settle­
ment", having a separate Legislative Council, but subject to
r l
the Governor-in-Chief whose headquarters were at Sierra Leone.
This arrangement was changed on 24th July 1874 when a new
charter was issued separating the Gold Coast and Lagos from
the Government of Sierra Leone, and erecting them into one
colony under the name of the Gold Coast Colony, under a
Governor-in-Chief at the Gold Coast with an Administrator at
Lagos.^
On 13 January 1886, Lagos was separated from the
Gold Coast and established as an independent colony.
From the time of its cession in l86l, the boundaries
of the Colony of Lagos were gradually extended by further
cessions until the whole of Yorubaland, with the exception of
the Egba State, was attached to the Colony of Lagos as a
British Protectorate.^ In 1914^ this area too came unreservedly
4
under the Government of the Protectorate of Nigeria.
1. See J.J. Crooks, Records Relating to the Gold Coast Settle­
ments, from 1750 to 1874, (Dublin: Browne and Nolan Ltd., 
1923),P. 375.
2. Crooks, ibid. ,p. 539; See also Newbury, 1961, Chapter IV; 
Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas: From the 
Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protectorate, 
edited by 0. Johnson, (Lagos: C.S.S. Bookshops, 1921, re- 
print 1976), pp. 508 et_ al; Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 1976, 
pp.2-3.
3. For a useful account of these cessions, and the subsequent 
reaction of the various communities, see Johnson, History 
of the Yorubas, esp.pp. 643-50; and for the treaties, see 
Ibid., Appendix A; see also Newbury, 1961, pp. 77-95; and 
generally, Burns, History of Nigeria, pp. 127-39, 211-31.
4. See Nigeria: Report by Sir F.D.Lugard on the Amalgamation 
of Northern and Southern Nigeria and Administration, 1912- 
1919, Cmd. 468, London, 1920, p. 12; Until 1914 Abeokuta 
was a semi-independent state, guaranteed by a treaty of 
1893, under the administration of the Egba Government - 
see Crowder, p. 202.
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(III) The Niger Coast Protectorate
Twenty-three years after the creation of the Colony 
:of- Lagos, the Niger; River Delta was * established as a. British 
Protectorate. After the opening up of the Niger, trade was 
established along the banks of the Niger and Benue Rivers.
In 1879, the various British firms trading on these rivers 
were amalgamated. At the Conference of European Powers at 
Berlin in 1885, Britain successfully claimed that British 
interests were supreme on the lower Niger. The area known as 
the Oil Rivers Protectorate came under the control of a British 
Consul, but administration was left to the National African 
Company, which consisted of the amalgamated companies. In 
1887> a charter was granted to the amalgamated companies, 
which became known as the Royal Niger Company, Chartered and 
Limited, to take the lead in opening up the Niger. In 1893, 
by Order in Council,, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was extended 
over the hinterland and renamed the "Niger Coast Protectorate".^ 
In 1894, after fierce fighting, a British expedition 
subdued the powerful Jekri Chief, the famous Nana, whose
p
authority had extended over nearly the whole area. In 1897, 
a similar expedition captured the city of Benin. In 1899, the 
charter of the Royal Niger Company was revoked, and on 1 January 
1900, its territories along the Niger came under the formal
*3
control of the British Government. The Arochuku people, 
however, were not subdued until 1902, and some of the other
1. See Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, Niger Coast 
Protectorate, Report on the administration, 1894-95, 1895 
[C. 7916] Vol. LXXI, 245.
2. See Obaro Ikime, Merchant Prince of the Niger Delta, (London 
Heinemann, 1968); Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, 373-74; 
King Jaja of Opobo, another powerful ruler of the Delta
had been earlier deported to the West Indies by Britain, 
see Great Britain: Parliamentary Papers, Papers concerning 
King Jaja and the Opening of Markets to British Trade, 1888, 
C. 53657, Vol. LXXIV; Dike, 1956, pp.182-202, 215-17: 
Hodgkin, 369-73*
3. See Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Government of 
Niger Territories, Papers on the Revocation of the Royal. . 
Niger Company's Charter, 1899CC. 9372] Vol.LXIII,p.479;. ; 
Great Britain, Niger Coast Protectorate: Report on the 
Administration. 1894-95, 1895 [C.7916] Vol. LXXI,p.245.
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Igbo groups, much later than this.'1'
(IV) The Northern Protectorate
As previously rioted,the Royal Niger Company, by its 
charter, became responsible for the government of the river 
basins and the whole of Hausaland and Bornu, but in practical 
terms, its influence extended little beyond the banks of the 
Niger and Benue Rivers. Owing to the restrictions on trade 
caused by artificial boundaries, and the virtual monopoly which 
the Niger Company exercised, to the inability of the Companyfs 
forces to restrain the slave-raiding propensities of the Fulani 
Chiefs, and to foreign aggression on the Western frontiers, it 
became necessary for the British Government to assume a more 
direct control over the country. When the Company's charter 
was revoked in 1900, the northern portion of its territories 
became the Northern Nigerian Protectorate; while the southern 
portion was added to the Niger Coast Protectorate, and the 
whole was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Both 
the Northern and Southern Protectorates were placed under 
Colonial Office control.^
(V) The Unification of Nigeria
When the Royal Niger Company disappeared from the 
scene as an instrument of government in 1900, there still 
remained three separate administrations, reduced to two in 
1906, when the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos was amalgamated 
with the Niger Coast Protectorate to form the Colony and
1. See Crowder, 1978, pp. 188-89; Some parts of Igboland were 
not finally brought under British control until as late as 
1918, see J.C.Anene, "The Southern Nigeria Protectorate and 
the Aros, 1900-02", 1, J.H.S.N., 1 December 1956, pp. 20-26 
Burns, 1969, pp. 215-216.
2. See Crowder, 1978, pp. 171-72; Burns, 1969,PP.162-70; 
Parliamentary Papers: .Papers on the Revocation of the Royal 
Niger Company’s Charter, 1899, o£. cit.; see also 
Parliamentary Papers, Niger Coast Protectorate: Report on 
the Administration, 1894-95, [C.7916] Vol. LXXI, p.245, 
generally,
3. Crowder, 1978, p. 172; Burns, 1969,pp. 182-95.
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Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.^"
On 1 January 1914, the Northern Protectorate, and
the Colony arid Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were amalgamated
and formed into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under
2the authority of Royal Letter Patent and order in Council.
Sir Frederick Lugard, who had been appointed Governor of both
Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1912, became the first
Governor of a united Nigeria.
The country continued in this form until 1954 when 
4a new Constitution came into force. This Constitution created 
the.Federation of Nigeria, consisting of the Federal Territory 
of Lagos and three Regions, based upon the traditional ethnic 
groupings of the three main tribes, that is, Hausa/Fulani in 
the Northern Region, the Yorubas in the West, and the Igbos 
in the East. In each Region, in addition to the dominant 
tribe, there were a number of minority groups.
1. See generally Burns, 1969, pp. 217-22; F.D.Lugard, Nigeria:
Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria
and Administration, 1900-1919, Cmd. 468, London, 1920.
2. See Nigeria: "Report by Sir F.D.Lugard on the Amalgamation
of Northern and Southern Nigeria and Administration, 1900- 
1919", Cmd 468.
3. For a full discussion of the amalgamation generally, see 
Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years of Authority, 1891-1945, 
(London: Collins, 1956-60) Vol.II, Chapter XX; See also
E.D. Morel, Nigeria, its Peoples and its Problems, 2nd 
edition, (London: Macmillan, 1912); Crowder,pp. 188-206.
4. See Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1954.
5. See further Coleman, 1965, op., cit.. pp. 369-408; Crowder,
op. cit., pp. 224-36; Kalu Ezera, Constitutional Developments 
in Nigeria, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1964); 
Frederick A. Schwarz, Nigeria: The Tribes, the Nation, or
the Race - The Politics of Independence. (London: M.I.T. 
Press, 1965. In 1963, a portion of the Western Region 
was detached to form a fourth Region - the Mid-Western 
Region.
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(VI) The post-Independence era
Nigeria became an independent country on 1 October 
I960, followed in 1963 by the. creation'of the Republic of • 
Nigeria."^
In 1963, a new Region, the Mid-Western Region, was
2carved out of the Western Region.
In 1966, the country suffered two successive military 
coups, followed in 1967 by a bloody civil war which lasted 
until 1970.3
The immediate cause of the war was the attempt by 
the Eastern Region to secede from the Nigerian Federation and 
to establish the independent republic of Biafra. Although the 
war affected the whole country, the peoples of the former 
Eastern Region bore the heaviest toll, and at the end of the 
war in 1970, not only had they lost a significant proportion 
of their population, but in many cases, all their material 
possesssions. Men may be the main casualties on the battle­
field, but women are the princip&t sufferers in any war. Not 
only did women of the Eastern Region lose their fathers, 
husbands and sons, but, in many cases, they lost their dignity, 
by wide scale rape, brutality, and other forms of degradation. 
It is important to bear this point in mind, and the impact of 
the war and its effect on women and marital life will be 
ventilated at various points of this thesis. It is pertinent 
to note, however, that "it's an ill wind that blows nobody 
good", and in some respects, the war had a beneficial 
repercussion on the status of women. For example, during the 
war many women were forced to assume new responsibilities;
1. See Nigeria Independence Act, I960 (8 and 9> Eliz. 2.C.55); 
and Constitution of the Federation Act, 1963> No. 20 of 
1963. See also Oluwole I. Odumosu, The Nigerian 
Constitution: History and Development. (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1963).
2. See the Mid-Western Region Act 1962, No. 6 of 1962, L.N.
96 of 1963.
3. See N.U. Akpan, The Struggle for Secession, 1966-1970- A 
Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War (London: Frank
. Cass, 19?l); John tie St. Jore, frhe Nigerian Civil War, 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972); John J. Stremlau,
The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 
19b7“197o, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977.)
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often they were the sole breadwinners of the family when the 
men were too scared to venture out for fear of being conscripted 
into the ..army. After the. war, they, asserted an independence 
hitherto unknown toymen in some communities, for example,
Eket.^
In 1967, Nigeria was divided into twelve States in-
2stead of the three previous Regions.
In 1976, after another bloody coup in 1975, this 
division into twelve States was replaced by one of nineteen 
States with the Federal Territory. The present States are 
Anambra, Bauchi, Bendel, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Gongola,
Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Lagos, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo,
Plateau, Rivers and Sokoto.^
B. Nigerian Women
(I) Introduction
"There is no such thing as Nigerian women.
There are only Igbo women, Yoruba woman, 
Hausa/Fulani women, and hundreds of others’1.
This is the emphatic statement of an eighty year old
Igbo Chief. He continues, 11 It is the British who created
Nigeria, not God, we are all different."
This was his way of expressing the historical fact
that the political entity now known as Nigeria, described as
h
"Africa's Goliath" , only came into existence around the
1. Many male informants in Eket stated that it was difficult 
to relegate women to their former, docile and servile 
status, after the Nigerian Civil War, and this caused the 
break-up of many homes.
2. See States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree,
1967, S.l, Decree No. 14 of 1967.
3. See States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree,
1976, secs. 1 and 6 and the Schedule, Decree No. 12 of
1976, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria; The Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979* First Schedule 
Part 1; and Map I, p.65.
4. See John Hatch, Nigeria: A History, (London, Heinemann 
Educational Books, Ltd., 1971) p.9.
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beginning of the present century. Before this, as previously
noted, there was only a multiplicity, of tribal groups, living
at various levels of technological development with little or
no contact with each other ranging in size from a few
thousands to many millions; speaking between them two hundred
and fifty or more dialects; presenting cultural contrasts in
social structure, religion and customs; and having different. . 2and more often than not, obscure origins.
How far justified is the old ChiefTs assertion?
This is not an appropriate forum to engage in a political 
debate as to how and when a group of different tribes can 
accurately be described as a nation. It may be pertinent to 
point out, however, that the welding of a diversity of tribes 
into a "nation" or "state" is not a problem peculiar to 
Nigeria. A similar process has occurred in most countries of 
the world. For example, British women include English, 
Scottish, Welsh and Irish women, each group of which can be 
broken down into further sub-tribes. The only difference 
being that the diversity among Nigerian tribes, has not, as 
in other countries, been mellowed by the passage of time.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland has existed 
for nearly three centuries, Nigeria for little more than three 
decades. It is difficult to find any contemporary nation that 
did not begin as a geographical expression, in one form or 
another, from its,already existing heterogeneous socio­
cultural systems. Nigeria is thus not unique
1. A variety of links existed between the various states and 
peoples which were the predecessors of modern Nigeria; 
between Kanem-Bornu the Hausa States, Nupe, the Jukun 
kingdom, the Empires of Oyo and Benin, the Delta States 
and the loosely associated Igbo communities, see Thomas 
Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives: An Historical Anthology,
2nd edition(I960, London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
p.2; Cf. Obafemi Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Freedom.
(London: Faber and Faber, 19^7), p.^7- "Nigeria is not a 
nation. It is a mere geographical expression... The word 
'Nigerian1 is merely a distinctive appellation to distin­
guish those who live within Nigeria from those who do not."
2. Hatch, Nigeria: A History, op. cit., pp. 9, 12-16; see 
J.E. Adetoro, The Handbook of Education in Nigeria. 3rd 
edition, (Ibadan: African Educational Press, 19^6), pp.1-9; 
Burns, 1969, op. cit., p. 25.
A
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in this respect. ^
Even though the term "Nigerian women" is acceptable 
as an accurate general description of the women to whom this 
work relates, it is still necessary, for the better understanding 
of the topics dealt with later, to locate the various groups 
of women in their geographical, tribal and historical perspect­
ives. A sustained and systematic account of the complex and 
diverse histories of the various peoples and civilizations is 
not possible here. The subject is brilliantly documented else-
p
where. All that is attempted in this section, is to give 
in concise form, essential basic information about the tribal 
groups which will be referred to in later chapters. This 
process necessarily involves choice, and the main determinant 
has been the relative size of the groups.
According to the 1963 Census, Nigeria has a population 
of 55*670,000 people, 49.5 per cent of whom are females. It 
is the most populous country on the African continent''* and is
4
more than three times the size of the United Kingdom. Although 
the country is now divided into nineteen states^ the former 
dichotomy of Northern and Southern Nigeria is a convenient one, 
and will be used in much of this work.^
1. See Onigu Otite, "On the Concept of a Nigerian Society" in 
Ethnic Relations in Nigeria, edited by A.0. Sanda, (Ibadan: 
Dept, of Sociology, University of Ibadan, Caxton Press, 
(West Africa) Ltd., 1976),p.4.
2. See Michael Crowder, The Story of Nigeria, 1978; Thomas 
Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, op. cit., 1974; J.C. Anene, 
Southern Nigeria m  Transition, lo05-1906, 1966;
J.S. Coleman, Nigeria, op. cit., 1965; Alan Burns, History 
of Nigeria, 1969; John Hatch, Nigeria: A History, 1971.
3. Crowder, op.cit., p.11; The total population of Nigeria in
1963 was 55*670,000 - Census of Nigeria, 1963, Vol. 3,
See Map No. 3.
4. Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1974, Federal Office of 
Statistics, Lagos, p.l. The area of Nigeria is 923*769 
square miles.
5. See above, Map No. 1, p. 65.
6. See further above, pp. 70-78.
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TABLE 1:1
POPULATION OP MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
NATIONALITY
AND TOTAL MALES FEMALES
ETHNIC GROUP
NIGERIANS 55,558,163 28,041,361 27,516,802
HAUSA 11,652,745 5,936,361 5,716,321
YORUBA 11,320,509 5,767,978 5,552,531
IBO 9,246,388 4,684,849 4,561,539
PULANI 4,784,366 2,448,537 2,335,829
KANURI 2,259,091 1,149,473 1,109,618
IBIBIO 2,006,489 982,010 1,024,479
TIV 1,393,649 711,481 682,168
I JAW 1,088,885 522,661 566,224
EDO 954,970 473,002 481,968
ANNANG 675,004 332,173 342,831
NUPE 656,296 309,382 346,914
URHOBO 639,251 313,845 325,406
IGALA 581,551 284,773 296,778
IDOMA 485,562 232,314 253,248
IGBIRRA 425,783 233,920 191,863
GWARI 378,168 189,747 188,421
EKOI 344,514. 165,021 179,493
ISOKO 200,357 99,392 100,965
EFIK 166,297 91,112 75,185
SOURCE: Population Census of Nigeriaa 1963, Vol.3, p. 10.
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MAP 2
POPULATION OF NIGERIA BY STATE 1963
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(II) The main language groups
Southern groups
In the Southern part of the country, the main 
language groups are the Yorubas, the Igbos, Edos and Ibibios, 
while in the North the Hausas, Fulanis, Kanuris, Tivs and Nupes 
predominate.^
2
(a) The Yoruba-speaking peoples
The Yorubas occupy the South-western corner of Nigeria, 
and are one of the most important and perhaps best known tribes^ 
in the country. There are many speculations as to their origin^, 
but Ife is generally believed to be their first settlement in 
Nigeria, and it still remains the spiritual headquarters of
1. For the classification of the various languages spoken by 
the main Nigerian groups- see Joseph Greenberg - Studies 
in African Linguistic Classification, (Compass, New Haven, 
1955). For the location of the main ethnic groups, see 
Map No. 2, p.82.
2. For the history of the Yorubas, see Johnson, 1976; Robert 
Smith, Kingdoms of the Yoruba, (London, Methuen,1969);
S.O. Biobaku ed., Sources of Yoruba History, (London: 
Clarendon Press, 1973); J.F. Ade Ajayi and Robert Smith, 
Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition 
(1964, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press).
3. The term "tribe" is highly misleading as applied to the 
peoples of Nigeria, in as much as most of the groups on 
which it is commonly conferred lack both self-consciousness 
and political focus as such, and often include a considerable 
diversity of ancestral stocks. For descriptive purposes, 
however, it has been customary to list certain major groups, 
in most of which, the distinguishing characteristic is 
language. Some of these are localised, and in a few there
is physical homogeneity and belief in a single derivation.
But neither political, nor ethnic ideas should in general 
be attached to such categories, since correlation of local 
histories, traditions and cultures, and language is often 
fallacious as a guide to racial affinities. The groups are 
enumerated below are subject to this caveat - see 
Colonial Report. 1938, No. 1904, para. 32, p. 10.
4. See Johnson, 1978,pp. 1-26; R.C.C.Law, "Traditional History" 
in Sources of Yoruba History, edited by Biobaku, o p . cit'. , 
pp. 25-^0; J.Olumide Lucas, The Religion of the Yorubas. 
(Lagos, Nigeria_ C.M.S. Bookshop, 194b); S.O. Biobaku,
The Lugard Lectures. Federal Information Service, 1956, 
pp. 8-10 and 11-13.
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the race1 . There are several clans, including the Oyos, Egbas, 
Ifes, Ijebus, Owas, Ijeshas, Ekitis and Ondos. The people of 
Lagos are also mainly of Yoruba origin, and additionally many
2
Yorubas are found in Ilorin and Kabba areas of Northern Nigeria.
They are said to be the most urban of all African
peoples, their urban way of life dating back long before the
3
period of European penetration. Out of the eleven largest
towns in Nigeria, nine are entirely Yoruba, while Lagos, which
4
is nearly two-thirds Yoruba, may fairly rank as the tenth.
One of these Yoruba towns, Ibadan, is the largest negro city 
in Africa.'*
Yoruba women in the nineteenth century were described 
by Horton thus:
’’The women make excellent traders; within 
a very short time they would double, treble 
and even quadruple a very small amount.
Their diet and living are generally simple
1. Burns, History of Nigeria, 1969, pp. 28-30; Wanda Abimbola, 
’’The Literature of the If a Cult”, in Sources of Yoruba 
History, edited by Biobaku, op.cit., p.42; Ajayi and Smith, 
1971, op. cit., p.l.
2. See Burns, op. cit. , p. 38; William Bascom, The Yoruba of
' South-Western Nigeria, (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1969), pp.5-6; a Tf . Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger: Narrative 
of Major Claude MacDonald’s Mission to the Niger and Benue 
Rivers, West Africa, (London: George Philip and Son, 1&92), 
pp.171-72.
3. Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria, 1968, op.cit., pp.7^-106; 
Bascom, 1937, op.cit., p.3; Population Census, West, 1952;
I.I.Ekanem, The 1963 Nigerian Census: A Critical Appraisal, 
(Nigeria, Ethiope Publishing Corporation, 1972), pp.59-64;
■ "For all Nigeria (1963) 19.2# of the population lived in 
urban areas. The corresponding figures for North, East 
and West were 9.9#, 11.2# and 50.9% respectively.
4. Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria,(London, 
1937), p.162; Bascom, 1969, op.cit., p.3. In 1963, 7 out 
of the 12 largest towns including Lagos were Yoruba towns, 
see Population Census of Nigeria, 19§3, Vol. 3,pp.58-65.
5. Bascom, 1969, o p .cit. , p.3; Perham, Native Administration, 
1937, op.cit., p .178.
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and inexpensive.;, they are very litigious; 
some of them are very good.looking, nicely 
shaped and formed, although marked; others 
are. hideously tattooed.
Although a large number of the people now profess the
Moslem religion^, their marriages and family life are governed
by customary law , and the economic and social independence of
the women provide a striking contrast to the Moslem women in
the Northern Emirates. For more than a century,the Yoruba were
the dominant group among Nigeria’s educated elite, and the
4women are among the best educated Nigerian women. This again 
is in direct contrast to Moslem women in the North, who are
5
among the most poorly educated in the country.
(b) The Igbo -speaking peoples
The Igbos are a single people in the sense that they 
speak a number of related dialects, occupy a continuous tract 
of territory, have many features of social structure and culture 
in common and believe in a common supreme God known as Chuku
-1. James A. Horton, West African Countries and Peoples a (London, 
1868, new edition with introduction by George.Shepperson,
1969) p.148.
2. In 1963, 43.4$ of the population of the former Western 
Region professed the Moslem religion as against 48.7$
Christians and 7.9$ others. See Map No.8 ,p,194.Cf. in 1913,when 
it was estimated that Moslems comprised 35$ of the population 
of Ibadan, Ife and Ilia towns as a group, see C.G.Elgree,
The Evolution of Ibadan, (Ibadan, 1914).
3. See below, Chapter IX, pp. 20-23.
4. For example, in 1947, girls in the Western Region accounted 
for 9.6$ of the total primary school enrolment; in the 
Eastern Region, 8$, and only 1.75$ in the Northern Region, 
see Colonial Report, 1947, p. 16; For later statistics see 
further, below, pp. 107 et_ al.
5. See further below, Tables 1:2 - 1:6.
6. Both forms "Igbo" and ”Ibo” are in use. "Igbo” is more
widespread among the people themselves. "Ibo" seems to
have been first adopted largely by foreigners because of - 
the difficulty in pronouncing the "gb”. "Igbo” will be
used in this thesis except when quoting authors who use the
alternative form.
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or Chineke, who was reponsible for everything in this world 
and the next. They were not formerly politically unified, and
there are marked dialectical and cultural differences among
1 2 . .the various main groups. Talbot divides the Igbos into
thirty sub-tribes, but the main groups are the northern group 
around Awka, northward to Nsukka, and southward to Okigwi; 
southern or Owerri Igbo, around the town of that name, western 
Igbo, a western community on the west bank of the Niger and 
around Onitsha, eastern or Cross River Igbo, near Bende and 
Arochuku, and north-eastern Igbo, found between Afikpo and 
Abakaliki. Igbos are mainly located in the south-eastern part 
of Nigeria on both sides of the river Niger, but sizeable groups 
are found in different parts of the country especially before 
the Nigerian civil war.
One of the most .powerful group of Igbos is the 
Aros, guardians of the famous Aro-Chuku oracle which wielded 
political influence over most of the peoples of the Niger Delta 
and its hinterland before colonization.
Olandah Equiano, an Igbo who was kidnapped from his 
home in the mid-eighteenth century, and taken as a slave to 
Virginia, and later sold in England, describes Igbo women thus:
1. See Daryll Forde and G.I. Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-speaking 
Peoples of South-Eastern Nigeria, (London., International 
African Institute, 1950),pp7 10-L2; Basden, Among the Ibos 
of Nigeria, 1966, pp. 27-56; C.K. Meek, Law and Authority 
m  a Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule, (London,
Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 1-19; Burns, History of 
Nigeria, p. 59; S.N.Nwabara, Iboland: A Centufry of Contact 
with Britain, 1860-1960, (London, Hodder and Stoughton,1977),
pp. 15-26.
2. See P. Amaury-Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, A Sketch 
of their History, Ethnology and Languages with an Abstract
of the 1921 Census, (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), 
Vol. IV, pp. 39-^1; Cf. Meek, Law and Authority, 1937, 
pp. 1-5.
3. See Forde and Jones, 1950, op. cit. , pp. 9-10; G.I. Jones,
Ibo Land Tenure 19 Africa, 1949, p. 309; Meek, Law and 
Authority, op. cit., p. 193.
4. Meek, Law and Authority, pp. 44-45.
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"Our women too were in my eyes at least uncommonly 
graceful, alert, and modest to a. degree of bashful­
ness; nor do I remember to have ever heard of an 
instance of incontinence amongst them before marriage. 
They are also remarkably cheerful. Indeed cheerful­
ness and affability are two of the leading character­
istics of our nation."-^
The Reverend Bishop Johnson, in 1903, noted that
"Ibo women are, like their Yoruba land sisters very 
industrious and hardworking. They are far superior 
to the men in this, and are said to have far more 
character in them than men."2
Igbo women are also keen traders, and indeed it is said that 
many of the women seem to do little else but attend markets, 
and from the small profits made it would appear that markets 
are attended almost as much for social as for commercial . 
purposes.*^
One important cultural difference among the Igbos
should be noted here. Whereas most Igbo communities have
patrilineal or father-oriented social systems, some groups,
for example, Afikpo and Ohaffia, have markedly matrilineal,
4or mother-centred, systems.
(c) The Ibibio-speaking peoples
The Ibibio-speaking peoples are found mainly in South-
1. Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of 
Olaudah Equiano, abridged and edited by Paul Edwards,
(London: Heinemann, 1967),p.8; see also Horton, 1969,
p.156.
2. Bishop Johnson, "Missionary Journeys", Lagos Standard,
29 April 1903.
3. See Sylvia Leith-Ross, African Women: A Study of the Ibo 
of Nigeria, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, 
reprint, 1965), pp.86-88; see also Basden, Among the Ibos 
of Nigeria, op.cit., pp. 89-90; Green, Igbo Village 
Affairs, p .37.
4. See Philip Nsugbe, Ohaffia: A Matrilineal Ibo People, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974); Simon Ottenberg, 
Leadership and Authority in an African Society: The Afikpo 
Village Group  ^ (Seattle, U.S.A.: University of Washington 
Press, 1971).
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Eastern Nigeria, mostly in the Calabar area- They are, after
the Igbo, the largest, linguistic, unit in the Eastern part of
Nigeria. • Six main sub-divisions' or groups are conveniently-
recognised. These are: Eastern or Ibibio proper; Western or
Anang; Northern or Enyong; Southern or Eket, and the Riverain
or Efik.1 Most of the other groups have laws and customs
similar to the Igbos, but the Efiks, especially in the laws
of inheritance and succession by daughters, bear closer
resemblance to the Yorubas. The Efik woman too, has a greater
2degree of social independence and power , in contrast to the 
Ibibio women of other groups, for example, Eket. According to 
an Eket chief, the Ibibio woman, before the Nigerian Civil 
War, "could not be seen, much less heard" in any conclave 
where men were.
Although education was brought comparatively early 
to these groups, this fact is not reflected in the general 
level of education of the women.
Efik is the best known dialect, and is understood by 
all educated Ibibios.
(d) The Edo-speaking peoples
■3
The Edos, the chief of whom are the Binis , are now 
a comparatively small group of people, but Benin was formerly 
-a very powerful kingdom; and its influence at one time extended
1. See Forde and Jones, 1950, op.cit., p.67.
2. The high social status of Efik women came out clearly in 
the essays written by Efik schoolchildren. Many of the 
boys expressed the desire to be reborn as girls if given 
the choice, and they listed all the advantages girls have 
in the society. Igbo schoolchildren, boys and girls, on 
the other hand, nearly all wanted to be reborn as boys, 
because of the low social status of Igbo women generally - 
See further, Chapter XIV.
3. "Bini" is used by Europeans as an adjective and for the 
dominant people of the Bini kingdom - see R.E.Bradbury 
and P.C.Lloyd - The Benin Kingdom, 1957 (Reprint, 1970), 
p.l4, Note 4. See also R.E. Bradbury, Benin Studies, 
edited with an introduction by Peter Morton-Williams, 
(London: Oxford University Press, Published for the 
International African Institute, 1973), pp. 44-75.
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over a considerable area. For example, it is said that
’’the original settlers of Lagos were the Binis and the Aworis”,
• • 2 
and the main dynasty of Benin originated in Yorubaland. The
Binis also had considerable impact on the western Igbos, and
Onitsha Igbos, and some other groups are said to have origin-
ated from Benin.
The group includes the Edo-proper (Beni) of the
Benin Kingdom, the Ishan, the Northern Edo and the Urbobo and
4
Isoko of the Niger Delta. As a whole, the group exhibits 
many common and distinctive cultural features, but, as will be 
seen later, some groups, such as the Ishan, have unusual 
customs, for example, recognition of two levels of marriage pay- 
ments or dowry.
Mention may be made here of the Itsekiri or Jekri 
who, although they speak a Yoruba dialect, claim descent from 
an early Oba of Benin. They live in the westernmost part of 
the Niger Delta, and are sometimes referred to as Warri in the
c
English literature, no doubt after Warri, their main town.
(e) Other southern Groups
There are many other groups of people in Southern 
Nigeria. Among these, special mention, for future reference, 
must be made of the Ijaws (Ijo) who live in the Niger Delta.
1. See Jacob U. Egharevba, A Short History of Benin, 4th edition, 
(Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 196b) ; Crowder, 
1978, op.cit., pp.37-47; Burns, History of Nigeria, p.40.
2. See Otonba Payne, "Outline of the History of Lagos, and 
Native Customs’’, A Paper read at the Lagos Institute on
28 January 1903, Lagos Standard, 11 February 1903; Crowder, 
op.cit., pp. 45-46.
3. See Crowder, op.cit., p.46; Egharevba, A Short History of 
Benin, op.cit., p.29; S.I.Bosah, Groundwork of the History 
and Culture of Onitsha, N.D.pp.3-10.
-4. See Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., pp.13-17.
5. See below, Chapter III, pp. 254-257.
6. See Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., pp. 172 et al; William
A. Moore, History of Itsekiri, 2nd edition(1936, London:'
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1970).
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The best known groups are the Bonny, Okrika and Kalahari Ij'os.1 
These groups also practice a double level of dowry payments.
Other tribal groups include the Membe and the Yako 
who occupy the region of the middle Cross River. These two 
groups are mentioned because they have a double-descent system 
of inheritance, being both patrilineal and matrilineal.
Northern Groups
The Northern Groups of people comprise mainly:
(a) The Hausa
The Hausa occupy the greater portion of Northern 
Nigeria, and from an early date had attained a fairly high
1. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta: Their Religions
and Customs, (1932, London: Frank Cass and Co.Ltd., new 
imp. 1967),pp. 4-18; E.J. Alagoa, A History of the Niger 
Delta, (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1972).
2. Rosemary Harris, The Political Organization of the Mbembe, 
Nigeria, (London: Her Majestyfs Stationery Office, London,
1965).
3. Daryll Forde, Marriage and the Family Among the Yako in 
South-Eastern Nigeria, (Monographs on Social Anthropology, 
No.5j Published for the London School.of Economics and 
Political Science by Percy Lund, Humphries, and Co. Ltd., 
1941).
4. For the history of the Northern Moslem Emirates see generally 
Crowder, 1978; Burns, 1969,p.46 et al; H.A.S. Johnston,
The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1967),PP.1“17; M.G.Smith, Government in ZauZau, 
1800-1930» (London: Oxford University Press, I960):
C.L. Temple, Native Races and Their Rulers: Sketches and 
Studies of Official Life and Administrative Problems in' 
Nigeria" (Capetown, Argus Printing and Publishing Co.Ltd., 
1918); C.K. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, (London,
Oxford University Press, 1925), Vol. 1,pp.85-94; S.G.Hogben 
and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, 
1966; S.J. Hogben, An Introduction to the History of the 
Islamic States of Northern Nigeria, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967); C.l T Temple, Notes on the Tribes, 
Provinces, Emirates and States of Northern Nigeria, 2nd 
edition(Lagos: C.M.S. Bookshop, 1922).
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level of civilization. At the beginning of the 19th century, 
the Hausa States were, conquered by the Fuiani, a nomad people 
who had settled';, in the towns and country of Hausaland, and who,, 
by their superior intelligence* had acquired great power and 
influence. Islam reached Hausaland from the West in the mid­
fourteenth century, but fifty per cent of the Hausas are said
to have been pagans at the time the British occupied the
1 2 Emirates. Today nearly eighty per cent are Moslems.
Queen Amina of Zaria, (one of the Hausa states), is
famous in Hausa history. Under her, Zaria rose to be the most
powerful state of the Central Sudan. All the towns, including
Nupe, paid tribute to her. The Sarkin Nupe sent forty eunuchs
and ten thousand kolas to her. Her conquests extended over
thirty four years. Amina is said to have built walled cities,
and to have married a fresh husband at each place she stopped,
killing him when she left. Daura, another Hausa State, also 
■5
had a queen.^
(b) The Kanuri
The Kanuri are mainly found in Bornu in the North 
East of Nigeria, a kingdom which has survived for many centuries 
in spite of great vicissitudes. Islam is said to have pene­
trated into Bornu as early as the eleventh century. It was 
known to the Portuguese as early as the fifteenth century, 
and to Arab geographers, several centuries earlier.
During the eighteenth century, Hausaland and Bornu 
"engaged in a series of wars amongst themselves, and with other
1. J.S. Trimmingham, A History of Islam in West Africa, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p.230.
2. See Population Census: Northern Nigeria, 1963* Vol.2, 
pp.215-71.
3. See H.A.S.Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, 1967*
op.cit., p.260; the Federal Government of Nigeria in 1975 
issued a set of three stamps to commemorate International 
WomenTs Year, proclaimed by the United Nations. The stamps 
bear a common motif of Queen Amina of Zaria, and other 
national female heroines. The stamps were on sale for six 
months, see Sunday Renaissance, 24 August, 1975* p.3.
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peoples, oftentimes the defeated town having to seek a new 
home.1
Of the Bornu Empire Schultze observes as follows:
"It is not generally realized, even in Nigeria, how 
ancient and powerful the old Bornu Empire was. In 
the fifteenth century it was the greatest power in 
Central Africa, and its boundaries extended to Pezzan, 
the Niger, and practically to the Benue. The Hausas 
of whom one hears so much nowadays, were then a 
congerie of obscure semi-pagan tribes, while the 
Pulani are, of course, politically speaking mere 
upstarts of a century ago."2
Kanuri women, although they are Moslems, had a 
reputation for independence of spirit and freedom in marital 
affairs.^
,  v A
(c) The Fuiani
The Pulani by origin are light-skinned cattle nomads 
found in various parts of the Sudan, and the women especially 
are extremely beautiful. Some settled in Nigeria and lived 
peacefully with their neighbours. Some even intermarried with 
the local population, but most of them remained devoted to 
their traditional religion and to their nomadic way of life. 
Those who settled in the towns became proselytes of the Moslem
1. See the authorities cited on p. 91 n.4 above; see also 
Migeod, Through Nigeria to Lake Chad, 1924, op.cit.%
Louis Brenner, The Shehus of Kukawa: A History of the al- 
Kanem Dynasty of Bornu, (London: Clarendon Press, 1973); 
Arnold Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu, edited and 
translated from the German with additions, etc. by Askell 
Benton, (London, 1913).
2.. Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu, p.4.
3. See further, Chapter IX below,pp. 62-65.
4. See Johnson, The Fuiani Empire of Sokoto, op. cit. , esp.
p.17-26; E.J. Arnett, The Rise of the Sokoto Fuiani, (Kano, 
1922); Heinrich Barth, Travels and Discoveries in Northern 
and Central Africa, 1849-1885, (London: Frank Cass, 1965),
3 Vols.; Edward C. Hopen, The Pastoral Fulbe Family in
Gwandu, (London: oxford University Press, 1958); H .R .Palmer 
Sudanese Memoirs:being mainly translations of a number of 
Arabian manuscripts, (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1967)
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religion, and in Hausaland found a niche, for themselves in 
the courts of the Hausa kings - gaining political and economic 
wealth. They formed a movement for religious and intellectual 
reform, ably led in Nigeria by an elderly Moslem scholar, Usman ■ 
Dan Podio, a Pulani born in Gobir from a clan which had 
emigrated to Nigeria from Mali, fourteen centuries before. He 
became head of a great jihad (holy war) which, within a few 
years, swept the Hausa kings off their thrones and established 
Pulani rulers. He pushed forward into Ilorin, the Yoruba town, 
and contributed to the breakup of the old Oyo Empire. He 
nearly conquered Yorubaland itself.1
The Pulanis are divided into Settled Pulanis, who
p
live in the towns and are mainly Moslems, and Nomadic Pulanis 
who are cattle people and are generally non-Moslems (Maguzawa).
(d) The Tivs^
The Tivs are by far the largest pagan tribe in Northern 
Nigeria. They mainly occupy the region bordering both banks 
of the Benue River. Tiv is the name these people use to refer 
to themselves. By the twentieth century, however, writers were 
referring to them as Munshi, the name by which they are known to
1. See Tucker, Abeokuta or Sunrise within the Tropics: An 
Outline of the Origins and Progress of the Yoruba Mission, 
(London, James Nisbet and Co., 1853), p.12; Meek, Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, pp.98-102; Johnson, History of the 
Yorubas, pp.193-205,258-88.
2. See D.J. Stenning, Savannah Nomads, (London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1959); J.R. Wilson-Haffenden, The Red Men of 
Nigeria: An Account of a Lengthy Residence Among the 
Fuiani or *TRed Men" and other Pagan Tribes of Central 
Nigeria" (London: Frank Cass, Ltd., 1930, 1967 reprint);
F.W. de St. Croix, The Fuiani of Northern Nigeria: Some 
General Notes, (Lagos, Government Printer, 1944);
Greenberg, The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion,
(New York: J.J. Augustin, Publisher, 1946).
3. See generally, R.C. Abraham, The Tiv People, 2nd edition, 
(1934, Lagos: C .M .S .Bookshop,1940); Akiga, AkigaTs Story, 
translated and annotated by Rupert East(London; Oxford 
University Press, 1965); S.A. Crowther, Journal of an 
Expedition up the Niger and Tshadda rivers, undertaken by 
McGregor Laird... in connection with the British Government 
in 1854^ (London: Church Missionary House,1855); J .I.Tseayo, 
,kThe Emirate System and Tiv Reaction to Pagan Status in 
Northern Nigeria”, in Nigeria: Economy and Society,
- footnote continued overleaf
95
the Hausas. The term Munshi was also used officially until 
the 1920s when it was. discarded in favour of their own name 
for themselves.'1'
Pew African tribes can boast of a longer resistance 
to European influence than these people. Their resistance 
earned them the reputation of being ’’truculent and almost 
brutally primitive’’ , a reputation which has today proved 
palpably false.^
(e) The Nupe
The Nupe is one of the larger groups inhabiting the
li
area of the Niger Benue Confluence. Politically, the people 
of the Niger Benue confluence exhibit widely different systems, 
ranging from the highly organized state of the Nupe^ with a 
ruling dynasty of Pulani descent, and the Igbirra and Igala 
chiefdoms with their ’’divine kings” to the fragmentary state­
lets of the Idoma-speaking peoples.
Of these people the Nupe are the only ones to have 
been Islamized to any considerable extent. The first Nupe 
king to become a Moslem is thought to have reigned about 1770.
Continuation of footnote 3. from previous page:
edited by Gavin Williams,(London, Rex Collins, 1976),pp.76-89;
Migeod, Through British Cameroons, (London, 1925); Mockler-
Perryman, Up the Niger, op. cit., pp. 74 et_ al.
1. The term Tiv will be used to designate these people as far 
as possible throughout this thesis.
2. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, 1937, op.cit., 
pp. 152-53.
3. Laura Bohannan and Paul Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria 
(1953, London: International Africa Institute, reprint,1969) 
see also Tseayo, ’’The Emirate System and Tiv Reaction”,
op. cit., p.88.
4. Daryll Forde, ed. Peoples of the Niger-Benue ConfliiPnp.P.J 
(1955, London, Internationa African Institute, 1970).
5. See S.F. Nadel, A Black Bvzantium: The. Kingdom of Nnpe in- 
Nigeria. (London: Oxford University Press, reprint, 1965).
6. Not more than one-third of the Nupe were even nominally r 
Moslem in 1880, today two-thirds at least would claim to be 
Moslems, and Islamic law is paramount - see Spencer Trimming 
ham, A History of Islam in West Africa. 1970, p. 230. Cf. 
other Northern tribes, see Map 8, p.194.
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Although many Nupe women are Moslems., they have a reputation 
of being ardent, traders, and like Yoruba women, present a 
contrast to the Moslem women of the. far North, in the degree 
of freedom of movement-they exercise.^
3. The Elements of Status
A. Introduction
It is necessary at this point to discuss what is 
meant by "legal status” within the context of this thesis.
Judicial and academic opinions are united in declaring 
the difficulty of finding a generally acceptable definition 
of the term ”status” . Thus Austin remarks:
"To determine precisely what a status is, is in 
my opinion the most difficult problem in the 
whole science of jurisprudence.'^
Markby expressed misgivings at having to explain the 
term "status or condition", "about which much has been written, 
but as the writers themselves generally confess, without much 
result"; while Allen was bewildered at the confusion surround­
ing the topic, and would have been deterred from writing on the 
subject at all had he noted Austin's discouraging remark before 
he set out on his own attempt. His diffidence was accentuated 
by the fact that Continental jurisprudence seems to be
1. See Nadel, A Black Byz.antium, 1965, pp.330-3^.
2. J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of 
Positive Law, 5th edition, lob55 (edited by R. Cambell), 
Vol.II, p. 351.
3. William Markby, Elements of Law Considered with Reference 
to Principles of~General Jurisprudence, 1905 > 6th edition, 
para. 16b, p. 97.
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similarly reticent on the topic.1
The difficulty in defining status is not., confined to .
lawyers: sociologists are equally unsucessful in finding a
2univerally acceptable definition of status.
In modern social science, status denotes principally 
the position occupied by a person with repect to the 
distribution of prestige within a social system, and sometimes 
by implication, with repect to the distribution of rights, 
obligations, power and authority within the same system.-^
Thus a person, or a class of persons, may be described as 
having a high status or a low status in a particular society.
In other words, status is used as a synonym for prestige or 
honour, and the adjective social is frequently used with status 
when it is intended in this sense. Mair, the well-known social 
anthropologist notes that:
"When we speak of status we mean a person's position 
in his society, as it might be a point on a map, the 
sum total of his different relationships to other 
members of his society."^
Linton, the American anthropologist, chose "status" 
to mean the place of an individual in society, and defined it 
as a collection of rights and duties, with "role" defined as
1. Carleton K. Allen, "Status and Capacity", Law Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 46, 1930, p. 277 at 278. Savigny said that
in his day the confusion in the subject was "somewhat wild"
- see Allen - Ibid., p. 278. See also Pollock and Maitland, 
The History of English Law, Vol. 1, p. 408; For judicial 
decisions where the difficulty of defining status was 
expressed see Anibire and Anor v. Howells and Anor [1973]
3 U.I.L.R. 36, Govu v. Stuart [1903] 24 Natal L.R. 440; 
Mahludi v. R.[19051; ,26 Natal L.R.298.
L>
2. See conflicting defintions of M.P. Banton - Roles: An 
Introduction to the ^tudy of Social Relations, 1955,p.21;
R. Linton, The Study of Man, 1936, pp. 113-114.
3. See A Dictionary of the Social Science, 1964 (eds.J.Gould 
and Kolb), p.692.
4. Lucy Mair, Anthropology and Social Change, (New York: 
University of London Athlone Press, 1969, Paperback edition, 
1971), p. 122.
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the putting into action of these rights and duties; the
dynamic aspect of a status.'1'
Banton, in- his book, Roles: An Introduction to the
Study of Social Relations,, rejects Linton's definition of the
word status. He asserts that status means the condition of
belonging to a particular c^j.ss of persons, and defines role
as a set of rights and obligations. This Bantonfs definition
2of TroleT is similar to Linton's definition of s t a t u s ’.
The difficulty of defining status is generally
attributed to the fact that the word has no very precise
connotations. Although "status” has a popular or dictionary
meaning of a personTs social position or rank in relation to
others, "status" is essentially a legal term and connotes the
sum of the legal capacities of an individual, his powers to
enforce legal rights and obligations either for himself or 
q
others.J
Status may be "legal status", "economic status", 
"political status", "educational status", etc., each denoting 
a collection of rights and duties which a person has in relation 
to others.
B. Legal status
Status in its legal sense is a more precise and exact 
term than in its broad popular meaning. Graveson notes that 
"status" has rarely been used, and never defined in an English 
statute, but the word has been used to apply to things so 
diverse as Egypt, enemy merchant vessels, private industrial 
pension plans, etc., in short, to almost any single thing to
1. R. Linton, The Study of Man, (London: Appleton-Century 
Company, 1937, pp.113-1^.
2. Michael P. Banton, Roles: An Introduction to the Study of 
Social Relations, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965),
p. 21.
3. See M. Radin, "Status" in E.R.A.Seligman, ed., Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences, 193^, Vol. 14, p. 373.
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which the writer chooses to. apply it,^ He observes that in 
"one form or another, problems o.f status are constantly 
before the courts. But it would indeed be hard to discover 
any other legal concept of equal importance that had been so 
neglected for so long."
After the best considerations which he was able to 
give to the subject, and after an extensive examination of the 
opinions of others, Austin still found no mark by which a 
status or condition can be distinguished from any other 
collection of rights and duties, and he concluded that
"The.sets of rights and duties called condition or 
status have no common generic character which 
determine what a status or condition is."2
Certain rights and duties are detached for convenience
from the body of the legal system, and these sets of rights
■3
and duties are styled status or conditions . They reside in 
an individual as belonging to a class. Whenever a set of 
rights and duties, capacities and incapacities, relate specially 
and constantly to one class of persons, every person in that
class has a status or condition, composed of those special
3
rights and duties, capacities and incapacities.
1. See R.H. Graveson, Status in the Common Law,(London: 
University of London, Athlone Press, 1953)a P»2; Graveson 
contends that whatever the bases of "status" may be, it is 
a legal idea - a conception of law and not a question of 
fact and he concludes that whether a person has or has not 
a given status or whether he is entitled to any particular 
status is a matter solely of legal principle; "Status is 
a condition imposed by the State but imposed according to 
settled principles of law." p. 114. He does not consider 
"status" in the popular or dictionary sense of the position 
of some particular object or institution.
2. John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy 
of Positive Law, 5th edition, ed. by R. Campbell,(London: 
John.Murray, I885), Vol. II, p.687.
3. Ibid., pp. 688,689.
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The status of an individual at a given moment of
time may be defined as the totality, of all his rights and
duties as recognized in the laws and customs' of the society
1to which.he belongs. . The rights constituting a. status,, and 
similarly the duties, are of many different kinds, some 
relating to the world at large or to the society as a whole,
others relating to some definite social group, for example,
2married persons, of which the individual is a member.
A person may be said to have a status in law when he 
belongs to a class of persons who, by reason only of their 
membership of that class have rights or duties, capacities or 
incapacities, specified by law which do not exist in the case 
of persons not included in the class and which, in most cases 
at least, could not be created merely by the agreement of such 
persons. An alien, as distinct from a Nigerian citizen, for 
example, or a married person as distinct from an unmarried 
person, an infant as distinct from adults, a bankrupt as
distinct from persons financially solvent, are all persons
h
who have a particular status. A husband, as a. husband, owes 
duties to his wife which he owes to no other person and cannot 
owe merely as a matter of law to any other person. A husband
1. Farwell, J . rs statement in Re Selot's Trust [1902] 1 Ch. 
488,492, that status is one"indivisible whole” does not 
recognize the fact that a change in the status of a person 
in one capacity does not necessarily affect his status in 
another capacity., e.g. a personfs discharge in bankruptcy 
does not affect his status as a father or husband.
2. A.R.Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive 
Society: Essays and Addresses (London, Cohen and West Ltd.. 
1952) p. 37.
3. Fprd v. Ford [1947] 73 C.L.R. 524.
4. Graveson, Status In the Common Law. 1953, pp. 14-32; Austin, 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, op. cit., p.710; William Markby, 
Elements of Law Considered with Reference to Principles of 
General Jurisprudence’] 6th ed. (London: Clarendon Press, 
1905) para. 99, p . 17o; Anson, Principles of the English 
Law of Contract, 24th edit. (London: Clarendon Press,1975), 
p~. 328; John Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th edit., (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., 1924), p .266.
101
therefore has a status different from that of unmarried men.^
-Similarly a bankrupt., because he is a bankrupt, cannot deal
with his property in the same manner as other persons.. These: •
consequences follow as a matter of law from the fact of member-
2ship of a particular class of persons.
The status of a married person was defined in Nibovet 
v. Nibovet thus:
"The status of an individual used as a legal term 
means the legal position of the individual in or with 
regard to the rest of the community. That relation 
between the parties and that status of each of them 
with regards to the community which are constituted 
upon marriage are not imposed or defined by contract 
or agreement but by law. The limitations or conditions 
or effects of such relation and status are different in 
different countries. As that relation and that status 
are imposed by law, the only law which can impose or 
define such a relation or status (i.e. relative position) 
so as to bind an individual is the law to which such an 
individual is subject."^
1. Brett, J. in Niboyet v. Niboyet [187^] 4 P.D.l, at p.11,
expressed the opinion that a married person had a status
but not a bachelor or spinster, and the House of Lords in 
Salveson v. Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] A.C. 
641, at p. 662, per Lord Dunedin noted that "'status' 
though sometimes loosely employed to denote the general 
attribute of being a true and lawful person within the 
jurisdiction of a particular community, in most of its 
application has a more restricted and a more technical 
meaning." See also Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence,
op. cit.» "A freeman or citizen has no status."
2. Cf. Roman law where a person who had a status was the
normal citizen of full age and capacity without any dis­
ability; the citizen who had full liberty and family 
rights without any disability; with the common law where 
"status" is used with reference to a person who had less 
or more rights than the average person. In English law 
status implies a legal classification of exceptions to the 
normal man or woman, see Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law 
from Augustus to Justinian, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1921), p.59.
3. [1874] 4 P.D.l; although the decision was overruled, the 
obiter dicta with reference to "status" were not adversely 
criticised.
4. Niboyet v. Niboyet [1878] 4 P.D.l at pp. 11-12.
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Allen makes a distinction between status, the 
condition which gives rise to certain capacities or incapacities 
or both; capacity, the power-to acquire and exercise rights, 
and the rights themselves ..which are acquired by the exercise 
of capacity.^ '
The different uses of the word status are illustrated
2
by the fact that marriage itself is a status, that is, in the
Q
sense that it is a condition of belonging to a particular 
class of persons which gives rise to certain capacities and 
incapacities; as used by Allen in the first sense. But there 
is also the status of a person within the status of marriage,
i.e. the capacity and the power to exercise rights or be 
subjected to duties within the status of marriage, Allenfs 
second use of the term , which he refers to as "capacity".
As used in the context of this thesis, legal status 
means the totality of rights and obligations, capacities and 
incapacities, attached to a group of persons, that is - 
women. The principle concern of the thesis is with the legal 
status of women in marriage, and not, for example, with their 
legal status in politics, contract or tort, where these are 
unrelated to marriage. Neither is the thesis concerned with 
those aspects of marriage which are not legal. However, 
womenfs status in any sphere of life is not dependent on law 
alone, and marriage is no exception. There are other factors, 
such as "educational status", which may affect the degree to 
which a wife is capable of exercising her legal rights in 
marriage. Again, her political status may determine what laws 
are made to govern her marital status.
1. See Carleton K. Allen, Legal Duties and other Essays in
Jurisprudence» (London: Clarendon Press, 1931), p.^7
2. See King v. Gray [1907] 24 S.C.554 (Supreme Court of the
Cape of Good Hope)
3. "Status" is often held to be synonymous with condition - 
see Mahludi v. R. [1905] 26 Natal Law Reports, 298;
Austin states that "a status or condition is a capacity
or ability to take rights or to incur or to become subject 
to duties which the law confers on a person as meaning 
homo or man" Austin,- Lectures, op. cit., p. 714.
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Other types of 11 status11
Certain types of status which directly affect the 
legal status of women in marriage will be briefly discussed 
here. These are:
(i) educational status 
(ii) economic status 
(iii) political status
The social status of women at different periods of 
time is highly relevant to the main theme: references to this 
are incorporated in the text, in the. appropriate contexts.
C . Educational status
The introduction into Nigeria of the Western type of 
education^* disrupted the parity between male and female 
education which previously existed in the traditional society.
Every homogeneous society has its own system of 
rearing children and instilling in them those tools of life 
necessary for effective existence. African society has always 
had its own scheme for inculcating its mores and norms in the 
young in preparation for adult life in the community. The 
system envisaged the different roles in the society played 
by males and females respectively, and accordingly, education 
and training after the weaning period was of a practical 
nature and bifurcated.
The young boy followed his father to the farm or to 
hunt in the forest. In a pastoral community, he helped his 
father to tend the cattle. In this way the child acquired 
those skills which fitted, him to be a farmer, hunter or herds­
man. He accompanied his father to the meetings of elders and 
learnt much of the history and tradition of his people. He 
became acquainted with the laws and methods of government
1. "Western education" means the formal and systematic
instruction in subjects characteristic of the curricula 
used in Western societies. This system of instruction was 
designed to standardize the training of young people, not 
only in the values of a modern industrialized society, but 
in the necessary skill for meaningful participation in that 
modernizing society.(J.S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to 
Nationalism. 1965, p.443) Cf. Otonti Nduka, Western. 
Education and the Nigerian Cultural Background,(Ibadan: 
Oxford University Press, 1964, p.4)
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during the discussions which took place at those meetings.
As soon as he had the required capacity, he was given 
•admission to the secret societies reserved for male members, 
a prevalent feature of many Nigerian societies. In the field 
of sports, he learnt to wrestle and play other games the men 
played.
The young girl, on the other hand, helped her mother 
with the household chores, followed her to market, and learnt 
her particular trade. She was taught to weed and cultivate 
womenfs crops, to take care of her younger siblings, do petty 
farming or petty trade, or whatever other occupation her 
mother and the female members of her family were engaged in.
She was trained to be a good wife and mother,(her main 
occupation in life), and, as soon as she was old enough, was 
allowed to attend women’s meetings. In other words, she was 
equipped for her status in life.
There was, therefore, separation, but no discrimination 
in educational opportunities; no question of the boy being 
educated while his sister was not. Both received the type of 
education best suited for their effective participation in the 
society.^
1. For education in the traditional society, see Saburi Biobaku, 
"The Effects of Urbanisation on Education in Africa: The
Nigerian Experience", International Review of Education,
Vol.XIII, 1967, No.4, pp.451-459; J .A.O.Akindele, History 
of Education in Nigeria, (Oyo: Nigeria, Ojoro Printing 
Works. 1967). p.8 et al: Abdou Moumouni, Education in Africa, 
(London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1968), pp. IS et al: J. A.
Majasan, Traditional System of Education in Nigeria,
Nigeria Magazine, No. 119, 1976, pp.23-295 see also No.'s 
120 and 121. Ibid. Cf. the views of Mary Kingsley "Mission­
ary and other forms of white education have not been given 
to African women to anything like the same extent that they 
have been given to men... our white culture has not had a 
grasp over the womankind of Africa that can compare with 
that it has had over the men," see Mary Kingsley, West 
African Studies, (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1899), 
p .376; Babs A. Fafunwa, History of Education in Nigeria. 
(London: George Allen)
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The introduction of the western type of education,
with its concomitants reading, writing^, and the formality of
a school, changed this traditional pattern. ■ The result was
disastrous to the status of women generally, and indirectly
affected their legal status in marriage. Western education
led to a significant dislocation of society and ultimate
neglect of the mainstay of the Nigerian economy - agriculture,
in which women played a full.'part. In some parts of the
country, for example, among the Ibibios, women did most of the
heavy work associated with farming, including clearing of the
2bush. Women thus had a dominant economic role.
Possession of a formal education became the new yard­
stick of social status and economic wealth. Western education 
created a new class of social elites , who in turn created a 
society which was European in outlook. Increased urbanization, 
and the establishment of various institutions, created a need 
for Nigerians with formal education. Few of these new jobs
were available to women because they lacked the required
4formal education*
Boys had a headstart in the field of Education in 
Nigeria, as in other parts of the world. While the boys were
5
'-sent to school grudgingly at first , it must be admitted,
1. Before the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria, Moslem schools were already functioning on a fairly 
wide scale. Most of these schools were "Koranic” schools 
where religious instruction as well as reading and writing 
in Arabic were taught. Many of the older women interviewed 
in Maidugari went to such schools; See also Albert Ogunsola, 
Legislation and Education in Northern Nigeria, (London:
Oxford University Press, 1974), p.6; Otoni Nduka,"Colonial 
Education and Nigerian Society", in Nigeria, Economy and 
Society, edit, by Gavin Williams, (London: Rex Collins,
1976), pp.94-95.
2. For the economic status of women see below, p.125.
3. See Hugh Smythe and Mabel Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite, 
(Stanford: U.S.A., Stanford University Press7 1971), p.165.
4. See Hugh Smythe and Mabel Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite,
1971, p.11.
5. See A.E. Afigbo, "The Background to the Southern Nigeria’ 
Education Code, 1903," 4, Journal of the Historical Society
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parents retained their hostility to Western education for a
longer time in the.case of girls. It was extremely difficult.
for a girl to be sent to school.1 - 
2Burns- , writing on African education, pointed out that 
there is a striking similarity in the objections which have been 
raised by parents in areas as widely separated as Northern 
Nigeria, Uganda, and the West Cameroons - objections which 
derive almost entirely from the dangers to which it is 
believed education will lead, rather than from any traditions 
which these areas might share. He says:
"It is claimed that schooling makes girls discontented 
and immoral, that girls who have been to school are 
less willing to undertake heavy labour in the fields, 
that there are no women teachers in the schools and 
that there is a real moral danger to adolescent girls 
in mixed schools with male teachers; and where the 
custom of bride wealth is strong parents commonly 
prefer marriage rather than schooling for their 
daughters"^
Footnote continued from, previous page:
of Nigeria, 1968, No. 2, p. 206; after fifty years of mission­
ary education on the coastal towns in Nigeria, farming, fishing 
and trading continued to compete with Western education as 
training for boys and girls; see also W.Waddell, 1863, op.cit., 
p.267. Cf. the position in 19^8 when 2,105 candidates competed 
-for the 30 places available at the Government College Umuahia 
in the former Eastern Provinces, see Colonial Reports. 1948,p.60.
1. Attempts to popularize the education of girls in the first 
two decades of this century met almost everywhere with a 
complete lack of encouragement; at the outbreak of the first 
World War, there were only seven or eight schools solely for 
girls, and very few girls were attending mixed schools - 
See G.H. Campbell, Some Educational Problems in Southern 
Nigeria in Connection with Progress Towards Self-Government, 
Ms. held in the library of the Institute of Education,London 
University, p.2.
2. See Donald G. Burns, African Education: An Introductory 
Survey of Education in Commonwealth Countries (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965); See also Memorandum on 
Educational Policy in Nigeria, 1947, Chapter XI, The 
Education of Women and Girls, pp.30-35.
3. See, "Some Trends in Education in the Western Region of 
Nigeria 1955-1965," 1965, I.L.Q. Labour Office Mission 
Pilot Project for Rural Employment Promotion, 1955-19bO,
p.5; see also ,fReport of the Committee on the Review of the 
Primary Education System in the Western State of Nigeria", 
1968; Western Nigeria Development Plan, 1962-68, Sessional 
Paper Nol 8 of 1962,p.40.
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A major factor contributing to the reluctance to educate girls 
in Nigeria, was the recognition that any benefits from a girlTs 
education would accrue ..to her future husband instead of her 
natal family. "Child-marriage" was also a potent factor 
militating against the education of girls. The attitude of 
parents towards paying for the education of girls is reflected 
in the fact that when the former Western Region introduced 
free primary education in January 1955, the proportion of boys 
to girls changed from 3:1 in 1954 to 2:1 in 1955. The number 
of girls at school more than doubled between these two years. 
This showed that parents did not object to the education of 
girls, but that they were not prepared to pay for it when there 
were boys to be educated.
Giving priority to the education of boys is a general 
trend all over West Africa and other parts of the world.^ In 
West Africa, the inferior educational status of women is 
illustrated by the fact that the ratio of girls to the total 
number of pupils in primary schools in 1945, in Nigeria was 1:5
p
in the Gold Coast 1:4; Sierra Leone 1:4 and Gambia 1:5.
This differential was maintained in the secondary 
school. The secondary education of girls everywhere in West 
Africa, except in Freetown and Bathurst, lagged behind that of 
boys. The ratios of girls to the total number of pupils in 
secondary schools in the various territories were - Southern 
Nigeria 1:8, Northern Nigeria 1:16, Ghana, (then the Gold Coast)
1. In 1961 UNESCO launched a large scale investigation into 
primary school attendance. Out of the 85 countries covered 
51 counted over 46 per cent of girls among school attenders 
However, in 24 countries girls represented only ten to 
forty per cent of primary school pupils. In 1965, of 122 
member countries or associate members of UNESCO, only 58,
- less than one half - had as many girls as boys in 
primary schools. In secondary schools the differentials 
are less in favour of girls - see Evelyne Sullerot* Woman, 
Society and Change, translated from the French by Margaret 
Scotland Archer, (London: World University Library, 1971),
pp. 113-116.
2. Great Britain: Report of the Commission on Higher Education 
in West Africa, 19^5, Cmd.6655, para.13, p.227
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1 :8; Sierra Leone 2:5; Gambia (Bathurst only) 2:3.1
.The disparity between male and.female education 
continued at the.university level.- The percentages which
women formed of the total student population in 1959 in
/
various universities were 35 in Rhodesia, 33 in the West Indies, 
26 in Hong Kong, 25 in Malaya, 10 in Sierra Leone, 8 in Malta,
7 in East Africa and Ghana, 6 at Ibadan in Nigeria, 4 at
p
Khartoum, and 24 for Great Britain. It is therefore evident
from these figures that the inferior status of women in higher
education was pandemic.
With particular reference to Nigeria, the tables,
graphs and maps below illustrate the gap which exists between
the education of boys and that of girls generally.-^ In 1959,
a year before Nigeria gained her political independence, and
when many of the women interviewed during field-work for this
thesis were of primary school age, girls represented only 36.7
of the total primary school population, although in 1963,
women were 49.5 percent of the population of Nigeria. The
percentage of girls in primary schools rose slowly from 36.7
per cent in 1959, to 39 percent in 1966, just before the
political disturbances disrupted education in the eastern parts
of the country. But after the Civil War ended in 1970, although
the number of girls actually enrolled in all types of schools
shows a steady increase, the percentage of girls in the total
primary school population has actually decreased. Prom 36.7
percent in 1959, it has fallen to 28.5 percent in 1973.
(Table 1:2, Pig. I). When it is considered that the numbers
of males and females are almost equal, it is evident that a
greater proportion of men are being educated now than was the
case in 1959. Additionally, there are more school drop-outs
among girls than there are among boys, so that the position
4may be much worse than the figures show ,
1. Ibid. - para 34, p.27.
Y*
2. See A.M. Care-Saunders, New Universities Overseas. 1961,
p. 187. In'Great Britain there was one university student 
for every 500 of the population; in Nigeria 1:20,000;
Ghana 1:9,000; West Indies and Malaya 1:4,000.
3. See Tables 1:3 and 1:5 below.
4. See fReport of the Committee on the Review of the Primary
Education System in the Western State of Nigeria,1 (Government Printer
Ibadan, 1968); Out of every primary school generation since 1959, .there 
were not less than 52% drop-outs before Primary VI.
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• TABLE 1:2
PRIMARY EDUCATION: STUDENTS ENROLLED IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS - 
(ACTUAL NUMBERS)
ci
SOUTHERN. STATES NORTHERN STATES NIGERIA
YEAR B G B G B G TOTAL
1959b 1,571,858 953,168 184,522 66,390 1,756,380 1,019,558 2,775,938
1965 1,442,000 976,913 349,563 143,266 1,791,563 1,120,179 2,911,742
1966 1,477,591 :1,029,526 367,776 151,088 1,845,367 1,180,614 3,025,981
1967° 742,249 529,909 363,624 143,194 1,105,873 673,103 1,778,976
1968d 534,717 387,081 394,200 151,037 928,917 538,118 1,467,035
1969° 772,710 549,566 431,535 169,497 1,204,245 719,063 1,923,308
1970 2,846,190 :1,106,852 669,637 192,746 3,515,827 1,299,598 4,815,425
1971 3,126,554 :1,270,872 767,985 224,623 3,894,539 1,495,495 5,390,034
1972 3,536,731 :1,464,094 854,466 252,237 4,391,197 1,716,331 6,107,528
1973 3,726,425 :1,574,504 934,696 278,691 4,661,121 1,853,195 6,514,316
a Sources: Compiled from statistics in the Annual Abstract
of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1966, 1969, and 197^. 
b Compiled from Digest of Statistics, Federal Ministry of
Information, 1959. 
c Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern States
d Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern and
Mid-Western States.
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• TABLE 1:3 •'
PRIMARY EDUCATION: STUDENTS ENROLLED IN PRIMARY gCOOLS BY 
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL SCHOOL ENROLMENT BY SEX AND STATE.
SOUTHERN STATES NORTHERN STATES TOTAL % BY SEX
B G TOTAL B G TOTAL B G
1959b 56.6 34.3 90.9 6.7 2.4 9.1 63.3 36.7
1965 49.5 33.5 83.0 12.0 5.0 . 17.0 61.5 38.5
1966 48.8 34.0 82.8 12.2 5.0 17.2 61.0 39.0
1967° 41.73 29.77 71.5 20.44 8.06 28.5 62.17 37.83
1968d 36.45 26.39 62.84 26.87 10.29 37.16 63.32 36.68
1969° 40.18 28.57 68.75 22.44 8.81 31.25 62.62 37.38
1970 59.1 23.0 82.1 13.9 4.0 17.9 73.0 27.0
1971 58.0- 23.6 81.6 14.2 4.2 18.4 72.2 27.8
1972 57.9 24.0 81.9 14.0. 4.1 18.1 71.9 28.1
1973 57.2 24.2 81.4 14.3 4.3 18.6 71.5 28.5
a Sources: Compiled from statistics in the Annual Abstract
of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1966, 1969 and 1974. 
b Source: Compiled from Digest, of Statistics, Federal
Ministry of Information, 1959. 
c Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern States,
d Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern and Mid-
Western States.
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FIGURE I
PRIMARY EDUCATION: STUDENTS ENROLLED IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS 
SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENROLLMENT BY STATE AND SEX
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The educational imbalance In favour of boys continues to exist 
at the secondary school leyel. In' 1959r. girls accounted for only . 20,5 
. per cent of the total secondary school population. This percentage has 
risen steadily over the period 1959 to 1972, although enrolment showed a 
sharp decrease from 33.6 per cent in 1970 to only 25.2 per cent in 1972. 
(Tables 1:4 and 1:5, and Pig. )
TABLE 1:4
SECONDARY EDUCATION (GENERAL): STUDENTS ENROLLED IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS 
(ACTUAL NUMBERS )a
SOUTHERN STATES NORTHERN STATES NIGERIA
YEAR B ... G B G B G TOTAL
1959b 84,700 22,485 4,237 446 88,937 15,479 64,209
1965 133,197 60,182 12,618 2,658 145,815 62,840 205,655
1966 131,418 62,187 14,492 3,208 145,910 65,395 211,305
1967° 79,832 42,689 16,663 3,653 96,495 46,342 135,162
1963d (129:.330) 20,762 5,065 - - 155,157
1969° 54,643 40,874 21,879 6,035 76,522 46,909 123,431
1970 175,945 95,824 30,014 8,271 ■ 205,959 104,095 310,054
1971 187,363 104,438 40,568 10,944 ‘. 227,931 115,382 343,313
1972 337,288 121,269 63,515 13,899 400,813 135,168 535,971
a Sources: Compiled from statistics in the Annual Abstract
of Statistics. Federal Office of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1966, 1969 and 1974. 
b Source: Compiled from Digest of Statistics, Federal
Ministry of Information, 1959. 
c Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern States,
d Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern or Mid-
Western States. The number for the Southern States is 
for boys and girls.
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' TABLE- 1:5 •
SECONDARY EDUCATION (GENERAL) STUDENTS ENROLLED IN SECONDARY 
SCHOOLS. AS PERCENTAGES OB TOTAL SCHOOL ENROLMENT BY SEX AND STATE
TOTAL
B G TOTAL B G TOTAL B G
1959b 75-7 20.1 79.5 3.8 0.4 4.2 79.5 20.5
1965 63.8 28.8 92.6 6.1 ■ 1.3 7.4 69.9 30.1
1966 62.2 29.4 91.6 6.9 1.5 8.4 69.1 30.9
1967° 55-9 29.9 85.8 11.7 2.5 14.2 . 67.6 32.4
1968d - - 83.3 13.4 3.3 16.7 - -
1969° 44.3 33.2 77.5 17.7 4.8 22.5 62.0 38.0
1970 56.7 30.9 87.6 9.7 2.7 12.4 66.4 33.6
1971 54.6 30.4 75.0 11.8 3.2 15.0 66.4 33.6
1972 62.9 22.6 85.5 11.9 2.6 14.5 74.8 25.2
a Sources: Compiled from statistics in the Annual Abstract
of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, 
Lagos, 1966, 1969 and 1974. 
b Source: Complied from Digest of Statistics. Federal
Ministry of Information, 1959. 
c Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern States,
d Numbers do not include enrolment in the Eastern and
Mid-Western States.
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MAP 5
GENERAL EDUCATION: NUMBER OF PUPILS ENROLLED BY SEX AND 
STATE 1972 (SECONDARY SCHOOLS)
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FIGURE 2
SECONDARY EDUCATION (GENERAL): STUDENTS ENROLLED IN
PRIMARY SCHOOLS SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EN- 
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The percentage of female teachers employed in all types 
of educational institutions in Nigeria is extremely low in 
comparison with the percentage of male, -teachers. For example^ 
in 1972 there were 130,434 male teachers employed in primary 
schools in the entire Federation, compared with only 34,312 
(20.8 per cent) female teachers.
n the secondary sector, the numbers were 16,722 and 
3s239 (16.2 per cent) for male and female respectively, and in 
Teachers* Training Colleges, while there were 1,915 male teachers 
employed, there were only 374 (16.4 per cent) female teachers 
employed. (Table 1:6 and maps No. 7 and 8)
TABLE 1:6
NUMBER OF TEACHERS EXMPLOYED BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND SEX
PRIMARY SCHOOLS SECONDARY SCHOOLS
TEACHERS’ , 
TRAINING COLLEGE
M F % Female M F % Female M F % Female
1970 103,152 . 24,409 .19.2 ' 14,091 2,667 15.9 1,8.56 366 16.5
1971 116,640 - - 15,278 2,829 15.6 2,108 344 14.0
1972 130,434 34,312 20.8 16,722 3,239 16.2 1,915 374 16.4
1973 123,780 34,663 21.9 1,863 356 16.0
Source: Compiled from statistics, Annual Abstract of Statistics,
Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos.
An interesting feature of the educational imbalance is 
that the total percentage of girls from the Southern States 
enrolled in both primary and secondary schools is greater than 
the total percentage of boys enrolled in the Northern States. 
(Figures 1 and 2.) In 1973, for example, while girls from the 
Southern States accounted for 24.2 per cent of the total primary 
school population, boys from the Northern States were only 
14.3 per cent of the total primary school population.
The girls from the Northern States are least 
represented in all types of schools. In 1959, they accounted 
for only 2.4 per cent of the total primary school population.. 
(Table 1:3), and 1.4 per cent of the total secondary school 
population of 64,209 pupils enrolled.(Table 1:5)
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MAP 6
PRIMARY EDUCATION: NUMBER OF TEACHERS EMPLOYED 
BY SEX AND STATE 1972
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MAP 7
GENERAL EDUCATION: NUMBER OF TEACHERS EMPLOYED BY SEX 
AND STATE 1972 (SECONDARY SCHOOLS)
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The responsibility for educating daughters and 
..wives among the. Moslems, is supposed to be imposed on fathers 
and husbands respectively.^ There has traditionally always 
been a wide gap between the education of male and female Moslems, 
although references in the Koran and Haaith which encourage
2the search for knowledge do not discriminate against women.
For a long time after colonization, the education
of Moslem children in the North was left in the hands of the
3local Moslem organizations such as the Ansarudeen Society.
Lugard, in his report of 1900-1901, stressed the 
importance of no compulsory religious training in the Northern 
Emirates. He was very concerned about forcing religious 
education on the children, and in accordance with his promise 
of non-interference in the religion of the people in the North 
he thwarted the attempts of Christian missionaries to open
*1. Dan Fodio, who inspired the main Fulani jihad in Nigeria
wrote in.the early 19th century: " to instruct one's wives, 
daughters and captives is a positive duty, while to impart 
knowledge to students is only a work of supererogation, 
and there is no doubt but that the one takes precedence 
over the other" - see Uthman Dan Fodio, "Islam and Women", 
quoted by Hodgkin, in Nigerian Perspectives, op. cit. 
pp. 254-255. See also Muhammad Yahaya, ojd. cit. p. 2.
2. See S.. A. Galadanci, "Education of Women in Islam with
Reference to Nigeria," Nigerian Journal of Islam, Vol.l,
No. 2, June 1971, pp. 5-10 at pp. 6-9.
3. See Babs A. Fafunwa, "Islamic Concept.of Education with
Particular Reference to Modern Nigeria", Nigerian Journal 
of Islam, Vol.l, No.l, June, 1970, p.l8; Albert Ogunsola, 
Legislation and Education in Northern Nigeria, (Ibadan, 
Nigeria: Oxford University Press, 1974) pp. 5-6; Lugard: 
Report on Amalgamation, cmd. 468, p.60; S.A.Jimoh,,"A 
Critical Appraisal of Islamic Education" Nigerian Journal 
of Islam, Vol. 2, No.l, 1972, pp. 36-37.
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Mission schools there.'1' In 1902, he stated the position 
thus:
"I am myself of the opinion that it is unwise and 
unjust to force-missions upon the Mohammedan 
population, for it must be remembered that without 
the moral support of the Government, these Missions 
would not be tolerated. In effect, therefore, 
the Mission obtains its footing on the support of 
British bayonets, and if they are established by 
order of Government the people have some cause to 
disbelieve the emphatic pledges I have given that 
their religion shall in no way be interfered with."2
Left to themselves, Moslem parents preferred not
to send their children to school. Fafunwa asserts that the
reason why Moslems did not send their children to school
to be educated was that they knew that "if their children
went to Christian schools they would return home as Christians."
Consequently, he argues that Moslem education in Nigeria
was retarded, not because the Moslems were unprogressive
or that their religion is opposed to formal education, but
because "TeducationT in those days meant Bible knowledge,
Christian ethics, Christian moral instruction, Christian
literature, some arithmetic, language and crafts, all geared
In the direction of producing Christians who could read
the Bible."3
However true this assertion may have been in the 
early days of Mission education, the argument loses its 
validity when applied to the modern situation. Most of the 
primary and secondary schools in the Northern States are 
now controlled and financed by the Governments and local
ii
authorities. As the figures show, the level of education
1. See Colonial Office Reports. 1905-1906, of Northern 
Nigeria, p. 470, especially Report for 1902, p. 136; 
see also Sonia Graham, Government and Mission Education 
in Northern Nigeria, 1900-19193 with special reference 
to the work of Hanns Vischer"] (Ibadan; Nigeria, Ibadan 
University Press, 1966, pp. 6-15; Albert F. Ogunsola, 
Legislation and. Education in Northern Nigeria, 1974,
pp. 6-13. Contrast, D.H. Williams, A Short Survey of
Education in Northern Nigeria (Ministry of Education,
Northern Region, 1959), p. 6.
2. Colonial Report. 1902, p. 136.
3. Fafunwa, "Islamic Concept of Education", op. cit., p. 18'.
4. In 1968, all the primary schools within the six Northern 
States were then administered by Local Education Authorities,
Footnote continued overleaf
122
in the North still lags far behind that in the South, although
there- is a slight improvement in the actual number of children
being educated.1
The reasons for the neglect of girlsT education in
2the Northern States are many, but, as will be later seen,
the chief causes are social customs and religious practices
such as ”child-marriage”J and polygamy, under which young girls
and, very often, even small children, are married to older
men as additional wives, and the practice of seclusion, whereby
women cannot associate with men who are not closely related 
4
to them.
Footnote continued from previous page:
see Ogunsola, op. cit. , p. 58. The Oldman Report recommended 
the formation of Local Education Authorities, each with 
an education committee, to provide and administer education 
in the Northern Region, see H. Oldman, The Administration of 
Primary Education, 1961, pp. 28-30; Oldman’s recommendations 
resulted in the Education Law,. 1962, No. 43 of 1962, Laws 
of Northern Nigeria.
1. For example, in 1912, the total number of children in 
school in the Northern Provinces was only 954 compared to 
35,716 children in the Southern Provinces in the same 
year, i.e. 2.7 per cent of total school population were 
Northerners. By 1926, the numbers increased to 5,210 in 
the North, compared with 138,248 in the South, 3.8 per cent. 
The increase in the North is 446 per cent compared to
only 387 per cent increase in the South, see Ogunsola, 
op. cit., p. 56.
2. See Memorandum on Educational Policy on Nigeria, 1947, 
Sessional Paper, No. 20 of 1947, Chapter XI.
3. See in this respect the submission of Mallama Hassu Kaita 
in the paper she submitted to the National Curriculum 
Conference: "A girl may sit for the common entrance
examination and get admitted to a secondary school after 
doing very well in examinations. Her parents may decide
to withdraw her from going for further study; in this case 
she is forced by local customs to get married at the age 
of twelve to thirteen, sometimes to an old man.”, see 
Federal Ministry of Education, ’’Report of National Curric­
ulum Conference”, Lagos, Nigeria: Nigeria Educational
Research Council, 1970; see also Ogunsola, 1974, p. 84; 
Mallam Aliyu Zaria,"Education of Women and Girls in the 
Northern Provinces" Ms.. kept in the library of the Instit­
ute of Education, London University, N.D.
4. See further, below, Chapter IX, pp. 59-67.
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At the inception of education in the l840,s in
Southern Nigeria, girls could be numbered, in twos or threes.,
while boys'came to school by the score, but there had always
been equal opportunity for the training of both sexes.^ Until
the early twentieth century, education in Nigeria was left in
the hands of the Missionaries who realised the importance of
female education, and catered for it, but it was an uphill
task to change conservative native opinion as to the value of
educating girls.
The pendulum has swung full circle, and most parents in
the Southern States do not discriminate between.boys and girls
with reference to education, especially since free primary
education in all States of the Federation was instituted in
1976. In fact, many parents stated that they would prefer to
educate their daughters, rather than sons, because of the greater
financial contributions women now make to their natal families.
In the words of a blind 80 year old Igbo Chief from Onitsha,
"Girls look after their parents better than men. The 
boy will look after himself and wife and wonft bother 
about anybody else.. The girls will look after their 
parents and the other children of the family."
In spite of this change in attitude towards womens1 education,
.. q
it still lags far behind mens1 education. Males predominate
in all educational institutions, and consequently, they have
1. See Waddell, Twenty-Nine Years,...op.cit. pp. 346-347.
2. For e.g. In 1964, the population of girls in elementary 
schools in the former East Central State was 457,338 which 
represented about 39 percent of the total primary school 
population. In 1975 - 1976, school year, the percentage of 
girls in’Auambra State alone, enrolled in primary schools, 
was 42.5 percent of the total primary school enrollment 
(actual numbers were 336,392 boys, compared with 271,750 
girls).. See Annual Report. Ministry of Education, Official 
Document, No. 4 of 1967, Government Printer Fnugh; and Govern­
ment of Arambra State, Schools Statistics, 1975#76 School Year, 
Research and Statistics branch, State School Management
Board Fnugh, p.35.
3. See the Tables and maps showing educational imbalance above 
pp.109. to. 117; The Educational Report for 1947 states: In no
area does the number of girls attending school in any way com­
pare with the enrollment of boys, and a proportion of 1:3 is 
the best which has yet been achieved anywhere. A proportion
of 1:6 (is) common", see Colonial Reports, 1947, p.48; see also 
The Ten Year Educational Plan, Dispatch No. 485, dated 19 Nov. 
1942, to P.C. Cranborne, Secretary of State, which contains an
Footnote continued overleaf
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a near virtual monopoly of professional and- skilled jobs.1
Formal education prepares the individual for employ­
ment in the economically and socially rewarded formal sector 
of the society. To the extent that women have less chance to 
enter the higher levels of the educational system, their 
chances to enter formal employment*and especially the higher 
level positions within this sector, are proportionately lessened.
Of 156 members of "the elites" interviewed by Smythe and Smythe around
21959, only 5 were women. The poor educational attainment of 
women generally also affects their marital status. The cul­
tural barriers erected between husband and wife due to the 
fact that the husband may have received a Western education and 
as a result finds it difficult to form a satisfactory marital 
relationship with a wife whose way of life, mental outlook and 
social values are rooted in the traditional culture, have con­
tributed to marital instability in many homes in Nigeria.
Additionally, lack of education deters a wife from 
understanding and enforcing her marital rights, and in some cases 
prevents her from appreciating the ill-effects on the welfare 
of the family which result from the neglect of her marital rights 
and duties.
Footnote continued from previous page:
extract of the report of Miss Plummer (Lady Education Officer) 
on "The Education of Women and Girls", Appendix X, para. 34 
of the dispatch.
1. See further, below, ;-Table 1:8, p. 132.
The introduction of Free Primary education in 1976 will help 
considerably in correcting the educational imbalance between 
the sexes, see Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Policy 
on Education, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1977, 
Section 3, Primary Education; 15 (1), p.7, "Government has 
made primary education free and by implementing the U.P.E. 
scheme in September 1976, and proposes to make it compul­
sory as soon as possible."
2. See Hugh Smythe and Mabel Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite, 1971, 
op.:clt. pJLl; Bernanrd Nkemdiran, Social_Change and Political 
Violence (London, Arthur Stockwell Ltd.- 1975; ,'*PP- 27 -”2b;
E. A. Ayan.dele., The Educated Elite in the Nigerian Society, 
(Ibadan, Ibadan University Press, 197^), espT pp. 13 - l4; see 
also Employment Aspirations and Prospects of Nigerian University 
Undergraduates and Graduates, Research Bulletin-. No. 1#002;
Human Resources Research Unit, School of Social Studies, Uni­
versity of Lagos, 1977, pp.26.
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D. Economic status
Women traditionally had a high economic status in most 
Nigerian societies-.
For the purpose of this brief examination of the eco­
nomic status of women, three types of societies will be consi­
dered, and the economic role women play in each type of society:
(i) communities where women are secluded and generally 
do only domestic work which can be done within 
the confines' of the compound;
(ii) agricultural communities;
(iii) communities where women are mainly engaged in trade.
(i ) Women in seclusion
This category, which comprises those societies in 
Northern Nigeria where women were traditionally, and to an in­
creasing extent still are secluded, and prevented from engaging 
in any activity which involves social intercourse with any man 
who is not within the prohibited degrees, of marriage with them, 
can be dispensed with easily. Here, womens* economic status was 
a dependent one generally, and for obvious reasons has remained 
•so.^ Modernization has. only resulted, as will be seen later, in
an increase in the number of women secluded, a consequence of
2enhanced economic prosperity of men generally; -the provision of 
modern amenities such as pipe-borne water, electricity and 
gas for domestic purposes, making it easier for husbands to dis­
pense with the wives1 domestic services which can only be per­
formed outside the compound, for example, fetching water or 
firewood, for cooking and other domestic purposes.
1. See further Chapter IX below.
2. See Dorothy Hemy, "Underdevelopment.and the Experience of 
Women: A Nigerian Case Study” , in Nigeria.: Economy and 
Society, edit, by Gavin Williams, (London: Rex Collings, 
1976), pp. 127 - 130); compare Emmy B. Simmons, Economic 
Research on Women in Rural Development in Northern Nigeria,
O.L.C. Paper, No. 10, Sept. 1976, pp. 6 et al, women in 
purdah earn money in occupations such as food processing, 
crafts, etc., which do not require contact with people 
outside their compounds.
126
(11) Agricultural communities
In the traditional farming communities, the family's 
income was derived mainly from three sources.
(a) agriculture - the production of food crops for 
subsistence o r .for sale;
(b) tree crops - such as kola-nuts, palm trees, rubber 
cocoa crops;
(c) home industries - for example, weaving of cloth, 
basket making, making of pottery, jewelry and 
household utensils for domestic use or sale.
Although the production of food was undertaken by the 
family as a unit, the major portion of the work was done by 
women in the large majority of traditional societies. For exam­
ple, Igbo communities are predominantly agricultural communities. 
The type of farming is mainly subsistence farming and the ser­
vices of the wives and children are indispensable.1 The hus­
band usually tills the ground and prepares the yam mounds on the
2
land allocated to him. His wife and children are expected to
"3
help him in the planting of his crops, usually only yams, and 
to attend to the weeding of the family farm. In addition to this, 
the wife invariably interplants such crops as pumpkins, melons, 
cocoayams, beans, corn and other vegetables, as well as culti­
vating her subsidiary plot adjacent to the compound, on which
1. See further, Margaret M..Green, Igbo Village Affairs Chiefly 
with Reference to the Village of Umueke Agbaja, 2nd edition 
(1947, London, Frank Cass Ltd, 1964), p. 33; Ford and Jones, 
1967, op.cit., p. 13; Equiano, op.cit. p.4 ; Esther Akpuokwe, 
"The Role of Women in the Traditional Religion of Nimo and 
Njokoka Division", (Part Fulfillment B.A. Degree, University 
of Nigeria, 1976, p.9; Green, Land Tenure in an Ibo Village, 
p. 34.
2. Men also cut stakes, train the yam vines, build the yam barns, 
and store the harvest; see generally: Forde and Jones, 1967, 
op.cit., p. 13; Bradbury, The Benin Kingdom,, op.cit., pp.23 - 
24; Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, op. 
cit., p. 51; Green, Igbo Village Affairs, 1964, pp. 36 - 37,
T77 - 175.
3. In some areas it is an offence for women to plant yams, see 
Meek, Law and Authority..., op.cit. , p. 17. Among the Tiv, 
millet belongs exclusively to women, see Bohannan and Bohan­
nan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, op.cit. p.l8; for the divi­
sion of labour between the spouses see J. Harris, "Papers on 
the Economic Aspect of Life Among the Ozu Item Ibo", 14, 
Africa, 1943-4, pp. 12 - 23, pp. 14-19; Meek, Northern Trltres 
of Nigeria, pp. 233 - 234.
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she.might plant cassava, corn, peppers and other vegetables.
•From her crops,, she-was. expected to supply all, or nearly all,
the family's food requirements. Any surplus vegetables, etc.,
/
she produced was utilized in the purchase of fish, meat and 
other items necessary for cooking.
This is the pattern which obtains among many other 
communities. The Ibibios are primarily cultivators, mainly for 
subsistence, since the bulk of their wealth is derived from 
the export of palm-oil products, distributive trading among 
themselves, and the wage labour of men employed outside their 
villages.^* At the present time, staple foods such as yams, 
cassava,and even green vegetables are brought from as far as 
Aba for sale locally. Women, who traditionally did most of the 
farmwork, even the work usually reserved for men in other 
communities, for example, clearing the bush for farming, have 
forsaken farming for the more lucrative trading, among many 
Ibibio communities.
Although the Nupe are primarily farmers, Nupe women
do no farm work, and with very few exceptions, no primary pro-
2
ductive activity. The Tiv are also mainly farmers, and Tiv women
3
do the planting and weeding.
The wife in such a subsistence agricultural community,
had an important economic function. Apart from the yams or
millet which the husband contributed, most of the other items
of food consumed by the family depended on her labour. Her
role as a provider increased with the introduction into many
parts of Nigeria of cassava, which the men disdainfully referred
4
to as womens' crops and refused to plant. Yam is a seasonal
1. See Forde and Jones, op.cit. p.70.
2. See Nadel, A Black Byzantium, pp. 205, 252; Meek, Northern
Tribes of Nigeria, p.133.
•3. See Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, p.51;
, see also Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, p.133-
4. See••Unokanma Okonjo, The Impact of Urbanization on the Igbo 
Family Structure, (Germany, Gerhard Munch Offsetdruck, 1970), 
p"! 106; Phoebe V. Ottenberg, "The Changing Economic Position 
of Women Among the Afikpo Ibo", in Continuity and Change in 
African Cultures, edit, by William R. Bascom and Melville J.. 
Herskovits (London: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix 
Books, 9th imp. 1975), p. 215.
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crop, and when the year!s yield has been consumed, the main­
stay of many families is dependent on cassava produced by the 
wife. When the yam harvest has been reaped, the farm is usually 
replanted by women with corn and cassava. The family is thus 
assured of provisions when the yams are finished.
In a word, the wife had a high economic status. In 
this respect Basden says of the Igbos:
"In the domestic affairs of life it works out that the 
menfolk hold themselves responsible for the yam supply, 
whilst the women provide all the extras, fish oil, 
peppers and other luxuries; they are the purveyors of 
the salt and savour of the mensr lives.
With reference to certain cash crops, for example palm-tree 
products, there was also a division of labour in which the wife
had a significant share. The husband usually reaped the palm-
2  ^nuts, but the wife and young children extracted the palm oilJ
4
and cracked the kernels. The oil belonged to the husband, but 
In many societies the wife had the right to claim the kernels.
In most cases she sold her husband's oil for him, but she had 
to account to him for the proceeds. Any money, she received 
for the kernels was her own.
1. G.T. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, 1966, p.90; P. Otten- 
berg., op>cit... pp.36 - 37; Akpuokwe , 1976, p.9. See also 
Green., Land Tenure in an Ibo Village, op. cit > p. 35.
2. The tapping of the palm trees to obtain wine, and the selling
of the wine are usually done by men, see Forde and Jones, op. 
cit. p.l4; Cf. the position among the. Yorubas, where women 
usually sell palm wine, see Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern 
Nigeria, p.26.
3. See Nadel, A Black Byzantiunu p.234; N.A. Fadipe, The Sociol­
ogy of the Yoruba, edit, with an Introduction by Francis Olu
Okediji and Oladejo 0. Okediji, (Ibadan, Ibadan University 
Press, 1970), p.88.
4. The kernels were almost as valuable as the palm-fruit itself, 
and were often sold to European factories for export to Europe, 
see Fadipe, op.cit. p.88; Burns, History of Nigeria. 1969, p.108; 
183,000 tons of palm oil and 418,000 tons of palm kernels were 
exported from Nigeria in I960.
5 . See Green, Igbo Village Affairs, 1964, p.40.
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With increased urbanization and attendant social change, 
there was- a disruption' of rural life, and. a resultant shift- from 
agriculture'and a divorce from the land. Traditional techniques 
of production have, in many cases, been abandoned. The hoe and 
the spade have given way to the machine, the horse and the plough 
have been replaced by tractors, and the manufacture of palm oil 
by laborious pounding of the wife at. home has yielded to pro­
duction by sophisticated oil mills, for example, the "Pioneer 
Oil Mills".
Mair has noted the fact that many people suffer in 
periods of rapid social change.^ In the change from the tradi­
tional society, where agriculture and primitive methods of pro­
duction prevailed, to a society primarily engaged in trade, 
manufacture, governmental and other pursuits common to cities, 
women have been among the principal losers.
For example, the traditional method of producing palm
oil was to boil the fruit, after which it was pounded and
2the oil extracted by hand. This work was done by women and
children. The oil, when extracted, usually belonged to the bus­
's
band, but the kernels were the wife1s. The introduction of 
oil mills to process the oil from the palm-fruit changed this 
pattern to the disadvantage of women. In the mass production 
undertaken by these oil mills, the palm-nuts were sold to them 
in bulk. The wife thus lost her right to the kernel. In most
4cases, the entire sum paid for the palm nuts went to the husband^: 
In addition, any profit she might have made by her ability to 
strike a good bargain when she sold her husband1s oil by the 
retail method in the local, markets was also lost, since the mills 
invariably purchased the. palm nuts directly from, the husband.
1. Lucy Mair, Anthropology and Social Change, 1971s p.137.
2. See Nadel, A Black Byzantium, p. 234; William L. Miller,
wAn Economic Analysis of Oil Palm Fruit Processing in Eastern 
Nigeria* (Ph.D. .dissertation, Michigan State University, 1965).
3. Okonjo, The Impact of Urbanization... pp.111-112; Green, Igbo 
Village Affairs, pp. 40 - 41; Green, Land Tenure in an Ibo 
Village, p.20.
4. Igbo women particularly suffered in this respect since it was 
not usual for the wife to be given the kernels among the Ibibios. 
Eket informants stated that both nuts and kernel were the sole 
property of the husbands.
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The' wife’s economic position was therefore adversely affected.'*'
(iii) Trading communities
In those societies where womens’ main occupation was
2
trade, the reverse occurred. The economic status of women who
were traders was enhanced as a result of the increased variety
of goods available, and the national appetite for consumption
of such goods. Yoruba women traditionally had a reputation for
trading, an aptitude which has been given full rein in the
3
m o d e m  society.
Trading has replaced, farmwork to a large extent even
in those societies where women traditionally never engaged in
trading. In fact, trading has become a major occupation among
all sectors of the population— professionals and non-professionals,
male and female. The huge profits that can easily be made
induce many professionals to forsake their chosen professions
4
and to engage in trade.
1* See Pius Okigbo, "Social Consequences of Economic Development 
*in West . Africa" in Africa: Social Problems, of Change and 
Conflict, edit, by Pierre Van Den Berghe, (California Chandler 
Publishing Co., 1965), p. 417 al.
2_ For e.g., the Yorubas; certain Igbo communities, e.g. Onitsha; 
the Efiks, mainly in fish and palm oil; and the Nupes.
3. In the 1850*s Madam Tinubu, a famous woman trader, was said 
to be a debtor of over £5,000 advanced to her for palm-oil, by
various merchants, see Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation,
Eminent Nigerians of the Nineteenth Century: A Series of
Studies originally broadcast by the Nigerian Broadcasting Cor-
porationl (Cambridge University Press, I960), p.37. In 1937, 
Bascom noted that Yoruba women traders were able to obtain 
credit running into thousands of pounds sterling for imported 
goods which they retailed through their associates; see 
Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, p. 26. Since inde­
pendence the value of their trade has risen considerably; see 
also P.C. Lloyd, "The Yoruba of Nigeria" in Peoples of Africa, 
edit, by James L. Gibbs, (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Win­
ston Inc., 1965)y p. 548.
4. See also Okonjo, "The Impact of Urbanization..." , p. 126 - 
129, Cf. Barbara B. Lloyd, "Education and Family Life in the 
Development of Class Identification Among the Yoruba" in The 
New Elites of Tropical Africa,, edit, by P.C. Lloyd, (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1966), p.l65: "...only a very few wives 
of top-level civil servants and politicians can afford the luxury 
of staying at home"; cf. Green, Igbo Village Affairs» 1964, op. 
cit. p.13: "Among these people trade is second only to agri­
culture as a means of livelihood and is one of their ruling 
passions".
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The emergence of "women contractors", a new phenomenon 
on the Nigerian scene, has further upgraded the economic status 
of Nigerian women. The introduction of this type of work has 
to a great extent redressed'the imbalance in the economic status 
of women which resulted from the reduced emphasis on agriculture 
and mechanisation, since education is not a necessary criterion 
for success in this field. Illiterate women, devoid of profes­
sional skills, execute contracts ranging from the delivery of 
sand to the building of complex office blocks. Nigerian women 
have thereby demonstrated their business acumen, enterprise and 
adaptability to changing circumstances. Every large town has 
many wealthy women traders and contractors, often referred to 
as "cash madams".^
During field-work for this thesis, primary and secondary 
school children were asked to write essays on the status of Niger­
ian women. The economic contributions and status of women were 
stressed in most essays. It was evident from these answers that 
wives continue to be the main economic pillars on which the 
Nigerian family is built, and that many of the children would 
not have had the opportunity of gaining an education had it not 
been for the financial contributions of their mothers.
(iv) Professional occupations
In the professional fields, womensf economic position is 
less favourable. Their inferior level of education has hampered 
progress in these fields.
A study of Nigeriars professional manpower in selected 
occupations, conducted in 1963 - 1964 revealed that male persons 
constituted the overwhelming majority of registered professionals
1. In this respect, see the reply made by the Nigerian Govern­
ment to the questionnaire on the role of women in the eco­
nomic and social development of their countries, issued by 
the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. in 1967, to the 
effect that, "although statistics with respect to the acti­
vities of gainfully employed women seemed low, such figures 
did not take into account the very significant role which 
women played in agriculture, in self-employed'activities 
and'in family enterprises", - Participation of Women in the 
Economic and Social Development of Their Countriesa United 
Nations Publication E CN.6 513, Rev.l, p.7; see also ibid., 
PP- 53, 65 and 99; and Emmy B. Simmons, Economic Research on 
Women in Rural Development in Northern Nigeria» O.L.C. Paper 
No. 10, Sept. 1976, pp. 1 - 3.
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being 98.3 percent of the total, while females accounted for 
only 1.4 per cent.^
As table 1:7 below shows, in terms of numbers, females 
were most notable in the field of medicine, yet there were only 
six of them registered as doctors, constituting a mere 2.7 per­
cent of that category; and one as dentist, equivalent to 5 per­
cent in the field of dentistry. There were also 4 female mathe­
maticians, equivalent to 7.5 percent and 4 female economists, 
constituting 1.5 percent of those registered in that profession. 
No females were registered in the field of architecture, town- 
planning, engineering or veterinary science.
TABLE 1:7
ANALYSIS OP REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER BY SEX
Male _______ Female________Unspecifiedrrui cos j-uxi J.U i/ax No. No.
Architects & 
Town Planners 37 37 10.0.0
Engineers 436 436 100.0 - - - -
Economists 273 269 98.5 4 1.5 - -
Statisticians 28 27 96.4 1 3.6 - -
Mathematicians 53 49 92.5 4 7.5 - -
Accountants & 
Auditors 186 181 97.3 2 1.1 3 1.6
Doctors 221 215 97.3 6 2.7 - -
Dentists 20 19 95.0 1 5.0 - -
Veterinarians 10 10 100.0 - - - -
All Professions 1,264 1 ,243 98.3 18 1.4 3 0.3
a Source - Lifted from: A Study of Professional Manpower
in Selected Occupations, 1964, Table 3, p . 10.
1. A Study of Nigeriafs Professional Manpower in Selected Occupa­
tions; Manpower Study No. 3, Lagos, 1964, p.4.
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In the 1963 Census, women constituted a little more 
than 14 percent of the total number of professional, techni­
cal and related workers employed, but In the administrative, 
executive and managerial grade, of 39,402 persons employed, only 
2,665 (or 6.8 percent) were women. Women accounted for 1 per­
cent of 2,299 electrical engineers, 3*2 percent of mechanical 
engineers, 15.2 percent of the 72 metallurgical engineers, and 
1.9 percent of 114 mining engineers.
In the medical field 458 (3.3 percent) out of 13,922 
physicians were females; 18 (8.3 percent) out of 2 i 7 dentists; 
and 4.9 (7.7 percent) out of 639 pharmacists were also women.
TABLE 1:8-
EMPLOYED PERSONS BY OCCUPATION; BY SEX,'1963.
PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND RELATED WORKERS
T O T A L
Occupation ------------------------------------
Total Males Females
Professional, Technical 
and related workers 440,613 375,066 65,547
Constructional Engineers 2,510 2,417 93
Electrical Engineers 2,299 2,417 24
Mechanical Engineers 1,848 1,789 59
Metallurgical Engineers 72 61 11
Mining Engineers 114 113 1
Surveyors 3,888 3,859 29
Other Engineers 333 331 2
Chemists 556 535 21
Physicists 205 192 13
Industrial Research 19 18 1
Veterinarians 439 411 28
Biologists 780 734 46
Agronomists 2,240 2,200 40
Livestock Specialists 26 26 -
Physicians 13,922 13,464 458
Dentists 217 199 18
cont *d
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TABLE 1:8 (contfd ...)
T 0 T A L
U 0 C-Lip Ci u ZL O xi
Total Males Females
Medical Research 55 51 4
Nurses 6,183 2,086 4 ,097
Midwives 2,883 101 2 ,782
Auxiliary Nurses 11,827 3,563 8 ,264
Pharmacists 639 590 49
Opticians 36 31 5
Medical Technicians 170 144 26
Health Officers 3,338 3,224 114
Dispensary Attendants 825 760 65
Herbalists 41,773 39,336 2 ,437
Osteopaths 36 31 5
University Teachers 533 466 67'
Teachers 205-,8l0 163,490 42 ,320
Vocational Teachers 1,079 1,015 64
Instructors 48,311 47,756 555
Jurists 3,504 3,370 134
Painters, Sculptors 1,992 1,934 58
Carvers 4,555 4,444 111
Writers 1,412 1,348 64
Actors, Musicians 62,992 60,186 2 ,806
Draughtsmen 4,617 4,529 88
Accountants 684 670 14
Technical Officers 2,112 2,084 28
Technicians 3,368 3,252 116
Other Professionals 2,411 1,981 430
SOURCE: Population Census of Nigeria, 1963
Table 9, pp. 42 - 43. .
As table 1:8 shows, women were predominant only in 
the field of nursing.
Since 1964, it is safe to assume that the number of fe­
male professionals has increased, evidenced by the number of 
graduates of Nigerian universities, males and females, in the 
years 1971 - 72, and 1973 - 74, shown below in table 1:9. The 
disparity nevertheless exists between male and female employ­
ment, and is evident even in those professions where one would 
expect to find more women, for example, teaching in primary 
school. As table 1.5 shows, males predominate in every stage of 
the teaching profession from primary school to university.1
Although the disparity between male and female profes­
sionals still exists in favour of the males, there is some indi­
cation that the gap is becoming less wide. For example, 365 
students entered the Higher College Yaba, Lagos from 1930 - 1945. 
All except 2 were men; that is, only 0.6 percent were women.
In I960 the percentage of women in the highest educational insti­
tution in Nigeria had risen to 6.3 percent. In that year there 
were 1,173 male students and 79 female students registered at
o
University College Ibadan. In 1973 - 74, there was a further 
Increase in female participation in higher education. Of 23,228 
students enrolled in all Nigerian universities, 3,591, or 15.5 
percent were women.^
1. In 1963, there were 446 male university lecturers, compared to 
67 female lecturers; see table 1:8, above, pp. 133-134.
2. Report of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa, 
Cmd. 6655, par. 26, p. 36; at the end of 1955, 520 students 
were in residence at University College Ibadan, of whom
21 (4 per cent) were women. See Colonial Report, 1955*
p.88.
3. See A. M. Cai^-Saunders, New Universities Overseas, (London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p . 254.
4. See Table 1:9, p. 136.
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TABLE - 1:9
STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ALL UNIVERSITIES IN NIGERIA, BY SEX, FIELD 
OF STUDY, AND LEVEL OF COURSE. - ACADEMIC YEAR 1973 - 1974.
Certificate
Field of Study & Diploma Degree ' Post- T O T A L
Course Degree
M F ; M F M F M F M-F
Administration 246 ■34 710 75 189 15 1145 124 1269
Arts 237 56 2656 678 98 19 2991 753 3744
Education 946 383 1555 532 152 44 2653 959 3612
Law 159 28 690 201 14 - 863 229 1092
Social Science 49 11 1994 189 65 7 2108 207 2315
Pure Science 1 3 3283 613 110 12 3394 628 4022
Medicine, Pharm­
acy, & Nursing 23 12 2302 431 32 3 2357 446 2803
Technology 1 - 2561 59 79 2 2641 61 2702
Agriculture, Fores­
try, and Veterinary 
Medicine 38 10 1358 168 89 6 1485 184 1669
TOTAL 1700 537 17109 2946 828 108 19637 3591 23228
GRAND TOTAL 2237 20, 055 936 23,228
Percentage Total 76 24 85.3 14.7 8.8.5 11.5 84.5 15.5
Total Percentage- 
1972 - 1973 79.1 20.9 86.3 13.7 84.6 15.4 85.6 14.3
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1974, Federal Office of
Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria, p. 159*• Percentages added.
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E. POLITICAL STATUS
The•political status of Nigerian women is less favour­
able than their economic status. This was so in the traditional 
society and to a large extent remains true today.
There is evidence that some women in certain traditional
societies played an active political role, and a few women rulers
are recorded in Nigerian history. As previously noted, Queen
Amina of Zaria is famous in Hausa history.1 Similarly, Queen
Kambassa of Bonny is notable in Bonny history as the first and
only women to occupy the throne. She was reputed to be an effec-
2tive ruler whose orders were obeyed by all.
Apart from these few female rules, daughters, mothers 
sisters and wives of the king or chief have played significant 
political roles. For example, the mother of the Shehu of 
Bornu,. Ya Magira, and his senior wife, Ya Gumsu, also held 
fiefs. The fiefs of these female title holders were among the 
largest in the kingdom, which suggests that these women were 
particularly influential. Among the Jukun, a minor group of 
people in Northern Nigeria, the sister of the deceased chief 
could veto the choice of his successor, and thus control the 
succession, and the widow of the chief was the counsellor and 
guardian of the next ruler.
Apart from these women who wielded political influence 
because of their relationship with the ruler, individual women 
in certain societies wielded political influence as compared
1. See above, p. 92.
2. Ebiegberi J. Alaboa and Adadonye Fombo, A Chronicle of Grand 
Bonny, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1972), p.IS; see also 
Eminent Nigerians of the Nineteenth Century, I960, a series of 
studies originally broadcast by the Nigerian Broadcasting Cor­
poration, for details of Madam Tinubu who was reputed to be 
the power behind the throne of King Akitoye of Lagos, and his 
successor, King Donsunmu.
3. See Louis Brenner, The Shehu of Kukawa, 1973* p.91. These 
ladies were not officially recognized by the British in Bornu, 
although at one time it was proposed that they be ranked as 
second class chiefs and given staves of office; see Askell 
Benton, The .Sultanate of Bornu, p. 173.
4. See Hatch, Nigeria: A History, 1971, p. 37, Meek, Northern
Tribes of Nigeria, Vol. I, p. 256.
138
with political power. For example, among the Yorubas, although --- 
women were not associated with the political, process on the- same
basis as men, through the institution of the Iyalode, the woiruln
delegated as their political'leader and spokesman in government, 
they did have a channel of direct participation in politics.
Fadipe points out that:
"although the views of the Iyalode were generally 
solicited with regards to business which was being 
discussed in the council, she usually deferred to 
the superior judgment of the males.f*^ .
A similar arrangement to the Yoruba Iyalode institution
existed among Onitsha Igbos, where the Omu or queen presided
over the organization of women of Onitsha (Ikporo Qnicha), to
which all women who are,or have been married,be long. Her role
paralleled that of the king and she was usually referred to as
queen by European observers, but she was not the king*s wife, nor
was she usually closely related to him. She was elected by the
king (Obi) to represent the womens1 viewpoint in the king*s
Council of which she was a member. The important criterion for
choice of Omu was proven ability for leadership. She had women
chiefs similar to those of some male chiefs, whose chief duties
were to look after the public affairs of the women generally,
to ensure that womens* organizations were peacefully run, to
supervise village markets, settle disputes among the women, to
ensure strict observance of customary law among the women,and
2
to render social and political services.
In spite of representation in decision-making Councils, 
womens* influence in the traditional society was minimal. Among 
the Igbos and most other communities, village assemblies, the 
centre of political authority, were mens* affairs, although there 
is evidence that women could use their combined political strength 
to effect their purpose when necessary. Ibo, Ibibio and Yoruba 
women all have shown considerable ability in using politics when
1.. N. A. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, 1970, op.cit., p.253
A. K. Ajisafe, The • Laws and Customs, of the Yoruba People, 
(London, Pioutledge and Sons Ltd., 1924), pp. 19 - 20.
2.' Information given in a recorded interview with P. 0. Ana- 
toga, the Onowu of Onitsha, on 19th July 1977 5 at Onitsha; 
and with Chief I. A. Mbanefo, the Odu of Onitsha, on 8th 
August, 1977.
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their economic interest is threatened,^ or to further their
trading interests. An example of this is evident in the Aba
riots of 1929, when the women revolted'against the colonial
2authorities following rumours that they were to be taxed.
These riots resulted in the death of thirty-two women (and
thirty-one were wounded) and led to a series of Commissions of
Enquiry^ as well as anthropological investigations as to their
4
probably causes. On a smaller scale were the disturbances
caused by the wives of miners at the Enugu colliery. The sole
cause of complaint seemed to have been that their menfolk were
not being paid money which was due to them. The disturbances
created by the wives were dubbed as an attempt to bolster the
claims of the miners. It was alleged that the women had no
political aim, but they caused a great deal of damage to property
5and there was some shooting. Margaret Ekpo, the well-known 
Nigerian politician, played an active part in this riot and
1. See Margaret Pei.1, "Female Roles in West African Towns", in 
Changing Social Structures in Ghana.(edited J. Goody) 1975-
2. Information collected by the present writer among the Ibibios, 
at Eket and Calabar, and informants from Aba who actually 
took part in the riots clearly showed that the riots were in­
stigated and stage-managed by the men who hoped to achieve 
certain reforms. The women were prompted to act, in the be-
. lief that the Colonial Authorities would not harm them,since 
v. in accordance with the tradition of the Ibibiosjwomen were nev- 
er killed in warfare, and on many occasions they acted as peace­
makers in tribal wars.
3. See the Reports of the Aba Commission of Inquiry - Sessional 
Papers' of the Nigerian Legislative Council, Nos. 12 and 28 of 
1930, and the Minutes of Evidence - Gazette Extraordinary,
7th February 1930.
4. See Margery Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, 1937; 
also Sylvia Leith-Ross, African Women: A Study of the Ibo
of Nigeria, 1959, pp. 22 - 39.
5. During the disturbances, 21 persons died, 51 were wounded and 
29 of the wounded were admitted into hospital. - See Report of 
the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the Eastern 
Provinces of Nigeria, No. 19^9, No. 256 (His Majesty's Station- 
ary Office, London).
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was alleged to have made "inflammatory and mischievous speeches".^ 
In the Nigerian Legislative Council Debates in 1948, 
several members commented on the fact that except for Lagos and
Port Harcourt where women had limited franchise, women (even
those who were liable to pay income tax) were prevented from 
voting. They referred to the system as "unfair” and "unreason­
able", and one member observed as follows:
"The women of Nigeria deserve better consideration 
than what they are having today. In some parts of 
the country they are taxed, but some of them are not
like cows, which are usually patient and allow them­
selves to be milked; rather some:of them are behaving 
like mules and are beginning to kick."2
Women in the South were allowed to vote during the 
first Republic, although Moslem women in the North were denied 
t-he right to vote in national and local elections. In the 1976 
Local Government elections, all women were allowed to vote on 
an equal basis with men, and women in purdah turned out in such 
large numbers, to vote that polling stations had to extend their 
closing time by two hours.
Even though there is now no legal bar. to womens1 par­
ticipation In politics, their general non-involvement In poli­
tics in the traditional society has been a hindrance to effective 
participation in politics in modern Nigeria, although they have 
been utilized by men to further the latterfs political aims and 
ambitions. As O'Bar rightly points out, "Women remain invisible 
in politics except when they seem to burst sporadically onto
1. See the Report of the Commissions of Enquiry, into the Disorders 
in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, November, 1949» No. 256, 
op.cit. Jones asserts that-the first recorded instance of 
women being used for political demonstration in Nigeria was 
around 1855, when King Dappo and other Chiefs promoted a 
hostile demonstration of market women against the super-car- 
goes (traders) in Calabar. The main reason seems to have been 
to demonstrate their resentment against the decision of the 
Court of Equity which held that Yanlbo did not belong to the 
Anna Pepple House but to William Dappa Pepple House; see fur­
ther G.I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A 
Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria, 196 3, P*125.
2. Legislative Council Debates, 10 March 1948, pp. 438 - 439.
3. See West Africa, 20 December 1976.
4. Jean F. O fBar, "Making the Invisible Visible: African Women” 
in Politics and Policy", African Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, . 
1975, P. 22.
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the larger scene".^
Pell.notes that "Nigerian women have been more poli-
2tically active than women in most developing countries". The 
present writer found women in Nigeria totally uninterested in 
active politics. It was evident from the statements of infor­
mants that they were disillusioned by the menfs political per­
formance and the brutal tactics adopted by some politicians dur­
ing the first Republic.
This attitude is unfortunate as it leaves the men a 
clear field to make laws detrimental to the status of women, 
especially in marriage and family life, although most of the 
main political parties, in recognition of the potential voting 
strength of Nigerian women, now that Moslem women are also al­
lowed to vote, have made an issue of the question of womens1 
rights in their political campaigns.
1. Margaret Peil, Nigerian Politics: The Peoplefs View,
(London, Cassell, 1976), pp. 13.
2. See Amma Ogan, "The Wooing of Women", Daily Times of 
Nigeria, 29 March, 1979, p. 3.
3. In this respect see the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1978, and below Chapter II, pp. 148- 
156.
~Lk2
CHAPTER II ;
THE FAMILY AND THE LAW IN NIGERIA
1. The Constitutional and Judicial Background
A, Federal and State legislative powers
It has been mentioned previously that Nigeria
is now a Federal Republic of nineteen States and a
Federal Capital Territory.^ When the country became a
Federal Republic on 1 October, 1963, it was given a
constitution which apportioned legislative powers between
the Federal Government and the then Regional (now State)
2
Governments. The 1963 Constitution contains an Exclusive 
Legislative List of subjects upon which the Federal 
Parliament has exclusive powers to make laws, and a Con­
current Legislative List of subjects upon which the 
Federal, or a State Parliament could legislate. The 
States have exclusive jurisdiction to legislate on those 
subjects which are not included in either of the legis­
lative lists.
With special relevance to marriage, the 1963 
Constitution provides that the Federal Parliament shall 
have exclusive power to make laws with respect to
"Marriages other than marriages under Moslem 
law or other customary law,.annulment and 
dissolution of, and other matrimonial causes 
relating to, marriages other than marriages 
under Moslem law or other customary law."^
Marriages other than marriages under Moslem 
law or other customary law refers to marriage contracted
1. See above, Chapter I, p. 78. For the definition of 
the Federal Capital Territory, see Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978, 
First Schedule, Part II.
2. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1963, No. 20 of 1963.
3. Ibid.. s. 69.
4. Ibid., Item 23, Exclusive Legislative List.
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under the Nigerian Marriage Act (statutory marriage).^
This provision gave rise to uncertainty. as to
the precise scope of the Federal Governments legislative 
2
powers. Did the Federal Government have exclusive power 
to make laws affecting the relationships of husband and wife, 
and parent and child, of a statutory marriage, including 
rights and duties of the spouses, and property rights, 
especially rights of succession as between husband and wife, 
and parent and child; or was the legislative powers limited 
to the creation, annulment and dissolution of marriage, 
leaving to the States1 legislatures the right to regulate 
the incidents of a statutory marriage; or, as posed by 
Kasunmu and Salacuse, in Nigerian Family Law, was the 
legislative power of the Federal Government merely "to 
establish the conditions and formalities necessary for a 
man and woman to become husband and wife?11
In 1956, the former Eastern Region of Nigeria 
enacted the Age of Marriage Law,^ which made a marriage, 
or promise or offer of marriage between, or in respect of 
persons, either of whom is under the age of sixteen, void. 
Section 2 of this statute stated:
"In this Law Carriage* includes a marriage con­
tracted under the provisions of the Marriage 
Ordinance and a marriage according to customary 
law"^
This Law was patently invalid, insofar as it 
attempted to legislate on the formation and annulment of 
a statutory marriage, matters reserved for the Federal 
Parliament in the Exclusive Legislative List.^ In fact, 
the Eastern Region Legislature seemed to be unaware of the 
fact that it had no competence to legislate on statutory
1. See above, Chapter 1, p.58,- n.5
2. See e.g. Alfred B. Kasunmu and Jeswald ¥. Salacuse, 
Nigerian Family Law. (London, Butterwoirths, 1966) pp.2-6.
3. Kasunmu and Salacuse, -o£.cit., p.3.
4. Eastern Region, No. 22 of 1956.
5. Ibid.-, s.2.
6. See Kasunmu and Salacuse op.cit.. pp.4-5 cf. E.I. . 
Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria. (Ibadan: Nigeria, 
Heinemann Educational.Books (Nigeria) Ltd., 1974), p.42.
144
marriages. For example, the Minister for Welfare, in 
introducing the second reading of the Bill, of the Age of . 
Marriage Law, 1956, in the former Eastern House of Assembly, 
stated that it was a "Bill for a.Law to make void all 
marriages between persons under the age of sixteen",'*' and,
p
in the debate on Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, the same 
Minister drew the attention of the House to the fact that 
the Bill was limited to customary marriages. He said:
"Honourable members will note that marriages, 
under the Marriage Ordinance, have been excluded 
from the provisions of this Bill;., Those who get 
married under the Marriage Ordinance are usually 
educated and comparatively well-off. They can 
look after themselves. It would not be fair to 
insist upon limiting incidental expenses to £5 
when the cost of an engagement might be much more. 
Expenses of the Church ceremony and the wedding 
reception could not be limited to £5".j
None of the Members of the House pointed out the 
pertinent fact that it was not within the legislative com­
petence of the House to legislate on statutory marriages * 
The Age of Marriage Law, 1956, was amended and 
limited to customary marriages only, in the revised Laws 
of Eastern Nigeria, 1963.^
Some bf the difficulties of interpretation of 
the constitutional provision (quoted above) are rendered
5
obsolete by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970 which 
provides:
"The Federal Military Government hereby decrees 
as follows:
Part I - Jurisdiction
(i) After the commencement of this Decree a 
matrimonial cause shall not be instituted 
otherwise than under this Decree, and if a 
matrimonial cause has been.instituted before
1. See Eastern Region Parliamentary Debates, Eastern House 
of Assembly, 1956 (Enugu, .Government. Printer), Vol.II, 
P* 671.
2. Cap 6, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963 Revision.
3. Eastern.Region: Debates, Eastern House of Assembly 
1956, ojD.cit. p.674.
4. Cap 6, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963 Division.
3. No. 18 of 1970. ; .
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the commencement of this Decree but not com- 
.pleted, it shall be continued and dealt with 
only in accordance with the provisions of this 
Decree prescribed in that behalf” .
✓
Section 114(1) of the Decree provides that 
"matrimonial cause” means:
"(a) proceedings for a decree of (i) dissolution of
marriage, (ii) nullity of marriage, (iii) judicial 
separation, (iv) restitution of conjugal rights 
or (v) jactitation of marriage;
• (b) proceedings for a declaration of the validity of 
the dissolution or annulment of a marriage by 
decree or otherwise or of a decree of judicial 
separation; or for a declaration of the continued 
operation of a decree of judicial separation, or 
for an order discharging a decree of judicial 
separation;
(c) proceedings with respect to the maintenance of
a party to the proceedings, settlements, damages 
in respect of adultery, the custody or guardian­
ship of infant children of the marriage or the 
maintenance, welfare, advancement or education 
of children of the marriage, being proceedings 
in relation to concurrent, pending or completed 
proceedings of a kind referred to in paragraph
(a) or (b) above, including proceedings of such 
a kind pending at, or completed before, the 
commencement of this Decree;
(d) any other proceedings■(including proceedings with 
respect to the enforcement of a decree, the 
services of process or costs) in relation to 
concurrent, pending or completed proceedings of
a kind referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) 
above, including proceedings of such a kind 
pending at, or completed before, the commence­
ment of this Decree; or
(e) proceedings seeking leave to institute proceedings 
for a decree of dissolution of marriage or of 
judicial separation, or proceedings in relation
to proceedings seeking such leave".^
The States, therefore, are not competent to 
enact laws dealing with a "matrimonial cause" as defined
1. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, No. 18 of 1970, 
9. 114(1).
|
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in the.Decree, in relation to a statutory marriage.
The division of legislative powers between 
Federal and State Governments has been retained by the 
new Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
1979^  In relation to marriage the new Constitution 
provides that the National Assembly shall have exclusive 
powers to make laws in respect of
nThe formation, annulment and dissolution of 
marriages other than marriages under Islamic 
law and customary law including matrimonial 
causes relating thereto”.2
This provision is more precise than its 
predecessor, and is in accordance with the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970. It should be noted that the two 
statutes do not entirely deprive the States of legis­
lative power in relation to statutory marriage. The 
States may legislate on matters which do not come under 
the definition of "matrimonial cause”, for example, rights 
of succession between the spouses, and between parent and 
child, of a statutory marriage.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978, which is due to Come 
into force on 1 October, 1979, provides as follows:
”(7) The House of Assembly of a State shall have power 
to make laws for the peace, order and good govern­
ment of the State or any part thereof with respect 
to the following matters, that is to say -
(a) any matter not included in the Exclusive 
Legislative List set out in Part I of the 
Second Schedule to this Constitution;
(b) any matter included in the Concurrent 
Legislation List set out in the first 
column of Part II of the Second Schedule 
to this Constitution to the extent pre­
scribed in the second column opposite thereto;
1. Section 4, Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Enactment) Decree 1978, Decree No. 25 of 1978.
2. Ibid., Item 58, Exclusive Legislative List, Second 
Schedule, Part I.
3. Section 279 (1) Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978.
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(c) any other matter .with respect to which
•it is empowered to make laws in accordance 
with the provisions of this Constitution”.^
Marriage under 'Islamic and customary laws are 
not included in either the Exclusive or Concurrent 
Legislative Lists, and are, therefore, within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the States,
To summarize, the National Assembly has exclusive 
power to legislate on the formation, annulment and dis­
solution of statutory marriage, including /"matrimonial 
cause” as defined by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970,
A State Assembly has exclusive power to make laws with 
reference to customary and Islamic law marriages within 
the State, as well as on certain ancilliary matters, not 
included in the definition of "matrimonial cause”, in 
relation to statutory marriage.
B. Fundamental rights and directive principles
(1) Introduction
"Fundamental rights" were first introduced into
the Nigerian constitution as a result of the recommendations
of the Commission appointed in 1958, to enquire into the
fears expressed by ethnic minorities in Nigeria, and to
2make recommendations as to the means of allaying them.
Since I960, the fundamental rights entrenched in the con­
stitution have remained unaltered, in spite of criticisms
3of their inadequacies. The Constitution Drafting 
Committee appointed by the Federal Military Government in 
1975, to produce a draft constitution for Nigeria, took
1. Ibid., s .4 (7). .................
2. See Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into 
the ftears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying them, 
Cmd. 505, London, 1958.
3. See Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee con­
taining the Draft Constitution, Ministry of Education 
and Information Printing Division, Enugu, 1977),
Vol. 1, p. XV.
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note of these criticisms, and made certain recommendations,1 
As a result of the Committee's recommendations, 
an improved chapter of "Fundamental Rights", as well as a 
separate Chapter, which^imposes the duty and responsibility 
on all organs of government, and on all authorities and 
persons exercising legislative, executive, or judicial 
-powers, to conform to, observe and apply certain funda­
mental objectives and directive principles of State policy,
2
were enshrined in the Constitution of 1979.
Some of these "fundamental rights" and "directive 
principles", are of vital importance to the status of 
women. This section examines a few of the legal implic­
ations inherent in some of these provisions, with particular 
reference to women.
(II) Right to freedom from discrimination
This is the most important provision, so far as 
the legal rights and obligations of women in marriage are 
concerned. The right to freedom from discrimination is 
entrenched in the Chapter on "Fundamental Rights", and reads 
as follows:
,! 39.- (l) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular 
community, ethnic group, place of origin, religion, 
sex or political opinion shall not, by reason only 
that he is such a person -
(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the 
practical application of any law in force in 
Nigeria or any executive or administrative 
action of the government to disabilities or 
restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of 
other communities, ethnic groups, places of 
origin, sex, religion, or political opinions 
are not made subject; or
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the 
practical application of any law in force in 
Nigeria or any such executive or administrative 
action, any privilege or advantage that is not 
accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other com­
munities, ethnic groups, places of origin, sex', 
religion or political opinions".^
1. Ibid., p. XV - XVIII
2. Gonstitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
(Enactment) Decree 1978, Chapter II, ss.13-22, and 
Chapter TV.
3. Ibid.. s.39(1).
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Closely connected to this provision is the . 
statement on social, objectives which is inserted in the 
Chapter on "Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy", which provides:
" 17 (1) The State social order is founded on ideals 
of Freedom, Equality and Justice,
(2) In furtherance of the social order —
(a) every citizen shall have equality of 
rights, obligations and opportunities 
before the law, •.,,
These two provisions revolutionize the legal 
status of Nigerian women in general, and of married 
women in particular.
As will be abundantly shown in subsequent 
chapters, women married according to customary or Islamic 
law only, suffer from several discriminations based solely 
on the ground of sex. The legal rights and obligations of 
wives are, in many respects, inferior to those of their 
husbands. To illustrate the legal discrimination between 
male and female, the following principles of law may be 
briefly mentioned.
(a) The practice of polygyny. Under the customary laws
of all Nigerian communities, as well as under Islamic 
law, a husband is entitled to marry multiple wives at 
the same time. A. wife, is- not-permitted to marry more than
one husband at a time. In other words, while polygyny is
- - 2 permissible, polyandry is prohibited.
1. Compare these provisions, and the proposed "Equal Rights 
Amendment" to the United States Constitution, now pending 
ratification by the necessary three-fourths of the States* 
legislatures: "Equality of rights under the law shall not. 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
state on account of sex".
2* Certain types of polyandry, previously found in some of 
the Northern communities, e.g. the Rukuba of Benue State, 
were abolished by local Declarations of law, see for 
example, Declaration of Borgu Native Law and Custom 
Relating to Marriage and. Divorce, N.A.L.N, 52, 1961, 
s.6 : "There shall be no statutory limit to the number' 
of wives a man may have at one time (2) It shall be 
an offence for a woman to have more than one husband at 
a time".
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(b) Divorce. In many communities, a husband can divorce his
wife at will, but she is not legally entitled to divorce
him, unless he consents to her doing so. This is especially
the case among Moslem communities in the Northern States
of Nigeria,^ but is not unknown to some systems of custom-
2ary law in the Southern States.
(c) Succession. Women suffer discriminations in the large
majority of commu nities, solely on the ground of sex.
In most systems of customary law, girls are deprived of
all rights of succession to property, especially in the
case of their father’s property, and in relation to land.
In Islamic law, males inherit twice as much as females
3
in similar circumstances. In some communities, husbands 
inherit from their wives, but not vice versa.
(d) Right to own and dispose of property. A wife’s right to 
own and dispose of property is severely restricted in 
some systems of customary law, and in a few communities, 
women have no legal capacity to own or dispose of prop-
ii
erty, even if they are unmarried adults. A wife’s 
right of disposal of property is also limited under 
Islamic law.
(d) The dowry system. Under this system, a man pays money or 
transfers other property to the parents or legal 
guardian of his prospective bride. Such payments must 
be refunded by the wife, or her family, if there is a 
divorce. This acts as a barrier to the wife’s freedom 
to effect a divorce. No payment is made on behalf of 
a man, and consequently, it is easier for him to
1. See further, below, Chapter IX, pp. 82-88.
2. See e.g. Solomon v Gbobo C197^3 4 E.C.S.L.R. 457,
Forde, Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. ,*p. 28.
3. See generally Chapter XIII, below, pp. 469-470.
4. See The Customary Law Manual: A Manual of Customary
Laws Obtaining in the Anambra and Imo States of 
Nigeria" (Government Printer, Enugu, 1977)> p. 8, 
ss. 12(1), 12(2) and 328.
5. See further, Chapter XIII generally.
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divorce his wife, than it is for her to divorce him.
(f) Inequality in tax provisions. Apart from "customary and 
Islamic laws^ there are also some statutory provisions
LLVlCLG't'
which discriminate against wives. For example^ The 
Income Tax Management Act, 1961,^ as amended by the 
Income Tax Management (Uniform Taxation Provisions, 
etc.) Decree, 1975 > a husband is given a tax allow­
ance for his wife, who lives with him, or who is 
maintained by him, whether or not she is actually 
dependent on him. A wife, on the other hand, is 
given no allowance for her husband, even in cases 
where he is totally dependent on her financially.
These are only a few of the many discriminatory 
provisions of customary and Islamic laws. Further 
instances of discrimination will emerge in future chapters.
What is the effect of the constitutional prov­
isions quoted above on the legal status of women? There 
is no doubt that many of the discriminatory provisions of 
customary and Islamic laws as well as discriminatory 
statutory provisions infringe the fundamental rights 
provision of the 1979 Constitution. If women enforce 
their constitutional right of freedom from discrimination 
on the ground of sex, with respect to marriage and family 
life, customary and Islamic law marriages would be com­
pletely revolutionized and brought into conformity with 
the provisions of the Marriage Act, and the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970,^ under which the spouses have equal 
rights and obligations as far as possible.
Th.e catastrophic effect of the provision of 
equality on the ground of sex, on customary and Islamic 
law marriages, was recognized by the Constitution Drafting
1. No. 21 of 1961, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
2. Decree No. 7 of 1975, S.20A, The Decree came into force 
on 1 April, 1974.
3. Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 
Revision.
4. Decree No. 18 of 1970.
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Committee, which was appointed by the Federal Government 
to produce a draft constitution for Nigeria. The draft 
constitution this committee submitted to the Supreme 
Military Council provides as follows:
MA11 citizens, male and female, shall have equality 
.of rights, obligations and opportunities before the 
law but this provision shall not abrogate any rule 
of Moslem or customary law".-^
The reason given by the majority of members for 
the proviso on equality of rights and obligations between 
the sexes was that frideas which have been embodied in rules 
of Islamic law or customary law are part of the religious 
or cultural heritage of the various peoples concerned, and* • 
have been accepted as binding for a very long time” . They
were of the opinion that a change "would unnecessarily
' 2 outrage the religious or cultural ideas of most Nigerians".
The view of the minority of members to the effect that the
reservation about Islamic and customary law may involve
constitutional protection for rules of conduct which may
be wholly indefensible, and which do not deserve to be so
protected, was rejected by the majority of members.
Not only were equal rights between male and female 
limited to exclude Islamic and customary laws, but the 
draft constitution submitted by the Committee also omitted 
the word "sex" in the section on the right to freedom from 
discrimination. In other words, the Constitution Drafting 
Committee recommended that a right to freedom from dis­
crimination should be entrenched in the constitution, but 
that an exception on the grounds of sex should be specifically 
preserved.
Fortunately, both recommendations of the Committee 
were rejected by the Supreme Military Council, and for the
1. Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee, 1977, 
par. 313, p. VII.
2 V Ibid., p. VII - VIII.
3. See The Draft of a Constitution for the Federal 
Republic.of Nigeria, 1977, S.35(l)(a).
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first time in the history of Nigeria, women have been given 
•constitutional equality of legal rights and-obligations with
men, including equal rights and obligations under customary
/
and Islamic laws.
To insert an equal rights provision in a con­
stitution is one thing, interpretation, application and 
enforcement of the rights may prove more difficult.
Certain pertinent questions arise: Are laws based on the
physical characteristics of one sex necessarily discriminatory? 
In other words, is total legal assimilation on the grounds 
of sex possible, or desirable, bearing in mind that certain 
physical characteristics are unique to one sex. For 
example, under the Labour Code Decree 1974,^ a woman is 
entitled to certain maternity benefits, including leave 
benefits, and partial payment of salary during her confine­
ment. Men are not entitled to such benefits. Similarly, 
where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the 
death of her child under the age of twelve months, due to 
the fact that at the time of the act or omission the balance 
of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully 
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child, or 
by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the 
birth of the child, she may be found guilty of manslaughter,
instead of murder, which carries a greater penalty on con- 
2
viction. No similar concession is given to a man.
Is legislation of this kind a denial of the right 
to freedom from discrimination, of the other sex? How would 
the courts interpret such laws?
Another important question is: how can a woman 
enforce her rights to equality and freedom from dis­
crimination under the fundamental rights provision of the 
constitution?
1* Decree, No. 21 of 1974, SS.53, 54, and 55; see Okunbowa
v. Group Consultants Nigeria Project Advisers Ltd. and Anor. 
lU9?4j 2 . CCHCJ. 159 * ~...  ........ ................
2. Criminal Code Act, 1916, Cap 42, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, s.327; cf. the English 
Infanticide Act, 1938, s.1(1).
iii
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Section 42 of the Federal Constitution of 
. -Nigeria (Enactment). Decree, 1978 provides for the enforce­
ment of the Chapter on "Fundamental Rights” as follows:
✓
”42 - (1) Any person who alleges that any of the
provisions of this Chapter has been, or is 
being, or is likely to be contravened in 
any State in relation to him may apply to a 
High Court in that State for redress.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constit­
ution, a High Court shall have original juris­
diction to hear and determine any application 
made to it in pursuance of the provisions of 
this section and may make such orders, issue 
such writs and give such directions as it may 
consider appropriate for the purpose of 
enforcing or securing the enforcement, within 
that St^te, of any rights to which the person 
who makes the application may be entitled under 
this Chapter.
(5) The Chief Justice of Nigeria may make rules 
with respect to the practice and procedure of 
High Court for the purposes of this section.
(4) The National Assembly -
(a) may confer upon High Courts such powers in 
addition to those conferred by this section 
as may appear to be necessary or desirable 
for the purpose of enabling those courts 
more effectively to exercise the. jurisdiction 
conferred upon them by this section; and
(b) shall make provisions -
- - (i) for the rendering of financial assistance 
. t o  any citizen of Nigeria where his right 
under this Chapter has been infringed, or 
with a view to enabling him to engage the 
services of a legal practitioner to pros­
ecute the claim; and
(ii) for ensuring that allegations of infringe­
ment of such rights are substantial and 
the requirement or need for financial or 
legal aid is real.”
This provision may be useful in many cases. For 
example, a daughter who has been deprived of inheritance 
rights to the intestate estate of her deceased father, 
solely on account of her sex, may effectively enforce her 
rights under section 39(1) of the Constitution, by taking 
advantage of the procedure under section 42. Similarly, 
in cases where, under customary law, a wife's property 
legally belongs to, or is subject to the control of her
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husband, there would be no serious difficulty in a wife 
enforcing her right to own and dispose of her separate 
property to the same extent as her husband can, under 
this provision.
The enforcement of some rights, however, even if 
they satisfy the provision of being "substantial”^ may prove 
more difficult. An obvious example relates to the practice 
of polygyny. How is a wife under customary or Islamic laws 
to enforce her equality of rights in this respect? Can she 
compel the State to alter customary and Islamic laws to 
give her the legal right to practise polyandry, or can she 
obtain an injunction to prevent her husband from exercising 
a legal right which is denied to her? What is the position 
if her husband is already a polygynist before the Con­
stitution comes into force some time in 1979?
This, and similar difficulties in enforcing certain 
rights, make the right of freedom from discrimination op. the 
ground of sex, as provided by the 1979 Constitution, a 
nebulous one, especially in relation to marriage and family 
life. The difficulty of enforcing certain rights, however, 
should not detract from the salutary effect of the con­
stitutional provisions on the legal status of women.
Nigerian women have gained, without the slightest struggle
or protest, what American women have been fighting for un-
2
successfully,for nearly a century, and what, after a 
similar lengthy struggle, English women only achieved in
1-. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Enactment) Decree, 1978, s .42(4)(b)(ii).
2- During the final quarter of the twentieth century, the 
U.S. is still debating whether men and women should have 
equal rights under the Constitution. The TrEqual Rights" 
amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
would ensure equality of rights between men and women, 
was first introduced in Congress in 1923. It has been 
introduced in every Congress thereafter. It was 
approved on 22 March, 1972 by the 92nd Congress, and 
submitted to the States for ratification. Twenty-one 
states, whose legislatures were in session, voted for 
ratification within six months of submission. By the 
end of 1974, more than thirty states had ratified the 
amendment, but in July, 1978, only 35 of the needed 38
Footnote continued
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1975^ - abolition of sex discrimination in relation to 
rights, obligations and opportunities, before the law*
/
(III) Right to intermarry
Also relevant to the status of women is section 
15 of the Federal Constitution of Nigeria (Enactment)
Decree 1978 which provides:
lf15 - (1) The motto of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
shall be Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress.
(2) Accordingly, national integration shall be 
actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on 
the grounds of place of origin, religion, sex 
status ethnic or linguistic association or 
ties shall be prohibited.
(3) For the purpose of promoting national integ­
ration it shall be the duty of the State
to • • • #
(c) encourage intermarriage among persons from 
different places of origin, or of different 
religious, ethnic or linguistic association 
or ties......”2
This provision is particularly important in 
relation to the Moslem States of the north. Under Islamic 
law, a Moslem woman is prohibited from marrying a non-
3
Moslem man, and a Moslem man cannot marry a pagan woman. 
Unlike section 39 of the Constitution, however, no provision 
is made to force a State to perform its duty under this 
section, and it is -unlikely that any Moslem State would 
voluntarily alter Islamic law in this respect. There is
Footnote 2 continued - States had approved the amendment 
passed by Congress in 1972. The time limit for ratif­
ication expires in March, 1979, see Daily Times. 10 July, 
1978, Marguerite Rewalt, "The *Equal.kigirts for Men and 
Women Amendment1 is Needed", Women Lawyers Journal.
Vol. 59, Winter 1973, pp. 4-10; Martha Wj Griffiths, 
"Status of Women", Women Lawyers Journal. Vol.60, Fall 
1974, pp.208-211; U.S. Congress Senate. Women and the 
Equal Rights Amendment; Senate Sub-committee Hearings 
on the Constitutional Amendment. 91st Congress, edix. 
by Catherine Stimpson (New York and London: Bowker Co., 
1972), pp. XIII-XVI.
1. See the English Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, C.65.
2. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Enactment) Decree 1978, S.15(3)(c).
3. See Asaf A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law. 4th edit. 
(Delhi, India, Oxford University Press, 1974)', pp.96-101.
Footnote continued...
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no legal bar to intermarriage under customary law.'1'
C. The .judicial system
(1) Introduction
The judicial system varies to some extent in the
Northern and Southern States, and only a brief discussion
of the structure and jurisdiction of the courts in each
2part of the country is possible here. The courts men­
tioned below are particularly relevant to marriage.
(II) Courts in the Southern States
In the Southern States, there are mainly two 
types of courts:
(a) Customary Courts. Customary Courts have unlimited 
and exclusive jurisdiction in matrimonial matters 
between persons married under customary law. They 
have no jurisdiction over the spouses of a statutory 
marriage, so far as matrimonial matters are concerned.
Except in the Western States, judges in these
courts are not legally trained lawyers, but local people,
•3
men, and occasionally women, with a good knowledge of 
the customary laws of the respective areas.
Footnote 5 continued - Abdur Rahim, The Principles of
Muhammadan Jurisprudence: According to Hanafi, Maliki. 
Shafi'i and Hanbali Schools. (London: Luzac and Co*, 
1911)r P* 5^9; Faiz B. Tyabji, Muhammadan Law: The 
Personal Law of Muslims, (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi and
co7'I9^ 6t;"p: ' 152.
1. See further, below Chapter V, pp. 412-415.
2. See further, E.A. Keay and S.S. Richardson, The 
Native and Customary Courts of Nigeria, (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 196"fc‘); B.O.JNfwaoueze, The Machinery 
of Justice in Nigeria (London: Butterworihs, 13b3)", 
pp. 45-106; F. Olawale, T. Elias, Groundwork of 
Nigerian Law (London: Rout ledge and Keegan Paul7 Ltd., 
1954), p. 37-163; Omoniyi Adewoye, The Judicial System 
in Southern Nigeria 1854-1954; Law and Justice in a 
Dependency ILondon:.Longman, 1$77)«
5. Of the Customary Courts visited during field-work, only 
Eket Customary Court had a female judge sitting on the 
panel of judges.
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(b) Non-Customary Courts.. These courts are not indigenous 
• to Nigeria; They were introduced-by the British, and' 
are modelled on coinrts operating in England to some 
extent. They are:
(i) Magistrates Courts.
(ii) High Courts.
(iii) Federal Court of Appeal.
(iv) Supreme Court of Nigeria.
Generally,these courts have no jurisdiction over 
customary marriages, except on appeal from a Customary 
Court. In 1971, Customary Courts were abolished in the 
former East Central State, and their jurisdiction was 
given to Magistrates Courts.1 In 1974, original juris­
diction over customary marriages was extended to the High
2
Courts of the former East Central State.
Under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, the
High Courts of each State in the Federation have exclusive
jurisdiction over statutory marriages, and "matrimonial
3
cause” in relation to statutory marriage.
Previous to 1976, only the former Western State
L
had a Court of Appeal - the Western State Court of Appeal.
In 1976, a Federal Court of Appeal, with 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the High 
Courts of every State in the Federation, was established.
The Federal Court of Appeal sits in Lagos, and branches 
of the Court are empowered to sit in Kaduna, Enugu, Ibadan, 
and Benin, and in such other places as may be designated.
The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal 
in the country, for all types of marriages.
1. Magistrates Courts Law (Amendment) Edict, 1971, 
S.17(l)(b), No. 23 of 1971 of the former East Central 
State.
2. High Court Law (Amendment) Edict, 1974,No.12 of 1974,
S.14(1). ■ . _
3. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, No. 18 of 1970, S.1(1).
4. Court of Appeal Edict, 1967, W.R.N.L.N., 19 of 1967, 
W.S.L.N. 80 of 1973. The Western State Court of Appeal 
was abolished by Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Decree, 
Decree No. 42 of 1976.
5. Constitution (Amendment) (No.2) Decree, 1976, No. 42 
of 1976.
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(III) Courts in the Northern States.
The corresponding courts in the Northern States
are:
(a) Customary Courts, The Area Courts and Upper Area 
Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Islamic law 
marriages, and matrimonial causes,with appeal to the 
Sharia Courts of Appeal in all cases involving 
questions of Moslem personal law, including questions 
relating to the dissolution of marriage, or regarding 
family relationships, or the guardianship of an infant
where all the parties to the proceedings are Moslems.
(b) Non-customary Courts.
(i) Magistrates Courts.
(ii) High Courts.
(iii) Federal Court of Appeal.
(iv) Supreme Court of Nigeria.
These courts have a similar jurisdiction as the 
corresponding courts in the Southern States, as stated 
above.
(IV) Recent reforms in Area and Customary Courts.
It has been mentioned previously^ that Customary 
Courts were abolished in the former East Central State, 
and in a few other States of the Federation. As a result 
of the hardship which resulted in 1976, the Federal 
Military Government appointed the Customary Courts Reform 
Committee to consider, inter alia, the need for the 
existence of Customary Courts, and, in particular, the 
need for their existence in the States in which they had 
ceased to function.
In September, 1976, also, the Area Courts Reform
1. See above p. 158.
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Committee was appointed, with almost identical terms of 
reference.^
Both committees found overwhelming support for
the retention of customary and area courts, and for their
reinstatement in those Southern States where they were 
2
inoperative. Reasons for the retention of Customary
Courts given hy the Reform Committee included the fact.
■3
that they deal with 80 percent of the judicial work in
4
every State, encompassing 85 percent of the population.
Abolition would, consequently, result in increased work-
5
load in the Magistrates' Courts. The fact that the 
procedure is informal and uncomplicated, and that generally 
there is no legal representation, which means that costs 
to the litigant are comparatively low, were additional 
reasons for the retention of customary courts. The reasons 
apply equally to the retention of area courts.
The Federal Government accepted the recommendations 
of both committees for the retention of customary and area 
courts, and directed that those States, viz. Anambra,
Bendel, Imo and Rivers States, where Customary Courts had 
ceased to function, should re-introduce these courts.^
1. See the White Paper on the Federal Military Government's 
Views on the Report of the Customary Courts Reform 
Committee, [1978] and Report of the Area Courts Reform 
Committee. £1977].
2. See Report'of the Customary Courts Reform Committee, 
par. 2.
3* C.C.R.C., ibid.. 22.
4. C.C.R.C. ibid., 23.
5. Ibid., 34(a); see also Adrian Collett, "Recent Legis­
lation and Reform Proposals for Customary and Area 
Courts in Nigeria, [1978] J.A.L. 161-184 at p.162, n.3; 
for the volume of cases in Area Courts see Report of 
Area Courts Reform Committee, 39.
6. See the White Paper on the Federal Military Government's 
Views on the Report of the Customary Courts Reform 
Committee, op.cit. par. 2.
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The Customary Courts Reform Committee recommended 
• that there should be two. grades of Customary. Courts:.
(a) Customary Courts (exercising original jurisdiction);
(b) Customary Courts of Appeal (exercising appellate 
jurisdiction).
The Government rejected the recommendation for 
Customary Courts of Appeal, and decided that Customary 
Courts, Grades I and II, both exercising original juris­
diction only, should be established.1
The new Constitution, however, provides that
"There shall be for any State that requires it a Customary
2
Court of Appeal for the State". It provides for the
3
appointment of Presidents and Judges for such courts.
A Customary Court of Appeal shall exercise 
appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings
3
involving questions of customary law. .
The Constitution also provides that there shall be 
for any State that requires it a Sharia Court of Appeal for 
that State.^ The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State shall 
exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in 
civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal 
law which includes inter alia:
"(a) any question of Islamic personal law regarding a 
marriage concluded in accordance with that law, 
including a question relating to the validity or 
dissolution of such a marriage or a question that 
depends on such a marriage and relating to family 
relationship or the guardianship of an infant;
(b) where all the parties to the proceedings are Moslems, 
any question of Islamic personal law regarding a 
marriage including the validity or dissolution of 
that marriage.... "^
1. Ibid. par. 4.
2. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Enactment) Decree 1978, s.245(l).
3. Ibid., ss.246, and 247.
4. Ibid., s. 240.
5. Ibid., s. 242 2(a) and 2(b).
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2. THE NIGERIAN FAMILY
A. Introduction.
There is no clear and consistent referent for 
the word 1 family”. Used alone, the word is ambiguous, 
and has been applied indiscriminately to several social 
groups which, despite functional similarities, exhibit 
important points of difference. If the word "family”, 
however, is to be used as a concept in scientific dis­
cussions, it must be given a precise meaning or meanings, 
and sociologists have found it necessary to develop a 
more precise terminology.
Murdock,'*'from his survey of 250 representative 
human societies, concludes that there are three dis­
tinctive types of family organization. The first and 
most basic is the nuclear family, which consists typically 
of a married man and woman with their offspring (if any), 
although in individual cases, one or more additional 
persons may reside with them. The second type of family 
results from the combination of two or more nuclear 
families into a large aggregate. These composite forms 
of the family fall into two types, which differ in the 
principles by which the constituent nuclear families are 
affiliated. Thus, the polygamous family consists of two 
or more nuclear families affiliated through a common 
spouse, usually the husband. For example, under polygyny, 
one man plays the role of husband and father in several 
nuclear families and thereby unites them into a larger 
familial group. An extended family, on the other hand, 
consists of two or more nuclear families affiliated through
1. George P. Murdock, Social Structure, (London, Macmillan 
Co. Ltd, 19^9, New York, The Free Press, 1965), 1-11.
2. See Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive
Society, 1971, op.cit., p.51, 1 a childless married 
couple does not constitute a family in this sense.”
This view is not generally supported.
5. The Polyandrous family consists of a wife her several
husbands, and all their children. Radcliffe-Brown refers 
to such families as ’’compound families”, and nuclear 
families as ’’elementary families”, see Radcliff e-Brown, 
1971, pp. 51-52.
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consanguineal kinship bonds, such as those between parent . 
and child or between the siblings. Thus the.patrilocal
extended family, often called the patriarchal family,
/
embraces, typically, an older man, his wife or wives, 
his unmarried children, his married sons, and the wives 
and children of the latter. Extended families may be 
compounded from polygamous families, from monogamous 
nuclear families, or from both.
All three types of family described by Murdock 
exist, and, as far as the available literature indicates, 
have always existed in Nigeria from the earliest times.^
The family is the most significant feature of African 
societies generally, and in Nigeria, the dominant social 
group is the extended family. In the traditional society, 
the extended family was the basis of the social and
2
political system among the Igbos, Yorubas and other groups.
B. The extended family.
The extended family.of a living founder rarely
comprises, more than four generations, and invariably
consists of the head of the family, his brothers and their
children and his sons and their children. It may also
4
include adopted children, slaves, and their offspring.
1. See Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe.
1937, pp. 139-1^4. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria. 
1925, op.cit., p.226. Ward Price, Land tenure in the 
Yoruba Provinces (Lagos: Government Printer, 1929J , p .13.
2* See generally, Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin-Kingdom, 
op.cit., pp. 27t 30; Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples 
of South Western Nigeria, 19&9, pp. 10-13; Daryll liprde 
et.al., Peoples of the Niger Benue Confluence (London, 
International African Institute, 195$, 1970 reprint), 
p.31, Fadipe, 1970, op.cit., pp.97-134; Bascom, 1969, 
op.cit.,pp.42-46; Meek,. Law and Authority.....", pp.88- 
Tb4; Forde and Jones, 1967, pp.71-73;' Forde, Efik 
Traders of Old Calabar,op.cit.,pp.120. .124; Meek,
Northern Tribes, op.cit., Vol. 1, pp. 226-230.
3. See Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom. 1957, p.30;
S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in 
Nigeria. 1942 (1965 reprint) p.27. .
4. See Alaka v. Alaka and Anor; [1904] N.L.R. 55.
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Such a group is referred to by some writers as "minimal 
lineage11 ^  to distinguish it from the larger extended
family, the "maximal lineage or clan. Unlike the/
biological family, it does not include wives for, although
wives are part of the nuclear family, or polygamous
family where relevant, of their husbands, they are not
2
members of his extended family.
Children are regarded as belonging to the
nuclear or polygamous family of their legal father, as well
as to his extended familyhence, when the average Nigerian
speaks of his "brother", he refers not only to the sons of
his parents, but to all male members of his extended family
group who could have been his brother.in terms of age, but
•3
who, in fact, may be his sixth cousin removed.
Married women remain members of their own 
extended families, and even during the subsistence of their 
marriage have rights and duties in their fathers* extended 
family in the patrilineal society. For example, when a 
member of a family dies, the umuada (daughters of the 
family) have certain funerarv duties to perform, regard­
less of their marital state.
In the towns, the nuclear or polygynous family 
usually occupies a single compound, and a group of such
1. C.K. Meek - The Tribes of Northern Nigeria 1925, Vol.I, 
p.226; Bascom, The.Yoruba.o f .Southwestern Nigeria, 
op.cit., pp.42-46; Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, 
op.cit., pp. 10-15; .Meek, Law and Authority,ojD.cit.,pp. 1-4.
2. See Meek - The Tribes of Northern Nigeria. Vol.1,p.226;
J.R. Wilson Haffenden, The Red Men of Nigeria: An 
Account of a Lengthy Residence among the Fulani, or 
Red Men and other Pagan Tribes of Central Nigeria...." 
(London: Seeley,.Service and Co. Ltd. l$36)f pp.274-275.
3. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria. Vol. 1, p.226; 
Wilson-Haffenden, 1930. op.cit.7 p. 276;
4. Women of the family usually wash the corpse and prepare 
it-for burial among some Igbo communities. At the second 
burial of the deceased they perform a ceremony known as 
"itu-unu", which indicates the fact that the final 
ceremonies for the glorification of the deceased’s spirit 
have been duly performed. The first daughter of each 
family has an important function in cases of burials, see 
generally, Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, 1966,
p.112-126, esp. at l22; Meek, Northern Tribes,op.cit.. 
Vol.l, p. 126. — “  “
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compounds, whose members constitute an extended family, 
is sometimes surrounded by a large wall. If the extended 
family occupying a compound becomes too large, some members 
may establish residence elsewhere.
Among the Yorubas, the houses in the traditional 
society were generally built in a cluster for protection, 
and for convenience of social intercourse. Each family 
usually has a house to itself, but in some cases, the* 
members of various branches of an extended family would 
decide to build one large compound for themselves within 
which every married woman would have a room for herself 
and her children, with verandahs for common use, and a 
few rooms set apart for the important men. On the other 
hand, it was not unusual for a man to build a separate 
detached house for himself, his wives and children, and
2
include a space around it for the use of his descendants.
Within the family compound, the senior male 
member (or in some communities, for example, Yoruba and 
Efik, a female member (if she is the most senior), is the 
headland he has certain obligations and rights. For 
example, it is his duty to allocate the family land, and 
to settle disputes among members of the family. Thus dis­
putes among resident members and their wives are subject to 
Zi
his authority, but the heads of the extended families of
1. See Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples of South-Western 
Nigeria, op.cit.. p.12; Fadipe. The Sociology of the 
Yoruba, op.cit.. p.98; Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin 
Kingdom, op.cit.. pp.27-28.
2. See Ward Price. Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces, 
op.cit.. par. 17, p. 6. ' ’
3. The head of a family is called bale among the Yorubas, 
okpala or diokpala among the Igbos; emitso. among the 
Nupe, - see I^orde, Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence, 
op.cit.. p.31*
4. The three types of family form a hierarchy, insofar as 
the head of the nuclear or polygynous family may be 
under the head of the extended family (minimal lineage), 
who may, in turn, be subjected to the head.of the 
maximum lineage.
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the wives may intervene on their behalf if necessary.1
p
In Balogun v. Balogun, Graham., J.. described 
the functions of the head of a family as follows:
"The head of the family is in charge and control 
of the family property; he collects the revenue 
of family property; he has to make certain dis­
bursement out of family revenue for family 
purposes, upkeep of the family property, ^ funeral, 
marriage and baptism ceremonial expenses of members 
often involving the entertainment of strangers, 
litigations on behalf of the family, maintenance of 
indigent members of the family, education of children 
and so on” .
The extended family, however, is composed of 
families which 'are independent of non-members as regards 
the management of their own affairs,^ provided they act 
in accordance with the accepted norms of the society. In 
times of need, for example, sickness, death or other 
adversity, the extended family is a reservoir of material 
and moral aid.^
The wider family of a deceased founder may be 
composed of several sets of extended families (maximal 
lineages) and number thousands of people all tracing their 
descent to a common deceased ancestor. Thus a whole village
1. For the obligations and duties of the head of an extended 
family see, Forde and Jones, 1967, p.15; Bradbury and 
Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom: And the Edo-Speaking Peoples
of South-Western Nigeria, 1970 > P . ^9; Fadipe, JEe 
Sociology of the Yorubas. pp.105-114; Chinwuba Obi,
Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria. (London, Sweet 
and Maxwell, 19bb) pp.27-52; C.K. Meek, Law and Authority 
pp.61-62; 104-114; G.T. Basden, Niger Ibos. pp.121 and 
151; T.O. Elias, Nigerian Land LawT pp.103-114; Waddell, 
Twenty Nine years in the West Indies,op.cit., p.313;
Ward ffrice, Land Tenure in bhe YoruSa' Provinces, op.cit., 
par. 45, p. 14. .
2. [1935]2 W.A.C.A. 290, 299; see also Ononye v. Obanye and 
Ors. [1945]ll W.A.C.A. 60 at p.62. In Fatai Adisa 
Anibire and Anor v. Howells and Anor; it was held that 
the concept of "head o f .family" in customary law need 
not be proved by evidence, but should be judicially 
noticed. Fatai Adisa Anibire and Ors. v. Howells and 
Anor. [1973J5 U.l.L.R. 3b. —  '
3. ihere are exceptions to this pattern, see Wilson-Haffenden, 
The Red Men of Nigeria, op.cit.^ p. 275.
4. The operation of the system was fully illustrated during 
the Nigerian Civil War, when many people from the Eastern 
States were forced to return pennyless, and often wounded, 
to their home-towns. where they were given succour by 
members of their extended families.
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may claim descent from a common ancestor.^ This wider
group is variously referred to as patrilineal lineage,
2clan, tribe or sub-tribe.
The solidarity and importance of the extended 
family has been somewhat weakened in modern Nigerian society, 
due to a variety of causes among which the following may be 
mentioned:
(i) The influence of Islam: Islamic law recognizes only
the nuclear or polygynous family, consisting of a man, 
his wife or wives, his children, his slaves and their 
children. Generally, after the adoption of Islam, the 
traditional extended family is maintained, but in a 
modified form, while the nuclear and polygynous fam­
ilies receive greater recognition. The process of 
change begins with the disappearance of the ancestor 
cult. One of the main functions of the head of the 
extended family is the performance of rituals connected 
with deceased ancestors, and the major source of his 
authority derives from the supernatural. With the 
adoption of Islam the dead lose their influence over 
the lives of the living, and the unity of the old 
community is consequently breached. The Yorubas are 
a notable exception in this respect.^
1. The Oloto family of Lagos, and the Amobi family of Ogidi 
are two examples of such large extended families.
2. Compare e.g. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria.
Vol. IV, pp.39-41; Meek« Law and Authority...,pp.3-^:
S.N. Chinwuba Obi, The Ibo Law of Property.(London. 
Butterworths, 1963),pp.4-23; ^orde, the Yoruba-Speaking 
Peoples, op.cit., pp.10-13? Bascom,.The Yoruba of South­
western Nigeria, op.cit.. p. 42-46.
3. See Spencer J. Trimmingham, Islam in West Africa. (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1959, 6th imp. 1976;.pp.126-130.
4. The Yoruba family structure has successfully-resisted 
the disintegrative influences of Islam and Christianity, 
and to a lesser extent modern urbanization and industrial­
ization, see J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, 
(London, Frank Cass and Co. 1955, new imp. 19 W )
pp. 222-224; Trimmingham, Islam in West Africa, p. 129.
See Aldous, "Urbanization and Kinship11 in Social Problems 
of Change and Conflict edit, by Pierre Van Den Berghe 
(California, Chandler Publishing Company, 1965) 
pp.424-425.
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(ii) The adoption, of Christianity:.. This has also been
a frequent cause of the fragmentation of compounds, 
especially in the,urban areas, and the abolition of 
traditional rituals also had an adverse effect on the 
family unity of Christians.
(iii) Modern economic conditions: Economic conditions
in modern Nigeria make it possible for members of 
the family to live and work, or trade far away from 
their home towns or villages. This has led to the 
growth, and even perhaps ascendancy, of individualism, 
and the development of the biological family unit at 
the expense of the extended group.
(iv) The acquisitive nature of modern society is destructive 
of family unity. Each segment of the family, with a
' view to securing a position of predominance and the 
major part of the family wealth, tendsto sacrifice 
. the general welfare of the extended family as a group. 
This tendency is particularly acute in polygynous 
families, where children of the same father b u t . 
different mothers have a rooted dislike and distrust 
of each other, and jealousy, fostered by their 
mothers, is rife.^"
(v) One of the most important functions of the family 
head was to act as arbitrator or even judge in inter­
family disputes, including disputes among members of 
the family and their spouses. Nowadays, the ten­
dency is to take such disputes to a court of law, 
thus eroding the traditional importance of the 
family as a group.^
1. See further, below, Chapter IV, pp.356-358.
2. The Population Census of Eastern Nigerian Report, 1953, 
p.56, states: "While most minor disputes are settled 
in family meetings, a very large number of cases go to 
Court, and a few years ago it was possible to calculate 
that on the average, every man, woman and child had been 
in court, either as principal or witness during the year. 
About one-fifth of these cases are about land and about 
three-fifths about marriage, bride-price or the custody 
of children”.
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(vi) Unlike the traditional society, where a man derived 
'his position in the wider political and social 
community, and his rights and privileges accrue to 
him, only as a member of his extended family, in 
the modern cities, a personfs political, social, or 
economic position may be unrelated to his extended 
family group. A man is capable of maintaining him­
self and his immediate family, by the sale of goods 
or his personal services without resort to the 
extended family.1 This means that a communal pattern 
of behaviour has been largely replaced by an indiv­
idualistic one.
Group consciousness, characteristic of Nigerians, is
being replaced by the desire for independence, and the
assertion of individual right and freedom, most evident
among high school graduates immigrants in urban centers.
Although familial attachments are still common in urban
areas, yet these are found mostly among the illiterate
migrants or seasonal workers. Many people living in Lagos
have not visited their home towns in the Eastern States
2
for ten or more years*
C. The Polygamous family.
The traditional Nigerian family is polygynous or 
potentially polygynous. The customary law of all commun­
ities allows a man to marry as many wives as he can finan­
cially afford, and the number of wives a man had was usually
1. Cf. Maine!s statement that the movement of the progressive 
societies has been from status to contract, status taken 
to mean a legal condition imposed by law on the individ­
ual independently of his own choice and as a result of 
circumstances over which he had no control - to the
state where the individual becomes more and more able 
to determine his legal rights and duties by his own free 
agreement, although some portions of status still remains. 
Such a movement gives rise to a gradual dissolution of 
family dependency and the growth of individual oblig­
ation in its place; Maine, Ancient Law, op.cit., 
p.170; See Graveson*s criticism of the Statement, 
Graveson, Status in the Common Law, op.cit..pp.33 et.al.
2. See Pius Okigbo, "Social Consequences of Economic 
Development in West Africa”, op.cit.. pp.420-425.
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an indication of his social and economic prestige. Islamic.
law limits the number of legal wives to four.^
Polygamy will be dealt with more fully in a later
chapter, but it should be noted here that the number of
polygynous families shows a steady decline, especially in
the Southern States, and in all parts of the country, the
2majority of families are in fact monogamous.
D. The Nuclear Family.
Linton* s view that the nuclear family plays **an
■3
insignificant role in the lives of many societies" has 
been rejected by Murdock,^ who found no support for it 
from his data collected from 250 representative human 
societies, or from any other reliable ethnographer. Murdock 
concludes that "Whatever larger familial forms may exist, 
and to whatever extent the greater unit may assume some of 
the burdens of the lesser, the nuclear family is always 
recognizable and always has its distinctive and vital 
functions - sexual, economic, reproductive and educat- 
ional...." The nuclear family is found in every society 
in Nigeria, and is the dominant economic group in most 
communities.^ In many societies, it is used as a basis 
of succession and inheritance, or for the distribution of 
wealth.
1. See further, below Chapter IXf28-37.
2. See below, Chapter IV,339-347.
3* Ralph Linton, The Study of Man. op.cit.. pp.154-155.
4. Murdock, Social Structure, op.cit.. pp.3.
5. Ibid., p.3.
6. See Bradbury* The Benin Kingdom. 1957* op.cit..
p. 281*
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3. MARRIAGE LAWS APPLICABLE IN NIGERIA
A. Introduction
In common with most African territories,"*"
Nigeria has a tripartite system of laws. This complex 
legal system reflects the historical development of the 
country. Before the intrusion of Islam and British 
colonization, the various ethnic groups had their own 
autonomous systems of customary laws. Although there 
were local variations, the laws of macroethnic groups 
had similar basic principles, and since most groups 
were endogamous, little conflict in marriage laws was 
experienced.
With the advent of Islam, many areas penetrated 
by that religion adopted Islamic law in relation to
2marriage and family life to a greater or lesser extent.
This resulted in an amalgam of Islamic law principles,
and the principles of the customary law of the converted
tribes, in which one or the other predominated in
different aspects of marriage.
Finally, colonization introduced the English
legal system as the fundamental and general law of the
country, but permitted and recognized the application of
the two previously existing laws, provided they were not
A
repugnant to civilized ideas of justice and humanity.
The types of marriages practised in Nigeria 
today correspond to these three systems of law. Thus, 
Nigerians may marry according to customary law, Islamic 
law, or under the Nigerian Marriage Act, which is based
1. See e.g. Kenya, Ghana and Siera Leone. Some countries,
for e.g. Uganda, have four systems of law. See generally 
Arthur Phillips, "Marriage Laws in Africa", in A Survey 
of African Marriage and Family Life, edit, by Arthur 
Phillips, (London, Oxford University Press, 1953),
pp.173-327.
2. Islamic influence in the sphere of personal relations is 
mainly confined to Moslems in the Northern States. 
Although a significant proportion of Yorubas profess the 
Moslem religion, their marriage and family life are 
governed by Yoruba customary law. See Map8 above, p.194.
3. See further below, Chapter IX, pp.11-14.
4. See further below, pp. 182-189.
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on English law. The principles of law applicable to
each of these types of marriage differ considerably, and
to a large extent in most cases they are administered by
1
different systems of courts respectively.
This pluralism of marriage laws, and dichotomy 
of courts, result in various kinds of internal conflicts 
of laws, compounded by the fact that a person may marry 
under more than one system at the same time, or may con­
vert from one system to the other, under certain circum­
stances. To add to the confusion, the law regulating the 
relationship among the systems is far from clear, as will 
be seen in future chapters.
In Nigeria, Islamic law is generally classified 
2
as customary law. The differences in origin, nature and 
fundamental principles between Islamic law and indigenous 
customary laws, especially in relation to marriage and the 
status of women, however, justify separate treatment. 
Accordingly, Islamic law will be treated as a separate 
system of law in much of this study.
These three systems of law will be briefly 
discussed, in order to give some insight into their general 
nature, the source of their authority and the limits of 
their application, with particular reference to the law of 
marriage and the status of women.
B. Customary law.
(1) Introduction
Customary law determines the legal status of
■5
the majority of married women in Nigeria* With the
1. See above, pp.157-159.
2. See S.2, High Court Law, Cap. 49, Laws of Northern
Nigeria 1965 Revision, Item 25, Exclusive Legislative 
List, Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1965; see further
below, p.189.
5. See Table 2:1 and Fig. 5, pp. 175 and 176 respectively.
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exception .of the Moslems in the Emirates of Northern 
Nigeria, .whose marriages are regulated by Islamic law, . .
the overwhelming majority of people marry according to
/
customary law only. Out of a total of 379 married persons 
interviewed by the present writer in the Southern States 
of Nigeria, 226 (59*6 percent) were married according to 
customary law only. Only 24 persons who had contracted 
other types of marriages had not also contracted a 
customary law marriage with the same person. Although 
17 of the Yoruba persons interviewed stated that their 
marriages were celebrated according to Islamic laws, 
southern Yorubas observe Yoruba customary law, rather 
than Islamic law, in marital and family matters.1 These 
marriages, therefore, for all practical purposes, can be 
counted as customary law marriages. This would give a 
total of 353 out of 379 persons who contracted customary 
marriages, or 89.2 percent of all the married persons 
interviewed. (Table 2:1).
In large cosmopolitan cities like Lagos, where 
people are far removed from their families, and the 
younger elements assert a greater degree of independence 
in marital affairs, there is evidence that the modern 
trend seems to be that persons do not usually celebrate 
a customary law marriage as well as a statutory marriage. 
For example, details of 412 marriages contracted at Lagos 
Marriage Registry from 11 January, 1975, to 31 July, 1975, 
were analysed by the present writer. The data from these 
marriages showed that only 54 of the couples were married 
to each other according to customary law, before their 
marriage under the Marriage Act. The others, except for 
seven husbands who were divorcees, three widowers, and 
two widows, all described themselves as "single” - not 
having gone through any form of marriage before.^
1. See further below, Chapter IX> pp.20-23.
2. See Green, Igbo Village Affairs, op.cit.. p.30; up to 
1934, no-one in the village of ,Agba ja (Igbo) had con­
tracted a Christian marriage.
3. See below, Table 2:1, p. 175* J
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There is the possibility of these couples 
contracting a. subsequent customary law marriage later, 
but further evidence from Onitsha makes this unlikely, 
at least in some cases.'
An analysis of 71 marital disputes brought to 
the Social Welfare Office in Onitsha, showed that 50 
(71 percent) of the marriages were celebrated under 
customary law only. Of the 21 marriages which had been 
celebrated under the Marriage Act, sixteen couples were 
not married according to any form of customary law, 
although the marriages had lasted for a considerable 
number of years in many cases.
This evidence does not detract, however, from 
the accuracy of the assertion that the majority of 
Nigerian women marry under customary law only.
(II) Nature of cusrbomary law. There is no statutory 
definition of customary law. The nearest approach to a 
definition of customary law is contained in the Customary 
Courts Law,'*' 1956 of the former Eastern Region of Nigeria, 
as follows:
11... * 'customary law1 means a rule or body of rules 
which obtains and is fortified by established 
usage and which is appropriate and applicable to 
any particular cause, matter, dispute, issue or question”.
The Evidence Ordinance, 1948 defined "custom as
a rule .which, in a particular district, has from long
2
usage obtained the force of law".
There are also few judicial definitions of 
customary law. In Alfa v. Arepo, Dtlffus, J., said:
"Customary law may be defined as the unwritten law 
or rules which are recognized and applied by the 
community as governing its transactions and code 
of behaviour in any particular matter. This law 
is unwritten....it owes its authority to.the fact 
that the custom has been established from ancient days.
1., E.R. No. 21 of 1956, S.2.
2. ‘Cap. 63, Laws 'of Nigeria, 1948 edition, S.2.
3. [1963] W.R.N.L.R., 95, at 97.
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Customary law is not, however, a static law and, in 
my view, the law can and-does change with the times 
and the rapid development of social and economic 
development"•
/
This passage aptly summarizes the basic nature
and characteristics of customary law: it is unwritten,^ it
2
must be a mirror of accepted usage in the area where it is
applied, and its rules change with time/
Although customary law is unwritten, in some
parts of Nigeria, the principles of customary law relating
4
to matrimonial causes have been recorded.
It is important that the customary law be
recognized and adhered to by a particular community as
binding. In other words, customary law is not uniform,
but varies from tribe to tribe, and even within the same
5
sub-tribe, divergent principles of law may apply. Thus 
among the Igbos,the customary law of Onitsha may be 
different in details from that applied in Arochukwu, and 
both may differ radically from the laws applied by the
1. See Cole v. Folami [l956]l F.S.C.66 at 68; Rotobi v.
Savage 119441 17 rt.L.R.77: but see Bakare v. Coker [1935]12 
N.L.R. 31; and Baba.lide v. Bankole 11962 | Unreported,
Suit No. AB/8A/60, Ibadan Civil Appeal No. 1/59A/62,
Ibadan High Court.
2. Per Bair amain, F.J., in Owonyin v. Omotosho 1*1961 ll 
All N.L.R. 304, at p. 309.
3. Osborne, C.J., in Lewis v. Bankole [l909]l N.L.R. 81,101; 
see further below, p.
4. In the Northern States some Native Authorities have 
recorded the rules relating to customary marriage in 
their respective areas, see e.g. Native Authority 
(Declaration of Bui Native Marriage Law and Custom)
Order, 1964, N.A.L.N. 9 of 1964; Native Authority 
(Declaration of Borgu Native Marriage Law and Custom)
Order, 1961, N.A.L.N. 52 of 1961; Native Authority 
(Declaration of Idoma Native Marriage Law and Custom)
Order, 1959, N.A.L.N. 63 of 1959; Native Authority 
(Declaration of Tiv Native Marriage Law and Custom) Order, 
1955, N.R.L.N. 149 of 1955. See also the Marriage,
Divorce, and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Law
Order, 1958, W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958, of the former Western 
Region of Nigeria; and The Ikwerre-Etche Federated 
Native Authority (Ikwerre Clan Area) (Marriage) Rules,
1953, E.R.L.N. No. 53 of 1954, of the former Eastern 
Region of Nigeria.
5. See Edokpolor v. Idehen [1961] W.R.N.L.R. 11.
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Tivs. This aspect of customary law is abundantly 
illustrated in future chapters, but often it is for­
gotten by judges, especially in relation to marriage.
1
In Awgu v. Nezianya. Gold Coast authorities 
were cited to prove customary law, although the case 
originated from Onitsha in Nigeria. Verity, C.J., 
observed that,, although in the specific instances cited, 
the principles of native law and custom were expressly 
applicable to the Gold Coast, "they were nevertheless 
equally applicable as general principles to the law and 
custom of Nigeria, a departure from which can only be 
justified if it is established by evidence that the 
native law and custom in any particular area differs 
from the general principle". This dictum established a 
dangerous doctrine, since no single system of customary 
law is applicable throughout West Africa, nor are there 
even general principles of universal validity. It is 
unsatisfactory to rely on authorities drawn from a 
different country, and dealing with a different system 
of law, for the ascertainment of the rules of a given 
system. Litigants should not have to disprove the 
application to them of principles drawn from some system 
of law other than, and possibly far removed from, their 
own.^
The most important characteristic of customary 
law is its flexibility and changing nature. The flexibility 
and non-static nature of customary law have been stressed 
in a number of cases. In one of the earliest cases,
1. [1949]12 W.A.C.A. 450; see also T.O. Elias, Law and 
Social Change in Nigeria. (London: Evans Bros. Ltd. (1972). 
p.267.
2. See Okpowagha and Anor* y.Ewhedoma [1970]1 All N.L.R. 203; 
the Supreme Couri held: where there is no direct 
evidence of a custom or where such evidence as exists is
a judicial decision not referrable to the particular 
area concerned, the Supreme Court would refuse to accord 
recognition or give effect to or enforce such custom 
or clothe it with the force of law; see also 
Adegboyega and Ors v. Igbinosun and Ors.f196911 All 
N.l TR.1; Taiwo v. .Dosunmu and Anor. [1966] N.M.L.R.94..
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Lewis v, B a n k o l e Osborne, C.J., noted that
"One of the most striking features of West African 
native custom...is its flexibility; it appears to 
have been always subject to motives of expediency, 
and it shows unquestionable adaptability to altered 
circumstances without entirely losing its character".
In the same case, at first instance, Speed,
Ag* C.J., affirmed that the native law and custom which
the courts enforce must be "existing native law and
2custom, and not that of bygone days". Similarly, in
3
Balogun and Ors. v. Ashodi, Webber, J., said the courts 
were "to administer existing native law", and that the 
"chief characteristic feature of native law is its
4flexibility". The Supreme Court in Apoesho v. Awodiya, 
noted that "it is a well-known fact that in recent years 
customs have changed rapidly in Nigeria, and what was the 
custom twenty years ago has ceased to be the custom of 
the people".
The changing nature of customary law is not 
peculiar to Nigeria, or Africa, as will be seen throughout
5
this thesis, and this fact was observed in Wokoko v. Molyko, 
where it was stated that
"*.. .in the past native custom has been by no means 
static: indeed a great many native customs in. West 
Africa are manifestly of European origin, and it is 
eminently desirable that native custom should be 
progressive, as in this case, where the older, and 
as I hold superseded custom would restrain develop­
ment" .
This statement highlights one of the central 
themes of this work: the similarity of many aspects of 
Nigerian customary laws of marriage and family life and 
the traditional customary family laws of Europe and other
1. [1909]1 N.L.R. 82, pp. 100-101.
2. Lewis'v. Bankole [l908]l N.L.R. 81 at p. 83.
3. [1931] 10 N.L.R. 36.
4. [1964]1 All N.L.R. 48 at p.53.
5. [1938] 14 N.L.R.
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societies - laws now discarded by those societies in 
accordance with changed social and economic circumstances.
In spite of the judicial recognition of the
/
changing nature of customary law, as evidenced by the 
cases cited above and others,^ many courts persist in 
applying archaic rules of customary law which adversely 
affect the legal status of women regardless of the fact 
that the customary law as practised by the community has 
changed. This is in large part due to the difficulty of 
proving that the law has changed.
(Ill) Proof of customary law. In Nigeria, judges of
Customary Courts are presumed to know the customary law
of the area, and litigants are not required to prove the 
2
law. In the non-customary courts, however, the onus is
on litigants to establish what a custom is, the existence
of such a custom, and to show that persons, or a class
of persons, concerned in the particular area regard the
custom as binding upon them. Thus, the existence or
non-existence of a custom in relation to any particular
matter or transaction under any given area of the country,
■3
is a question of fact which must be proved by evidence.
The necessity for such evidence only ceases when, in the 
words of Lord Justice Channel in the case of Angu v. Attah,^ 
quoted with approval in Larinde v. Afiko. ^  ,!the particular 
customs have, by frequent proof in the courts become so 
notorious that the courts take judicial notice of them.”^
1. See e.g. Eshllgbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering the 
Government of Nigeria [1^28] A.C. 45$; [1931] A.dT 662 
at 673.
2. See Egri v. Uperi [1973] 4 E.C.S.L.R., 632.
3. S.14(3) Evidence Act, Cap.62, Laws of Nigeria, 1958 
Revision. See also Ibid., s.s.56(1) and 58.
4. [1921](Gold Coast Reports P.C. 1874 to 1928); see also 
Larinde v. Afiko [1940] 6 W.A.C.A., 108.
5. [1940] 6 W.A.C.A. 108;'see also Adagun v. Fagbola & Anor. 
,1932] 11 N.L.R. 110; Buraimo v .Obamboye [l94oj 1$
N.L.R. 138; Eccua Bimba v. Effuah~Mansa. see Sarbah,
Fanti Customary Laws, 3rd edit. (London, Frank Cass
and Co. Ltd. 1968), p. 137.
6 . S.14(2) Evidence Act, Cap.62, Laws of Nigeria, 1958 
Revision; Odunsi v. Ojora and 0rs.[l96l] 1, All N.L.R.283.
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Customary law is difficult to prove, but change 
in customary law is almost impossible to prove in some 
cases.
In Balogun and Anor. v. Ashodi.^ the question 
arose as to whether land could be the subject of a sale 
under Yoruba customary law. Kingdom,C.J., in a dissenting 
judgment, said he was aware that "native law and custom is 
a live thing, and may change as conditions change", but he 
wanted "strong evidence” that the change had in fact taken 
place. He said:
"I cannot think that, because a number of people — 
even a large number - choose, for their own pecuniary 
advantage to treat the law as though it were different 
from what it is, their actions can have the effect of 
changing the law” .2
Yet in 1931, when this case was decided, sale and
other alienations of land were notorious, not only among the
Yorubas but also in other parts of the country, where land
■3
traditionally had never been sold. As early as 1902, the 
administrator of Southern Nigeria reported that many new 
houses were being built on leased/land in Ibadan. He wrote:
"I have repeatedly warned the Bashorun and Council of 
the grave and serious trouble they are creating for 
themselves in leasing land to Europeans and strangers 
in this highly irregular fashion".^
1. [1931] 10 N.L.R. 36.
2. Balogun and Anor. v. Ashodi [1931] 10 N.L.R. 36 at p.57.
3. See C.K. Meek. Land Law and Custom in the Colonies. 
(London: Frank dlass and Co. Ltd., 19^8 }, pp. 150 and 300; 
M.M. Green, Land Tenure in an Ibo Village. (London:
Lund and Humphries, 1 9 ^ 1 P*34; J.O. Field, "Sales of 
land in an Ibo Community", Man. Vol.XLV. No. 47, 1945; 
Elias, Nigerian Land Law.1971. pp.148-149; see also 
Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v. John Holt and Co. 
11910 I 2 tf.L.ft. 1 at 3; Lewis vT Bankole 11909 1 1 
N.L.R. 82 at 83.
4. Great Britain, Public Record Office, C.O. 684, Dispatch 
No. 33, par. 3, 15 Feb. 1902. See also C.O. 580,
Dispatch No. 140 of 21 May, 190.
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Similarly, in 1908, it was stated that "at the 
present time a native occupier in Lagos may.mortgage his 
interests in land.,.."'*'
No proof of customary law is required in customary
2courts, but customary court judges are usually very trad­
itional, and would refuse to recognize any change in 
customary law, especially in relation to marriage, unless 
they were forced to do so by a statutory provision. Some 
aspects of customary law of marriage have been enacted in 
legislative provisions, but the bulk of customary law 
remains unwritten, and this tends to make the law vague.
(IV) The validity of customary law. In Nigeria, rules 
of customary law are subject to certain general tests of 
validity before they can be enforced. Wherever customary 
law is stated to be enforceable in a statute, it is always 
qualified. Thus, the High Court Law of the former Western 
Region provides: ^
"The High Court shall observe and enforce the obser­
vance of every customary law which is applicable and 
is not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by 
implication with any written law for the time being 
in force, and nothing in this Law shall deprive any 
person of the benefit of any such customary law".^
1* Great Britain, Public Record Office, C.O. 879, No. 906 
(African (West)) Memorandum on Land Tenure and Land 
Revenue Assessment in Northern Nigeria: Sir Percy 
Girouard, dolonial Office, May 1906, Appendix III,
Land Tenure in the Central and Eastern Provinces of 
Southern Nigeria, 9 Jan. 1908, by M.R. Menendez.
2. Egri v. Uperi [1973]4 E.C.S.L.R. 632 (Supreme Court 
decision); Ababio II v. Nsemfoo [1947J12 W.A.C.A. 127; 
Edokpolor v. idehen [1961] W.N.L.R.11; see also Order 10, 
Rule b, par. 3, Customary.Courts Rules, 1966, Bendel. 
State: "Where in any cause or matter before a customary 
court any party wishes to rely on the customary law of 
the area of jurisdiction of the court, there shall be no 
need to prove the customary law before the Court". 
Contrast Ehigie v. Ehigie [1961] All N.L.R. 842;. 
customary law must be proved before a Grade A Customary 
Court in the Western States; Fijabi v. Odumola [1955-561 
W.R.N.L.R. 133.
3. S.12 High Court Law, Cap. 44, West Region, 1958 Revision.
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A similar provision is contained in the High
1 p
Court Law of each State, in the Evidence Act, and in
3
the various Customary Court Laws.
The object of the incompatibility provision is 
to provide for inconsistencies between the provisions of 
customary law and statutory law. For example, under the 
Marriage Act, marriage is monogamous, and a man is legally 
entitled to have only one wife. Under customary law he 
is entitled to multiple wives. A statutory marriage 
deprives a man of his customary law right to contract 
polygynous marriages, since this right is inconsistent 
with the provisions of the Marriage Act.
The first limitation acts as a means of reforming
customary law, and bringing it in line with modern ideas
and practice. This is clearly illustrated by the Ghanian
4
case of Addae v. Asante. According to Fanti customary
law as stated by Sarbah at the turn of the present century, 
if a father failed to obtain a wife for his son on reaching 
the age of puberty, he was liable for damages arising from 
the son's misconduct with any woman. The relevance of this 
custom to present day Ghana was questioned by Edusei, J., 
who found such a claim untenable. The learned Judge said:
nEven if such a custom prevailed in the days of Sarbah, 
it is undoubtedly true to say that it cannot be the 
custom now for it is against good conscience to permit 
it to persist to the present times when present day 
children are asserting their freedom of action and 
thought in diverse ways. If the son is old enough 
to know what is sex, and in these days there is 
nothing esoteric about sex, I cannot see by what 
stretch of legal ingenuity a parent should be
1. See S.22 High Court Law, Cap.61, Eastern Region, 1963 
Revision; S.34, High Court Law, Cap.49 Northern Region, 
1963 Revision; S.26, High Court Law, Cap. 52 Lagos 
State, 1973 Edition.
2. S.14(3) Evidence Act, Cap. 62 Laws of Nigeria, 1958
Revision.
3. See e.g. S.22 Customary Court Edict, 1966, Mid-Western 
State, No. 30 of 1966.
4. [1974]2 G.L.R. 288 at 291.
saddled with the son's responsibility".^
No general principle for the interpretation, and 
application of the phrase has ever been propounded, and 
judges mainly use their' own criteria of what is repugnant 
to equity, justice and good conscience. This results in 
an inconsistent application of the phrase, and conflicting
decisions are not unknown. For example* in Laromeke v.
2 -------
Nekegho and Ayo* the plaintiff obtained orders in the
lower courts, requiring the second defendant, who was the 
widow of his late brother, to pay him £12, being a return 
of her dowry, and to deliver to him her two children by 
his deceased brother. From these orders the defendants 
appealed. The first defendant was the second defendants 
father. The plaintiff was a Nigerian from Urhobo living 
in Accra. He led evidence that, by a binding Urhobo 
custom, the family of a deceased man select a member of 
the family to marry the deceased’s widow. This custom was 
admitted by the defendants. By the custom, the widow is 
entitled to refuse the fllevirate marriage”, but in this 
event, the family is entitled to demand a repayment of the 
marriage dowry, and the custody of the children of the 
marriage.
The plaintiff claimed that he had been selected 
by the family to marry the second defendant, but that she 
had refused him. He was therefore entitled to the return 
of the dowry paid for her by his brother, and to the 
custody of the children. Sampson, J., in the Ghana High 
Court, held that such a custom, which requires a woman to 
deliver her children to a man she declines to marry, must 
be regarded as repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience within the meaning of the Courts1 Ordinance, 
section 87 (1).^
1. Addae v. Asante [1974]2 G.L.R. 288, at p. 291
2. [1958]3 W.A.L.R. 306.'
3. Courts Ordinance of Ghana, C.4.
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But in re The Estate of Agboruja.1 on similar 
facts, and also in relation to the customary law of 
Urhobo, Ames, J., did not see anything wrong with a woman 
being forced to hand over her children in such.a situation. 
He held that "there can be nothing intrinsically unfair or 
inequitable even in the inheritance of widows, where those
who follow the custom are pagans, and not Mohammedans or
2
Christians".
•5
. As will be later seen, this so-called "widow 
inheritance”, and its concomitant - the deprivation of 
the widow of any benefit in the property left by her 
deceased husband if she refuses to be "inherited” - today 
remains one of the greatest injustices perpetrated in the 
name of customary law on Nigerian women. It is difficult 
to justify application of the rule on the grounds of 
religion, as the learned Judge did in the above case.
The phrase has been used, however, in a number 
of cases, especially by the earlier judges, to soften the 
harsh and discriminatory attitude of customary law towards 
women. Thus, in Solomon v. Gbobo,^ Holden, C.J., held 
that a custom whereby the husband could divorce his wife 
at will, but the wife could not obtain a divorce unless 
the husband consented, was contrary to natural justice, 
eauitv and good conscience. Similarly, in Mariyama v.
5
Sadiku Ejo. the High Court refused to enforce the 
application of a rule of Igbirra customary law under 
which a wife is forbidden to marry within ten months of 
a divorce. If she does so in defiance of the rule, any 
child born as a result belongs to the former husband. In
1. [1949] 19 N.L.R. 38.
2. Ibid,'p.39*
3. See Chapter X m  below, p p . 438-442.
4. [1974]4 E.C.S.L.R.
5. [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 81
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this case,, the parties had "been separated for .several months 
before the divorce was granted. The wife remarried after 
the divorce, but delivered a child within ten months of the 
divorce. Her former husband was given custody of the child 
in the trial court, but the decision was reversed in the 
High Court on the ground that the rule was repugnant. The 
learned Judge was careful to point out that
"We must not be understood to condemn this native law 
and custom in its general application...There is a 
similar provision in Moslem law and also in English 
law, where there is a presumption in similar cases 
that the former husband is the father. That pres­
umption must be rebuttable if natural justice is 
to be done. In this case it has been clearly and 
absolutely rebutted•"1
One of the oldest cases in which the repugnancy
2clause was applied in favour of women is Edet v. Essien.
According to Ibibio customary law (as is the 
case in most systems:, of customary law) a man-who has 
paid dowry for a woman is entitled to - custody and legal 
paternity of all her children whether begotten by him or
not, provided such dowry has not been repaid.
2
In Edet v. Essien. a man paid dowry for a 
woman when she was a child. Later she married another man 
who had also paid dowry for her, and bore three children 
by him, one of whom died. The first husband, whose dowry 
had not been refunded, was granted custody of her two 
surviving children by the Customary Court in accordance 
with Ibibio customary law. On appeal, this decision was 
reversed on the ground that it was repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience that a man should be 
entitled to the child of another, simply because the dowry 
he had paid on its mother had not been refunded to him.
This decision alleviated the mental agony of 
many mothers who would have been deprived of their children
1. Ibid., p .83.
2. [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47.
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in similar circumstances• The decision seeped through 
.to- the Customary Courts, where pudges, although 
reluctantly, applied the precedent to similar cases. 
Unfortunately, however, 'many High Court Judges have 
distinguished the decision on its facts, and have refused 
to follow it even in cases which would have justified the 
application of the repugnancy rule, independent of the 
decision in Edet v. Essien.^
An example of such a case is Nwaribe v. Registrar. 
Eastern Orlu.^ In this case, the husband of a woman, 0, 
died, and she continued to live in the matrimonial home 
with the family of the deceased. She became pregnant, but 
before delivery she married the father of the child, the 
applicant in the case. The native court, dealing with the 
formal dissolution of her marriage with the deceased, 
awarded the child to the deceased. The Applicant appealed, 
arguing that the decision of the Native Court was wrong, on 
the ground that it was against natural justice, equity and 
good conscience to have" awarded the child to the deceased 
as against the new husband. Evidence given by the applicant 
himself indicated that
nUnder the local custom of Otulu, a woman whose husband 
is dead, cannot be married by any of the relatives of
the deceased but the children born after the death of
the deceased are the children of the deceased”.-,
Egbuna, J., held that if the applicant knew that
this is the custom of Otulu, and impregnated the woman 
whilst she was staying in the deceased husband!s place, he 
could not be heard to complain that the decision of the 
native court was against natural justice. The Judge 
quoted with approval a passage from Elias’S'book, "The 
Nigerian Legal System, to the effect that-
”Under ancient customary law marriage was almost 
always indissoluble, as it was looked upon as a 
permanent social and spiritual bond between man
li [1932]11 N.L.R. 47.
2. [1964]8 E.N-.L.R. 24.
3. Ibid.; p. 26.
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| and wife on the one . hand and their respective families
on the other
The learned Judge held that if a woman stays in 
the matrimonial family after the death of her husband, and 
becomes pregnant during such period, it is not against 
| natural justice and equity that the child is regarded as
a member of that household.
With the greatest respect, it is submitted that 
the learned Judge failed to recognize the fact that, whether 
the widow remained in the deceased husband's family or not, 
according to Otulu customary law, any child conceived by her 
belonged to her dead husband. Secondly, the passage he 
quoted with approval referred to ancient customary law. 
Divorce is now prevalent in all Nigerian societies, and in 
all types of marriages, even inter vivos. Thirdly, the 
passage quoted referred to societies where the widow is 
allowed to remarry another member of her deceased 
husband's family. In the present case, the law expressly 
forbade such remarriage. Fourthly, but not the least 
important, the applicant was not protesting against the 
decision of the customary court as such, but against the 
particular rule of customary law which made such a decision 
legally possible. His knowledge of the law is therefore 
irrelevant.
2As stated elsewhere, the phrase "repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience” applies to 
"customary law”, and not to its application in specific 
situations. It is therefore clear that the courts should 
in all cases consider whether the rule itself is repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience, and if they 
find that it is, then the particular rule should not be 
enforced, regardless of whether the complainant against the 
rule knew of its existence or not.
In a country like Nigeria, where men continue to 
marry women very much younger than themselves, widows may
1. Ibid., p. 26.
2. A.E.W. Park, The Sources of Nigerian Law. (Lagos, African 
Universities tress, I$b3, 4th imp. 197b, p. 78.
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.be.very young. Any rule of law which denies remarriage to 
such widows, or indeed to any widow, must be regarded as 
repugnant and against public policy. It promotes illicit 
intercourse. It is also clear discrimination against 
women, since a husband can marry another woman during the 
life-time of the wife, but she is prevented from remarrying 
even after her husband’s death. This principle of law is 
invalidated by section 39(1) of The Federal Constitution 
1978.1 •
C. Islamic Law.
As previously stated Islamic law is generally
2
classified as customary law in Nigeria. However, the 
source, nature and legal basis of Islamic law are 
radically different from those of indigenous customary 
law. Islamic law also differs considerably from customary 
law in relation to its treatment of women.
Islam is not indigenous to Nigeria. It is an 
imported religion in the same sense as Christianity is, 
but it predated Christianity in Nigeria by several 
centuries.^ and since Islamic law has its basis in the
1» See above pp. 148-149.
2. See above p. 172, n.2.
3* The Area Courts Reform Committee, in its Report, argues 
against nthe lumping of Islamic law along with Customary 
law". The Report maintains that "Islamic law is a 
fully fleged jurisprudence which grew up and developed 
throughout the early period of Islamic History and in 
many parts of the world. It can indeed be fairly said 
that Roman law and Islamic law are the two great legal 
systems of modern times.... It therefore does not do 
justice to the system to disdainfully bracket it with 
an assortment of customary usages” . See Report: Area 
Courts Reform Committee, p.29, S.53; Contrast Item 23, 
Exclusive Legislative List, Federal Constitution 1963 
and Item 58, Exclusive Legislative List Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree 1978.
4. Islam antedated Christianity in Nigeria by over 400 yeears. 
The first Christian missionaries landed in Nigeria 
around the 1840*s. The Portuguese made some mild attempts 
to convert certain groups in the' early 15th century, but 
their interest was centered on trade and commerce in the 
Delta Regions of the East and Western parts of Nigeria
Footnote 4 continued.....
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traditional customary laws of the ancient Arabs,many 
of its rules are similar to'the rules of Nigeria1s 
indigenous customary laws. Less friction is therefore 
experienced between customary and Islamic law, than bet­
ween English law and either of them.^" For example, both 
customary and Islamic law recognize polygyny while 
English law does not.
Schacht notes that Islamic law is the epitome 
of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation of the 
Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of Islam itself, 
while Gibb asserts that it is the Sharia which, down the 
centuries, has been the most effective agent in moulding 
the social order and community life of Muslim peoples and
of holding the social fabric of Islam compact and secure
through all the fluctuations of political fortune.
The sources of Moslem law are varied.
Cl) The Koran; This contains the direct injunctions of 
God. The moral principles enunciated in the Koran,
as well as the legal rules therein, were gradually
built up during the life time of the Prophet 
Muhammad. . They were not enunciated simultaneously 
as a complete code of laws, but in accordance with 
the exigencies of the moment and the requirements 
of each special case. Family law is fairly exhaus­
tively treated in the Koran, albeit in a number of 
scattered passages. Emphasis is laid on conduct
Foot 4 continued - rather than in the Gospel - see Babs. A.
“ Fafunwa -,dIslamic Concept of Education with Particular
Reference to Modern Nigeria1,* Nigerian Journal of Islam. 
Vol.1, No. 1, June, 1970 p., ; Hodgkin, Nigerian
Perspectives, op.cit.. pp.124-128;. Ling Roth. Great 
Benin: its Customs, Art and Horrors. 1903, p.b;
J.J. Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours in Several 
Countries in the Interior of Africa. 184^-1856. 1857 "
(2nd edition 1968) pp.21-22; Burns, 1969,.p.265;
1. Burns, History of-Nigeria. 1969, p. 265.
2. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1^64;, p. 1.
3. Hamilton Gibb, Mohammedanism. 2nd edit(London, 1953),p.9.
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towards women and children, orphans and relatives,
but the legal effects of an act contrary to the .
rules are not mentioned.'1'
✓
(II) The Sunna: These are the oral precepts delivered from
time to time by the Prophet, and by reference to the 
daily mode of his life as handed down to posterity
by his immediate followers. The Sunna supplements 
the Koran on many points on which the latter is silent.
(III) I.ima is defined as agreement of the jurists among the 
followers of Muhammad in a particular age on a question 
of law. Its authority as a source of law is founded
on certain Koranic and traditional texts. I.ima is an 
essential principle of Sunni jurisprudence.^
4(IV) Kiyas or analogical deduction from the Koran and Sunna.
(V) Customs and Usages. The customs and usages of the 
people of Arabia which were not expressly repealed 
during the life-time of the Prophet, are held to have
. been sanctioned by the Law-giver by his silence.
These customs are generally spoken of as having the 
force of I.jma. and their validity is based on the 
same texts as the validity of the latter. The Sunni 
Schools hold that custom overrides analogical law.
It must not, however, be opposed to a clear text of 
the Koran or of an authentic tradition. The first 
four sources are formal sources, while the latter is 
a material source. The spirit of the law in Islam 
is religious and ethical, drawing its inspiration 
from the Koran and the teaching of the Prophet.
1. See Abdur, Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence, op.cit., 
p. 17y Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, op.cit., , p . 6.
2. Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence, op.cit., p.17,
69-71; Tyabji, op.cit., pp. 7, 10-14.
3* Rahim, op.cit., p. 18, 71-77, 115-136; Tyabji, op.cit. 
pp. 14-To..
4. Rahim, op.cit., pp. 137-160; Tyabji, op.cit., p. 16-18. 
5- Rahim, op.cit., pp. 136-137; Tyabji, op.cit., p. 18-19.
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. . But the. context of the. law is . based upon pre-Islamic
customs and usages.^
There are four schools of law in orthodox Islam:
the Maliki, ShafeiTi, Hanafi and Hanbali. In Nigeria,
the prevailing school is the Maliki. The tenets of the
Maliki school also predominate in the rest of West Africa
and in North Africa, especially Morocco and Algeria. The
four schools mentioned above are known as the Sunnis.
Their doctrines are essentially the same as regards the
fundamental dogmas (usi\l), though they differ from each
other in the application of private judgment, and in the
2
interpretation and exposition of the Koran.
The majority of the population in the Northern 
States of Nigeria are Moslems and marry according to 
Islamic law. In Faremilekun and Ors.v. The State, the 
Western State Court of Appeal stated that some Moslems 
marry according t£ customary law, and some marry under 
the Marriage Act. As will be later seen, there are some 
aspects of customary law in the marriage rites of most 
Moslem communities in the Northern States. There are few 
Moslems, however, who marry solely according to customary law, 
and very few in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria marry 
under the Marriage Act. Of the 106 married Moslems inter­
viewed in Maiduguri by the present writer, all were married 
according to Islamic law only.
Among the Yorubas of Southern Nigeria, a large 
proportion of the population are Moslems, but, apart from 
the presence of a mallam to recite verses from the Holy
1. For the sources of Islamic law generally see Abdur 
Ramin, The Principle of Muhammedan Jurisprudence, op.cit., 
pp.l6-3b, b9« et.al; Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, opTciTr,
pp.6-24; JosepE”Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 
(London: Clarendon Press, 19b4), pp. 10-88; Origins 
of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 1950.
2. Rahim, op.cit  ^, ;p. 23; Tyabji, op.cit., p. 9.
3. In 1963^71.7 percent of the population of the Northern 
Provinces were Moslems and in 1953, 73 percent professed 
the Moslem religion - see The Population Census of 
Nigeria 1963, North, Vol. 2, pp. 215-217; Population 
Census of Nigeria 1952-53 Summary Tables p.9.
4. See Faremilekun and 4 Or s. v. The State ["197413W.S.C .A.
86.
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Koran, the form of their marriage ceremony, the legal 
essentials, and the legal, incidents of the marriage are 
all governed .by Yoruba customary law.'*’ A few Yorubas 
also marry under the Nigerian Marriage Act, among whom 
some are Moslems.
TABLE 2:2
POPULATION BY RELIGION AND SEX
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
TOTAL MALES FEMALES
Relig­
ion
Population % Population % Population °/o
Moslems 26,276,496 47.2 13,397,054 47.7 12,879,442 46.7
Christ­
ians 19,207,144. 34.5 10,077,436 35.8 9,129,708 33.1
Others 10,186,415 18.3 4,637,362 16.5 5,549,053 20.2
Total 55,670,055 100.0 28,111,852 100.0 27,558,203 100.0
Sources Population Census of Nigeria, 1963, Vol.Ill, op.cit., 
p. 3.
D. General law.
The term "general law” is used here compendiously 
to refer to that part of Nigerian law which was imported 
from England in one form or the other, as well as local 
statutes enacted by Nigerian Legislatures, much of which 
is based on English or other foreign laws.
The introduction of English law into Nigeria was 
effected by local statute law. Some of these local
1. See further, ChapterIX, pp.20-23.
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enactments provided for the. reception of English law 
generally. For example, the High Court Law of Northern 
Nigeria, states:
”28. Subject to the provisions of any written law
and in particular of this section....-
(a) the common law.
(b) the doctrines of equity.
(c) the statutes of general application 
which were in force in England on the 
1st day of January, 1900, shall, insofar 
as they relate to any matter with respect 
to which the legislature of the Region is 
for the time being competent to make laws, 
be in force within the jurisdiction of the 
court”
Statutes received in this manner, and of 
particular relevance to this study are:
(i) Intestates Estate Act 1890.^
(ii) Married Women1s Property Acts 1882-1890.^
(iii) Will's Act, 1837.4
It is pertinent to note that a statute of 
general application which was in force in England in 1900, 
may still be in force in Nigeria, although the law may 
have been subsequently amended or even repealed in England.
In Oyo, Ogun, Ondo and Bendel States (all 
formerly parts of the former Western Region), common law 
and equity alone are received. In 1958 and 1959, the then 
Western Region Legislature enacted all the English statutes 
which it considered necessary to have as a part of Western
1. Cap 49, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 Revision.
2. 13 Stats.32; Johnson v. United Africa Company T 1936113 
N.L.R. 13; Coker v. Coker 11972 1b C.C.H.C.J. 1.
3. 17 Stats. 116, see Ogedegbe v. Qgedegbe [1964] L.L.R. 
209; Egunjobi v. Egunjobi 11974 |4 E.C.S.L.R. 552; 
Asomugha v. Asomugha 11972 112 C.C.H.C.J. 91.
4. 39 Stats. 856; Thomas v. De Souza [1929] 9. N.L.R. 81; 
Yunus a v. Adesubokan [1968TTOT7C.R. 97; see further 
Chapter XIll.
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Nigerian law. Some of the laws, for example the Married 
Women*s Property Act,^ were updated in conformity with 
subsequent changes in English law, but most pre-1900 
statutes of general application were enacted in identical 
terms.
In addition to the general reception statutes,
a few local provisions introduced English law upon a
particular subject. An example which is particularly
relevant here, was the States Courts (Federal Juris- 
2
diction) Act, section 4 of which imported into Nigeria
the English Matrimonial Causes Acts, which dealt with
divorce, nullity and other matrimonial causes.
Section 4 of the States (Federal Jurisdiction)
Act was repealed by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970j
which also provides that all "matrimonial causes" must
now be instituted under the Decree.
Local statutes based on English law were also
enacted. The Marriage Ordinance 1884, re-inacted in 1914
and still in force as the Marriage Act is particularly
relevant. This Ordinance introduced the monogamous type
of marriage into Nigeria. A monogamous marriage has been
4defined in Hyde v. Hyde as the voluntary union for life 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.
■ Both customary and Islamic law marriages are 
potentially polygamous. This and other differences between 
customary and Islamic law marriages on the one hand and . 
statutory or English type of marriage on the other have 
been fertile sources of conflict of laws which are fully 
discussed in later chapters.
1. 17 Stats. 116.
2. Cap. 177, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
3. See S.115(2) Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
4. [1866] L.R.l P and D., 130, see further Chapter X, pp. 127-153
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CHAPTER III
THE NATURE AND TYPES OF CUSTOMARY LAW MARRIAGE
"Marriage is the destiny traditionally 
offered to women by society. It is 
still true that most women are married, 
or have been, or plan to be, or suffer 
from not being".
Simone de Beauvoir - The Second Sex.^
1. The Nature of Customary Law Marriage
A. Introduction
In traditional Nigerian society, marriage is
the main’occupation of the overwhelming majority of women.
In 1925, Meek noted that "the universality of marriage is
one of the most characteristic features of African life,
2
and the unmarried man is the object of derision".
Marriage is even more important for a woman. It is her 
one great object in life. If she fails in that she is 
considered to have nullified her existence, and not to be 
married is a major misfortune for which there are few 
compensations. A Womans glory is to have children, and 
marriage brings children. Although the "single" status 
is less devastating for women in m o d e m  society, and there 
are now other acceptable avenues, such as business or 
professional careers, marriage remains a desirable goal 
for the large majority of Nigerian women, and most women 
express a desire to be married at least once in their 
life-time.
It has been seen that most Nigerian women 
contract a customary law marriage. A pertinent question 
at this point is whether the relationship of husband and
1. Edit, and trans. by H.M. Parshley (Penguin Books, 1976), 
p. 445.
2. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria. ojD.cit.,Vol.II, p.239; 
see also hamanchi, Nigerian Modernization, op.cit., p.26.
3. See Basden, Niger Ibos. op.cit.»p.2lj; an unmarried 
woman among the Igbos is scorned and mocked; see also 
John Jordan, Bishop Shanahan of Southern Nigeria 
(Dublin: Clonmore and Reynolds Ltd., 1949), p.221.
4. See Chapter n, above, pp. 172-174 and Table 2:1.
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wife which in European societies constitutes marriage, 
exists in its essentials in a customary marriage? In 
other words, can the union between a man and a woman which 
is regulated by the customary laws of their particular 
society be properly regarded as a "marriage”, even though 
it differs in certain fundamental aspects from what is 
generally regarded as marriage in modern Western societies.
With reference to the universality of marriage 
as an institution, Bryce notes:
”In all communities that have risen out of the 
savage state, no legal institution is at once 
so universal, and also so fundamental, a part 
of their social system as is marriage,...None 
has appeared under more various forms, or been 
more modified by law, when sentiment or religion 
prescribed a change....Yet it so happens that 
there is no relation with, which custom and legis­
lation have, in different peoples and at different 
times, dealt so differently. Nature must surely have 
spoken with a very uncertain voice when, as the 
jurist says, she 1 taught this law to all animals1,1 • 2.
The sentiment expressed in the above passage may 
seem so obvious as to make their quotation pedantic, but 
it is an undisputed fact, that not a few scholars, jurists, 
anthropologists, religious enthusiasts, and even govern­
ments have denied the claim of unions celebrated under
customary systems of law to be categorised as marriages
2in the "Western” or "Christian” sense of the word.
The reluctance to assign to customary law unions
the appellation of "marriages" can be attributed to a
variety of reasons. Most of these reasons have been aptly
3
summarised by Westermarck, who discounts the accuracy of 
the statement that certain peoples live, or have lived in
1. James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence,
2 Vols. (New York: Clarendon Press, 1901), Vol.li, p.782.
2. The term "Christian" is not used in the religious sense,
but to describe the monogamous character of the 
marriage; see Brinkley v. Attorney_General.[1890115 
P.D. 7b; Nachimson v. Nachimson 11930 1 P .217. C.A.
3. Edward Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage.
3 Vols. (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1^21), Vol.I, 
p. 124.
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a state of promiscuity, without any family ties. He 
concludes that all cases where this promiscuous state is 
said to exist are
/
"simply misrepresentations of theorists, in which 
sexual laxity, frequency of separation, polyandry, 
group marriage or something like it, or absence of 
a marriage ceremony or of a word for "to marry" or 
of a marriage union similar to our own are con­
founded with promiscuity"^
B. The attributes of customary marriage
The main features of customary law marriage
which qualify such unions for segregation as a separate
type of institution not worthy of the appellation 
Carriage* are:
(i) the fact that all systems of customary law, at least
in Nigeria, approve of the practice of polygyny;
The possession of several wives by prominent African 
men has particularly antagonized European observers 
of African marriage;
(ii) the ease with which a customary marriage may be 
dissolved in theory has led to the unjustified 
accusation that such unions are "brittle” and unstable, 
being subject to dissolution at the whim of either 
spouse, particularly the husband;
(iii) the payment of "marriage consideration" or dowry, 
in the form of some kind of property, or services, 
by or on behalf of the bridegroom, to the family of
1, Ibid.. p.121. For similar views on the universality of 
marriage see Paul Vindgradoff, Outlines of Historical 
Jurisprudence, Vol.1.(London: Oxford University Press 
1920) pp.Ib3 et al; A.R. Radclifjfc-Brown and Daryll 
Forde, eds., 'African Systems of Kinship and Marriage - 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1950 11th. imp* 1975), 
p.43; Arthur Phillips and Henry Morris, eds., "Marriage 
Laws in Africa". (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
pp. 3-5; A.N. Allott, "Marriage and Internal Conflict of 
-Laws ...in Ghana'", J.A.L^ [1958 J pp. 164-183, at p. 172,
D TOliver 0. Parran, "Matrimonial Laws of the Sudan". 
(London: Butterworths, 19b3), pp.29-30; Margaret Mead,
' ~:Male and Female : A Study of the Sexes in a Changing 
World' (U.S.A. 1949,. Penguin Book 19% ; ,  p. 181.  .
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the bride, in most systems of customary law, has 
characterised customary marriage as “wife purchase” 
'(iv) the large measure of control exerted by the families 
of the spouses in the formation, continuance and 
dissolution of a customary marriage, has led to the 
assertion that customary marriage is predominantly 
a union between two families, rather than between 
two individuals. The families1 right of control of 
all aspects of the marriage, it is alleged, often 
dictates the choice of spouse, especially in the 
case of the bride, and invariably dispenses with the 
consents of the spouses;
(v) certain incidents of customary marriage, for example, 
the so-called ”widow-inheritance”, and the legal 
right of the husband to own and control property 
acquired by his wife, in many societies, are part­
icularly revolting to modern European opinion;
(vi) the rituals and ceremonies which were customarily 
performed on the occasion of a marriage have given 
rise to aspersions of heathenism and idolotry, 
especially by religious observers;
(vii) the emphasis placed on procreation of children as 
the chief aim of marriage in African societies has 
also been the subject of adverse criticisms.
C. Colonial attitudes to customary law marriage
The references to customary marriage as not merit­
ing the term "marriage” are as many and as motley as the 
reasons advanced for the discrimination, and compete for 
inclusion as evidence of their existence, but for present 
purposes, a few of these comments will amply illustrate 
the prejudice with which customary law marriage has been 
previously regarded. For its chronological significance 
and virulence, pride of place must be given to the opinion 
of the former Acting Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Colony,
1. See e.g. R.V. Amkeyo [1917] 7 E.A.L.R. 14 at p. 16.
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Thomas W. Jackson. In attempting to justify his reasons 
for advocating the enactment of a marriage ordinance, 
under which only a religious ceremony would constitute a 
valid legal marriage, the learned Chief Justice expressed 
his opinion of customary law marriage thus:
"Native marriage. The term is vicious, as marriage 
connotes exclusiveness and indissolubility as its 
immediate and palpable advantages. Among many 
other advantages, it enables the man to obtain a 
number of women whom he can employ in labour or 
trade with confidence. It ensures to the woman, 
however, ill-favoured by nature the certainty of 
not being compelled to pass her life in single 
blessedness. Its cause has been advocated by Godwin, 
Shelley, and Mill. It is still respectable in the 
colony, and as a mode of existence would never be 
forsaken by the native for the civil marriage. In 
such a state of things the missionaries have, 
regardless of the law, been for more than fifty 
years, by education, example, and particularly by 
the setting forth in lively description the awful 
torments that most certainly await all persons who 
venture to cohabit without marrying, endeavouring, 
and with great success, to persuade the natives to 
become Christians, and to make and keep marriage 
vows"
No long comment is necessary, since the passage 
speaks for itself, except to point out that the learned 
Judge failed to see the virtue of every woman, regardless 
of her attractions, (or lack of them), reaching final 
fulfilment as a wife and mother. His prejudice over­
whelmed his judgment to such an extent that the virtue 
which should have contributed to the reprieve, if not 
acquittal, of polygamous marriage, was used as evidence 
for its condemnation and annihilation. How great was the
measure of success achieved by the missionaries will be
2
dealt with in due course, but it is pertinent to note 
here that the euphoric optimism of the Chief Justice was
1. Great Britain,. Public Record Office, Gold Coast 
Marriage law, C.O. 879/20, Dispatch 441, dated 18 Sept. 
1882, enclosure No. 5 of Number 18, p. 210. See 
further, Chapter XI below.
2. See further below, pp.216-217;
See also above, Chapter II, pp. 172-174; and Table 2:1,. 
p.175.
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as misconceived as his perception of the true nature of 
customary marriage.
Thirty eight years later, and hundreds of kilo­
metres across the continent, from West Africa to East 
Africa, Justice Jackson’s views of customary marriage 
were echoed by another English judge in R.V. Amkeyo.^ 
Chief Justice Hamilton stated that "the word ’marriage’ 
to describe the relationship entered into by an African 
Native with a woman of his tribe according to tribal 
custom, is a misnomer which has led :in the past to a 
considerable confusion of ideas'*.^ He continued:
”1 know of no word that correctly describes it;
*wife-purchase’ is not altogether satisfactory, 
but it comes much nearer to the idea than that of 
marriage as generally understood among civilised 
peoples”.^
It may be noted that this was. also the attitude 
adopted by the English courts in a long line of cases, in 
which they consistently refused to recognize polygamous, 
or potentially polygamous marriages, for the purpose of 
matrimonial relief. As early as 1835, Lord Brougham, in
p
Warrender v. Warrender, made the following statement:
”If indeed there go two things under one and the 
same name in different countries - if that which 
is called marriage is of a different nature in 
each - there may be some rule for holding that 
we are to consider the thing to which the parties 
have bound themselves according to its legal 
acceptance in the country where the obligation was 
contracted. But marriage is one and the same thing 
substantially all the Christian world over. Our 
whole law of marriage assumes this; and it is 
important to observe that we regard it as a wholly 
different thing, a different status, from Turkish
1. [1917] 7 E.A.L.R. 14, at p. 16.
2. [1835] 2 Cl. and Fin. 488 at p. 551; see also
Nachimson v. Nachimson [1930] 2 P. 217 at 237, C.A;
Re Bethel [1888] 38Ch.D. 220, which involved the 
cus-bomary law marriage of the Baralong tribe of 
Bechuanaland. This decision seems to deny any recog­
nition whatever.to a polygamous marriage. Cf. Baindail 
v. Baindail [1946] P. 122, 125 C.A., per Lord Greene
M.R,; The Sinha Peerage Claim [1946] 1 All E.R. 348;
Srini Vasan v. Srini Vasan 11946] P. 67 [19451 2
All E~.R. 21. Mehta v. MelrEa [1945] 2 All E.R.,690.
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or other marriages among infidel nations, because we 
clearly never should recognize the plurality of wives 
and consequent validity of second marriages, standing 
the first, which second marriage the laws of those 
countries authorise and validate".
The case in which this statement was made involved 
a Scottish appeal to the House of Lords, the question being 
whether a marriage celebrated in England between a Scotsman 
and an English woman could be judicially dissolved in 
Scotland. There was, therefore, no occasion for the learned 
Judge to discuss the validity of polygamous marriages at 
all, but his dicta have had a profound effect on the
1
development of the law, although much ingenuity, judicial 
2and academic, has been expended on the effort to discover 
precisely what he meant by the above remarks.
Lord Brougham* s views were approved in the
3
leading case of Hyde v.-Hyde, where Lord Penzance, 
referring to polygamy, and to women married polygamously, 
said:
".♦.the status of these women in no way resembles 
that of a Christian *wife.* In some parts they are 
slaves, in others perhaps not; in none do they stand, 
as in Christendom, upon the same level with the man 
under whose protection they live. There are, no 
doubt, in these countries laws adapted to this state 
of things - laws which regulate the duties and 
define the obligations of men and women standing to 
each other in these relations. It may be, and 
probably is, the case that the women there pass 
by some word or name which corresponds to our word 
*wife*. But there is no magic in a name; and, if 
the relation there existing between men and women 
is not the relation which in Christendom we 
recognise and intend by the words * husband* or 
*wife,* but another and altogether different relation, 
the use of a common term to express these two 
separate relations will not make them one and the
1. For example. Lush L .J . in Harvey v . Farnie [1881] 6 
P.D. 35 at p. 53; Stirling♦ J.t in Re bethel [1888]
38 Ch.D. 220, at p. 234.
2. See Dicey, Dicey*s Conflict of Laws, 6th ed. by J.H.C. 
Morris with Specialist Editors (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1949), p. 224, n.62; Fitzpatrick, "Non- 
Christian Marriage", 2 Journal of Comp. Legislation and 
International Law," 2nd. Ser., 1900, p. 359 at p.3?5; 
J.H.C. Morris,.^ The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages 
in English Law".66, Harvard Law Review. 1953, p. 961- - 
1012, at pp. 965-9o 6.
3. [1866] L.R.l P & D 130, [1866] 14 L.T. 188.
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same, though it may tend to confuse them to a 
superficial observer".^
2Lush, L.J., in Harvey v. Farnie, noted that 
“there is no analogy whatever between the union of a man 
and a woman in a country where polygamy is allowed and 
the union of a man and a woman in a Christian country", 
and in Brinkley v. Attorney General.^ it was said that 
"a marriage which was not that of one man and one woman, 
to the exclusion of all others, though it may pass by the. 
name of a marriage, is not the status which the English 
law contemplates when dealing with the subject of marriage11..
These passages abundantly illustrate the early 
English judicial attitude towards polygamous marriages, 
and marriages according to customary law which were
Zf
potentially polygamous.
During the past thirty years, the attitude of 
English judges towards polygamous marriage had become 
progressively more liberal, and a measure of recognition 
had been accorded to such marriages for limited purposes.*^
In 1968, in Mohamed v. Knott.^ which involved a Nigerian
1. Hyde v. Hyde [1866] L.R.l P. & D. 130, at pp. 135-134.
2. [1881] 6 P.D. 35, at p. 53. C.A.
3. [1890-15 P.D. 76, at p. 79.
4. See also Sowa v. Sowa [1961] 1 All E.R. 687, C.A.
[1961] P. 86; Ohocliuku v. Ohochuku. [i960] 1 All E.R.
253; Lee v. Lau [ 1967 I P.l4; Imam Din v. N.A.B.T19671 2 
Q.B. 215. , ........  ”
5. See e.g. Sinha Peerage Claim [1946] 1 All E.R. 348;
Coleman v. Shang 119ol | AC.481; Baindail v. Baindail 
[194bJ P.122, c TA; Cheni v. Cheni 11962 I 3 All E 1 R .573;
W.E. Beckett, “The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages
Under English Law", 48 L.Q.R. 341; See also Joseph H. 
Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws,3 Vols. (New 
York: Baker, Voorhis and Co.,.1935), Vol. 2, pp. 699- 
701; S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald;"Nachimson1s and Hyde’s 
Cases," 47, L .Q . R .. 1931, pp. 253-270; John Delatre 
Falconbridge. Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. 
(1947), Toronto,; Canada Law Book Co.,1954), Chapter 
40, pp. 776-788; Dennis Fitzpatrick, "Non-Christian 
Marriage", Journal of the Society of Comparative 
Legislation. New Series. Vol. II. 1900. p p . 359-387 .
6. [1968] 2 All E.R. 563; [1969] 1 Q.B.l.
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marriage according to Islamic law, Lord Parker, C.J., 
stated that "a polygamous marriage is now recognised in 
this country unless there is some strong reasons to the 
contrary", and in 1972, for the first time, the 
Matrimonial (Polygamous Marriages)Act, 1972, enabled 
matrimonial relief to be granted, notwithstanding that the 
marriage was polygamous. Section 47 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1973, now provides that "a court in England 
and Wales shall not be precluded from granting matri­
monial relief or making a declaration concerning the 
validity of a marriage by reason only that the marriage
in question was entered into under a law which permits
2
polygamy".
Most of the adverse criticisms of the customary 
law are based on inadequate knowledge of the law as 
practised by the majority of the people in any given 
society. Foreign observers of African marriage invariably 
base their opinions on isolated incidents, personally 
witnessed or related to them, rather than on the practice 
of the majority of the society. For example, a few cases
1. Citing Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 7th ed.
by J.H.C - Morris et.al., (London: Stevens and Sons, 1973), 
r. 37. —  —
2. See Poon v. Tan [1973] Family Law, 1974, p. 161;
Chaudary v. Chaudary [1975] 3 All E.R. 687; [1976] 1
E.R. 805• C.A. (affirmed on other grounds); R.V. Sagoo 
[1975] 3 W.L.R. 267, C.A.
3. See the Address of the Minister of Internal Affairs at 
the second reading of the African Law and Tribal Courts 
Bill, 1969, in which he notes "the conception or mis­
conception of African law derived from the tales of 
early travellers and explorers who, quite naturally, 
like our modern newspapers picked out the newsy sen­
sational episodes of life, the abnormal, the exciting, 
and describe with grim conclusions the sorcery, the 
trials by ordeal, the ferocious and impetuous orders
to cut off lips and ears, the tortures and impaling 
of victims", Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates. Official 
Report, unrevised, Vol. 73, No. 11, 28 Jan. 1969,
D. 617.
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in which the husbands have arbitrarily divorced their 
wives after a short period of married life, and for no 
apparent reason, may lead to the erroneous conclusion 
that marriage in that society is unstable and easily 
dissolved, unless the fact that for the majority of the 
population marriage is a life-long union, is taken into 
account in assessing the degree of marital instability.
In other words, the practice of the majority of married 
people, and not of a few individuals . in the society, 
should be the norm which determines the nature of the 
marriage bond.
Another reason why Westerners have tended to 
disparage customary law marriage is ignorance, or 
probably disregard, of comparative historical juris­
prudence. Fletcher, in The Family and Marriage in Britain,^ 
makes the pertinent point that, "in general, all peoples 
are greatly ignorant about the past of their own society, 
and this account's for the fact that they tend always to 
glorify it”. Throughout this thesis, as far as possible, 
attention will be directed to the marriage laws of other 
nations at an earlier period of their history. The com­
parisons will serve to spotlight the remarkable similarity 
of development of the marriage laws of various peoples, 
and to demonstrate the fact that most of the features 
which now pertain to customary law marriage in many parts 
of Africa, including Nigeria, were present, comparatively 
recently in some cases, in the marriage laws and customs 
of the majority of the peoples of Europe. Vinogradoff 
noted that
"monogamy itself is tribal custom, influenced but not 
created by Christianity. It was gradual and began 
at an early stage, among those who had small means".2
1. Ronald Fletcher, The Family and Marriage.in Britain:
An Analysis and Moral Assessment 3rd, ed. (1962, Penguin 
Books 1975), p. 31.
2. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence, p. 238; C.K. 
Allen, Law in the Making. 4th. ed. (Tiondon: Oxford, 
University Press, 1946)7 p . 74.
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From this statement it is evident that polygamy was
formerly practised. For those who could not afford the
luxury of polygamy, the practice of marrying only one wife
gradually replaced polygamy, until monogamy became the
norm, instead of the exception. A similar trend, which will
be elaborated later, can now be discerned among most
Nigerian communities.
The description of a wedding according to old
English law, recorded by Vinogradoff, reveals many of the
features of the present African customary marriage:
"If people want to wed a maid or a wife and this is 
agreeable to her and to her kinsmen, then it is 
right that the bridegroom should first swear 
according to God*s right and secular law and should 
wage (pledge himself) to those who are her for- 
speakers, that he wishes to have her in such a way 
as he should hold her by Godfs right as his wife - and 
his kinsmen will stand pledge for him.
*Then it is to be settled to whom the price for 
upfostering her belongs, and for this the kinsmen 
should pledge themselves.
!Then let the bridegroom declare what present he 
will make her for granting his desire, and what he 
will give if she lives longer than he does.
!If it is settled in this way, then it is right 
that she should enjoy half the property, and all if 
they have a child, unless she marries another man. 
fAll this the bridegroom must corroborate by giving 
a gage, and his kinsmen stand to pledge for him.
rIf they are agreed in all this, then let the kinsman 
of the bride accept and wed their kinswoman to wife 
and to right life to him who desires her, and let 
him take the pledge who rules over the wedding.
fIf she is taken out of the land into another lord's 
land, then it is advisable that her kinsmen get a 
promise that no violence will be done to her and 
that if she has to pay a fine they ought to be next 
to help her to pay, if she has not enough to pay herseJf'".
1. Quoted by Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Juris­
prudence r Vol.l, pp. 252-253 from Lieberman, Gesetze der 
Angelsachsen, Vol.l, p.442; see also Vinogradofft op.cit., 
pp7236-260'for other similarities in the development of 
English marriage; Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, African 
Systems of Kinship and Marriage, op.cit.,pp. 44-49.
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From this description marriage is an agreement 
between the family of the.bridegroom and that of the bride, 
for a consideration from the bridegroom and his kinsmen 
paid to the bride!s family. The amount of consideration 
or dowry payable, as well as the property the wife should 
enjoy if the husband predeceases her are subject to agree­
ment between the kinsmen of both parties. The bridegroom^ 
kinsmen pledge themselves to honour his pledges, while the 
bride's kinsmen agree to pay any amount which the bride may 
incur-as fines for her misbehaviour if she herself is
unable to pay. The bridegroom and his kinsmen are also
responsible to the bride's kinsmen for her safety.
Points of similarity between the marriage des­
cribed in the above passage and a customary marriage will be 
better appreciated after the discussion of a typical customary 
marriage, but it may be noted here that the marriage described 
in the above is a private.affair between the spouses and their 
families without any State intervention.1 . Although the 
prospective spouses have to agree to the marriage, the 
agreements of their kinsmen are also essential, and there
is no mention of romantic love which is such a prominent
2
feature of modern English marriage.
D. The adoption of customary law principles by m o d e m  
legislation................ - ..........
An important point to be noted is that marriages 
in many modern European societies are currently drawing 
closer to customary marriage, both in law and in practice. 
Legislators have adopted some of the principles, as well
1. Cf. the position in Scotland where it is still possible 
to establish retrospectively a marriage 'by cohabitation 
with habit and repute. This arises where couples set up 
a home together, and live as a married couple;
Kilbrandon Report: Report of the Departmental Committee
appointed to enquire into the law of Scotland relating 
to the Constitution of Marriage, The Marriage Law of 
Scotland, 1969, Cmnd. 4011, Chapter I.
2. See Fletcher, The Family and Marriage in Britain, op. 
cit., p. 375; k*marriage has not always been based upon 
the 1personal love1 of_the partners - that basis of
. marriage with which we are most familiar. Marriage has 
sometimes been based upon capture, on the payment of a 
'bride-price', on the decision of elders, on property 
arrangements, and on other criteria".
210
as the methods traditionally known to customary law marriage, 
to solve the problems posed by modern societies. Specific
cases will be pinpointed in the appropriate contexts, but a
/
few examples will illustrate the modern trend.
(i) A striking example of legislation which embodies a 
traditional customary law principle relating to 
marriage is the recent English Divorce Reform Act of 
1969\ under which all the former grounds for divorce 
were reduced to a "sole ground” - that the marriage 
has broken down irretrievably.- Irretrievable break­
down postulates the possibility of reconciliation,
2
and provision is made in the Act for reconciliation 
of the spouses before a decree of divorce is granted.
Reconciliation of the spouses of a marriage is 
a familiar procedure to many systems of customary 
law marriage in the traditional society, and before a 
divorce is accepted by the families, protracted efforts 
are made by both sets of families to effect the recon­
ciliation of the spouses. A divorce is only accepted 
when it is conceded, after failure of all recon­
ciliation efforts, that the spouses can no longer live
amicably together and that the breakdown of the
3marriage is inevitable. In other words, the marriage 
has broken down irretrievably.
1. This Act has been repealed and reenacted in the Matri­
monial Causes Act, 1973.
2.. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, sections 6(1), 6(2).
Cf. S.M.Cretney, Principles of Family Law, 2nd, ed.
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1976), p. 153; "The Divorce
Reform Act introduced for the first time the notion of 
reconciliation as a positive feature of matrimonial 
litigation"; Nicholas Tyndall, "Reconciliation and the 
Divorce Reform Act, 1969". L .S . Gaz« 1971, pp. 37-39. 
A.H. Manchester and J.M# Whetton, "Marital Conciliation 
in England and Wales, 23, I.C.L.Q., 1974, p. 339; E.J. 
Griew, "Marital Reconciliation; Contexts and Meanings",
C.L.J, 1972 A, pp. 294-315; Finer Report: Report of the 
Committee on One-Parent Families,1974, Cmnd. 5629, 
paras. 4.286-4.335..
3. See further below, Chapter VIII♦
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The English Divorce Reform Act of 1969, has 
been substantially reproduced in the. Nigerian Matri­
monial Causes Decree, 1970,1 and reference to. the 
adoption of the customary law procedure for divorce
will be elaborated further when discussing the
2
provisions of the Decree.
(ii) Another example of legislation which mirrors
customary law attitude and policy is the increased " 
legal rights and duties given to, and imposed on, 
illegitimate children and their parents, by a number 
of statutory provisions. In English.law, practically 
all the former legal disabilities of an illegitimate 
child and its parents have been abolished by 
statute.
A greater degree of social tolerance of illegit­
imacy has accompanied the increased legal rights, and 
many of the discriminatory social conventions have 
also disappeared.^
1. Decree No, 18 of 1970; see also Australia - Section 14 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959; New Zealand - sections 
13 and 14 Domestic Proceedings Act, 1968. The Con­
ciliation Court of Los Angeles County, California, 
effected reconciliation in 45% of the 3581 cases heard 
in 1954-1959, and in 1968, in. 73% (1311 out of 1764')
of the cases reconciliation of the spouses was achieved 
- see H.A. Finlay, "Family Courts - Gimmick or Panacea?", 
43 Australian Law Journal, 1969, pp. 602-607, ss. 7 
and 8 Canada Divorce Act, 1967.
2. See below Chapter XI.
3. See e.g. English Births and Deaths Registration Act,
1953, section 10 as amended,.and section 10A as inserted 
by Children Act, 1975* section 93; Family Law Reform 
Act, 1969, sections 14, 15 and 16; Children Act 1975, 
sections 85 (7); J.H.C. Morris, "The Family Law Reform 
Act, 1969, Sections 14 and 15", 19 I.C.L.Q. Vol. 19,
pp. 328-333; E.C. Ryder, "Property.law Aspects of 
Family law Reform Act, 1969", Current Legal Problems,
1971, pp. 157-177; Legitimacy Act, 1959; Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1973, section 16.
4. See P.M. Bromley, Family Law. 5th edition; (London: 
Butterworths, 1976), p . 300; I. Pinchbeck, "Social 
Attitudes to the Problem of Illegitimacy", British 
Journal of Sociology. 1954, pp. 309-323;. S. v. S.
[1972J A.C.24 57,.per Lord Hodson "the legal incidents
of being born a bastard are now also almost non-existent"; 
cf. Colin Smith Ltd. v. Ridge [1975] 1 W.L.R. 463, at 
p. 467, per Lawton J. - a man is not obliged to house 
his illegitimate children.
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Some writers suggest that illegitimacy as a 
legal concept is unknown to traditional customary law. 
This proposition is open to question, and is discussed 
further in a later chapter1 hut there is considerable 
evidence that the traditional customary laws of many 
societies impose few, if any, legal disabilities on 
persons whose parents were not legally married at the 
time of their conception or birth.1
In many Nigerian systems of customary law, an
illegitimate child whose mother was unmarried at the time
of its conception or birth, if acknowledged by its natural
father, is treated exactly like a legitimate child of its
father, with regard to affiliation, inheritance and
succession. Acknowledgement of illegitimate children is
a prominent feature of Yoruba customary law, and was
adversely criticized by Osborne, J., in the old Nigerian
2
case of Re Sapara, decided in 1911, as follows:
"The consideration of the law of native marriage is 
beset from the start with great difficulty. The 
sexual relations are viewed from such totally,dif­
ferent standpoints by Europeans and natives of West 
Africa that it is hard for a European to understand 
native ideas on the subject*..in' English law 
marriage is necessary to legitimize the offspring of 
two persons, such offspring if illegitimate having 
no right of inheritance; but under native law a 
child!s right of succession to his fatherfs property 
can be legalised by mere acknowledgment of paternity, 
without the necessity of any form of marriage between 
his parents. Consequently, the legal importance of 
the marriage ceremony is not nearly so great under 
native law as it is under the law of England".
The learned Judgefs obiter dictum with reference 
to legitimation under English law is not strictly accurate, 
since it has always been possible in English law for the 
legislature to legitimate a person illegitimate at common
1. See below, Chapter XIII, p/+81-483.
2. [1911] Renners Law Report, 605.
5. Ibid.t at pp. 606-607.
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law. Bromley notes that occasionally, a special Act has 
been passed, for that purpose, although there have been no
instances of an Act of this sort in modern times.1
✓
Osborne J !s dictum also betrays disregard of
European historical - jurisprudence. Pinchbeck, in his
historical survey of illegitimacy, produces evidence to
show that among most European nations, illegitimate children
were acknowledged as part of their fatherfs family with
2some right to share in heritable property. It was not 
until the early seventeenth century that the Irish custom 
of gavelkind under which estates were distributable among 
bastards as well as lawful kin, was abolished by judicial 
decision.^ In England, while the illegitimate child was 
from Anglo-Saxon days excluded from inheritance, Pinchbeck 
advances ample historical evidence to show that throughout 
the mediaeval period it was customary in many sections of 
society to treat the illegitimate child in all other
Zi
respects as a member of his father*s family. Pollock and 
Maitland, speaking of early English law, note the fact that
1. Bromley, Family Law, op.cit., p. 279. Acknowledgement 
of an illegitimate child by its natural father is 
possible under some European legal systems, e.g. in the 
U.S.S.R. under the New Fundamental Principles of Family 
Law, introduced in 1968* paternity may be established 
by recognition, or by a judicial finding.
2. I. Pinchbeck, "Social Attitudes to Illegitimacy1*, op. 
cit., pp. 312-313;"Just as the African native who 
accepts Christianity today frequently finds himself
at variance with Christian views on marriage and retains 
his several wives, so in Europe, extra-marital relations 
everywhere persisted', while the nations outside the 
mainstream of Western civilization continued for centur­
ies to treat illegitimate children as members of the 
family.1*
3. "By the Irish custom of gavelkind the inferior tenanties 
were partible among all the males of the Sept, both 
Bastards and Legitimate", see Henry Sumner Maine, 
Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (London: 
John Murray, 1889), p.. 18b.. .
4. Pinchbeck, "Social Attitudes to Illegitimacy", op.cit., 
314-317.
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"bastardy cannot be called a status or condition. The 
bastard cannot inherit from his parents or anyone else,
but this seems to be the only temporal consequence of his
✓
illegitimate birth....In all other respects he is the 
equal of any other free and lawful man".^ Pinchbeck 
says:
"Throughout the early centuries of our history and 
indeed right into the eighteenth century, many 
fathers appear to have been willing to acknowledge 
their natural children and to rear and educate them 
with their lawful offspring. The ease with which 
the bastard of gentle birth could intermarry with 
the highest families in the land is further evidence 
that inferiority of legal status was not accompanied 
by loss of social caste. Moreover, in English medieval 
law the bastard suffered under none of the harsh 
disabilities which degraded him in continental lands, 
such as loss of freedom or personal rights"^
Pollock and Maitland suggest that the reason for
this divergence of English from continental law may be
"due to no deeper cause than the subjection of England to
kings who proudly trace their descent from a mighty 
■3
bastard". William the Conqueror made no disguise of his 
illegitimate origin, and frequently styled himself "William 
the Bastard"
It would seem from the above statements that the 
sexual relations are not "viewed from such totally different 
standpoints by Europeans and natives of West Africa" as 
Judge Osborne believed. There are many communities in 
Nigeria where illegitimate children cannot be acknowledged
by their natural fathers for the purposes of affiliation
5
and inheritance under customary law.
1. F. Pollock and W. Maitland, The History of English Law 
Before the Time of Edward I t 2nd ed. (.London: Cambridge 
University Press, 19b8), Vol. II, p. 397.
2. Pinchbeck, "Social Attitudes to illegitimacy", op .cit., 
p. 513; See.also Pollock and Maitland, op.cit. ,‘~"‘The 
Canon Law itself admits that children are legitimate 
who are not the offspring of a lawful wedlock". -
Vol. II, p. 375.
3. Pollock and Maitland, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 397.
4. Pinchbeck, op.cit.t p. 313.
5. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit.,pp. 230-231;
and Qnwudin.joh y. Qnwudin.joh 119371 .R.N.L.R. 1.
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In'1926, fifteen years after Osborne, J.’s 
judgment in. Re Saparaf modern English law. approximated
to the position under Yoruba customary law by the enact-
✓
• ment of the first English Adoption Act, under which an 
illegitimate child, if adopted by its natural father, is 
entitled to inheritance and other legal rights as if he 
were a legitimate child of his father. Acknowledgement 
of paternity in customary law bears a striking resemblance 
to adoption by a man of his natural child under English 
law.
Since 1926, a number of statutes has brought 
the legal status of an illegitimate child in English law 
closer to the status of the illegitimate child in many 
systems of customary law in Nigeria. As previously noted, 
recent legislation has tended in many respects to assimilate 
the legal position of an illegitimate person to that of a
2legitimate one, especially in relation to proprietory rights.
One is compelled to agree with Diamond’s con­
clusion that
i
flthe history of law is forever repeating itself and 
the same stages that were reached many thousands of 
years ago in the East are being reached and past in 
parts of the modern world”.^
E. The prestige of customary law marriage in Nigeria
In the 1850*s, Clarke, a traveller and explorer, 
noted that customary law marriage was highly regarded among
1. [1911] Renner*s Law Report, 605.
2. See Bromley, Family Law, op.cit. t pp. 577-578; Cretney,
Principles of Family Law, op.cit.. pp. 410-421; see 
also Coleman v. Shang 1196T| A.ti. 481 at 493. A private
member’s Bill, sponsored by.M.Ps. James White and Leo
Abse, designed to end the remaining disabilities suffered 
by illegitimate children, although it expressly exempted 
from its provisions the Adoption Acts, so that a father’s 
consent to the adoption of his illegitimate child would 
not be needed, did not manage to get a second reading on
25 February, 1979, see Family Law. Vol.9, No. 2, 1979,p.34*
3. Arthur S. Diamond, Primitive Law; Past and Present.
(1935, London: Methuen, 1971), p . 1. See also Wokoko v. 
Molyko [1938] 14 N.L.R. 41.
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the Yorubas..’ He viewed it as one of the main pillars in 
their social fabric that gave to it. beauty, strength and .
durability.'1* Acting Chief Justice Jackson, in 1882, in
" 2the passage quoted above, stated, that customary law 
marriage was "still respectable" in the Gold Coast Colony 
(which included Lagos and adjacent Territories), and would 
never be voluntarily forsaken by the natives for a civil 
marriage. It is significant that marriage according to 
customary law has retained a high prestige among the 
indigenous population of Nigeria, despite the introduction
3
of two other types of marriage.
Among most Northern Moslem communities, the 
process has been one of integration of Islamic law 
principles of marriage and customary law principles, 
facilitated by the similarity between the two types of 
marriage laws, rather than the adoption of the Islamic 
law marriage in its entirety.
In the Southern States, it has been previously 
shown that the majority of the population contract a 
customary marriage to which they sometimes add a statutory 
marriage. Many of the early protSjgonists for the abolition 
of customary marriage would be surprised at the fact that 
after more than one hundred and twenty years of missionary 
activity aimed at discrediting customary marriage and 
replacing it with "Christian" marriage, customary marriage 
remains popular and the preferred type of marriage in 
Nigeria.
Undoubtedly, most Nigerian women would like to 
contract a statutory marriage, but this must be in addition 
to, and not instead of, a customary marriage. Hastings notes
1. William Clarke, Travels and Explorations in Yorubaland 
1854-1858, (Nigeria: Ibadan Universitv Press. 1972). 
pl246; see also Adrian Hastings, Church and Mission in 
Modern Africa (London: Burns and bats, Ltd. I$b7) p. 163.
2. See above, p. 202.
3. See above,Chapter II, Table 2:1, p.175.
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that "in most areas marriage in church is not an altern­
ative to tribal marriage: it is additional,T. .The
ceremony in church is seen as a religious extra, a blessing
1
upon the union. In many communities, a person is.not 
regarded as properly married, despite prestigious 
ceremonies in a Church or marriage registry, if he, or 
more particularly she, is not married in the customary 
manner. This high regard for customary marriage, 
especially in the case of women, often contributes to 
marital discord. Many women, for one reason or the other, 
for example, failure to get parental consent for their 
marriage, contract a statutory marriage, in the hope that 
this would be followed by a customary marriage later, 
when they have won their parents over to their choice of 
husband. If for any reason (especially if it is due to 
the husband*s fault), this hope is not realised, the 
frustration and disappointment of the wife can lead to 
the break up of the marriage.
A typical case where-the wife*s disappointment 
at the husband*s failure to conclude a customary marriage,
after a statutory marriage, resulted in divorce is
2Onuorah v. Onuorah. The parties were married in a
Marriage Registry Office under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
The husband sued for -a divorce on the ground of desertion.
He claimed that his wife refused to follow him when he was
transferred to Northern Nigeria by his employers. The wife,
a university lecturer, said she refused to accompany him on
transfer, because he would not perform the traditional rites
according to Onitsha customary law in respect of their
marriage, as he had promised to do before their marriage in
the Registry Office. His refusal to contract a customary
law marriage was a cause of marital friction between the
parties and one of the key factors which eventually led to
■3
a divorce being granted by the Court.
1. Hastings, Church and Mission in Modern Africa,00.cit.,
p. 168.
2* [1972] Suit No. E/27D/72, unreported; Enugu High Court-..
3* For similar cases see-below, Chapter XI.
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2.. The. Definition of Customary Law Marriage
Is it possible^ to define marriage under African 
customary law? Cotran believes it is not. He says:
"I would say that it is impossible to put forward 
a definition which would cover marriage as 
recognized and known under the multitude'of 
African customary laws, differing and conflicting 
as they do in such material respects as their 
political and social structure, kinship groupings, 
descent systems, economic way of life and so on".^
The variations which customary marriages present 
are universally acknowledged, but writers generally agree 
that African customary marriage, diversified though it may 
be in form, nevertheless reveals broad basic principles 
common to many communities. Differences in the contents 
of detailed rules do not necessarily preclude similarities
in the ultimate purpose for which they are designed, or
2
in some broad features and essential characteristics.
If it is accepted that a definition differs from a des­
cription, and is satisfactory provided it conveys the 
essential nature of the res defined, it is possible to 
formulate a general definition of customary marriage which 
would adequately cover the basic essentials of marriage 
recognized and practised by the various Nigerian communities.
1. Eugene Cotran, "The Changing Nature of African Marriage", 
in Family Law in Asia and Africa, ed. J.N.D. Anderson, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1968) p. 15.
2. See e.g. T.O. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System. 2nd. 
edit. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963), 
p.289; B.O. Nwabueze, The Machinery of Justice, 1963, 
op.cit., p.3; Okay Achike,."Problems of Creation and 
Dissolution of Customary Marriages in Nigeria", in Law 
and the Family in Africa, ed. Simon A. Roberts, (The 
Hague, Mouton, 1974) p . 145; F.A. Ajayi, "The Judicial 
Approach to Customary Law in Southern Nigeria", Ph.D. 
dissertation, London University, 1958 pp .9-I^Chinwuba,
S.N. Obi, Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell,. 19bo),p. .4; d.K. Meek. Land Tenure 
and Land Administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(London: Her Majesty1 s Stationery Office, l^bV) p.l'/8; 
Stanley Childs, Christian Marriages in Nigeria, 16 
Africa. 1946. pp. 238-246 at p.31; Report of the Native 
Courts, Western Provinces, Commission of Enquiry (Ibadan, 
Government Printer, 1956), part93, p.22.
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Writers have advanced definitions of customary
law marriage, and a few of these definitions will be
discussed before formulating a definition for the purpose
/
of this thesis.
Obi says:
’’Marriage as known to customary law may be defined 
as the union of a man and a woman for the duration 
of the woman’s life, being normally the gist of a 
wider association between two families or sets of 
families”
It is respectfully submitted that this definition 
cannot be supported for the following reasons:
(1) The definition of marriage under customary law as
’’the union of a man and a woman”, excludes a
marriage between a woman and another woman, commonly
referred to as ”woman-to-woman” marriage. Marriage
between a man and a woman is the primary form, but
it is not the only form of customary marriage in
Nigeria. The marriage of a woman to another woman
is regarded as a valid legal marriage, and was
hitherto practised by many communities in all parts
3
of Nigeria, and in other parts of Africa. Although
the practice is less prevalent in the modern society,
4
it is still found in many areas.
1. Chinwuba S.N. Obi,Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, 
op.cit. p. 155.
2. But see Meribe v. Egwu [1976] 5 S.C.23, and below p. 246,
3. See A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, in"the Introduction to African 
Systems of Kinship and Marriage,op.cit., p.4; This type 
of marriage is particularly prevalent among the Nuer
of the Sudan - see E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Some Aspects 
of Marriage and the Family Among the Nuer" (Rhodes- 
Livingston Paper, No.11, 1945). P .5 et.al; and among 
the Zulu of Natal - see Max Gluckman, ’’Kinship and 
Marriage among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and the 
Zulu of Natal” in ’’African Systems of Kinship and 
Marriage”, op.cit.,p.184; the Vendas and Basutos of 
Southern Africa; see M.D.N. Jeffreys, ’’Lobolo is Child- 
Price”, African Studies, 1951, Vol.10 No#4, p. 145-184 
at p .. 165.
4. See further, below pp. 241-254.
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(ii) . The definition may include relationships other than
marriage, for example concubinage.
(iii) The definition confines the duration of a marriage
/
to the woman*s lifetime, and therefore implies that 
the death of the husband does not terminate the 
marriage, while that of the wife does. Whether this 
is an accurate statement of the law in some Nigerian 
societies is debateable, and is considered further 
in later chapters,'1' but there are a number of 
societies in Nigeria where a marriage is dissolved 
by the death of either husband or wife. For example, 
there are quite a few societies where, on the death 
of a woman*s husband, the widow is free to dispose 
of herself as she pleases, without any repayment of 
the dowry which had been paid on the occasion of the 
marriage. In fact, in some societies, she is not 
legally entitled to remain in her late husband’s 
house, even if she desires to do so. A few examples 
of societies where the husband’s death terminates 
the marriage will suffice to support the contention.
In Ohaffia (Igbo), women are free to remarry on
the death of their husbands, and they have an unfettered
choice of their future husbands. No dowry is repayable
to the family of the deceased husband. It is said that the
people of Ohaffia view with horror, the so-called ’’widow
inheritance”, under which a widow marries another member of
2
her deceased husband’s family.
The Nupe have a similar rule, and after a few 
months of mourning, the widow is hard-pressed to find a 
new husband, regardless of her age, for if she dies before 
she can remarry, no one will bury her. Before she remarries
1. See Chapters VIII and XIII below.
2. Philip 0. Nsugbe, Ohaffia ; A Matrilineal Ibo People. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1974) pp.&1-82; . 
Customary Law Manual 1977, ojd.cit.,p. 152. In Afikpo, 
Arochulp/ni, and some other sub-groups a widow cannot 
be taken over by a member of her deceased husband’s 
family.
231
she. has no home, where she has a legal right to stay.^
... Among the Yakos, too,' a.widow is free to remarry.
when she wishes to do so. Only if widowed while suckling
/
a child, has she a right to remain for any length of time
in her late husband1s compound, and to he given farming
facilities by one of his kinsmen. She may, or may not return
to her parents or other relatives, but in any case, she
2
cannot remarry until she has weaned the child.
In the Benin laws of inheritance, widows,
provided they have living children, are free to return to
their families or to remarry to anyone they choose. No
dowry is repayable. Should a widow*s child die, and she
has no surviving child about one o r •two years after the
death of her husband, she must refund the dowry paid on
the occasion of her marriage to the children of her
■3
deceased husband. This rule seems to indicate that for
4
the Benis, dowry is child-price. Benin customary law
may be compared with that of the nomadic Fulani, where
a widow who has no children is forced to leave her
5deceased husband*s house.
1. 0. Temple, **Notes on the Tribes, Provinces, Emirates 
and States of ~bhe Northern Provinces of flfigeria<r. 2nd, 
ed. (Lagos: (2.M.S. Bookshop 1$£2), p.330.
2. Darryl Forde, *'Yako Studies1* (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964) p.125;."Marriage and the Family Among the 
Yako in South Eastern Nigeria1*. Monograph on Social 
Anthropology, No.5 (Published_for the London School
of Economics and Political Science, Percy Lund, 
Humphries and Co. Ltd., 1941), p.71.
3 * Jacob Egharevba, ** Benin Law and Custom** (1949, Germany
Kraus-Thompson Organisation Ltd., I971), p.76; see also 
R.E.. Bradbury and P.C. Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom and 
Edo-Speaking Peoples of South Western Nigeria ,(1957. 
London International African Institute, Reprint, 1970) 
p.47.
4. See M.D. Jeffreys, "Lobola is Child Price**, Journal of 
African Studies. Vol.10, No.4, 1951, pp.145-184.
5. de St. Croix. The Fulani of Northern Nigeria: Some 
General Notes. (Lagos: Government Printer. 1944).p.45.
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In some societies in Nigeria, in which a double 
level of dowry is payable, whenever the small .amount of dowry, 
has been paid on behalf of the wife, on the death of her
husband, the wife is automatically liberated. She is free 
to return to her own family and is not expected to marry 
any member of her deceased husbandfs family.1
In view of the fact that the above societies 
release a wife from the marriage bond in the event of her 
husbandfs death, a definition of customary marriage which 
limits the duration of the marriage to the lifetime of the 
wife, but not of the husband, is untenable.
Achike defines a customary marriage simply as
"a union of a man and a woman which however permits a
2
plurality of wives” . This definition is deficient in 
several respects and may equally apply to casual liaisons 
between a man and a woman as well as to more permanent 
unions. The participation of the family, an'important 
aspect of customary law marriage is neglected by this 
definition.
SohierTs definition of customary marriage as 
”an alliance between two groups cemented by the trans- 
.ference of goods from one to the other, and a personal 
union of two persons symbolized by certain rites such as 
that of eating together" improves on the two preceding 
definitions in that it is broad enough to cover "woman-to- 
woman" marriage, and satisfies the basic essentials of 
most types of customary marriage. There are, however,
1. See S.O. Imoagene, "The Marriage System of the Weppa- 
Wano", African Notes, Vol.6, No.l, 1970, p.12; P. 
Amaury Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta: Their 
Religions and Customs, op.cit.,pp.1&9* 193.
2. 0. Achike, "Statutory and Customary Marriage : A Com­
parison", The Nigerian Law Journal, 1967* Vo1.2, No.l, 
p.49. ........
3. M.A. Sohier, Le Mariage en droit coutumier congolais, 
1943, as quoted in Notes and frJews. 16 Africaf 194b r""" 
p.260; For similar definitions of marriage which 
recognize the fact that marriage is not limited to a 
man and a woman, see Leach, "Polyandry, Inheritance 
and the Definition of Marriage", Man 55, pp.182-186; 
Kathleen Gough, "Definition of Marriage", in Marriage, 
Family and Residence, eds. Paul Bohannan and John 
Middleton (New York: Natural History Press, 1968) p.68.
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certain types of customary marriage, in which there is 
no transference of goods from one group to the other, for 
example, "exchange marriage", formerly practised by a
1
number of societies in the Northern States of Nigeria.
A customary marriage, for the purpose of this 
thesis, may be defined as a permanent union between two 
persons, recognized by the law of the parties concerned 
as creating mutual rights and duties, and invariably the 
nucleus of a contractual relationship between their res­
pective families.
The union is described as permanent, because 
it exists until dissolved by some process recognized by 
the law of the particular community. The union is not 
for life, since in the large majority of cases, it can 
be dissolved by either party before death; but this 
fact does not alter its permanent nature until so dis­
solved.
The definition is not negatived by the practice
. of polygamy; a polygamous marriage comprises sets of
single unions, with one person as the common denominator.
Malinowsky correctly states that every real marriage,
"whether monogamous or polygamous is based on an individual
legal contract between one man and one woman, though these
2contracts may be repeated".
It should be noted that polygamy, although 
permitted by customary ‘law, is obviously not a compulsory 
ingredient of customary marriage, and many customary 
marriages are in fact monogamous. For example, during field­
work for this thesis in Onitsha, there were no polygamous 
families in Umudei Village, and only about six polygamous 
families in Ogboli Eke. In neither of the two villages was
*5
there a case of polygamy among the under-thirty age group.
1. See below, pp.258-264.
2. Bronislaw Malinowsky, "Parenthood : The Basis of Social 
Structures", in The Family : Its Structure and 
Functions, edit, by Rose Coser, (New York : St. Martins 
Press, 19o4), p. 10. n.2.
3. See further below, Chapter IV, Table 4:2, p.345.
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3. The types of customary law marriage
A. Introduction
The literature on customary marriage presented 
by anthropologists enumerates sundry alleged "types of 
marriages" previously existing in traditional Nigerian 
societies, some no doubt still fondly lingering in the 
more remote parts of the country up to the present time. 
Separation of cdstomary marriages into multifarious 
types may embellish the material of the social researcher, 
but to the legal analyst, it is an impediment to eluci­
dation, hindering rather than promoting precise classif­
ication, a necessary element of legal exposition.
For legal purposes, in order to qualify for 
segregation as a separate type, a form of marriage must 
display some distinct legal feature. As in most parts of 
the world, there are in most Nigerian societies, variations 
in the precise modes by which marriages may be celebrated.
For example, there may be different types of ceremonies by 
which marriage may be initiated, some of them of ancient 
origin, and some of them (e.g. proxy marriage), of more 
recent development. However, the essential characteristic, 
of these various modes of entering into marriage is that 
they do not alter the normal legal incidents of the 
marriage which is thereby contracted.
Examination of the twenty or more types of marriage 
recorded"** reveals that they do not merit treatment as 
separate types, since they conform in their essential legal 
incidents with marriages in which some payment is trans­
ferred, even though they may be peculiar in some minor 
details. For example:
(i) In some societies marriages may differ in the sex of
the parties involved. An example of this is "woman-to-
1. See Obi, Modern Family Law, pp. 157-161; C.K. Meek, The 
Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.. Vol.l, pp.190-213; 
P . Amaury.Talbot,.The Peoples of Southern Nigeria. 
op.cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 425-42?.
235
woman marriage”, discussed below,^ in which a woman
contracts a marriage with another woman.
(ii) Marriages may also differ in some communities in the
status of the spouses. An example of this is "slave
marriage" in which one or both parties had the status 
2
of a slave. Among some Igbo communities a free born
person (nwadiani) could not marry a slave (ohu, oru.
or osu). although a slave could marry another slave.
Among most of the other Nigerian societies, there was
no legal bar to marriage between free-born persons,
male or female, and a slave, although a "slave
4
marriage" may differ in some essentials. Among the
5
Yorubas Fadipe says:
"Theoretically, a female slave was at the entire 
disposal of her master and, if he decided to 
establish sexual relations with her, he made her 
his wife and thereby automatically gave her her 
freedom.. .Marriage between a freeborn woman and a 
slave was not looked upon with favour. It was a 
different matter, however, with an emancipated 
slave, especially if he was rich".^
1. See below, pp. 241-254.
2. For slave marriages see Talbot, Tribes of the Niger
Delta, p. 189J J.C. Cotton, "The Calabar Marriage Law 
and Custom", 4 J.A.S. 1905, pp. 427-430.
3. Ikenna Nzimiro, Studies in Ibo Political Systems: 
Chieftaincy and Politics in Four Niger States» ^London: 
Frank Cass 1972), pp. 26-27. .
4. See Samuel Johnson, The History of the Yorubas from the
Earliest Times to the Beginning of the British Protect
orate» (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1$21), p.116.
5. F.A. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, edited and 
with an Introduction by Francis 0. Okediji and 0ladejo 
Okediji, (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1970)
pp.182-183. Slave-Dealing was abolished in Nigeria by 
the Slave-Dealing Act, No.l, of 1874; and the status 
of slavery by the Slavery Ordinance 1916 (as amended in 
1936).
6. For general descriptions of slave marriages, see - 
Talbot, Tribes of the Nigeria Delta, op.cit.,p,189; . 
J.C. Cotton, ,fThe Calabar Marriage Law and Custom, 4 
J.A.S.,1905. pp.427-430; Thomas, Anthropological Report 
...Ibo-Speaking Peoples, (London: Garrison and Sons, 
1914), p.58 et.al.
236
(iii) Some communities distinguish between different types 
of marriages according to the level of dowry paid on 
the occasion of the marriage. An example of this is 
the so-called "small”, and "big" dowry marriages dis­
cussed below. These marriages are essentially 
validated by transfer of wealth, but they vary in their 
incidents in some respects.
(iv) Marriages may also differ in the mode of initiation 
of the marriage. Examples of marriages exhibiting 
this kind of difference are:
(a) The eagle-feather marriage. This type of 
marriage is practised in the Asaba area of 
Bendel State and was recorded by Mockler- 
Ferryman in 1892 and Thomas around 1914.
Thomas^* notes that when a man puts an eagle 
feather in a woman *s hair, she is legally bound
to him whether she-is unmarried or a widow.
2
Mockler-Ferryman adds that
"when a woman is chosen for marriage in 
this manner, the law then permits no 
divorce, and commands the wife to remain 
with her husband till death, punishment 
being meted out to any man attempting to 
entice her away; should she, however, leave 
her native land, she is never permitted to 
return, and the husband can never claim the 
refund of the purchase money from the . parents 
of an eagle-feather wife” .^
The husband in an eagle-feather marriage was 
obviously not absolved from the payment of
1. Northcote Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo- 
Speaking Peoples of Nigeria, op.cit.« Part IV, p.6j.
2. A.F. Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger; Claude MacdonaldTs 
Mission to the Niger and Benue Rivers, West Africa, 
(London: George Philip.and Son, 189^), p.39.
3. Neither Mockler-Ferryman nor Thomas mentions the signif­
icance of the eagle feather, but during field-work an 
informant stated that the eagle was a beautiful bird 
which only a skilled marksman could kill. It was there­
fore very difficult to obtain an eagle*s feather, and a 
woman on whose head it was placed would usually regard 
it as an honour, since it signified that she was held 
in great esteem. It was alleged that the number of 
women married in this way was always relatively few, 
and the custom no longer obtains in the Asaba District.
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dowry to the woman’s legal guardian, and the- 
marriage can, therefore, be categorised as a 
marriage by payment of dowry, differing only 
in its peculiar method of initiation.
(b) Proxy marriage. Uchendu^ refers to this type 
of marriage as "photograph marriage". It is 
evident that this is not a type of marriage, 
but merely an expedient employed for choosing 
a spouse, when the man is absent from,,home 
and therefore unable to see the girl personally. 
The marriage may also be celebrated in his 
absence by proxy, if the arrangement fructifies.
This method of initiating a marriage is 
particularly popular among Nigeriem. students 
overseas. Parents, for fear that their sons 
may succumb to the charms of foreign women
p
(an idea usually distasteful to them), 
deluge such students with photographs of home­
grown products, in the hope that they may be 
tempted. If the student capitulates, the 
marriage is celebrated by proxy at home, with 
all the normal ceremonies and legal incidents 
of marriage attached, including payment of dowry. 
Many Nigerian girls will opt for this arrange­
ment, even with men they would not have
1. Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria. 
(New York: Holt, Rineport and.Wilson, 19&5), p.51.
2. See Dorothy M. Jerrome - "Continuity and Change in the 
Societal'Organization of the Ibos in London", (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of London, 1974), p.154 who 
points out that to marry anyone outside a group of 
traditionally inter-marrying communities is to "marry ‘ 
a foreigner", and the further one goes outside the 
circle, the greater is family resistance to the match; 
see also Edward Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, 
(Washington, The Catholic University of America, 1937), 
pp.11-15, for.a similar attitude among the Yorubas.
He relates the pitiful story of a young English wife 
of a Yoruba who threw herself into the lagoon because of 
unhappiness over family disapproval of her marriage.
3. Proxy marriages are legally binding in Nigeria; Beckley 
v. Abiodun, In the Matter of the Marriage Ordinance
[ 19437TTN.L.R. 59.
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considered for marriage while the latter were
at home. • The girls regard it as a,means' of .
becoming a "been to",^ a highly regarded status /
. in Nigeria,- since, in most cases, they are sent
abroad to stay with the husbands. The ultimate
disillusionment of many of these women has been
2
noted by Jerrome.
(c) Marriage by chalking. By this method a wife is
chosen before her birth. A man who rubs chalk
on the stomach of a pregnant woman is thereby
regarded as betrothed to the child when born,
if it is a girl. He may marry her himself, or
give her to his son as a wife. This method of
initiating a marriage obtains among several
3
groups in Nigeria. It is interesting to note 
that rubbing of chalk on a wife is a method of 
initiating divorce, not only among some Nigerian 
communities, but among other African commun­
ities.^
(d) Tying on of medicine. Among the Tiv, when a man 
- - saw a girl he wanted to marry he would buy a
small open-work cloth for the girl to bind 
round her waist. This is called "tying on the 
medicine". Other men would then be afraid to 
pay court to the girl, for fear the medicine 
would harm them. When the girl was grown up, 
and after the customary payments, she was given
1. Interview with undergraduates of Nsukka University, held 
on 22nd July, 1977, at their home town in Onitsha. A 
"been to" is a derisive colloquial term for a person who 
has spent some time abroad, usually for educational 
purposes.-
2. Jerrome, "Continuity and Change, op.cit.. p.154.
3. J.W. Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages: Human Ecology and 
Education Series, (University of Ibadan, Occasional Jrrib- 
lication, INfo. 13, 1966), p.22. Cf. Meek, Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.« Vol.II, p.95; betrothal by 
tying two cowries on.the waist of a baby girl.
4. See further, Chapter VIII, Chalk (Nzu) was also used 
for a number of purposes in traditional society, e.g. 
strangers were greeted with it as a symbol of peace arid 
good reception, see Ogbonna 0. Ekeghe, A Short History 
of Ibiriba (Nigeria, N.D.), p.51.
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to him for a wife.1
It is evident from the.four illustrations 
given that marriages contracted as a result of the 
procedures described above are not different in 
kind from marriages by payment of dowry. The 
differences may be regarded as limited to the 
method of betrothal in the first, third and fourth 
examples, and of choosing a wife in the second.
(v) Finally, the most important category of
- - different forms of marriage is that which includes 
the variations in the modes of initiating marriage 
which significantly alter the legal incidents of 
the marriage. The types of marriage which merit 
special attention because of significant differences 
in their legal consequences, and consequent effect 
on the status of women may be classified as follows:
(a) marriage by payment of dowry.
(b) marriage by exchange.
(c) marriage by capture.
(d) marriage by mutual consent only.
B. Marriage by payment of dowry
This is generally regarded as the standard form 
of customary law marriage in Nigeria. Thus, Kasunmu and 
Salacuse state:
nOne of the most distinctive features of Nigerian 
_ customary marriage is the requirement that a payment 
of some sort be made by the boy or his family to the 
girlfs family in order to establish a valid marriage. 
The authors are unaware of any system of Nigerian p 
customary law which does not have such a requirement".
Although the payment of dowry as a legal essential 
"of a valid customary marriage is widespread in Nigeria, 
there is some evidence that in a few communities, no payment
1. Akiga, Akiga!s Story, op.cit.. p.125.
2. Alfred B. Kasunmu and Jeswald Salacuse, Nigerian Family 
Law, op.cit.,p.77.
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of dowry is necessary for the legal validity of a customary 
marriage. For example, Begho says of marriage according to 
Itsekiri customary law:
/
"...payment- of dowry was and is still unknown. The 
legality of the marriage is in the ceremony called 
* La emo. tsiT, which is done in the presence of 
witnesses. ;It is the form that gives it legality 
and differentiates it from concubinage".^
Similarly, Talbot notes that the Munshi pay no
dowry, but the first child is given instead to the wife*s
father; whiTe the rest of the children belong to the
2
husband as usual.
Thomas records that no dowry is payable in money 
in Ugo in the eastern border of the Edo country, and
■3
presents such as kola,coconuts and yams only are made.
Among the Pastoral Fulani, Stenning states that
no bride-wealth changes hands at any stage of their main
4form of marriage, while among the Yorubas, there is a 
legally recognized form of marriage in which no dowry is 
paid, and the only legal requirement is the mutual
5
consents of the parties.
An outstanding example of a customary law system 
of marriage in which no payment is made by, or on behalf 
of the man to the family of the woman, is "marriage by
1. Mason A. Begho, Law and Culture in the Nigerian and 
Roman World, (Benin City: Nigeria, Mid West Newspaper 
Corporation, 1971), p.30; Contrast Lloyd, who says 
such payments are made by the Itsekiris, but they are 
small, see Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op.cit.,
p.190.
2. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, Vol.Ill, op. 
cit.. p .454; For a similar statement about the Munshi 
(Tiv) see Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., 
Vol.l p.201, "among the Munshi a man may marry a virgin 
without making any payments, but he thereby forfeits 
his claim on their children".
5. Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples, Part IV, 1914,_p.49.
4. Derrick Stenning, "The Pastoral Fulani of Northern 
Nigeria", in Peoples of Africa, edit by James L. Gibbs, 
(New York, Holt, Rinepart.and.Winston, Inc. 1965),p.38b.
5. See further-, below pp.276-282.
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[
exchange”, practised by many groups in the Northern States 
of Nigeria. As shall be shown later, no transfer of wealth
| was necessary in this form of marriage, as practised by the •
' ' 1  | Tivs, to make it binding.
In a marriage by capture, among some communities,
! no payment is made by the prospective bridegroom, or his
| family, to the bride or her family. Indeed, in many areas,
! inability or refusal to pay dowry is the only reason why
[ 2 
this form of marriage becomes necessary.
Confronted with such incontrovertible evidence 
of legally binding customary marriages which do not require 
any transfer of wealth in the form of property or services, 
the most confident statement that can be made is that for 
the overwhelming majority of Nigerian tribes, marriage by 
| payment of dowry is practised, either as the sole form of
; marriage, or in conjunction with other types.
Marriage by payment of dowry is therefore the 
normal mode of contracting a marriage according to customary 
law in Nigeria, and will be dealt with further in detail,
but it is necessary to focus attention here on three
I special types of marriage by payment of dowry, in order to
| dispel misconceived notions about them, and to pinpoint
their essential features. These are:
(i) ” Woman-to-woman marriage”
This form of marriage, in which a woman contracts 
a marriage with another woman by payment of dowry 
merits special attention here because of its importance 
to the legal status of women, and in view of the fact 
that writers, for the most part male, are reluctant to 
accord such a marriage the status of a valid legal 
marriage.
A good starting point is to examine a few of 
these writings. Elias says:
1. See further,below pp.258-259.
2. See further, below p.268.
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"Another detestable practice among a few tribes was 
the system of ’’Woman Marriage”, which., consisted of . 
a barren wife taking' a woman into her household and 
then permitting her to "go with1 other men outside, 
whether free or for profit• The children of such 
unions were usually adopted by the couple as their 
own. The hired woman was literally in the position 
of a ’wife* to the barren wife who had thus ’married’ 
her in her husband’s household” .^
The learned writer, citing Esenwa, stated that
the practice of ”woman-to-woman” marriage had long been
2
absolute and is now legally prohibited. Esenwa, writing 
of marriage customs of Asaba in Bendel State in 1948, 
declared that such marriages were prohibited, but he 
nroduced no evidence of their abolition. In Iweze v.
■=5
Okacha, a case involving ”woman-to-woman” marriage which 
came before the High Court of Bendel State in 1968, no 
mention of its illegality was made.
Obi writes in a similar vein to Elias, but he 
extends the category of women who contract such marriages 
to women who marry for their sons, or, if they are single 
women,, for their dead fathers - a sort of ghost marriage.
In all cases of ”woman-to-woman marriage”, he says, the 
marriage must be effected in the name of a man.^
Nwogugu makes an attempt to delve slightly 
deeper into the true nature of the institution, but never­
theless says such marriages may be ’’superficially des­
cribed as the union of two women”, but the true position 
is that there is a man in whose name the marriage is con­
tracted and there is no question of one woman being 
married to the other. He admits, as does Obi, that these
1. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System. 1963, p. 295..
2. F.E. Esenwa, "Marriage Customs in Asaba Division",
The Nigerian Field. , 1948, No. 13, pp.71-81 at p..74.
3. [1967 - 1968] M.S.N.L.R. 64.
4. Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit., pp.157-158. Cf. Thomas, 
Anthropological Report..Tlbo-Speaking Peoples. o p .cit.. 
Part IV, p. 58. . . ..... .
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marriages "retain the basic characteristics of the 
traditional bride-price marriage and are, therefore,
not of a different order".^
/
The true position is that, contrary to the
assertion of Elias, ”woman-to-woman" marriage was practised
throughout Nigeria among communities with widely different
2
origins and customs. They have been recorded as widely
3 4 4 *5practised among the Igbos; Yorubas; Nupes; Ijaws;
6 7 8 4Igalas: some groups from Benin; the Opobos; Yagbas;
4 4Akokas and Gana-Ganas among others.
In order to appreciate the real nature of the 
custom, it is necessary to examine separately the circum­
stances in which these marriages were usually contracted. 
To treat them as a single category, as many writers have 
done, would be misleading.
The circumstances under which this type of 
marriage was usually contracted may be categorised as
follows
(i) A married woman with children may provide the dowry
1. E.I. Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria. (Ibadan. Nigeria; 
Heineman Educational Books (Nig.) Ltd., 1974;, p .36.
2. F.D. Lugard. Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa; 
op.cit..p.244.
3. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit., pp. 431, 
441; Tribes"of the Niger Delta, op7cit..pp. 93, 195-196; 
C.K. Meek. Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, op. 
cit.. p .275; Thomas, Anthropological Report on the 
Ibo-Speaking Peoples. Part IV. 1914. op.cit..pp.83-85; 
Esenwa, "Marriage Customs in Asaba", op.cit.. p.74; 
Uchendu, The Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria, op.cit..
p. 50. . . .
4. C.K. Meek, Tribes of Northern Nigeria.Vol.1. pp.209-210;
0.. Temple, Notes on the Tribes. Provinces. Emirates and 
States of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria.1922. p.324: 
Pearce Jervis, Of Emirs and Pagans:.A View.of Northern 
Nigeria (London, Cassell,1963), pp.137-138.
5. Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit..pp.195-196.
6. Enwezor and Anor.v. Enwezor and Qrs.f19721 Suit No. 
0/146/72; unreported, Onitsha High Court...
7* Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit..p.244.
8. M.D. Jeffrey, "Lobolo is Child Price", African Studies, 
1951, Vol.10, No.4, pp. 145-184 at p.16T. ' '
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for her husband to marry another woman^ who, as a 
■ result of the marriage, will- be her co-wife, both
of them sharing a common husband. The reason for
/
a wife providing dowry for such a purpose is that 
she wishes to enhance the status of her husband, 
since the possession of many wives was formerly a 
mark of ^ considerable prestige. Indirectly, of 
course, she also enhances her own position, since 
in most cases she would be the senior wife. The 
addition of a new wife enhances the prestige of 
every wife senior to her. In addition, the wife 
who pays for another wife, invariably has a greater 
degree of control over the choice of the new wife 
than she might have had if the husband himself had 
provided the dowry. She would also have a greater 
degree of control over the new wife in domestic and 
other matters. Payment of the dowry for a new wife 
operates as an assertion of her economic affluence, 
and a contribution to the status of the husbandfs 
extended family as a whole.
(ii) A woman, married or unmarried, may provide the dowry
for her son or other male relative to marry. This
is usually done when the man concerned cannot afford
2
to pay the dowry for his own marriage. In some 
cases, especially in the case of a son, a mother may 
provide the dowry and marry a wife for her son whether 
he consents to her doing so or not.
In spite of the son*s protests, in some communit­
ies, for example, Onitsha, the children begotten by 
such a wife for another man are legally affiliated to
1. See Ngwobia Uka, nGrowing Up in Nigerian Culture;
A Pioneer Study of Physical and Behavioural Growth and 
development of Nigerian Children".IIbadan Nigeria: 
‘Ibadan University Press, 19bb), p.375 C.K. Meek, Law 
and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe”,i950, op.cit., 
p.£75; Meek. Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.ci/b.,
pp.209-210.
2„ See the case of the Tiv lady who paid the dowry for 
the marriage of her junior brother, below p p 262-264. 
See also Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe. " 
op.cit., p.203.
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the son, and will be classed with his other children, 
if any, begotten by wives he himself married, for 
purposes of inheritance and representation.^- A 
number of such cases were reported in Onitsha.
Categories (i) and (ii) above cannot be correctly 
termed "woman-to-woman" marriages. The woman providing 
the dowry does not contract the marriage on her own 
behalf, and all the marriage rites are performed in 
the name of the man concerned, whether husband, son 
or other male relatives. The payment of the dowry 
gives the payer a measure of moral control over the 
wife paid for, but legally, the woman who provides the 
dowry has no rights over the woman on whose behalf it 
is paid, or her progeny, and the latter cannot inherit 
from the payer, as her children. In other words, 
provision of the dowry creates no legal bond between 
the woman who provides the dowry, and the woman on 
whose behalf it is paid, or the latterTs children.
(iii) A barren married woman may marry another woman
2
on her own behalf. For example, F H, a woman, 
marries W, another woman. Any children begotten by 
W are counted as the children of F,H for inheritance 
and other purposes. The dowry is-paid by F H and all 
the rites are performed by her in her own name. 
Different detailed rules apply to different commun­
ities, but in Isele Asaba (Igbo), for example, where 
F H pays for W, W is assigned to a male "friend” for 
the purpose of procreation, and any son begotten by W
1. Information given by Professor J.B. Okala of Onitsha, 
confirmed in interviews with other Onitsha informants. 
Compare this account with the custom as practised by 
the Lovedu, see Eileen Jenson Krige, "Woman Marriage 
with Special Reference to the Lovedu”, Africa 44,
1974, pp. 11-37 at p. 18; R.G. Armstrong, '*Intestate 
Succession among the Idoma", in Studies in the Laws
of Succession in Nigeria, edit, by Duncan M. Derrett, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.215.
2. See Thomas, ihithropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples, Part IV, 19147 p.58, "..a childless wife pur- 
chases for herself, not for her husband, a wife whom ' 
she assigns to a "friend, usually chosen by the TwifeT 
herself".
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inherits from F H and from F H*s husband (H) if she 
herself is married. Under no circumstances may H 
have sexual relations with ¥, but if he dies, ¥ may 
have sexual relations with his sons if they are old 
enough. If F H marries the eldest son of H, (who of 
course must not be her own son) after H Ts death, ¥ 
remains with her ffriend*.^
In some societies, ¥ is given to the husband of 
F H for the purpose of bearing children. Any children 
begotten by ¥ are counted as the children of H (F H*s 
husband), and may therefore inherit from F H and from 
H, their legal father, whether he is also their
father or not. ¥ is known as the wife of 
*F H and not a co-wife as in (i) above, and F H has 
full legal control over ¥. Instead of a stranger
2
her husband is used as the genitor of ¥ fs children.
3
This was the position in Meribe v. Egwu, where the 
distinction was drawn, but it is respectfully sub­
mitted, not correctly interpreted by the Nigerian 
Supreme Court.
The reason why a barren woman who can afford 
to do so would marry another woman is not far to seek.
The position of a childless woman in the traditional 
Nigerian society was not an enviable one. Basden says:
A childless woman is regarded as a sort of 
monstrosity; indeed, it is not unknown that, 
when such a woman dies, in order to express 
the contempt in which she is held, her abdomen 
is slit across prior to her burial. She has 
failed to fulfil her function in life, and this 
mutilation of the corpse is the token of her failure 
her name is blotted out for ever".^
1. Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples,~op.cix.t Fart IV. p.85.
2. Ibid., p.84.
3. [1976] 3. S.C.23.
4. Basden, Niger Ibosf op.cit., p.213; see also Arthur G. 
Leonard, The Lower Niger and its Tribes. (London: Mac 
Millan and Co•, Ltd. 1906),.pp.215 and 216; Talbot, 
Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit., p.191; Ngwobia Uka, 
Growing Up in Nigerian Culture, op.cit.tpp.36-37; Bowen, 
Central Africa, op.cit,.. p.303: "iTagan, barren, is a word 
which the most malignant and enraged person scarcely 
ever presumes to address to a childless woman", among 
the Yoruba.
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. He notes that this is probably true of all African 
tribes. A barren woman who begets children by 
marrying another woman thereby avoids the social 
censure of sterility, since these children are 
affiliated to her. She also secures the performance 
of her burial rites. Children have a sacred duty to 
perform these important rites for their deceased 
parents. In addition sustenance and comfort in her 
old age is guaranteed.
Last, but not least, is the benefit she gains
should her husband predecease her. In all Nigerian
societies, women do not inherit property from their
deceased intestate husbands, under customary law,
except through children, or in some societies,
through sons only. A wife who has no children may
derive no benefit from her husband*s property when
he dies. A barren but wealthy woman compensated for
her sterility by her economic fecundity, - paying for
a wife of her own through whom she produces children,
and thus gains rights of inheritance and other 
V
benefits.
(iv) A single woman may marry another woman on her
2
own behalf. She gives ., the woman thus married to 
a man to beget children who are legally affiliated to 
her. Although the large majority of women in trad­
itional society was married, some women were not, for 
a variety of reasons. Society was less tolerant of
3
children begotten by single women than it is today. 
Woman-to-woman marriage was a possible method of 
intruding into the exclusive male domain.
1. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Deltaj 0£.cit.,pp.195-196.
2* Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit.« p .275; Thomas,
Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking Peoples,
Part IV, 19i4, op.cit.. p.83; Meek. Northern bribes of 
Nigeria, op.cit.,p.£lO; Iweze v. Okacha 11967-19&8 I
m .§:n :l ?r . 6?t ~ :— " — :—
3. Any children begotten by a single woman legally belong 
to the woman*s father in most Nigerian societies. Cf. 
the position in England where until 1883 women could - 
not claim custody of their illegitimate children either 
at Common law or Equity. The position was changed in 
1883 in R.V. Nash, [1883] 10, Q.B.D. 454, C.A., followed
footnote continued.....
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A single woman of wealth and strength of character 
could, by this method, establish a compound of her' .. 
own, and may even be a polygamist.^ In Orakwue v.
O '
Enemali, the founder of the compound over which the
claim was brought had been a woman, one Mbem, who
founded the Mbem family of Onitsha. She had never
been married to any man, and had no issues of her
own. She was alleged to have married three wives
who produced many children for her. The woman in
Nwezor v. Nwezor also had several wives, although
she had a husband as well.
4In Iweze v. Okacha, expert evidence was given 
which showed that according to Asaba customary law it 
was possible for an unmarried woman who haflt no issues to 
marry another woman. Issues produced by this other woman 
took the name of, and inherited from the woman who paid the 
dowry on behalf of their mother. The marriage need not be 
contracted in the name of a man. The statement by Obi and 
Nwogugu that the marriage must always be contracted in the 
name of a man does not apply in all communities in Nigeria,
5
nor even among all Igbo communities.
6The recent case of Meribe v. Egwu shows the
Footnote 3 continued.... by Barnado v. McHugh [1891] A.C.
388 and finally by Statute, see Children Act, 1975,
Section 85 (7).
1. See Lugard,-Political Memoranda, op.cit., p.245, where 
it is reported that one woman.had 19 wives for whom she 
paid dowry ranging from 15/ to 25/.
2. [l964]Suit No.0/37/64, unreported,- High Court Onitsha,1964.
3. [1972] Suit No.0/146/72,unreported,High Court-Onitsha,1972.
4. [1967-1968] M.S.N.L.R.64.
5. See Thomas; Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples. Pari IV. 19147 p.$3; Meek. Law and Authority in 
a Nigeria Tribe, op.cit.. pp.275-276; Meek. Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., p.210; Iweze v. Okacha 
[1967-1968J M.S.N.LTr .'TS.
6. [1976] 3 S;C.23.
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attitude of the Nigerian Supreme Court towards ”woman-to-
woman” marriage.1 In this case, Nwanyiokoli, one of the
wives of Chief Cheghekwu, because she had no children,
/
married her niece, Nwanyiocha, and gave her to her husband 
for procreation. The niece had children for Chief 
Cheghekwu, one of whom was the plaintiff in the case, 
which involved inheritance to land owned by Nwanyiokoli. 
Nwanyiokoli had brought the plaintiff up as her son and 
he and his natural mother, Nwanyiocha, lived with her.
When Nwanyiokoli died, the plaintiff claimed that he 
performed the burial ceremony, and inherited her property, 
including the disputed land. He had farmed on this land 
from the time of Nwanyiokoli1s death in 1937, until 1971, 
when the defendants trespassed on it.
The defendants were the children of Meribe, 
eldest son of Chief Cheghekwu by another wife. When his 
father died, Meribe had “inherited” Nwanyiokoli under 
native law and custom, and they had lived as man and wife.
The defendants claimed that when Nwanyiokoli died, it was
their father Meribe who had performed the burial rites, 
and inherited her properties, including the disputed land, 
and not the plaintiff. On Meribe*s death, they had 
inherited the land, as his children.
Chief J.O. Ekwuruke gave evidence, which was 
accepted by the court, as follows
”It is the custom in our place [Umuahia] that if
.a woman has no issue, she can marry another woman 
for her husband; any issue from the said woman 
would be regarded as an issue from the woman who 
married her for the purpose of representation in 
respect of estates and inheritance”.2
The trial Judge, Aniagolu, J., was satisfied that 
Nwanyiokoli married Nwanyiocha for Chief Cheghekwu, and that 
she treated the plaintiff as her son. He held that the
1. For a criticism of this case see* C.O. Akpamgbo, ”A 
Woman-to-Woman Marriage and the Repugnancy Clause,” 
African Law Studies. 1977, No. 14, p.87.
2. Meribe v. Egwu [1976] 3 S.C.23, at p.24.
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facts disclosed in the evidence were in accord with the 
native law and custom of the area. He said- that it was 
evident that "Nwanyiokoli did not marry Nwanyiocha for 
herself - a fact naturally impossible - but for her 
husband” . The learned Judge continued:
”The word marriage in that context is merely 
colloquial, the proper thing to say being that 
she procured Nwanyiocha for Chief Cheghekwu to 
marry her” .
The Court found no suggestion of anything immoral 
in the transaction, and entered judgment for the plaintiff, 
thereby holding that the marriage was legally valid.
The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court 
which upheld the judgment given in the lower court. The 
Supreme Court, in the course of its own judgment, said:
”In every system of jurisprudence known to us one 
of the essential requirements for a valid marriage 
is that it must be the union of a man and a woman 
thereby creating the status of husband and wife* 
Indeed' the law governing any decent society should 
abhor and express its indignation of a "woman-to- 
woman” marriage, and where there is proof that a 
custom permits such an association the custom must 
be regarded as repugnant by virtue of the proviso 
to section 14(3) of the Evidence Act and ought not 
to be upheld by the court
Having drawn a distinction between cases where a 
woman marries another woman for her husband, and where she 
marries for herself, the Courts found in the instant case 
that Nwanyiokoli married her niece for her husband, that 
is, she paid the dowry and selected the girl for her 
husband to marry. Nevertheless, the Courts gave inheritance 
rights in Nwanyiokoli1s estate to the children of that 
marriage, thereby implying that children acquire 
inheritance rights in the property of whoever pays the 
dowry for the marriage of their mother. This principle, 
if followed to its logical conclusion would vest in the 
issues of a marriage inheritance rights to the property
1. Meribe v. Egwu [1976] 3 S.C. 23 at p.32-33.
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of a mother, sister, father, or even a friend who provided 
the dowry for the marriage..
It is respectfully submitted that this does not
correctly represent the customary law of the Igbos, nor of
the other communities in Nigeria. Payment of dowry sim-
pliciter, confers no legal rights on the payer. Legal
rights are vested in the person in whose name the marriage
rites are performed. If the marriage rites were performed
in the name of Nwanyiokoli*s husband, then the woman married
would be Nwanyiokoli*s co-wife, and issues of that marriage
should not inherit from Nwanyiokoli, since children do not
inherit from the wives of their fathers, who are not their .
own mothers. If, however, the marriage rites were carried
out in the name of Nwanyiokoli, then it was she who married
the woman, a fact not "impossible** as the courts held.
Sexual intercourse is merely one of the functions of
marriage. Incapacity to have sexual intercourse does not
render a marriage void.^ Many marriages are contracted
with the express intention that the parties should have no
sexual intercourse with each other. Marriage for compan-
2ship has long been known to various systems of law. The 
courts, by holding that the marriage between Nwanyiokoli 
and her niece was "impossible**, was confounding one of the 
incidents of marriage - sexual intercourse - with the 
marriage 'itself. This exposes the danger inherent in
*3
adopting a functionalist definition of marriage.
With the introduction of more stringent immig­
ration laws in many countries, for example, England,
1. Under the - Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970 
incapacity to consummate a marriage makes the marriage 
voidable by either party, S.15(1;(a); see also the 
English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, s.12(a). For 
the distinction between void and voidable marriages, 
see De Renville v. De Renville [1948] 1 All E.R.56,60;
C.A._[1948J.P.100,111. For the history of the dis­
tinction, see Bromley, Family Law.op.cit., pp.69-72;
See also S.A. Adesanya, Laws of Mallrimonial Causes 
(Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 19?3, pp.139 
et al.
2. See W.V. Horton Rogers, "Sham Marriages", 4 Family Law. 
1974, pp.4-7 at p.14; and obiter dicta in United States 
v. Rubinstein [1945] 151 F. 2d, 915.
5- For criticisms of the functionalist definition of
marriage, see P.G. Riviere, "Marriage: A reassessment",
Footnote continued.......
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marriages of convenience have become commonplace, and are
2recognized as valid legal marriages by the English Courts.
Contrary to the sentiment expressed by the Supreme 
Court, there is nothing'intrinsically wrong or immoral 
which "any decent society should abhor or express its indig­
nation" at, with a barren woman, in accordance with the laws 
of the society to which she belongs, marrying another woman 
to raise issues for her by a male genitor. Sterile or 
impotent men marry women, and, with the latter*s consent, 
assign them to other men for the purpose of producing heirs.
This is common practice in all parts of Nigeria,^ and is
l±
not unknown in other parts of the world. In some cases, 
the husband pays for the services rendered by the male 
genitor, as was done in the recent German case where the
Footnote 5 continued.... in Rethinking Kinship and Marriage, 
edit, by Rodney Needham (London: Tavistock Publications 
1971), p. 59; Krige, "Woman Marriage...", ojD.cit., pp. 30-34.
1. Advertisements offering marriage "for citizenship" for 
very substantial considerations frequently appear in the 
English press. Private Eye, 16 Nov. 1973, contains no 
less than 20 "offers of citizenship" at prices up to 
£1,000.. -
2. See for example Silver v. Silver I"19551 2 All E.R. 614; 
see also Kelly vTTeTTv [1932J49 T.L.R.99; H v.H [1953j
2 All E.R. 1229 at 1234. See.also, "Horton“ftogers, "Sham 
Marriages", 4 Family Law 1974, p.4, and cases cited there. 
In Silver v. Silver.the courts refused to grant a decree 
of nullity of . marriage and held that the marriage was 
valid as there was no element of duress and the parties 
had intended to become man and wife. The wife, a 
German subject, had gone through a form of marriage with 
the step-brother of her lover, an Englishman in order to 
enable her to obtain permission to stay in England. She 
wanted to live in England with her lover but he was 
already married, hence the sham arrangements. The parties 
never cohabited and saw each other only twice during the 
twenty-nine years following the marriage. Cf.United 
States v. Rubinstein. 151 F.2d. 915 [1945].
5. The Customary Law Manual, op.cit.. pp.272-274; Meek,
Law and Authority . op.cit..p.276; Basden, Niger Ibos. 
pp.226. 258; Lugard. Political Memoranda, op.cit.. p.244.
4. Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom.
(London: John Murray, I6B5 ), p p .98 et.al; Vinogradoff, 
Historical Jurisprudence. Vol.I, 1920, pp.257-258.
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genitor was paid f.1,200.1
The use-of the word ’procure1 by the Courts is -
an unfortunate one as a procurer is a man or woman who
/ p
obtains women for the gratification of another’s lust,
but there was no suggestion of immorality in the evidence 
before the Courts.
Farran, writing on the matrimonial laws of the 
Sudan, where ’’woman-to-woman” marriage has a wide dis­
tribution, called for great sympathy from the judges. He 
advocated that judges try to understand the purpose, and 
the effect in customary law of these unions before ruling 
on their validity, rather than just rejecting them out of 
hand as ’barbarous’ and * absurd.’ He thought it probable 
that this would be the attitude of an uninstructed 
European judge. It is unfortunate that this has been the 
attitude of brilliant sons of Nigerian soil.
The Judges were no doubt influenced by the recent
decisions of the English courts in cases involving marriages
II
between members of the same sex, and the current prevalence
5
of homosexuality and lesbianism in Europe and America.
Information collected during fieldwork about the 
nature and practice of ”woman-to-woman” marriage in 
Nigeria, revealed no tint of sexual relations between the 
women involved. There is opportunity for abuse inherent
1. See ”News of the World”; 19 Feb. 1978, p.11; The genitor 
employed by -the husband had *two children of his own. 
After six months frequent trials proved unsuccessful, 
the genitor was taken to the doctor where he too was 
pronounced sterile. His wife later admitted that she 
had, unknown to him secured the services of a genitor 
who was the natural father of the two children of the 
marriage; see also Customary Law Manual, 1977, op.cit., 
pp.273-274.   “
2. Concise Oxford Dictionary, 6th edition.
3. Farran, Matrimonial Laws of the Sudan, op.cit.,pp.80-81.
4. See e.g. Talbot v. Talbot [1967] 111., Sol.Journal, 213;
Corbett v. Corbett ^otherwise Astley) [1970] 2 All E.R. 
33 which involved a,sex change; see also A.R. David 
Green, ”Transexualism and Marriage”, The New Law Journal 
1970, Vol. 120, p.210. .
5. Under the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, Section 
11 (c), a marriage is void if the parties are not res­
pectively male and female. There is no similar prov­
ision under the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree,1970.
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in the system, and this was referred to by Lugard,^ the former 
Governor-General of Nigeria, who described women who marry 
young girls as "keepers of brothels". But as Jeffreys 
aptly points out, "Brotlaels are most highly evolved under 
European culture, they form no part of African indigenous 
culture".^
Of the fifteen case histories collected during
field work which involved "woman-to-woman" marriages, only
one had a tinge of misuse, and this was done by a man who
used the legal fiction of the institution to solve his
3
marital problems•
The custom as practised by the traditional
society was no more than a legal fiction. Maine reminds
us that ancient family law has long been entangled with
such legal fictions, and points out the fact that
"familiarity with Adoption during such a length of History,
blinds us to the fact that it is one of the most violent 
4
of fictions". Fictions of affiliation of children are
"startling to modern sentiments but they seemed perhaps
simpler and more natural to ancient thought than the
5
admission of a mere stranger to the family".
(II) ^ig-dowry* and *small-dowry* marriage
There are some communities in Nigeria* mainly 
in the Southern States, where there are two levels of 
dowry payable with reference to the contract of marriage.
1. Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit., p.244.
2. Jeffreys, "Lobolo is Child-Price", on.cit.. p. 164.
3. Case file M0H/SWD/0NZ/12S 264, Social Welfare Office, 
Onitsha. His wife, married under the Marriage Act, 
had no children. She threatened to prosecute him for 
bigamy if he "married" another wife under customary law, 
so he married a wife in his dead mother*s name, with whom 
he lived as man and wife, and who got children for him. 
Under customary law these children would be affiliated
to him, as the mother would be taken as having married 
the woman for him.
4. Maine, Dissertations . op.cit., p.96*
5. Maine, Ibid., p . 98. -
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These marriages are referred to by various local terms such 
as Iya and Igwa.among the' Kalahari I jaw,1 Iya and egwa 
among the Okrikan Ijaw,2 and Amoya and isomi of the 
Northern Edo-speaking peoples"!^Writers have adopted the 
popular (but by no means accurate) terms "big-dowry" and 
and "small-dowry" to describe these marriages, and this 
nomenclature will be used throughout this thesis to 
designate these types of marriages.
The essential difference, from a legal point
of view, between these two kinds of marriages is that
in a nbig dowry11 marriage, a bigger dowry is paid, and the
wife is completely incorporated into her husbandfs family.
Her husband acquires full rights in uxorem (sexual,
domestic and other connubial rights), and rights in
genetricem (rights of ownership of her children), which
may be transmitted to other members of his family after
his death, provided the dowry is not repaid.^ Williamson
notes that among the Okrika I jaw, a "big-dowry"-marriage -
is relatively uncommon, and is regarded as a solemn
5
tying together of the two families involved. In Solomon
v. Gbobo it was stated that
"Under the Okrika customary law an fIya* marriage 
.could be dissolved at will by the husband by 
sending the wife back to her parents. The woman 
was then free to remarry and any children of the
1. Eastern Nigeria: Report: Bride Price Committee. 1954,p.50.
2. Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit..p. 193:
Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria,,op.cit..Vol.III.p.457.
5. Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op.cit., pil08;
S.O. Imoagene, "The Marriage System of ?ne Weppa-Wano
(Mid-Western Nigeria)" African Notes. 1970, Vol.6, No.l, 
p. 12; N.W. Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Edo- 
Speaking Peoples of Nigeria. Part I(London: Harris and 
Sons, 1910), p.47. . ___
4. For a good-description of these marriages see, Report of 
Bride Price Committee. 1954,o£.cit.,pp.50-57; see also 
Kay Williamson 11 Changes in tEe Marriage System of the 
Okrika Ijo", 53.Africa, 1962; Thomas, Anttoopological 
Report of the Edo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., p. 47.
5. Williamson, op.cit. p.55...................
6 . [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 457.
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subsequent marriage belonged, to the new husband.
", Similarly, the wife could call the- husband before 
the chiefs and have them work out how much was to 
be paid to him by way of refunding the bride price 
and all other expenses, including the ’Ikpo’ and 
’Okuru* cloths. If the husband accepted that refund, 
the marriage was at an end but if he refused to 
accept the refund, the marriage continued to subsist 
and there was nothing the woman could do to get free 
from it and any children she had by her new husband 
were regarded as the children of the former husband 
and were treated as bastards”.^
In the ’small dowry1 marriage a smaller sum is
2
paid, but the wife does not become a full member of her 
husband’s family. Her husband’s rights in uxorem are 
limitedj and in some communities, she may not live with, 
or cook, for him. He acquires no rights to her children 
begotten by him. On the death of the husband of a small 
dowry marriage, his rights over the wife are automatically 
terminated; she is free to return to her own family, and 
is not inherited by any member of her deceased husband’s 
family. In some communities, this form of marriage- is 
compulsory for all the daughters of a family, except the
Zf.
first daughter. A big dowry marriage, among some 
communities, for example, the Kalahari, is considered the 
highest honour conferable on a woman, and usually only 
free-born women could be married in this manner.
Further differences between the two types of
1. Solomon v. Gbobo [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 457-459.
2. The Bride Price Committee reports that among Okrika 
I jaw* there is no dowry payment and no ceremony in
a small dowry (Igwa) marriage. An expenditure of £5 
to £10 is involved and the two families merely gather 
and drink. A big dowry marriage ranges from £60 - £80; 
cf. the position among Kalahari Ijaw where the total 
cost of a big dowry marriage ranges from £300-£400 or 
even more, while the total cost of the small dowry 
marriage is about £25 - see Bride Price Committee 
Report, op.cit.. p. 50-34.
3. Bride Price Committee Report. p . 34.
4. Imoagene, “The Marriage System of the Weppa-Wano”,
0JD . cit., p , 12.
5. See Talbot - Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit.«
p . 191. ,...........  .
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marriages will be noted and exemplified in the appropriate 
cdntext in future chapters.
(Ill) "Marriage by succession” (widow-inheritance)
There are two practices in regard to widows
found in many legal systems in all parts of the world,
both sometimes mistakenly designated by the generic term
levirate marriage. Radcliffe-Brown insists that a
distinction must be made between levirate marriage and
what many writers refer to as "widow inheritance".^*
In the case of levirate marriage as practised
2by the biblical Hebrews and many other societies, on the
death of the husband, the widow is taken over by his brother
or other male relative whose duty it is to raise children
in the name of the deceased. Children born of this union
are affiliated to the deceased husband for purposes of
inheritance, succession and representation. Levirate
•3
marriage was formerly practised by the Yorubas, and is 
still practised by the Tivs.^
In the different situation of the so-called 
"widow-inheritance", the widow remarries to a member of 
her deceased husband1s family, but any children of this 
subsequent marriage are affiliated to their natural 
father, the widow1s new husband, and not to her deceased 
husband. Although some writers do refer to this sub­
sequent marriage as widow-inheritance, it is respectfully
1. Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, African Systems of Kinship 
and Marriage, op.cit., p.64.
2. Deuteronomy, Chapter 25, verses 5-10; Ruth, Chapters 
1 - 4 ;  See Also Max Gluckman, Kinship and Marriage, 
op.cit..p. 183, who describes the practice of levirate 
among the Nuer and Zulu.
3. A.B. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples of the Slave 
Coast of West Africa, (London: Chapman Hall Ltd.. 1894) 
p- 185
4. Akiga, AkigaTs Story, op.cit.. pp.316-319; see further 
below, Chapter VIII.
|
!
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submitted that this term is derogatory of women’s status 
and is also scientifically incorrect. Women are not 
items of property, and should not be classified as such.
This argument will be pursued in future chapters.^" The 
term "widow-inheritance” as far as possible, will be avoided 
in this thesis. The appellation ’’marriage by succession”, 
or "succession marriage" will be employed in its stead.
(IV) "Marriage by exchange"
Meek records at least twenty-one tribes 
including Idoma and Tiv who practised exchange marriage in 
the Northern parts of Nigeria.
It is a form of marriage whereby a lineage dis­
tributes its female members as wards to its male members, 
referred to as guardians. Usually a guardian exchanged 
his ward (ingol).ideally his immediate younger sister 
(Ityongo)'. with a man from another lineage, who in return 
gives him his own ward, again ideally the manfs younger 
sister, as his wife. The essence of the idea-is that the 
wife who is introduced-into a lineage takes the place in 
a very real sense, of the daughter of the family for whom 
she had been exchanged. She bears children for the lineage 
by proxy, and the. exchange is not complete until children 
are born. If, at the end of the child-bearing period, 
both women have children of the same number and sex, then 
the matter rests there. If only one of the women bears
1. See further below, Chapters VIII and XIII.
2. For a full description of exchange marriage as practised 
in different parts of the Northern States of Nigeria, 
see Akiga, Akiga’s Story, op.cit., Bohannan and 
Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria. ojD.cit.,pp.69-75;
C.K. Meek."The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., 
204-205; C.K. Meek. A Sudanese Kingdom:- An Ethno­
graphical Study of the Jukun-Speaking Peoples of 
Nigeria.(London: Kegan Paul. Trench. Trubner and Co. 
Ltd., 1931), pp.373-376; Abraham, The Tiv People, op. 
cit.. pp.138-147; R.M. Downes, The Tiv Tribe.(Kaduna: 
Nigeria, Government Printer, 1935)f,pp.,lb-l§; and see 
generally, Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, 
op.cit..Vol. II, p.358 et.al., for exchange marriage.
in all parts of the worlcl., .
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children, then her lineage could annul the contract, and
demand her return, or another woman to take the place of
the barren one.
The system, although simple in theory, in
actual fact resulted in an uneven and unstable mixture
of features which varied from one lineage to the other.^
Marriage by exchange in the form described
above seems to be entirely unknown in the Southern States
of Nigeria. Talbot records that marriage by exchange is
2common among the Igbos and other eastern groups, but he
describes the system as one where two men will agree that
each shall take as wife the daughter of the other, thus
saving dowry expenses. Under this system wives were also 
3
exchanged.
SpSrndli, on the other hand, describes among the
Igbo, a system called Inwe-nwunye n*oghagha (marriage in
exchange), in which two female children are handed over to
the bride*s family by the future husband in exchange for
his wife* He only came across one such case and limits
4
the practice to four places south of Owerri. Queries to 
various sources during field work as to the practice of 
exchange marriage among the Igbos, or other communities in 
the Southern States, elicited negative replies. Informants, 
however, did not rule out the possibility of occasional 
private arrangements between two individuals, be they 
fathers or husbands, or even families, such as these
5
reported by Talbot.
1. Bohannan and Bohannan. op.cit., p.69.
2. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit..
Vol. Ill, p. 425.
5. Talbot, Ibid., pp.440-441; see also Report: Bride Price 
Committee. (Enugu. Nigeria, Government Printer, 1954), 
p. 35, Westermarck, History of Marriage, op.cit.
4. J. Spbrndli, "Marriage Customs Among the Ibos", Anthr- 
QPQ.S, 1942-1945, Vol.37-40, pp. 113-121 at p. 119;"see 
Bride Price Committee Report.1954. op.cit.. p.35, which 
states that in Brass Division, two men exchange sisters, 
instead of paying dowry; Meek, Law and Authority, op. 
cit., pp.265-266. ------------------
5. See Uchendu, The Igbo of South Eastern Nigeria, op.cit., 
p.51, who describes a case of private exchange of wives; 
cf. Wife-swapping in Europe and America.
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• It is evident that the system described by the
two authors, as practised by the Igbos,' is different from.
the system briefly described above, which is found in the
Northern States where i*6 has a fairly wide distribution.
As noted above, Meek records at least twenty-one tribes
including Idoma and Tiv who practise exchange marriage.^
This type of marriage, lumped by Elias with the systems
described as practised by the Igbos, and referred to by
2
him as 1 revolting1 and 'untenable1, was, among the Tiv, 
the basic form of marriage. Akiga s'ays:
"...with the Tiv the exchange system cannot be con­
sidered merely as a better or worse way of getting 
a wife. It is, or has been, an institution of 
paramount importance, and lies at the base of the 
whole present tribal organization. Moreover, it 
is bound up with the strongest of supernatural 
sanctions; for although the spiritual life of the 
tribe has been severely shaken by events of recent 
years, the orthodox belief, still held by the old 
men, is that the fertility of the crops and of the 
women - in fact, the very existence of the tribe - 
is dependent on exchange marriage and the rites 
which are associated with it".^
The Bohannans, who conducted intensive invest­
igations of Tiv society, note; that exchange marriage
1. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.,p.204;
Akiga's Story op.ci-fc.. p.291; C.K. Meek. "Marriage by 
Exchange in Nigeria: A Disappearing Institution",
Africa Vol.IX 1936, p.64-74 at p.65. For general 
distribution of exchange marriage, see .0. Temple,
"Notes on the Tribes...".op.cit.,1922.
2. T.O. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System. 1963, op.cit..■ 
p.291; The writer states that it is practised in a 
few isolated pockets in rural places. In 1963 the 
Tivs had a population of 1,393,649 and the Idomas, 
485,362; For a similar opinion see Akinola Aguda,
Select Law Lectures. (Nigeria: Associated Publishers.
1571777^ 557-  .
3. Akiga*s Story, op.cit..p.100. Compare the statement 
made by Meek with reference to exchange marriage among 
the Igbos, "Two men may agree to exchange their sisters 
(or cousins.or daughters) as brides; though, when this 
is done, it is usual also to exchange some small amount 
of material property, in order to formalize the marriage, 
as it is felt that if gifts and money are not also 
exchanged the relationship set up would be one of 
concubinage rather than of marriage". - Meek, Law
and Authority.... , op.cit. p.265.
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among the Tiv is based on the idea that the "only 
comm4^ i y  decently exchangeable for the fertility of one
woman was that of another".1✓
The system was admittedly complicated, and gave
rise to many legal disputes. In addition, it was abused
in certain areas, but writers generally agree that,
despite its perils, marriage by exchange was a more stable
form of marriage than marriage by payment of dowry which
remained the only permissible form after the* Government
2declared marriage by exchange illegal in 1927. Marriage 
by payment of dowry^ formerly existed side by side with 
exchange marriage, but it was not considered important. 
Marriage by payment of dowry contains none of the elements 
of compulsion and permalloy inherent in the exchange system 
of marriage.^* The greatest value of the exchange system
5
was that "it gave a poor man an equal chance with the rich”.
The abolition of marriage by exchange has created 
hardships for the less wealthy in Tiv society. In common 
with other parts of Nigeria, the level of dowry now payable 
in Tivland has soared considerably, and ranks amongst the 
highest in the country.
An informant, a Tiv lady,^ said she was forced
1. Paul Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p .72; See 
further, Paul and Laura Bohannan, "Tiv Economy",
(London: Longmans, 1968), p.232. In Kern (dowry marriage) 
only rights in uxorem were acquired, to affiliate 
children, separate payment had to be made.
2. Marriage by exchange was abolished in 1927 among the
Tiv, and among other Northern Tribes in 1921, see Meek,
"Marriage by Exchange", op.cit., p.64.
3. Referred to as "kern" marriage among the Tiv.
4. Abraham, The Tiv People, op.cit., p.147.-
5. Meek, Marriage by Exchange, op.cit., p.73.
6 . Personal Interview with Mrs. C.O. Social Welfare Officer, 
held at The Catholic Guest House Ibadan, on 12 August, 
1977, where she was attending a Conference.
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to pay Ml,500 in order to get a wife for her "brother who 
could not afford such a large'sum. In addition to." the 
money, she also had to make gifts of-clothes, jewellery 
and other items to the "6ride and her parents. She stated 
that that was not the end of the. payments as ’femong the Tiv 
one never stops paying dowry” . She expressed her joy, 
however, at the news recently received that the wife whom • 
she had sent to her "brother, a student in England, had 
delivered a "baby boy, so that the dowry paid had not been 
"wasted” as it might have been had the wife proved sterile. 
Her story is interesting and is best recorded in her own 
words:
”My mother was the second of the six wives of my 
father, and had not been married by exchange.
We all lived in the very large compound of my 
paternal grandfather who was a big Chief with 
about twenty wives, the first one of whom only 
had been married by exchange.. Most of the other 
wives had been brought to him for marriage by 
their people, because of his prosperous compound.
My mother had no living son. The only son she had 
died* I never saw my mother smile. I remember 
her crying for that son years after he had died.
She would just sit down and cry and cry. One 
day when I was about six years old I said to her,
"Ma, why do you always cry?” She said, ”It is 
because I have no child. Your father's wives 
laugh at me and tease me with scorn because I 
have no child”. I asked her, ”You say you have 
no child, am I not your child,.is Wante (my 
sister) not your child, why do you say you have 
no child?” "Yes,” she answered "you are my child, 
and it is.for you and your sister that I am crying.
I myself had no brother, and I have suffered all 
my life beeause of this. I do not want you to 
suffer as I have done". Now crying myself I said 
to her "Ma don't cry, .or I will die too. I will 
kill myself. When I grow up I will buy many 
things for you if you do not cry”.
From that day her mother stopped crying, at
least in her presence. Ironically, not long after, she 
was noticed by a missionary who thought she was a bright
little girl, and if left in the old Chief's compound, would
"go the way of all the other women” . She-was taken to the 
mission house where she was trained and educated, with the 
result that of all her father's numerous children, she was
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the only one to occupy a prominent position. She could
afford to buy all kinds of things for her mother, whom
she described as being "happy now”, and the envy of all
✓
the other wives, who had many boys”.
This story is related for its pathos, bringing 
out in bold relief the importance of male children in the 
eyes of the Tiv (and in many other societies), even though 
because of their - peculiar marriage system, girls were 
essential and at a high premium.
"There is nothing that the Tiv esteem so highly 
as Woman”, says Akiga, whose history and institution of 
his people was translated and annotated by East in 1939.1 
Yet her mother would have gladly exchanged her two daughters 
for a son. It also portrays the agonising humiliation and 
misery a woman who had no children, or more particularly no 
male child, could suffer in a polygynous household. It 
belies the assertion of the protagonists of polygyny that 
it provided an alternative to a childless woman^ It may 
do so in a small minority of cases, but . U S u & l ?ly it did 
the opposite.
D. Marriage by capture
•The capture of women in traditional society was
a popular method of obtaining wives in all parts of 
2
Nigeria. Women captured in tribal wars, or when villages 
were plundered for the purpose of obtaining slaves during 
the slave trade, were not all killed, or sold as their 
male counterparts generally were. Many of the women were 
retained and shared to the victors in recognition of their 
valour, and the resultant proportional imbalance between
1 . Akiga, Akigafs Story, op.cit., p.313.
2 . See Ward,” Marriage Among the Yorubas”. 1937, op.cit., 
pp.1 5 -1 8 ; Fadipe, The Sociology of "the Yoruba. 1§70, 
op.cit., p.92; Donald M. McFarlan, Calabar: The Church 
of Scotland Mission founded 1876 (London: Thomas Nelson 
and Sons Ltd., 1957) P*90;  O.K. Meek, Northern Tribes 
of Nigeria, 1925, op.cit., p p .287-293 esp. at p.293; 
BeghoT fiLaw and Culture....”, 1971. o p .cit.. p.55 ; the 
Itsekiri man would not hesitate to marry beautiful 
women captured by him in battle.
265
the sexes, has been attributed as a potent factor con­
tributing to the practice of polygyny in certain 
communities.^
These captured women, however, were generally
treated as slaves, and, if married by freemen, were not
2referred to as wives, but as concubines, since in most
cases the usual formalities prevailing in the society
were either absent or considerably reduced in the marriage 
3
of slaves,
4Mead gives a vivid description of the treatment 
accorded to.the captured victims of tribal wars, among 
the natives of the island of Manus in the Admirality 
Groups, an isolated community in New Guinea, until 
recently untouched by missionaries or foreign trade.
The victim was treated as a prostitute:
"...the unfortunate captive was raped by every man 
in the village, young and old. The men kept her 
in the boys* house; her particular captor collected 
tribute from the others; sometimes he even took 
her on a money-making tour through friendly villages. 
The men dressed her in finery to outrage further the 
women, who disagreed with the spirits about the 
innocuousness of the whole proceeding. Everywhere 
the men went, they took their unhappy captive with 
them, afraid to leave her exposed to the vengeful 
hatred of the women. But the men did nothing to 
ameliorate her lot; they showed her neither kindness 
nor consideration.. .Upon her the men wreaked’ their 
hatred of women aroused by the frigidity of their 
wives and the economic exactions imposed by 
matrimony. Upon her single person the young men 
savagely expended all the pent-up energy of the
1. See R.O. Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce Under Yoruba 
Customary Law, (Ife, Nigeria: University of Ife Press, 
1969}, pp.8-9, for the view that one important factor 
which could have influenced the Yorubas to adopt 
polygamy, was the slave trade.
2. Downes, The Tiv Tribe. 1937, op.cit.,p. 19; Begho, Law 
and Culture....", 1971, p.55; the only legal foriji of 
marriage ta emo tsi was never done in the marriage of 
a slave-woman.
3. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta,1932, op.cit., 
pp.189-191; Ward. Marriage Among the Yorubas, op.cit., 
p.42.
4. Margaret Mead, Growing up in New Guinea: A Study of 
Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Societies, 1930, 
(Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 147-148.
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youth which was denied the joys of courtship and 
flirtation. Worn and. old in a year or two, or 
displaced by a new prostitute, she was permitted 
to go back to her home where she usually died soon 
after. Sometimes she died in captivity".-^
Marriage by capture as a normal mode of con­
tracting the conjugal tie, also exists among some groups
2
in the Northern States, and to a lesser extent in the 
3
south.
This type of marriage previously existed in 
various parts of the world including Rome, Russia, Japan, 
Australia^ India and Arabia before the advent of 
Muhammed. It has also been reported as practised by 
many Indo-European peoples. Pollock and Maitland wrote:
"It is said with some show of truth that in the 
earliest Teutonic laws, we may see many traces of 
"marriage by capture". The "Rape marriage", if 
such we may call it, is a punishable offence; 
but still it is a marriage".5
In various parts of Africa, wives were also 
married by capture
Westermarck disagrees with the suggestion that 
marriage by purchase arose out of marriage by capture, and 
that abduction without parental consent was the primary 
form; then there came the offering of compensation to
1. Ibid., pp.147-148. '
2. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.. pp.205-209.
3. Ward, Marriage Among the Yorubas, op.cit.. pp.15-17.
4. Westermarck, A Short History of Marriage. op.cit.» 
pp.110-113; William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. 10th edit. (London: Clarendon Press9 ) 
Vol. IV, pT2o6. cf. Deuteronomy, Chapters 20, V.14;
21, Verses 10-14.
5. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, op. 
cit., Vol.II, p.364; see also Westermarck, A Short 
history of Marriage, p.113.
6. See H.J. Simons, African Women: Their Legal status in . 
South Africa, (London: Hurst and,Co., 19o8), p.117-118; 
Cf. R.Cr. Abrahams, "The Peoples of Greater Unyamwezi", 
Tanzania, (London: International African Institute, 
1967), p.75; Such marriages are in the form of an 
elopement among some communities in Tanzania. See also^ 
Yambeze v. Gpndamidzi,[1912] S.R.L.R.103. Held, a
i woman1 s marriage to a man who had captured her in war-
| fare would be recognized as binding as other native
Footnote continued........
i
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escape vengeance of the woman*s clan, which grew eventually 
into; the making of presents beforehand. He points out in. 
contradiction of this assertion, that marriage by con­
sideration prevails among a large number of peoples who 
have never been known to be in the habit of capturing
wives, and that among no people is marriage by capture
known to ha^e been the usual or normal mode of contracting 
a marriage.
In Nigeria, in most cases,, marriage by capture is
futertwined with elopement, since the seizure is usually
effected with the consent of the bride, and often with the
cognizance, if not acquiescence of her parents, especially
her mother. The method is adopted when the young couple
would encounter difficulties in obtaining formal consent
to their marriage, for example, if they belong to different
tribes, or where the man, being too poor to pay the dowry,
the couple are forced to resort to subterfuge to accomplish
2
their purpose, and capture is simulated. Freedom from 
obligation to pay the usual dowry was the main reason why 
the retention of marriage by capture was advocated by the 
young people among the Tiv, when marriage by exchange was 
declared illegal.^
In some societies, marriage by capture is not 
regarded as legally valid, unless some kind of payment is 
made after the event. In the case of the Tiv, the marriage 
is only considered valid when a leg of mutton is accepted 
by the bride*s family from the bridegroom.^
Footnote 6 continued..... marriages of the time, if it took 
place before British laws came into force in Rhodesia.
1. Westermarck, op.cit.. p.113.
2. Hermon Hodge, Gazetteer of Ilorin Province.(London:. 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1929)f pp.43-44; de St. 
Croix, The Fulani of Northern Nigeria.op.cit.,p.4l« 
for the.procedure among.the Fulani of Northern Nigeria.
3. Akiga, Akiga*s Story, op.cit.'. p. 166; Bohannan and 
Bohannan. op;ci-b.r p .7 T T
4. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.« p.207, 
and generally, pp. £05-208. .
268
In Ibusa (West Niger Ibos), a form of marriage
by capture j T.jide Nwanye. still • exists • • The boy and girl
agree to marry, but because of the inability of the boy to
✓
pay the requisite dowry, the couple subscribe to an 
arrangement whereby the girl visits the boy at his house. 
While she is there a cannon (nulu-ani) is fired, and almost 
immediately women and others - around begin the traditional 
incantations. People gather to know which girl has been 
"seized” .• The girl pretends to resist seizure, but is 
restrained by the young friends of the bridegroom, who 
have gathered for the purpose. Delegates are dispatched 
to the girlTs parents to inform them of her capture. The 
parents demand the traditional payments and are appeased 
by the promise of the boy or his parents to pay by instal­
ments. The marriage is not considered valid, however, 
until such payments have been made.^
Several cases of marriage by capture were 
recorded during fieldwork among older people. Most of the 
marriages were contracted with the consent of the girl.
A typical case is that of a seventy-nine years old 
informant interviewed in Umudei Village in Onitsha. He 
had been married to five wives, and described his third 
marriage as one by "capture". While he was a Civil Servant 
stationed in another town, he became friendly with a girl 
there. Her parents refused to consent to his proposal of 
marriage, and so he"captured"her and brought her to his 
hometown in Onitsha; He never paid any dowry for her.
She stayed with him for a number of years, but eventually 
left him and returned to her parents at Itani, another 
Igbo town. According to him, it was a valid legal marriage 
in those days, and Oiiitsha men who worked away from home 
usually brought back wives they had "captured" from the 
places where they had stayed. In most cases the parents 
of the girl concerned had, refused to give the girl in
1. Anthony Ezeife, "The Sociology of Ibusa Community,"
Bsc. Degree Thesis, University of Nigeria, Nsukka,.1971, 
pp. 40-41; See aiso Fadipe, op.cit., p.93.
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marriage, but in some cases they were not asked.1
Many of the Onitsha wives interviewed- by the 
present writer came from, different parts of Nigeria, 
including a Fulani Moslem from Sokoto in the far north 
of Nigeria. Although some of these women may have been 
married with the initial consents of their parents, there 
is a suspicion that a few cases had been "marriage by 
capture", although the women did not describe them as 
such. A more accurate description perhaps is "marriage 
by elopement” . In some cases dowry had been paid to the 
parents after the elopement, especially if there were 
children of the union.
There is conflict between "marriage by capture" 
and certain provisions of the Criminal Code Act, and what 
may have been a perfectly valid method of acquiring a 
wife in some traditional societies, may now give rise to 
criminal prosecution under Nigerian criminal law. For
p
example, section 361 of the Criminal Code Act provides:
"any person who, with intent to marry or carnally 
know a female of any age, or to cause her to be 
married or carnally known by any other person, takes 
her away, or detains her, against her will is guilty 
of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for 
seven years".
A marriage by capture, without the consent of the 
girl, constitutes an offence under this section, as well as 
the offence of rape under section 357 which provides:
"Any person who has unlawful carnal knowledge of a 
woman or girl, without her consent, or with her 
consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by 
means of threats or intimidation of any kind,-or 
by fear of harm, ...is guilty of an offence which 
is called rape".
If the girl is .unmarried, and under sixteen years
1. Recorded interview held with Mr. James E. Offodile, of 
Umudei Village Onitsha on the 15th July, 1977* Cf. Obi, 
"Modern Family Law", op.cit.. p.228 who asserts that 
marriage by capture is.unknown to Ibo customary law.
2. 1916, Cap 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, -
1958 Revision.,
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of.age, even if she consents, the person who abducts her 
without her parents* consent'may be liable to criminal 
prosecution under section 362 of the Criminal Code. The 
fact that the abductor Relieved the girl to be of, or 
above, the age of sixteen years, or that she was taken 
at her own suggestion is immaterial.
"Marriage by capture" without the consent of the 
girl or her parents was of frequent occurrence during the 
Nigerian Civil War. Numerous cases of girls "captured" 
by soldiers are recorded in the various Social Welfare 
Departments, especially at Onitsha, Nsukka and Enugu.
These cases are categorised as "marriage by capture" by 
Social Welfare Officers, who do not seem to realize that 
they involve criminal offences. For example, in a case 
recorded at Onitsha Social Welfare Office, a Yoruba 
soldier captured a young girl from Asaba and forced her 
to live with him as his wife throughout the war. A son 
was born of the union. At the end of the war, her 
relatives succeeded in tracing 'her, and found her still 
living with the soldier. They demanded payment of M100 
dowry. The soldier refused to pay the amount demanded.
He said he had no money. As a result, the family took the 
girl and her son away during the soldierTs absence from 
home, and married her to another man. The soldier applied 
to the Social Welfare Office for the custody of his son, 
since the girl and her parents refused to recognize his 
claims to the child. The Social Welfare Department 
advised him to go to the police to help him to recover 
his child.1
Unfortunately, the record of the case stopped at 
this point, but it would be interesting to know what the 
reaction of the police was to this interesting case which 
involved three aspects of law. The first aspect is the 
customary law of "marriage by capture, under which a girl 
captured by a man* especially during a war, becomes the
1. File No. 0NZ/SWU/12/S621, dated 1975; Onitsha Social 
Welfare Office.
271
man’s wife by virtue of capture and cohabitation.1 The 
second aspect ..involves the current customary law of the 
Igbos of Asaba, under which marriage is normally con­
tracted by payment of dowry, and a woman is not regarded
as the wife of a man who has paid no dowry for her, in
2spite of years of cohabitation. Similarly, legal paternity
and custody of a child would not be given to a father who
has not paid the dowry for the marriage of its mother,in 
3
most areas.
The third aspect refers to the circumstances in 
which the girl had been taken. Although the taking* of the 
girl in this manner may have been lawful under traditional 
law, as stated above, ^  it now constitutes the offence of 
rape and abduction, and depending on her age at the time 
she was seized, may also constitute the offence of 
"abduction of a girl under sixteen". The customary law 
is therefore inconsistent with the-written law and con­
sequently unenforceable.
In spite of this illegality it is doubtful 
whether the police would institute criminal proceedings 
against the complainant in the above case. It is a common 
belief that rape during war is inevitable, and not in the 
same class as other criminal offences. In fact, few people 
recognize that it is a criminal offence.
Brownmiller, in her informative study of rape, 
notes the inevitability of rape during war:
"Rape was a weapon of terror as the German Hun 
marched through Belgium in World War I. Rape was 
a weapon of revenge as the Russian Army marched to 
Berlin in World War II. Rape flourishes in warfare 
irrespective of nationality or geographic, location.
1. Marriage by capture was more frequently practised among 
the Northern communities than it was in the Southern 
States; and most of the soldiers involved in marriage 
by capture were from the Northern States.
2. See Thomas, Anthropological Reports.. .Edo-Speaking Peoples 
Pt.l,p.48.op.ci£; Meek. Law and Authority, op.cit..p.255; 
Nwogugu, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit.,.p . The(
Customary Law Manual, op.cit., p .238.
3. See Customary Law Manual, 19771op.cit.,pars. 383,384, r 
pp.315, 3It. Legitimation by acknowledgement is possible 
in certain communities, see Ibid.,par. 385, p.316.
4. See above, pp.264-267.
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Rape got out of hand - 1regrettably* as the foreign 
minister was later to. say - when the Pakistani Army • 
battled Bangladesh. Rape reared its head as a way 
to relieve boredom as American GI*s searched and 
destroyed in the highlands of Vietnam".-^
But rape during war, although socially acceptable 
behaviour among certain peoples in ancient times, for example, 
the Greeks, is outlawed by the modern international community.
In Nigeria, it is a criminal offence whenever 
committed. In peace time, it is comparatively rare, 
especially with reference to adult women. For example, 
there are less than a hundred cases reported involving rape, 
in all the Nigerian law reports. Of 62 cases collected 
from these reports by the present writer, only nine involved 
adult women. The number of rapes committed by adult men 
and.tried in the High Courts of the former East Central
2
State was eight in 1971, and twelve each in 1972 and 1973.
•x
This gives a maximum rate of 1 per 600,000 of the population.
In 1926, Talbot wrote of the women of Southern
Nigeria:
"Enquiries about rape generally elicited a smile;
.it was apparently considered that genuine cases 
were few and far between, and that force had seldom 
to be employed by a man to effect his object. This 
opinion accounts for the fact that such an act was 
usually treated merely as adultery".^
1. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will; Men. Women and Rape. 
1975, p.32; See also Barbara 'Joner. The Facts of Rape, 
(London: Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., i$7r), 
p.l73-182>
2. Annual Abstract of Statistics.1974# Federal Office of 
Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria, p.180, Table 16:1.
3. The population of East Central State in 1963 was 
recorded as 7,228 thousand, Annual Statistics, 1974, op. 
cit., p.14, Table 2:1. cf. The percentage of rapes in East 
Central State with 4 per 100,000 population in England 
and Wales 1975, (Criminal Statistics, England and Wales, 
1975 H.M.S.O), and 47.2 per 100,000 population among the 
Gusii, a Bantu-Speaking tribe in Kenya in 1955-56.
Robert A. Levine, Gusii Sex Offences: A Study in Social 
Control", American Anthropologist.Vol.61. 1959,
pp.965-990.at p.9b5. . .
4. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.. pp.631,655; 
Contrast the statement credited to Landolphe about the . 
Binis: "The man who commits a rape.is at once considered 
married to the girl; if the assault has been committed at 
night the two are proclaimed as married as soon as 
daylight appears - they are united by this simple
Footnote continued......
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.This statement is defamatory of Nigerian women
and has been, rightly criticized by Begho.^ Lawick- 
2
Goodall, in her study of wild chimpanzees at the Gombe 
Stream Reserve in Tanzania noted that the chimps, male 
and female were ’’very promiscuous, but this does not mean 
that every female will accept every male that courts her.
She recorded one female who by the telltale pink swelling 
of her genital area was ready to welcome male advances, 
but who nevertheless displayed an aversion to one particular 
male who pursued her. Even professional prostitutes are 
known to refuse certain clients who do not appeal to them. 
There is no evidence that women in contemporary Nigeria 
are more promiscuous or more easily seduced than women 
elsewhere, for example England, and yet rape has remained 
relatively rare in Nigeria.^
The capture of girls during the war created 
social problems which are still in evidence in certain 
areas in Nigeria. Many of the girls ”captured" and forced 
to cohabit with their captors, were treated not as wives, 
but rather as slaves, although they were allegedly "married 
by capture”. For example, a complaint brought to the 
Social Welfare Office in Onitsha involved one Blessing 
Okafor and Usuman. Blessing claimed that she was captured 
by Usuman from a refugee camp at Achala in Anambra State 
where she was staying at the time. She stated that Usuman 
forced her to follow him at gunpoint and she complied for 
fear of death. He took her to his army camp at Nando, 
where she lived with him as his wife until the end of the 
war. She alleged that she was treated as a slave, and sub­
jected to severe beatings from Usuman, the husband, who
Footnote 4 continued... .formality. If the girl be too young 
to bear [a] child the man is fined, as his action is con­
sidered criminal” - see Roth, Great Benin,op.cit.. p.39.
1. See Begho, Law and Culture, op.cit.. p.39.
2. Jane van Lawick-Goodall, In the Shadow of Man. (London: 
William Collins, Sons and Co. L-td., 1971}, pp. 173-174.
3. The reason why rape of women is rare in Nigeria must be 
sought elsewhere and may be psychological. See Barbara 
Findlay, "Cultural Context of Rape”, 60, Women Lawyers ' 
Journal, 1974, p.199; cf. Begho, op.cit.. p.60.
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also habitually called her yamili.(Hausa word for slave). 
She complained several times*to-the-'Officer Commanding 
No. 1 Infantry Brigade, Apollo II of No. 140 Battalion, 
Nigerian army, who warned the husband to desist from his 
cruel behaviour, but there was no improvement. One day in 
1972, her father accidentally saw her with Usuman at the 
market. The father asked Usuman to bring the dowry and 
legalize the marriage, "in order to cover the shame of his 
daughter", but the husband, although he promised to do so, 
never did. In May 1974, he drove her away with her three 
children. .Blessing's father claimed the three children, 
since no dowry had been paid, and refused to negotiate with 
Usuman or the Social Welfare Officers to whom Usuman 
complained.1
In some cases, where girls had lived with their
captors and then been deserted by them, they found it very
difficult to live in their own society, where they were
often referred to as "Hausa slave". A case in point is
2
that of The State v. Ukazu. The accused, a young woman, 
was indicted for the murder of her young child, fourteen 
days old. She was unmarried, and as her parents were 
without a male issue of their own, she was encouraged to 
have as many children as possible for them in the hope of 
getting a male child. Her mother looked after the three 
children she conceived in this manner before the war.
During the war, she was captured by a Hausa soldier and 
forced to live with him. At the end of the war, she asked 
the soldier to marry her according to customary law, by 
payment of dowry, since she knew her family would not 
relish the idea of her living with a non-Igbo man in this 
manner. The 'soldier refused to marry her, although she 
was pregnant for him. She left him and returned home where 
she delivered a male child. Her mother welcomed the child.
1. File 0NZ/SWU/12/S534, dated 7 August, 1974. Social 
Welfare Office, Onitsha.
2. [1973] Suit No. H0/36C/72, unreported, Okigwe High
Court, 31 May, 1973.
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Some days after, the girl went to the Army Camp, dumped 
the baby in a latrine pit, and returned home. The cries 
of the child led to his discovery. He was recovered 
alive from the pit, covered all over with human faeces 
and worms. He received medical attention at the Mission 
Hospital nearby, but died on the evening of the day 
following his discovery.
The' accused claimed that the villagers mocked 
her for getting a baby for a Hausa man, and called her 
names. Since her father had died during the war, the 
child was considered a bastard, unlike the three children 
born during her fatherls lifetime who were regarded as 
legitimate children of-her father under Igbo customary 
law. To hide her shame she attempted to get rid of the 
illegitimate child. She was found not.guilty of murder 
but guilty of infanticide, and sentenced to five years 
imprisonment.
This is a sad case. The accused was a victim of 
circumstances beyond her control. First, she was the 
victim of the customary law under which a father with no 
male heir is permitted by law to keep one of his 
daughters unmarried for the purpose of producing male heirs 
for him* The custom is referred to as idigbe. Additionally 
she was also the victim of war, and of tribal prejudice.
Her case illustrates the vulnerability of women 
whose sexuality tend to be exploited by men in a -variety 
of circumstances, but nearly always for the menfs own 
benefit and satisfaction.
Hostile capture of women by soldiers during the 
war hasf it is alleged,^" been a potent contributor to the 
present instability of marriage among the Igbos. Girls 
who have been deserted by soldiers from other communities 
are invariably repulsed by men from their own community, 
who do not consider them fit for marriage, although their 
initial union with the soldiers concerned may have been
1. See Social Welfare Report: Progress Report for Aguata, 
Oct. and Nov. 1975- ..............
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forced on them. Social inferiority complex often compels
these women to, abandon the children begotten for their
captors, and to resort to prostitution.
✓
E. Marriage by MMutual Consent Only”
Marriage by "mutual consent only” is a 
recognized form of marriage according to Yoruba customary 
law, in which the only legal requirement is the mutual 
consent of the prospective spouses. It is sometimes 
referred to as "marriage by elopement", but no dowry is 
payable, either■before or after the marriage.
Fadipe, in his list of the types of marriages 
practised by the Yorubas includes, "marriage by mutual 
consent of the principal parties which neither assumes 
the consent of parents nor involve the payment of bride- 
price” ."^
2
Ward refers to this type of marriage as 
"marriage by elopement". He records the fact that it is 
widely practised among - certain Yoruba communities,, for 
example Ilajaland, where there is no regular system of 
marriage by payment of dowry, and among the Ijaws of the 
Ondo Creeks, where it has replaced dowry marriage as the 
customary mode of marrying a wife.
Johnson, after listing the essentials and 
formalities of the ordinary dowry marriage says:
"There are cases in which all the above forms and 
.ceremonies are not gone through, and yet the 
woman is regarded as the lawful wife of the man 
of her choice. Mutual consent is the only thing 
indispensable. Of such cases some may be girls 
who when of age, will not accept the man chosen 
for them from childhood, except one of their own 
choice. Some may be widows who fail to be mated
1. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba. op.cit.. p . 63.
2. Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba. 1937, op.cit.,
p. 68.
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at the home of her [sic] late husband. Some may 
be- slaves who have redeemed themselves, or* a 
captive of war, or one bought to be made a wife 
of. In all such cases the womanfs free consent, 
and the recognition of her by the members of the 
man*s family, are all that is required for her to 
be regarded as the man's lawful wife"
Marriage by "mutual consent only” is still
practised by the Yorubas, and among some communities, for
example, Ibadan, it may now be regarded as institutionalized.
During field work in Ibadan, the present writer analysed
1,116 cases involving family disputes heard in the Grade B,
Customary Court, No. 4, Mapo, Ibadan during 1976. Of these
cases, 276 involved paternal disputes, while 840 were
divorce cases. Of the divorce cases, 303 were brought by
men, and 537 by women. In all the divorce cases brought
by the men, dowry had been paid, but of the 537 cases
brought by the women, 326 of the wives claimed that no
dowry had been paid on their behalf at the time of the
marriage, or at all. In most of these cases, only the
wife appeared, and so her evidence was unchallenged. It
may be that the men were too anxious to get rid of their wives
to appear and contest these claims. But in the great majority
of the cases where the wives admitted that dowry had been
paid, the husbands had put in appearances if only for the
purpose of receiving the dowry refunded by the wives. It
is therefore safe to conclude that no dowry had been paid
as alleged by the 326 wives. This means that 38.8 percent
of the total number of marriages were contracted without
payment of dowry, and were therefore marriages by "mutual 
2
consent only”.
Some confirmation of this evidence is provided by
1. Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, 1921, op.cit.«
p.116; See also Fadipe, Sociology of the Yoruba. op.cit.« 
p.92; the practice of marriage by mutual consent only 
was formerly confined to slaves and people without kin; 
Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit., p.433;
"A woman can also be married without ffie Igbeyawo 
ceremony, the only requirements being mutual consents”.
2. It is worthy of note that these wives thought it necessary 
to obtain a judicial divorce, even though no dowry had 
been paid with reference to the marriages.
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the statistics of "Matrimonial Conciliation and Family Case­
work" in the Social Welfare Department at. Ibadan.- For ... 
example, the statistics of Family Casework for the month of 
August, 1977* the last completed month for which statistics 
were available at the time of the field-work for this 
thesis were as follows:
TABLE 3:1
TYPES OF MARRIAGES HANDLED BY SOCIAL 
WELFARE DEPARTMENT, IBADAN, DURING AUGUST 1977.
TYPE OF MARRIAGE NUMBER DEALT % of
WITH. TOTAL
Customary• Law Marriage; by pay­
ment of dowry 47 29.6
Customary Law Marriage; 
by seduction^ 30 18.9
Customary Law Marriage; by 
mutual consent only 72 45.2
Marriage under the Nigerian 
Marriage Act 5 3.1
Marriage according to Muslim ritesr\ 3 1.9
"Church Marriage" 2 1.3
Total Number of Marriages 159 100.0
Source: Statistics were supplied by the Social Welfare
Department, Ibadan*
Marriage by mutual consent accounted for 45.2 
percent of the total number of marriages dealt with. This 
percentage may be compared with the statistics from the
1. Marriage by seduction is a valid legal marriage among 
Yorubas, and is effected when a man seduces a married 
woman, persuades her to leave her husband and marry 
him, and he repays the dowry to the former husband - 
see Faremilekun and Ors. v. The State [1947] 3 W.S.C.A. 
86 at p .109* Cf. Chawere v . Johnson [19361,12 N.L.R.4.
2. A "church marriage" is not legally valid unless 
celebrated also under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
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eourt cases. If all the divorce cases recorded for 1976 
are taken, .36 percent of the marriages were contracted’by 
mutual consent only. If the divorces initiated by women 
only are taken, the percentage is even higher, 62.5 
percent. The nature of the association in Matrimonial 
Conciliation and Family Casework of the Welfare Department 
in the former Western Region for the year, 1967-1968, 
reproduced in Table 3:2 below provide further confirmation 
of the large proportion of Yoruba marriages contracted by 
mutual consent only. Marriage by "mutual consent only" 
predominate in all areas of the former Region.
It is significant, however, that both the 
marriages from the Court cases and those handled by the 
Social Welfare Departments involve marital breakdown. 
Although "marriage by mutual consent only" figures 
prominently among broken marriages, they do not form a 
significant proportion of total marriages contracted among 
the Yorubas generally. For example, of the eighty women 
interviewed in Ibadan and the two Yoruba areas where field­
work was conducted, only nine (11.2 percent) of the women 
stated that no dowry had been paid on the occasion of their 
marriage. From this it may be concluded that among the 
Yorubas marriages contracted by payment of dowry, which 
involve maximum family participation, are more stable than 
marriages where no dowry has been paid, or marriages where 
family participation is minimal or altogether absent.
Commenting on this phenomenon, the Annual Report 
of the Department of Social Welfare for 1967-68 states:
"It would appear that the social norm which is 
.characteristic of a particular marital association 
bears direct relationship with the degree of the 
social dislocation as well as the solidarity of 
marriages contracted under the respective systems 
...In marriages by mutual consent and seduction, 
the age long reverred sanctions and connubial 
blessings by elders are side-tracked. Thus the 
elements by which tradition holds marriage together 
.are absent in these marriages”.^
1. Annual Report: Ministry of Economic Planning and Social 
Development, 1967-68, Western State of Nigeria,
Official Document, No. 2 of 1971, pp.9-10.
Marriage by mutual consent only as a recognized 
type of marriage is confined to the Yorubas. Among other 
communities such a union is regarded as concubinage,^
1. But see the custom among certain pagan Fulani
communities where any man who could successfully 
seduce another's wife to his house ipso facto divorced 
her from her former husband and married her himself,
- see Wilson-Haffenden, op.cit., p.110.
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CHAPTER IV
Polygamy and its Effects on the Status of Women
✓
"When the fair sex enters upon the 
subject of polygamy, it apparently 
loses all self control not to say 
its senses"-^
Sir Richard Burton, 1861
1. Introduction
The topic that provoked maximum discussion 
during fieldwork for this thesis was undoubtedly polygamy. 
It is an emotive subject. Basden, writing on polygamy 
among the Igbos after more than thirty-five years 
sojourn in Igboland, says:
"Polygamy is a subject that is honeycombed with 
pitfalls; a slippery path even to the wary.
Anything written is open to criticism, because 
its problems, complications and ramifications 
are so manifold. With the exercise of extreme 
caution, one is still liable to misjudge, or to 
fail to discern the true aspects of this widely 
spread and deeply rooted institution” .2
Burton, the nineteenth century peripatetic 
digester of continents, was equally categorical in 
voicing the trepidation he felt on being confronted with 
the necessity of writing on polygamy among the Mormons in 
America. He says:
"I approach the subject with a feeling of dispair, 
so conflicting are opinions concerning it, and so 
difficult is it to neutralise in Europe the customs 
of Asia, Africa, and America, or to reconcile the 
habits of the 19th century A.D. with those of 1900
B.C".
The apprehension expressed by these male writers 
*-
is intensified for the female writer on polygamy, for she 
must always bear in mind the male conviction so character­
istically expressed by Burton, and quoted at the beginning 
of this Chapter.
1. Richard Burton, 'Hie City of the Saints and Across the' 
Rocky Mountains to California (London: Longman Green: 
Longman and Roberts, ISbl).
2. G.T. Basden, "Niger Ibos: A Description of the Primitive 
Life Customs and Animistic Beliefs..." (London: Frank 
Cass and Co. Ltd. 1938, New Imp. 1906, p.228.
284
There is an importunate temptation to omit 
the topic entirely, hut so vital is it to any assessment 
of the position of women in traditional as well as modern, 
Nigeria, that failure to expose it to the searchlight of 
enlightened discussion would detract from the value of any 
ultimate conclusion.
At Common Law, entering into a subsequent 
marriage while the first remains undissolved was desig­
nated "polygamy". Bigamy, strictly speaking, means twice 
married, as its derivation clearly shows. This was never 
an offence at Common Law, but of ecclesiastical cognizance 
exclusively. It was not punishable by an ordinary common 
law tribunal.^" Polygamy is the proper terms to describe 
the offence of having two extant "marriages", contrary to 
the law, but by long usage, bigamy has come to be under­
stood in law to be the state of a man who has two wives,
or a woman who has two husbands at the same time, this
2
practice being legally forbidden. The benefit of clergy 
was taken away from the offence of bigamy^ and the • 
ecclesiastical offence was frequently used in the Common 
Law Courts as the subject of a counterplea to a claim of 
benefit of clergy, in the prosecution of clergyable 
offences.^ Later, however, bigamy was declared to be no 
longer an impediment to receiving the benefit of clergy^ 
and this was the state of the law on the subject until the 
reign of James I, when bigamy was made a felony punishable 
in the civil courts.^
1. See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, op. 
cit. Vol. II, p .374;ccAdultery was not, bigamy was not, 
incest was not a temporal crime"; see also C.J.S. 10 
Bigamy, S.2; and State v. Sellers,f1926] 134 S.E.873; 
140 S.C.66.
2. 10 Am.Jur.2d. par.2, note 3; C.J.S., 10 Bigamy S.2; and 
see Gise v. Commonwealth, 81 P.A. 428.
3. 4 Edward I , Chapter 5.
4. Barber v. The State. [1878] 30 Md. 101.
3. 1 Edward VI, Chapter 12 (16); see also Barber v. The
State. [1878] 30 Md; 161, _ " "-------
6. James I, 1604, Chapter 11, provided that if any personj 
being married, shall afterward marry again, the former 
husband or wife being alive, "such offense shall be 
felony, and the person and persons so offending shall
footnote continued....
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In American jurisprudence, the terms "bigamy”
and "polygamy" are now used interchangeable. For example,
the offence of having two husbands or wives contrary to
the law is designated "polygamy" in the statute book of
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Vermont.'1'
In Nigeria, however, polygamy exists where a
person is married to more than one spouse at the same
time having the legal right to be so married. A Nigerian
man has such a right when he is married under Customary or
Islamic Law. Where a man is married under the Nigerian
Marriage Act, and he purports to marry another wife,
whether under the Statute or not, he commits the offence 
2
of bigamy. In other words, in Nigerian law a married 
person who has no legal right to marry another spouse, 
and who does so, is a bigamist, and not a polygamist.
The position is the same in English law.
Bromley says:
"English law regards a marriage as polygamous if 
it is possible for either party to take another 
spouse during its subsistence whether he does so 
or not".^
The legal difference between polygamy and bigamy 
under English law arose in the celebrated case of Hyde v.
Hyde t^  where the distinction was not properly made because 
of the Judge!s mistaken belief that the marriage in the 
case was polygamous. In law the marriage was monogamous.
Hyde was an Englishman by birth. He joined a 
congregation of Mormons in London in 1847, and was soon
Footnote 6 continued.... suffer death as in cases of felony” ;
see People v. Martin T1922] 205 Pa.121; 188 Cal. 281;
 21 A7L.R'.''1399~
1. 10 Am. Jur. 2d. S.l; see also C.J.S. 10 Bigamy, S.l,
note 2; McBride v. Graeber T19151 85. S.E.; 16 G.A.
’ I ' '250 Pa. 239.App.240; iState "v. Martinez [1926
2. Criminal Code Act, 1916; Cap 42, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, section 370.
3. Bromley, Family Law, 1976, op.cit. p.55; R.v. Sagoo 
[1975] 2 All E.R.926, 929, C.A. where it was stated 
that a marriage which is to be the foundation for a 
prosecution for bigamy must be a monogamous one; 
jl.'v. Sarwan Singh 119621 All E.R.612.
4. [1866] L.R. 1 P. & D, 130.
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afterwards ordained a priest of the Mormon church. He 
became engaged to one'Miss'Hawkins'in London. Miss 
Hawkins and her mother later went to Salt Lake City in 
the Territory of Utah, in the United States, the head­
quarters of the Mormon church. They were joined there 
by Hyde, and in April 1953, the parties, having apparently 
acquired a U.S. domicile,were married according to the 
rites of the Mormon church by Brigham Young, the president 
of the church. After cohabitation for three years, Hyde 
left Utah and renounced the Mormon faith. He was excom­
municated by the Mormon hierarchy,^ who also declared 
that his wife was free to remarry. In 1859 or I860, his 
wife remarried to the co-respondent, according to the 
Mormon form, in Salt Lake City and cohabited and had 
children with him there. Hyde returned to England,and 
having resumed his English domicile, he petitioned for 
a divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery with the 
co-respondent. At the time of Hyde’s marriage in Utah, 
polygamy had been declared as part of the Mormon doctrine, 
but the petitioner had never taken a second wife. J.P. 
Wilde (afterwards Lord Penzance), held that the marriage 
was polygamous, and that the English law of divorce was 
appropriate only to a marriage which was !,a voluntary
union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion
2
of all others11, and not to a polygamous marriage. He 
stated that "it would be quite unjust and almost absurd 
to visit a man who among a polygamous community, had 
married two women, with divorce from the first woman, on 
the ground that, in our view of marriage, his conduct 
amounted to adultery coupled with bigamy".
It is a quirk of fate that Wilde J., while
laying down a pontifical censure of what he erroneously
1. The text of the excommunication is quoted by Morris, - 
The "Recognition of Polygamous Marriages in English 
Law". Harvard Law Review. 1953-1956, §61 at p. 1007 
note 222.
2. Hyde v. Hyde [1866] L.R.l P. and D. 150, 155.
5. Ibid. p. 155.
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believed was a polygamous marriage, promulgated a
definition of a monogamous marriage which became the
guiding precedent of the courts adjudicating on marriage,
in most commonwealth countries.^- Vesey-Fitzgerald*s
opinion, that the utility of the definition as a working
one "has probably averted criticism from the rest of the 
2
judgment", is probably true, because, as will be shortly
shown, Hydefs marriage, contrary to what has been believed
3
for more than a century by the Common Law legal world, was 
not polygamous, since Hyde had married no other woman at 
the time his petition was brought, nor could he have 
done so, either in America.:or in England. His marriage 
was a valid monogamous marriage,*
In view of the fact that it has not been 
established in any known work that Hyde’s marriage was 
monogamous in law, the following proof is submitted.
The nature of the marriage in Hyde v. Hyde.
4
As previously noted, Hyde was a Mormon. The 
Mormons are a religious sect in America, who because of 
religious prosecution, mainly due to their declared 
practice of polygamy, had made several attempts to 
establish an independent State within the United States, 
where they would have freedom to practise polygamy as 
dictated by their religion. Attempts to found a State
1. For e.g. Savage v. MacFoy [1909] Renner’s Gold Coast 
Reports, 504. at p. 50?, Nigeria; R.V. Amkeyo [1917] 
E.A.P.L.R. 14 - East Africa. United States v. Cannon 
[1885] Pa, 369, p. 381; U.S.A. ..........
2. S.G. Vesey-Kerald, "Mixed Marriages", Current Legal 
Problems. 1948, Vol. 1, pp. 222-242 at p.22?•
3. Vesey-Fitzgerald, on.cit.. put forward the suggestion 
that the law of the United States was the law of 
Utah; and that local vagaries had none but a strictly 
local operation, but the writer added: "this difficult 
point of United States constitutional law is not 
propounded as certain", and he suggested that the 
court ought to have considered it. He submitted no 
evidence to support his suggestion.
4. The community of the Mormons in the United States, which 
styled itself "The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter . 
day Saints" was founded by Joseph Smith of Sharon, 
Vermont in 1830. Joseph Smith maintained that
footnote continued...,
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were made in Ohio, Missouri and later Illinois.'*' A 
settlement was finally established at Salt Lake City 
and a petition was made to Congress for admission to 
the United States as the State of Desseret. This 
petition was ignored and remained unanswered by Congress.
Irritated and frustrated by the contemptuous 
silence of the Federal Government to their petition to 
form an independent State within the United States, they 
"duly erected themselves into a free sovereign, and
2
independent people with a vast extent of territory11.
They set up a Provisional Government of the State of 
Desseret. The Constitution adopted for the State showed 
that they were still citizens of the United States, and 
that it was only adopted, "until the Congress of the 
United States shall otherwise provide for the Government 
of the Territory".
On 9 September, 1850, three years after the 
founding of Salt Lake City, the United States in Congress 
"assembled, sheared the self-constituted Republic of its 
fair proportions and reduced it to the the infant
Footnote 4 continued..... the "Book of Mormon” was revealed 
to him in 1827 as a parallel volume to the Holy Bible.
In 1845 in a second revelation, he claimed he was com­
manded to practise polygamy. He was succeeded as 
President of the Mormon Church by Brigham Young under 
whose leadership Salt Lake City was founded in 1847;
For accounts of the Mormons and their practice of poly­
gamy see Burton, The City of the Saints. 1861; Irving 
Wallace, The Twenty-^everrbh Wife. 1961 (Four Square Book 
1965); M.R. Werner, farigham Young (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co. 1925; Franklin Stuart Harris and Newbern
I. Butt, The Fruits of Mormonism, (New York: MacMillan 
Co. 1925): Kimball Young. Isnf-b One Wife Enough? (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1954).
1. See Harris and Butt, op.cit., pp. 45-57; Ruth Kauffman
and Reginald Kauffman, The Latter-Day Saints; A Study
of the Mormons in the Liglrfc of Economic Conditions 
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1912).
2. Burton, The City of the Saints. 1861, op.cit.. p.55-
5. See the preamble to the Constitution, set out in full
in Burton, City of the Saints, op.cit.f p.550-551.
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conditions of New Mexico” .^ A Bill organizing Utah
Territory, was signed “by President Fillmore, and on 5 April,
1850, the Assembly met and Utah Territory was duly organized.
On 9 September, 1850, the Act organizing the Territory of
2
Utah became law. Brigham Young the President of the Mor­
mon Church was appointed Territorial Governor of Utah.
Utah retained her territorial status, despite 
several attempts by the Mormons to attain Statehood, until 
the Enabling Act - ,!an Act to enable the people of Utah to 
form a constitution and State Government, and to be admitted 
into the Union on an equal footing with the original State”
- was approved on 16 July, 1894, and on 4 January, 1896 
President Cleveland signed the Act admitting Utah as a 
State of the United States.^
It is therefore submitted that at the time of 
John Hyde's marriage in Utah in April, 1853, as well as at 
the time his divorce petition was heard in 1866, Utah was
5
a Territory of the United States.
During their stay in Nauvoo, Illinois, the Mor­
mons had been granted a charter by the Illinois legislature, 
which gave them the right to legislate for the city, but 
it is doubtful whether any law permitting the practice of 
polygamy was enacted by them before the charter was withdrawn. 
This is because, although the doctrine of “plural” or 
“celestial” marriage, as the Mormons preferred to call it,
1. Burton, The City of the Saints, op.cit.. p. 352.
2. Stat.. 453, Comp. Laws of Utah, 1876, p.88; Murphy v.
Ramsey and Ors. f18851 114 U.S., 15.
3. 28 Stat. 108.
4. For a general discussion of the political struggle for 
Statehood, see Howard Lamar, "Statehood for Utah" in 
Mormonism and American Culture, edt. by Marvin S, Hill 
and James B. Allen, (London: Harper and Row, 1972), 
pp. 127-141; and Klaus Hansen, "The Political Kingdom 
as a Source of Conflict" in Mormonism and American 
Culture edit.by Hill and Allen.op.cit., p p .112-l2b.
5. The Report of Hyde's case stated that "Utah was a 
territory not within any State"; see p. 131. The 
omission of a capital letter for the word territory 
made it appear as if it meant merely land not within . 
any State.
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was revealed to Joseph Smith their first leader on July 
12th, 1843, in Nauvoo, it was not officially declared a
tenet of the church until August 29th, 1852, four years
/
after the founding of Salt Lake City. Two years after 
the organization of Utah Territory, Brigham Young 
announced to his followers, the nation and the world, 
that henceforth the doctrine of plural marriage was an 
official tenet of the Mormon church.^ In fact, before 
this announcement the Mormons had consistently denied 
the practice of polygamy. The Book of Doctrine and 
Covenants, the revelation given to Smith at Kirtland, 
Ohio, denied and denounced polygamy. In 1846, at a con­
ference of the Saints in Manchester, England, Parley 
Pratt, an elder of the church, had declared polygamy to 
be "another name for whoredom;" and in 1850 at Boulogne, 
France, John Taylor, another elder, had denied that the 
theory or practice of polygamy was part of the Mormon 
church doctrine or ritual. Werner reports that at "the 
moment in 1850 when he was issuing vehement denials at 
Boulogne, John Taylor had four wives in Utah, and was
"2courting a young girl who lived on the isle of Jersey.
It was an open secret that a few of the leaders
of the church had furtively practised polygamy before its
official declaration, or even before the revelation
ordered Smith to practise it, or lose his priesthood.
Wallace writes,
"Evidently Smith had a roving eye and a need for 
sexual variety. Yet his stern puritanical up­
bringing did not give him the easy conscience of 
a rake; he could not allow himself mistresses, And 
so, possibly to have his cake and eat it too he 
allowed himself a plurality of wives".^
1. Wallace, op.cit.. p.68.
2. Werner, op.cit.. p.280-282.
3. Wallace, op.cit., p.48; see also Werner, op.cit..
p. 129-130. —  . ---
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Smith.is reported to have had about, forty-nine wives 
and within'eight .years had' married twenty six young women, 
most of them not yet twenty years old.'*'
The constitution of the Territory of Utah 
provided that
MA11 the laws passed by the Legislative Assembly 
and Government shall be submitted to the Congress 
of the United States and if disapproved shall be 
null and of no effect".2
It is therefore evident that no law permitting 
the practice of polygamy could have been passed by the 
Territorial Legislature without the sanction of Congress, 
and such sanction would not have been given, since the 
practice of polygamy was the main reason why statehood 
was denied to the Territory. Burton says of Congress’s 
refusal to grant statehood to the Territory
"The cause is, I believe polygamy, which until the 
statute law is altered, would not and could not be 
tolerated either in America or in England".^
This belief is buttressed by the fact that 
section 3 of the Enabling Act, which eventually granted 
statehood to the Territory specifically provides as follows:
"...that perfect toleration of religious sentiment 
shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of said 
State shall ever be molested in person or property 
on account of his or her religious worship; 
provided, that polygamous or plural marriages are 
forever prohibited".^
The first anti-polygamy statute passed by the 
United States Congress, which applied to all States, 
Territories and other places within the jurisdiction of 
the United States was enacted on 1 July, 1862, and was 
entitled "An Act to punish and prevent the practice of 
polygamy in the Territories of the United States, and
1. Wallace, Ibid., pp. 48-49; Werner, op.cit., pp.131-153.
2. For the Constitutional Provisions, see Burton, The City
of the Saints, op.cit., p. 366.
3. Burton, op.cit>, p. 352.
4. Enabling Act, 1894; Section 3, 28 Stat. 107; This
provision is irrevocable without the consent of the 
United States and the people ..of the State of Utah; see 
also United States v. Cannon, I"18851 7 Pac.369. at
p. 38i:
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other places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts
of the. Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah.'*'
This Act, was followed in 1874, by another anti-polygamy
✓
statute, section 5352 of the Revised Statutes, commonly
2
referred to as the Poland Law, which was in turn amended
by another Act of 1882, known as the Edmunds Act. These
Acts provide as follows:
"Every person having a husband or wife living who 
marries another, whether married or single, in a 
Territory or other place over which the United 
States have exclusive jurisdiction is guilty of 
bigamy, and shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than J5500.00, and by imprisonment for a term of not 
more than five years...
The validity of this legislation enacted by 
Congress against polygamy, was challenged in the case of
5
Reynolds v. United States. Reynolds was charged with 
bigamy in violation of Rev. Stat. Section 5352. He was 
convicted by the Utah courts and he appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court, inter alia on the following 
grounds:
(1) That the Poland Bill, Rev. Stat. Section 5352 was
unconstitutional.
On this ground the Court said
"Undoubtedly Congress under art. 4, section 5 of the 
Constitution which gives power to dispose of and 
make all needful rules and regulations respecting 
the territory or other property belonging to the 
United States”, and under the decision of this 
court upon it, may legislate over such territory, 
and regulate the form of its local government” .g
The Court held that section 5352 was in all 
respects constitutional and valid.
1. Act of Congress, 1862r 12 Stat. C. 126, par.I.; see
Murphy v. Ramsey and Ors. [1885] 114 U.S. 15.
2. Passed on 8 January, 1874.
5. Passed on 6 March, 1882; 22 Stat.30, S.l; see also
[1887] 24 Stat. 635.
4. 22 Stat. 30, S.l.
5. [1878] 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.ed. 244 affirming The State 
v. Reynolds 1 Utah, 226.
6. Reynolds v. The United States [1878] 98 U.S. 152; see 
also Davis v. Beason 11&9Q I 133 U.S. 333 at p.342."The 
cases in which the Legislation of Congress will
footnote continued.......
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(11) That at the time of his alleged second marriage, he 
was, and for many years before had'been, a member of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and 
a believer in its doctrines. That it was a duty of 
male members of the church to practise polygamy.
That he believed that failure to practise polygamy, 
as enjoined by God in a revelation to Joseph Smith, 
by such male members would be damnation in the life 
to come.
The defendant argued that since he was married 
in "pursuance of and in conformity with what he believed 
at the time to be a religious duty11,'*’ the verdict must be 
not guilty.
The Court rejected this argument. After tracing 
the history of polygamy under the Common Law, the Court 
stated as follows:-
"By the statute of James II (C.ll) the offence if 
committed in England and Wales was made punishable 
in the civil courts, and the penalty was death. As 
this statute was limited in its operation to England 
and Wales, it was at a very early period re-enacted, . 
generally with some modifications in all the colonies. 
In connection with the case we are now considering 
it is a significant fact that on the 8th of December, 
1788, after the passage of the Act establishing 
religious freedom, and after the Convention of 
Virginia had recommended as an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States the declaration in 
a bill of rights that "all men have an equal, natural, 
and inalienable right to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience, 
the legislature of that State substantially enacted 
the statute of James I, death penalty included 
because, as recited in the preamble, it hath been 
doubted whether bigamy or polygamy be punishable by 
the laws of this Commonwealth... From that day to 
this we think it may safely be said there never has 
been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy 
has not been an offence against society, cognizable 
by the civil courts and punishable with more or less 
severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is 
impossible to believe that the constitutional
Footnote 6 continued....... supersede the legislation of a
State or Territory, without specific provisions to 
that respect, are those in which the same matter is
• the subject of legislation by both".
1. Ibid. p. 163.
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guaranty of religious freedom was intended to 
prohibit legislation in respect to this most 
important feature of social life.^
The appeal was refused. It should be noted that
Reynolds was Brigham Young’s secretary, and he was
specially selected to test the validity of the Mormon
practice of plural wives. In 1874, he had just married
a second wife, and he voluntarily turned himself over to
P
the authorities as an admitted polygamist.
Had Hyde attempted to marry another wife at the 
time his divorce suit was heard in 1866 he would have been
liable for prosecution according to the law of the United
3 4States. In United States v. Musser, the defendant, a
Mormon, was indicted for unlawful cohabitation as defined
in the Act of Congress of 22 March, 1882. The indictment
charged that the defendant unlawfully cohabited with three
women between 1 May, 1882, and 1 April, 1885, 11in the
habit and repute of marriage, holding that relationship
out to the world by his language and conduct. The Utah
courts found him guilty. He appealed to the Supreme Court,
on the ground, inter alia, that the Court below erred in
admitting evidence of his contfcict and relationship to the
women before the day first mentioned in the indictment, or
to prove his purported marriage to the women before the law
in question took effect. The Supreme Court rejected these
arguments. Zane, C.J., said:
1. Reynolds v. United States [1878] 98 U.S. 145, p.165;
see also Davis v. Beason [1890]_133 U.S. 333 at p.342
"Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of the 
United States, by the laws of Idaho, and by the laws
of all civilized and Christian countries and to call
their advocacy a tenet of religion is. to offend the
common sense of mankind".
2. See Irving, The- Twenty-Seventh Wife, op.cit.,pp.343, 
345, Thirty thousand persons petitioned President Hayes 
to show leniency to Reynolds, but the clemency requests 
were refused. Reynolds served two years imprisonment 
with hard labour.
3. See e.g. Morey v. Commonwealth [1867] 108 Mass. 433,
a Mormon was indicted for lewd cohabitation with two . 
"wives”.
4. [1885] 7 Pac., p. 389.
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"The Common law has been in force in this territory 
more than a generation; and an act of congress 
against bigamy more than 22 years. None of the 
conduct or circumstances in evidence extend back 
so far. They tend to prove a relationship unlawful 
in its inception. I am of the opinion that there 
was no error in admitting evidence for the purpose 
of showing marriage between the defendant and the 
woman named, before the law took effect or showing 
that he cohabited with them as his wives before 
that time11.^
2
In view of these and other decisions to the same 
effect, it is respectfully submitted that the practice of 
polygamy has always been an offence under the Common Law 
throughout the United States of America, and remained an 
offence at the time of Hydefs marriage, and at the time he 
petitioned for divorce in the English court. There is also 
no doubt that at the time of the hearing of Hydefs divorce 
petition, polygamy was definitely prohibited by the 
statutory laws of the United States. The Morrell Act
"X
was enacted by Congress in 1862, and it made bigamy a 
crime in all the Territories of the United States. Hyde 
v. Hyde^ was decided in 1866. It is remarkable that the 
Counsellor of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
called to give expert evidence in Hyde v. Hyde failed to
1* Ibid, pp. 396-397; see also State v. Clawson [1885]
7 Pac.;Snow v. United States, 116 U.S. 34b; 30 L.ed. 
207; 6 S.C.1059; United States v. Snow [1886] 120 
U.S. 274; 9 Pac. 50l« 4 Utah. 280; United States v.
Eldredge 
v. Smith
r18871 13 Pac. 673; 5 Utah lbl: United States 
;i88j] 14 Pac. 291; 5 Utah 232; United StaFEes
v. Peay [18871-14 Pac. 342, 5 Utah, 263; State v.
L o c k e i 19151 151 Pac. 717; Re Nielson r18&9 I 131 U.S.
1?6; 33 L.3d. 118; Davis v. BeasonTT890l 133 U.S.333,
33 L.ed. 637; United States v. West T18911 27 Pac. 84;
7 Utah 437.
2. See United States v. Cannon [1885] Pacific Reporter,
369; Thayer v. Thayer, loi Mass.Ill; See cases at note 
p above. Between 1882 and 1889, under the Edmonds 
Act, 1882, 24 Mormons were convicted for polygamy, and 
909 imprisoned for unlawful cohabitation. In 1877,
Brigham Young!s marriage to his alleged twenty-seventh 
wife was declared void, since he had no capacity to 
marry her, being an already married man at the time of 
the purported marriage; see New York Times, 28 April,
1877, and Irving, The Twenty-Seventh Wife, op.cit., p.332.
3. The Bill was written by Representative Justin R.
Morrell of Vermont, and was passed and signed into law
footnotes 3 and 4 continued ..........
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bring the existence of this statute to the notice of the 
presiding .Judge. Had he done so, the Court should have
had no difficulty in finding that Hyde’s marriage was
/
monogamous in law as it was in fact.
It is submitted that the illegal practice by the 
Mormons did not make such unions polygamous, but rather 
bigamous.
It is most remarkable that although since this 
decision Hyde’s case has been commented on and followed 
by judges in all parts of the Commonwealth also including 
America; and has also been the subject of a number of 
academic legal essays, the invalidity of the decision has 
never been established. It is submitted that the decision 
in Hyde, v. Hvde was given per incuriam.
2. Forms of Polygamy
Ellis says:
’’The ’polygamy* which some people view today 
with consternation is mostly, as someone has 
improperly termed it, merely a ’consecutive 
polygamy’, due to an increased tendency to 
divorce.. That is to say it is simply an 
enlargement of the familiar monogamy”. i
This statement refers to the modern trend to
classify polygamy, and to extend the term to a variety of
social relationships. Some of the terms used to describe
these relationships are:
Footnotes 3 and 4 continued........ (3) by President Lincoln
on 1 July, 1862; 12 Stat. 501. This statute was 
revised and incorporated in the United States Revised 
Statutes, par. 5352 ’’which is a full substitute in 
every respect for the English statute [of bigamy], 
except as regards the grade of the offence which.is, 
under the Act of Congress, a misdemeanour”; see
C.J.S. 10, Bigamy, para. 2 note 2; Knight v. U.S.
6 App.l.
(4) [1866] L.R., 1 P. and D. 130.
1.- Havelock Ellis, Psychology of Sex. (London: William 
Heineman (Medical Books) Ltd. 1933),.2. 244; See also 
Eugene Hillman, Polygamy Reconsidered: African Plural 
Marriage and the Christian Churches  ^ (New York: Orbis 
Books, 1$75), p. 10.
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1. simultaneous polygamy;
2. consecutive polygamy;
3. sporadic polygamy;
4. symbolic polygamy.
Many of these forms of polygamy exist in Nigeria
and have an important bearing on the status of women. It
may therefore be pertinent to indicate briefly the
essential nature of each type of these relationships.
(1) Simultaneous polygamy
This is the traditional variety and exists where
a person is married to more than one spouse at the same
time. He retains a marital relationship with each spouse
simultaneously, and invariably, all the parties share a
common residence, although they may have separate dwellings.
This type of polygamy, as practised by men, was, and to a
lesser degree still is prevalent in Nigeria, and as a
chief characteristic of customary marriage will be treated
in greater detail shortly.
Basically, simultaneous polygamy implies marriage
and is thus a legal relationship. As such it is forbidden
by the laws of most European countries. A man may
however simulate simultaneous polygamy by cohabiting with
two women at the same time. He may be married to one or
neither of the women. There is evidence that this form of
2
"polygamy11 is still practised among the Mormons and is not 
totally absent from Britain. Recently John Knight, an
3
amateur athlete by profession, was reported^ as living 
with two women simultaneously, in Cornwall, England.
Previous to the report, the women had shared the same home 
but the growing size of the combined family forced them to 
live separately. The women had eight, and eleven children 
respectively, and were both expecting babies at the time of
1. But see John Cairncross, After Polygamy was made a Sin; 
The Social History of Christian Polygamy (.London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974;; see also below,
Pp.309-311.
2. See the "Sunday Times." 19 March, 1978.
3. Daily Mirror. 30 January, 1978, p.11.
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the report. He was married to one of the women, and the
other woman was referred to as his ’’Common Law wife”.
Marriage by mutual consent, unlike the position among the
Yorubas previously noted, is not legally valid in England,"^
but cohabitation with two or more women is not unlawful as
2
it was at one time in the United States.
(11) Consecutive polygamy.
This form of ’’polygamy” is becoming increasingly 
rife in many societies in different parts of the world, 
and is displacing simultaneous polygamy in many parts of 
Africa, especially in the urban areas. Writers use this 
term to cover situations where the man owes marital 
obligations to two or more women or their children although
1. The so-called ”common-law marriage” is only recognized 
in English Law:-
(i) where there is absence of local formalities for the 
celebration of a marriage; Wolfenden v. Wolfenden 
[1945] 2 All E.R.539; [1946]' P.bTi 
(ii) if it is unreasonable to expect the parties to com­
ply with the lex loci celebrationis in the circum­
stances, see Bromley, op.cit. p. 27.
Valid marriages contracted by mutual consent of the 
parties only was abolished in England by Lord Hardwick’s 
Act, 1753. But see A.N. Allott - ’’The People as Law- 
Makers: Custom, Practice and Public Opinion as Sources 
of Law in Africa and England”, 21 J.A .L.. 1977, pp.1-25
at p.15. In certain States.of the U.S. common-law
marriages are still recognized as valid; see 10 Am. Jur. 
2d. par. 9; For list of such States see Am. Jur. 2d.
Desk Book, Document 124.
2. See above p. 294. During the late 19th century 
cohabitation with two or more women as ’’wives” was 
illegal, see Section 5352 Rev. Stat.; Cannon v. U.S. 
[1885] 7 Pac. 569.
5. See Alyward Shorter, African Culture and the Christian 
Church, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1973), pp.172-173; 
Adrian Hastings. Christian Marriage in Africa, (London: 
SPCK, 1973), p.40; Aidan Southall7 "The Position of 
Women and the Stability of Marriage", Introductory 
summary in Social Change in Modern Africa, ed. by 
Aidan Southall, (London: Published for the International 
African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1961), 
p.52; Kenneth Little, Urbanization as a social process: 
An essay on movement and change in contemporary Africa, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp.82-54; 
Ngwobia Uka, Growing up in Nigerian Culture, op.cit., 
p.15; Kenneth Little, African Women in Towns: An Aspect 
of Africa’s Social Revolution,(Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp.107 et.al.
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at any one time, he may be living with or married to only
one of the women. It is sometimes referred to also as
"successive polygamy"^ and may be practised in a country
where monogamy is the legal norm since the essence of the
relationship is marital obligations fiscal or physical,
owed to two or more women and their children at the same
time. As noted by Ellis in the statement above, consecutive
polygamy is due to the increasing frequency of divorce in
many societies. Adam notes that by "the beginning of the
Seventies a new kind of polygamy had been accepted in 
2
Britain". She describes its machinery as divorce, 
separation, single motherhood and unofficial unions. In 
all these situations, the man involved may still be res­
ponsible for the women with whom he previously had sexual 
relations, although he may not be currently associating 
with them. The situation may be illustrated by reference 
to divorce. On the grant of a decree of divorce, nullity, 
or judicial separation, the court may order either spouse 
to make unsecured periodical payments to the other spouse. 
If the husband against whom such an order is made re­
marries, or cohabits with another woman, he becomes liable 
to maintain both his former wife as well as his present 
wife, or mistress.
Instances of consecutive polygamy are numerous 
in Nigeria. They may occur as a result of divorce, but 
more often from separation without a divorce. They are 
evidence of marital instability in the community and in 
many cases result in considerable hardships for the
1. See Southall, op.cit. p. 52, who uses the term 
"successive monogamy” and Uka, op.cit. p.15, who refers 
to it as "progressive polygyny" and Esther Vilar,
The Polygamous Sex: A manfs Right to the other Woman, 
trans. from the German by Sophie Wilkins (London:
W.H. Allen, 1976), p.71, who defines such relation­
ships as "successive polygamy".
2. Ruth Adam, A Woman!s Place; 1910-1975«(London; Chatto 
and Windus, 1975) p . 19b•
3. Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, sections 
70-75; see also the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1975, sections 23 and 27(b).
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divorced or separated wife. As will be shown later, a 
woman married under customary law is not entitled to be 
maintained by her husband after a divorce, or when the 
parties are separated. The husband1s liability to 
maintain dependent children,however, remains. A woman 
who is wholly dependent financially on her husband, and 
who has been divorced or separated from him may be 
adversely affected, especially in cases where she has no 
children."*"
(III) Sporadic Polygamy.
Vilar, in her book, The Polygamous Sex: A
2
Man's Right to the Other Woman , extends the categories 
of polygamy to include "sporadic polygamy", which she 
defines as "the occasional irregular indulgence in having 
more than one woman at a time", and in which a man 
satisfies his sex drive with women he cannot have on a 
fixed basis, for example, other menTs wives, or women 
anyone can have, for example, prostitutes0 This is but 
another name for two associations known to mankind from 
the beginning of time to the present day; associations 
which no society has been able to eradicate completely - 
prostitution and adultery. As will be later seen both 
forms exist in Nigeria.
(IV) Symbolic polygamy.
t
This term is also cotoed by Vilars and she uses 
it to describe the increasing situation found in the 
United Kingdom, the United States and many European 
countries, whereby a manfs sexual needs may find satis­
faction in sexual substitutes such as pornographic films, 
pictures and books, in addition to having a wife. If 
the man becomes sufficiently addicted, this can pose a 
great threat to the position of the wife both financially
1. See further, Chapter
2 C Esther Vilar, op.cit,. pp.68-83.
3. Ibid. p.71.
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and physically. Sporadic and symbolic polygamy are often 
the only kinds the average man can afford because of 
economic reasons. Pornography no doubt exists in some 
Nigerian cities, for example Lagos, but it is generally 
insignificant as compared to European countries.
The main form of polygamy that will be dis­
cussed in this Chapter is simultaneous polygamy where a 
man is married to two or more wives and retains marital 
relationship with each woman.
3. Polyandry
Polygamy may take the form of
1. polyandry, in which a woman has two or more husbands 
at the same time, or
2. polygyny, the system whereby a man has two or more 
wives at the same time.
A. Introduction
Westermarck, who conducted extensive studies
on the prevalence of polyandry all over the world, notes
that ’’polyandry is a much rarer form of marriage than
polygyny” But an examination of the literature cited
by him supports the statement of Prince Peter of Denmark,
who has made an exhaustive study of polyandry, that ’’there
is more literature in evidence on polyandry than one would
at first be led to suppose”, revealing ’’quite a broad dis-
2
tribution of the custom of polyandrous marriage”.
. Although many peoples practise polyandry, in no case is it
3
known to be the exclusive form. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and 
Ginsberg, who computed the prevalence of polyandry
1. Westermarck, ’’History of Human Marriage”, op.cit.
Vol.Ill, p.107.
2. H.R.H. Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark, A Study of 
Polyandry (The Hague: Moulton and Co., 19o3), p.5o.
3o Westermarck, op.cit. Vol.Ill, p.155.
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according to grades of economic culture, found that it
occurs sporadically in all grades, hut everywhere as an
exception."* Crawley notes that polyandry is found
2sporadically even in Southern Europe.
The practice of polyandry is said to have 
originated in India: it has been practised principally 
by priestly and barbarous tribes, who fear most for the
increase of their members, which would end in driving
3 cc
them to honest industry. It, however, reappears in a
remarkable manner in the highest state of social 
civilization, where excessive expenditure is an obstacle 
to freehold property....
B. Types of polyandry
Various types of relationships have been 
described as polyandry. For example, writers include 
cases in which
(a) children recognize more than one man as having the
5
status of !truef father.
1. L.T. Hobhouse, G.C. Wheeler and M. Ginsbergh, The
Material Culture of the Simpler Peoples11, (London:
Chapman and Halls, 1830-1$30J p. 163.
2. Edward Crawley - The Mystic Rose: A Study of Primitive 
Marriage and Primitive Thought in its Bearing on 
Marriage,'2nd.edit. (New York: Meridan Books Inc., 1927), 
p. £58.
3. Burton, City of the Saints, op.cit. 522; see also
Simon Ottenbergh and Phoebe Ottenbergh, "Social 
Groupings" in The Study of Africa, ed. by P.M.J. McEwan 
and Robert Sutcliffe, (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd.1965), 
p . 42.
4. Burton, City of the Saints, op.cit. p. 522.
5. See Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.
Vol.Ill, pp.131-133; Ahmad Shaw, Four Years in Tibet,
2nd. edit. (Benares, 1906) p.52; Mary ^ew, 11A form of
Polyandry among the Lele of Kasai", 21 Africa, 1951,
pp.1-12; The institution among the Lele and other groups 
of the former Belgian Congo was banned by statute;
Ordinance of 31 Jan. 1947, Ord. Leg. No. 37, A.I.M.O.,
Prohibition des pratiques de Polyandri^ - an Ordinance 
of the former Belgian Congo - Tew, op.cit. p.l; Phillips 
and Morris; Marriage Laws in Africa, op.cit., p.90.
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(b) a woman bears legitimate children to several different 
fathers in succession.^
(c) a legitimately married woman regularly cohabits with
several men, none of whom rate as father to her 
2
children, and
(d) a single legitimate husband allows other men sexual
•5
access to his wife.
How far any of these types of relationships may 
properly be described as polyandrous marriage is debatable. 
For example, the system where a legitimate husband allows 
other men sexual access to his wife includes "wife-lending", 
and cicisbeism (male concubinage), in which the woman has 
only one recognized legal husband, and her children only
one legal father, but her other sexual partners have a
L\,
respectable status. Meek refers to this practice as
1. Westermarck, op.cit. Vol.Ill, p.124; Vinogradoff, 
Historical Jurisprudence, op.cit. Vol.I, pp.174-175.
Cf. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit. p. 198, 
who says that among "the Gwari a woman may have several 
husbands and families in different towns, living now 
with one, now with another, as she feels inclined. As 
the children belong not to the first husband but to 
their natural father it is a fairly close approximation 
to true polyandry.
2. The classical example of this type of polyandry is 
reportedly found among the Nayars of Southern India - 
see Encyclopedia Britanica; Westermarck, History of 
Human Marriage, op.cit., Vol.Ill, pp.133-134, for list 
of literature on “the Nayars, and pp.135-142 for a 
description of polyandry among them; see also Kathleen 
Gough, "Definition of Marriage", op.cit.. p.68;
E.R. Leach, "Polyandry, Inheritance and the Definition 
of Marriage", 55 Man, 1955, pp® 182-186; P.G. Riviere, 
"Marriage: A Reassessment", in Rethinking, Kinship and 
Marriage, ed. by Rodney Needham^ (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1971), p. 69.
3® See Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.p. 197; 
Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence, op.cit. Vol.I, 
pp.174-175; see also Westermarck, History of Human 
Marriage, p.154,who reports this type of marriage as 
found by Thomas in Southern Nigeria.
4. Meek, Tribes of Northern Nigeria. op.cit.p.lQ7.
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"sexual communism", and notes that it may be found among
many African communities, for example, the Ewe-Speaking
Peoples of Dahomey, and the Bahima^ of East Africa. He
gives examples of the practice in Nigeria among the Tiv,
where sons cohabit with their fathers* wives when the
latter have become old men, and among the Yoruba of Osi and
Ekiti, where every male in a compound has access to every
female, except in cases of close consanguinity. Sons have
access to their father*s wives (their own mothers excepted),
and even young brides are free to all. Meek also notes
that wife-lending is common among the pagan Nomad Fulani
even for considerable periods, and that among the Yorubas
and Igbos,impotent old men constantly lend their wives to
2
young men in consideration of farm work.
These types of relationships cannot, however,
be properly described as polyandry, since in all cases,
the woman concerned is married to only one man at any
given time. As Radcliffe-Brown correctly points out,
"it is not sexual intercourse that constitutes marriage
3
either in Europe or amongst savage peoples". Except, 
probably, the disputed case of the Lele of the former 
Belgian Congo, closer examination of all other instances 
of African polyandry discloses, not the marriage of a 
woman with two or more men at the same time, but a kind 
of"sexual communism", in which several men have the right 
of access to a woman, although she is married legally to only
1. See also Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence t op-cit. 
p.5.
2. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria,op.cit. p.200;
Meek, Law and Authority, opTcit. p. 2?6; He describes 
the relationship among the Igbos as Iko-Mbara; a 
recognized form of paramour relationship. Talbot 
records similar practices among many of the other 
Southern peoples; see Talbot, Peoples of Southern 
Nigeria, op.cit. pp.429, 441.
3. Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, "African Systems....", 
op.cit. p. 5; see also George P. Murdock, Social 
Structure. 1965, op.cit. pp.5-7 esp. p. 6; Bronislaw 
Malinowsky, "Parenthood, The Basis of Social Structure," 
in The Family: Its Structure and Functions, ed. by 
Rose L. Coser. 1964. op.cit. p. 18T
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one of them,'1' or "group marriage", - households with 
several husbands and wives all sharing sexual services.^
C # Incidence of polyandry in Nigeria
Most African writers assert the relative rarity 
3
of polyandry in Africa, while a few are quite emphatic 
about its non-existence in Africa. Thus Agbede writes 
that "polyandry is practically unknown in Nigeria, and 
one might add that it is not practised anywhere in Africa."^ 
How far this statement is accurate depends on the precision
1. For e.g. the Ibibios as stated by Talbot; among the 
Atamm Ekol, "a wife is regarded as the property of her 
husband*s age-class, and any man who refuses to allow 
a member of his * company* to have access to her is 
punished", see Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta,
op.cit. p.202.
2. See the statement of Julius Caesar that the early Britons, 
in their domestic life, practised a form of community of 
wives, ten or twelve combining in a group, especially 
brothers with brothers and fathers with sons. Writers,
on the strength of this text have suggested that the 
community of wives in Britain was polyandrous in origin 
and can be regarded as a real instance of group marriage 
- see Julius Caesar, De Bello Gallico, Bk. V.14, 1819, 
cited by Prince Peter, op.cit. p.59; see also Wester­
marck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit. Vol.Ill, 
p p .226-22?; and Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence.
Vol.I, op.cit. p.225; Cf. group-marriage in certain 
Western societies at the present time, see Karl 
Fleischman, "Marriage by Contract: Defining the Terms 
of Relationship", 8 Family Law Quarterly. 1974, No. 1, 
pp.27-49 at p.28; see also Harold Berman, "Soviet Family 
Law in the Light of Russian History and Marxist 
Theory", 56 Yale Law Journal. 1946, p. 26 who notes 
that group-marriage exists in Russia to the present day. 
Contrast Murdock, Social Structure, op.cit. pp.24-25;
R.H. Lowie, Primitive Society (London. 1921), pp.49-62.
5. See David B. Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968}, p.146;
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, African Systems...".op.cit. 
p.90.
4. I .0. Agbede, "Recognition of Double Marriage in Nigerian 
Law", 17, Int. and Comp. Law Quarterly. 1968, pp.735 
at p.736. See also Walter Trobisch, My Wife made me 
a Polygamist. (Illinois: Inter-Varsity Press, 1971), 
p. 9.
3 0 6
with which polyandry is defined.^- As far as Nigeria is 
concerned, there are writers who assert that it does not
exist among the Yorubas,^ in Southern Nigeria,^ or even
in Nigeria,^ but many of the types of relationships
commonly described as polyandry exist in Nigeria, although
5
they cannot be strictly defined as polyandry.
Muller^describes a system of marriage among the 
Rukuba of Benue Plateau State of Nigeria, several miles 
west of the town of Jos, which seems to justify the des­
cription of polyandry, and indeed a similar type of
marriage found among the Kadara of Zaria and the Kagoro of
7 8Jos Plateau has been classified as true polyandry.
1. See e.g. J.M. Cooper, Temporal Sequence and the Marginal 
Cultures. Catholic University of America Anthropological 
Series, No. X, 1941, pp.52-53; Murdock, Social Structure 
op.cit.. pp.25-26.
2. See e.g. A.K. Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the Yoruba 
People.1924, op.cit. p.61; Edward Ward, Marriage Among 
the Yoruba,op.cito. p.25; R. Galletti, K.D.S. Baldwin, 
and l.Oo Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers.(London; Oxford 
University Press, 1956), p.7^, n.l.
3. Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit. p.380.
4. 1.0. Agbede, op.cit. p.736; 0. Achike, "Statutory and
Customary Marriage1*, op.cit. p.49.
5. See e.g. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, who reports 
the Zaga marriage found among the Gwari, Kamberi and 
Tiv, where the women have several husbands and families 
in different towns, living now with one, now with the 
other, as she feels inclined. As the children belong 
not to the first husband but to the actual father, 
there is a fairly close approximation to true polyandry 
- see p. 197.
6. Jean Claude Muller, "Of Souls and Bones: The Living and 
the Dead among the Rukuba, Benue Plateau State, Nigeria", 
46 Africa, 1976, No.3, pp.258-273 at p.259.
7. M.G. Smith, "Secondary Marriage in Nigeria", 23 Africa, 
1953, pp.298-323.
8. Prince Peter,A Study of Polyandry, op.cit. p.507.
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Muller describes the system among the Rukuba thus:
The tribe is bisected, for marriage purposes, into 
two exogamous moieties. Residence is patri-virilocal; 
villages can belong exclusively to one or the other 
moiety, or some'members of the village may be from 
one moiety and others from the opposite moiety. In 
the latter case the chief is always from the more 
numerous moiety found in the village, the less 
numerous one having no political rights and duties 
and supplying only a ritual assistant to the chief«
Each of those villages belonging exclusively to one 
exogamous moiety constitutes, within the total 
marital structure, what I call a wife-taking unit.
Those villages comprising members of both moieties 
form at least two wife-taking units: in such cases 
the more populous wife-taking unit is led by the 
village chief, and one or more additional wife-taking 
units, depending on circumstances, are formed by mem­
bers of the opposite moiety. The wife-taking units 
of opposite moieties marry each other*s girls in 
primary marriage, i.e. the first marriage of a girl; 
and the wife-taking units of the same moiety take 
each other*s wives, i.e. girls married in primary 
marriage from the opposite moiety, in secondary 
marriage. A woman can thus be married to several 
men of differing wife-taking units; she cohabits 
with one husband at a time but her different hus­
bands all keep some rights in her. Thus it may be 
said that wife-taking units of opposite moieties 
are daughter-givers and daughter-takers to each 
other; whereas wife-taking units of the same moiety 
are wife-givers and wife-takers to each other.^
It can be seen from this description that a 
woman may be married to two or more men at the same time, 
and each husband has some rights over her. Although she 
cohabits with only one husband at a time, cohabitation is 
not a necessary incident of marriage, and in many polygynous 
marriages in Nigeria, especially among the Yorubas, the 
husband and his several wives may not cohabit, at least 
in the sense of living in the same household.
Apart from this practice among the Rukuba,
Kadara, and Kagoro, and a few isolated practices which may 
simulate the features of polyandry, it may be said that 
the practice of polyandry does not exist among the tribes 
of Nigeria. The unfortunate reporting of the case of
1. Muller, op.cit. p. 259.
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Ohochuku v. Ohochuku,1 which has created the erroneous 
impression that polyandry is permitted by the customary 
laws of the Igbos is not substantiated by available 
evidence.
4 0 Polygny
A. The Historical perspective of polygyny
As previously noted, polygyny is the system in 
which a man is married to more than one woman at the same 
time. In accordance with popular usage, the term polygamy 
will generally be used, instead of the more linguistically 
correct polygyny, to designate this practice, but the 
latter term will be retained wherever it may aid clarity.
Contrary to African belief, the practice of
2
polygamy is not confined to Africa and Asia. The 
erroneous belief that polygamy originated in Africa and 
Asia, and is only to be found there, was created by the 
hostile reaction of the early Missionaries to African 
polygamy. The Missionaries, ignoring their own cultural 
and Scriptural background, consistently and persistently 
opposed and attacked polygamy. They referred to the 
institution by repellent epithets, and made depreciatory 
comparisons between polygamy and monogamy in which the 
former emerged as desirable and divine, while the latter 
was represented as a pernicious, licentious institution, 
a peculiar preserve of the barbarous Africans. Thus 
Waddell, in his defence of monogamy, says of polygamy:
"...polygamy and its companion, concubinage, 
prevail in Calabar, while marriage, properly so 
called, is unknown...people are apt to confound 
heathen and Christian wives and marriages, and 
reason concerning them as if they were quite the 
same. We have seen how different they are at 
Calabar and learn from missionaries in Natal how 
different they are in that colony. The polygamy
1. [i960] 1 All E.R. 253 at p.254; see further Chapter
XI below.
2. See L.T. Hobhouse, G.C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg,
The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the 
Simpler People's! (,^ on(ion: Chapman and Halls, 1930J, 
p.lo1-153, esp. p. 163; L.H. Morgan, Systems of
footnote continued............ .
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there is described as a horrid system of vileness 
and oppression, utterly contrary to any 
scriptural view of the Christian system...they 
[women] are not contracting parties in heathen and 
Mohammedan countries; but the victims of avarice, 
lust, or power..."^
Time has not entirely obliterated this attitude
to polygamy, and although a more sympathetic approach is 
2
now advocated, the old attitude to African polygamy 
lingers. For example, modern writers on polygamy, even 
those with a religious bias, fail to mention Mormon 
polygamy, which has a religious basis, and portrays 
parallel features and incidents to those of African 
polygamy.
Available literature shows that, apart from a 
few communities which have been recorded as entirely 
monogamous, for example, the Veddas of Ceylon,^ most of 
the Negritos of the Philippine Islands, some of the Central 
African pygmies, and some of the aboriginal tribes of
5
South America and the Malay Peninsula, polygamy numbers 
among its practitioners, at various periods of their 
legal history, the overwhelming majority of the peoples 
of Asia and Europe.
The Greek and Romans are represented by most 
writers as strictly monogamous,^ but Bryce notes that a
Footnote 2 continued.....Consanguinity and Affinity of the 
Human Family. (Washington: Smithsonian Contributions 
to Knowledge, 1871) Vol. XVII, p.476-477.
1. Hope Masterton Waddell, Twenty-Nine Years in the West 
Indies and Central Africa; A Review of Missionary Work 
and Adventure 1829-1858,2nd.edit. (London: Frank Cass 
and Co. Ltd. 1970), pp.667-672.
2. See Adrian Hastings, Clyistian Marriage in Africa, op. 
cit. pp.77-78; Eugene riillman. Polygamy ReconsiderecUop. 
cit. pp.205-208; Alyward Shorter. African Culture and 
the Christian Church, op.cit. p p .176-17?.
3. See e.g. Hastings, op.cit., Hillman, op.cit.; Shorter, 
op.cit.; see also dT w .T. Shropshire, Primitive Marriage 
and European Law; A South African Investigation,(London: 
Frank Cass and Lo. Ltd. 1970); Cf. Oairncross,After 
Polygamy was made a Sin, op„cit.. pp.165-200.
4. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, Vol.Ill, 
op.cit. p p .12-16.
5. Margaret Mead, Male and Female, op.cit. p. 189.
6. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, Vol. Ill, 
op.cit. pp. 49, 50.
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form of concubinage, superadded to lawful marriage, was 
not unknown, especially among the Greeks.^ Countries 
which formerly practised polygamy include China, Japan, 
and Arabia. Polygamy was also permitted amongst most 
Indo-European peoples - the Slavs and Teutons; the 
ancient Irish, the Hindus, and even in Christian Europe. 
Although there is no direct evidence of polygamy among 
the Anglo-Saxons, it could not have been entirely
2
unknown, as it is prohibited in some of their law books.
The Jews permitted and practised polygamy at 
the beginning of the Christian era, and in 212 A.D. the 
lex Antoniana de civitate, while re-affirming the law of 
monogamy for Roman marriage, tolerated polygamy among the
3
citizens who were Jews. Among Western Jews, polygamy 
was forbidden about the twelfth century, but among Eastern 
Jews it survived to some slight extent into very modern 
times.^
The practice of polygamy by the old patriarchs 
of the Bible is too well-known to need reiteration and
c C.
mention need only be made of Abraham, Jacob, David and 
Solomon as outstanding examples.
Polygamy has not been entirely absent among 
modern Christians. Martin Luther, as the Mormons point 
out, treated polygamy with toleration, if not approval,
1. Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, op.cit.
p.784; Hastings, Christian Marriage in Africa, op.cit.p.8.
2. Westermarck - History of Human Marriage. 0£.cit.Vol.Ill, 
pp.38-51; see also Harold Berman. Soviet Family Law.
op .cit. pp. 42-43 <»
3. Hastings, Christian Marriage in Africa, op.cit.pp.6-9; 
Hillman, Polygamy Reconsidered, op.ciTE.pp.16-27; Burton, 
City of the Saints. op.cit.p39.
4. Hillman, op.cit. pp.20-21; Hastings, "Christian 
Marriage...” op.cit. p.7.
5. Book of Samuel, Chapter 10, verses 7-12.
6. Book of Genesis, Chapters 16, verses 3 and 25, 
verses 1-6.
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and with the sanction of the Lutheran Clergy, affirmed 
the bigamy of Philip of Hesse and Frederick William of 
Prussiao In 1531, the Anabaptists openly preached at 
Munster that he who wants to be a true Christian must 
have several wives,"*" and ,fcertain British dissenters of 
the Royal Burgh of Dundee who in our day petitioned
Parliament for permission to bigamise”, was noted by
2
Burton in 1861.
From the foregoing examples of the prevalence 
of polygamy, it is obvious that it was not confined to 
Africa. Why then has polygamy been regarded as almost 
synonymous with African marriage? Although polygamy has 
been practised widely in some countries and more con­
servatively in others, it is in Africa that polygamy is 
found at its height, both in points of incidence and 
intensity.
B. The practice of polygamy in traditional African 
societies
Many kings and chiefs in traditional African
societies had a large number of wives. King Mtessa of
Uganda is said to have had 7,000 wives, and a similar
number is accredited to the king of Loanga. "This is to
my knowledge”, says Westermarck, "the high-water mark of
■3
polygamy anywhere” .
In Nigeria, the king of Benin is reported by 
Landolphe as having had 600 wives and concubines, "while 
the noblemen have often some eighty or ninety or even 
more and there is no man so poor that he has ten or twelve 
wives at the least”; while Dapper says: The king has a
1. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.
Vol. Ill, pp.50-51.
2. Burton, City of the Saints, op.cit.; Cairncross, 
op.cit. pp.9-22; 31-52.
5. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.
Vol.Ill, p.21.
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great number of wives, actually more than a thousand.^
Oldfield, who visited Idah in Nigeria in 1833,
stated that, "There are about a hundred and twenty houses,
enclosed by a wall a few feet high in which Attah’s
[the King of Idah] favourite wives reside, the whole
2
number of which exceeded two thousand". An Igbo king
who was visited by McWilliam in 1841, was reported as
having only 110 wives in contrast. It is interesting
to note the statement of Bowdich who visited Ashantee
in the early nineteenth century, that ’the laws of Ashantee
allow the king 3,333 wives, which number is carefully kept
up, to enable him to present women to those who distinguish
themselves, but never exceeded, being in their eyes a 
>• Zj.
mystical one.
There is no doubt that some of these alleged 
number of wives are greatly exaggerated, but the level of 
polygamy among kings, chiefs and other wealthy men was 
remarkably high. This extreme appetite for marriage 
possessed by kings and chiefs has led to the belief that 
all men had a great number of wives, but the evidence shows 
that a significant number of men in the traditional society
5
were in fact monogamist.
Although polygamy in Africa may be regarded as 
culturally normative^, it was by no means universally
1. As quoted by Ling Roth, Great Benin. Its Custom Art and 
Horrors,(London: F. King and Sons, ±9b5)9 p.37•
2. MacGregor Laird, and R.A.K. Oldfield, Narrative of an 
Expedition into the Interior of Africa by the River 
Niger, (London: Richard Bentley, 1 8 3 7 ), p.190.
3 . James Ormiston McWilliam, Medical History of the 
Expedition to the Niger, during the Years 1 8 4 1 -2 ,
(London: John Churchill, 1 8 4 3 ).
4. Edward Bowdich, Mission From Cape Coast to Ashantee,
(3rd. edition, (London: Frank Cass, 1 9 6 b ), p.290; see
also Leighton Wilson, Western Africa,(London: 1856), p.180.
5. See Joseph Mullin, The Catholic Church in Modern Africa:
A Pastoral Theology (London: Geoffrey Chapman. l9 b 5 )«
p.10; Hastings, Christian Marriage in Africa,p.29;
Isaac Schapera, Married Life in an African flribe,
(Pelican Books, 1 9 7 1 ). P«87; J.J. Freeman. A Tour in
South Africa (London: 1 851 ), p.280; C.K. Meek, A 
Sudanese Kingdom: An Ethnographical Study of the 
Jukun-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria (London: Kegan Paul,
footnotes 5 and 6 continued. .......
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practised in actual fact.^
C. The determinants of polygamy
A variety of reasons has been advanced as 
tending to make polygamy a necessary, desirable and 
preferable system of marriage, and it is necessary to 
examine some of the determinants of polygamy in order 
to see how far they still exist in modern society, 
before discussing the present practice of polygamy in 
Nigeria.
The factors conducive to polygamy can be 
summarised under three main causes:-
(I) men's desire for numerous wives;
(II) the unequal numbers of men and women in a society; 
and
(III) the need to provide for widows under the levirate and 
analogous systems.
(l) Men's desire for numerous wives
The motives controlling a man's desire to 
multiply his wives are many, and one or more may prevail 
in inducing him to found a harem. Thus, he may be actuated 
by:
(a) a desire for numerous progeny;
(b) a desire for enhanced economic and social 
status;
(c) the need to cater for periodical continence;
(d) the attraction which female youth and beauty 
exercise upon men;
(e) a taste for sexual variety.
(a) A desire for numerous progeny:
In the traditional African society children
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued Trench, Trubner and Co.
Ltd. 1931), p.195.
6. For definition of a society which could be regarded as 
a "culturally normative" polygamous community, see 
George Murdock, Social Structure, op.cit. pp.27-28.
1. Older informants in the communities visited during field­
work were positive that not only were there many men who 
had only one wife, but quite a few were never able to 
marry at all, because of poverty, even in traditional 
society. See further Tables 4:1 and 4:2, below.
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were highly valued, and were regarded as the fundamental
component of an economically secure household*^ Economic
production activities were labour intensive, and the
larger the family unit, the greater were the possibilities
of wealth and social prestige. The first responsibility
of a wife was therefore to produce children. If a marriage
did not result in children who grow to maturity, the woman
2
was held responsible, mercilessly teased by other women
and sometimes divorced. The stigma attached to barren
women has been previously noted, and to this may be added
Nadel's observation among the Nupe to whom "marriage has
no real meaning without progeny". Barrenness is regarded
as a great curse and misfortune, and many cults and forms
of magic are designed to secure fertility of the women or
4to cure barrenness". Lander recounts the plight of the 
old wife of the Fulani Governor who, married for thirty 
years still had no children. She begged him piteously for
5
medicine to "promote and assist her accouchement".
1. See Eileen Jenson Krige, "Changing Conditions in Marital 
Relations and Parental Duties Among Urbanised Natives",
9 Africa. 1936, pp.1-23 at p.l.
2. See the story of the old Tiv woman recounted above, 
Chapter III. see also Uka, Growing Up in Nigerian 
Culture. op.cit. pp.35-38, a childless woman stands
the risk of being disgraced by other women and ridiculed 
by co-wives in a polygamous household.
3. See above Chapter III, p.198.
4. S.F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in 
Nigeria, op.cit. p.154; see also Akiga, Akigafs StoryT 
op.cit.. p .312; Evans-Pritchard, The Position of Women 
in Primitive Societies, op.cit. pp.45-47; Sylvia Leith- 
Ross, African Women: A S^udy of the Ibo of Nigeria, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1939)7 Reprint, 
1965), p.270; Uchendu, The Igbo of South Eastern 
Nigeria, op.cit.p.57; Richard Henderson, The King in 
Everyman: Evolutionary Trends in Onitsha Ibo Society 
and Culture, (New Haven and London: Hale University 
Press, 1972;, pp.231-232.
5. Richard Lander and John Lander, Journal of an Expedition 
to Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger,Edit, 
and Abridged by Robin Hallett, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd. 1965), p*98; see also William Bosman,
A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea, 
Divided into the Gold* ^ke Slave and the Ivory doasts, 
op. cit." "the fruitful woman is highly valued, whilst 
the barren woman is despised".
315
This desire for children, "particularly hoys, 
the labour force and inheritors of his herd",^ among 
the Fulani, has not changed in its effect on the status 
of women, since Lander*s visit in 1830. Stenning in 
1952-1953, found evidence to show that
"during the course of her marital history unduly 
lengthy intervals between birth of her children 
may bring divorce upon her...Male sterility which 
in fact may be the cause of such intervals is not 
recognized by Pastoral Fulani men and may result 
in the divorce of a woman by her husband".2
Failure to produce children, or male children 
specifically, is a common reason for additional wives, 
and among various peoples polygamy is practised or per­
mitted only when the first wife is barren or has no
3
male offspring. This of course implies, and demonstrates 
the widely held belief, especially in Africa, that the wife 
is responsible for the failure to propagate, and also for 
the failure to produce male children. These beliefs 
have no scientific basis, and it has been conclusively 
proved that sterility is not the prerogative of women.
Men are equally prone to infertility.^
1. See Derrick Stenning, "Household Viability Among the 
Pastoral Fulani" in The Development Cycle in Domestic 
Groups, edit. Jack Goody, (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1958, Reprint, 1971), p.105.
2. Stenning, op.cit. p.106. This phenomenon is not 
peculiar to Africa, see further below; Chapter XI,
3. See Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.
p.76; Genesis, Chapter 16; Abraham's wife Sarai bore him 
no children so she gave him Hagar, her handmaiden to be 
his wife; see also R. Thurnegsen, Studies in Early Irish 
Law, (Royal Irish Academy, 1936), sterility of the wife 
is a justification for polygamy among the ancient Irish.
4. See George Gellhorn, "Non-Operative Treatment in 
Gynecology", Gynecological and Obstetrical Monographs, 
1924, Vol.V, p.252; Fritz Khan, Our Sex Life. (London; 
Heineman, 1953), pp.211-212; L.J. Ludovici, The Final 
Inequality: A Critical Assessment of Woman's Sexual 
Role in Society,(London: Frederick Muller Ltd. 19b5), 
p.47; Josephine Langstaff. Adam's Rib, (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 195^), p.63.
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As a result of ignorance of the biological facts,
compounded by male egoism and arrogance, childless women
continue to suffer in Nigeria. Numerous writers provide
evidence of the cruel treatment meted out to Nigerian
n_
women because of their infertility.^
It is significant that no taint is attached to 
the barren man in Nigeria. In fact the term barren is 
reserved for women, and wherever it becomes necessary to 
mention the man*s infertility, the less emotive word 
"sterile" is used. The barren man does not exist in 
Nigeria. As one male writer discovered,
"A man!s own infertility is characteristically, not 
believed to enter into the question. Male sterility 
is not recognized; there must be a woman, somewhere, 
by whom a man can have children. Social institutions 
support this; a man may acquire a family through the 
clandestine adulterous relations of his wife..."2
If a wife who has no children refuses to engage 
in an adulterous relationship in order to produce children 
for her husband, at his or his relativefs bequest, she 
may be divorced and replaced with a more compliant wife. 
This allegedly occurred in the case of Ogbogu v. Ogbogu,^ a
1. See authorities cited in Note 4 p.314; see also 
William H. Clarke, Travels and Explorations in Yorubaland 
1854-1838. op.cit. p.305; Alexander Leighton, et.al. 
Psychiatric Disorder among the Yoruba. (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1$63), pp.47-48; Ward, 
Marriage Among the Yoruba. op.cit. p.30; T„J. Bowen, 
Central Africa: Adventures and Missionary Labours in 
Several dountries in the Interior of Africa. 164^-1556t 
op.cit. p.305.
2. Stenning, "Household Viability Among the Pastoral 
Fulani", op.cit. p.Ill; see also Leith Ross, African 
Women, op.cit.t p.270.- Potency is confounded with 
fertility and if a man is potent he assumes that he is 
fertile; Leighton et.al. "Psychiatric Disorder...". op 
cit. p.50; Richard"TTenderson, The King in Every Man. 
op.cit. p.214; Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce...".
op.cit. p.36.
3. See Leith-Ross, op.cit. p.270; Henderson, op.cit. p.214.
4. [1972] Suit No. 0/8D/71, unreported, Onitsha High 
Court, 13 April, 1972.
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divorce case heard in the Onitsha High Court in 1971. The 
parties were married in 1961, and for six years of the 
marriage the wife had no children. The wife alleged that 
the husband suggested that "she tried elsewhere in the 
matter of her having a child, which base suggestion she 
refused". As a result, he refused to have sex with her 
from 1967, and also refused to eat food cooked by her.
He purported to "marry” another woman who got three 
issues for him". Perhaps the second woman was more 
amenable to his "base suggestion"0
The wife who accepts such suggestions, or makes 
efforts to cure her sterility is not free from jeopardy.
In the first case, especially if failure follows her 
efforts, she may be accused of adultery. In the second 
case she may be accused of practising witchcraft or juju. 
For example, in Obi v. Obi,^ a case decided in 197^, the 
husband accused the wife of practising juju, but the wife 
claimed that the juju was given to her to "cool her womb", 
and to cure her barrenness.
The alleged sterility of women has led to 
innumerable divorces and the separation of spouses, and 
is a contributing cause of prostitution. Nadel traced 
among the Nupes an ideological association between female 
sterility and sexual licence:
"As the barren woman fails by the common standard of 
marriage and womanhood, she is also exempted from 
the standards of common morality. Adultery and 
unchastity count less in her than in other women.
And although the stigma of immorality would still 
attach to the unchaste barren woman (she would 
still be called a Worthless woman*), it would be, 
as it were, overshadowed by and fused with the 
other paramount stigma of barrenness itself."2
Of thirty-nine divorce cases heard in the Onitsha
1. [1973] Suit No. 0/8D/74, unreported, Onitsha High Court,
26 September, 1975; see also Nnoli v. Nnoli [1969]
Suit No. 0/3D/69 (unreported),.Onitsha High Court.
2. Nadel, Block Byzantuim, op.cit. p.154; Stenning, 
"Household Viability Among the Pastoral Fulani", op. 
cit. p.107. Of 70 prostitutes interviewed in Accra, 
Ghana, in 1958, only 31 of them had children, 16 
having only one child each, - see lone Acquah, Accra 
Survey. (London: University of London Press, 1958),p.73*
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High Court during the last few years, twenty-five of the
wives involved either had no children, no male children,
or one male child only. In eleven cases the wife had no
children. In all the cases the alleged sterility of the
wife was a contributing factor in the breakdown of the 
1marriage.
One wonders how many of these wives were truly
barren, or were simply victims of custom or their
biological plight. For example, a woman in traditional
society was completely ostracized during her menstrual 
2
periods, and intercourse during menstruation continues 
to be totally unacceptable to the large majority of people, 
yet some rare cases of sterility were cured by the dis­
covery that the particular women were fertile only during 
menstruation. Told to disregard their scruples all con-
3
ceived successfully.
Again, men may conceal their barrenness by the 
biological facts which enable them to claim other menfs 
children as their own. Women, however, are unable to-do so.
1. These marriages were statutory marriages and sterility 
of the wife is not a ground for divorce. In many 
customary law systems, protracted sterility of the wife 
may be a ground for divorce, see, Oluwasola v. Gina 
Adewole [1959] Grade B Customary Court, Ilesha, Case 
No. UBD 272/59 and Esther Akande v. Karimu Apero [1962] 
Grade B Customary Court, l2gba Odede, Civil Record Book, 
No.12, p.11, and other cases where divorce was granted 
because of the wifeTs sterility, cited by Ekundare, 
Marriage and Divorce, op.cit. p.36; see also R.E.Dennett, 
Nigerian Studies or theKeligious and Political System 
of the Yoruba. (London: MacMillan and Co.Ltd. 1^10),p.37.
2. M. Green, Igbo Village Affairs. Chiefly with Reference 
to the Village of Umueke Agbaja, op.cit. pp.178-177;
Osman Newlana, West Africa (London: Daniel 0*Connor, 
1922), p.159; Paul Bohannan, Africa and Africans (Garden 
City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1$64), p.161; 
Basden, Niger Ibos. op.cit.. p.62.
3. See Boris B. Rubenstein, "The Vaginal Smear, Nasal Boody 
Temperature Technic and its Application to the Study of 
Functional Sterility in Women", Endocrinology.V, 1940,
No. 27, p.855.
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Paradoxically, a woman's ability to bear children, which 
places her in an advantageous position in some respects, 
acts as a handicap in others. For example, it is possible 
for every mother to know her own child, but because of this 
advantage she suffers the disadvantage of being unable to 
fabricate claims to maternity. She has to prove her 
facundity by parturition. Evidence of her maternity 
endures for a number of months, and culminates in the
actual delivery of a child from within her own womb. On
the other hand, the participation of a man in the production 
of a child is momentary, and, in conformity with social 
norms, is never an ouvert act. A man, in most cases, is
unable to prove his paternity of a child, but because of
this, he can make spurious claims to paternity and shift 
the burden of proof to whoever disputes his paternity, a 
difficult and sometimes impossible task.
Another misconception entertained about women 
is inherent in the myth that they are solely responsible 
for female births, and that if a man who has only female 
children finds the right woman, he will automatically get 
male children. Geneticists and physiologists have 
established facts to the contrary.'**
The desire for many children is rendered 
ineffectual by the high mortality rates in tropical
1. See Havelock Ellis, Psychology of Sex, op.cit.
pp.7-9; Germaine Greer, The Female Eunich" [London: 
Paladin, 1976), pp.25-29; Elizabeth G. Davis, The 
First Sex, (London: Penguin Books, J.M. Dent and 
Sons Ltd. 1973), pp.33-35; Shirley Weitz, Sex 
Roles, Biological, Psychological and Social 
Foundations, (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
p.19; C.O. Carter, "Sex Linkage and Sex Limitation", 
and P.E. Polani, "Errors of Sex Determination and 
Sex Chromosome Anomalies", in Gender Differences: 
Their Ontogeny and Significance, edit, by Christopher 
Ounsted and David C. Taylor, 1972, at pp.1-12 and 
13-39 resp.
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Africa, and many wives are necessary to produce the
2
large number of children required. But to what extent 
was the multiplication of wives productive of numerous 
offspring? How far do facts accord with theory?
There is abundant evidence to show that while 
polygamy increases the number of children generally, it 
does not do the same for the women involved. "Most 
writers, both official and unofficial, who take note of 
the relationship between polygamy and fertility agree 
that polygyny results in fewer children born".
For example, Basden notes that the "paucity 
of children in polygamous households among the Ibos is 
notorious - the theories being completely upset by the 
facts, and gives examples culled from among his 
acquaintances.
"A. has nine wives; from all of them but one daughter 
survives. B. has probably twenty (the Ibo has a 
rooted objection to stating exact numbers, all he 
will answer is "some", "few", "many”), wives; only 
one sone bears his name and a few daughters.
C. has several wives - no son at all, and only 
about as many daughters as there are wives. D. has 
more than three wives, but only one child. E. has 
five wives with three children between them.
F. has as many wives as his compound can accommodate, 
but only three sons, and they are of a degenerate 
type, indeed, which no form of imprisonment or 
flogging has been able to subjugate".^
This evidence was confirmed, not only among the 
Igbos, but among other Nigerian communities, from the
geneologies of persons interviewed by the present writer
1. See John C. Caldwell, and Chukuku Okonjo, eds., The 
Population of Tropical Africa,(New York: Columbia 
University Press, 19b8), p .11; Ansley J. Coale, Estimates 
of Fertility and Mortality in Tropical Africa", in The 
Population of Tropical Africa,edit, by Caldwell and 
Okonjo, op.cit., p.106; A.J. Coale and F. Lorimer,
"Summary of Estimates of Fertility and Mortality” in
The Demography of Tropical Africa,edit, by William Brass, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp.157-161; 
see T.J. Bowen, Central Africa, op.cit. p.305. Infant 
mortality in the rural areas of Nigeria has been documented 
at 300 per 1000 - see John Bryant; Health and the Develop­
ing World,(London: Cornell University Press, 19&9), P P -50- 
51; Basden, Ibos of Nigeria,op.cit.pp.102-103 and Basden, 
Niger Ibos, p ~ 3 5 : ------ -----
2. See Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of 
the Gikuyu,(London: Seeker and Warburg,1938), p.l; Hill 
and Allen, Mormonism and American Culture,op.cit.p.108; 
Werner, Brigham Young,op.cit.p.541.
3. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op.cit. pp.102-103.
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during fieldwork. For example, the head labourer at 
the Shehu Garbai primary school in Maiduguri, Baba, as 
he was popularly known, a Kanuri, had twelve wives0 He 
had no children alive at the time of the writer1 s stay 
in Maiduguri, and since he was well over fifty years old, 
was at the point of despair at ever* having a living 
child.^
2
These and other numerous examples merit the 
observation of Reade, writing of Equatorial Africans in 
1863:
"Propagation is a perfect struggle; polygamy becomes 
a law of nature; and even with the aid of this 
institution, so favourable to reproduction, there 
are fewer children than wives".^
Of twenty-three studies analysed by Dorjahn, 
only five show polygamously married women to have been 
as fertile as, or more fertile than, the monogamously 
married segment.^"
The published data thus indicate that the hypot­
hesis is true, and that polygamy does have a lowering
1. News was received later from Maidugari that a son had 
been born to him at last by his twelfth wife. Unfort­
unately, although the son is alive, the mother died 
during his birth.
2. See Laird and Oldfield, Narrative of an Expedition,
op.cit. Vol.I, p.225, who quote the case of an elderly 
Chief who died leaving fifteen wives and no children; 
McWilliam, Medical History of the Expedition to the 
Nigero <> • op.cit. p.65. who compiled a list of seven 
Igbo men who had a total of sixty-one children produced 
by thirty-four wives. Forty of the children were dead 
at the time of his visit in 1841; Hill and Allen,
Mormonism and American Culture, op.cit. p.108; Joseph 
Smith, the first President of the Mormon Church, had no 
children by his forty-nine or more wives, while Brigham 
Young, the second President fathered fifty-six children, 
approximately one for each wife. Cf. James E. Smith 
and Phillip R. Kunz, "Polygyny and Fertility in Nine­
teenth-Century Americai1 Population Studies, 1976,
No. 30, pp.465-480.
3. Winwood Reade, Savage Africa (London: 1863), p.242.
4. Vernon R. Dorjahn, "The Factor of Polygyny in African 
Demography", in Continuity and Change in African Cultures, 
edit, by William Bascom and Melville J. rierskovits,
1959, (Chicago: University of Chacago Press, 1959,
9th. Imp. 1975), p.110.
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effect on fertility."*'
There is little evidence that the desire for
numerous children is a contributing factor to the practice
of polygamy in present day Nigeria. Although the desire
for numerous children still exists to some extent it is
not so intensive as to propel a husband into marrying
many wives, except where the first wife is barren or
only has female children. Pure water supply, improved
sanitation and medical facilities in towns have reduced
the toll on young children and make it unnecessary for
twelve children to be born in order to rear four or five.
Economic pressures contribute to the growing realization
in Nigeria that the smaller the family, the greater the
opportunities parents can offer their children, and that
fewer children and more material wealth enhance their
social stature more than many children, poorly educated,
2
with a low level of living.
In answer to the question as to what the size of 
the ideal family in Nigeria should be, most people stated 
four to six children, and many people, especially men, 
said personally they did not want more than three or four 
children. On the other hand, no one stated that he or 
she did not wish to have any children.
(b) A desire for enhanced economic and social status
In the traditional African society, polgamy was 
correlated with prestige and wealth. Wealth was exhibited, 
not by possession of land or other property, but by 
family size - numerous wives and children acting in turn 
as producers of further wealth. ’’Women and slaves constitute
1. See Burton, The City of the Saints. 1861, op.cit. p.521; 
Paul Bohannan. Africa and Africans, op.cit. p.lbl;
H.C. Trowell, The Passing of Polygamy: A Discussion 
of Marriage and Sex for African Christians.(London: 
Oxford University Press, 1940), p.9; - "This is the 
strange contradiction of polygamy; it promised many 
children, it produced few” .
2. Allan Mountjoy, Industrialisation and Under-developed 
Countries.2nd, ecf! (London: Hutchison University 
Library, 1966), p. 76.
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the wealth of an African”, is a well-known statement?"
Ward, writing of the Yoruba says that a man's status is
not usually judged by his wealth in land or house
property...As a rule only by showing that he has a number
of wives can be convince his neighbours that he is
somebody.” Among kings and chiefs the matter is much the
same, ”title is not a criterion of status or respect from
subjects, but the size of the harem nearly always is” .
He gives the example of a chief with 205 wives who "loomed
larger in the eyes of his countrymen”, than their king
(of Ondo) who ruled over 60,000 persons, but only had 75 
2
wives.
Similar statements have been made for other
3
tribes and it can therefore be accepted that generally, 
the possession of many wives and children was the status 
symbol of wealth and social prestige.^ The prestige to 
some extent was shared by the wives, especially the first 
one. ”To be the one and only wife is humiliating. It is 
a sure indication that her husband is a poor man. She
1. Mary H« Kingsley - West African Studies, op.cit. p.438.
2. Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, 1937, op.cit. p.29.
3. Leonard, The Lower Niger and Its Tribes. 1906, op.cit. 
p.442; Lieber, fcfik and Ibibio Villages. 1971, op.cit. 
pp.44, 47; Basden, Niger Ibos: A Description ofxhe 
Primitive Life, Customs and Animistic Beliefs etc.. 
op.cit., p.228; William Bascom. The Yoruba of South­
western Nigeria.1969. op.cit.,pp.b3-b4; Nadel,
A Black Byzantium, op.cit. p. 358; Alyward Shorter, 
African Culture and the Christian Church, 1974, op. 
cit. p.l?5« notes that because of the prestige of poly­
gamy it was often forbidden for a commoner to have more 
wives than the Chief or king; see also generally 
Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, Vol.Ill, 
op.cit.. pp.82-84.
4. See Edet Akpan Udo, The Methodist Contribution to 
Education in Eastern Nigeria, 1893-1960, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston University Graduate School,
1965, p.35; Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa 
op.cit. p.117.
would rather be the mistress controlling a number of 
other women than be a person of no importance....She 
has more honour and respect from the community, freedom 
from loneliness and domestic helpers at her beck and 
call".1
Wives and children were not only symbols of
prestige, indicative of wealth, but they were also a
fruitful source of economic gain, as they were invariably
the creators of wealth.
With a few exceptions, for example, the Fulani
in the North and a few riverine communities who traditionally
engaged in fishing, most traditional Nigerian societies were
2
based on a farming economy. Before 1939, there was virtually
no manufacturing industry in Nigeria. Cotton was
partially processed, and cigarettes were manufactured at
■3
Ibadan, but there was very little else.
Many communities depended heavily on the labour 
of women and children on the farms. For example, the 
Igbos traditionally engaged in farming and most of the 
farm work was performed by women.^ "Native agriculturists"
1. Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit. p. 231.
2. See Ukandi Godwin Damachi, Nigerian Modernisation.
(New York: The Third Press, JT Okpaku Publishing Co. 
Inc., 1972); also Nadel, A Black Byzantium, op.cit. 
p.330.
3. B.W. Hodder, Economic Development in the Tropics, 2nd. 
ed. (London: Methuen and Co• Ltd., 1973), p .183. In 
1929, the Colonial Development Act was enacted, and 
the formal declaration of the British Government's 
intention to help its dependencies to attain internal 
sufficiency was later implemented. Since 1948, there 
has been a rapid growth of factory industry, though
at present Nigerians tend to prefer to invest in trade, 
see Louis Zerby and Margaret Zerby, If I should Die 
Before I Wake; the Nsukka Dream. (Mitchigan: Mitchigan 
State University, 19?1J, p.l2;Bowen, Central Africa, 
op.cit. p. 307; Ward, op.cit.. p.34.
4. See Gustavus Vassa Equiano, Equiano's Travels, op.cit. 
p.93; Green, Igbo Village Affairs. ojD.cit. pp.lE§- 
177; Leith-Ross, African Women, op.cit. pp.197. 228. 
241, 244.     •
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says Basden, depend almost entirely on their wives and
families for manual labour; the peasant farmer would be
sadly crippled without his wageless staff of workers.^"
Although Yoruba women generally did very little farm 
2
work, the wives of farmers usually carried the farm 
produce to the market, a valuable contribution which 
enabled their husbands to make a profit in cases where 
none would have been made,if they had to depend on paid 
labour, a scarce commodity in a subsistence economy 
where land was freely available to everyone.^
The need for many wives as a source of labour 
is considerably reduced in modern Nigeria, even in the 
rural areas. Agriculture is becoming increasingly 
mechanized, and the subsistence sector of the economy 
is to a large extent eroded by changes in technique of 
productiono The economic participation of women has 
shifted from agriculture to trade, and to a lesser
5
extent, to- occupations requiring education and skill.
1. Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit. p.238; see also Meek, 
Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit. p.233, for a 
similar statement about some Northern Tribes«
2. See Bowen, Central Africa, op,cit. p.306; W.B. Schwab, 
"Continuity and Change, in the Yoruba Lineage System", 
in Black Africa: Its Peoples and Their Cultures Today, 
edit, by John Middleton, (London: MacMillan and Co., 
1970), p. 161; Bascom, The Yoruba of South-Western 
Nigeria, op.cit. p.24.
3. Ward, Marriage Among the Yorubas. op.cit. p.34; see 
also Remi Clignet, Many Wives. Many Powers: Authority 
and Power in Polygynous Families. Ihvanston: North­
western University Press, 1970), p.22; Murdock, Social 
Structure, op.cit., p.36; A.B. Ellis, West African 
Sketche~ (London: Samuel Tinsley and Co. 1881), p.40.
4. See Pius Okigbo, "Social Consequences of Economic 
- Development in West Africa", op.cit. p.4l7.
5. David Lucas, "Women in the Nigerian Labour Force" 
in Population 70. p.486.
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The cyclical situation occurs, wherein numerous 
wives who do not possess adequate qualifications for 
procuring employment in the urban areas can be a source 
of embarrassment to an urban dweller of meagre income . ^
But women with the required qualifications, who can con­
tribute effectively to the economic prosperity of a 
marriage will not usually tolerate polygamy; they would 
refuse to marry or remain with a polygamist of inadequate 
means, and tend to marry men of higher social and economic 
status than their own. Many Nigerian women today marry for
lucre, not love. Their preference for money in the choice
2
of a spouse has been noted by several writers, and is
3
exemplified in Onitsha Market Literature in such salacious 
titles as "Why Boys Never Trust Money-Monger Girls; "Beware 
of Harlots and Many Friends", "Beware of Women", Money is 
Hard but Women Don't Know", in which women are portrayed
4
as immoral Shylocks, bereft of capacity for conjugal love.
Not only is the educated woman unlikely to choose 
an economically inferior marriage partner, but she can 
more easily manipulate the marriage relationship, and can 
more effectively exert pressure to prevent her husband
1. An informant in Calabar, a junior Civil Servant stated 
that he had two wives, one married for him by his mother, 
when he was a small child, and the other his own choice. 
Because of his small salary he was forced to keep the 
senior wife in his home village, where she could engage 
in farming, and help to eke out his meagre salary. He 
had married the second wife, despite the prohibition 
against polygamy imposed by his church, "The Jehovah 
Witness". See also Unokanma Okonjo, The Impact of 
Urbanization on the Ibo Family Structured (Germany:
1$76), p. 157.
2. See Phoebe Ottenberg, "The Changing Economic Position 
of Women among the Afikpo Ibo", in Continuity and 
Change, edit, by Bascom and Herskovits, op.cit. p.215; 
Mary Kingsley, Travels in West Africa,Abridged edit. 
(London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd. 1897), p.153.
3. Pamphlets by amateur writers who centre their attentions 
mainly on the cultural changing habits and attitudes in 
the society; see E.N. Obiechina, edit., Onitsha Market 
Literature, (London: Heineman, 1972).
4. Obiechina, Onitsha Market Literature, op.cit., p.132.
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marrying further wives than an uneducated wife. This
aspect of the behaviour expected or tolerated from a good
wage earner was succinctly expressed in the typical
unsophisticated manner of a child. When asked to write
an essay on MThe Status of Nigerian Women'1, for the
present writer, one pupil said:
"Women who are educated and work very hard and 
make money for the family do not take bluffs".^
By this she meant that women who are educated
or economically independent would not tolerate certain
behaviour from their husbands.
The cycle is completed by the fact that men who
can afford to maintain many wives, show a reluctance to
2
engage in legal simultaneous polygamy, (although, as
will be later seen, they are not averse to surreptitious
bigamy), since monogamy has to a large extent replaced
polygamy as an indication of social prestige.
More detailed research is necessary in order to
determine to what extent polygamy remains an emblem of
kingship and chieftaincy, but there are some indications
that in this respect also, polygamy no longer holds sway
as an index of prestige and power. For example, the Obi
of Onitsha from 1962-1970^ was, until his death a
L
monogamist. Similarly, the present Obi, has only one 
wife. The Clan-Head of Ikpai, the traditional ruler of
5
Qua Town in Calabar, although previously married to
1. Essay submitted by Freda McEwen, pupil of W.T.C.
Primary School, Enugu on 21 October, 1977.
2. See Alison Izzett, "Family Life Among the Yoruba in 
Lagos, Nigeria", in Social Change in Modern Africa, 
edit, by Southall, op.cit. p.31:5; Bascom, The Yoruba 
of South Western Nigeria, op.cit. p. 65; Okonjo,
The Impact of Urbanization...>f , op.cit. p.160.
3. Obi, Joseph Okwudili Onyejekwe.
4. Obi, Okechwukwu Okagbue of Onitsha.
5. His Excellency, Ntoo Etim.
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three women, at the time of the field-work for this 
thesis, had only one wife, and refused to marry another, 
in spite of the pressure of work involved in the official 
entertainment of his subjects. Many of the Clan-Heads as 
well as other minor chiefs interviewed in Eket were 
monogamists.
(c) The need to cater for periodical continence
Many traditional societies forbid women to 
indulge in sexual intercourse during periods of men­
struation, pregnancy and lactation, which might last from 
two to five years in the latter case.*1' A menstruous woman
was usually ostracized and various social and other taboos
2
were imposed in most African, as well as other societies.
In Nigeria menstruous women were prohibited from cooking
•3
for their husbands in many societies.
Similarly, it was the practice in Nigeria to 
prolong the post-partum period to several years during 
which time marital sexual intercourse was forbidden. 
Information collected during field work revealed that the
1. Various reasons were advanced for this practice, 
including the health of the children, e.g. Ogilvy says:
"African women keep from men as long as the child cannot 
go, or commonly until it attains the age of one year 
and a half; unless the child sucks so long it would be 
infected with some remarkable infirmity11, see J.O.
Ogilby, Being an Accurate Description of the Regions of 
Barbary, Libia tEthiopiaJ,(London: 1670)> p.49b; see 
also Newland, West Africa, op.cit» p.159; Paul Bohannan, 
Africa and Africans, op.cit. p.l6l; Basden, Niger Ibos. 
op.cit.p.188; Bosman, Description of the Coast of 
Guinea, op.cit. p.447, and Landolphe, "It is also 
criminal to cohabit during a wife*s periodical sickness, 
or when the woman is enceinte,or with milk” as quoted 
by Ling Roth in Great Benin, op.cit. p.39; Compare 
J.A. Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, Trans, 
and edit. by ttenry K. Beauchamp, 2nd. edit. (.London: 
Clarendon Press 1889, pp.602-603 of Hindu women in 
similar circumstances: "The mere wish to cohabit with 
her husband would be a serious sin".
2. See Richard Burton, Selected Papers on Anthropology,
Travel and Exploration, edit, by N.M. Penzer, (London,
A.Mo Philpot Ltd., 19^4), p. 120; see also Ling Roth,
Great Benin, op.cit.p.30 quoting Landolphe and Nyendael;
footnotes 2 and 3 continued..............
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period of abstention observed formerly ranged from two 
to five years, with an average of three years among 
older interviewees. In Onitsha, the three years prohibition 
is emphasized by the fact that age groups are arranged 
triennially, and two maternal siblings are not permitted to 
become members of the same age-grade, even if in actual 
fact, they are qualified to be, since it was usually regarded 
as an abomination for women to give birth to two children 
within three years.^* This prohibition is preserved and is 
currently observed, even though the post-partum sex taboo 
is almost non existent in most parts of Nigeria.
A very old Onitsha informant, commenting on the 
behaviour of modern wives in this respect, said: "women 
abstain from sexual relations for three weeks after
2
child-birth and in some cases not even for so long", Her 
opinion was confirmed by several other informants 
including nurses from the School of Midwifery in Maidugari 
who volunteered the information that judging from the time 
when their patients became pregnant after the birth of a 
child, the period could be,as little as three weeks, but 
generally tend to be two to five months.
Footnotes 2 and 3 continued Equiano, op.cit.p.12;
Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria. op.cit. Vol.Ill, 
p.712; Christine Oppong, MNotes on CuTtural Aspects 
of Menstruation in Ghana", Institute of African Studies 
Research Review, 1973, Vol.9, No. 2 pp.33-36.
3. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit. pp.209-210.
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos. op.cit. p.188.
2. Recorded interview with Mrs. Omenye, held at Onitsha on 
25 July, 1977. Her opinion of spacing between births 
was confirmed by the statistics collected from informants 
during field work, as to the periods of abstinence 
observed after child-birth. The average was six months. 
Compare Olusanya, The Educational Factor in Human 
Fertility: A Cast Study of the Residents of a Suburban 
Area in Ibadan, Western Nigeria. (.N.I .S .R. Reprint 
Series, No. 49 i$b7j, p.3b5 Table XXII, who found that 
the ideal mean intervals between births of one child
and another was stated to be roughly, 3, 2 and 2 
respectively by women with no education, with primary 
or modern school education, or with higher school or 
higher education.
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Men were not debarred from sexual intercourse 
during the post-partum periods of a wife. Various authors 
have asserted that polygamy thus provides a husband with 
a socially acceptable way of fulfilling their sexual needs 
during these periods of prolonged female continence 
following pregnancy, and during lactation.'3'
This argument is not very persuasive, unless the 
husband has a relatively large number of wives, or some of 
the wives are past the child-bearing age. This is obvious
from the fact that, since contraception was not usually
2
practised, and women were anxious to get as many children 
as possible, invariably all the wives would be at various 
stages of pregnancy and lactation at the same time. The 
polygamous husband would therefore be nearly in the same 
position as a monogamous husband. For example, Forde says 
that among the Yako, a man is induced to take a second wife, 
normally a previously unmarried girl within two months of 
his first wifefs pregnancy, since sexual intercourse with 
the latter is forbidden within two years. But this 
assertion ignores the fact that the second wife could her­
self become pregnant within a week (or less) of the 
commencement of sexual relations, and thus be similarly 
disqualified to have sexual intercourse with the husband.
1. Paul Bohannan, Africa and Africans, op.cit. pp.161-16; 
Shorter, op.cit. p.174; Murdock, Social Structure, op. 
cit. p.37; Hillman, Polygamy Reconsidered, op.ci€«
p.123; see also, Joseph Mullinst The Catholic Church 
in Modern Africa, op.cit. who advocates that priests 
should support efforts being made to have African 
children weaned after about nine months, and abolition 
of traditional taboos on intercourse, as measures to 
encourage monogamy; and Stephen Gwynn, The Life of 
Mary Kingsley, (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1$33) 
p.77; a Missionary is reported to have said "A blow 
must be struck at polygamy and that blow must be 
struck with a feeding bottle".
2. See Olusanya, The Educational Factor in Human 
Fertility, op.cit. pp.36?, 372; see also flvans-
Pritchard, Some Aspects of Marriage and the Family 
Among the Nuer, op.cit. p.46.
3. Daryll Forde, Marriage and the Family Among the Yako, 
op.cit. p.77.
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It is submitted that periodical continence of 
women was never a valid reason for polygamy, and examination
of polygamous families support this submission. Siblings 
of different mothers in a polygamous family usually have
corresponding ages in many cases, signifying that their
mothers were all pregnant at the same time.
(d) The attraction which female youth and beauty 
exercise upon men
Most men will not readily admit this as a 
reason for the practise of polygamy.'1' It is a fact, 
however, that youth is generally attractive, whether male 
or female, and men who marry further wives, invariably 
choose younger girls than their existing spouses, often 
young enough to be their grandchildren, especially in 
traditional society.
The tendency in older men to practise polygamy 
has been well documented, and polygamy may be regarded 
as a bolster for an old man's ebbing ego, and a bulwark 
against the inevitability of old age. Thus Nadel dis­
covered that among the upper classes of Bida, "old men 
long past marrying age would still add young girls to 
the number of their 'wives'. Aphrodisiacs (which one can 
buy from the barber-doctors in Bida) and stimulants (above 
all kolanuts) keep alive their sexual appetites". He 
gives the example of old "S., who died in 1935, 70 years 
old", and who "had married a new young wife only the 
previous year, and a son was born to him (to him at least 
in the legal sense) posthumously". Ward adds his quota:
He says:
"The Yoruba woman ages quickly. After the birth of 
her first child the bloom of her premarital state 
is gone. She has lost the youthful shape, the
fine carriage, and the appearance that are so
characteristic of the girls of her race. The
1. See Shorter, op.cit. p. 173.
2. Nadel, Black Byzantium, op.cit. p. 152.
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Yoruba man, however, no matter how old he himself 
may be, nearly always desires a young attractive 
woman". ^
Basden describes this tendency of old men to
marry young women as a "pernicious state of affairs", and
observes that
"it acts as a bar to the marriage of the young 
virile men; it creates dissatisfaction amongst 
the young wives as they are not prepared to 
endure married life simply as the appendages of 
one whos too often, is a more or less decrepit 
old man, and the result is an unprecedented 
increase in illicit intercourse”
Preference for younger wives is not confined to
societies where polygamy is the norm, nor to traditional
3 4societies. It is universal, and of all ages, and may
therefore be regarded as instinctive in humans. That the
expression of the instinct in men is applauded, while in
women its existence is denied, or if expressed, is
derided, is indefensible. Once a womanfs child-bearing
period is over, it is assumed that her capacity for sexual
experience, even with a husband of similar age, also ends.
The female menopause is "presumed to signify
5
demise of sexual interest ”, a s ,the ovaries atrophy,
6 7the sexual impulse pass into extinction. Dickenson, in a
1. Ward, Marriage Among the Yorubas, op.cit. pp.31-32; see 
also Daryil Forde, "double EescentAmong the Yako" in 
African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, edit. by 
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, op.cit. p.290.
2. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op.cit. p.101.
3. See e.g. Godfrey Wilson, "An African Morality", 9 
Africa. 1936, p.75 at p.77* Cf. Edwin Ardener, Divorce 
and Fertility: An African Study (London: Oxford 
University Press 1962), p. 33, who found that the dis­
tribution of the women*s age group showed a direct 
general relationship of polygamy to age, and he con­
cluded that the tendency for men to marry further wives
increases with age and they tend to marry younger 
women than their first wife.
4. See Villars, op.cit.,pp.47-51.
footnotes 5, 6 and 7 continued
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study of both young and menopausal patients discovered that 
women's greatest peak of intensity of sexual desires existed 
during the climateric. Yet this is the period that a 
Nigerian wife is often divorced, or deprived of sexual con­
tact with her husband, while the latter, invariably much 
older than she is, is entitled to marry younger wives.
The practice of polygyny discriminates against women in 
this respect.
(e) Men's taste for variety
Westermarck notes that the sexual instinct is 
dulled by long familiarity and stimulated by novelty, 
and he states that the need for variety is one of the 
reasons for the practice of polygamy. He narrates the 
anecdote of the Sheriff of Morocco who, when asked by 
some English ladies why the Moors did not content them­
selves with a single wife like the Europeans, answered 
"Why, one cannot always eat fish".*^ A more correct answer, 
perhaps would have been, one cannot always eat fish from 
the same dish.
Footnotes 5, 6 and 7 continued....
5. William Masters and Virginia Johnson, Human Sexual 
Response. (Boston: Little Brown and CoTJ~~T97o77”pT2l6; 
see also M.J. Field, Search For,Security: An Ethno- 
psychiatric Study of kural Ghana (.Faber and Faber, 
I960), p.130.
6. Ernest R. Groves, Marriage, (London: Henry Holt, 1933), 
pp.479-482; see also Langstaff, Adams Rib, op.cit.
P-55.
7. See R.L. Dickenson, Human Sex Anatomy:. A Topographical 
Hand Atlas, (Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1933j, Figure 
1^5; see also Havelock Ellis, The Psychology of Sex, 
op.cit. p.271; Langstaff, op.cit. p.3t; Villar, The 
Polygamous Sex, op .cit. p.5i; Mary Jane Sherfy,
1 The Evolution and Nature of Female Sexuality in 
Relation to Psychoanlytic Theory", 14, American 
Psychoanalytic Association Journal, 1966, pp.26-128 
at p .116.
1. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.p.74, 
Havelock Ellis, Studies in Psychology of Sex, 1906,
Vol.Ill, part 3, p.^28,
332
A necessary corollary of this reason for poly­
gamy is the argument of pro-polygamy enthusiasts that a 
monogamous society, by ignoring the basic need of men 
for sexual variety, creates conditions favourable to 
prostitution,while polygamy, by catering for this need in 
the form of multiple marriages, makes it unnecessary for 
them to patronise prostitutes.^- This argument was
advanced by the old Igbo Chief in Egbuna!s Wind Versus 
2
Polygamy. in his defence of polygamy. -There is by this 
argument an identification of prostitution with monogamy, 
and sexual morality with polygamy. Some writers have in 
fact claimed that prostitution was unknown to Africa 
before the advent of Europeans, and this claim led Ellis 
to assert that 11 the sexual impulse of the noble savage 
is deficient.11 Both the claim and the latter assertion 
are untenable.
There is evidence which shows that prostitution 
existed in various communities in Africa before any con­
tact with Europeans was established. Bosman, a seventeenth 
century Dutch merchant, in his account of the customs of 
Ghana, shows that prostitution was a flourishing institution 
there before the arrival of the Portuguese, who were the 
first Europeans to establish settlements on the West Coast 
of Africa. Prostitution was also traditional in Dahomey,^
1. See e.g. Azikiwe, My Odyssey: An Autobiography (London: 
Hurst and Co., 1970;, p.25.
2. Obi B. Egbuna, Wind Versus Polygamy: Where "Wind" is 
the "Wind of Change” and Polygamy the "Change of Eves” 
(London: Faber and Faber, 19b4), p.71.
3. See William Hadrian Bonger, Criminality and Economic 
Conditions, trans. by Henry Horton (London: Heineman, 
191b), p.70; Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.p. 239.
4. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast 
of Guinea, op.cit. p.211-216.
5. See Bosman, ibid. pp.214-215; see also Alfred Skertchly,
Dahomey As it is: Being a Narrative of Eight Months
Residence in That Country, (London: Chapman and Hall,
1874), pp.28^-284; Bowdich, Mission From Cape Coast to
Ashanti (London: 1873), p.2l2T
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1 2in Nigeria among the Nupe and Hausa and in many other
3
parts of Africa. It is therefore evident that polygamy
A
does not prevent prostitution. As will be later seen, 
polygamy is still practised to a considerable extent in 
the Northern States among all sections of the communities. 
Nevertheless, prostitution continues to exist, and a man 
with three or more wives still indulges in prostitution.
(II) The unequal numbers of men and women in a society
Strictly speaking the unequal numbers of men 
and women in a society do not provide a reason for poly­
gamy, since men do not contract multiple marriages for 
philanthropic reasons. The hypothesis is that a surplus 
of females makes polygamy feasible. Thus Basden says 
that 11 in order for polygamy to exist at all there must be 
more women than men". But Westermarck provides numerous 
examples of societies with a surplus of men, which never­
theless practise polygamy to a considerable extent.^
Population statistics indicate that there are 
probably more females than males in sub-Saharan Africa
7
as a whole, but while this imbalance may be reflected
1. See Nadel, op.cit. pp.152-156; 333-334.
2. M.F. Smith, Baba of Karo: A Woman of the Muslim Hausa. 
(London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1$54), pp.25-2b, b3-b, 
225, 274.
3. See generally Fernando Henriques, Prostitution and 
Society: A Survey. (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1962)
Vol.I, pp.570 et al.
4. See further Chapter IX, pp. 33-37.
5. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op .cit. p.99.
6. Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, op.cit.
Vol.Ill, pp.5^-55 and 64.
7. Dorjahn, ”The Factor of Polygyny in African Demography”
op.cit. pp.95-96, 105-109; J.C. Caldwell, ”The Demo­
graphic Situation”, in The Population of Tropical Africa 
edit, by Caldwell and Okonjo, op.cit. pp. 11 and 21;
Ettienne Van de Walle, Characteristics of African
Demographic Data” in The Demography of Tropical Africa, 
edit, by William Brass (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), pp.38-43.
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1 2
in some countries, for example, Guinea, Tanzania and 
■3
Sierre Leone, other countries which practise polygamy
show a preponderance of males, for example, Ghana (then
Gold Coast) in 1911, 1921, 1931, and again in 1948.^
Moreover, although a country as a whole may
have a female surplus, particular areas or communities
may have a surplus of males, and without contracting
marriages outside the community, the level of polygamy
may still he very high. For example, the Nigerian
Population Census, 1953, shows a female surplus for the
5
country as a whole, and this female surplus is reflected 
in the Regional figures, hut Ibadan and Rivers Provinces 
show a male predominance of 1,023 and 1,018 respectively 
in every thousand females, while the figures for Lagos 
Township in December 1952, registered 1,041 males to 
every thousand females. Yet polygamy flourishes in 
these areas. That there is still a significant incidence 
of polygamy in these areas, for example, in Ibadan and 
Lagos, as compared with areas with a female surplus, 
negates the supposition that there must be a female 
surplus in order for polygamy to exist.
The persistence of polygamy in the presence of
7
a male surplus lends support to the findings of Dorjahn,
1. See Van de Walle, "Marriage in African Censuses, and
Enquiries" in Demography of Tropical Africa edit, by
William Brass op.cit. p.218.
2. See Hastings, Christian Marriage in Africa, op.cit.
pp.130, 132.
3. See Dorjahn, op.cit. p.107.
4. See Dorjahn, op.cit. p.107; see also Kenya and South
Africa, Hastings, Christian Marriage in Africa, op.
cit. p. 131•
5. Population Census of Nigeria, 1952-53, op.cit.
Table 1, p.2.
6. Ibid.; Table 2, p.3; par. 54, Population Census, 
Western Nigeria, (Government Printer, Western Nigeria, 
1952).
7. Dorjahn, op.cit. p.108.
335
who, from comparison of statistical data from Africa,
rejected the hypothesis that polygyny is possible because
there are more women than men, and even where there was
a surplus of females, he noted that it was by no means
sufficient to account for the incidence of polygyny in
the various parts of Africa.
It should be noted that the existence of
polygamy in the presence of a male surplus mentioned
above would not be affected to any great extent by the
fact that men marry at a later age than women since the
mean age of first marriage of men and women shows an
increasingly closer approximation in m o d e m  Nigeria.^"
Begho states that "unlike Rome in the days of
Romulus there were sufficient women in Nigeria that
marrying more than one could not be regarded as anti- 
2
social”. The writer gave no indication of the relative 
number of men and women he had in mind, but most of the 
published estimates of the ratio of imbalance between the 
sexes in the Nigeria population do not seem to justify 
his conclusions. A census taken in Lagos in 1872 showed 
that there were 27,774 men and 32,353 women among the 
population of African origin. There were therefore 886 
male to every thousand female, or 1:1,1. This seems to 
be the greatest surplus of women over men ever recorded 
in any part of Nigeria within the last 100 years,^ and it 
can hardly justify polygamy.
5
Dorjahn rejects the assumption that many men go 
through life unmarried so that a few can be polygamous, 
but gives no reason for doing so. Felkin states that 
among the Baganda, the proportion of females to males was 
3i:l. Yet, owing to the frequency of polygamy, a large 
number of the poorer men were unable to marry. This
1. See below, Chapter V.
2. Begho, op.cit. p. 27.
3. Vogt, "Die Bewotwer Von Lagos”, in Globus XLI, p.253, 
cited by Westermarck, History of Human Marriage.
Vol.Ill, op.cit. p. 60.
4. See the 1911, 1921, 1933, 1952/53 and 1963 censuses.
5. Dorjahn, op.cit., p.108.
6. R.W. Felkin, Notes on the Waganda Tribe of Central 
Africa, in Proceedings, Royal Soc. Edinburgh, 1886, 
Vol.XIII, p.744 as cited by Westermarck, op.cit. p.35»
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assertion is disputed by Westermarck, who contends that
it is not "likely that men had to remain unmarried on
account of poverty in those primitive conditions where
there was no accumulated property worth speaking of".^
Felkin1s findings were substantiated, however, by
information collected during field-work for this thesis.
Older informants generally agreed that, in spite of the
relatively lower cost of marrying a wife in traditional
society, there were many men who were unable to marry
2
because of poverty.
It is suggested that both Westermarck and 
Dorjahn arrived at their conclusions because they neg­
lected the important economic factor which contributes 
to the acquisition of many wives, and which also deter­
mines the choice of a husband. In a society where men 
have identical financial status, and where a fairly 
balanced sex ratio prevails, polygamy would not thrive. 
Morgan*s observation that "in its highest and regulated 
form it presupposes a considerable advance of society, 
together with the development of inferior and superior 
classes, and of some kinds of wealth”, remains true 
today, not only of the practice of polygamy, but some 
mothers even prefer their daughters to have affairs
with prosperous and influential men, rather than to marry
Ll
a man of low social status.
1. Westermarck, A Short History of Marriage, op.cit. p.35.
2. For example, among the Ibibios, dowry ranged from as 
little as 100 manilas (less than £2), yet it was 
asserted by many informants in Eket that there were 
bachelors who could not afford to marry because of 
poverty; recorded interviews with Mrs. Neato Edem, 
and Madam Judith Coffe Mbang, held on 19 August, 1977 
at Eket.
3. Morgan, Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity, op.cit. 
p. 477; see also Villar. The ^Polygamous Sex .op. cit. p. 70.
4. See Mara K. Larson, "Changing Marriage Patterns in 
West Africa with Special Reference to Nigeria",
M. Phil. Thesis, London University, 1968, p.237;
A. Izzett, "Family Life Among the Yoruba in Lagos, 
Nigeria", in Social Change in Modern Africa, edit, by 
Aidan Southall, op.cit. p.3^7.
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Illiterate girls usually prefer to be one of 
the multiple wives of a wealthy husband rather than the 
sole wife of an indigent man, and a few educated women 
may make a similar choice. Unequal distribution of 
wealth and social prestige, makes polygamy feasible more 
than a surplus of females does. Women generally move up 
the ladder, even in economically advanced countries,1 and 
in Nigeria where the economic and social status of women 
are considerably below those of men, and wives generally 
identify with the status of their husbands, the tendency 
to marry for economic reasons remains a significant con­
tributor to polygamy. This tendency decreases with the
2
education of women.
(Ill) The need to provide for widows under the levirate 
and analogious systems
In many African systems of law, a man inherited
the wives of certain deceased relatives. Similarly,
among some communities, a traditional ruler, for example,
the Oba (king) of Lagos, inherited the surviving wives of
his predecessor in office, regardless of his previous
Zi
marital status. Refusal was considered a serious breach 
of familial obligations or tribal political tradition, and 
considerable pressures would be exerted on an individual
1. See Villar, The Polygamous Sex, op.cit. p.41.
2. See Remy Clignet, Many Wives. Many Powers: Authority
and Power in Polygynous Families, op^cit. p.33«
3. See further, below, Chapter XIII, pp.438-442.
4. See Itse Sagay, "Multiple Marriages in Nigeria: A
Conflict of Law with Culture", Nigerian Bar Journal. 
Vol. XII 1974, pp.82-87, at p.82; see also Nigerian 
Sunday Times, 31 December, 1972 which reported the 
statutory marriage of Oba Oyekan of Lagos, although
he had allegedly inherited several of his predecessor’s 
wives; D.A. Ijalaye, "Marriage Laws in Nigeria: 
Harmonisation or Unification", Nigerian Bar Journal. 
Vol.XII, 1974, p.21-31 at p.24.
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to secure compliance* Such laws obviously encourage poly­
gamy,. and in traditional society, the so-called "widow 
inheritance" was a popular method of acquiring multiple 
wives•
In modern Nigerian society, however, such 
marriages are becoming increasingly rare, and a breach of 
the law in this respect earns no censure. Frequently, a 
young widow remarries to a non-member of her deceased 
husband’s family, while older widows are maintained by 
their adult children* This law, therefore, can no longer 
be regarded as a valid reason for polygamy, although the 
system may facilitate the taking of multiple wives, and 
may be used as a convenient justification for polygamy, 
especially where the man involved had previously con­
tracted a statutory marriage, and is thereby legally 
incapable of contracting a second marriage during the 
subsistence of the first.
The expedient use of the system is illustrated 
in a case which occurred recently in Onitsha. The parties 
were married under the Nigerian Marriage Act, before 
proceeding for England to undertake further studies. After 
nearly fifteen years of marriage, they had no children* 
i While they were still resident in England the husband 
returned to Nigeria, and, unknown to the wife, "married” 
his deceased younger brother’s wife* The brother had died 
during the Nigerian Civil War, leaving a young widow but 
no children. The wife only learnt of the "marriage" when 
she returned to Nigeria later, and this lack of communication 
eventually led to the first wife obtaining a divorce. The 
first wife maintained that it was not the fact of the 
"marriage” but rather the clandestine manner in which it 
was contracted that excited her hostility, but there is 
evidence that educated Nigerian women do not usually 
tolerate polygamy under whatever guise it is practised.
This case raises the interesting question as 
to the legality of the husband’s alleged "marriage” with 
his deceased brother’s wife. The husband-was married 
under the Nigerian Marriage Act, and therefore incapable 
of contracting a further marriage during the subsistence
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of his first marriage.'1’ Is inheritance of a wife under
such circumstances considered to be a valid customary
marriage? If it is, the husband1s purported second
2
marriage is void. If it is considered a right of 
inheritance and not a marriage, the union between the 
husband and his deceased brother1s wife would be a valid 
customary union, which falls short of the status of 
marriage, (a sort of concubinage).
It is respectfully submitted for reasons given 
later, that "wife-inheritance** is a marriage, and what 
the inheritor inherits in such a case is not a wife, but 
rather the dowry the deceased husband paid for the widow, 
which entitles him to be considered as a prospective 
husband of the widow if they both consent. If this 
viewpoint is accepted, the purported marriage of the 
husband to his deceased brother*s wife before the 
dissolution of his statutory marriage is void and 
attracts criminal liability under the Nigerian Marriage 
Act.'*
5. Incidence of polygamy in Nigeria
The high incidence of polygamy among kings and
Zf
chiefs has already been noted. Among the generality of
the Nigerian population, however, there is evidence which
indicates that even in traditional society, the number
of wives each man had very seldom exceeded two or three,
while many men had only one wife. Ward, writing about the
Yoruba states that among the rank and file
"monogamy is the common form. This however is 
not from choice but is mainly due to the 
relatively high bride price...Except where
1. See further below, Chapter X.
2. Marriage Act, cap 115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 Revision, S.35.
3. Ibid., s.47.
4. See above, pp.311-312.
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chance or inheritance throws another wife in his 
way, the commoner remains a monogamist all his 
life”
Johnson asserts that in ancient times "the
Yorubas were mostly monogamic; not from any enlightened
views on the subject, however, but rather from necessity;
for although polygamy was not actually forbidden, yet
only rich folks could avail themselves of indulgence in
2
that condition of life”• As long ago as the seventeenth
century Bosman recorded of the Benins: "The Men here
Marry as many Women as their Cirexamstances will allow 
3
them to keep". Similar statements are made about
L
other Nigerian tribes.
Murdock rejects the criterion of numerical 
preponderance to classify a society as monogamous or 
polygamous, since monogamous xonions nearly always out­
number polygynous ones at any given period of observation, 
even in societies where the preference for plural wives 
is extreme. He classifies a society as polygynous 
"whenever the culture permits and public opinion encourages, 
a man to have more than one wife at a time, whether such 
unions are common or comparatively rare, confined to men
1. Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba. 1937, p.41.
2. Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op.cit. p.113.
Cf. Akiga, Akiga's Story, op.cit. pp.313, 349; the Tiv 
traditionally were also mostly monogamous; polygamy 
was forced on them by epidemics which depleted the 
population.
3. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description, op.cit. p.441
4. See generally, Bohannan, "The Tiv of Nigeria" in 
Peoples of Africa, edit, by James Gibbs, op.cit. p.327; 
Roth, op.cit. p.40; Basden, Niger Ibos. op.cit. p.228; 
M.J. Mortimore, and J. Wilson, Land and People in the 
Kano Close-Settled Zone: A Survey of Some Aspects of 
Rural Economy in the Ungogo District. Kano Province 
(Ahmadu Bello University, Department of Geography, 
Occasional Paper, No. 1, March, 1965), p.31; Nadel,
A Black Byzantium, op.cit. p.358; Meek, Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit. p.193; Jordon, Bishop 
Shanahan of Southern Nigeria. 1949,. o p . cit. p . 222.
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of outstanding prestige or allowed to anyone who can 
afford them” .1 In all cases where polygamy enjoys 
superior prestige, and is not the exclusive prerogative 
of a very small status group, he assumed that polygamy 
is the cultural norm.
It has been previously shown that polygamy in 
traditional Nigeria was extremely prestigious, a wlaudable 
ambition” of most men. Despite the preponderance of
'Yf]
monogal.ous unions, traditional Nigerian societies could
be characterised as culturally polygamous according to
Murdock*s definition.
The extent to which this characterization can
be validly applied to modern Nigerian societies is difficult
2
to determine for Nigeria as a whole. In the Moslem areas,
and possibly among the rural Yoruba Moslems elsewhere,
polygamy continues to be accorded high prestige, but among
educated Yorubas, and the other communities in the Southern
States of Nigeria, polygamy can no longer be sai'd to be the 
4cultural norm. ,
For example, field-work for this thesis was done 
in two villagesLin OnitshaT In one of these villages,
Uifiudei Village, it was not possible to find a man who was
currently living with more than one wife, although a few 
of the older men, at one time or the other, had been 
polygamously married. In the other village, Ogboli Eke, 
informants could recall only about six cases where older 
men were currently married to, and living with, two or 
more wives. Two of these men were interviewed. One had 
two, and the other three, wives. In neither village was
1. Murdock, Social Structure, op.cit. p.28
2. See below, Chapter IX, pp. 23-37.
3. See Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, 
op.cit. p.73. See Marris, Family and Social Change
m  an African City: A Study of Rehousing in Lagos, op. 
cit. pp.47-48; but see Elias. The Nigerian Legal 
System, op.cit. pp.296-297*
4. See Table 4:2 below.
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there a case of polygamy among the under-thirty age group.
In the thirty-to-fifty age group, there was only one man 
who had two wives. When his first wife was interviewed she 
described him as a "foolish man who says he has married a 
second wife when he cannot even support his children".
Although admittedly she was his wife, she alleged that she 
was not living with him, nor was she being maintained by 
him. It was evident that they were husband and wife in 
name only.
Ohadike notes that, of all aspects of traditional 
family life, the decline of polygamy particularly in the 
urban areas would seem to be one of the most likely 
casualties of social changes?" This statement seems 
generally true, as several recent surveys of various 
Nigerian urban and rural areas, especially of the Yorubas, 
have established. For example, a survey of 776 domestic 
units of Yoruba cocoa farmers, in 1956, revealed that the 
greater majority of the farmers appear to have either one 
wife or two; 34,9% had one wife, and 32.4% had two wives.
Of all the units 62.6 were polygamous, 35% monogamous and 
2.4 wifeless.
Yoloye, who conducted a survey in 1967 in three
types of schools in seven rural areas in Western Region
of Nigeria, recorded a similar finding. The large 
majority of children in all three types of schools came 
from polygamous homes; 76.4%, 79.6% and 77.6% for primary,
3
secondary modern, and secondary grammar schools respectively. 
These findings could be compared with that of
1. P.O. Ohadike, "A Demographic Note on Marriage, Family 
and Family Growth in Lagos, Nigeria" in The Population
of Tropical Africa, edit, by John C. Caldwell and
Chukuku Okonjo, op.cit. pp.380-382.
2. See Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers 
op.cit. p.73; Cf. I.H. Vanden Driesen; Some 
""observations on the Family Unit, Religion and the 
Practice of Polygyny", 42, Africa, 1972, pp.44-36.
3. E.A. Yoloye, "Socio-Economic Background and School 
Population: A Survey of the Background of Children in 
Three Types of Schools in Western Region of Nigeria", 
(Unpublished Ms. 1967), p.6.
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Marris, who conducted a social survey in three areas in
and around Lagos in 1958/59 and found that 38% of all
male householders interviewed were polygamous.^ The
majority were therefore monogamous. Similarly, a small
random sample survey of the municipal area of Lagos in
1964, established that 68.6% of the wives interviewed
2
were monogamous and 31.4 polygamous.
Okonjo also recorded a differential intensity 
of polygamy between urban and rural areas among the Igbos. 
In two districts of Enugu Urban, 8% and 14% of house­
holders interviewed were married polygamously, while 
18% and 23% were recorded for the nearby rural areas of
3
Okpatu and Udi. The degree of polygamy recorded among 
the Igbos by Okonjo spotlights a differential of 
intensity of practice by Yorubas and Ibos, which will 
be further highlighted shortly by research findings 
during fieldwork in Ibadan and Ejigbo, and Onitsha and 
Nsukka communities.
From the above figures given for rural and urban 
polygamy it may be concluded that the incidence of 
polygamy is higher in the urban areas than it is in the 
rural areas of any ethnic group, but this is not univer­
sally true as the interesting survey carried out in 1966 
in one urban and one rural area among the Igbo and Yoruba
respectively, and one rural area among the Ibibio clearly 
Zi
shows. The project was launched by the Institute of 
Education, University of Ibadan, to research into the 
characteristics of physical and behavioural development 
of children in the main linguistic and ethnic groups of 
Nigeria. On the whole, there was a trend towards mono­
gamous marriages. Of the 925 families studied, 552 were 
monogamous while 373 were polygamous. The statistics
1. Marris, op.cit. p.48.
2. See Ohadike, op.cit. p.381, Table 1.
3. Okonjo, The Impact of Urbanization. 1970, p.160.
4. Ngwobia Uka, Growing Up in Nigerian Culture, op.cit. 
p. 14.
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were as follows:
TABLE 4:1
Household Arrangements5
Centre
Monogamous
households
Polygamous
households
Total Percentage of
polygamous
households
ABA Urban 115 50 165 30.3
Ibadan Urban 109 79 188 42
Ifeodan Rural 102 136 238 57.1
Ihioma Rural 112 46 158 29.1
Ikot Ada Idem 114 62 176 35.2
SOURCE:Ngwobia Uka, Growing up in Nigeria, op.cit. p.14; 
percentages (final column) added.
It can he seen that there were more monogamous 
than polygamous households in all areas except the rural 
Yoruba area of Ifeodan.^ There was a greater number of 
polygamous households in Aba (Igbo) urban, than at 
Ihioma (Igbo) rural, which contradicts the hypothesis that 
polygamy is more common in rural than in urban areas. The 
Yoruba/Igbo differential is confirmed. A higher percentage 
of polygamous families is recorded for the Ibibios than 
for the Igbos, while among the three ethnic groups, the 
Yorubas register the highest percentage of polygamous 
households.
Table 4:2 records the findings of the present
writer1s field research. It was found necessary to
classify interviewees according to age-groups, as the
2
incidence of polygamy tends to rise with age. The degree
1. Table 4:1 and see Uka, op.cit. p.14.
2. Ardener found that the distribution of Bakweri women1s 
age-groups showed a direct general relationship of 
polygamy to age, the percentage being 20% in the youngest 
age group, and 38.5 % in the oldest; see Edwin Ardener, 
Divorce and Fertility: An African Study, (London:
Oxford University Fress, 1962), p.33.
345
of polygamy found in four of the communities in the 
Southern States, during field-work is set out in Table 
4:2 under three age groups as follows:
TABLE 4:2
INCIDENCE OF POLYGAMY AMONG MARRIED 
MALE INTERVIEWEES1
Age of Male Interviewees
Area Below 
30 yrs.
30->50 yrs. Above 
50 yrs.
Total
Inter-
Percentages
Married
Mon. Poly. Mon. Poly. Mon.Poly. V 1CWCU JT UJ-y gCUIL—ously
Onitsha 
(urban) 11 Nil 18 1 26 2 58 5.1
Nsukka
(urban) 8 Nil 18 9 1 4 40 32.5
Ibadan
(urban) 2 Nil 6 2 12 5 27 25.9
Ejigbo
(rural) 1 Nil 2 Nil 1 3 7 42.8
22 Nil 44 12 40 14 132
From Table 4:2 it can be concluded that in all 
four communities studied, monogamous marriages greatly 
exceeded polygamous marriages, and polygamy reached its 
lowest ebb in the urban area of Onitsha, even among the 
oldest age group. Only 5.1 percent of the 53 men inter­
viewed there were married polygamously at the time of 
interview. This accords with the figure for Enugu Urban 
found by Shields in 1965, when 5*8 percent of 853 households 
interviewed were found to be polygamous, and also with 
Okonjo*s finding that 8 percent, and 14 percent of
1. E'jigbo is taken here as rural, but the population as 
recorded in the 1963 Census was 46,410; Compare the 
population of Ibadan, 627,379 and Onitsha Town, 
163,032. The statistics for Nsukka were obtained from 
interviews in two villages, Akpa-Edem and Orba.
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households were polygamous in two different districts of 
Enugu Urban. However, it is interesting to note the 
great variation between the two urban areas of Onitsha 
and Enugu, and the urban area of Aba, in which 30.3 
percent of 165 households interviewed were polygamous.
In all three areas the population is predominantly Igbo.
The discrepancy may be accounted for by the 
fact that Enugu is a city of civil servants who cannot 
afford to be polygamous. Aba and Onitsha are both large 
trading centres, with uneducated, but prosperous business­
men, but the men interviewed'at Onitsha for the present 
study, belonged to the indigenous community, and their 
life-style is in contrast with that of the business 
community found at the Water-side Area. The date may 
also be important: the Aba survey was conducted in I960, 
the Enugu study in 1965-1966, and the Onitsha: figures 
were obtained in 1978.
These figures, although they represent very 
small samples of the communities, are primitive guides 
as to the extent to which polygamy is still being 
practised in the various Nigerian communities. They do 
not, however, attest the decline of polygamy asserted by 
many writers. A rough index of the decline of polygamy 
is provided by the marital'genealogy of the households in 
which the interviewees grew up. The total number of 
households interviewed in the Southern States, for the 
purposes of this thesis was 349. Only one person was 
interviewed in each household, and they were asked to 
give the marital history of the male head of the house­
hold in which they grew up (in most cases their father!s 
household). The number of wives married by the 349 male 
heads of households in which the interviewees grew up 
was 1,318 wives, giving a mean average of 3.7 wives for 
each household head. But the 132 men interviewed, 
together married only 173 wives, a mean average of 1.3 
wives per man.
A clearer picture emerges if the 28 men above 
fifty years old, interviewed in Onitsha are taken.
Although at the time of the interview, only two of them
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were polygamously married, as previously noted, all but 
five of them had previously been polygamously married.
The aggregate number of wives married by the 28 men was 
50, an average of 1.7 wives per man, but the fathers of 
these men had between them 106 wives, an average of 3.8 
wives per man. This differential provides some evidence 
of the decline of polygamy.
60 Concubinage
In some systems of law, apart from the wife or
wives a man is allowed to marry, he is also permitted to
have one or more concubines, with a legal status inferior
in most cases to that of a wife.'*' For example, according
to Islamic law, a man may marry four wives, but there is
2
no legal limit to the number of concubines he may have.
Similarly, according to the marriage customs of old
China, it was customary for a man to take a principal wife,
the tpais first (though not invariably), in a formal
ceremony; the husband was free to take as many tsips, or
11 secondary wives” as he liked, and a formal ceremony was 
3
not required.
Concubinage in such cases is a legally recog­
nized institution, and the concubine and her children 
have certain defined legal rights and obligations. To 
what extent does Nigerian customary law recognize the 
status of concubinage?
The question is a difficult one, due to the 
fact that various writers use different terms to designate 
the same institution. For example, with reference to the 
system whereby two levels of dowry payments operate in 
the same community, Esenwa refers to the union which is
1. See Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit. p.253;
concubinage is a type of marriage in which the woman 
occupies an inferior social position to that of the 
true wife in the same community.
2. See further, below, Chapter IX.
3. See Cheang Thye Phin v. Tan Ah Loy [1920] A.C.369;
This was also the law in Singapore until.1961, when the 
Women*s Charter of Singapore was passed, and marriages 
since then are strictly monogamous; see Poon v„ Tan [1973] 
4 Family Law Report. 1974, p.l6l.
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contracted by the payment of a small dowry, usually in
the form of presents, as "concubinage", and the union
contracted by a high dowry payment as "marriage" ."*■ Obi
takes a similar view, and "marriage by consent only",
which,as previously stated,is popular among some Yoruba
communities, he dismisses as "concubinage" and not 
2marriage.
Meek, writing of Owerri Igbos in 1937
states:
"There is in the Owerri Division a legitimate form 
of paramour relationship known as Iko-mbara. By 
this a husband allows a friend or acquaintance to 
sleep with his wife regularly on one night of the 
eight day .week. The paramour is required to give 
the husband a gift of two jars of wine, one leg 
of meat, a chicken, and some cash. He is also 
expected to assist the husband in farm work, 
when called upon. The practice is particularly 
common in cases of elderly men married to young 
women".
3
Uchendu, who wrote of concubinage among the Ngwa
Igbos, characterizes the institution of wife lending (or
renting?) described by Meek, and all other forms of
recognized and approved sexual intercourse between a man
and a woman as "concubinage". Thus he stigmatizes
"woman-to-woman marriage", whereby the "wife" of a female
"husband" consorts with a chosen paramour, and the system
of idegbe under which a father retains one of his unmarried
daughters to beget children (by a paramour) who would be
4affiliated to the fatherfs lineage, as "concubinage".
There is little evidence, however, of a system 
of concubinage comparable to that of Islamic or Chinese 
customary law, under which a man cohabits with a wife or 
wives, as well as with other women occupying the legal 
position of "secondary wives", with defined rights and
1. Esenwa, op.cit. p.73.
2. Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit. p.158.
3. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, op.cit.
p« 276.
4. See Victor C. Uchendu, "Concubinage Among Ngwa Igbo 
of Southern Nigeria", 35 Africa. 1965, pp.187-196 at 
pp. 189, 192.
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obligations, existing among any of the main ethnic groups 
in Nigeria. In Agongo v. Asekile and Anor,"^  it was stated 
that Yoruba customary law Recognizes concubinage in 
favour of the man and disallows it for the woman” . It is 
respectfully submitted that there is no evidence of con­
cubinage as a recognized legal status in Yoruba customary 
law or indeed in any other customary law in Nigeria. The 
various Nigerian institutions which writers refer to as 
concubinage are essentially different in form to con­
cubinage in which a man cohabits with two or more women 
simultaneously, the women being assigned different legal 
status.
7. The status of wives in polygamous households
What is the legal status of the wives in a poly­
gamous household? Do all the wives of a polygamous husband 
have equal rights and duties, regardless of age or the 
sequence of marriage? Has the husband a duty not to 
discriminate among his several wives in all matters? Is 
it discrimination to treat a wife from a low social or 
economic background in the same manner as a wife who, 
previous to her marriage, was higher up the social scale?
Of the legal status of the wives in a polygamous 
household among .the Igbos, Basden states:
"Whilst polygamy is recognised as an integral part 
of the social economy of the Ibos, yet in actual 
fact one wife only is specifically acknowledged.
In native law the first wife alone is granted the 
position and rights of a legal wife. She alone 
bears the title of "anasi” and,...in every way the 
distinction between the first wife and the others 
is clearly defined, showing that, in principle, 
the Ibo recognises but one legal wife".^
It is respectfully submitted that this statement, 
insofar as it relates to the legal status of the wives,
1. [1967] N.M.L.R.21.
2. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op.cit. pp.97-98;
Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit. pp.£28-229*
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cannot be supported with reference to Igbo, or most other
Nigerian customary laws.'*' There is evidence that the
senior wife of a polygynist is treated with a greater
measure of respect than his other wives, among most
communities. For example, among the Yorubas, a junior
wife is expected to prostrate before a senior wife, and
2
to perform certain services for her. There is also some
evidence that in domestic matters, the senior wife
usually has some measure of control over the other wives,
and she also has the duty of performing certain religious
3
rites for her husband. None of these rights or obligations 
are, strictly speaking, legal obligations, nor do they give
Zj.
her a superior legal status.
Seniority in most societies is reckoned from the 
time of a woman*s marriage into the family, and not 
according to the relative ages of the wives. It is there­
fore possible for a much younger woman to be senior to an
5
older woman, in terms of age.
The husband has no legal duty not to discriminate 
among his several wives, although it may be politic for him 
to be impartial, in order to secure a greater degree of 
domestic harmony.
Each wife has a right to be provided with living 
accommodation in her husband's compound, (or by mutual 
agreement, elsewhere), and in a trading community, for 
example among the Yorubas, to be given an initial capital
1. See Daryl Forde, "Double Descent Among the Yako", in 
African Systems of Kingship and Marriage, edit.by 
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, op.cit. pp.326-327.
2. See Fadipe, op.cit. pp.114-115; Meek, Northern Tribes 
of Nigeria, op.cit. p.196; Of. Izzett, Family Life 
Among the Yoruba, op.cit. p.306.
3. See Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op.cit. p.97; 
Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit. p.196;
Thomas. Ibo Speaking Peoples, op.crt. Part IV, p.63; 
Westermarck, op.cit. Vol.Ill, p.29; A.J.N. Tremearne,
The Tailed Head-Hunters of Nigeria (London: Seeley 
Service and Co. Ltd., 1912), p.235.
4. See Forde et al, The Peoples of the Niger Benue Con­
fluence, op.cit. p.68; Stenning, ''Household Viability 
Among the Pastoral Fulani", op.cit. pp.109-110.
5. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit. p.92; Fadipe, op. 
cit. p.114; Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, op. 
cit. p.86; Ellis, The Yoruba-2peaking Peoples, op.crtT
p .182.
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for the start of her trading activities. In a farming 
community each wife is entitled to a share of her 
husband!s yams, etc., and land for farming purposes.^
In many communities, each wife has a duty to 
provide the food, and to cook for her husband for a 
specific period, usually a week. During the week she 
cooks for him, she usually also spends the nights with 
him. But the husband is free to decide his own house­
hold arrangements, and provided a wife is not totally 
neglected materially, or sexually, she cannot complain 
of unequal treatment, even if she is the first wife.
Among many Igbo societies, for example, Onitsha, 
when a husband becomes a member of a titled society, such 
as the Ozo titled society”, as a climax to the ceremonies 
of initiation, he publicly embraces his first son, first 
daughter, and first wife, three times respectively, and 
presents them with gifts of money. If, for any reason, 
the first wife is unable, or refuses to take part in this 
ceremony, no one, including the other wives, can deputise
for her. The initiate has to pay a fine instead, if the
2
first wife is absent. The ceremony of embracing of the 
first wife has given rise to certain complications and 
there are many cases in Onitsha recently where a husband 
has preferred to pay a fine rather than to greet the
3
woman who is legally considered to be his first wife.
Although Basden uses the embracing of the 
first wife to support his contention that 11 the first
1. See below, Chapter VII.
2. See Nnabuenyi Stephen Aniweta Chukwudebe, Onitsha 
Quo Vadis. compiled and edited by Ben Chukwudebe, 
(Onitsha, Nigeria, n.d.), pp.23-30; see also
S.I. Bosah, Ground of the History and Culture of 
Onitsha. (Onitsha, Nigeria, n.d.;, pp.153-159•
3. For example in a ceremony witnessed by the present
writer during field-work in Onitsha, the initiate
refused to greet as his first wife a woman married
for him by his parents when he was a small child, and
with whom he had never lived, or associated, as man 
and wife. Legally, she was considered to be his first
wife, although he had married a wife for himself, whom
he had lived with, and by whom he had many children.
He opted for the payment of a fine when it was ruled 
by the community, that he could not greet the second
wife.
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Woman dancing in preparation to embrace her hus­
band who is in the process of being initiated 
into the Agbalanze Society. The embracing ceremony 
is the climax of the initiation procedure
353
The typical dress worn when a woman’s husband 
is being initiated into the Agbalanze society
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woman the man marries alone enjoys the privilege which 
belong to a legal wife”, it should be noted that the 
Ozo title is a socio-religious institution, which, 
because of the expenses involved, few men can become 
members of. It is not part and parcel of Igbo customary 
law.
8. Attitudes to polygamy in Nigeria
A. The attitude of the Government
The Colonial Administration in Nigeria adopted 
a tolerant attitude towards the practice of polygamy* 
Unlike the position in some other colonial territories 
where polygamy is prohibited by s t a t u t e t h e  Marriage 
Ordinance which introduced statutory marriage and 
monogamy into Nigeria expressly recognized the validity 
of customary marriage, and specifically provided that 
nothing contained therein "shall affect the validity of
any marriage contracted under or in accordance with any
2 3native law or custom..*." As will be seen later, the
colonial government entertained the hope that with the
introduction of statutory monogamous marriage, the
indigenous population would eventually adopt monogamy
as the preferred form of marriage*
The attitude of subsequent Nigerian governments
on this issue is one of indifference. The legality of
polygamy in the customary laws of the various ethnic
communities, as well as in Islamic law, is legally
recognized, but the practice of polygamy is not actively
encouraged. In many cases, the polygamously married
spouse is not treated differently from a monogamously
married one. For example, under the Income Tax
1. See e.g. the recent Belgian Decree, (Decret du 4 Avril 
1950 relatif a 1 Tinterdiction de la polygamie)which
withholds recognition from any polygamous marriage con* 
tracted after 1950, see Phillips and Morris, Marriage 
Laws in Africa* op.cit. p*88.
2. See Marriage Ordinance, 1884, S.37; see also S.35, 
Marriage Act, Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
35. See below, Chapter XI.
355
Management Act, 1961,^ a husband who has two or more
wives is given an income tax allowance for only one
wife. Under the same Decree, each taxpayer is entitled
to income tax allowance for four children and one
dependent relative. In the case of married couples,
however, the spouses together are entitled to allowances
for four children and one dependent relative. Where a
man is polygamously married, he and his several wives
are counted as one unit, and can together claim for
2
four children and one dependent relative only. In 
other words, no account is taken of his polygamous status.
It is submitted that the system of taxation 
under the Income Tax Decree discriminates against the 
polygamously married man, and indirectly, discourages
3
polygamy.
B. Popular attitudes
The attitudes of Nigerians to the practice of 
polygamy in the modern society reveal some slight 
differences between men and women, and between the old 
and the young. While 89.2 percent of the women inter­
viewed during field-work for this thesis advocated 
monogamy as the better form of marriage for Nigeria in 
future, only 83.8 percent of the men interviewed were 
of that opinion. (Table 4:3). Of the interviewees below 
thirty years of age, 95 percent preferred monogamy, com­
pared with 84.3 percent, and 23 percent among the 30-35 
years-old, and above 50 years old, age groups respectively.
(1) Women*s attitudes. There is abundant evidence that 
traditionally, most women were in favour of polygamy,
1. No. 21 of 1961, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
S.20A, as amended by the Income Tax Management (Uniform 
Taxation Provisions Etc.) Decree, 1975.
2. Ibid.,S.20A.
3. See I. Olu Agbede, Recognition of Double Marriage in 
Nigeria, Int. and Comp. Law Quarterly, 1968, Vol.17, 
pp.735-743 at p.743, who opines that there is a policy ■ 
both legislative and judicial to discourage polygamy 
and encourage monogamy, in Nigeria.
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especially those who were senior wives, and who invariably
shared the prestige of the husband. Talbot notes that
among the communities in the Southern States, not only do
wives like to have others in the house to help with the
work, and to provide society, but the more numerous they
are, the higher is their social standing, particularly
1 2that of the senior wife. Meek makes a similar state­
ment with reference to the communities in the Northern 
States. He adds that "it is commonly the wife who incites 
her husband to add to the number of his wives, no doubt 
with a view to lightening her domestic burdens", while 
Basden notes that "it is not uncommon to find that women 
are stout protagonists of polygamy"•
Women*s attitude to polygamy has changed, con­
siderably, and there are very few women who, in normal
circumstances, would incite their husbands to take another
wife., in the modern society. Among the reasons given by
persons who were interviewed during field-work, for the
abolition of polygamy, jealousy among the wives of a
polygamous family appeared most often. Although some
writers assert the absence of jealousy among the wives in
traditional society, there is considerable evidence to
the contrary, and in fact, jealousy among wives was, and
continues to be, one of the chief deterrents to the
4practice of polygamy.
The jealousy of the wives is often transmitted, 
with disastrous consequences in some cases, to their off-
5
spring, and most children who grew up in polygamous 
households reject polygamy, because of the strife and
1. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.Vol.Ill,
p. 429; see also Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,pp.228-229.
2. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit. p.196.
3. Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit. p.228; See Stenning, 
"Household Viability Among the Pastoral Fulani," op.
cit., p. 110.
4. Stenning, "Household Viability Among the Pastoral 
Fulani", op.cit. p. 109; Galletti, Baldwin, and Dina, 
Nigerian Uocoa Farmers, op.cit. p.78.
3. See Theo Ola Fayiga, "Polygamy in African Society. A 
Drag.on Progress", The University Herald, Ibadan,
Vol.I, No.3, 1948, pp.2-3.
357
turmoils they had experienced as children. An example 
of this tendency appears in the autobiography of Nigeria’s 
veteran politician, Nnamdi Azikiwe. When his father took 
a second wife, Zik, as he is popularly known, had the 
opportunity of experiencing the canker which can consume 
the harmony of a family. He voiced his resentment of 
polygamy thus:
"My young mind revolted against polygamy. I saw 
my mother exchange blows with my father for no 
other reason than jealousy. And I saw my mother 
and the new wife exchange harsh words for the 
same reason. If father ate all the food cooked 
by one wife, then the other would regard it as 
evidence of father’s affection for that particular 
wife. If father chatted with one oftener than the 
other, then this was regarded as evidence of his 
affection. So our home became a madhouse. These 
conditions became unbearable and so my father and 
my mother agreed to disagree after seventeen years 
of married life11.^
By a remarkable coincidence, this was also the 
experience of another Nigerian veteran politician,
Obafemi Awolowo who, in an account of his early life 
described the shock he received from the "verbal virulence” 
and "disgraceful scenes" which followed the introduction
of a second wife into his father’s hitherto peaceful
2
household.
The jealousy of women in polygamous households 
is universal and is well-documented in the literature on 
polygamy. Thus Kimball Young, also a product of a poly­
gamous household, writing of Mormon polygamy, remarked:
"The greatest check upon the institution is the 
jealousy of the women...the idea is so generally 
distasteful to the present state of human nature 
that, as we might anticipate it is rarely possible 
to realize it".^
1. Nnamdi Azikwe, My Odyssey: An Autobiography, dp.cit. 
p.24. The author later changed his mind, and became 
"almost convinced that polygamy may be a better system 
of marriage designed for moral-living humanity, if all 
claims to moral-living can be realised without any 
hypocrisy", ibid., p.25.
2. See Obafemi Awolowo, My Early Life. (Lagos: Nigeria, 
John West Publications Ltd., 19b8), pp.22-23.
3. Kimball Young, Isn’t One Wife Enough. (New York, Henry 
Holt and Co., 1554), p.&O; see also Basden, Niger Ibos. 
op.cit. p.237; Shorter, op.cit.p.174.
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The natural tendency of humans to entertain 
feelings of jealousy was restrained and stifled by the 
advantages which, in traditional society accrued to 
women from the practice of polygamy. The fact that 
polygamy was the normal mode of life of people of 
prestige in the society also helped to alleviate feelings 
of jealousy aroused among the wives.
In modern society, the advantages of polygamy, 
as far as women are concerned, have largely disappeared, 
and jealousy, no longer saturated with compensations, 
coalesce with the subtle tincture of odium now attached 
to the status to render the modern woman an incompatible 
companion in polygamy.
(11) Men * s attitudes. Men in traditional society favoured 
polygamy. In addition to the prestige and economic value 
of many wives, there was also the ability of the husband 
of multiple wives to be independent of the tantrums of a 
disgruntled wife. "When one fails, another will minister 
to his needs", says Basden. "One wife may be at variance 
or physically unfit but another will serve him equally 
well"
The attitude of men in modern society towards 
polygamy is lukewarm, even in the rural areas. There 
are still a few men who assert a preference for polygamy, 
but usually they are men who have no personal experience 
of the practice. An interesting feature of the whole
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos. op.cit. pp.227-228.
2. Basden, Niger Ibos. op.cit. p.232; it is nevertheless 
not unknown for a husband with many wives to be forced 
to cook for himself because all his wives have refused 
to do so. One informant in Eket narrated the case of
a man who refused to sleep with, or eat the food cooked 
by his third wife. His two other wives who felt that 
he was unfair to the third wife refused to cook for, 
or sleep with, him, on the ground that it was not their 
turn. The embarrassed husband was forced to capitulate 
and to give the third wife her share of his affection.
3. See Galletti, Baldwin and Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers. 
op.cit. p .78.
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situation is that those with personal experience of 
polygamy are often also the advocates of monogamy, 
while some monogamists appear as advocates for polygamy 
- for example Burton, of whom it is said "there is no 
more rigid monogamist in existence than the traveller 
who in theory is an inveterate polygamist" While he 
advocated and defended polygamy, he himself never 
practised it. On the other hand, Chief Ozo of Oroko 
town in Nsukka, who claimed to have had five wives at 
one time, was particularly emphatic about the evils of 
polygamy. After an interview with the present writer 
when asked what message he had for the women of Nigeria, 
he replied "Tell Nigerian women to behave themselves so 
that their husbands would not take additional wives”.
He recounted his experience of the problems involved in 
a polygamous marriage, and denounced it as an undesirable 
practice, although previously he had five wives, and at 
the time of the interview still had two of them living 
with him.
C . The attitudes of the Churches
It is not feasible to deal comprehensively 
here with the various attitudes of the Christian Churches 
towards African polygamy, and reference should be made to
2 "5
the excellent treatises and monographs which deal with
1. Frances Hitchman, Richard E. Burton. His Early Private 
and Public Life (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle 
and Rivington, 1887), Vol.II, p.256.
2. See Phillips, Survey of African Marriage and Family 
Life, op.cit. pp.355-55$; Hastings, Christian Marriage 
in Africa, op.citj David Barrett, Schism and Renewal 
in Africa. 1968, op.cit; James Webster, The African 
Churches Among the Yoruba, 1888-1922, (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 1964); Mullin, The Catholic Church
in Modern Africa, op.cit.
3. e.g. Hillman, Polygamy Reconsidered: African Plural 
Marriages, op.cit; Trowell, The Passing of Polygamy,
_2E..£i£.
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the topic.
The policies of the churches with regard to 
polygamy show some slight variations, but generally they 
refused to baptise a polygamist unless he had first put 
away all but one of his wives, usually the first wife
he had married<, For example, Phillips reports of Roman
Catholic discipline concerning marriage in Africa as 
follows:
”The first marriage, though contracted under native 
law and custom, is considered a full binding 
marriage. When conversion takes place, the first
marriage is the only binding one unless the casus
apostolicus (1 Cor. vii. 10-16) comes into force.
In case the first wife deserts her husband because 
he has become a believer, he may marry whom he 
wishes, but a new Christian marriage has first to 
take place. If the wives of an unbeliever wish to 
become Christians, only the first one may be 
baptized and the others have to leave him. A poly­
gamist who refuses to let his wives go, except the 
first one, may not be accepted as a catechumen and 
may be baptized only in exceptional cases upon his 
death-bed”.-^
Macfarlan asserts, with some justification, that
in "nothing was the early work of the missionaries more
marked than in their endeavours to raise the position of 
2
women”. The contribution of the missionaries to women*s
3
education has been previously noted, and in later chapters, 
their attacks on many social and legal injustices against 
women will be mentioned. Unfortunately, however, in a 
few instances,the religious policies of the missions 
imposed hardships and injustices on the very women they were
1. Phillips, Survey of African Marriage, op.cit. p.355; 
see also Hastings, Christian Marriage in Africa.
op.cit. pp.9-10, 11; Eugene Stock, The History of 
the Church Missionary Society, (London: 1899), Vol.Ill, 
p.ill; Voi.il, p.64b; see also J.B. Webster,"Attitudes 
and Policies of the Yoruba African Churches Towards 
Polygamy”, in Christianity in Tropical Africa edit, 
by C.G. BSeta, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 
p. 225.
2. McFarlan, Calabar, The Church of Scotland Mission, 
op.cit. p.6l. ' ” ‘
3. See above, Chapter II.
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trying to protect. The policies of the Missions relating 
to polygamy are illustrative.
During field-work for this thesis quite a few 
women interviewed had been abandoned by their husbands in 
conformity with the policy of the Missions that a poly­
gamist could not be baptised unless he had divorced all 
but the first of his wives.^ The intensity of hostility 
against the Churches shown by these women provide some 
evidence of the hardships and sufferings this policy 
imposed on them. In some communities, discarded wives 
of polygamists found it difficult to remarry, and in cases 
where they were fortunate to remarry, they invariably con­
tracted less favourable marriages than their previous ones, 
due no doubt to depreciation in their social status.
The present policy of the Christian Churches in 
Nigeria continue to exclude a polygamous husband and his 
additional wives from becoming or remaining even as cate­
chumens. If they are already baptised, no positive action 
may be taken against them, although probably they would
not be permitted to take communion,or allowed to hold or retain
2any office in the Church.
9. Conclusion 
A, Types of marriage in Nigeria in the future
Controversies as to the types of marriage 
suitable for future generations are not confined to Africa, 
but they are intensified on the African continent because 
of the present legal recognition of polygamy in many of 
the countries, and the existence of several kinds of marriages
1. See Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op.cit. p.212, 
who reports the pa*bhe-tic story of an old Chief with 
three wives, who as a result of conversion to 
Christianity, believed that exclusion from holy 
communion meant eternal damnation; he did not wish to 
reject any of his wives, and since none of the ladies 
would consent to marry him, if the others were sent 
away, "he worried himself to a shamrock".
2. See generally, H.W. Turner, History of an African 
Independent Church: The Church of the Lord (Aladura), 
(London, Oxford University Press, 1967), Yol.l.
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in the same legal system. For example, in Nigeria, 
in addition.to monogamous marriage under the Marriage 
Act, customary laws and Islamic law permit polygyny, 
but the latter limits the number to four legal wives,^ 
while the former allows unlimited number of wives. If, 
therefore, polygamy is advocated, the further question 
arises whether any limit on the number of wives should 
be imposed.
Writers are consistent in asserting a decline
2
in the practice of polygyny in Africa, and this is
•3
certainly true of all parts of Nigeria. The factors 
operating to hasten this decline have already been noted. 
To reiterate briefly, they are, inter alia:
(i) the educational and social emancipation of women;
(ii) the high cost of maintaining a large family,
even in rural areas;
(iii) the mechanization of farming methods, negativing 
the need for intensive manual labour;
(iv) the growth of alternative avenues for expenditure, 
for example, improved housing, luxurious cars and 
other consumer commodities;
(v) a definite shift in the symbols of prestige from
the large family of many wives and children to
educational and material achievements.
1. See further, below Chapter IX.
2. See e.g. Ohadike, op.cit., p.391; Hastings Church 
and Mission in Modern Africa,op.cit. p. 171;
Trowell, op.cit. John C. Caldwell« Population Growth 
and Family Change in Africa: The New Urban Elite in 
Ghana (Canberra7 Australian National University Press, 
1968), p. 71.
3. See Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op.cit. p.296; 
Uka, o p .cit. p.l4; Larson. Changing Marriage Patterns 
in West Africa, op.cit. p.2AO.
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TABLE 4:3. PREFERRED FORM OF MARRIAGE FOR NIGERIA IN THE FUTURE
Answers given in response to the following question: What 
form of marriage would you advocate for Nigeria in the future?
(a) polygamous marriage (more than one wife at a time);
(b) monogamous marriage (one husband or wife at a time);
(c) polyandrous marriage (more than one husband at a time).
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TABLE 4:4. PREFERRED FORM OF MARRIAGE BY AGE GROUPS
Age Group Preferred form of marriage
a b
Below 30 years 5 95
30-50 years 15.7 84.3
Above 50 years 23 77
From Tables 4:3 and 4:4 it can be seen that no one ex­
pressed a preference for polyandry and, while women were generally 
quiescent about it, may men denounced it as "a sin against God 
and man", "an abomination", and "real prostitution". One male 
interviewee was of the opinion that "the women will not favour 
it".
The reasons given in favour of polygyny included:
"It is the custom of our ancestors"; "it gets rid of surplus 
women"; "I have seen it run well"; and "a woman who is an 
only wife gets swollen-headed". The reasons generally given 
against polygyny were "jealousy of the wives", and the "high 
cost of maintaining a large family".
B. Should polygamy be abolished by legislation?
Elias, in 1963, noted "the growing awareness of 
the evils of polygamy among the rising generation of 
educated youth and their willingness to accept the dis­
cipline which monogamy imposes", and he concluded: "these 
new social values will soon make it necessary for the law 
to be called upon to frown upon polygamy as an institution".
1. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op. cit. p.297.
2 . Ibid., p .297•
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The vital question is: Should polygamy in Nigeria 
now be abolished by legislation? The pertinent point made 
by Read that ,flaw reform as an instrument of, or catalyst 
in, social change must be finely calculated if it is not 
to confuse still further an already complicated system11 
must not be forgotten in this context.
Some governments have abolished, or restricted
2
the practice of polygamy in recent years. Others, notably
Tanzania, have effected a compromise by allowing parties
•3
to opt for either polygamy or monogamy. Since the
introduction of statutory Marriage, Nigerians have always
had the freedom to choose the type of marriage they prefer.
Unlike the present position in Tanzania, however, which
allows a couple who are monogamously married to convert
their marriage to a polygamous one whenever both spouses
jointly decide to do so, conversion in this manner is
not possible in Nigerian law.
Nwogugu argues the case for the provision of
conversion similar to that of Tanzania to be introduced
into Nigeria. He says:
"Is there not a case for providing for the possible 
conversion of a monogamous marriage into a poly­
gamous one if the parties so desire? This position 
has in fact been achieved in Tanzania where it is
1. James S. Read, "Womens Status and Law Reform”, in 
Changing Law in Developing Countries, edit, by J.N.D, 
Anderson, op.cit. p.215.
2. See Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World. 
(London: The Athlone ftress, 1976Jt pp.bl et al.t and 
110-114; Coulson*Succession in the Muslim Family, op. 
cit.f p.15; see also Poon v. Tan 11973 I 4 Family Law
Report, 1974, p.161, legal concubinage was abolished 
in Singapore in 1961, when the Women*s Charter of
Singapore was passed.
5. See The Law of Marriage Act, Act No. 5 of 1971,
S.11(2); for the general policy and the legal aspects 
of the implementation of the policy of the new 
Tanzanian Act, see James S. Read, ”A Milestone in the 
Integration of Personal Laws: The New Law of Marriage 
and Divorce in Tanzania, 1972, J.A.L. Vol.16, No. 1, 
pp.19-39, at pp.25, 25.
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now possible -under the law to convert a monogamous 
marriage into a. polygamous one if both parties agree 
to the change. In this way the parties will be given 
the freedom to determine what type of relationship 
they wish to maintain at any given time” .-^
It is respectfully submitted that the writer has 
ignored the fact that in Tanzania, the freedom of the 
spouses to convert their marriage at any given time is 
not absolute, since a marriage which is in fact poly­
gamous cannot be converted into a monogamous one. In 
other words, conversion from monogamy to polygamy is 
possible, but not vice versa.
In any case, the legal freedom of spouses to 
change the nature of their marital relationship at will 
augurs ill for the status of marriage and for its future 
stability. Marriage is approximated with ordinary 
commercial contracts by such a provision. Entry into 
marriage entails certain expectations, which condition 
the attitude of the spouses to the relationship. If 
these expectations can, at any moment, and with minimum 
effort, be changed, the spouses lack the assurance of
security. He, or more probably she, may act to minimise
any possible detrimental effect, which may result from a 
change. To illustrate, a woman who enters into a 
monogamous marriage may be prepared to make financial 
and other sacrifices, in the expectation that the chief 
beneficiaries of her efforts will ultimately be her own 
children. If, however, there is the possibility that, 
through a conversion to polygamy, this expectation may be 
defeated, she will be tempted to adopt a less responsible 
attitude, - an attitude which may be detrimental to that 
unity and trust which are the essential foundations of 
a good marital relationship.
The fact that the wife1s consent would be 
necessary to effect a conversion is no answer to this 
argument, for what Read points out in another context is
1. E.I. Nwogugu, ’’The Position of Women in the Changing
Family Law in Nigeria” in a Year to Remember, op.cit.
pp. 101-102. ------------------  ---
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equally applicable here: "pressure of various kinds may 
operate in different degrees, much of it not even 
realized by the person concerned",^ to influence her 
free consent.
C . Recommendations
Because of economic and other difficulties which
accompany the practice of polygamy in the present society,
especially among the less privileged families, monogamy
is proposed as the most suitable form of marriage for
Nigeria at its present stage of economic and cultural
development. The use of legislation to effect the change
is not, however, advocated. Polygamy should be allowed
to atrophy and die a natural death. From the data given
above, there is some evidence that this venerable
institution, which has served generations of forebears,
but which has become almost an anachronism in modern
Nigeria, is gradually being replaced by monogamy in some
2
parts of the country.
As will be seen later when marriage according to 
Islamic law is discussed, a significant proportion of the 
people in the Northern States continue to practise 
polygamy. It would be unwise to enact a law abolishing 
polygamy unless the law can be effectively enforced, and 
this is not feasible at present.
A
Although, as previously mentioned, the right 
of freedom from discrimination entrenched in the Con­
stitution of Nigeria, 1979, may affect the practice of 
polygamy in specific cases, it is not a suitable tool for
1. Read, "Women*s Status and Law Reform", op.cit,. p.226.
2. See Larson, "Changing Marriage Patterns in West Africa," 
op.cit. p.240; Ezeife, "The Sociology of Ibusa Community," 
op.cit. p.47; Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages, op. 
cit.,p.16; Caldwell, "Decline of Polygamy in Urban 
Areas." op.cit. p.248.
3. See further, Chapter IX, pp.29-37.
4. See above, Chapter II, p. 149.
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the abolition of polygyny. In fact, it can equally be 
used to maintain polygamy, and e.qualiiy between the sexes, 
guaranteed under the Constitution, can be effectively 
secured by extension to wives of the right to practise 
polygamy.
A better method than legislation of dealing with 
polygyny is to increase the level of education of women.
It is not possible to practise polygamy without the co­
operation of women, and there is evidence that educated 
women do not readily tolerate polygamy."*'
1. See Olusanya, "The Educational Factor in Human Fertility”, 
op.cit. p.356. Education of wife...,is closely 
associated with the type of marriage contracted. Wives 
without education who contracted their marriages under 
the Marriage Ordinance are only a small 2.6% of all 
wives without education in contrast to 100% for wives 
with University education. Cf. J.C. Caldwell,
Population Growth and Family Change in Africa.
(Australia: Australian National University Press, 1968), 
pp.34-36.
369
CHAPTER V
FORMATION OF MARRIAGE (I)
"The laws of most countries are far 
worse than the people who execute 
them, and many of them are only able
to remain laws by being seldom or
never carried into effect. If 
married life were all that it might 
be expected to be, looking to the 
laws alone, society would be a hell 
on earth".
John Stuart Mill -"The Subjection 
of Women"
1. Introduction
Polygamy and its effects on the status of women
have been discussed in the last chapter. This chapter
examines the legal aspects of formation of a customary
marriage particularly relevant as indices of the legal
status of women.
Although there are considerable variations in the
precise rules which govern a customary marriage in the
various systems of law in Nigeria, each system distinguishes
clearly between a union regarded as a valid legal marriage,
2
and other relationships, for example, concubinage. What 
are the basic legal essentials which must be present to 
qualify a union as a valid legal marriage? Precise require­
ments vary from community to community, and there are few 
basic essentials which can be stated as applying to all 
communities in Nigeria, but in most customary law systems, 
the following qualify for consideration as essentials of 
a valid marriage:
1 . capacity to marry;
2 . consents to marriage;
3 . payment of "dowry" (marriage consideration);
4. marriage ceremonies;
5 . cohabitation.
1. 1861, (London: Everyman's Library, 1974), Chapter II, 
p . 249.
2. See above, Chapter III, p.198-200.
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These essentials of marriage will be discussed 
with particular reference to the status of women. Where 
there are significant variations in the laws of the various 
communities, the discussion will take the following form:
(a) Yoruba law;
(b) Igbo law;
(c) The law of the other communities.
2. Capacity to Marry
Capacity to marry may involve:
(i) personal capacity - the capacity of each prospective 
spouse to contract a valid marriage; and
(ii) interpersonal capacity - the capacity of the parties 
to marry each other.
Personal Capacity
The main determinants of personal capacity to 
enter a customary marriage are:-
(i) the age of marriage;
(ii) initiation ceremonies;
(iii) physical and mental fitness.
A. The age of Marriage
The general rule among the overwhelming majority 
of communities in Nigeria is that neither infancy nor old 
age is a bar to marriage.^ In most communities, a marriage 
can be contracted at any time from birth to death. In some 
communities, marriages can be contracted before birth, 
usually in the case of women, and even after death, invariably 
in the case of men.
"Child-marriage" was a significant feature of 
customary marriage in most traditional societies in Nigeria.
1. See Customary Law Manual, 1977, op.cit.,p.211, for some 
exceptions to this rule among Iguo communities.
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A compilation of the age of marriage among the communities 
in the- Southern States of Nigeria made by Talbot, the 
ethnographer, in the early 1920’s, shows that first marriage 
of adult women was the exception rather than the rule.^ 
Talbot notes that the Biromm Bafumbum (a semi-bantu tribe), 
of Southern Ikwerre, an Igbo community, two sub-groups of 
the Boki, and the Tiv, are the only peoples in Southern 
Nigeria who generally wait until the women are adults before 
a marriage is contracted. At least five of the communities 
normally contract a marriage for their children before birth.
Among the communities in the Northern States,
’’child-marriage” is found in nearly all groups, especially
2
where the community has been converted to Islam.
”Child-marriage” has been recorded as an 
institution in most traditional societies in various parts 
of the world at some period of their history. For example, 
under English common law, boys could legally be married at 
the age of fourteen and girls at twelve, but ’’the Church 
sometimes performed the pathetic farce of child marriage 
even on babies in arms, usually to guard against an 
estate reverting to the crown under Feudal law”.^ Turner 
has reported several cases of child-marriages from the 
diocese of Chester (England) as late as the sixteenth 
century:
1. See Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 1926, op.cit., 
Vol.Ill, Table 15, p p .460-467; see also Esenwa,
’Marriage Customs in Asaba Division”, op.cit., p.76; 
Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, op.cit.,p.38; Dennett, 
Nigerian Studies, op.cit., p.165.
2. See further, below, Chapter IX.
3. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
op.cit.,Bk.I, Chapter 15, p. 436; Pollock and Maitland, 
History of English Law, op.cit.»Vol.II, pp.389-392;
"At the age of seven years a child was capable of consent, 
but the marriage remained voidable so long as either of 
the parties to it was below the age at which it could be 
consummated”, - p.390; see also Joseph Jackson, The 
Formation and Annulment of Marriage, 2nd.ed., (London: 
Butterworths, 1969), p.2b.
4. Joseph Braddock, The Bridal Bed, (London: Robert Hale 
Ltd., I960), p.33; Maitland and Pollock, The History of
English Law, op.cit., Vol.II, p.390-392.
372
f,At the age of three John Rigmarden was married to a 
bride of five. Borne in the arms of a clergyman, he 
had to be coaxed to repeat the marriage words. Before 
the end, the wilful John announced that he would 
learn no more that day. The priest replied: "You 
must speak a little more and then go play you.... 
Eleven year old John Bridge, bedded with a girl 
a year or two older lay with his back to her all 
night, which offended her. On the wedding night 
of Ellen Damport, aged about seven, two of her 
sisters lay between her and ten year old John Andrews; 
and since that time he never lay with her nor never 
had carnale dole with her".-^
Braddock observes that:
"child-marriage laid itself open to abuses and to 
thoughtless cruelty from the husband. Yet every­
where it was considered quite natural"^
The reason usually given for child-marriage in
traditional societies was that the only sure way of
protecting a girlfs chastity was to marry her off before 
3
puberty. Women were thought to be naturally libidinous, 
and after reaching puberty it was assumed that a girl would 
somehow find a lover, however carefully her parents tried to 
guard and protect her; once her virginity was lost she was, 
in many societies, usually unmarriageable, and both a
Ll
disgrace and often a serious economic liability. Another
1. E.S. Turner, Child Marriages, Divorces and Ratifications 
etc. in the Diocese of Chester, A.D. lg6l-6 , edit, by
F .J . Furnival, (London: Early English Text Society, 1897), 
Original Series, pp.1-52; G.M. Trevelyan, English Social 
History, (London: Book Club Associates, 1973;, pp.68-6^; 
Willystine Goodsell, A History of Marriage and the Family, 
(New York: MacMillan Co., 1934), p.475; Richmond and Hall, 
Child Marriages, 1925, pp.56-57; who estimated, with the 
aid of four census reports made between 1890 and 1920, 
that approximately 343,000 women and girls living in the 
U.S. in 1924, began their married lives as children; see 
the American case of State v. Sellers [1926] 134 S.E.
873, where a child of 11 years lived with her husband; 
the marriage was held voidable, not void, in view of the 
Constitution, art. 3, par. 33, and Civil Code 1922, 
paras, 5331-5533.
2. Braddock, The Bridal Bed, op.cit., p.36.
3. See Rhoda L. Goldstein, Indian Women in Transition : A 
Bangalore Cast Study, (New Jersey: The Scarecrow fress, 
IncT 1972), p.52.
4. See Braddock, op.cit.. p.35.
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reason for child-marriage in some societies, for example,
Nsukka in Anambra State,is the imbalance between male and 
female, (the females being less than males); the practice 
of polygamy made it necessary to secure a bride as early 
as possible.'1'
Before discussing the age of marriage in the 
various Nigerian communities, it is necessary to examine 
the legal difference between "child-marriage" and "child- 
betrothal” . Was there a legal difference between betrothal 
and marriage in traditional Nigerian societies? Under the 
common law, agreements to marry are binding contracts
2
provided there was intention to enter into legal relations.
In Nigeria, it is still possible for parties to sue for the 
breach of a contract to marry under the common law. A 
betrothal, or contract to marry, however, does not confer
a legal right to consortium, nor to any of the incidents
l±
inherent in a statutory marriage. In R. v. Mwela Chinkupe, 
a Rhodesian case, it was held that for adultery to amount 
to provocation, sufficient to be a defence to a charge of 
murder, the woman concerned must be the lawful spouse of 
the accused; it was not sufficient to show that she was 
merely engaged to be married or is the mistress of the 
accused. There are similar decisions of the English courts 
which draw a clear distinction between the legal effects 
of a contract to marry, that is a betrothal or engagement,
1. See also Anthropological Report...Edo-Speaking Peoples 
op.cit., Part I, p.57.
2. Bessela v. Ste.rn [1877] 2 CP.D.265; Gamble v. Sales [1920] 
56 L.T.R. 427; c f • Wiedman v. Walpole [1891] 24 Q.B.537.
Breach of contracts to marry are no longer actionable in
English Courts - see "Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act, 1970".
3. See e.g. Martins v. Adenugba [1946] 18 N.L.R. 63;
Uso v.Iketubosin [1957] w Tr Tn .L.R. 187; Ugboma v. Morah 
[1940] 15 N.L.R. 78. See further below, Chapter X.
4. [1963] 5 N.R.L.R. 276; but see Banda v. The People,
Zambian Court of Appeal, Judgment No. 1? of 1$73 where 
it was held that finding a girl-friend in the act of 
adultery is sufficient provocation to reduce conviction 
of murder to manslaughter; see Zambia Law Journal,
1974, Vol. 6 , p.129.
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and a marriage.'*'
In most systems of customary law, however, the 
legal boundaries between betrothal and marriage, whether 
of children or adults, seem less c / c & K  than it is under 
the common law, and it is often difficult to decide whether 
Mchild-marriage" or Mchild-betrothalM is involved in any 
particular case. This difficulty is compounded by the 
fact that among most communities, although a marriage may 
be contracted by, or on the behalf of a child, the marriage 
is not actually consummated until the girl has reached the
2
age of puberty, usually evidenced by her first menstruation.
Most writers have identified marriage with con­
summation of marriage, and if the "husband” is not legally 
entitled to have sexual intercourse with the girl before 
puberty, or does not usually have sexual relations before 
this time although legally entitled to do so, they refer
■x
to the contract as "betrothal” rather than marriage. 
Accordingly, many writers maintain that what was prevalent 
in traditional Nigerian society was "child-betrothal” and
not ”child-marriage” Thus in the well-known case of
5
Edet v. Essien, where the plaintiff claimed that he had 
married the woman concerned when she was still a child, Obi 
contends that it was not a case of child-marriage, but only 
child-betrothal.^ In other words, the plaintiff had only
1. See e.g. R.v. Greening [1913] 3 K.B. 846 C.C.A; killing 
of a woman with whom the accused was cohabiting on 
finding her in a house of ill-fame was held to be murder. 
See also D. Mendes, “Criminal Law”, in A Century of Family 
Law” edit, by R.H. Graveson and F.R. Crane, (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1957), p.173.
2. See Meek, Law and Authority...,op.cit.,p .271; Basden,
Niger Ibos, 0£.cit.,p.180; Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin 
Kingdom, 0£.cit. ,pp.4-9, 154; Forde and Jones, The Ibo and 
Ibibio-Speaking Peoples..., op.cit.,p.18; Nwogugu,
Nigerian Family Law, op.cit.,p.4l; Dennett, Nigerian 
Studies, 1910, op.cit.,p.165; Leith-Ross, African Women, 
op .cit., pp.96-§7 .
3. See e.g. Fadipe, Th,e-Sociology of the Yoruba, op.cit.,
p.78; Bascom, The Yoruba of South-western Nigeria, op.cit., 
p.59; Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit., pp.115-117;
Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People,op.cit., 
p .55; Nwogugu, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit.,p.49; Esenwa, 
“Marriage Customs in Asaba District”, op.cit.,p.72« 
Leith-Ross, African Women, op.cit.,p.99* n.l.
4. Obi, Modern Family Law, o p .cit.. pp.115-116, 186-187.
footnotes 5 and 6 continued.........
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agreed to marry the woman when she grew up to adulthood.
The writer gave no evidence or arguments to justify his
conclusion, but there is evidence to show that child
marriage did exist,^ and still does exist in many areas of
Ibibioland,including the area where all the parties to
2
that case belonged. It is therefore difficult to say, 
without direct evidence to the contrary, whether a mere 
betrothal or a marriage is involved in any particular 
case. Mrs. Talbot, in her account of Ibibio women says:
"Infant betrothal and marriage are not uncommon.
In the latter case the baby bride usually lives 
with her husband!s family, but, save in very rare 
instances, her youth is respected by him. Should 
the contrary be proved against a man his conduct 
is regarded as reprehensible, and the girl’s family 
can claim her back without returning the dowry".^
The writer records many cases where children 
actually lived with their husbands.^ Her findings were 
confirmed by informants in Eket during field-work for this 
thesis. It was stated by all informants that no contract 
regarding marriage is made for a child before its birth, 
but a marriage can be contracted at any time after birth.
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued.....
5. [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47.
6 . Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit., pp.186-187, 115-116.
1. See J.C. Cotton, "The Calabar Marriage Law and Custom”,
4 J.A.S., 1905, pp.427-450 at p.427; D. Amaury-Talbot, 
Woman’s Mysteries of a Primitive People,1915, op.cit., 
pp.88-92; Bride Price Committee Report,1954, p742.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report.1954. p.42; "Child 
marriage occurred, though it is less prevalent now. It 
took place where there was an old friendship between two 
families. It was also the practice where a father wss 
in difficulties to give away his daughter in marriage 
while still a child in order to secure the help and 
assistance of the husband” .
3. Amaury-Talbot, Woman Mysteries of a Primitive People, 
op.cit.,p.88.
4. Ibid.. pp.88-92; see also Meek, Law and Authority. 
op.cit., p .271.
5. During field-work a few of the older women interviewed 
at Eket stated that they were married as children; some 
of them lived in the homes of their husbands* family.
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Usually, the marriage ceremonies are completed when the 
girl is eight to nine years of age, when she invariably 
joins her husbandfs household. Once in her husband's 
household, she is regarded as his wife, even though he 
is not expected to have sexual relations with her until 
she has undergone the "fattening rites" to make her fit 
for motherhood.
Many cases recorded at Eket Customary Court 
revealed instances of "child-marriage" where the brides 
actually lived with their husbands. A recent example is 
the case of Udo Atake Charlie v. Udo Ubom and Ors.^ The 
plaintiff claimed £30 damages against the- defendants for 
"retaining the plaintifffs wife named Essien Ubom, 
thereby depriving plaintiff of her services and conjugal 
rights since one and a half months now".
He admitted that the "wife" was not mature, and 
stated that he would not have carnal knowledge of her, 
since he had married her for his son who was still at 
school. The girl, the defendants daughter, had been 
living with the plaintiff after the marriage and "performing 
services" for him. The defendant reported to the-police 
that the girl had been stolen by a cyclist and sold to the 
plaintiff. The Magistrate had ordered the return of the 
girl to her father. The plaintiff complained that the girl 
had been taken away without him enjoying her services, and 
that his dowry had not been refunded.
The Customary Court held that the defendant had 
no case to answer, since it was the husband of the girl 
who could have instituted an action for conjugal rights, 
and not the plaintiff, who was the husband's father. The 
important point to note here, however, is that the 
Customary Court did not deny the conjugal rights of the 
husband, even though the girl was allegedly only eight to 
ten years old. In other words, the Court recognized the 
fact that child-marriage was a legal institution in Ibibio
1. [1970] Suit No. 164/70, unreported, Eket Customary
Court.
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customary law. It is not possible, therefore, to agree 
with Obi that Edet v. Essien1 was only a case of child- 
betrothal. The report of the case does not state whether 
the wife had ever lived with the plaintiff as his wife or 
not. It simply stated that he had paid dowry for her when 
she was a child. Without more positive evidence it is 
respectfully submitted that no conclusions can be validly 
drawn.
Certain communities have distinguishing words 
for a girl who is betrothed, and one who is married, that 
is, one who has had sexual relations with her husband.
For example, in certain Igbo communities, specific names 
given to a betrothed girl are not used to refer to a girl 
who is married. In Nkanu (Igbo) a betrothed girl is 
referred to as Nwag'baw, while a girl who is married is ikusi 
or nne-wayin.^ Similarly, Yorubas refer to a betrothal as
-z.
isihun or i.johun, while marriage is known as igbeyawo.
Sometimes a certain style of dress, or hairstyle, habitually
worn by married women who live in their husband*s houses,
are forbidden for betrothed girls living with their parents.
For example, in Chitsha, while the former used two wrappers,
4
the latter used only one, as unmarried girls also do.
In view of the variations in the age of marriage,
5
and the legal consequences of a betrothal, as distinct from
1. [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47.
2. See Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit., Vol.Ill, 
p.447.
3. See Fadipe, Sociology of the Yoruba, op.cit.,p.72;
Johnson, History of the YorubasV op.cit.,pp.113* 114.
4. Information obtained at Onitsha during field-work 
reveal that this distinction is not rigidly adhered to 
in contemporary Onitsha society.
5. On betrothal in customary law among Nigerian communities, 
see generally, Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. 
cit., Vol.Ill, pp.426-455, and esp. Table lb pp.4b0-4o7; 
Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, o j d.cit.,pp.313-220; 
Esenwa, op.cit.,p.76; Meek, Law and Authority..., op.cit., 
p.268; Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.,p p .103-136;
Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit.,pp.58 and 49 and 156; Meek,
A Sudanese Kingdom, op.cit.,pp.376-378; de St. Croix,
The Fulani of Northern Nigeria, op.cit.,p p .39-41; Meek, 
Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., Vol.II, p.94.
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a marriage among the various Nigerian communities, especially 
in traditional societies, the discussion on the age of 
marriage will be further treated under three headings:
(a) the age of marriage among the Yorubas;
(b) the age of marriage among the Igbos;
(c) the age of marriage among the other communities.
(a) The age of marriage among the Yorubas
The position in Yoruba customary law is that, 
although there are two distinct ceremonies involved in a 
marriage, the girl is considered to be the wife of the 
man as soon as the engagement ceremony is performed, 
regardless of her age. Consequently, all the legal 
incidents of a marriage, except cohabitation, are enforceable 
by either party.
This is so although the idana (dowry) has not
been paid, or the wedding ceremony, the formal handing
over of the girl to her husband, been performed. Thus
Fadipe, discussing claims established by marriage, says:
lf...the celebration of I.johun marked the formal 
betrothal of boy and girl. Without this ritual the 
girl was not considered engaged to the boy, and no 
claim for damages lay open to him in case of her 
adultery with someone else. From the time of the 
ceremony, however, the boy became the okox(husband) 
of the girl, while the girl became his iyawo 
(bride)n
Elaborating further he noted that
From the time of the formal betrothal as marked by 
the isihun celebration until the day on which the 
girl entered the threshold of her husband*s house 
to assume the sexual and domestic functions of the 
partnership, a period of ten ..years normally elapsed.
The boy usually abstained from having sexual inter­
course with his fiancee for this length of time, 
although the ceremony of isihun was held to have 
given him exclusive right to her sexual attention, 
and a remedy lay for him against any man who bet­
rayed the girl from that day onward."
1. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, 1970, op.cit., 
p.73.
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This opinion is reinforced by Ajisafe, who
notes that as soon as "Ijohun is paid the girl becomes
the wife of the man", who thenceforward is liable to pay
a share towards all funeral expenses which his wife may
incur, or to help her parents financially, wherever
necessary.1 In other words, his financial obligations..
to his "betrothed" and her family comes into operation as
soon as the betrothal ceremony is performed. He may also
enforce all his legal rights as a husband.
Ellis, however, states that "girls of the better
classes" were almost always betrothed when mere children.
"Betrothal confers upon the male all the rights of marriage
except consummation, which takes place shortly after the
2
girl arrives at puberty".
If the right of consummation is conferred on
betrothal as averred by Fadipe and Ajisafe, there is no
justification for drawing a distinction between "child-
marriage” and "child-betrothal", even though in actual
practice, the Yorubas rarely hand over the bride to her
husband before puberty, and may sometimes postpone the
handing-over ceremony until several years after puberty.
The evidence indicates that among the Yorubas,
there is no legal distinction between betrothal and marriage,
and that although marriage of a woman could take place from
birth onwards, the usual age of consummation of marriage
for most Yoruba girls, was eighteen or more years. The
usual age for consummation of a child-marriage was the age
of puberty, evidenced by commencement of menstruation.
There is scant evidence of child-marriage among
3
the Yorubas in modern society. Marris, in his research
1. A.K. Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People, 
(Lagos, Nigeria: C.M.&. Bookshop, 19^4), p.55; see
also Bascom, op.cit., p.60.
2. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples..., op.cit., p.183; 
Compare Dennett, Nigerian Studies, 1910, op>.cit. ,p .163, 
who notes that girls were given in marriage as babies, 
and Bascom,o£.cit., p.59, who says girls were often 
betrothed at five years of age and sometimes before 
birth. Cf. Fadipe, op,.cit.. who says the usual age of 
betrothal was 10; see also Temple, Notes on the Tribes. 
p .103.
3. Peter Marris, Family and Social Change in an African 
City: A Study of Rehousing in Lagos, (London: Routledge
footnote 3 continued..............
3 8 0
in Lagos in 1961, found that only one of the householders 
interviewed had actually married a girl before puberty, 
and he was a Hausa trader, twenty-five years old, who was 
born in Lagos.
Of the eighty Yoruba women interviewed during 
field-work for this research, the average betrothal age 
recorded was 11.2 years, while the average age of con­
summation of marriage was 19.7 years. The minimum age 
of marriage recorded was 10 years, but only four women 
lived with their husbands below age 15.^ A curious feature 
was that the average marriage age was highest among the 
women above fifty years old, which seems to indicate that 
Yoruba women are marrying at an earlier age than they were 
in the traditional society. In 1849, Bowen noted that 
Yoruba women were not married until they were eighteen 
or twenty years of age. As shown on Table 5:1, the women 
over fifty years old who were interviewed, recorded an 
average age at marriage of 22.4 years, those between 30 
and 50 years, 19.5 years; but the youngest age group were 
married at the average age of 17.1 years.
3
Olusanya, in a study of two areas in Ibadan, 
shows that the mean ages for wives with no education was 
17.6 years, whereas for those with university education, it
Lj.
wasl. 24.9 years. Ohadikefs study of 596 married women in 
Lagos, in 1964, shows similar differentials between educated 
women, and others with little or no education. White-collar
Footnote 3 continued.... and Kegan Paul, 1961), p.45;
Child-marriage is popular among the Hausas of Northern 
Nigeria; see further, below, Chapter IX.
1. See Table 5:1 below, p.381.
2. Bowen, Central Africa, op.cit.,p.286; see also Temple, 
Notes on the bribes, op .cit.,p.103 who notes that Northern 
Yoruba women are usually married at ages, 18, 20, or
even 25.
3. P.O. Olusanya, The Educational Factor in Human Fertility, 
op.cit.,p.360, Table Xll.
4. P.O. Ohadike, ,!A Demographic Note on Marriage, Family and 
Family Growth in Lagos, Nigeria”, in The Population of 
Tropical Africa, edit, by Caldwell and Okonjo, op.cit., 
Table 2, p.383.
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workers recorded a mean age at marriage of 23.1 years, 
craft and other workers 20.8, traders 19.6,and women with 
no occupation, 19 years. The average age of time of 
marriage for all groups of women recorded by Ohadike was 
19.8 years.
The evidence seems to indicate that not only is
there a differential of the mean age of marriage between
age groups, but also a considerable variation between the
1socio-economic groups.
(b) The age of marriage among the Igbos
Child-betrothal among the Igbos in the traditional
society was almost universal, and among many Igbo clans
2
betrothal took place before birth. The Customary Law
Manual states that "neither infancy nor old age is a bar 
3to marriage". There are a few local variations. For 
example, marriage between a man and an infant girl is not 
recognized as a valid marriage in some clans in Afikpo
Ll
Division, and in Etiti, Mbano, Nkanu and Oguta Divisions.
The Manual states that a woman is invariably 
betrothed to a man before she is married to him, and 
betrothal gives the man the legal right to live with the 
woman as husband and wife in a number of societies, including 
Owerri, Udi and Arochukwu and fourteen other Divisions. He 
is also entitled to any child born to his "betrothed" 
whether or not he is the child1s natural father, in more
1. See Ohadike, op.cit., p.382, and Table 2, p.383; see 
also P.O. Olusanya, Socio-Economic Aspects of Rural 
Urban Migration in Western Nigeria, (Ibadan: Nigeria: 
Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research,1969).
2. See Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria,op.cit.,pp.460- 
467; Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking 
Peoples of South-Eastern Nigeria,op.cit., p.18. Basden, 
Niger Ibos,op.cit.,p.£19; M e e k , Law and Authority....", 
op.cit.,p.270. Leith-Ross, African Women,op.cit.,
pp.$6-97; Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit.,p.4l; 
Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples, op.cit., Part IV, p.6l et al.
3. Customary Law Manual,1977» op.cit.,p.211.
4. Ibid., pp.225-227.
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than twenty-five out of the thirty-nine Divisions in 
Anambra and Imo States.^
"Under Ibo law and custom, the girl is technically the man!s 
wife from the moment the first payment is accepted by the 
parent or guardian...If she be young as a great number are 
when affianced she will make periodical visits [to her 
husband1s house] staying, as a general, but not binding, 
rule about two weeks at a time. During the course of the 
visits she may, or may not, cohabit with her affianced 
husband; in the eyes of the people they are legally man 
and wife11
Basden*s statement was not supported by informants
at Onitsha. Older informants stated that according to
traditional Onitsha law, it was not legally permissible for
the fiance of a girl to have sexual relations with her
during these ritualized visits (^e uri). She was usually
protected by the women of the fiance*s household, among
3
whom she was obliged to sleep.
The purpose of the visits was to give the man*s 
family an opportunity to observe the behaviour of the girl, 
in order to judge whether she had the qualities required 
of a good wife.
In 1915, pressure from missionaries caused the Obi 
and Ndichie of Onitsha to declare a law prohibiting these
5
visits. Informants attributed the reason for the prohibition 
to the fact that young men took advantage of the visits and 
had sexual relations with their future brides. It seems, 
therefore, that betrothal did not confer a legal right to 
have sexual relations, in Onitsha community.
Although child marriage was not legally prohibited 
in Onitsha, its occurrence was relatively rare in comparison 
with other Igbo communities, for example, Nsukka, Nnewi,
Owerri and Aba where the Bride Price Committee found
1 . Ibid., pp. 225-227.
2. Basden, Niger Ibos,op.cit.,p.219.
3. Information obtained by recorded interviews at Onitsha 
by the present writer during field-work.
4. See Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, op.cit., 
p.272; Nzimiro, Studies in Ibo Political Systems, op.cit., 
p.108; Jordan, Bishop Shanahan of Southern Nigeria,
op.cit.. n .220: Snorndli. on.cib.. p .Il6.
5. Nzimiro, Studies in Ibo Political Systems, op.cit., p.108.
6 . Some of the older informants stated that a ceremony
referred to as ime ife aru (asking for the parents of
the girl to consent to sexual intercourse) if performed
before marriage, gave the betrothed husband a right to 
sexual intercourse before the wife was formally handed 
over to him. Once the girl had sexual intercourse with
footnote 6 continued...
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child-marriage still existing in 1956.^ Bosah says that
child-marriage is regarded with contempt in Onitsha, and
that a girl reaches marriageable age at fifteen years, while
2
a boy becomes an eligible bachelor at twenty.
Of the wives interviewed at Onitsha, only one 
Onitsha indigene said she lived permanently at her husbandTs 
house from childhood. She stated that she was handed over to 
her husband at the age of ten years and lived with him as 
his wife from then on. She was about fifty-five years of 
age at the time of the interview. There were quite a 
few wives who had been married, and had lived with, their 
husbands when they were children, but they were all women 
from other Nigerian communities who were married to Onitsha 
men.
Several of the older Onitsha wives who were 
married as children came from Anambra Division, and indeed 
the only cases of child-marriage actually discovered at 
Onitsha during field-work involved a man from that Division. 
While interviewing some women at a compound in Umudei village 
in Onitsha, the precocious behaviour of a little girl, not 
more than nine to ten years, attracted the attention of the 
writer. Attempts to exclude her from the group, since the 
discussion was not considered suitable for a child of her 
age to participate in, drew ribald protests from the other 
women that she was also a wife. Closer enquiries revealed 
that she was actually married to, and living with, a man 
from Anambra Division. The women of the compound volun­
teered the information that she was having sexual relations 
with her husband, but apart from her evident precocity, 
she seemed to have suffered no visible harm. The women
Footnote 6 continued her betrothed, she was allowed to
establish copulative relationships with lovers of her 
choice. Information given by the Onowu of Onitsha,
Chief P.O. Anatogu, in a recorded interview held at 
Onitsha on 19 July, 1977. See also R. Henderson, The 
King in Every Man, op.git.,p.203; Chukwudebe, Onitsha Quo 
Vadis,1975» op.cit.,p.32.
1. See Bride Price Committee Report,1954,pp.10,24, 25-26.
2. S.I. Bosah, Groundwork of the History and Culture of 
Onitsha, (N.D.), p.122.
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also stated that there was a younger wife (of the same man) 
who had gone to school. The latter was estimated to be 
about seven years old. Whether she too was having sexual 
relations with the husband was uncertain.
Child-marriage is still practised among some 
Igbo communities in the present society. Social Welfare 
Officers particularly in Nsukka and Abakaliki, (both Igbo 
areas) attribute the present instability of family life to 
forced marriages contracted when the wives were small 
children. When the wives grow up they invariably refuse 
to live with the husbands chosen for them, especially when 
such husbands are very much older."**
(c) The age of marriage among other communities
Most of the other Nigerian communities also
2
permit child-betrothal and child-marriage. In the majority 
of cases, the brides do not live with their ^ disbands before 
puberty, even though in many cases, there is a legal right ' 
of cohabitation.
There is evidence that in quite a few cases in 
traditional societies,child-wives actually live, and have 
sexual relations, with their husbands. For example, Thomas, 
in his anthropological report of the Edo-Speaking peoples 
of Nigeria,records seeing several wives who had been married 
for at least three years, but none of whom appeared to have 
been more than thirteen years old at the time he saw them.
He says: 111 could not, however, observe the slightest ill- 
effects of this premature marriage, on the contrary, both 
young and older wives, appeared to be particularly healthy
1. See e.g. Progress Report, July-August, 1974, of Nsukka 
Social Welfare Zone; Bride Price Committee Report, 1954, 
op.cit. ,p.47 et.al; see also Parliamentary Debates.. 
Eastern House of ""Assembly, Official Report, Vol. II,
pp.671-672, 28 March, 1956.
2. See generally de St. Croix, The Fulani of Northern 
Nigeria, op.cit.,p.41; Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, 
opTcit^ p o Q ;  Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, 
op.cit.,p.121; Ling Roth, Great Benin, op.cit.
Tremearne, Tailed Head-Hunters of Nigeria, op\cit.,
p.232; Wilson-Haffenden, op.cit.,p.2o5. Cf. Temple, 
Native Races and Their Rulers, op.cit.,p.62.
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and the standard of physical development was a good one".
He attributes the scarcity of women as a possible
explanation of child-marriage in some areas.
Contrary to the assertion of a few writers that
2
child-marriage is no longer found in Nigeria, there is 
evidence that it still exists in all parts of Nigeria, 
and is particularly frequent among Moslem and other 
communities in the Northern States.
(11) Legislation aimed at preventing tfchild-marriage” .
There is no general legislation prohibiting child- 
marriage in Nigeria. A few local authorities have attempted 
to fix the age below which a customary marriage may not be 
contracted. For example, four Native Authorities in three 
of the Northern States have fixed the marriageable age for 
girls in their own areas. The Declaration of Tiv Native
5
Law and Custom relating to marriage and divorce states
that a marriage is valid if the woman has reached the age
of puberty, while the Declaration of Idoma Native Law and
Custom^ relating to marriage and divorce states that
,!No woman shall be married unless she has reached the age
7 8of twelve years”. In Borgu and Biu the prescribed minimum
1. Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Edo-Speaking 
Peoples, op.cix.,ftart 1 . p.57; Sp&rndli, op.ci~b. . p . 118; 
Meek, Law and Authority...,op.cit.,p.271.
2. See Isacc 0. Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, (London:
Weiner Laurie Ltd., 1937), p.121.
3. See Bride Price Committee Report, 1954; Okonjo, The
Impact of Urbanization..., op^cit.,p.!32; Forde and Jones,
op.cit.,p.18, Gunn and Conant, Peoples of the Middle 
M g e r  Region, Northern Nigeria. I960. op .cit.. pp.69.
103 and 123; Gunn, Pagan Peoples of the Central Area of
Northern Nigeria, 195o« op.cit., pp.20, 77; see also
Emeakuana and "Anor. v. Umeo.jiako, [1976] Suit No.
AA/1A/76, unreported, High Court Amawbia/Awka, 15 Oct. 
1976.
4. See further, below, Chapter IX.
5. Native Authority (Declaration of Tiv Native Marriage 
Law and Custom) Order, 1955, Section 2(a).
6. Native Authority (Declaration of Idoma Native Marriage 
Law and Custom) Order, 1959, Section 2 (1) (a).
7. Native Authority (Declaration of Borgu Native Law and 
Custom) Order, 1961, Section 2 (1) (a).
8. Native Authority, (Declaration of Biu Native Marriage 
Law and Custom) Order, 1964, Section 1 (a).
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ages for the marriage of girls are thirteen and fourteen 
years respectively. In Borgu and Idoma,^ breach of the law
is an offence, on the part of the man who "marries*1 a girl
below the prescribed age, and her father or other legal 
guardian who permits the "marriage” to take place.
In 195^, the former Eastern Region of Nigeria 
set up a committee to investigate the social effects of 
the payment of bride-price in the various parts of the
Region. During its investigation and visits to the
different communities, the Bride-Price Committee found 
that "child-marriage" was still practised in many areas. 
Although it was not asked to do so, the Committee made the 
following recommendation in relation to the age of marriage:
"Child-marriage should be abolished. No marriage 
should be valid where either party is below the 
age of sixteen years. Where either party is below 
the age of twenty-one years, the consent of the 
parent or guardian should be required, but this 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld"^
As a result of this recommendation, The Age of 
Marriage Law, 1956, was enacted. Section 3 (1) of the Law 
provides that "a marriage or promise or offer of marriage 
between, or in respect of, persons either of whom is under 
the age of sixteen shall be void". The statute does not 
affect marriages contracted before the passing of the Law.
Any person who "asks, receives or obtains, or 
agrees or attempts to receive or obtain, any property of 
benefit of any kind”, in respect of a marriage intended
1. Sections 2(2) Borgu, and 2(2) Idoma.
2. See Report of Bride Price Committee, 1954, p.4-7.
3. Cap 6, Laws of Eastern Nigeria 1963. This Law as enacted 
in 1956, stated in section 2: "In this Law "marriage" 
includes a marriage contracted under the provisions of 
the Marriage Ordinance and a marriage according to 
customary law”. This provision was altered and confined 
to customary law only in the 1963 edition of the Laws
of Eastern Nigeria. Reference to marriage under the 
"Marriage Ordinance" in the 1956 Law, was ultra-vires 
and void, since such marriages are governed by Item 45, 
Exclusive Legislative List, and the Regions had no 
power to legislate upon such matters; see Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, Nigeria Family Law. 1966, op.cit.« pp.2-4.
1
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or celebrated between...persons either of whom is under the
age of sixteen is guilty of an offence.^* Similarly, a
person who "gives, confers or procures, or promises or
offers to give or confer, or to procure or attempt to
procure, to, upon, or for, any person, any property or
2
benefit of any kind, is guilty of an offence". It is a
defence, however, for a person charged under the Law if he
could prove "that he did not know or did not have reason
to believe that the marriage would be void" and that before
he did the prohibited acts, he took reasonable steps to
3
verify the ages of the parties to the marriage.
Section 6 of the Law provides:
"6(1) No court shall -
(a) entertain or continue any suit or proceeding; or
(b) pass any decree or order; or
(c) execute wholly or partially any decree or order;
if the claim involved, in such a suit or proceeding 
or if the passing of the decree or order or if such 
execution would be in any way contrary to the 
provisions of this Law.
(2) No court shall, in adjudicating any matter or 
executing any decree or order, recognize any 
marriage or promise or offer of marriage, which 
is avoided by this Law".
In the event of a divorce, section 6 prevents a 
man who had "married" a girl under the age of sixteen after 
the enactment of the Law, from reclaiming his dowry or 
other gifts he paid on the occasion of the "marriage". He 
is also prevented from enforcing any claims on the children 
she begets by him, or by anyone else, which he might have 
had if the Law had not been passed. For example, in 
Ezie v .Otaka and Anor.^ the plaintiff sued for recovery of 
bride-price he had paid on the occasion of his marriage to 
the second defendant. He claimed that he married her in
1. Age of Marriage Law, 1956, s.4 (1) (a).
2. Ibid., s.4 (1) (b).
3. Ibid., s.4 (2).
4. [1973] Suit No. MN/35/73, unreported, Nsukka Magistrate
Court.
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1963, and paid N60.00 as bride-price to her uncle, since 
her father was dead. He stated that the girl formerly 
lived with him as his wife, but was taken away by her 
mother on the pretext that the mother needed the girl 
to do some domestic work for her. The girlfs mother, in 
her evidence, said that the girlfs father died in I960, 
thirteen years before the suit was heard. When the father 
died, the first defendant, the girl*s eldest brother, was 
seven years old, and the girl herself only one year, three 
months old. She denied any knowledge of a marriage between 
the plaintiff and the second defendant. The Magistrate,
Mrs. Obiora, found as a fact that the marriage, if contracted 
as alleged by the plaintiff, was void under "The Age of 
Marriage Law". She was satisfied that the first defendant, 
at the time he gave evidence in Court could not have been 
more than twenty years old. In 1963, the time of the 
alleged marriage, he could not have been more than ten years 
old, and he was older than the second defendant. It was 
evident that the second defendant at the time of the marriage 
was therefore under the age of sixteen years.
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that even if the 
marriage was void under The Age of Marriage Law, the dowry 
was nevertheless recoverable. The Magistrate rejected their 
contention: she held that even if dowry had been paid as
alleged, it was not recoverable, since the marriage was void.
It is respectfully submitted that this decision 
is in accordance with section 6 of the Law, and that once 
a court decides that a marriage is void under The Age of 
Marriage Law, the court has no further jurisdiction to 
pursue any claims brought by virtue of the purported 
marriage. This interesting point arose in the case of 
Emeakuana and Anor.v. UmeOjiako, an appeal case heard in 
the Amawbia/Awka High Court in 1976, from the decision of 
Magistrate Onyefulu at Aguata.
1. [1976] Suit No. AA/lA/76, unreported, High Court
Amawbia/Awka, 15 October, 1976.
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The claim was instituted by the respondent who 
claimed to be the natural and legal father of a baby girl.
He paid dowry for, and performed the ceremony of customary 
marriage with the second appellant in 1968. The parties 
lived together as husband and wife until 1972. No children 
were born before the separation, but after the separation 
a child was born to the wife on 27 December, 1972. Part 
of the dowry paid was refunded at the time of the separation. 
The main disagreement centered around the date of separation, 
the inception of the pregnancy, and the precise amount of 
dowry paid and actually refunded. The appellants stated 
that cohabitation ceased in January 1972. The. respondent 
maintained that it was not until 18 April, 1972, that the 
separation occurred. The refund of dowry took place late 
in April, 1972. The appellants said all the dowry paid on 
the occasion of the marriage had been refunded. The 
respondent stated that only a part of the dowry had been 
refunded. The child1s birthdate was recorded at the 
hospital where it was born as 27 December, 1972.
On behalf of the respondent,evidence was given 
by a Chief of the area to the effect that once a woman 
became pregnant before she left her husband, or if any part 
of the dowry remained unrefunded at the time of the con­
ception of a child, the child belongs to the ex-husband, 
despite the fact that the dowry may have been returned 
before the child1s birth. The Magistrate entered judg­
ment for the respondent as being the natural father of the 
child, and overlooked the claim for custody. The appellants 
appealed against this decision.
The Judge, Obi-Okoye, J., found that the purported 
marriage was void under The Age of Marriage Law, due to 
the fact that the bride was under the age of sixteen years 
at the date of the purported marriage.^ He believed the 
evidence of the respondent rather than that of the appellants 
(as did the Court below), and held that the respondent was 
the natural father of the child. Mr. Okafor, Counsel
1. The Age of Marriage Law, 1956, s.3(1).
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for the appellants, submitted that Igbo customary law does 
not recognize the natural father of the child of an unmarried 
woman: the child is legally that of the woman*s father. He 
argued that the invalidity of the marriage created the 
status of a spinster at the relevant time since the mother 
of the child had not been married to anyone. The Judge 
said that the matter was one of evidence, and that there 
was no evidence of what the custom is in the situation before 
the Court, viz., where parties have lived together as husband 
and wife under their customary law; been recognized as 
husband and wife by relatives and friends, subsequently 
find that the marriage is not valid. The learned Judge 
stated that perhaps such a situation is unknown to customary 
law. He said:
"Generally Igbo custom abhors illegitimacy or bastard­
ization of children. Invariably in all circumstances 
the custom awards legal paternity of a child to some­
one. The parties here have led no evidence of the 
custom in the circumstances of this case. Decision 
shall therefore turn on the burden of proof. I do 
not accept the submission of Mr. Okafor that the 
invalidity of the union renders the situation 
analogous to that of a spinster who delivered a child 
in the house of her father. Here it is the statute, 
not the custom that declared the marriage void, but 
the same statute failed to prescribe the status of a 
child born by a couple whose marriage it nullified.
We shall therefore fall back to custom. That a 
custom invariably ascribes a legal father to a child, 
postulates that unless a custom is proved to other­
wise prescribe, a person who is proved to be the 
natural father of a child is also the legal father 
of the child and the onus is on he who challenges the 
legal paternity of the natural father to prove his 
contention in custom. If this principle is applied 
to this case, the onus was on the appellants to prove 
that by the custom of Ezinifite the respondent who 
is shown to be the natural father of the child in 
question is not also the legal father of the child.
This burden was not established by the appellants".
The appeal was refused, and custody of the child 
was granted to the second appellant, the mother, until the 
child attained the age of seven years, after which custody 
was to be given to the respondent.
It is respectfully submitted that the legal 
paternity of the child of an unmarried woman is vested in 
the woman1s father under Igbo customary law. Marriage
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deprives a father of the legal paternity of his daughter*s 
children. Contrary to the assertion of the learned Judge, 
customary law does not prescribe that a person who is proved 
to be the natural father of a child is also the legal father. 
As correctly submitted by Counsel for the appellants, once 
the marriage was declared void the status of the second 
appellant was that of a spinster. Consequently, a child 
born to her should be affiliated to her father. The 
Customary Law Manual states:
**A child is born illegitimate if it is born of a 
woman who is not married at the time of the child*s 
conception or birth'*.
There are no exceptions to this rule. An 
illegitimate child is affiliated to its mother*s father.
There are some communities where a man has the right to 
acknowledge a child born as a result of sexual intercourse 
with an unmarried woman, usually subject to the consent of 
the mother*s family, and invariably, by performing certain 
customary rites.
In the above case, it is submitted that the Judge 
did not consider the effect of section 6 of The Age of 
Marriage Law. Once the purported marriage was rendered 
void due to non-age of the bride, the Court should not 
have continued to entertain the suit, in accordance with 
section 6(1)(a) of The Age of Marriage Law.
(Ill) The effectiveness of The Age of Marriage Law=
The Annual Report of the Social Welfare Department 
of the former Eastern Region, 1958 states:
'*The Age of Marriage Law and Limitation of Dowry Law 
are both progressive social measures, and under the 
former the police have been able to take energetic 
and welcome action and have been instrumental in 
saving a number of girls from potential slavery1*.^
1. Annual Report, Eastern Region, Social Welfare Department, 
1957-1558, [lUnugu: Nigeria, Government Printer), p.5.
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The present writer failed to discover any case 
which involved prosecution under The Age of Marriage Law.
Even in cases where the Courts have held that a marriage 
is void under the Law, they have not directed the attention 
of the police to the possibility of prosecutions under the 
Law. There are quite a few cases brought before the courts 
involving "child marriage", but no reported case of a 
penalty being imposed for the breach of the Law. Many 
Customary Courts, and Higher Courts, ignore the provisions 
of the Law. For example, in the case of Udo Atake Charlie 
v. Udo Ubom and Ors,^ where the plaintiff admitted that he 
had married a child for his son, and claimed the return of 
his dowry, the Eket Customary Court made no mention of this 
Law under which the purported marriage was void. Neither 
the plaintiff nor his son was entitled to claim refund of 
the dowry they had paid with reference to the purported 
marriage. The attitude of the Judges may have been due to 
the fact that before the enactment of this Law, "child- 
marriage?* was recognized under Ibibio customary law. In 
fact, the Bride Price Committee reported that representatives 
from Uyo, Eket, and Ikot Ekpene stated that "they were fully 
satisfied with their marriage system; they desired no
2
change and any Government interference was most unwelcome".
Although there is no concrete evidence, it seems 
that the practice of "child-marriage" among the peoples of 
the former Eastern Region has been considerably reduced 
from what it had been in traditional society; but it is 
doubtful whether this decrease is due to The Age of 
Marriage Law.
(IV) The case against child-marriage
During the second reading of the Bill on the Age 
of Marriage Law 1936,^ the Minister of Welfare, the mover
1. [1970] Suit No. 164/70, unreported, Eket Customary Court, 
14 November, 1970.
2. Report of Committee on Bride Price (Enugu: Nigeria, 
Government Printer, 1954), p.2.
5. Cap 6, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963.
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of the Bill said:
"This Bill sets a standard for the Region. It is 
adopted in nearly every civilized country in the 
world. There are two obvious reasons why marriage 
between children under the age of sixteen years of 
age is undesirable. The first is on the grounds 
of health. A girl under the age of sixteen years 
should not marry, and as a doctor, I can say that 
in many cases it could be dangerous for a girl to 
marry before she is old enough to bear children.
The second reason is that the element of consent 
is nearly always lacking when one of the parties is 
under the age of sixteen years of age. Such 
marriages are, as everyone knows, arranged marriages. 
The girl is often much too young to know her own mind 
and if she did she would have no power to contest the 
authority of her parents11
It is not easily appreciated why a girl aged 
sixteen should be presumed capable of flouting parental 
authority in the choice of a husband, while a girl of 
fifteen or fourteen is not. In other words, what mystical 
quality of maturity is inherent in age sixteen? The average 
Nigerian sixteen years old girl is no more capable of 
defying her parents wishes in the choice of a husband than 
a twelve or fourteen years old girl is.
Forced marriages, and the perpetration of slavery 
in the guise of marriage, are discussed later. The pertinent 
point in the Minister*s statement is the alleged impairment 
of health caused by "child-marriage". What empirical 
evidence is there as to this fact?
Although the child-wives, noted by Thomas among
the Edos,^ and by the present writer in Onitsha, and 
4
Maiduguri did not show any visible signs of physical 
damage, there is evidence in other countries of the disas­
trous physical effects marriage, followed by consummation
1. Parliamentary Debates. Eastern House of Assembly, 
Official Report 28 March, 1956, p.671.
2. Thomas, "Anthropological Report...Edo-Speaking Peoples," 
op.cit., p 7 3 7 7
3. See above, pp.384-385 .
4. See below, Chapter IX, pp.42-44.
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at a very early age, can cause.^ Many writers state that
in Nigeria, although there may be ,fchild-marriage", such
marriages are not in fact consummated until the wife
reaches the age of puberty, usually at fifteen or sixteen 
2
years of age. There is, however, evidence to the contrary, 
and a Nigerian case which came before the English Courts 
is particularly relevant in showing how illusory it is to 
believe that men who live with wives below the age of 
puberty always refrain from sexual relations with them.
In Mohammed v. Knott, the appellant who was a 
Nigerian Moslem married in Nigeria a girl, then aged 
thirteen years and two weeks, who was also a Nigerian Moslem. 
Both parties were Hausas domiciled in Nigeria. They went to 
London soon after the marriage. The husband was a medical 
student there. The report states that he was twice her age, 
had three illegitimate children with another woman before 
the marriage and had intercourse with the wife Rabi at a 
time when she had almost certainly not reached the age of 
puberty. After intercourse with his wife had begun, he 
slept in Nigeria with a prostitute and contracted gonorrhoea. 
Within five days of his arrival in England, the husband 
went to a doctor to be cured. A few days later, he took 
the wife to a doctor to have a contraceptive fitted. As 
a result of this visit to the doctor, the doctor took the 
view that the wife was an extremely young girl, and the 
matter was reported to the authorities. The Justices, 
having heard the complaint, ordered that the wife should 
be committed to the care of the Local Authority. They 
held that the potentially polygamous marriage was not 
recognized in England, and accordingly, or alternatively, 
because she had no parent or guardian in England, she was 
exposed to moral danger, and was not receiving such
1. See e.g. the pitiful cases described by Kathleen Mayo 
in Mother India, (London, 1927), pp.39-65, esp.
pp.55-57, 60-63.
2. See Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit., p.271; Dennett, 
Nigerian Studies, op.cit., p.To5; Forde and Jones,
The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., p.18; 
Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.180,
3. [1968] 2 All E.R. 565; [1969] 1 Q. B.l.
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protection and guidance as a good parent might be expected 
to give for the purposes of section 2 of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1963 of England. On appeal, it was held 
that the Justices had misdirected themselves by ignoring the 
way of life in which the parties to the marriage had been 
brought up, and had failed to take account of their back­
ground and customs in deciding whether a child is exposed 
to moral danger. The Judge said:
,!For my part, as it seems to me, it could only be 
said that she was in moral danger if one was con­
sidering somebody brought up in and living in, our 
way of life, and to hold that she is in moral 
danger in the circumstances of this case can only 
be arrived at, as it seems to me by ignoring the 
way of life in which she was brought up and the 
appellant was brought up".^
The learned Judge was of the opinion that it was 
perfectly possible to make a fit order person in respect of 
a wife validly married to a husband, and gave us as 
illustrations, where there had been evidence that the 
husband had constantly assaulted her, or deserted her, 
leaving her on the streets of London, a girl who spoke no 
English. He disregarded the fact that the Justices had 
found that sexual intercourse before puberty is "something 
which, if not a crime, is looked on as a serious matter in 
Nigeria". He held that the police could not prosecute the 
husband for unlawful sexual intercourse with the wife in 
England as their marriage was recognized in English law as 
a valid legal marriage, though he admitted that the 
suggestion that "every time the appellant in England had 
intercourse with his wife he -was committing a criminal 
offence" had given him "some trouble".
It is respectfully submitted that the Judge 
was unduly concerned with his idea of the social conditions 
in Nigeria regarding child-marriage, and the fact that 
English law recognizes a marriage which is valid by the 
law of the parties* domicile. It is difficult to accept 
that the wife could be in moral danger by constant assault,
1. Ibid., p. 568.
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but not by constant sexual intercourse before puberty, yet 
the physical and mental., damage which could result from 
assault is no greater than that which could result from 
pre-puberty intercourse, especially with a gonorrhoea- 
infected husband.
Intercourse before the wife attains the age of 
puberty is the criminal offence of rape under the Penal 
Code Law, 1960^* operative in the Northern States of Nigeria 
where both parties came from. Section 282 of the Penal Code 
provides:
”282 (1) A man is said to commit rape who, save in the 
case referred to in sub-section (2), has sexual 
intercourse with a woman in any of the following 
circumstances -
(a) against her will
(b) without her consent
(c) . . .
(d) . . .
(e) with or- without her consent, when she is 
under fourteen years of age or of unsound 
mind.
(2) Sexual intercourse by a man with his own 
wife is not rape if she has attained to 
puberty”.
In so far, therefore, as the wife had not attained 
puberty, the husband was committing the offence of rape 
every time he had sexual intercourse with her, and was 
liable to prosecution under section 282 of the Criminal 
Code Law, I960.
It is hardly necessary to argue the case against
”child-marriage”. It is intricately bound up with forced
marriage and both produce untold hardship and disaster for
2
some of the unfortunate victims. The United Nations has 
declared that child-marriage and the betrothal of young
1. Cap 89, Laws of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1963.
2. See e.g. Status of Women in India: A Synopsis of the
Report of the National Committee on the Status of Women, 
1975, pp.42-43; Child-marriage was reported as one of
the significant factors leading to the high incidence
of suicide among young married women; see also G.M. 
Wilson, "Homicide and Suicide among the Joluo of 
Kenya”, in African Homicide and Suicide, edit, by Paul 
Bohannan, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, I960), 
pp.205-206; but see the views expressed in Studies in 
the Family Law of Islam, edit, by Khurshid Ahmad, 
(Karachi, India, Chiragh-E-Rah Publications, 1959), 
pp.143-150.
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girls before puberty shall be prohibited. Women should 
have the same rights as men have to free choice of a 
spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free 
and full consent. The recommended minimum age to be 
adopted in each country was not less than fifteen years, 
with all marriages being officially registered."*'
Although the Convention and Recommendation on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration 
of Marriages was recommended to member States for implemen­
tation in 1962, as of 30 September, 1966, the Convention
2
was only signed by nineteen member States. Nigeria was
not one of the States which signed the Convention initially,
and up to the present moment has still not signed it. In-
fact, in 1973, the rather disturbing case of The State v.
3Hassan Audu was decided by the Supreme Court of Nigeria.
The respondent, aged 39 years, was charged with 
the offence of committing rape on a girl aged nine years. 
Apparently, the girl, who had been hawking mangoes, visited 
the room of the accused at Gusau, on May 23rd, 1970. The 
accused promised to buy all her mangoes if she would go to 
bed with him, which she did. The accused then took off 
his clothes, went into bed with her and had sexual inter­
course with her, in the course of which she was deprived 
of her virginity. When the accused saw the girl bleeding 
from her vagina he attempted to wash the blood off. As the
1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 16; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, art. 10; Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, art. 6; Convention and 
Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for 
Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962 and 1963); 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar 
to Slavery (1956), art. 1.
2. See United Nations Assistance for the Advancement of 
Women, 1966, p.14; The Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery....1956, on.cit.. as of 30th 
September, 1966, had sixty-seven States parties to
it.
3. [1973] 1 N.M.L.R. 105.
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bleeding would not stop, he asked her to go home, while he 
rode away on his bicycle to his uncle to whom he reported 
what had happened.
The accused did not deny the charge, and 
explained that he told the girl to go away, but that the 
girl came into bed with him and started playing with him 
in consequence of which he had sexual intercourse with her. 
This account differed from what the girl herself said. 
Medical evidence was given to the effect that the girl 
was nine years of age. The "offence of rape was therefore 
proved since it is illegal in the Northern States for 
anyone to have sexual intercourse with a girl under the 
age of fourteen years with or without her consent”.^
The trial Judge found the offence proved, but he
said:
"However, on the evidence, I am more inclined to 
believe that the sexual intercourse in question 
came about more from the deep love which the 
accused has for Inno and which love is unmistakably 
reciprocated by her. For inspite of the damage 
caused her by the accused through that intercourse, 
she did not mince her words in declaring in open 
court that she was prepared to marry him if she 
would be allowed to do so".^
The trial Judge found the accused guilty of the 
offence and sentenced him to three years imprisonment, but 
because he was convinced of the deep love of the accused 
for the girl, and her reciprocal love for him, he suspended 
the sentence for three years. The prosecution appealed 
to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held:
"We think that the appellant is right in pointing
1. S.282(l)(e) Penal Code Law, I960, Cap 89. Laws of 
Northern Nigeria, 1963.Contrast this with S.357 of the 
Criminal Code Act, 1916, Cap 42, Laws of the Federation, 
1958 which defines rape as "unlawful carnal knowledge
of a woman or girl, without her consent, or with her 
consent, if the consent is obtained by force or by means 
of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of 
harm, or by means of false and fraudulent representation 
as to the nature of the act, or, in the case of a married 
woman, by personating her husband..." See R. v.Kufi 
[i960J W.R.N.L.R.l, at p.3.
2. The State v. Hassan AucLu [1973] 1 N.M.L.R. 105 at p.106.
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out that the learned trial judge has no jurisdiction 
to impose a suspended sentence under the law of the 
North-Western State. Of the various types of punish­
ment provided for in section 68 of the Penal Code, 
there is none for a suspended sentence of imprison­
ment, although there is provision for imprisonment 
simpliciter. The Penal Code Code [sic] itself provides in 
section 283 for imprisonment for life or any less 
term on conviction for rape; the convicted person may 
suffer a fine in addition. While in English law the 
punishment of a suspended sentence of imprisonment 
has been introduced under section 39 of the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1967, and although section 13 of the High 
Court Law of the Northern States provides that the 
jurisdiction of the High Court of North-Western State 
is mutatis mutandis the same as that of the English 
High Court, the (English) Criminal Justice Act, 1967, 
is not a statute of general application in the North- 
Western State of Nigeria.
Accordingly, we think that the High Court at Sokoto 
acted in excess of its jurisdiction by importing the 
idea of a suspended sentence for which there is no 
provision in the applicable law. We must, therefore, 
allow this appeal. The appeal is hereby allowed and 
the order suspending the sentence is set aside. The 
sentence of three years1 imprisonment imposed on the 
respondent by M. Muhammend, J., at the Sokoto High 
Court on June 29, 1971, is hereby confirmed without 
the qualification of suspension.
The respondent, who appeared in person before us 
and to whom all the proceedings were duly interpreted 
by an official interpreter, expressed a desire to 
marry the girl, now aged eleven years, as soon as her 
parents would permit. We, however, consider that this 
factor should not affect our view of the enormity of 
his crime against a young girl of nine years.
We would, however, add a recommendation to mercy 
for consideration by the appropriate authorities 
provided, as he asserted before us, the respondent 
takes immediate steps towards marrying Inno Garba,!
It is pertinent to note that the girl the Court
was recommending for marriage was still only a child,
eleven years old. The Court may have been influenced by
the fact that child-marriages are frequently contracted in
the Northern States of Nigeria, as Lord Parker, C.J.,
2
evidently was in the case of Mohamed v. Knott, previously
1. The State v. Hassan Audu [1973] 1 N.M.L.R. 105 at 106.
2. [1968] 2 All E.R. 563.
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discussed. The report does not state whether the girl had 
attained puberty, but at the age of eleven, it is unlikely 
that she had. In this event, the Supreme Court was 
ordering a course of action which, if executed, would 
eventually result in a criminal offence, since marriage 
is a defence to rape only where the wife is fourteen or 
more years or has attained the age of puberty.
The Supreme Court was obviously influenced also 
by the allegedly "deep love" the girl had for the accused. 
Could there still have been a "deep love" had the girl at 
the time of the rape been five or two years of age, instead 
of nine? What is the Court*s definition of "deep love"? 
These are the questions that must haunt every mother, and 
indeed father, of infant girls. It is sincerely hoped that 
the "depth of feeling" test is not adopted and applied by 
Nigerian courts in similar cases of rape.
Law is not a panacea for all social evils, but 
undoubtedly the law could be a potent factor in influencing 
public opinion, and a standard by which people could pattern 
their behaviour. In suitable cases it may provide a yard­
stick for the judiciary, to curtail decisions based on 
sentiment. Had there been a national minimum age for 
marriage, it is most probable that it would have been higher 
than eleven since in most systems of Nigerian customary law, 
the age of puberty is the legal age for consummation of a 
marriage; the age of marriage is generally held to be at 
least fifteen years for a girl. The Supreme Court would 
have found it difficult to order marriage for an eleven 
years old girl as it did in the State v. Hassan Audu.
(V) Summary
The general rule among the overwhelming majority 
of Nigerian societies is that infancy is not a bar to 
marriage. With very few exceptions, child-marriage and 
child-betrothal were widely practised. The first marriage 
of an adult woman was relatively rare, and in some societies, 
a girl could be betrothed before birth. In most societies,
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marital cohabitation did not take place until the girl 
attained the age of puberty, evidenced by her first 
menstrual period. In a few societies child-brides 
cohabited with their husbands.
Although the practice of child-betrothal and 
child-marriage is reduced in contemporary Nigeria, they 
are by no means extinct, and there is evidence that 
child-marriage is still practised to some extent amongst 
most Nigerian societies, especially in the rural areas.
There is no general legislation applicable to 
the country as a whole, prohibiting child-marriage; a few 
local authorities have enacted bye-laws stating the 
minimum age of marriage for women. The Age of Marriage 
Law of the former Eastern Region fixed a minimum age of 
sixteen years for either spouse of a customary marriage.
Child-marriage, apart from the fact that it may 
be physically harmful if consummated before the age of 
puberty of the wife, contributes to forced marriage with 
all its attendant evils.
B. Initiation Ceremonies
Among certain communities a man or woman is not 
usually.considered capable of contracting a valid marriage 
without having gone through certain customary initiation 
rites. With special reference to women, two rites are 
usually associated with marriage:
(I) circumcision;
(II) fattening ceremonies.
(1) Circumcision=
In many communities in Nigeria women in traditional 
society were circumcized,^ and although the practice is
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,p p .176-178; Meek,
Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.tVol.II, p.91;"Meek, 
Law and Authority...H, op.cit.,p.293; Forde and Jones,
The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op.cit.,p.24; 
Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit.,p.97; Daryll Forde, Yoruba- 
Speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria, (London: 
International African Institute, reprint 1969), p.28;
footnote 1 continued.......
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much less prevalent now, it is not altogether extinct.^
The usual method by which women were circumcized was by
the removal of the clitoris (clitoridectomy), either
during early childhood, or immediately before, or after
puberty. Where the operation is performed during child-
2
hood, for example, among many Igbo communities, and
3
the Efik of Calabar, it cannot be considered as an
initiation for marriage or womanhood. There are some
4 5communities, notably the Yorubas and Isokos, where the 
operation is postponed until the girl is ready for marriage, 
and may be performed just before she is taken to her 
husbandfs home.
Although great importance is attached to 
circumcision in those societies where it is practised, 
very few of them require the performance of the operation 
as a legal essential for a valid marriage; rather it is 
regarded as a preparation for marriage and motherhood.
In a few communities, for example, Oguta town in Oguta 
Division of Imo State, a marriage is not regarded as
7
legally valid if the wife has not been circumcized.
Footnote 1 continued....... Bascom, 0£. cit.,pp.61-62; Fadipe,
op.cit.,p.79; Bosman, op.cit.. p.444; Dennett, op.cit., 
p p .167-168; Temple, Notes on the Tribes,op.cit., p.105.
1. An Igbo informant in London stated that she had to break 
off her engagement to an Igbo man from Oguta Division, 
because she refused to be circumcized. She stated that 
if they had got married she would not be legally recog­
nized as his wife unless she had been circumcized, and 
her children would be considered illegitimate. Her own 
community does not practise circumcision, and she 
refused to comply.
2. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit.,p.168; 
Leith-Ross, African Women, op.cit.,p.10^T Meek, Law and 
Authority...'7* 76:253.----  ---  -------
3. Antera Duke, Efik Traders of Old Calabar, edit, by Daryll 
Forde, (London: International African Institute, reprint 
1968), p.15.
4. See Fadipe, op.cit.,p.79; Forde, Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, 
op.cit.,p.28; Bascom, op.cit.,pp.bl-b2.
5. See Bradbury and Lloyd, og.cit.,pp.154-155; see also
Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages, op.cit., p.32.
6. See e.g. the Isokos, "where no other event, except
possibly the death of_a very important man, entails the
spending of so much money, time, preparation, and emotion" 
as female circumcision (Oyao).
footnote 6 and footnote 7 continued....
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Although the practice of circumcision is wide­
spread among most of the major ethnic groups, for example, 
the Yoruba, Igbos, Ibibios and the Edo-Speaking Peoples, 
it is by no means universal, even among these groups.
Onitsha women, old and young, stated emphatically that 
circumcision of women in any form has never been practised 
by Onitsha people.^- Similarly, although most Ibibios 
practise circumcision of women, often at the time of marriage, 
Eket women asserted that the practice is unknown there. The
practice is fairly general among the Yorubas, but there are
2
also exceptions. There is no evidence that it was ever
practised by the Tivs, Nupes, or Igbiras.
Most Missionaries objected to the practice and
3
forbade it among Christian converts. McFarlan maintains 
that female circumcisign was the cause of disease among 
the Calabar community, and Basden refers to it as a "bad 
custom", and says: "The operation designated as * repairs 
after circumcision* is well known at the hospitals in these
5
latter days".
Although the practice of circumcision is widely
Footnotes 6 and 7 continued....
6. See also Report of Bride Price Committee, op.cit., p.36.
7. Customary Law Manual, 1977* op.cit.,p.£l3: In some Igbo 
areas, it is an offence punishable by a heavy fine for 
any girl to conceive before she has been circumcized, 
see Meek, Law and Authority....",op.cit., p.293; see 
also among the people of Brass Division, of the Rivers 
State, where it is said that female circumcision is an 
essential of a valid marriage, Bride Price Committee 
Report, op.cit., p.36.
1. See also Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,p.!79» n.7; Female 
circumcision is also not practised in a number of Village 
groups of Nsukka Division, where Igala influence is strong, 
see Meek, Law and Authority...."op.cit., p.292.
2. See Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit.;p.121, although female 
circumcision is universal among Edo-Speaking Peoples it 
is not practised at Okpe.
3. See Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,p.178; Meek, Law and 
Authority.... "7 op. cit;., p .2.93; Leith-Ross, African 
Women, op.cit.,p.163: McFarlan, Calabar, The Church of 
Scotland Mission, op.cit.,p.61.
4. McFarlan, op.cit., p.61.
5. Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,p.177*
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practised in Nigeria, nobody seems to know the reason for
the practice, at least insofar as it relates to women.^
In the case of men it is said to be an aid to cleanliness,
a reason which does not pertain to women*s circumcision.
Many of the older informants stated that formerly no man
would marry an uncircumcized girl. It was alleged that the
operation deprived women of sexual desires, or at least such
desires were reduced when the clitoris is removed. The virtue
2
of the woman was thus easier to preserve. In the case of 
men, however, circumcision was supposed to have the opposite 
effect; it tended to increase their sexual ardour. This is 
an illustration of the tendency in traditional society to 
sublimate women*s sexual capacity while efforts are made to 
intensify men*s.
3
The Bride Price Committee stated in its report:
**¥e strongly disapprove of the practive of cliterodectomy 
or female circumcision which obtains in certain areas,, 
particularly in the case of Brass Division where the 
operation is performed after the age of puberty.
However, it is an integral part of native custom in 
such areas and its sudden abolition would not be 
acceptable to the people. We wish to recommend, 
however, that it should be made a punishable offence 
to circumcize all but the very young and we consider 
the age limit should be fixed at one month**.^
This recommendation was not implemented by the 
Government and no legislation to this effect has been enacted.
1. See Meek, **Law and Authority....**,op.cit. ,p.295; Meek, 
Northern Tribes of Nigeria,' vol.II, op.cit. ,p.91; Compare 
Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.tp.4l7, "Both for male and 
female, the Ibos, while retaining the rite, have quite 
lost the reasons for its practice and to all questions 
reply: *that it has always been done and we follow the 
custom of our forefathers *. Beyond that they cannot go 
although some try to manufacture reasons’*.
2. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic 
Commission for Africa: The Position of Women in Kenya, 
prepared by Julius Carlebach, E/CN.14/URB/9, lb July, 1963, 
p.2: in a recent study of juvenile prostitutes in Nairobi,
Kenya, it was found that 49.5 percent of women and girls
interviewed were circumcized; Cf. Thomas, Anthropological 
Report...Edo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit,. Part I, p.53, 
noted that ’*clitoridectomy is practised in all the 
communities south of Okpe. In Okpe it is known but not 
practised, and precisely here is the standard of morality 
higher’*.
3. The Bride Price Committee Report,1954, op.cit.,p.48.
4. Girls are circumcized at age 15 to 16 years and cases
footnote 4 continued.......
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(11) Fattening Ceremonies
Fattening ceremonies were not usually considered 
a legal essential of a valid marriage. Like female cir­
cumcision, in most communities, it was considered a 
preparation for marriage, and more especially, of mother­
hood. The practice seems to have been mainly confined to 
1 2the Igbos, Ibibios and a few other communities in the
3
Eastern States, and was more institutionalised among the
Ibibios than among other communities. There is a fair
4amount of literature which describes the practice, but 
basically it consisted of a period of seclusion which might 
range from three months to several years^ for a girl of 
marriageable age, depending on the wealth of her parents 
and her prospective bridegroom. During this period, the 
secluded girl was made to do no work and was fed on the 
best food and other delicacies. She had several attendants 
whose duty was to attend to her every need and to make her 
look as beautiful as possible. Its main purpose was to make
Footnote 4 continued  are said to occur where the
operation is performed on girls who are already pregnant, 
see Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit.,p .36
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.223; Meek, Law and 
Authority...11, op. citT, p .2?1.
2. See P. Amaury-Talbot, Woman Mysteries of a Primitive 
People, op.cit., p p .82-68.
3. See Bride Price Committee Report, 1954, op.cit.,pp.28, 
31, 36« 3^« 42; Talbot, Tribes"of the Niger Delta, op. 
cit., pp.172-175; but see C.K. Meek, Tribal Studies in 
Northern Nigeria (London: Keegan Paul, 1951), Vol.I, 
p.230; Meek notes that rites of similar character are 
practised in the most distant parts of the Northern 
Provinces, e.g. among the Margi of Adamwa Province.
4. See particularly Talbot, Woman Mysteries....", op.cit., 
82-88; Talbot, Tribe of the ^iger Delta, op.cit.,
pp.172-175, who notes that fattening ceremonies were 
essential in some communities, e.g. Okrika, "It is con­
sidered a grave crime for a man to induce a girl to 
yield to his advances before the Iria [Fattening] 
ceremony has been performed on her behalf". Circum­
cision of females, on the other hand, is not practised 
by the Okrikas.
5. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit., p.172;
at Akwete in Aba District a period of two years may be
passed in the fattening house, and in a neighbouring
district even seven years.
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her fat and fit for childbirth. Girls were married at a 
very young age, and were therefore unfit for the arduous 
task of childbearing. It was thought that excessive 
feeding would accelerate growth and physical maturity.
The Missionaries^ objected strongly to the 
practice in the mistaken belief that the husbands wanted 
the wives to be fat for sexual purposes. As in the case of 
female circumcision, it was forbidden among Christian con­
verts. The 104-year old informant in Eket told the 
present writer that she did not undergo fattening ceremonies, 
although her slightly elder sister did. Just about the time 
of her marriage, her family and her prospective husband all 
became Christians, and so she was not permitted to go into 
the Fattening-House. She expressed this lost opportunity as 
one of the greatest regrets of her life, and always looked 
back on it with sorrow. Asked the reasons why the Missionaries 
had prohibited the practice, she said she did not know, but 
suggested that they might have thought it sinful, since a 
lot of money was spent on the ceremonies. In many places
it operated as a sort of "coming out" ceremony so popular
in certain European circles, at which prospective suitors 
were given the chance of meeting the belles of the season 
and making their choice of wives.
C . Physical and mental fitness
Generally, lack of physical and mental fitness was
2
not, and is not now, a bar to marriage. Under Yoruba 
customary law, Ekundare states that "no person with unsound 
mind could negotiate for marriage and neither could a 
marriage be negotiated on his behalf". Similarly, the 
Customary Law Manual states that it is not permissible
1. See Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit.,p.272; Sporndli, 
op.cit., p .120.
2. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit.» p.213.
3. Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce under Yoruba Customary Law, 
op.cit., p.11. ' '
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to marry a woman who is sane on the behalf, or in the name 
of a person who is insane, nor is it permissible for a 
women who is insane to be given in marriage to a man who is 
sane, although it is permissible for an insane man to marry 
a sane woman during a lucid interval. There are a number 
of exceptions in each case.'*'
Interpersonal Capacity
D. Consanguinity and affinity
(1) Consanguinity (blood relationship)
Incapacity to marry because of prohibited degrees
of relationships vary widely among the different ethnic
2
groups, and even among sub-groups of the same tribe. For 
example, speaking of the Ekoi, Talbot says:
"There are practically no marriage restrictions among 
this people....It is not even forbidden by native 
law for half brothers and sisters to marry, though 
cases of this kind are extremely rare” .^
Among the Edo - Ibibio - Igbo - Igbirra - Yoruba 
and I jaw-Speaking peoples, on the other hand, the general 
rule is that marriage under customary law is forbidden 
between persons who are related by blood, usually identified 
by the fact that they both descend from a common ancestor,
1. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit., pp.212-213.
2. For consanguinity bars generally see, Nwogugu, op.cit., 
p. 46; Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.,p p .168-l7l;
Thomas, Report on The Edo-Speaking Peoples...11, op.cit., 
p.61 et.al; Talbot, Peoples of Southern fTigeria, VolTTlI, 
op.cit., pp.711-717; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, 
o£.cit.,pp.187-188 and 190-195; Meek, Law and Authority
~op.cit., pp.259-264; Talbot, Life in Southern 
Nigeria: The Magic Beliefs and Customs of the Ibibio 
Tribe, (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., new imp., 1967), 
p .204; Akiga, Akigafs Story, op.cit.,p.!50 et.al; Ward, 
Marriage Among the Yorubas, op.cit.,pp.10-15; D.A. 
Ijalaiye, "Capacity to Marry under Nigerian Customary 
Law", op.cit., p.22.
3. Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush: A Description of the 
Ekoi of Southern Nigeria, (London: William Heineman,1912), 
p.110; see also de St. Croix, The Fulani of Northern 
Nigeria, op.cit., p.39.
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even though several generations removed. Precise rules 
vary among the different groups as to how far the 
relationship should he traced. Thus Ellis says of the 
Yorubas:
"Marriage is forbidden in the same blood; and as 
descent is traced on both sides of the house, it 
is consequently forbidden both in the father!s 
and motherfs families, as far as relationship can 
be traced. This, however, is not far,...As a rule 
relationship does not seem to be traced further than 
second-cousins, and the prohibitive degrees of 
marriage are for a man, mother, aunt, sister, 
daughter, niece, cousin and second-cousin".-^
Among the Edo, intermarriage is permissible from 
2
the fifth generation; among the Annang (Ibibio) a man
3
could marry his cousin once removed, while among the
Igbos generally, marriage with close consanguineousA
relatives is totally taboo.
There are also variations in the laws of con­
sanguinity observed by the various sub-groups of the same 
tribe. For example, an Onitsha man "cannot marry any 
woman from his father's village, even if they are twenty or
5
more generations removed", and he would be surprised to 
learn that the law is different in other sub-groups, and 
a man could even marry his brother1s daughter in some Igbo
1. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit.,p.188;Contrast 
Fadipe, op.cit., p.71; the relationship ends at three at 
Ile-Ife iMeta ni itan tan); Meek, Northern Tribes, 
marriage between half brother and sister is possible 
among Northern Yorubas; and Ward, Marriage among the 
Yoruba, op.cit.,pp.10-11; the prohibition extends to 
people with a taint of blood relationship in their veins; 
see also Talbot, People of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,
p.713; Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,p.204.
2. See Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op.cit.,p.12;
Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,p p .713-714.
3. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,Vol.Ill,p.717*
4. See Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,
pp.715-717; Customary 4aw Manual,1977> op.cit.,pp.216-220; 
E.W. Ardener” "The Kinship Terminology of a Group of 
Southern Ibo", 24 Africa, 1954, p. 85 at p.95; Basden,
Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.£l5.
5. O.N.B. Chukwudebe, Onitsha: Quo Vadis, (Onitsha Nigeria,
Rex Litho Press, N.D., ), p.3l; Talbot, Southern Peoples, 
op.cit.,p.716; E.C.O. Ilogu, Christian Ethics in an 
African Background, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p.2if*
Ar diner, 1 The "Kinship Terminology for a Group of Southern 
Ibo", 24 Africa 1954, p.95.
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communities. In Chukwu v. Mb ah and. Ors.'j' the defendant 
contended that he married Janet his niece, his brother*s 
daughter. He lived with her from 1952 and had three children 
(claimed by plaintiff). The plaintiff contended that the 
defendant could not marry Janet as it was an abomination 
for a man to marry his niece.
Witnesses for the defendant, including Barrister 
Nwafor Chukwuami and Chief Daniel Ogbuzulu Nnamani, a former 
member of the Eastern House of Assembly and Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Minister of Local Government, testified 
that it is not an abomination in their area,Mburumbu (Ibo), 
for a man to marry his niece by their native law and custom. 
The evidence showed that an uncle can marry his niece if the 
uncle and the father of the niece are half brothers, not 
having the same mother. A man can also marry his half 
sister, provided the mother of the half sister has no male 
issue for his father. The Judge, Kaine J., accepted the 
evidence of the witnesses for the defendants, and said:
111 am of the opinion that there is nothing abhorrent 
in the custom of the people about marriage. That 
is their own way of life and this Court is not 
prepared to disturb it. It may not be decent enough 
to marry a half sister or a niece or a first cousin 
but if that is the custom of a people to do so under 
certain circumstances•I do not see why this court 
should interfere with it1*.
Similar local departures from the normal rules 
of consanguinity of an ethnic group can be found in other 
communities
Prohibitions which prevent inter-marriage are 
applied equally to men and women, and as such do not form 
a feature of the distinctive status of women, but are 
relevant insofar as they illustrate the disadvantageous 
position of the modern woman in comparison with her
1. [1967] Suit No. E/56/63 and [1967] Suit No. E/57/63, 
unreported; Enugu High Court, 20 February, 1967.
2. See Ijalaiye, "Capacity to Marry Under Nigerian 
Customary Law1*, op.cit. ,p.22.
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traditional counterpart. It is now possible for a woman 
to fall in love with a man whom she is prohibited from 
marrying before discovery of the relationship is made,"^ 
a situation which was extremely unlikely in the traditional 
society where travel outside the community was limited and 
marriage was arranged by the families.
Marriage within the prohibited degrees of con­
sanguinity is still not permitted among most communities.
A marriage contracted in ignorance of a prohibited relation­
ship is void in certain communities, for example, Aba or 
2
Onitsha. In certain circumstances, if the relationship is
not too close, it can be severed by the performance of
3
certain rites, for example, by killing a goat.
(11) Affinity (relationship by marriage)
The laws prohibiting a marriage between parties 
who are related by marriage also show wide variations.
In certain communities there are very few bars against the 
marriage of persons related only by virtue of a marriage. 
Ellis, speaking of the Yorubas, says:
"Relationship by affinity has not yet been invented, 
and a man may marry two or more sisters, aunt and 
niece, and even mother and daughter, but the last 
unions do not often occur".4
Similarly, Schwab asserts of Yoruba customary
law:
"Between those who call each other ana (in-law) 
there are no rules forbidding marriage since a 
union between a man and another member of his 
wifefs lineage, while not viewed with favour is 
not prohibited". ^
1. Young people live and work in towns far removed from their 
native towns and villages, for example in Lagos,or,
Kaduna.
2. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit.
3. Customary Law Manual, op.crt., pp.218-219.
4. Ellis, Yoruba-Speaking Peoples....", op.cit., p.18..
5. See William B. Schwab,"The Terminology of Kinship and 
Marriage Among the Yoruba," 28 Africa, 1958, pp.301-315 
at p.311.
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I^alaiye"^ submits that Schwab*s statement is an
overstatement, and that there is only one instance when a
man may marry his wifeTs sister: that is in the case of a
sororate union which imposes on the kinsmen of a deceased
wife an obligation to provide another woman to make good
the deficiency or loss. But Schwab*s statement is
supported by Ellis who was writing as early as 1894.
It is difficult, however, to formulate a principle
of law which applies to all communities of a single group,
2
even among the Yorubas. The most that can be safely said
is that relationship by marriage is not viewed with the
same degree of repugnance as blood relationship is, and
that, although in most cases marriages where the parties
are related by marriage is permissible under customary law,
they are not viewed with favour, and are few in fact.
The customary law of the Igbos show a wide
variation in the rules governing prohibited degrees of
affinity, and are set out in the Customary Law Manual.
While in some communities, for example, Aguata, Etiti and'
Mbano Divisions, a man has legal capacity to marry his wife*s
daughter born to another man, in other communities, a man
has no capacity to marry two sisters, for example, Onitsha,
Nsukka and Enugu Divisions. In all Divisions, a man has no
4
capacity to marry his wife*s mother in any circumstances.
Similar variations are found among other Nigerian
5groups.
C. Inter-tribal and Other Bars
(1) Inter-tribal bars.
There is no evidence of any legal bar to inter­
tribal marriages,^ but traditionally, most communities do
1. Ijalaiye, "Capacity to Marry...**, op. cit., p. 23
2. See e.g. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,p.715.
3. See Customary Law Manual, on.cit.. p.222, par.284(11).
4. Customary Law Manual, op.cit., pp.220-223.
5. See Ijalaiye, "Capacity to Marry", op.cit.,p.23; Forde,
Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., p.13.
6. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit., p.213, par. 278.
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not encourage marriage of their women to men of other
communities. This social restriction on inter-marriage
may extend to sub-groups of the same tribe, especially if
there is a traditional history of warfare existing between
them. For example, an Onitsha parent would be extremely
reluctant to consent to his daughter*s marriage with a man
from Obosi, even though they are both Igbo sub-groups.
Many of the parents interviewed during field-work
expressed a preference for their children, especially girls,
to marry within their own community, that is, their own
sub-group, for example, Onitsha or Eket, or Ibadan, and if
given a choice, all things being equal, would prefer a
woman entirely foreign to Nigeria, than a Nigerian woman
from another ethnic group, or a sub-group, of their own 
2
tribe. Their reason seems to be that a Nigerian woman 
from a different community would maintain an attachment to 
her natal community to the detriment of that of her husband*s, 
in time of crisis, whereas a foreign woman can be totally 
incorporated into her husband*s community.
Although this feeling was justified in a few 
cases during the Nigerian civil war, many informants stated 
that they owed their lives to the fact that they were married 
to women from another community. For example, an Igbo 
informant from Nsukka married to an Ibibio woman from Oron, 
stated that when the Nigerian soldiers captured Oron during 
the Nigerian Civil War, he was hidden by Oron people for 
weeks, while other Igbos were given up to the Nigerian 
soldiers. Most of these Igbo men were subsequently shot 
by the Nigerian soldiers. He felt he owed his life simply 
to the fact that he was married to a woman from Oron.
Is it possible for a non-Nigerian to marry a
■5
Nigerian under customary law? It has been decided in the 
Nigerian courts that a non-Nigerian has no capacity to
1. The two communities have a history of hostility marked 
in recent years by several legal disputes over land; 
see Customary Law Manual, op.cit.,p.223, p. 285(3).
2. But see Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, op.cit., p.11.
3. For definitions of the term "Nigerian1* see Customary 
Courts Edict, 1966, Bendel State, S.17; Western Region 
Customary Courts Law, 1958, Cap 31, Laws of Western
footnote 3 continued......
4l4
contract a marriage under Nigerian customary law, even if
he is domiciled in Nigeria.
In Fonseca v. Passman,^ a Portuguese national
domiciled in Portugal purported to marry an Efik woman
under Efik customary law in 1926. Hedges, J., held that
the purported marriage was void on the ground that a
European domiciled in the country of his nationality has
no capacity to contract a valid marriage under customary
law. He further stated obiter that it would have made no
difference if the deceased had acquired a Nigerian domicile.
2
Similarly,in Savage v. Macfoy, the deceased, who 
was born at Freetown in Sierre Leone, settled in Lagos 
where he acquired a domicile of choice, and married a 
Yoruba woman according to Yoruba customary law. Osborne, 
C.J.,held that the mere fact of Macfoy having made Lagos 
his domicile of choice would not necessarily make him 
subject to, or given the benefit of native law and custom, 
and his ordinary relations would be governed by English, 
and not native, law. The learned Judge held that Macfoy*s 
customary union was void on the ground that since he was 
born in Sierre Leone, and English law applied there, no 
effect could be given to **a polygamous union which would 
not be recognized as valid by the laws of the domicile or 
origin of either party” .
This decision and the obiter dictum in Fonseca 
v. Passman, it is respectfully submitted, are contrary 
to the rules of private international law of most countries. 
A person*s capacity to contract a marriage is governed by
4the law of his or her domicile at the time of the marriage,
Footnote 3 continued Nigeria, 1959 Revision; Customary
Courts Edict, No. 2 1966, Eastern Region, s.11. For a 
discussion on these definitions see, Keay and Richardson, 
The Native and Customary Courts of Nigeria, op.cit., 
pp. m - 1 8 b .
1. [1958] W.R.L.R. 41; see also Short v. Morris [1958]
3 W.A.L.R. 339; Nelson v. Nelson 11951 "I 13 "W.A.C.A.248;
Re Bethel [1887] 38 Ch.D.22Ch
2. [1909] 1 Renner*s Gold Coast Report, 504.
3. [1958] W.R.N.L.R. 41.
4. See Brook v. Brook [1861] 9 H.L. Cas.193; Warrender v. 
Warrender [1835] 2 Cl. and Fin. 488, H.L.; Dicey and
footnote 4 continued.......
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and the domicile of origin, or nationality of a person is 
not relevant in determining his or her capacity to contract 
a marriage. Consequently, Macfoy by virtue of his Lagos 
domicile of choice had capacity to contract a polygamous 
marriage, and since he was not debarred under Yoruba cus­
tomary law from contracting a Yoruba customary marriage, 
it is submitted that his marriage was valid. In Fonseca 
V. Passman.since the deceased was not domiciled in Nigeria, 
his capacity to contract a polygamous marriage would depend 
on the law of his domicile at the time of the marriage.
(11) Traditional taboos
Certain communities, notably the Igbos, prohibited 
slaves and their descendants from inter-marriage with free 
citizens. There were several categories of slaves 
including:
(a) osu - persons dedicated to certain kinds of ,ju,iu 
(shrine) to appease the gods, and the descendants of 
such persons;
(b) ordinary slaves, to whom various communities gave 
different names such as ohu, oru, or ume.
Persons who were Osu suffered the worst sort of 
social and legal discrimination, especially in relation to
Footnote 4 continued.......
Morris, The Conflict of Laws, op.cit.tpp.258 et al; 
cf. Cheshire!s Private International Law, 9th edPE. 
by P.M. North, (London: Bullerworths, 1974), p.536;
"The basic presumption is that capacity to marry is 
governed by the law of the husbandfs domicile at the 
time of the marriage, for normally it is in the 
country of that domicile that the parties intend to 
establish their permanent home. This presumption, 
however, is rebutted if it can be inferred that the 
parties at the time of the marriage intended to 
establish their home in a certain country and that 
they did in fact establish it there within a reasonable 
time. See also Radwan v. Radwan(No. 2) [1972] 3 All
E.R. 1026 where this principle was applied, and 
Ali v. All [1968] p.64; [1966] 1 All E.R. 664; 
Cumming-Bruce, J., at p.576-577, suggested that both 
views were tenable and neither concluded by authority; 
see Hartley, 32 M.L.R. 158.
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marriage. The Bride Price Committee, during its invest­
igations of dowry payments, found severe discriminations 
against persons labelled as osu, ohu or oru, and the
2descendants of such persons, who were similarly labelled.
As a result of their recommendations, the Abolition of Osu 
System Law, 1956, was enacted by the government of the 
former Eastern Nigeria. The Law abolished the osu system, 
and its allied practices, including oru, ohu and ume systems; 
removed certain social and legal disabilities, for example, 
incapacity to marry a free citizen (diala, or nwadiana),and 
prescribed punishments for breaches of the Law.
During the second reading of the Bill of the 
Abolition of Osu System Law, 1956, several members of the 
House of Assembly opposed the Bill, and some members, stated 
that their constituencies had specifically mandated them not 
to support the abolition of the systems. Many members, for 
example, Dr. A.N. Obonna of Owerri Division, and Chief 
N.N. Anyika of Awka Division expressed the opinion that the 
law if passed, would be unenforceable.^1 Unfortunately, time 
has vindicated the assertions of these members. Twenty-one 
years after the enactment of the Abolition of Osu System 
Law, 1956, the social stigma attached to these unfortunate
1. See generally, Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.,pp.171-175; 
Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,p p .2h-5-£58; Forde and Jones, 
The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op.cit.,p.23; Green 
Igbo Village Affairs, op.cit., pp.o-24, 50-51, 158-159; 
Arikpo, ’*The End of Osu?" West Africa, 21 April, 1956,
p.201; W.R.G. Horton, "The Ohu System of Slavery11, 24 
Africa, 1954, p.517-555; Uchendu, The Igbo South­
east Nigeria, op.cit., pp.87-90; Sylvia Leith-ftoss,
"Notes on the Osu System...”, 10 Africa, 1957,p p .207-220;
Nzimo, Studies in Ibo Political Systems, op.cit.,
pp.24-29; Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit.,p p .51,205-205.
2. Bride-Price Committee Report, (Enugu, Nigeria, Govern- 
ment Printers, Enugu, 195577 p. 48. Discriminations 
were especially noted at Okigwe and Owerri, where it is 
alleged the system of osu originated and from whence it 
spread to other areas, see Basden, Niger Ibos. pp.245- 
258; Uchendu, "The Igbos...", op.cit., p.89.
5. Cap 1, Laws of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1965 
Revision.
4. See Eastern House of Assembly Parliamentary Debates,
20th March, 1956, Eastern Debate, Vol.II, pp.599-415.
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group of people and their descendants, still remains. 
Although there are very few reported cases where breach 
of the Law has been alleged,^" discriminations remain as 
stringent as ever.^
For example, a young Onitsha woman fell in love
with a man who allegedly was an oru. Although he was a
suitable person in every other respect,, her family were
united in their opposition to any marriage between the
couple. The girl!s father informed the present writer
that he would prefer to die, or to see his daughter dead,
rather than see her married to an oru. He stated that if
such a marriage was contracted, no Onitsha person would
marry any member of his family or associate with them.
They would all become social outcasts in Onitsha. The
views of other Onitsha indigenes confirmed his statements.
Everyone appreciated the injustice of the system, but no
one was prepared to incur the social ostracism that would
3
result from such a marriage.
The position demonstrates the almost total failure 
of legislation to effect social changes which involve deep- 
rooted practices and beliefs. It is hoped that time would 
eventually prove the who opposed the Bill on the
ground of its unenforceability wrong, but from available 
evidence, that time has not yet come.
1. See e.g. Nwachukwu v. Nnoremele [1956] 2 E.R.L.R. 50 
which involved an allegation of slander.
2. See C. Obi Akpamgbo, "Magistrates Courts Law (Amendment) 
East Central State of Nigeria Edict, No. 25 of 1971", 
Nigeria Lawyers1 Quarterly, Vol.4, pp.153-144 at p.155; 
A.N. Aniagolu, ^Aspects of Customary Marriage and 
Divorce and Their Incidents Upon Family Life", in 
African Indigenous Laws, edit, by T.O. Elias; Basden, 
Niger Ibos, op.cit.t pp.245-244; Green, Igbo Village 
Affairs, op.cit., p. 158-159, n.l.; Uchendu, "The Igbo 
of Southeast Nigeria" , op.cit. ,p.90; W. Horton, op . cit... 
p.334-535; Leith-Ross, t(T h e  Osu System." o p .cit.. p.218.
3. See Horton, on.cit.. p.334 "..even Christian parents, I 
was informed, would never countenance such an alliance. 
Isaac Mba, court member for Ibagwa and one of the most 
enlightened men in the area, admitted that he would be 
horrified at the thought of himself or his children 
marrying Ohu". Basden notes that a free-born man who has 
intercourse with an osu girl automatically becomes an osu,
footnote 3 continued............
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3. Consents to Marriage
Two sets of consents are necessarily involved 
in contracting a customary marriage:
(I) parental consents
(II) the consents of the individuals to the marriage.
A. Parental consents
(1) Introduction
From the definition of customary marriage given
above,^ it is seen that,unlike marriage in "modern'’ English
law, the families of both parties to a customary marriage play
an important part, not only in the formation of the marriage,
but during its existence, and its termination, whether by
divorce or death. The consents of the respective families
of the parties involved are therefore a necessary legal
element of the marriage.
The word '’modern11 is used designedly, as in
traditional English society, marriage did not portray the
spirit of individualism that is its characteristic feature
today. In common with other European and Asian countries,
in addition to the consents of the bride and groom, that of
the kinsmen on both sides were usually also necessary. A
contract of marriage, as seen from the description of an
2
ancient English marriage given above, created rights and 
duties, not only between the spouses, but among the kinsmen, 
and in fact, the parties who arranged the terms of the con­
tract were not the pair to be wedded, but the bridegroom's 
kindred and the ’forespeakers of the bride’.
Footnote 3 continued  see Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,
p.248; see also Green, Igbo Village AffairsT op.cit., 
p.158; Meek, Law and Authority, opucit., p.2047 n.l; 
Leith-Ross, The Osu System Among the Ibo, op.cit., 
p.216-217.
1. .See above, Chapter III.
2. Ibid., p.208.
3. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence, op.cit.,p.252; 
see also Pollock and Maitland, history of English Law,
op.cit.,p.5; Phillips, Survey of African Marriage, op.cit., 
  ' footnotedcontinued::77. .77.“
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Child-marriage, as previously seen, is of ancient 
origin, and the power of families to marry off their off­
spring existed in most traditional societies.1 0 !Faolain 
and Martines say of the Greeks:
"Respectable Greek women were bred for marriage - 
there was no alternative. A guardian's duty to 
his ward was to dower and marry her off suitably 
when she came of age and as many times thereafter 
as might be necessary. Her consent was not required"
In ancient Roman law, the consents of the pater­
familias were indispensable to the marriage of sons and 
daughters alike, and where the consent of a parent was 
needed, it must precede the marriage itself. It was not 
possible to validate the contract by ratification if the
union was preceded by consortium without parental con- 
3
sents. A daughter was permitted to refuse to accede to 
her fatherTs choice of husband only when he selected some­
one who was unworthy on account of his habits, or who was 
of infamous character.^ Augustan legislation made provision 
against unreasonable withholding of parental consents, but 
even to the time of Justinian parental consents continued 
to be a legal requirement in most cases.
Corbett contends that, neither in the sixth century 
A.D., nor in the classical period^ could a father betroth his 
son against his will, but he concludes that, despite arguments 
to the contrary, there is considerable evidence that the
paterfamilias had it in his power to play a despotic role in
5
the betrothal of his daughter. Similarly, Lee notes that
Footnote 3 continued  p.xv; Radcliffe-Brown and Forde,
African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, op.cit.,pp.44-46; 
Yaotey v. Quaye 119bl I G.L.R. 573* 379*
1. See John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women,(London: 
Dent, Everymanfs Library, 1975), p.246; Originally 
women were taken by force, or regularly sold by their 
father to the husband. Until a late period in European 
history, the father had the power to dispose of his 
daughter in marriage at his own will and pleasure, 
without any regard to hers".
2. Julia O'Faolain and Lauro Martines, Not in God's Image. 
Women in History from the Greeks to the Victorians, 
(London: Temple Smith, 1973), p.15.
3. W.W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law,(London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1925), p.b1?; Maine,
Ancient Law, op.cit., p.l4l.
footnotes 4 and 5 continued.......
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"It is likely enough that in early times marriage was a
matter of arrangement between the parents on both sides
in law as it always might be in fact".^
Arranged marriages in China, India, and Japan are
sufficiently common in recent periods not to need special
comment. The Roman law, which became the basis of legal
systems in most European countries, was based on the same
hierarchal family system as that of the East. When Japan
decided in 1898 to create a new legal system, it took over
the Napoleonic Code which was based on the laws of ancient
Rome and found that it almost perfectly fitted the con-
2
ditions of Japanese patriarchalism.
In Russia, marriage was not permitted without the 
consents of parents, guardians, or trustees, although they 
were not rendered void if already performed without such
3
consents.
In Ireland, especially in the rural areas, marriage
was a contractual affair arranged by the parents or families
A
of the marrying'parties, while in France, where arranged 
marriages have always been numerous, it is not a thing of 
the past; "there is a whole bourgeois class of solid sub­
stance which is keeping it alive", and clubs devoted to
5
such matters still flourish.
Footnotes 4 and 5 continued.
4. Digest XXXIII, 1, 11, 12.
5. Percy E. Corbett, The Roman Law of Marriage (London:
Oxford University £ress, 1530), pp. 2-4.
1. R.W. Lee, The Elements of Roman Law, with a Translation 
of the Institutes of Justinian, 4th edit. (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1956), p.65, par. 96.
2. David Mace and Vera Mace, Marriage, East and West,
(London: MacGibbon and Kee, i960;, p.44; see the 
interesting comparisons made by Begho between Roman Law 
and the legal systems of customary laws in Nigeria,
Begho, Law and Culture in the Nigerian and Roman World, 
op.cit.
3. Berman, "Soviet Family Law in the Light of Russian History 
and Marxist Theory", op.cit., p.26.
4. C.M. Arensberg, and S.T. Kimball, "The Small Farm Family 
of Rural Ireland", in Sociology of the Family, edit, by 
Michael Anderson, (London: Penguin Education, 1971, 
reprint, 1975), p.52.
5. De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, op.cit.,p.451; Marlene 
Dobkin, "Colonialism and the Legal Status of Women in 
Francophonic Africa", Cahiers d Tetudes Africaines, 51 
1963, pp.390-405 at p .393.
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These examples are some evidence of the fact 
that arranged marriages existed in most traditional 
societies, and justify the conclusion of Engels:
“Throughout the whole of antiquity marriages were 
arranged by the parents, and the partners calmly 
accepted their choice. What little love there was 
between husband and wife in antiquity is not so 
much objective inclination as objective duty, not 
the cause of marriage but its corollary. Love 
relationships in the modern sense only occur in 
antiquity outside official society".-^
In the traditional laws of the great majority of 
cultures, parental participation in marriage has been the 
general rule, and the exceptions, if any, have been very 
few.
(11) The traditional position in Nigeria
The general rule which existed in the traditional 
societies in Nigeria is that the consent of each family is 
necessary for the validity of a marriage. Even in cases of 
elopement, the “marriage“ was not usually regarded as 
valid, until the parents accepted some form of gift from 
j the husband. Acceptance of such gifts acted as retros-
! pective consent. Child-marriage or child-betrothal, as
I previously seen, was prevalent among most Nigerian
I
| communities, and these institutions necessarily involve
| parental consents.^
| Before discussing parental consents in the various
i
| societies, it is necessary to identify the parental consents
, necessary for the validity of a marriage. Was it the
! consents of the fathers of the bride and groom that was
| necessary, or must the consents of their mothers also be
obtained? Must the extended family, or the head of the 
extended family also consent?
! It is difficult to formulate precise legal rules
| in this respect. Thus Thomas says:
1. Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State in the Light of Researches of 
Lewis H. Morgan, with introduction and notes by 
Eleanor B. Leacock, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1972), p.
2. See above, pp.378-386.
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"the decision appears to rest entirely with the father 
^and mother, their families may be called in but they 
have no voice in the matter. At Nise £lgbo] I was 
told that the girl was asked first and if she agreed 
she was told to go and ask her mother, and if the 
mother agreed a message was sent to the suitor to 
come and bring palm wine for both father and mother.
On the other hand, when a man marries it appears that 
he will often consult his elder brother".^
The general position seems to be that the families
of each party to the marriage were consulted, and invariably,
their wishes were respected, but provided the girl!s father,
or other legal guardian, consented, the marriage was
2
regarded as legally valid. In some Igbo communities for
example Onitsha, the consent of the girl*s mother was also
legally necessary, and in the modern society, the mother*s
consent to her daughter*s marriage remains a legal necessity
for the validity of a marriage in Onitsha. In most
communities, only the father*s consent was legally necessary,
although the mother had to be consulted, and her opinion may
3
affect the choice of spouse in actual fact.
In the overwhelming majority of Nigerian
traditional societies, the consents of both the man*s
and the woman*s families were necessary for the validity of
a marriage which involved payment of dowry, and in this
4 5
respect reference can be made to the Igbos - Yorubas -
1. Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking Peoples, 
Part I, op.cit., pT62; see also Fadipe, op.cit.,pp.71-7^; 
Contrast Qkpanum v. Okpanum [1972] 2 E.CTs.L.ft.561.
2. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.,p.l62; Nwogugu,
Family Law in Nigeria, op.cixT,p.44; Cf. Bradbury and 
Lloyd, op.cit.. p.98.
3. See Johnson notes that it is "generally the female members 
of the family to look out for.a wife for their male 
relatives", see Johnson, op.cit.. p.113.
4. See Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples of Nigeria, opTcit., Part I, p.b£; Meek, Law 
and Authority7 op.cit.,p.268; H.A. Wieschhoff, "Divorce 
Laws and Practices in Modern Ibo Culture", 26 Journal 
of Negro History,1941, p.299; Forde and Jones, The Ibo 
and ibibio-SpeaKing Peoples, op.cit.,pp.17-18.
5. See Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit.,p.l85>
Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, op.cit., p.21; Johnson, 
History of the Yorubas, op.cit., p.113; Ajisafe, op.cit., 
pp.52, 59; Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1966;, p.£o£.
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1 2 3 4 3 6Hausas - Fulanis - Ibibios - Edos - Nupes - Tivs
7 8Ekois Igbirras and other communities. The consent of
the man's family was especially necessary in the case of
his first marriage; in the case of the woman, parental
consent was necessary for the first and all subsequent
marriages. If the woman's father was dead, the consent of
her legal guardian and usually her elder brother or uncle,
must be obtained.
(Ill) The legal effect of a lack of parental consents
An important consideration is the legal effect 
on the validity of a marriage celebrated without the required 
consent or consents. Is such a marriage void, or merely 
voidable?
1. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., Vol.II, p.94.
2. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., Vol.II, p.94;
Stenning, 1 The Pastoral Fulani", op.cit. ,p.386; De Croix, 
The Fulani of Northern Nigeria, op.cit.t p.39-40.
3. Talbot, Woman Mysteries of a Primitive People, op.cit., 
pp.89-90.
4. See Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Edo-Speaking 
Peoples of Nigeria, Part I, op.cit.tp w h o  notes that 
the father of the bride has to pay attention to the views 
of his elder brother, who may possibly have a power of 
veto; see also Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op.cit., 
p . 15.
5. Forde, Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence, op.cit.,
p.43; Nadel, A Black Byzantium, op.cit.t p.358.
6. Akiga, Akigafs Story, op.cit. ,p.114-113; Meek, Northern
Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., p.204.
7. Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush; A Description of 
the Ekol of Southern Nigeria (London, Heineman, 1912), 
p.107.
8. See generally, Temple, "Notes on the Tribes,” op.cit.,
Paula Brown, "The Igbira**, in Peoples of the Niger-
Benue Confluence, op.cit., pp.67-68; Welch, "The 
Isoko Tribe", 7 Africa, 1934, pp.160-173; Charles
Partridge, Cross River Natives. (London: Hutchinson 
and Co., 1905), p p .423, 425. Kasunmu and Salacuse, 
op.cit., p.42.
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The Traditional Society
(a) Among the Yorubas
If, despite the lack of parental consent, the 
man and woman live together as man and wife, the marriage 
would he regarded as one by "mutual consent only", which, 
as previously seen"*" was, and still is, a valid legal
2
marriage among the Yorubas. In fact, as noted by Johnson, 
this type of marriage arose mainly where the girl*s 
parents had refused to give their consent to the marriage, 
or wanted her to marry someone else.
The parties may elope without the consent of the
3
girlfs parents, but Ward notes that although dowry is 
not strictly payable in such cases, after the elopement, 
the husband usually "goes to the parents of the girl, 
prostrates himself before them and begs their forgiveness. 
He then presents them with a case of gin or its equivalent, 
in money or in kind” .
(b) Among the Igbos
The legal effect of lack of parental consent 
varies among various Igbo communities, and may depend 
on whether the person whose consent is required, refuses to 
give his consent, or was not asked to give his consent, 
that is, he or she was not consulted about the marriage.
For example, in Oguta, where a person*s consent is required 
to a valid marriage, and he or she is asked for, but does 
not give the required consent, the marriage, once concluded 
with the necessary ceremonies, will be valid, but where the 
person was not consulted before the marriage ceremonies are 
performed, the marriage is void.
1. See above, Chapter III.
2. See Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op.cit., p.116.
Fadipe notes that the popularity of marriage without 
parental consent is one of the most important changes
in traditional marriage customs, see Fadipe, op.cit.,
p. 92.
3. Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, op.cit.,p.21.
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Where a marriage is performed without the necessary 
consent, subsequent consent ratifies the marriage, and it will 
be regarded as lawful from the beginning in Oguta, Abakaliki 
and many other Divisions, but in Aba, Umuahia, Aguata, and 
a number of other Divisions, the marriage will only be 
regarded as valid from the day the necessary consent is 
given. ^
The modern society
The modern position as to the requirement of 
parental consents as an essential of a valid customary 
marriage is less clear. The changing nature of customary 
law renders the position rather fluid. Changes in personal 
laws are difficult to ascertain, but undoubtedly, 
traditional laws regarding many aspects of customary 
marriage are no longer being complied with in fact.
To what extent are parental consents still 
necessary to effect a valid marriage? The law and practice 
show some variations among the communities, and it is 
necessary to examine the position:
(a) among the Yorubas;
(b) among the Igbos;
(c) among other communities.
(a) Among the Yorubas
Writers on Yoruba customary law generally agree
that in a marriage contracted by payment of dowry the con-
2
sents of the woman*s parents are necessary. In Savage v. 
Macfoy,^ decided in 1909> evidence was established that the
1. Customary Law Manual, op.cit., pp.254-238; see generally, 
Basden,., Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op.cit. ,p.69; Basden, 
Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.215; Thomas, Anthropological 
Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples, Part I, op.cit., 
p.o2; Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit., p.268;
Wieschhoff, l*Divorce Laws and Practices in Modern Ibo 
Culture**, 26 Journal of Negro History, 1941, p.2jj;
Forde and Jones, Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples,
op.cit., pp.17-18.
2. See Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op.cit.. p.297;
footnotes.2 and 5 continued....
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consent of the girl's family is necessary for the legal 
validity of a customary marriage.
The position has now been changed by statute in 
some Yoruba areas. For example, the Marriage, Divorce and 
Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958 provides 
as follows:
"When any parent or guardian of a bride refuses his 
or her consent to a marriage or refuses to accept 
his or her share of the dowry, the bride, if she is 
eighteen years of age or above, and the bridegroom 
jointly may institute legal proceedings in a com­
petent court against the parent or guardian to show 
cause why he or she should refuse consent or to 
accept his or her share of the dowry; and if the 
court is of the opinion that no sufficient cause 
has been shown, it shall order that the marriage may 
proceed without the consent of such parent". ]_
This provision does not specify the procedure for 
payment of dowry, where a parent refuses consent to the 
marriage. Should the payment be made to the court, or is 
payment waived? If payment of dowry is not necessary in 
cases where the parent refuses his or her consent, there 
is no significant difference between such a marriage and a 
marriage by "the mutual consent of the parties only,” and 
there is little to be gained by applying to the court for 
permission to marry. The Ibadan District Council did not 
adopt this provision in its own Marriage, Divorce and 
Custody of Children Bye-Laws. Indeed where a community 
recognizes "marriage by mutual consent only", as does 
Ibadan, application for the court's permission to marry 
is superfluous.
Footnotes 2 and 3 continued....
2  Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People,
op.cit., p.51; Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.73; 
Ekundare, op.cit.,p.12.
3. [1909] Renner's Gold Coast Report, 504.
1. W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958, s.5.
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With reference to the necessity for the man’s parents 
to consent to his marriage, most writers agree that customary 
law has been modified to the extent that a man may now con­
tract a valid marriage by payment of dowry without the 
consent of his family.
In Re Sapara,^ the caveatrix sought to forbid the 
intended marriage between one Dr. Oguntala Sapara and Sarah 
Ellen Green on the ground of an alleged prior marriage con­
tracted under customary law between herself and the doctor.
She claimed that this marriage was still subsisting,and 
consequently Dr. Sapara could not legally marry another woman 
under the Nigerian Marriage Act. Dr. Sapara denied that he 
was ever married to the caveatrix, on the ground, inter alia, 
that native marriage was a contract between families, and 
therefore a man could not marry without the consent of his 
family. The Judge, Osborne, C.J., accepted the evidence 
that the doctorfs family never gave their consent to the 
doctor*s marriage to the caveatrix, but rejected the 
proposition that the consent of a man’s family to his marriage 
was a legal requisite of the marriage;
He said:
"It has been urged that native marriage was a con­
tract between family and family, and therefore that 
a man could not marry without the consent of his 
head of the family, though the experts were not 
agreed that such was the case. If it were so, then 
it follows that a man who had no family could not 
marry, yet according to the evidence, he could, 
and could get some of his neighbours to assist him....
I am unable to accept the proposition, which is con­
tracted by one of the most reliable expert witnesses, 
that the consent of a man’s family is a legal essential 
to his marriage”.2
He held that the nexus of the contract of customary marriage 
was between the man himself on the one side, and the woman 
and her family on the other.
1. [1911] Renner’s Gold Coast Reports, 605.
2. Ibid., p.* 607.
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This decision illustrates the changing nature of 
customary law. Insofar as the evidence, and the judgment 
indicate that in traditional society, the consent of a man!s
family was not legally necessary, they cannot be supported. 
Kasunmu^ fails to see why a distinction should be made bet­
ween parental consent of the man and the woman, and various
other writers have not lent their support to this view of
2
the traditional customary law of the Yorubas.
It is respectfully submitted that the consent
of the manTs family was legally necessary, as was the
consent of the woman1s family, for a marriage by payment
of dowry, the usual form of marriage among the Yorubas in
traditional society. It is difficult to visualize a man
in the integrated and close-knit family system with its
patriarchal flavour which operated during the last century
in Nigeria, acting unilaterally, or against the wishes of
his kin in the acquisition of a wife. The reciprocal
nature of rights and duties of the families inherent in a
customary marriage negatives such a proposition. For
example, when one of the wifefs parents died, not only the
husband, but his relatives as well, had certain defined
3
duties to perform.
Fadipe rightly stresses the importance of the 
interest of both families in a marriage and sees it as 
relating to the "purposes of the relationship and its terms
1. A.B. Kasunmu, "The Law of Husband and Wife in Western 
Nigeria", in Integration of Customary and Modern Legal 
Systems in Africa, edit, by Law Faculty, University of 
Ife, (ile-Ife, Nigeria, Africana Publishing Corporation, 
1971), p.334.
2. See e.g. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op.cit., 
p.297; Ekundare, op.cit.,p.l£; Fadipe, op.cit., 
pp.71-72; Ajisafe, op.cit.,p.31.
3. See Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit., p.228; Cf.R.S. 
Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, 1929, p.26:
"It is almost a platitude to state that marriage in 
Ashanti is not so much between individuals concerned 
as one between the two groups of individuals whom they 
represent".
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and conditions, the prospects of realising the principal 
purpose of the union, and the possible consequences - 
legal, social, economic, political and religious - to the 
groups concerned with such a union".^
2
But the decision in Re Sapara can be taken as
representing a change in the law of customary marriage.
In modern Yoruba law there is no doubt that a man's
marriage contracted without the consent of his family may
3
be legally valid. Indeed, the Marriage, Divorce, and
Custody of Children Bye-Laws of the former Western Region
seems to recognize this fact in the provision quoted above.
No provision is made for obtaining the consent of the man's
family where such consent is withheld.
It should be noted that although parental consent
of the woman's family is necessary for her first marriage
if contracted by payment of dowry, her subsequent marriages
may be contracted without parental consent. The dowry paid
by the first husband is repaid to him by the second husband,
obviating the necessity of referring to the wife's parents.
Such a marriage is known as "marriage by seduction," and
4involves payment of dowry.
The position with reference to Yoruba customary 
marriage may be summed up.
In the traditional society the parental consents 
of either party to the marriage were legally essential, and 
a marriage contracted without such consents operated as a 
marriage by "mutual consent only"; insofar as it purported 
to be a marriage by payment of dowry, it was void. In the 
modern society, the consent of a man's parents is not legally 
essential. In the case of a woman, her parents consent is 
necessary for the validity of her first marriage by payment 
of dowry. Her subsequent marriages may be legally valid
1. Fadipe, op.cit.,p.69.
2. [1911] Renner's Gold Coast Report, 605.
5. See Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit.,p.75.
4. See Faremilekun and Ors.v. The State T19741 
3 W.S.C.A.86.
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without parental consent. Lack of parental consent in 
both cases operate as marriage by mutual consent only”, 
which is a valid legal-marriage.
(b) Among the Igbos
The law among the various communities varies
considerably. The general rule which obtains among most
communities is that a man is free to marry without first
obtaining the consent of his parents or family head, while
a woman must obtain the consent of her parents or other
legal guardian to her first, as well as to all subsequent,
marriages.^ There are exceptions in both cases. For
example, The Customary Law Manual states that an adult man
has no right to marry without the consent of his parents or
family head in Onitsha and Udi Divisions, two communities
in Nkanu Division, and five communities in Northern Ngwa
Division. On the other hand, an adult woman may marry
without parental consent, or the consent of her legal
guardian in Afikpo, Aguata, Enugu, Etiti, Ishielu, Mbano,
Aguta, Okigwe, Orlu, Oru and Owerri Divisions, as well as
2
in many communities in other Divisions.
In Nwinya Ike v. Offia Nwa Una and Anor,
Okagbue J., refused to consider as valid a marriage allegedly 
contracted in accordance with the customary law of the 
husband, without the consent of the bridefs family. He 
observed:
”It is trite knowledge that under customary law a 
marriage can only take place with the consent of 
the brideTs family and that the intended bridegroom 
must seek the hand of his prospective bride from her
1. See Nwagugu, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit., p.44; Obi, 
Modern Family Law, op.cit.,p.162; Basden, Niger Ibos, 
op.cit.-, p.213; see generally, The Customary Law 
Manual, op.cit.,pp.213-216; Thomas, Anthropological 
Report....Ibo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., Part I, p.62; 
Wieschhoff, Divorce Laws and Practices in Modern Ibo 
Culture, 26 J. Negro History, 1941, op.cit., p.299 
Forde and Jones, op.cit., pp.17-18.
2. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit.,pp.234-233.
3. [1974] Suit No. E/lA/74, unreported, Enugu High Court;
see also Otaka v. Otaka [1973] Suit No. MN/35/73, 
unreported, Nsukka Magistrates Court; for the facts 
see below, p.
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people and in accordance with the custom of her 
people” .
There are a few obiter dicta which suggest that 
marriage is a union between families, and that the consents 
of both families are necessary for a valid marriage under 
Igbo customary law,"*" but there seems to be no reported 
cases where this point expressly came up for decision in 
Anambra and Imo States. In many cases the consent of the 
woman*s parents was specifically declared to be legally 
necessary.
The position under Igbo customary law may there­
fore be stated as follows: it is not legally essential for a 
man's parents or the head of his extended family to consent 
to his marriage. The consents of a woman*s parents, or that 
of her legal guardian, are necessary for the validity of her 
first marriage, and for all subsequent marriages. There are 
exceptions in each case.
(c) Among other communities
In most of the other communities, a man does not
need the consent of his family in order to contract a
valid marriage; a woman in order to contract a valid
marriage by payment of dowry needs the consent of her parents,
2
or at least her father or other legal guardian. For
example, the Declaration of Idoma Native Law and Custom
3
relating to marriage and divorce provides that "no woman
1. See e.g. Okpanum v. Okpanum [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 561.
2. Contrast and Compare: Philip E. Leis, Enculturation and 
Socialization in an I .jaw Village (London: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc., 1972), p.8 6 ; Meek, Northern Tribes
of Nigeria, op.cit., Vol.II, p.94; Stenning, nThe 
Pastoral Fulani of Northern Nigeria”, in Peoples of 
Africa, edit, by Gibbs, op.cit.,p.586; de Croix, op.cit., 
pp.39-40; Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Edo- 
Speaking Peoples, op.cit., fart f , p . 4?; Egharevba,
Benin Law and Custom, op.cit.,p.15; Forde, Peoples of 
the Niger-Benue Confluence, op.cit.,p.45; Nadel, op.cit., 
p.38; Akiga, Akiga's Story, op.cit.,pp.111-116; Talbot, 
In the Shadow of the Bush, p .107; D . Amaury-Talbot,
Woman!s Mysteries, op.cit.,p p .89-90; Temple, Notes on 
the Tribes, op.cit.-, . Meek, Northern Tribes, op.
cit.. Vol.I, p .204; Rosemary Harris, The Political 
Organization of the Membe, Nigeria, (London: 19&5J," 
pp.39-40.
3. N.A.L.N. 63 of 1959.
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shall be married unless her father or guardian consents". 
Section 5 of the Declaration states:
"(2) If a woman cohabits against the wishes of her
father or guardian with a man who purports to 
be her husband but is not married to her, the 
father or guardian may at any time after the 
commencement of cohabitation demand the bride- 
price from that man in accordance with sub- 
paragraph (1) of this paragraph.
(3) After payment in accordance with sub-paragraph
(2) of this paragraph the parties shall be 
deemed to be married".
Similar provisions are found in the local law of other
communities.^ There are no corresponding provisions
requiring the consent of the man!s family as a legal
essential of his marriage.
Decisions of the High Courts of the communities
generally confirm that parental consent is necessary for the
2
marriage of a woman. For example, in Obele v. Obele and Ors. 
the plaintiff, a Master-Fisherman under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, sought a declaration that the marriage between 
the first and second defendants be declared null and void.
His reason was that before the purported statutory marriage 
between the two defendants, the second defendant was legally 
married to him under Epie Attisa customary law, which 
marriage was still subsisting at the time of the purported 
statutory marriage between the defendants. The second 
defendant’s father admitted that the plaintiff offered to 
marry his daughter, but maintained that the offer was not 
accepted by him or his daughter. Reviewing the evidence, 
Allagoa, J., said:
"It is common ground from the evidence led by both 
parties that the question of marriage is not an 
understanding reached by the intended husband and 
the intended wife alone but by the families of both 
parties....
1. See e.g. the declarations of native law and custom of the 
Biu Federation (N.A.L.N.9 of 1964); Borgu (N.A.L.N.52 
of 1961) and generally, see Jeswald Salacuse, A Selected 
Survey of Nigerian Family Law,(Ahmadu Bello University, 
1965)t PP.31 et al.
2. [1973] N.M.L.R. 155.
3. Ibid.; p.155.
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He held that there had been no valid customary marriage 
between the plaintiff and the second defendant, since 
there was no evidence that she, or her parents, had con­
sented to the alleged marriage.
The view that a man does not need parental con­
sent for his marriage under customary law in modern 
society seems to be now firmly established. Since the 
decision in Re Sapara in 1911, there is no known case in 
which lack of consent by the man's family has been held 
to invalidate a marriage under customary law. Indeed, no 
such case has engaged the attention of the courts since 
then. On the other hand, there are several cases which 
have decided that the consent of the woman's family is an 
essential of a valid marriage. What has been responsible 
for this discrimination in the legal status of women with 
reference to parental consent as a legal essential of 
marriage?
(d) The retention of parental consent as a legal essential 
for women's marriage
The reasons for the retention of parental consent 
for women's marriage are mainly due to the peculiar nature 
of a marriage by payment of dowry, the enhanced economic 
status of men, and the social attitude of women towards 
marriage without their parents' consent.
Economic emancipation has freed men from the 
purse-strings of the family in many cases, and young men 
are now generally capable of providing the funds for their 
marriage without the financial assistance of parents. 
Parental consent may therefore not be necessary to effect 
a marriage. In fact, a man's ability to finance his own 
marriage tends to secure family consent where it would have 
been otherwise withheld. Not many families would be 
prepared to oppose the wishes of a financially successful 
son who is generous to them, in the choice of a wife, 
even in cases where they disapprove of the bride, knowing
1. [1911] Renner's Gold Coast Reports, 605.
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that he could accomplish his purpose without their help.
The most the family would offer is advice. Open hostility 
would be avoided in most cases.
The economic factor coupled with the fact that the 
majority of law making agencies are composed mainly, or 
solely, in some cases, of men, have combined to give the 
man legal emancipation from his family in his choice of 
spouse, as witnessed by the number of provisions which do 
not mention parental consent for men*s marriage, while 
retaining and stressing it as a legal requisite in the case 
of women.
Women have been less fortunate in this respect 
because of the continued retention, and increasing 
importance attached to the payment of dowry as a require­
ment of a valid marriage, and also to the fact that 
generally speaking, women are more conservative in their 
attitudes to dispensation of parental consents to their 
marriage. With the possible exception of Yoruba women, 
few women are prepared to marry without the consent of their 
parents. In spite of increased economic independence,women 
remain doomed to parental eccentricities, according to 
McFarlan,^ the favourite being, marrying their daughters 
to men old enough to be their fathers.
Although legislation has improved the lot of a
few women to some extent, quite a number of women are still
victims of the traditional law which requires parental
consent. The Bride Price Committee recommended that parental
consent should only be required for parties below the age
of twenty-one years, and such consent should not be
2
unreasonably withheld, but the recommendation was not 
accepted.
The greatest factor militating against the 
abolition of parental consents as a legal essential for a 
woman1s marriage is the fact that in most communities a
1. McFarlan, Calabar: The Church of Scotland Mission 
Founded 1846, op.cit., p.90.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report, 1954, op.cit., p.47.
435
customary marriage is not regarded as valid if dowry has 
not been paid on behalf of the bride to her parents. ' Dis­
pensing with parental consents as a legal essential of a 
marriage paves the way for the abolition of dowry as a 
legal essential.
The Customary Court Judges interviewed by the 
present writer were almost unanimous in their opinions 
that a marriage without the consent of a girl's family 
is not valid. The main reason given was that it is against 
law and custom, as it jeopardises the payment of dowry to 
the bride's family, an idea which is repugnant to the 
customary law of some communities, for example, the Igbos 
and Ibibios. Dispensation of parental consents would, 
they declared, eventually lead to the principle that pay­
ment of dowry is not essential for a valid marriage.
The social attitude towards payment of dowry will 
be discussed more fully later, but it is worth noting here 
that the Bride-Price Committee, after considerable inves­
tigation and discussion with many communities in the former 
Eastern Region, was of the opinion that the time had not 
yet arrived when the payment of dowry may be abolished, and 
many communities objected to any interference with their 
present system of dowry payment.^
Whatever the legal position may be as to the 
requirement of parental consent for the marriage of a man 
or woman, in actual practice, marriage without the consents 
of both sets of families is rare, especially where it is the 
first marriage of the man or woman. Reluctance to marry 
without parental consent is particularly strong among 
certain Igbo communities, for example, Onitsha. Parties 
do live together in a few cases in the urban areas, without 
marriage, but generally, if the parents' consents (especially 
the woman's) havenot been given to a union, any purported 
marriage under customary law, or even a valid statutory 
marriage does not make the parties husband and wife in the 
eyes of the community.
1. See e.g. some Ibibio communities, such as Eket, Uyo and Ekot 
Ekpene Divisions, who, informed the Bride Price Commission 
that "they were fully satisfied with their marriage system, 
they desired no change, and any Government interference 
was most unwelcome". - see Bride Price Committee Report, 
op.cit., p.2.
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As noted previously, women are particularly con­
servative in this respect, and a few women who have 
asserted their independence and contracted statutory 
marriages in opposition to their parents* wishes, expressed 
themselves as "never feeling really married", until such 
marriages have been ratified by the parents, and the 
customary formalities observed. Failure to get parental 
consent subsequently, may lead to marital discord, or even 
to divorce.
In one case personally known to the present writer,
the father refused to give his consent to his daughter*s
marriage. Since she was over twenty-one years of age, she
married the man of her choice under the Nigerian Marriage
Act."*" In spite of the fact that the other members of her
family accepted her choice, and recognized the husband, the
persistent refusal of the father to speak to her as long
as she remained with that husband, was a constant source of
worry to her. She often referred to herself as not being
properly married, and expressed her feeling of inferiority,
2
since no dowry had been paid for her. While her father 
is alive no one else could legally accept the dowry on her 
behalf.
B. The consents of the prospective spouses
Article 16 (2) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights provides:
"Marriage shall be entered into only with the free 
and full consent of the intended spouses".
To what extent are marriages contracted according 
to customary law in Nigeria entered into with the free and 
full consent of the prospective wife? There are two 
aspects to the question involving situations where:
1. Under the Nigerian Marriage Act, parental consent is 
not necessary for the marriage of any person twenty- 
one years or above, see further, Chapter X, pp.168-174.
2. See further, Chapter X, pp.186-188.
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(I) child-marriage or child-betrothal has been contracted;
(II) where an adult woman refuses to consent to her parents 
choice of spouse.
These situations will be examined in traditional 
and contemporary societies, and as far as necessary differences 
among the various communities will be pinpointed.
(1) Traditional society
(a) Consent in relation to child-marriage
Child-betrothal and child-marriage have been
discussed in the previous section, and only their relation
to forced marriage needs comment here.
Child-betrothal and child-marriage, which as
previously seen were formerly practised among the great
majority of Nigerian communities,^- invariably entail lack
of real consent, since, very often, the girl is too young
to appreciate the true nature of the marriage contract.
Child-marriage which involves handing over of an infant
girl to her husband, was especially vicious, since she had
little opportunity of rejecting her parents* choice., at a 
2
future date.
In societies where the girl remained at her 
parents* home until she had her first menstrual period, 
usually at the age of fifteen or sixteen, she was often 
given an opportunity to formally accept or reject the hus­
band chosen for her when she was a child. For example, 
among the pastoral Fulani, child-betrothal was, and still 
is common, but the girl betrothed as a child, may choose 
to refuse the lad to whom she was affianced, and the man
1. See e.g. Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, op.cit., 
pp. 17-19; Okonjo, The ~~ Impact of Urbanization, op .cit., 
p.132;Great Britain, Correspondence Relating to the 
Welfare of Women in Tropical Africa, 1935-1937, CMD 
5784, 1938, p.32; Qkpanum v. Okpanum [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 
561 at 563; and below, pp.440 et.al.
2. See Obi, Modern Family'Law, op.cit., pp.161-162.
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of her choice then has to recompense the disappointed 
suitor for the hull which had been transferred to her 
father when the original betrothal took place.^
In other communities, the girl, whatever her 
age, gives her formal consent to the marriage at the 
betrothal ceremony. If this was done when she was a 
child, she is given no opportunity to accept or reject 
the man chosen for her before she is taken to his home 
as a wife. Her consent, given as a child, validates the 
marriage, and any subsequent rejection has no legal effect.
The position among the various ethnic groups 
may be briefly stated.
Among the Yorubas: Child-betrothal was prevalent among
the Yorubas in traditional society. The bride1s consent
was formally given at the time of betrothal, regardless of
her age. Johnson notes that the betrothal ceremony is
called isihun and means 11 formal consent”, since at this
ceremony the girl and her parents formally consent to the
marriage. Although the girl was not usually taken to her
husband*s home until the age of puberty, there is no
evidence that she was given any opportunity to express her
disapproval, or otherwise to the marriage, at any stage
2
after the betrothal.
Among the Igbos: Generally, the formal consent of the bride
is obtained at the initial ceremony when the boy and his 
family formally ask for the girl*s hand in marriage. She 
is usually handed a cup of wine during the course of the 
ceremony. She is expected to take a sip and hand the cup 
to the bridegroom, or to a member of his family. If she 
hands the cup to a member of her own family, it means that
3
she does not give her consent to the marriage. In the
1. De St. Croix, The Fulani of Northern Nigeria, op.cit.p.41.
2. See Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op. cit. ,p.H3;
Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., p.28;
Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, op.cit., 
pp.59-63: Temple. Notes on the Tribes. opTcit., p.103:
"A girl is not permitted to reject any husband chosen 
for her by her parents, except in the case of a man 
physically or morally unsound1*.
3. See Chukwudebe, Onitsha Quo Vadis,(Nigeria, Rex Litho 
Press, 1973), pp.31-32; Elias, The Nigerian Legal 
System, op.cit.. p.290.
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case of child-betrothal, or child-marriage, this ceremony
was performed while the girl was still a child. In some
communities, the girl was given a formal opportunity to
ratify or reject the marriage. For example, in Owerri,
child-betrothal occurred frequently, However, the girl
was generally required to give her consent after she had
reached the age of puberty, at the marriage ceremony
before she was handed over as a wife to the bridegroom.*^
In other communities, for example Onitsha, the child-wife
was given no further opportunity to formally express her
2
opinion about the marriage contracted on her behalf.
Among other communities: The rule also varied among other
communities. Child-betrothal or child-marriage had to be
ratified by the girl when she became an adult. Among the
Ibibios, generally, the girl had to signify her consent
during the marriage ceremony, but the child wife was not
usually given an opportunity to ratify the consent she is
presumed to have given as a child. Among other
3
communities she is given such an opportunity.
Whatever the practice of the community, child- 
betrothal and child-marriage are obviously conducive to 
forced marriages.
Another practice which contributed to forced 
marriages in traditional societies was the widespread 
practice of pledge, whereby a person may be given as 
security for the repayment of a debt. Where a girl was 
given under these circumstances, she may remain after 
puberty as the wife of a member of her masterfs household, 
and the difference between the dowry payable and the amount 
of the loan was adjusted accordingly. This system
1. See Bride-Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.25.
2. See generally, The Customary Law Manual, op.cit., 
pp.254-238; Thomas, Anthropological Report of the 
Ibo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., Part I , p .62.
3. See Obele v. Obele [1973] N.M.L.R. 155; Akiga, Akiga1s 
Story, op.cit.,p p .Il4-llb; see also Bradbury and 
Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op.cit., p.156.
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necessarily curtailed the girl*s freedom of choice,^ but
the greater iniquity of the system was the fact that the
length of the service never defrayed the loan and rep-
2
resented only the interest it earned.
(b) Lack of consent by a grown-up girl
It is difficult to state precisely the effect 
of non-consent by the girl to a marriage arranged by her 
parents. The available evidence reveals a variety of 
practices. In some communities, for example among the 
Yorubas, and most Igbos, the girl had to formally declare 
whether she accepted the prospective bridegroom, and her 
consent was considered essential to a valid marriage. Con­
sequently, strenuous efforts were made to force her to 
accept the man chosen for her. But many writers express 
the opinion that the girlfs consent was not legally 
necessary, yet these writers also state the treatment
meted out to obstinate girls to secure their consent.
4Among the Tivs, she was allegedly beaten, among the
5
Yorubas she was shut up and chastised, while Talbot 
records the pitiful case of the young Ibibio girl who, 
forced to marry her father*s choice, preferred death by 
her own hands.^
1. See Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit.,pp.205; Johnson, 
History of the Yorubas, op.cit., pp.126-130; Thomas, 
Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking Peoples, 
op.cit., Part I , p .62.
2. See Oke Nkwazeme of Nekede v. Ugwanya and Anor.f19431 
Suit No. 2/1943, Governor*s Court of Appeal, finugu, where 
Commissioner F.B. Carr held that it was inequitable for
a loan of £19.10, to be still outstanding after more
than twenty years service rendered to the lender by the
debtor*s son and daughter. See also Kuahen v. Avose 
[1892] Reports of Certain Judgments of the Supreme 
Court: [1884-1892] Law Reports (Colonial), Nigeria A, 
Colonial Office. _
3. See e.g. Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit., p.164.
4. See Akiga, Akiga*s Story, op.cit., p.166.
5. See Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., p.185.
6. Talbot, Woman Mysteries, op.cit.,pp.88-89. A similar, 
but more recent case occurred in Eket, where it was 
claimed that a young girl did not like the man chosen 
for her. She, nevertheless, lived with him and had a
footnote 6 continued.........
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The true position seems to be that her consent 
was not necessary for the validity of the marriage. Girls 
were usually very submissive and generally accepted the 
men chosen for them,^ so that the effect of a girl's refusal 
on the validity of the marriage rarely had to be considered. 
In the relatively few cases where the girl was obstinate and 
refused to live with the man chosen for her, various sorts
of pressures, including physical force were exerted in order 
to secure her compliance.^
(11) Modern society
The requirement of the bridefs consent as a 
legal essential of a customary marriage under modern cus­
tomary law is clearer than it was under traditional law.
The consent of the bride is an essential of a valid marriage 
in modern Nigerian society. Several alleged marriages have 
been declared void by the courts, where it was proved that 
the bride had not given her consent to the marriage. As 
early as 1909, it was accepted by the Court in Savage v. 
Macfoy that the essentials of a marriage according to 
Yoruba customary law included the consent of the bride, and 
in 1943, in Ogunremi v. Ogunremi^ it was held that the
Footnote 6 continued....... baby boy. One day, overcome with
grief and desperation, she put the young baby on her 
back and drowned them both in the river. Many cases of 
forced marriages were recorded in Eket; cf. Esenwa, 
"Marriage Customs in Asaba11, o£.cit. ,p.74, who notes 
that forced marriages were in vogue up to the first two 
decades of this century, but is virtually extinct at 
the present time.
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,p.214; Johnson, History 
of the Yorubas, op.cit., p.113; Akiga, Akiga*s Story, 
op.cit., p.166.
2. Compare Akiga, Akigafs Story, op.cit.,p.166; Ellis, The
Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.ciTT,p.l83; Basden, Niger
Ibos, op.cit.,p.69; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria,
op.cit.,pp. 455, et.al; Temple, Notes on the Tribes, op.
cit., p. 14-5. Compare the position in other parts of
Africa - see G.M. Wilson,"Homicide and Suicide among
the Joluo of Kenya," in African Homicide and Suicide,
edit, by Paul Bohannan, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press), I960, pp.203-6; see Lucy Muir, African Marriage
and Social Change (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1969),
pp. 80-8 , 1 1-1 4. footnotes 3 and 4 continued.......
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consent of "both parties to a marriage is a sine qua non of 
a valid customary’ marriage. The attitude of the Nigerian
courts can best be illustrated by two decisions of the
1 2 Supreme Court, Egri v. Uperi, and Osamwonyi v. Osamwonyi.
In Egri v. Uperi ,^the plaintiff claimed the
return of his wife, one Lucy Onumerulu Uperi, whom he
alleged was being detained by the defendant, her father,
despite the plaintiff's demands for her return. In the
course of establishing whether a valid marriage according
to customary law had been contracted and that Lucy was
legally the plaintiff's wife, the Customary Court stated
that before marriage can be established according to Isoko
customary law the consent of the girl and her parents must
first of all be obtained. The court held that the plaintiff
did not adduce evidence to show that he had gained the
consent of the girl nor her parents, and therefore he had
4failed to establish a valid marriage. The plaintiff 
appealed to the magistrate court, but his appeal was dis­
missed. He further appealed to the Ughelli High Court* The 
Judge of the High Court held that both the Customary Court 
and the Magistrate were wrong in holding that no marriage 
was validly negotiated between the appellant and the 
respondent’s daughter. The Judge said:
l!In my view, when the bride price was fixed and paid and 
the girl was escorted to the house of the appellant a 
valid marriage under native law and custom was 
contracted'*
Footnotes 3 and 4 continued....
3. [1909] Renner*s Gold Coast Reports, 504.
4. [1971] 5 U.I.L.R., 446; see also Ezie v. Otaka and Anor.
[1973J Suit No. MN/35/73, unreported, Nsukka High Court 
where a customary marriage was held void on the ground 
inter alia that the bride was too young at the time of 
the marriage to have given her consent.
1. [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 632; [1974] N.M.L.R.22.
2. [1972] U.I.L.R. 527; [1972] 10 S.C.l.
3. [1974] N.M.L.R. 22; [1974]'4 E.C.S.L.R. 632.
4. Ibid., p.23.
5. Ibid., p.24.
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The appeal was allowed. The respondent then 
appealed to the Supreme Court where the judgments of the 
Customary and Magistrate Courts were restored. The Supreme 
Court held that the Judge in the High Court was in error 
in substituting without any justification whatsoever, his 
own statement of the customary law for those of the 
Customary Court which is presumed to know the law without 
requiring that any evidence should be led before it to 
that effect.
In Osamwonyi v. Osamwonyi,^ the necessity of 
the bride1s consent was finally and emphatically settled.
In this case,the petitioner, a doctor, had gone through a 
form of marriage with the respondent at Lagos in June 1969, 
under the Marriage Act. He filed a petition in the Benin 
High Court, claiming that this marriage be declared void 
on the ground that at the time the said marriage was per­
formed, the respondent, unknown to him was already legally 
married to one Patrick Goubadia according to Benin customary 
law. The plaintiff alleged that at the time the respondent 
went through the form of marriage with him in 1967, her 
marriage to Goubadia had not been dissolved.
The respondent denied being previously married to 
Goubadia. She stated that although Goubadia had paid the 
sum of £60 to her father on her behalf, it was not with 
her knowledge or consent; that as soon as she learnt of 
this payment, she rejected any proposal of marriage from 
Goubadia and told the latter so. After some abortive attempts 
to persuade her to change her mind, he abandoned the idea.
There was conflicting expert evidence as to the 
provisions of Benin customary law in respect of the need 
for a girl!s consent to her marriage. The former President 
of the Udo Customary Court, Hawdon Uwaifo, on behalf of the 
plaintiff, stated that under Benin customary law, the con­
sent of a daughter was not necessary. Her father had no
legal obligation to get her consent before he gave her
1. [1972] U.I.L.L.R. 327.
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away in marriage. Dr. Egharevba, another expert on Benin 
customary law, however, on behalf of the defendant, gave 
evidence which seemed to indicate a view to the contrary.
UwaifoTs evidence was rejected by the trial 
judge, who found that the requirement of the brideTs con­
sent to a proposal of marriage under native law and custom 
was not only in accord with common sense but also in con­
formity with the law of the land. He observed:
,!In my view consent is not only basic but fundamental 
to either a potentially polygamous union such as a 
customary marriage or a monogamous union such as 
marriage under the Act. Special provisions for 
obtaining consent are inserted in the Marriage Act 
(Cap 115)11-l
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of 
the High Court that the customary marriage was not valid 
since the brideTs consent had not been given, was confirmed. 
It was held that the decision of the learned trial Judge, 
so far as it related to consent, was more consistent with 
the principles of natural justice, equity and good 
conscience.
These decisions demonstrate that, at least in 
legal theory, the modern girl who is being forced to marry 
against her wishes is in a better position than was her 
counterpart in traditional society. If she has the moral 
courage to do so, she may flout parental authority, safe 
in the knowledge that the law will, in the ultimate, uphold
her right of free choice of a marriage partner.
2
Whitfield has suggested that in South Africa, 
a girl who was forced in marriage against her will had a 
right of appeal to the chief ,!who often ordered or persuaded 
her guardian to abandon his project”. Simons, however, 
has shown that this view is based on surmise, and he
1. Ibid., p.530; No special provisions for obtaining the 
consent of the parties to a marriage is inserted in the 
Marriage Act (Cap 115) as declared by the learned Judge - 
see Agu v. Agu Suit No. E/5D/70 and, below, Chapter X.
A marriage contracted under the Marriage Act is valid, 
even if the parties or one of them had not consented: 
see S.53; but now see the Matrimonial Causes Decree,
1970, s .5(1)(d).
2. G.M.B. Whitfield, South African Native Law, 2nd. edit.
(Johnnesburgh, Cape Juta,1948), p.8?.
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submits that a girl was "legally obliged in the last resort
to submit if her people overruled her objections".'*' In
2
the South African case of Nomatusi v. Nompetu, the court
recognized the fact that custom allowed a father to use
force and often violence to coerce a reluctant daughter
into accepting a bridegroom whom she did not desire, but
rejected such treatment as- "repugnant to, and in conflict
3
with, all principles of law and humanity".
Evidence collected from very old people during 
field-work in the various communities, supported the sub­
mission of Simons. A few interviewees suggested that a 
girl had the right to refuse the choice of a despotic
father. When further asked what the girl would do if her
father remained obdurate, they admitted that in such 
circumstances the girl would have to submit. There was
no right of appeal as such to the chief or elders, of the 
4village.
The modern Nigerian girl who refuses to submit to 
parental pressures may resort to the law for protection.
Section 361 of the Criminal Code may be utilized, and if
1. H.J. Simons, African Women: Their Legal Status in 
South Africa, op.cit., p.103.
2. [1915] 5 N.A.C. 165.
3. Ibid.,p.166; cf. Ared Asham v. Njokk Abang, cited by 
Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush, op.cit.. p.Ill, 
where the Customary Court held that a girl on attaining 
marriageable age, could confirm her childhood marriage, 
or repudiate it if she wished. To protect women against 
abuses of patriarchal authority, The Natal and Cape 
administration introduced legislation prohibiting forced 
marriages; see s.29, Cape Proclamation 140, of 1885;
s.59(1) Natal Code of Native Law, which requires a public 
declaration by the bride of her free consent; see also 
Simons, op.cit.,p.!04; Phillips, op.cit., pp.203-205; 
Seymour M. Seymour, Native Law in South Africa, 2nd 
edit. (Juta: Capetown, I960), pp.7^-76.
4. Cf. the position among the Fante where, if the consent 
of a womanTs family is withheld, a valid marriage
may be contracted, provided the agreement is made in the 
presence of "creditable and responsible witnesses, or 
in the presence of the chief or headman of the place, 
see J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, op.cit., 
p .48.
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her parents persist in their choice of bridegroom, and 
effect a marriage despite her protests, the marriage will 
not be enforced by the courts.
The modern woman is in a more fortunate position 
than the woman in traditional society as far as the law 
regarding her consent to marriage is concerned, but in 
actual fact she may be in no better position to resist 
parental pressures. Read notes that ,fin the villages of 
Africa the day has not yet come when young daughters will 
readily invoke the aid of local judicial authorities to 
defy their parents* wishes", and this is very true of the 
ordinary Nigerian village girl. Not many girls have the 
courage of Veronica, the heroine of Ogali*s play, "Veronica 
My Daughter", who, in answer to her father*s threat to flog 
her if she does not give up Michael, the man of her choice, 
and marry the man he has chosen for her instead, replies:
"Papa, I must be candid now, I love Mike and I think 
nothing on earth can separate us. If you flog me 
I must love him. If you curse me, I must love him.
If you cut off my head...well, I must still love him 
in the world beyond. I know your opinion. You want 
me to marry the old illiterate man, Chief Bassey - 
No! The more I see him, the more I am offended. In 
fact the mere sight of him is annoying; but the more 
I see Mike, the more I love him. I have decided to 
marry Mike and I assure you we are wedding in a few 
months time, that is a month after the examination.
If you give your hand to it - all good. If you do 
not, I assure you before God and Man that nothing 
stops it".^
There are a few cases, some of them recorded in 
the Social Welfare Departments of the various States which 
show that forced marriages in Nigeria, although being 
slowly weeded out, are not yet extinct. There are cases
where judges have refused to declare such marriages void.'
2
Although the marriage in Agu v. Agu was a statutory 
marriage, it illustrates the difficulty a woman may face
1. Ogali A. Ogali, "Veronica Makes Up Her Own Mind", in 
Onitsha Market Literature edit, by Emmanuel Obiechina, 
(London: Heineman, 1972), p.49.
2. [1970] Suit No. E/5D/70, unreported, Enugu High
Court.
in attempting to prove that a marriage was contracted 
without her consent. The petitioner in this case sued 
for a declaration that her marriage was void ah initio, 
based on the fact that at the time the marriage took 
place she was only fourteen years of age, that she did 
not consent to the marriage, that she was crying during 
the ceremony, and did not understand the nature of the 
ceremony. Phil-Ebosie, J., rejected her evidence that 
she was only fourteen at the time of the marriage as 
mere hearsay. He held that there was no provision in the 
Marriage Act that the consent of the bride was a legal 
essential of the marriage. Despite the fact that attempts 
at reconciliation had been made by several prominent persons 
but the petitioner was adamant that she would never live with 
the respondent again, the Judge refused to declare the 
marriage void or to grant the wife a divorce. He expressed 
the hope that "reason may one day prevail on the petitioner 
to return to her husband 's house11.
4. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summary
The consent of the bridefs parents, usually her 
father, or other legal guardian, and in some communities, 
also her mother's consent, is a legal essential of a valid 
customary marriage which involves payment of dowry, in 
traditional societies. Where parents refuse to give their 
consents, there was little the bride could legally do to 
compel them to do so. Among the Yorubas the practice of 
cohabiting without parental consent, where parents refused 
to give their consents eventually led to this type of union 
being regarded as a valid customary marriage.
The requirement of parental consent for a woman's 
marriage has been retained to a large extent in the customary 
laws of most contemporary societies, although certain
1. See Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, op.cit.,
p.59; Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op.cit., p .116.
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inroads in the principle have been made among a few 
communities by legislation.^ In other communities, the 
bride cannot force her parents to give their consent, and 
consequently she cannot contract a valid customary marriage. 
If the bride is twenty-one years or older she may contract 
a statutory marriage without the consent of her parents.
This is not a popular alternative especially among the 
Igbos and it has proved unsuccessful in a few cases.
The bride!s consent was a legal essential of a
2
valid customary marriage in many traditional communities.
Child-betrothal and child-marriage, however, were prevalent
in most societies, and these were naturally conducive to
forced marriage, since invariably the bride was too young
to appreciate the true nature of the marriage contract.
In some societies, the bride was given an opportunity of
rejecting or confirming the marriage contracted on her
behalf, before cohabitation with the husband. Many
societies, however, regarded her consent given when she
was a child as legally binding, and no opportunity for
rejection was given to the bride before she was handed
over to her husband. I/'/here she was handed over as a child
to the husband, it was even more difficult for her to
repudiate the man chosen for her.
Child-betrothal and child marriage are relatively
fewer in modern societies, but they are by no means 
3
extinct. There is evidence of some girls who were married 
as children being forced to live with their husbands, who
1. See e.g. Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws, 1958, W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958, s.5.
2. But see Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit.» 
p.44; Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit., p .164.
3. See Esenwa, op.cit., p. 72; Obi, Modern Family Law, 
op.cit., p.lEb; ialbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta,
op.cit., p.184.
449
invariably are much older than they are.^
The consent of a grown-up bride was necessary for 
a valid marriage in traditional customary law. Girls, 
however, usually accepted their parents’ choice, and cases 
of conflict were relatively few. Where a girl refused to 
marry a man chosen for her by her parents, she may be 
persuaded by moral arguments, threats or physical force.
Modern girls show an increasing tendency to oppose parental 
choice if they do not like the men chosen for them. Many
parents seem to recognize this fact,and do not generally 
force their daughters to marry against their wishes, 
although they may use gentle persuasion. If a marriage is 
contracted without the birde’s consent, the courts will 
invariably declare it void, and criminal action may be 
taken against persons including parents, who detain or 
take away a girl with a view to marriage, without the girl’s 
consent.^
Should parental consent for a customary marriage 
no longer be required after age eighteen? It should not be 
forgotten that the Nigerian system of social services is 
not yet as fully developed as it is in England. A woman 
who has been left destitute by her husband is invariably 
forced to seek support from her relatives, since the aid 
she can obtain from the Social Welfare Departments may be 
less than adequate for her needs. Her family may refuse 
to help her if she had asserted her independence and married 
without their consent. Extreme youth is more prone to make 
hasty sentimental decisions which may later be regretted.
1. See in this respect the answer given by the Governor of 
Nigeria to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 
1937: ,lIn all cases in which pressure is being brought to 
bear upon a girl to marry against her will, she is at 
liberty to complain to the Native Authorities or to the 
District Officer; and this right is freely exercised.
When such a complaint is received the families concerned 
are called together and attempt is made to settle the 
matter amicably. Failing this, proceedings for termination 
of the contract are instituted in the Native Court - see 
Correspondence Relating to the Welfare of Women in 
Tropical Africa, 1935-37, CMP. 3784, 1938, pp.32-33.
2. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit.» p.44; Obi 
Modern Family Law, op.cit., pTl64.
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CHAPTER VI
FORMATION OF MARRIAGE (11)
A. Dowry ("Marriage Consideration”)
lfIt is frequently said that, today, 
fathers do not give their daughters in 
marriage; they sell them to the highest 
bidder. The social state of women is 
deteriorating” .
The Minister of Welfare - Eastern House 
of Assembly.-^
1. Introduction
Various terms have been used by writers to des­
cribe the property transferred on the occasion of a 
customary marriage, for example, "marriage consideration”, 
”bride-price”, "dowry”, "token payments”, and "gifts” have
all been used to designate the payments made by the bride-
2groom or his kin to the bride or her family.
Some writers use the local term for such payments, 
the most widely known being lobola, the South African word 
for these payments. The use of the word lobola has been 
extended by various writers to describe these payments in 
the whole of Southern Africa, but there seems little 
justification for the use of the word lobola to refer to 
these payments in Nigeria,^ since it is entirely unknown 
to the average Nigerian. There are local terms used for
1. Second Reading of the Bill on The Limitation of Dowry 
Law, Debates in the Eastern House of Assembly, 28 March, 
1956, Eastern Region of Nigeria, Parliamentary Debates, 
1956, Vol.II, p.674.
2. See generally, Jack Goody and S.J. Tambiah, Bridewealth 
and Dowry, (London: Cambridge University Press), 1973, 
pp.1-2; E. Torday, "Brideprice, Dower or Settlement”,
Man. Jan. 1929, PP*5-7.
3. See Simons, African Women: Their Legal Status in South 
Africa, op.cit.,p.67, "lobola is a Zulu noun which 
describes a man*s obligation to pay cattle, horses, hoes, 
money or other property to the father of his intended 
bride in consideration of their marriage”.
4. See e.g. Okonjo, The Impact of Urbanization on the Ibo 
Family Structure, op.cit., p.151, who uses lobola to 
designate dowry among the Igbos.
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these payments by various communities in Nigeria. For 
example, among the Yorubas, the payments are referred to 
variously as "ano", "ana", and "idana"; among the Igbos 
as "onyenyelf t "ego nwanyi" (woman wealth) and 11 ikwu-ngo" 
(earnest price); while among the Ibibios they are known
as "mpko ndu" (the thing which a man gives when he marries 
a woman).
The terms commonly used to refer to these payments 
in Nigeria generally are "bride-price" and "dowry". The 
Bride-Price Committee set up by the former Eastern Region 
of Nigeria to investigate the effects of rising bride-price 
in the various communities of the Region and to make 
recommendations, reported that many complaints were received 
against the use of "the objectionable and derogatory term 
"bride-price”
"Dowry" as used in European society refers to 
property or money brought by the bride to her husband on 
the occasion of their marriage, but in Nigeria, it is used 
to describe the payments made to the bride and her family by
or on behalf of the bridegroom. The term "dowry" is widely
2 3used by Nigerian courts and legislatures, and for these
reasons will be used throughout this thesis to refer to
the payments made in cash or in kind, or by services
rendered, by or on behalf of the bridegroom to the family
of the bride, as a legal requirement of a marriage, and
which are invariably refundable when there is a divorce.
Property transferred on the occasion of a marriage from one
party to another, which are merely paraphernal in character,
and which are not essential to the legal validity of the
marriage will be referred to as "gifts”.
1. See Bride Price Committee Report. 1954, p.3.
2. See Briggs v. Osagie [1964] M.N.L.R.95; Chawere v. 
Aihenu and Johnson \19351 12 N.L.R. 4.
3. See e.g. The Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, Cap 76, 
Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963; Marriage, Divorce and 
Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958, 
W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958; The Daura Local Authority 
(Declaration of Daura Native Marriage Law and Custom) 
Order, 1972.
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Marriage by payment of dowry, for want of a better 
name will be described herein as "marriage by. consideration” .
2. Definition of Dowry
The Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, of the former 
Eastern Region of Nigeria, defines dowry as:
"...any gift or payment, in money, natural produce, 
brass rods, cowries or in any other kind of
property whatsoever, to a parent or guardian of a
female person on account of a marriage of that 
person which is intended or has taken place.
’Incidental expenses of marriage’ means customary 
gifts or payments, other than dowry, made or 
incurred on account of a marriage, before, at the
time of, or after that marriage".^
This definition makes a distinction, which is also
maintained by the courts, between dowry, properly so-called,
that is, a legal requisite for a customary marriage, and
incidental expenses, which are not legal requirements, but
which are nevertheless customary in the various societies.
The distinction is important, especially in respect of
refund of dowry, since incidental expenses are usually not
refundable in the case of a divorce, whereas dowry nearly
2
always is. For example, in Okaludo v. Omama, the appellant 
claimed a refund of £60 allegedly paid by him as dowry on 
the occasion of his marriage. The evidence showed that 
the actual dowry paid was only £22, and that the remaining 
sums were for incidental expenses. The Customary Court 
ordered the respondent to refund £10 of the £22 dowry to 
the appellant, but dismissed his other claims. This 
decision was upheld on appeal to the High Court, on the 
ground inter alia that expenses for clothing etc. do not 
form part of the dowry, and are not refundable.
1. S.2, Limitation of Dowry Law, Cap 76, Laws of Eastern 
Nigeria, 1965 Revision.
2. [I960] W.R.N.L.R. 149.
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Similarly, in Okoriko v. Otobo,\rhere the plaintiff 
claimed £140 dowry refund on the dissolution of his marriage, 
it was held that apart from the sums of £15 called "Extra 
Dowry" and £60 called "Grand Dowry", most of the various 
sums claimed by the plaintiff were not part of the dowry, 
but were presents made to the wife and some members of her 
family, and these could not be reclaimed, as property in them 
had passed to the donees. They were outright gifts, and as 
such were irrecoverable in law. The court also held that, 
despite the epithets used, the sums of £15 and £60, called 
"Extra" and "Grand" dowry respectively, were in fact 
presents to the brideTs family, and refund of these gifts 
could not be legally enforced, since any customary law which 
gave a right to reclaim such gifts or presents were con­
trary to the provisions of section 19 of the Customary
2
Courts Law, 1958.
Can dowry be legally described as a gift? The 
Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws 
Order, 1958.defines dowry as "a customary gift made by a
3
husband to or in respect of a woman at or before marriage".
Criticizing this definition Obi says:
"...a dowry is not necessarily a gift. Its payment 
is enforceable in a court of law".^
It is respectfully submitted that this reason for 
dowry not being a gift cannot be supported. A gift legally 
means voluntary transference of property without consideration. 
There are, however, contrary to Obi*s assertion, voluntary 
transfers of property without consideration, which are legally 
enforceable. For example, property bestowed in a deed, 
without consideration, is enforceable in a court of law, 
although it is a gift.
Nsereko on the other hand, asserts that dowry is
1. [1962] W.R.N.L.R. 48.
2. Cap. 31, Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
3. W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958.
4. Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.t p.175.
5. D.D. Nsereko, "The Nature and Function of Marriage-Gifts 
in a Customary African Marriage", East African Law 
Review, Vol.6, No.2, pp.89-112 at p.90.
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not a gift, because, "in a great many instances the 
giving of marriage gifts was not and still is not Voluntary* 
on the part of the prospective bridegroom. To the contrary, 
he must deliver or promise to deliver the gifts if the 
resultant marriage contract is to come into force unless, 
of course, he has been excused11. This submission also 
cannot be supported. Transference of dowry is voluntary 
in the sense that marriage, although desirable, is not 
compulsory, and no one is forced to marry against his 
wishes. When a man therefore pays a dowry in order to get 
married, it is a voluntary payment, since he has the 
alternative choice of remaining unmarried.
The submission of these two writers that dowry 
is not a gift is supportable on the ground that the trans­
ference is made for valuable consideration, namely, the 
conjugal and other services rendered, or to be rendered, 
by the wife.^ Dowry therefore cannot be legally classified
as gifts. Traditionally, dowry usually took the form of
2
labour services, and in some parts of Nigeria, still does.
In such cases the services of the man are given in exchange 
for the services of the woman, both being valuable con­
sideration. These services cannot be properly described 
as gifts.
3. The Legal Functions of "Dowry”
A. Introduction
The sociological significance of dowry in African 
customary marriage has received considerable attention from 
anthropologists and missionaries. The various reasons given 
for the payment of dowry, as well as the diverse opinions 
as to its effect on the marital relationship, reveal two facts
1. See In Re Sapara [1911] Rennerfs Gold Coast Reports,
605; "the consideration is on one side the giving of the 
ano [dowry] and the other the giving of the bride".
2. See e.g. the peoples of the middle Niger where the usual 
length of service for a bride is from two to six years, 
see Harold Gunn and E.R. Conant, Peoples of the Middle 
Niger Region, Northern Nigeria, (London: International 
African Institute, 19^0), pp.43-44.
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(a) the nature and function of dowry differ widely among 
different societies, and no single description can 
adequately characterize dowry in all the various 
African societies where dowry is payable;
(b) institutions never subserve one single purpose, but 
rather combine a number of social purposes in their 
structure.^
On one hand, all the virtues found in marriage 
in traditional society, have been attributed to the payment 
of dowry by its protagonists. Among these virtues may be 
briefly mentioned the following:
(I) it ensures the stability of the marriage by discouraging 
divorce
(II) it protects the virtue of young girls and the morality 
of the society.
(III) it ensures good care and considerate treatment of the
4
wife by her husband.
(IV) it ensures to a man legitimate children.
These, and other virtues, are summed up by Lindley 
who wrote strongly in favour of payment of dowry in South 
Africa:
1. See Nadel, A Black Byzantium, op.cit., p.552.
2. See e.g. Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, 1969,
o£.cit.,p.60; Lugard, Political Memoranda, 190o, op.cit., 
p.250; Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit.,p.267; Mullin,
The Catholic Church in Modern Africa, op.cit., p.153; 
Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit., p.250.
5. Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit.,p.250; Kennan Nair,
Politics and Society T n  01d~Talabar, op.cit.,p.65*
4. See Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit.,p.250; The husband 
"often prizes less what he does not pay for; Nair,
op.cit. ,p.65.
5. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive 
Society, 1952, op.cit. ,p .50; !tQne of the chief functions 
of lobola is to fix the social position of the children
of a marriage; see also Jeffreys, "Lobola is Child-Price," 
op.cit.,pp.145-184; Nair, Politics and Society in Old 
Calabar, op.cit.,p.65; Uka, Growing Up in Nigerian 
Culture, op.cit.. p.16.
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"Why is it that I have not heard of six illegitimate 
children since I came among this people? Why is it 
that wives are required to be true and faithful to 
their husbands? Why is it that wives are not daily 
driven off and new ones taken? Every year more 
husbands are separated by the law of Connecticut 
than I have heard of here in 33 years, ...Why is it 
that we have not here such a Sodom as once existed 
in the Sandwich Islands? Why is it that the family 
organization here is as perfect as it could be made 
with the existence of polygamy? There is seldom a 
dispute among children about the division of a man's 
property, however many wives he may have had.
Uku-lobola lies at the foundation of the structure 
of native society here and has been productive of 
a world of good".-^
These sentiments would be readily accepted by many
of the older inhabitants in Nigeria as equally applicable
2
to traditional Nigerian society. A few moments reflection 
exposes the fallacy of the argument that payment of dowry 
is a panacea for marital ills. Dowry continues to be paid 
in modern Nigerian societies, and is generally regarded as 
indispensable by many communities. In spite of this, the 
evils which dowry is alleged to abolish nevertheless 
flourish.
On the other hand, all the inequities of the male- 
dominated traditional society are attributed to the payment
3
of dowry. Judges, as seen earlier, have referred to the 
system in derogatory terms, tending to show the contempt 
with which the system is regarded. Thus payment of dowry 
is said to:
(I) encourage prostitution, since it reduces the 
opportunities of young girls to marry.
(II) reduce women to the level of chattels to be bought 
and sold.
(III) help men to claim the legal paternity of children 
which are not biologically theirs.
(IV) prevent women from leaving undesirable husbands.
1. Edwin W. Smith, The Life and Times of Daniel Lindlev. 
1801-80, Missionary to the Zulus, Pastor of the Voor- 
trekkers, Ubebe, Omhlohe (London. 1949). no.395-594.
2. Lugard, Political Memoranda, 1906. op.cit.. p.230.
3. See further Chapter III, pp.202-205.
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Similarly, the system does not merit all the 
calumny heaped on it. Many of the evils associated with 
modern marriage would exist even if payment of dowry was 
abolished.
There are three main legal functions generally 
attributed to the payment of dowry in customary marriage:
1. it is an essential to the legal validity of a marriage;
2. in the majority of societies, it ensures to the husband
legal paternity of all children born to his wife;
3. a refund of dowry, or part thereof, paid on the occasion
of the marriage is necessary to effect the dissolution 
of the marriage by divorce, or death of the husband.
The second and third functions will be discussed 
in the next two following chapters respectively.
B . Dowry as a legal essential of customary marriage
It has been stated previously, that the over­
whelming majority of Nigerians contract a customary marriage 
by payment of dowry.1 To what extent is the payment of dowry 
essential to the legal validity of such marriages?
(1) Traditional society:
In 1954, the former Eastern Region of Nigeria
set up a Bride-Price Committee to investigate the social
effects of the payment of dowry in the Region and to make
recommendations as it might think fit, with a view to the
removal of any anomaly or hardship. In the course of their
investigations the Committee took advantage of this opportunity
to obtain descriptions of the marriage systems in their
traditional form in the various communities, since they
correctly felt that unless the traditional form of marriage
is compared with conditions in the present era the social
effects which they were asked to investigate could not be
2
properly assessed.
1. See above, Chapter II, Table 2:1, p. 175.
2- Bride Price Committee Report, on.cit.. p.3.
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In the report subsequently submitted to the 
Government, they stated the traditional position with 
reference to payment of dowry as a legal essential of 
a marriage as follows:
"22. During the period of betrothal which usually
lasted several years the young man rendered labour 
services to the girl’s parents. These took the form 
of assistance in farm work, particularly with the 
original clearing of the bush and the making of yam 
heaps, of assistance in the building of their house 
and sometimes palm cutting and fence-making also. 
During this period he usually gave presents to the 
girl’s parents of things like palm wine, yams and 
firewood or, if he was a hunter, a share of any 
animal he killed. It was generally obligatory to 
give certain presents at festival times. In this 
way the parents were compensated for their trouble 
in bringing up their daughter and for the loss of 
her services on the farm when she married. In some 
areas the parents received in addition livestock 
such as cows or goats or a special gift of yams 
as an additional recompense. This was the origin 
of the dowry. It was never fixed. The number of 
years during which labour services were rendered 
varied with the age of the girl when the marriage' 
was first agreed upon and where cows and goats 
were also given their number varied with the wealth 
of the young man and his family. When the girl went 
permanently to live with the young man there was 
usually some ceremony to mark the occasion and a 
feast, (sometimes more than one) would be given.
The payment of dowry was not the essential 
element of the marriage contract. It was the 
giving of consent, ratified by the acceptance of 
drink that was really important and generally the 
marriage ceremony, often sacrificial in nature, 
was also essential.
In view of the fact that the Bride-Price Committee 
defined "dowry" as "those things whether cash, gifts, in 
kind or labour services which a man gives when he marries 
a woman and which are regarded in a case of divorce as 
refundable", the Committee’s statement that the payment of 
dowry was not the essential element of the marriage contract 
insofar as it implies that a marriage was valid without such 
payment cannot be supported.
1. Ibid., p.4.
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There is abundant evidence which shows that in 
the traditional society, not only those communities visited 
by the Committee, but among most other Nigerian communities, 
farm and other labour services were rendered by the bride­
groom, invariably assisted by his age-mates, to the parents 
of the bride, over a period of time.^ As stated by the 
Bride-Price Committee, these services were always supple­
mented by payments in kind, such as yams, cocoanuts, corn 
or other farm products or meat given at certain specific 
periods, or at certain festive seasons to the parents of 
the prospective bride, especially the mother. Although 
the length of the services, and amount of the gifts were 
not fixed, nevertheless, they were an important part of 
the marriage contract, and if they were not performed or 
given, would entitle the bride's parents to break off the 
engagement.^
Equiano, an Igbo, captured in Nigeria when he was 
a youth and taken to England as a slave in the early 
eighteenth century, whose autobiography remains one of the 
earliest accounts written about the Igbos by one of their 
own members, mentions that at the time of the marriage, "the 
parents of the bridegroom present gifts to those of the 
bride, whose property she is looked upon before marriage; 
but after it she is esteemed the sole property of her 
husband". These gifts compensate for the loss of the 
bride and her progeny, and were considered important in 
most communities.
1. See generally, Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, 
op.cit.,pp.80, 108, 157; Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking 
Peoples, op.cit.,p.28; Ford et.al, The Peoples of the 
Niger Benue Confluence, op.cit.,p.68; Forde and Jones,
The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op.cit.,p.77;
Fadipe, op.cit.,pp.75-78; Meek, Northern Tribes of 
Nigeria, op.cit.,p.201; Gordon, Bishop Shanahan, op.cit., 
p .220; Gunn and Conant, Peoples of the Middle ftJiger,
op.cit.,p.45; Uka, op.cit.,pp.l6-l?; Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, op.cit.,p.78.
2. See Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (London:
1882-96), Vol.I, p.721, who opines: "obtaining of wives
by services rendered instead of by property paid, con­
stitute a higher form of marriage, and is developed 
along with the industrial type of society".
5. Equiano, Equiano!s Travels, op.cit., p.5.
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Fadipe notes that among the Yorubas, in order
to secure maximum services from his son-in-law, a father
shared the tasks among them instead of requiring them to
labour on the same piece of work. One was asked to work on
the farm, another to erect the mud walls of a new house,
while another was responsible for the thatching, and yet
another for the roof timber, and so on.'*'
In many societies, for example the Igbos, cows,
goats and other animals were also given as dowry, in
addition to the services, and a small amount of the current
currency, which may be manillas, brass, rods or cowries.
Money was not important, however, and the services rendered
by the prospective bridegroom were of more value and
2
importance than the small sums paid.
It is submitted that payment of dowry, whether 
in the form of services, farm produce, cattle, or other 
medium of exchange was always essential to the legal 
validity of a marriage in traditional society. As shall 
be seen later, the payment of dowry determines the legal 
paternity of the children borne by the wife, and the 
refund of dowry is essential to a divorce.
(11) Modern society:
The position has not changed in the modern 
society. Payment of dowry is a legal essential of a
3
valid marriage under customary law . There are a few
1. Fadipe, Sociology of the Yoruba, op.cit., p.77.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.42.
3. See e.g. Begho, Law and Culture in the Nigerian and
Roman World, op.cit. ,pp .51-52; A.N. Aniagolu, '•Aspects
of Customary Marriage and Divorce and their Incidents upon
Family Life11, on African Indigenous Laws, edit, by
T.O. Elias et.al; (Enugu: Nigeria, Government Printer,
1975), pp. 101-105; Stanley Childs, ’’Christian Marriage
in Nigeria”, 16 Africa, 1946,p p .238-246 at p.243;
Phoebe Ottenberg" "The Afikpo Ibo of Eastern Nigeria” 
in Peoples of Africa edit, by James L. Gibbs, (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1965), p.20.
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exceptions, for -example, a "marriage by mutual consent only” 
found among the Yorubas, but the general rule among most 
communities is that the payment of dowry is an indispen­
sable legal essential of a valid marriage, except where 
such payment has been specifically waived by the brideTs 
parents
With the advent of money and increased material 
wealth, services and the value they represent assumed 
greater importance, since money could be paid instead of 
actual services. In process of time, money payments 
entirely replaced services among some communities, although 
in other communities, especially where farming was the main 
occupation, the services of the bridegroom have remained 
an important aspect of the marriage contract. For example, 
among the Ibibios, the services rendered by the bridegroom 
to his in-laws are considered a more important part of the 
dowry than the relatively small amount of cash payable.
The position with reference to payment of dowry 
as an essential of a valid customary marriage has been 
correctly stated by Radcliffe-Brown as follows:
"In most African marriages, as in the early English 
marriage, the making of a payment of goods or 
services by the bridegroom, to the bride1s kin, is 
an essential part of the establishment of 1 legality1". ^
The requirement of dowry as a legal essential of 
a valid customary marriage has been established in several 
cases. In 1911, Osborne, C.J., in the case of In Re Sapara
1. See Emeakuana and Anor. v. Ume O.jiako [1976] Suit No. 
AA/1A/70, unreported,Amawbia/Awka High Court where it 
was held that dowry as a legal essential of a customary 
marriage is firmly established as to require no further
proof in court; see further, Bohannan, Justice and Judg­
ment among the Tiv, op.cit.,p.73; Mullin, The Catholic 
Church in Modern Africa, op.cit.,p.153; Uchendu, The 
Igbo of South-east Nigeria, op.cit. ,p.5Q; Talbot,
Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit., p.190.
2. Radcliffe-Brown, Introduction, in African Systems of
Kinship and Marriage, edit, by Radcliffe-Brown and
Forde. on.cit.. p.46: see also Uchendu,"Concubinage
Among Ngwa Igbo." op.cit., p.188; Kasunmu and Salacuse,
op.cit., p.79; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.,
p.201; Meek, A Sudanese Kingdom, op.cit., p.373; cf. the
position in Kenya, - see Eugene Cotran, "The Laws of
Marriage and Divorce in Kenya", in Integration of
Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa, op.cit.,
p.4l8: With the exception of three tribes customary
footnotes 2 and 3 continued....
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observed:
"The actual legal essentials of native marriage are 
.as laid down in Savage v. Macfoy, viz., first, the 
consent of the girl and her family, and secondly 
the presentation and acceptance of the ano [dowry] 
...the consideration is on one side the giving of. 
the ano,and on the other the giving of the bride. 
Despite the social changes wrought by the increase 
of individual wealth, and the consequent loosening 
of the family tie, and by the spread of Christianity 
and Mohammedanism, the giving of the ano has always 
remained a feature of the native marriage ceremony, 
whatever the religion or the position of the parties"
It should be noted that the learned Judge was 
here speaking of a marriage arranged by the family of the 
two spouses, the usual form of marriage among the Yorubas.
This principle of customary law enunciated by
Osborne, C.J., in the above passage has not changed with
2
time. In the recent case of Egri v. Uperi, it was held
that before a marriage could be established, "the bride-
■3
price must be fixed”, and in Ogunremi v. Ogunremi, the
idana (dowry) ceremony was held to be a sine qua non of a
valid marriage according to Ado-Ekiti [Yoruba] customary
Zj.
law. In Okpanum v. Okpanum, Agbakoba, J., stated that 
the "most important evidential requirement constituting 
a valid customary marriage is the payment, or part payment 
of bride price or dowry". The learned Judge, made a dis­
tinction between evidential and essential requirements.
He said:
In order to constitute a valid customary marriage, 
therefore, it is necessary to establish the existence 
of the essential requirement and one or more of the 
evidential requirements. It follows that parental 
consent, and in recent years mutual agreement of the
Footnotes 2 and 3 continued....
2...marriage in Kenya is preceded, accompanied or followed 
by a payment or payments by the bridegroom or his 
family to the bride*s family”. See also Abrahams,
The Peoples of Greater Unyamzi, op.cit., p.44.
3. [1911J Renner's Gold Coast Reports 605.
1. Ibid., 608.
2. [1974] N.M.L.R. 22.
3. [1971] 4 U.I.L.R. 466.
4. [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 561.
5. Ibid.,p.563.
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man and woman, coupled with payment of dowry or 
part, thereof, or coupled, with one or more ceremonies 
associated with marriages and recognized as such by 
the community would constitute a valid customary 
marriage"
From this statement, it appears that in the 
opinion of the learned Judge, marriage ceremonies can be 
an alternative to the payment of dowry. This is the 
introduction of a revolutionary principle into modern Igbo 
customary law of marriage, and is not supported by other 
decided cases, academic writers, or by actual practice of 
the people. The Customary Law Manual of the Igbos, 1977, 
states:
”305.(1) Bride-price is an essential requirement for 
marriage. Agreement on it is a condition 
precedent for contracting a valid marriage; 
and so, no marriage can take place unless and 
until bride-price is fixed and agreed upon.
(2) It is not essential that the agreed bride- 
price shall be paid in full, but at least 
part-payment of the bride-price must be made 
before a valid marriage can be performed"
Except for the fact that payment of dowry may be 
waived by the bride*s parents, which is very rare, the 
statement in the Customary Law Manual is in accordance with 
the law and practice of the Igbos. During field-work, it 
was emphasized repeatedly by informants that there can be 
no valid marriage without payment of dowry. Parents who 
do not wish to give the impression that they are selling 
their daughters, nevertheless insist on the payment of a 
token sum, since they are aware that without such payment, 
the marriage would not be regarded as valid.
The present writer examined the registration of 
more than a thousand customary marriages at Onitsha Local 
Government Office. In all the cases, the amount of dowry
1. Ibid., p.564.
2. Customary Law Manual, op.cit.t p.238.
3. Cf. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit.,p.!82; 
"The poorest always pay a small sum for their wives, 
so as to give the union the title of a marriage, and 
distinguish it from concubinage".
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paid, or agreed to be paid, was precisely stated. In not one 
of the cases registered was there any indication that payment 
of dowry had been waived.
In view of the above evidence, contrary to the 
opinion of Agbakoba, J fs statement in Okpanum v. Okpanum,^ 
it is submitted that payment of dowry is an essential of a 
valid marriage in modern Igbo society. The consensus of 
opinion is that in all marriages in which dowry is payable, 
payment in part or in whole, or agreement to pay is legally 
necessary for the validity of the marriage, unless such pay­
ment is waived.^
C. Quantum of Dowry
(1) Traditional society
3
As previously stated, payment of dowry in 
traditional society consisted mainly of services per­
formed by the prospective bridegroom for the bridefs 
parents, accompanied by payments, such as farm produce, 
meat, cows, goats and other forms of property, including, 
in some cases, small amounts of money current at the 
time in the particular society. The quantum of dowry 
varied from society to society. The services rendered by 
the bridegroom usually depended on the duration of the 
betrothal period before the bride was formally taken to 
her husbandTs house. If the girl was betrothed as a child, 
the periods of service would extend over many years. The 
services usually commenced after the betrothal and lasted 
for the duration of the marriage. This has given rise 
to the statement that the payment of dowry never ends.
The quantum of other forms of property included 
in the dowry varied from society to society and may briefly
1. [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 561.
2. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit., p. 175; Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, op.cit.,p.77; Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, 
op.cit.,p.49;Aniagolu, op.cit.,p.101.
3. See above, p.459.
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be described among the Yorubas, Igbos and other communities.
(a) Among the Yorubas
Bascom records that in the traditional society,
during the engagement, and continuing as long as the
marriage lasted, the suitor had to perform 'free labor'
when called upon by his father-in-law to do so.^ This
involved clearing the farm, hoeing yam heaps, building the
walls of a house, roofing the house, or providing the
rafters or thatch. Each year during the betrothal, the
suitor had to send a total of twenty-four yams and some
maize to his fiance's mother during four of the religious
festivals. In addition, he had to send the girl's father
an annual gift of one log of firewood from the ita tree.
Negligence in any of the obligations to the fiance's
family could lead to arguments, and even to the breaking
2
of the engagement.
When the marriage is first proposed, the inter­
mediary takes forty kola nuts and ten shillings to the 
girl's father. The second instalment consisted of cowry 
shells equivalent to two shillings six pence given at any 
time before the third year after puberty when the girl becomes 
"marriageable". The final instalment made just before the 
girl is taken to her husband's house was about two shillings, 
six pence in cowrie equivalent.^
The dowry among the Yorubas generally, therefore, 
consisted of labour services, usually performed with the 
help of the prospective bridegroom's relatives and members 
of his egbe (age-group), farm-produce, and cowrie shells, 
amounting in value to about fifteen shillings to £1.
Fadipe notes that the obligation to provide farm produce was 
not difficult to fulfil, and generally, the total dowry and 
other gifts were within the reach of most men by the time
1. Bascom, The Yoruba of South-western Nigeria, op.cit.,p.6l.
2. See Ajisafe, op.cit.,p. 83; Fadipe, op.cit., pp.73-78.
3. Bascom, op.cit.tpp.61-62; Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking 
Peoples, op.cit.,p.28; Elias, Nigerian Legal System, 
op.cit.t p.291-292.
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they reached marriageable age."*"
(b) Among the Igbos
There is considerable variations among Igbo
communities, and in some communities, the nature of the
dowry in traditional society is similar to that described
above for the Yorubas. For example, among the Igbos of
Asaba District, Thomas reports:
Bride price - A girl is often asked for in marriage the 
day after she is born, the suitor bringing wood and 
throwing it down before the mother’s door. Some 
months may elapse before he is finally accepted, but 
as soon as he is recognised and presented to the 
umunna (sept, or extended family) he is called upon
(a) to work on his prospective father-in-law’s farm 
or elsewhere if he needs assistance in clearing the 
land, planting yams, re-roofing the house and so on, 
and (b) to bring ’’ifenru”, gifts of yams, palm wine, . 
cowries, palm oil, etc., on certain ceremonial 
occasions; he will also give 15 or 20 yams to his 
mother-in-law once or twice a year besides bringing 
her palm nuts, wood, etc., and providing for her in 
his farm a plot in which she plants if’ubwo, 
vegetables, such as pepper, tomatoes, beans, etc., 
for him to tend.2
Similarly, in Onitsha, dowry was traditionally paid 
in labour services, and in presents given at festival 
seasons. Dowry for many of the older Onitsha women inter­
viewed during field-work, consisted mainly of labour 
services, farm produce and meat, given at harvest time or 
other festive seasons. This was the general pattern 
throughout Igboland, although there were a few communities, 
for example, Adaba in Nsukka Division, Orlu Division, and 
some communities in Okigwi Division,' where dowry was
traditionally paid in cows or goats, supplemented in some
4cases by farm labour. In Adaba, the dowry usually consisted 
of three cows given to the bride’s father, and yams
1. Fadipe, op.cit.,p.74.
2. Thomas, Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria, op.cit.,
Part IV, p.61.
3. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., Basden,
Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.217.
4. Bride Price Committee Report,op.cit., pp.15-18.
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presented to the mother.1 In Orlu Division where dowry
traditionally was paid in cows or goats, the number was
never fixed, and varied according to the agreement of
the parties. It usually ranged from one to two cows or
three to eight goats. In Uturu community of Okigwe
Division, dowry was traditionally paid in goats and varied
2
from five to twelve.
The general nature of dowry among the Igbos may
be summed up as consisting mainly of labour services, farm
produce, especially yams, and in some communities, cows or 
3
goats.
(c) Among other communities
The nature of dowry in other traditional Nigerian 
societies does not differ radically from that which 
obtained among the Yorubas and Igbos. Among the Benins, 
Egharevba notes that as soon as the engagement ceremony has 
been performed, the bridegroom*s expenses begin. He says:
’’From now onward to the end of his life, he is never 
allowed to forget the responsibilities he has taken 
on. Thenceforth he must send to the girl’s parents 
annually seven yams in a bundle, one shilling in 
cash, and four pieces of kolanut, all this is called 
’Agban’ or ’Ikuangban’. The suitor is also expected 
to help his father-in-law with any house-building or 
farm work, as part of the dowry, so that he is very 
much tied to the girl's family, as well as to his 
wife"
Among the Ibibios, apart from the labour services 
rendered, dowry was traditionally paid in goats, and ranged 
from ten to twenty-five in number in some communities, but 
the greatest importance is attached to the rendering of 
labour services and assistance, generally both before, and 
after marriage. After marriage the services continue, and
1. Ibid., op.cit., p.15, par.97.
2. Ibid.,p.16, par.109.
5. See generally, Thomas, The Ibo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., 
Part IV., pp.61, 64-85; Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit., 
p.216; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, p.185 et.al., 
Meek, Law and Authority, op. citT,p.275; Forde, Marriage 
and the Family Among the Yako, op.cit., p.16-19.
4. Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op.cit., p. 16.
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although they are not part of the refundable dowry, they 
are obligatory under customary law.*^
The dowry among the peoples of the middle belt 
and Niger confluence consisted mainly of labour services 
on the farm, and sometimes lasted for five to six years, 
or even longer.^
The general position among all communities in 
traditional society may be summed up: dowry was mainly 
payable by services rendered by the prospective bridegroom. 
Provided a man was physically fit, there was no financial 
bar to the acquisition of a wife in most cases. The 
services were generally accompanied by small payments of 
kola, cocoanuts, yams, meat, corn or other farm produce 
the provision of which was not beyond the ability of the 
large majority of men.
(11) Modern society
It has been noted that the introduction of money
affected the nature of dowry. It also affected the
quantity paid. In the traditional society money was not
the important element of the dowry, although its inclusion
was essential for the legal validity of marriage in some 
4communities. The value of the labour services rendered 
by the bridegroom, and the other forms of property given, 
far exceeded that of the money actually given. In most 
societies today, however, money has become the most 
important part of the dowry from the point of view of 
relative value, and in some areas of Igboland, the level 
of dowry a man is forced to pay in actual cash before he
5
obtains a wife, is extremely high. Recent world wide 
inflationary trends are reflected in the level of dowry
1. See generally., Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., pp. 
41-42, esp. par.277.
2. See Gunn and Conant, Peoples of the Middle Niger Region, 
op.cit.tpp.43, 53, 69 and 105; Harold D. GunnT Pagan 
Peoples of the Central Area of Northern Nigeria.(London: 
International African Institute, 1956), pp.20, 46, 113.
3. See above, p. 461.
4. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit.,p.42 et.al.
5. For an account of similar escalation of dowry among
footnote 5 continued............
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asked for, and paid, in certain areas. Phillips observes 
that the rise in the levels of dowry may-not in fact be 
exorbitant, in relation to the general erosion in monetary 
values.^ Although this observation is generally true, the 
extent to which the amount of dowry payable has risen in 
certain areas provides some evidence to the contrary.
Before giving details of the level of dowry in 
some modern Nigerian communities, in an attempt to discover 
the extent to which the level of dowry has risen, it is 
necessary to mention the legislative and other attempts 
made by various governments and local communities to set 
maximum limits to the payment and refund of dowry.
4. Statutory Limitations of Dowry
A. Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956
p
The Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956, applies in 
the Eastern States which formerly were included in the 
Eastern Region of Nigeria. As previously noted, the 
Government of the former Eastern Region set up a committee 
to investigate the social and other effects of the allegedly 
soaring price of dowry in the various communities of the 
Region. As a result of this committee’s recommendations,
The Limitation of Dowry Law was enacted. The Law fixes 
the value of dowry payable on the occasion of a marriage 
under Customary Law, at a maximum of £50,including 
incidental expenses. It is an offence punishable by up to 
six months imprisonment either to pay or to receive as 
dowry any amount in excess of the prescribed maximum.
The courts are precluded from entertaining or 
from continuing any suit, or from making any decree or order, 
or executing any order if the amount of dowry involved in
Footnote 5 continued South African Zulus, and Govern­
mental attempts to curb it as early as 1869, see 
Theodore C. Binns, The Warrior People; Zulu Origins 
Customs and Witchcraft (London: Robert kale & Co..1975), 
p.194.
1. Phillips and Morris, Marriage Laws in Africa,op.cit.,p.50.
2. Cap. 76, Laws of Eastern Nigeria, 1963 Revision.
5. Ibid., Section 4(1).
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the claim is contrary to the Law. In Okeke v. Okeke
2   ----
and Ors. the Magistrate found as a fact that the first
defendant had received the sum of £30 and three goats in 
respect of the marriage on which the suit was founded.
He found that the defendant was not the person legally 
entitled to the payment of dowry and made an order for 
the £30 and three goats to he paid over to the plaintiff 
who was legally entitled to receive the dowry. On appeal 
to the High Court, the defendants argued that the order 
of the Magistrate was illegal being contrary to section 6 
of the Limitation of Dowry Law, 1956 which provides:
,! (1) No court shall -
(a) entertain or continue any suit or proceeding; or
(b) pass any decree or order; or
(c) execute wholly or partially any decree or order;
if the claim involved in such a suit or proceeding or
if the passing of the decree or order or if such
execution would be in any way contrary to the
provisions of this Law.
(2) No court shall, in adjudicating any matter or 
executing any decree or order, recognise any marriage 
or promise or offer of marriage, which is avoided by 
this Law11.
Egbuna, J., upheld the defendant’s submission, but 
nevertheless changed the order of the Magistrate to read 
”thirty pounds11. This decision seems to be contrary to the 
provision of the Law, although to hold otherwise in this 
particular case would have resulted in injustice to the 
plaintiff, since he was prevented by the Law from recovering 
the dowry wrongfully received by the defendants. In other 
words, a strict application of the Law would have enabled 
the defendant to profit from his own wrongful act.
The fact that the Limitation of Dowry Law is 
honoured more in the breach than in the observance is an 
open secret. At the Workshop on African Indigenous Laws 
held at Nsukka in 1974, the failure of the Law to curtail
the rising level of dowry was acknowledged by participants.
1. Ibid., S.6.
2. [1966] Suit No. 0/26A/1965, unreported.
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In fact, one learned Senior Magistrate admitted that 
the level of dowry remained as high as ever. He said:
,fI know how much I had to pay for my own wife” .
During the debate on the Bill for The Limitation 
of Dowry Law in the Eastern House of Assembly, some Members 
opposed the Bill mainly on the ground that ”the law might 
be passed but it is one that will be hard to implement” .^
The Honourable Minister of Welfare who moved the second 
reading of the Bill, assured Members that other steps had
been taken to ensure compliance with the Law.
f,The Government does not propose to leave this matter 
at passing this Bill. In order to make it effective 
a further step is necessary, namely, the registration 
of marriages. This also is recommended strongly by 
the Bride Price Committee. It is for Local Govern­
ment Bodies to take action. A circular will be sent
to all Local Lovernment Councils requiring them to 
make bye-laws to make compulsory the registration of 
marriages in their areas. When each marriage is 
registered the amount of dowry paid and the amount of 
petty expenses, and to whom paid, will be recorded in 
each case. I am sure that this House will agree with 
me that this step has long been needed, and I seek the 
co-operation of Members in ensuring that it is carried 
out"
The most flagrant abuse of The Limitation of Dowry 
Law, noted by the present writer, was evidenced by the 
registration of marriage particulars at the Local Govern­
ment Offices at Onitsha and Nsukka. As will be seen shortly, 
parties to a customary marriage were allowed to register 
with impunity, marriage contracts which showed that they 
had paid and received as dowry, sums of money ranging from 
M34 (£17) to Ml,700 (£850). Of 217 customary marriages 
registered at Onitsha in 1975, only fifty of the husbands 
paid dowry within the legal limits of £30 or M60. Most of 
the fifty husbands were Onitsha indigenes. Onitsha has 
successfully limited payment of dowry to M40 (£20) for 
indigenes of Onitsha and M60 (£30) for non-Onitsha men who 
marry Onitsha women.
1. See Parliamentary Debates. Eastern House of Assembly, 
Official Report, 28 March, 1956, p.675.
2. Ibid.,p.674.
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It may be noted that all the parties who signed
the Certificates, and the Registers which stated that, they
had given or received an amount exceeding £30 dowry, were
committing a crime. In many cases, the contract for the
payment of dowry involving large sums of money was reduced
to writing and pasted at the end, or on the reverse side
of the registration form, and kept in the Local Government
Office. No attempt was made to prosecute the offenders.
The abuse of law in Nigeria has been noted by
various writers.'*' In many cases the law enforcing agencies
make no effort to enforce the law. Governments tolerance
of breaches of laws invites contempt of the law generally;
it fosters the impression in the average Nigerian man or
woman that laws are made for law books, and possibly for
lawyers, but not to be obeyed. This is particularly relevant
2
in the case of laws relating to marriage. If a law cannot
be enforced, it should not remain on the statute books.
The intention here is not to advocate witch-
hunting to ferret out concealed breaches of the law, but
where the breach is brought to the notice of the Government
authorities, as it was in the registration of these marriages,
two examples of which are given below, there is no excuse
for non-enforcement of the law.
Receipts attached to Marriage Registrations at Onitsha
Local Government Office
No. 1
Imo State 
2nd November, 1976.
Sir> (a)The Bearer Mr. I.0.v J of Umuhu-Okabia, Orlu,
married my daughter under native law and Costum [sic].
He paid the dowry, the sum of one thousand, seven hundred
Naira (Ml,700.00) only.
Signed: J.
Occupation of husband - trader.
Occupation of wife - Primary School teacher.
(a) Names withheld in order to protect the identity of 
the parties
1. See e.g. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit.,p.79» with 
reference to breaches of laws limiting the payment of 
dowry; see also Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit., 
pp.42, 31.
2. See below, Chapter X, pp.133-140.
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No.2
3. 1. 77
Receipt
--------—  ( a )
I, Mr. E.O. ' of Ohukaba Awoldemili in Orlu Division of 
Imo State of Nigeria marrys [sic] the daughter of 0. A. 
of Isieke Awoldemili and of the same division and of the 
same State,
The dowry for the girl called Lavina 0. was settled to be 
one thousand (M1000.00) Naira and the sum of nine hundred 
Naira was paid cash to 0. on behalf of the daughter called 
Lavina 0.
Signed: E. 0. 
and four witnesses
0. A. and four witnesses
(a) Names withheld in order to protect the identity of 
the parties.
Before the enactment of The Limitation of Dowry 
Law in 1956, several local communities in the former 
Eastern Region had passed local laws regulating the level 
of dowry in the community, in exercise of the powers con­
ferred upon native authorities by the Native Authority 
Ordinance,^ with the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor of 
the then Eastern Region. For example, the Ikwerre-Etche 
Federated Native Authority (Ikwerre Clan Area) (Marriage) 
Rules, 1953, provided: "Notwithstanding any custom or 
practice to the contrary the maximum amount of any dowry
payable in respect of any marriage shall not exceed the
2
sum of thirty pounds", and petty expenses not to exceed 
five pounds. Twenty pounds of the dowry was to be paid 
to the father or other guardian of the bride, and
ten pounds to the mother. A penalty of five pounds or 
imprisonment of two months, or both, was provided for any 
person who pays, demands or receives any payment in excess
5
of these sums.
1. See Native Authority Ordinance, Cap.l40, Laws of Nigeria, 
1948 Revision, which empowered Native Authorities, inter 
alia, to make rules relating to the use and alienation 
of land and to declare and modify native law and custom, 
s .25(1)(xxvi).
2. Section 4(1)
3. Ibid., s.3(1)
4. Ibid., s .4(2)
5. Ibid., s .5
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In Onitsha, the traditional labour-service
dowry had been replaced by cowries. In 1900 it was fixed
at £10. By 1910, it had risen to £17, and by 1915, £60
to £70 was being paid.^ Because of the agitation of young
men who could not afford the high dowry, and were forced to
remain unmarried, and the fear of fathers with young
daughters that their daughters will be seduced as a result,
the Onitsha Native Authority fixed the amount of refundable
dowry at £32. During the following years, the incidental
expenses of marriage increased appreciably, until by 1938,
the cost of getting married was £80 to £100. In 1958 the
Native Authority again intervened and fixed the amount of
refundable dowry at £17, and petty expenses at £3 for
2
indigenous Onitsha men.
The marriage system in Onitsha with reference to 
payment of dowry is working remarkably well. The Ekwueme 
age-grade was delegated the task of ensuring that the rules 
were observed. No case of anyone paying or demanding a 
higher dowry than the maximum was discovered during field­
work. Although a few girls complained that their parents 
were not being adequately compensated for the expenses of 
rearing them, the people are generally satisfied with the 
level of dowry which, having regard to the cost of living 
in Nigeria at present, and the value of the bride*s outfit 
with which she is sent to her husband*s home, is merely 
symbolic.
It may be noted that, although the dowry and 
other customary presents paid by the bridegroom to the bride 
and her parents have been limited by statute, or by local 
laws of the community, the household articles and other 
property traditionally given to the bride when she is sent 
to her husband* s home have not been similarly restricted in 
value. The Bride Price Committee, in relation to these 
presents stated:
1. Bride-Price Committee Report, 1954, op.cit., p.5.
2. Information given by informants interviewed at 
Onitsha.
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"We consider that the giving of presents by the 
^parents of a bride when she goes to her new home 
should be regarded as entirely voluntary. A bride 
should not expect more than the bare essentials with 
which to start her new home and the cost of these 
should not exceed £15. Wealthy parents should, 
however, be free to give as they choose."-^
Gifts given to the bride when she is taken to 
her matrimonial home is traditional among most Igbo com­
munities. Equiano, who wrote in the early eighteenth 
century mentions these gifts as including "portions of
land, slaves and cattle, household goods and implements 
2
of husbandry".
Many lands in Onitsha were given to daughters as 
wedding* presents by their families in traditional society, 
and this accounts for the fact that quite a few Onitsha 
families now own plots of land in several different and 
widely separated areas of Onitsha.
Today, the value of these wedding gifts has 
soared, and may include landed property, sewing machines, 
cookers, refrigerators assorted expensive household furniture 
and equipment, and a liberal supply of foodstuffs. In 
Onitsha, the entire village of the bride usually subscribes 
to purchase her outfit. Regardless of the social status of 
the girl, if she comes from one of the larger villages, her 
wedding gifts from the village can be worth more than N500.
A wealthy indulgent parent, in addition, may give his 
daughter costly equipment, including land and a car. For 
his forty Naira outlay, therefore, the husband may get in 
return, property costing several hundreds of naira, and this 
makes marriage to an Onitsha woman a profitable venture.
May the wife in these circumstances claim that 
the husband has been bought?
The success of the Onitsha people at controlling 
the level of dowry serves as an object lesson for the 
Government.
1. Bride Price Committee Report, 1954, op.cit.,p.49, par.2.
2. Equiano, op.cit., p.5.
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Laws made locally are more likely to be successful 
than those-enacted by a central authority, far removed from 
the people who are meant to observe the laws. Although some 
people wilfully break the law, others commit breaches of the 
law because of ignorance of the law. When lav/s are made 
locally by the people themselves, everyone knows the law, 
and they themselves act as watchdogs to see that the laws 
are observed. In many cases, when laws relating to marriage 
are enacted by the central legislature, the existence of the 
laws are not brought to the notice of the ordinary village 
people.
One of the questions in the questionnaires dis­
tributed during field-work was to suggest ways by which laws 
limiting dowry can best be enforced. Many of the people 
interviewed, or who answered the questionnaires, suggested 
that control of dowry should be delegated to the traditional 
local rulers - chiefs or kings - whom the people by custom, 
have an obligation to obey. The peoples' views are 
invariably taken into account in the passage of local rules 
and regulations. This method has been adopted with success 
in some of the Northern States. For example, in Maiduguri, 
informants stated that when the Government wishes the 
people to pursue a certain course of action, or to obey a 
law, it is relatively easy to do so through the Shehu of 
Bornu, whom the people are traditionally accustomed to obey, 
and whom they revere and respect.
B. Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive 
Bye-Laws, 1938
The Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws Order,1958,^“ provides a standard dowry 
of £10, and other gifts and expenses to a total value of 
£24. This figure may, subject to the approval of the 
Commissioner for Local Government, be varied by a resolution 
of a local Council which has adopted the Bye-Law. The 
Bye-Laws have been adopted by several local Councils in
1. W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958.
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the Western States including Ibadan District Council. The 
Ibadan District Council (Marriage, Divorce and Custody of 
Children) Bye-Laws, 1965 provides as follows:
" 3(1) No dowry or betrothal presents in excess of the 
following shall be demanded or recoverable by 
any person:
(1) itoro (gift for first engagement £2.10
(ii) obi and isanlelori (actual dowry) £10.
(iii) ibowo (allowance for brideTs parents £5.
(iv) dresses £5.
22.10
(2) Any person who demands more than the amounts in 
par.(l) shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
of £10 or in default of payment to imprisonment 
for two months with hard labour".
This Bye-law seems to be generally obeyed. Every­
one knows the maximum amount of dowry that can be legally 
demanded or paid. There seems no incentive for parents to 
inflate the dowry for their daughters. As previously seen, 
a recognized customary marriage without payment of dowry may 
be contracted among the Yorubas. If the dowry demanded is 
too high, the parties can contract a marriage by "mutual 
consent only", and parents are aware of this fact. Although 
the social status of such a marriage may be lower than a 
marriage by payment of dowry, it is a legally recognized 
marriage. Yoruba women show a greater tendency to dis­
regard the wishes of their parents with reference to 
marriage than Igbo, Ibibio, or other Nigerian women.
Generally, the level of dowry among the Yorubas 
has always been lower than among the Igbos, and less 
importance is placed on the amount of dowry among most 
Yoruba communities.^
No penalties are imposed by the Ibadan District 
Council Bye-Laws for infringement of the dowry regulations, 
but as will be later seen, in the case of a divorce, the 
amounts that are refundable through the courts are strictly 
regulated by the Bye-Laws, and no greater sum will be 
recoverable, even in cases where a greater amount has been 
actually paid.
1. See Stanley Childs, "Christian Marriage in Nigeria", 
16 Africa, 1946, pp.238-246 at p.242.
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Other District Councils have also adopted the 
Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye- 
Laws Order, 1958, but many of them have modified the 
schedule and have stipulated a greater amount of dowry 
than that recommended in the schedule. For example, the 
schedule stipulates a dowry of £10, but the Oka and Odo- 
Otun District Councils stipulate that the dowry shall 
be £12/10, while the Ijero District Council fixed the 
dowry at £20, excluding other petty expenses.^
C. Other Statutory Provisions
The Declarations of Customary Law of Marriage, 
of a few native authorities in the Northern States, pres­
cribe maximum dowry payable and refundable in their 
respective areas. An example of such Declarations is the
Daura Local Authority Declaration of Daura Native Marriage
2
Law and Custom) Order, 1972. Dowry is not limited by the
Declaration, and 11 shall consist of such property as may be
agreed by the parties to the marriage'*. Pre-betrothal
marriage gifts are, however, limited.- The maximum marriage
property to be given by the bridegroom to his bride is
set out in two schedules, applicable in the case of first,
■3
and second and subsequent marriages respectively.
As shall be seen later in the discussion on 
marriage according to Islamic law, in addition to the amount 
given to the girl*s father, the traditional dowry of 
customary law, a sum of money, dower or sadaki (Hausa term 
for dower) is also payable. In classical Islamic law, this 
sum is not fixed but depends on certain variants. Some of 
the Native Authority Declarations include in the maximum 
dowry payable, the bride*s dower or sadaki. In the Daura 
Declaration, the term dowry is interpreted t o ■include the
1. See Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce under Yoruba 
Customary Law, op.cit.,p.77.
2. N.C.S.L.A.N. 7 of 1972.
3. Ibid.,s.6.
4. See below, Chapter IX, pp.50-52.
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ftsadaki”, and in accordance with Islamic Law, is not fixed.
Some Authorities, however, have laid maximum amounts for
both payments. For example, dowry in the Borgu area must
not exceed £15 (N30), including sadaki.^" In Biu Native
2Authority area the maximum dowry is also £15.
The Local Authority (Modification of Bornu Native 
Law and Custom Relating to Marriage) Order, 1971 provides 
that the bride-price shall not be less than £1, and not more 
than £10. The dower or sadaki as stipulated in section 5 
must not exceed £10 in cash and £20 in clothing and other 
articles.
As in the case of The Limitation of Dowry Law in 
the Eastern States, the Bornu Local Authorityfs attempt to 
limit the payments of dowry or sadaki is generally dis­
regarded. During field-work in Maiduguri, the consistent 
complaint of the young, and in some cases, older men 
interviewed, was the high cost involved in getting married, 
especially where the girl had never been previously married. 
The total outlay involved sums ranging from N500 upwards.
The problem is discussed further with reference to Islamic
3
law marriages.
It has been mentioned previously that certain 
communities operate a double-level system of dowry - ,!big- 
dowry” and ftsmall-dowryl! systems. The "big-dowry" marriage 
usually involves a considerable amount of expenditure on 
ceremonies and payments, and in the early years of this 
century the total cost of this type of marriage amounted 
to £500 to £400, or even more among the Kalahari communities. 
In 1921, the Kalahari National Assembly attempted to limit
the dowry in a big-dowry (Iya) marriage to a maximum of £50.
This was observed for three or four years, after which there 
was a gradual return to the old scale. In 1942, the unions 
and associations of the areas again brought the problem of
1. Declaration of Borgu Native Law and Custom Relating to 
Marriage and Divorce, N.A.L.N. 52 of 1961, s.5(1).
2. Declaration of Biu Native Law and Custom Relating to 
Marriage and Divorce, N.A.L.N. 9 of 1964, s.4(1).
3. See further below, Chapter IX, p.50 et.al.
4. See above, Chapter III, pp.254-257.
high dowry before the Chiefs. The Council stipulated that 
the maximum dowry payable for a'"big-dowry" marriage should 
not exceed £20, or £10 where the~contracting parties were 
from the same house. When the Bride-Price Committee visited 
the area, in 1954, however, the cost of a "big-dowry" 
marriage was up to £80 to £100 on any girl.^
5. Modern Level of Dowry Payments
A. Among the Yorubas
The present level of dowry among the Yorubas 
generally is relatively low in comparison with most Igbo 
communities. This seems to have always been the case as 
the available evidence shows, at least from the time of the
p
introduction of English currency. In 1946, Childs stated 
that in the Igbo country, the dowry is £25 or more, but in 
Yorubaland it is only about £5. He says: "That makes an 
important difference: a dowry that would be accepted in 
the Yoruba country would be regarded as no dowry in the 
Ibo".
Dowry among the Yorubas has not risen drastically
if the general rise in the cost of living is taken into
account. For example, in Savage v. McFoy^ the marriage
was contracted in 1900, and the ano (dowry) included the
sum of five guineas in cash. Johnson, writing in 1921 states
"Well to do families rarely require more than ten 
heads of cowries in these days, in early times, one 
head was considered ample - only as a token ."^
He estimated the value of one head of cowrie as sixpence.
Ten heads would therefore be less than a pound, which was 
probably the sum paid by the generality of the people. 
Ajisafe, in 1924, stated that if the parents of the girl
1. See Bride-Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.32.
2. Childs, "Christian Marriage in Nigeria”, op.cit., p.242.
3. [1909] 1 -Rennerfs Gold Coast Report, 504.
4. Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op.cit., p.114.
5. Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the Yoruba, op.cit., p.53.
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are in a good position the sum of fifty shillings is paid
to them as dowry, but if they are poor, it may be as much
as fifteen pounds or even more. Fadipe records that up to
1918, the amount of the money payment was considerably less
than five pounds - two pounds ten shillings was a common
figure in Abeokuta.^* Bascom notes that by 1937 payment in
2
cash had risen to thirteen pounds. In 1974, a columnist 
of the Nigerian Daily Times stated that among the Yoruba, 
f!those who claim to be modern can ask for as much as
•X.
M300 (£150) excluding other incidental expenses. But the
highest dowry recorded among Yoruba women interviewed
during field-work was M120 (£60), and the average dowry
4
allegedly paid was M30. As will be shown later, the 
general cost of living has risen considerably.
B. Among the Igbos
The level of dowry payable among the Igbos varies
5
from community to community. Variations existed in the
traditional society, and continue to exist in the modern
society, but generally it may be stated that there has
been an upward rise in the level of dowry payable in most
communities which, in many cases, far exceeds the general
rise in the cost of living.
In 1938, Basden noted the rising level of dowry
among the Igbos: He says:
,fA prospective bridegroom may be faced with costs 
amounting to £100 or more, according to the social 
standing of the girl, her personal charms and 
qualifications, whereas in the olden days, the price 
varied from the equivalent of a few shillings to a 
few poundslf.g
1. Fadipe, Sociology of the Yorubas. on.cit., p p .77-78.
2. Bascom, The Yoruba of South-western Nigeria, on.cit.,p.59.
5. See Tayo Adetola, ’’Bride Price and the Nigerian Parents’*,
Daily Times (Nigeria), 26 April, 1974.
4. There is some evidence that a higher level of dowry is 
payable among Yorubas in Lagos; see e.g. Lagos Weekend 
8 July, 1977, p.3 and Lagos Weekend,22 July, 1977, for 
cases in which the sums of N120 and H88, were allegedly 
paid.
5. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit. pp.9-46.
6. Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.216.
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The Bride-Price Committee found that changes 
in the traditional dowry was due to the impact of Western 
civilization. Pseudo-forms of currency such as cowries 
and manillas, brass and iron rods were used for trading 
instead of the original barter. Men took up employment 
which left them no time in which to render the traditional 
labour services. The dowry was therefore paid in the 
available currency and gradually became fixed at a level 
within the range of the ordinary palm cutter, farmer or
labourer. It did not remain constant throughout the
years but varied with the general prosperity of the 
people. In many areas there was a fall in the level of 
dowry during the years of depression in the early 1930*s.
For example in Njikoka, by 1919 the dowry payable had 
risen to £60 in cash, exclusive of incidental expenses 
which brought the total to £100. But during the
depression of the 1930’s the range of dowry fell to £8
to £40.
During the war years, an unprecedented rise in 
the levels of dowry payable occurred and service men are 
held to have been largely instrumental in causing the 
rises. The position was described by the Bride Price 
Committee:
ff 28. Many of them entered the Army as young unmarried 
men and when they found that the Army pays 
marriage allowances they soon became alive to the 
advantages of acquiring a wife. Money was dis­
patched to their parents who were asked to look 
around and find them wives. Girls were called 
upon to marry young men they had either never seen 
or had forgotten and the period of betrothal, so 
important in the traditional system, had no place 
in such marriages. Soldiers returning from over­
seas who had not yet acquired a wife came home 
with the object of doing so as quickly as possible. 
Men with daughters of marriageable age were 
dazzled by the money they were offering and often 
made their daughters marry them, irrespective of 
the fact that they had already been betrothed to 
others and in complete disregard of the girls’ 
wishes. Instead of arrangements being made by 
the two families the soldiers negotiated them­
selves with the parents of the girls they wished 
to marry. The dowry rose. • Often it was paid in 
one lump sum, instead of by instalments.
Gradually the idea dawned that to marry off one’s
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daughter was a way to acquire wealth and that idea 
has persisted” .^
In addition to the contribution of the servicemen, 
the general rise in the cost of living was reflected in the 
rise of dowry levels. During the war there was more money 
available generally and less things to spend it on.
Since the end of the war prices generally have 
continued to rise and so has the level of dowry. For example, 
in the Oratta community of Owerri Division, the cost of 
getting married including a dowry of £15, was £18.10. The 
influence of servicemen during the war caused the dowry to 
rise and, at the time this community was visited by the 
Bride-Price Committee, the cost of getting married to 
an uneducated girl was £90, including the dowry of £65. The 
actual dowry had risen to more than four times the pre-war 
level, but the cost of the customary gifts had risen to 
more than seven times their pre-war prices. For an educated
girl the total cost was £150.^
Dowry in Owerri Division has continued to rise 
and perhaps the highest level of dowry to be found in 
Nigeria exists in this Division. The marriages registered 
at Onitsha Local Government Marriage Registry, which were 
examined by the present writer showed that parties from 
Owerri Division paid the highest amounts of dowry. The 
least amount of dowry for a marriage contracted by parties 
from Owerri was M275 (£137.10), and the two highest amounts 
recorded at the Registry, M1000 and Ml,700 (or £500 and 
£850) - were paid by Owerri husbands, (see Table 6:1).
A lecturer at the Institute of Management and 
Technology, an Owerri indigene, who at the time of the 
field-work for this thesis was searching for a girl whom 
he could marry, reported that he could not get a suitable 
girl for less than Ml,500-N2,000, although he did not want 
a highly educated girl.
1. Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.5.
2. Ibid., generally.
3. See Table 6:1.
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Other Igbo areas also show a high level of dowry.
For example, in 1954, the dowry in some areas of Nnewi
Division had risen from its pre-war level of £15-£29 to
£90-£180; in Ogidi from £5 to £10 with an absolute
maximum of £20 to £60-£150; in Awka, the dowry up to
1943 was about £8;ithadrisen to £100 for an illiterate
girl and £150 for a girl wirh an elementary education;
in Orlu Division the dowry of £20 to £30 in 1940 had
become £80 to £200 or even £300.^
Statistics collected at Onitsha Local Government
Marriage Registry Office give an indication of the present
level of dowry among the Igbos generally. Although these
customary marriages were registered at Onitsha, they were
contracted by parties from various parts of Igboland, and
2
further afield, since Onitsha, as previously noted, is a
large commercial centre. Most of the registrations were
from the non-indigenous Onitsha population. The sums
registered as being paid as dowry ranged from M34 to M640.
The statistics are tabulated and shown in Table'6:1 below.
The marriages were registered during the year 1975. In 1977
however, two dowries of M1000.00 and Ml,700.00 respectively
were paid, and an examination of amounts registered for the
first six months of 1977 shows an equal steady increase.
The agreements registered for the payment of Ml,000 and
Ml,700 are reproduced above. It can thus be seen that
the level of dowry rose from a maximum of £150 (M300.00) in
1954 to £850 (Ml,700.00) in 1977.
To confirm the general rise in dowry the
following newspaper comments may be contrasted:
In 1956, Freeman wrote in the Sunday Times:
,lWhen you charge fifty pounds for the hand of an 
illiterate daughter, ninety pounds for another who 
has passed standard six and a hundred and fifty 
pounds for one with grammar school education, you 
are not merely demanding the customary payment of 
dowry,...They call that amount simply *price1 and 
since the commodity in that case is the would-be
1. Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., pp.12-15.
2. See above, Chapter I , p .62.
3. See above pp.472 and 473. Refund of twice the amount 
of dowry is also the recognized way in which wives may 
divorce their husbands in some of the Northern tribes - 
see Meek - Northern Tribes, p.218.
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bride, such a payment can hardly be anything if 
not bride-price". i
2
In 1974, in the. Nigerian Daily Times, Adetola wrote:
"When it [dowry] all started the fee was a token one 
and in some communities it was as low as five naira 
(M5) - maybe because of the state of economic 
development - but things have assumed such ridiculous 
dimensions and the price is steadily rising. In the 
recent past, some parents have asked for as much as 
Ml,600 for their daughter. New Nigerian of September 
3rd, 1969, reported that bride price at Otukpa in the 
Idoma Local Administration in Benue-Plateau State was 
Ml,600. Among the Yoruba those who claim to be 
modern can ask for as much as N300 excluding some 
other incidental expenses.
TABLE 6:1
STATISTICS OF PAYMENT OF DOWRY 
REGISTERED AT ONITSHA
Total number of marriages registered - 217
12 paid below M40
58 1! between M40 - 60
4 tl t M61 - 100
12 fl n M101 - 150
18 II tt N151 - 200
68 I! tt M201 - 250
14 I tt M251 - 300
20 It t M301 - 550
5 It tt M351 - 400
8 It tt M401 - 450
1 It M451 - 500
10 It tt M501 - 550
1 tt tt M551 - 600
6 It tt M601 — 650
217 marriages
1. Patricia Freeman, "The Psychology of Bride Price - The 
Voice of Eve", Sunday Times, Nigeria, May 13, 1956,
P-7.
2. Tayo Adetola, "Bride Price and the Nigerian Parents", 
Tayo Daily Times, Nigeria, 26 April, 1974; see also, 
Aniagolu, op.cit., pp.101-107.
4 8 6
C . Among other communities
Among many of the other communities, the rise 
in the level of dowry has not been steep. For example, 
among the Nupes, Nadel reports that the dowry has under­
gone great changes. From £3 value in pre-British days it 
had risen to £10, £15 and even £20. At the time he made 
his investigations in 1934-1936, it had fallen to £5 and 
£10. In 1936 he found cases where a dowry of £9 and £10 
had been paid.^ This rise, comparatively speaking, is a 
modest one. Similarly, among the Igbirra, the traditional
dowry of three years marriage-service for the bride's father
2
had been replaced by a payment of £11 by 1955.
In some societies the rise has been higher. For 
example, among the Ibibios, traditionally, dowry was paid 
in goats and ranged from ten to twenty-five in number.
Later manillas were used, and the number varied from 800- 
4000, although as a general rule it did not exceed 1,200, 
equivalent to £15. In 1954 the dowry ranged from £15 to 
£50. Since 1954 it seems to have risen considerably, at 
least in Eket. Information from an Eket family revealed that 
200 manillas had been paid for the mother of the family 
nearly 80 years ago. This was equivalent to about £1.
For the daughter of the family, who was married around 
1930, £37 was paid. For the granddaughter of the family,an 
undergraduate at an American university, N1000 (£500) dowry 
was paid in 1977. The family is a respectable one, and the 
grandmother's husband had been a Christian minister. This 
may be regarded as a fairly high rise in dowry, but what 
does it represent in terms of real value? If the maximum 
traditional dowry of 25 goats is taken, it would be worth 
at N40 for a goat, exactly M1000. In many areas in Nigeria a 
goat was being sold for N30 - N50 at the end of 1977. In
1. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, op.cit., p.350; see also Forde, 
et.al., Peoples of the Niger Benue Confluence, op.cit., 
p.43.
2. Ibid.,op.cit.,p.68.
3. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.4l.
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terms of actual value, therefore, the dowry has not 
risen.
Among the Efiks of Calabar, 12 guineas are paid
to the bride herself, as dowry, Ml6 to her father, and
N10 to her mother by the bridegroom, at the present time.
In addition, a trunk box containing articles such as
clothes, jewels, shoes etc. is also given to the bride,
according to the inclination and wealth of the bridegroom.1
Efik people insist that dowry in their communities has
never risen beyond this level, and among some groups it is
not refundable in the case of a divorce. It has been
previously noted that Efik women have a high social status
and legal rights, for example, rights of inheritance, denied
2
to some other Nigerian women.
Among the pagan Fulani, dowry has always been low, 
and was purposely kept low, due to the instability of
married life among newly married couples. The parents fear
liability in cases of desertion or separation.
Mention has already been made of the rise in the 
level of dowry payable for a nbig-dowry” marriage among the 
Kalabaris.
Among the Okrika I jaws, the dowry of a ’’big-dowry” 
marriage has also risen. Formerly manillas were used in the 
area and the dowry consisted of the following:
2 cases of nOkuruM (Native woven cloths).
23 manillas.
6 pitchers of tumbo wine.
8 yards of real Indian cloth.
7 or more pieces of Akwete (Native woven cloths).
£1 to the bride’s father
5/- to £1 to the bride’s mother.
1 bottle of whisky to the Head of the House (or
1 guinea),
Several Fene cloths (Portuguese blankets).^1,
1. Information obtained from informants at Calabar:
Special thanks are hereby recorded to Mrs. Veronica 
Effiom, Librarian at Calabar High Court, and her assistant 
Florence Kubianghalfee.also Forde, Efik Traders of Old 
Calabar, on.cit.. p.14; See also Bride Price Committee 
Report, op.cit., pp.43-46.
2. See further, below Chapter XIII, p.430.
footnotes 3 and 4 continued...........
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In 1954, the dowry for this type of marriage
ranged from £60 to £80.^* In a "small-dowry” marriage
among the Okrikas "there is no dowry payment and no
ceremony". An expenditure of £5 to £10 is involved and
the two families merely gather and drink. It may he noted
that all the children of such a marriage belong to the
2
wifeT s family and they answer her family name.
6. The Factors influencing the quantum
of dowry
In many areas of Nigeria, the quantum of dowry
payable for a wife depends on certain factors such as the
education of the girl, her social status, beauty and other 
3
qualities. The wealth and social status of the bridegroom
or his family also play a prominent part in deciding the
A
level of dowry payable. Ajisafe says of the Yorubas:
"If the girl is highly connected and beautiful the 
husband should give a specially valuable dowry 
befitting the girlfs status, hence the maxim, "Bi omo
ba ti ri li a se ana re",The status of the girl
determines the value of the dowry".
But he also says that more is paid to the parents who are
poor than to those who are in a good position.
Similarly, Basden notes that among the Igbos,
"The social rank, age and personal qualities of the girl are
It c
all assessed. There is evidence that in other traditional 
societies, the level of dowry was sometimes dependent to
Footnotes 3 and 4 continued....
3. See Wilson-Haffenden, The Red Men of Nigeria, op.cit. >p.ll6.
4. Bride-Price Committee Report, op.cit.,p.33> par.217; See 
also Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit.,
pp.189-193.
1. Bride Price Committee Report,, o p .cit.. p.33.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit.,p.34,par.223.
3. See generally, Bride Price -Committee Report,op.cit.
4. Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the Yoruba, op.cit., p.53; 
cf. Ekundare, Marriage and divorce Under Yoruba Customary 
Law, op. cit.,p . 19: 11 The status of the girl determines the 
value of the dowry".
5. Basden, Niger Ibos,- op.cit. , p.216.
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some extent on the social status of the bride and bride­
groom, but generally, except for the daughters of chiefs 
and kings, there was not much difference in social status 
of the people, and in many societies, whether a girl was 
beautiful or not was irrelevant, and did not affect the 
amount of dowry paid for her."1- For example^ among the Efiks 
of Calabar, the social status of either bride or bridegroom, 
or the youth and beauty of the girl did not affect the level 
of dowry.
With the introduction of money payment, added 
emphasis is placed on the qualities of the girl, the social 
status of the prospective bride and bridegroom, and other 
factors. In many communities, especially among the Igbos, 
a higher dowry is demanded for an educated girl. For example,
in the Nnewi area around 1954, an illiterate girl attracted
a dowry of about £90, a girl with standard VI education about
£120, while as much as £180 may be paid for a Higher Elementary
2
certificated teacher.
In Orlu Division, while £80 to £200 had to be paid 
for an illiterate girl, another £100 had to be added for an 
educated one. Sometimes, however, as much is paid on behalf 
of a beautiful illiterate as on that of a less attractive
3
educated girl, though generally literacy adds at least £50.
In Mbaise there is a heavy premium for education. In 1954, 
the Bride Price Committee found that the dowry on illiterates • 
ranged from £80 to £120, on semi-literates from £150 to £160 
and on a girl with standard VI, £200 or more. Girls with 
Secondary School^ qualifications were not usually married 
for less than £250. Today the dowry for an educated girl 
in this area ranges from N1000 (£500) to N2000 (£1000) .
1. Among some Ibibio communities, certain specific articles 
had to be given by the prospective husband if the bride 
was the first daughter of the family, see Udo E. Akpan,
The Methodist Contribution to Education in Eastern 
Nigeria, Ph.D. dissertation Boston University Graduate 
School, 1965, p.103. The gifts included a he-goat, a 
ram, a hen, seven bundles of afan (vegetable) palm fruits 
and a bundle of firewood, all fetched by the man himself, 
as well as three brass rods, nsei (red chalk) and other 
small things as sacrifices.
2. Bride Price Committee Re-port, op.cit., p.10.
3. Ibid., p.15.
4. Ibid., p.26.
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Four of the six Native Authorities in the area, maintained 
a differential dowry for the non-educated and educated 
girls in their recommendation to the Bride Price Committee. 
For example, three Authorities recommended £40 for an 
illiterate, £60 for a Standard VI, and £80 for a girl who 
had Secondary School education.^
The reason for maintaining a difference in the 
level of dowry paid on behalf of educated and non-educated 
girls given by most communities was that it was necessary 
in order to encourage parents to send their daughters to 
school. It was said that parents would not send their 
daughters to school, if education would have no effect on 
the amount of dowry paid. Inherent in this argument is 
the theory that dowry compensates the parents for the 
expenses incurred in rearing the girl, including expenses 
involved in education. There is evidence, however, that 
some communities which have no differentials in dowry 
payment dependent on education, nevertheless educate their 
daughters. For example, in the Owuwa Anyanuri group of 
communities, where inheritance is mainly matrilineal, 
dowry has been kept relatively low, and there is rarely 
a difference for educated girls.^ Among the Abiriba group 
the actual dowry in 1954 was £2.15 for a farmer and £3.5 for 
a trader or civil servant. The differential is based on 
the fact that a farmer is expected to render labour services 
during the betrothal period. In spite of this relatively 
low level of dowry, compared to other Igbo-speaking com­
munities, parents educated their daughters in order to 
enhance their prestige and to secure more highly educated 
sons-in-law. Similarly, among the Onitsha people, where 
dowry has been kept low for a number of years, parents do 
educate their daughters.
Differentials in the payment of dowry, whether 
based on beauty, education, or social status relegate the 
transaction to the nature of a "purchase", deprive it of
1. Ibid.. pp.24-27.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.19.
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its "token” character, and debase it altogether. The 
element of-bargain involved is consistent with buying of 
any other commodity in the Nigerian markets.
7. Principles of Law Relating to 
Dowry
A. To whom is the dowry payable?
As a general statement it may be said that dowry 
is payable to the parents of the bride. How the dowry 
received by her parents is shared varies from community 
to community, but usually the father receives the largest 
share, followed by the mother, and other members of the 
extended family.
(I) Among the Yorubas
The dowry is paid to the parents of the bride, 
and there is no evidence that other members of the family 
are legally entitled to be given any amount of the money 
paid, although they are entitled to share some of the 
other articles included in the dowry, such as the kola-nuts, 
and drinks. Ekundare states that dowry is usually dis­
tributed among the members of the girlfs family, but whether
the distribution is fair or not does not affect the legal
1 2 validity of the marriage. In Re Sapara, it was argued
that the ano (dowry) was not properly distributed and,
therefore, the union was illegal. Osborne, C.J., found
as a fact that many important members of the family of the
bride had received no share of the dowry. He held, however,
that it "would be contrary to natural justice to deprive
a woman of her status as a wife because the head of the
family erred in the distribution of her ano” .
(II) Among the Igbos
Sharing of the dowry varies from community to 
community. In Aguata, Awgu, Idemili, Ihiala, Mbano,
1 i Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce Under Yoruba Customary 
Law, op.cit.,p.2Q.
2. [1911-] Renners Gold Coast Reports, 605.
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Njikoka, Nkwere, Mnewi, Ogbaru, Orlu, Owerri, and certain 
clans in Afikpo and Okigwe Divisions, the entire dowry is 
payable to the bride's father or other male legal guardian, 
if her father is dead, and legally belongs to him alone.
The mother of the bride is usually also entitled to some 
small payment in money and to other gifts for having reared 
the child. In most of the other' communities, dowry is paid 
to the father of the bride, but does not belong to him 
exclusively. A certain sum is usually paid to the mother 
of the girl, but the proportion varies. For example, in 
the Ngwa Clan of Aba Division, if the dowry is £90, the 
father's share would be about £60, and the mother's £20; 
in Orrata Clan of Owerri Division in 1954 the father's share 
of the dowry was up to £100, while the mother's share was 
about £25, plus the customary gifts; and in Ikwo Clan of 
Abakaliki Division where the Bride-Price Committee found 
the traditional form of marriage with little modification 
still in existence, the father's share of dowry was two 
cows, one goat, four yards of cloth, two iron bars, and a
red cap, while the mother's share was one goat and a supply
- 2 of yams.
In Onitsha the dowry is shared as follows:
A. Oji Nna - fathers d o w r y ............. N14.00
Oji Nne - mother's d o w r y ............M 8.00
Afe Aru - the bride's personal
share........... ........... M 6.00
Ife Nru Aro - the year's tribute
to parents ........... M 2.00
Oji Ozuzu Nwa - training expenses
(where applicable) . . . . M 2.00
Oji Diokpala-(male head of the
extended family........... M 1.00
Oji Ada - (female head of the
extended fam i l y )......... 50 K.
Ekene Idunata Uno (made up of 35K.
cash, two heads of tobacco,
kola nuts, and two pots
of wine ........ 50 K.
Total = M34.00
1. See generally, Customary Law Manual, op. cit. ,pp.238-246.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report generally.
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B. Manya Efifie (general drinks)
To the-father- : Two pots of wine and two bottles
of gin.
To the mother : two pots of wine and two bottles
of gin.
Manya Oji Nna : one pot of wine and one bottle of gin,
Manya Oji Nne : one pot of wine and one bottle of gin,
Manya Oji Diokpala : one pot of wine.
Manya Oji Ada : one pot of wine.
C. Manya Idu Nwunye Uno : To the father : one bottle of
wine and one bottle of gin.
To the mother : one pot of wine and 
one bottle of gin.^
(Ill) Among other communities
Among most of the other communities, the dowry,
although received by the bride's father, is usually shared
among other members of the family. Among the Efiks, for
example, the father, mother, and the girl herself are
2
entitled to definite portions of the total dowry. In
other Ibibio communities, the motherfs share is not fixed,
though in a case where £50 is paid, she will probably
■3
receive about £20, and the father £30. It is said that the 
mother sometimes takes a larger proportion and that there 
are cases on record where powerful mothers have given out 
their daughters in marriage and received the whole of the 
dowry. Informants in Eket insist that it is the father 
who is legally entitled to receive the dowry, although the 
mother is also entitled to a small part of it. The Okobo- 
Oron District Council recommended that the dowry for the 
father should be £55 and that of the mother, £10. The 
girl is not usually given any share of the dowry.
1. See Bride Price Committee Report generally.
2. Forde, Efik Traders of Old Calabar, op.cit., p.14;
Bride Price Committee Report, op. cit. ,p.*+5 .
3. Ibid., op.cit., p.41.
4. Ibid., p.41.
5. Ibid., p.43.
Among the Benins, Bradbury reports that dowry
payment of £12 is made to the bride*s father, and unspecified
gifts to the mother.^ At Ora (Northern Edo) in 1914, the
dowry was fixed at £12; £10 was given to the father and £2 
2
to the mother. At Asaba, Esenwa states that £20 dowry is
given to the father, £5 to the mother, and £10 to *fthe
■5
girl and her numerous relations’*.
B. The validity of a marriage if dowry is paid to the 
wrong person
The validity of the marriage depends on the bride*s 
relation to the person to whom the dowry is paid. Clearly 
a marriage would not be valid if payment is made to a 
stranger, without the authority of the bride*s parents.
If a bride*s legal father is alive, it is doubtful whether 
unauthorised payment to another person would render the 
marriage valid, but in the absence of the girl*s legal 
father, payment made to a person who is not the recognized 
legal guardian, but who nevertheless is a close member of 
the family would not render the marriage void or voidable.
The court would compel payment to the person legally 
entitled to it, but the marriage would be valid. In 
Okeke v. Okeke & Orsft the plaintiff claimed that he, being 
the eldest son of his deceased father, and head of the 
family, should be entitled to the dowry payable in respect 
of the marriage of Ifechukwu Okoye, daughter of his late 
father. The Awka Magistrate Court found as a fact that the 
defendant, another son of the deceased, had received the 
dowry. The Court ordered the dowry to be paid by the 
defendant to'the plaintiff. On appeal to the Onitsha 
High Court, Egbuna, J., held that the plaintiff did not give 
the girl away in marriage; that the marriage contract was 
between the first and third defendant, the husband of the
1. Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op.cit., p.49.
2. Bradbury and Lloyd, op.cit., pp.97-98.
3. Esenwa, ’’Marriage Customs in Asaba Division”, op.cit., 
p.76.
4. [1966] Suit No. 0/26A/1965, unreported, Onitsha High 
Court, 28 March, 1966.
girl, and the plaintiff was not a party. He said:
’’The claiming of dowry and refunding of dowry
.is between the contracting parties” .
The plaintiff was held not entitled to the dowry,.
With respect,it is submitted that the plaintiff’s 
claim was not that he was a party to the contract, but that 
he ought to have been, and the relevant question ought to 
have been whether he, as head of his deceased father’s 
family, was entitled to give his half-sister in marriage, 
in preference to her full but younger brother. This would 
depend on the customary law of the particular community.
8. The Historical Incidence of Marriage by Consideration.
Before discussing the effect of dowry on the legal
status of Nigerian women, it is pertinent to refer briefly
to the occurrence of ’’marriage by consideration” in other
parts of the world. Because there are countries, for
example England, where payment by the bridegroom or his kin
to the bride’s parents is not an essential of a valid
marriage, it is often mistakenly thought that marriage by
payment of dowry is essentially an African institution.^ But
marriage by consideration is not confined to African societies
and, like other African customs, is found in the comparable
period of development of other nations.
Maine observes that during the ”troubled era which
began modern history the women of the dominant races were
under various forms of archaic guardianship, and the husband
who takes a wife from any family except his own pays a
money price to her relations for the tutelage which they
2
surrender to him” . Diamond refers to dowry, or as he 
calls is ’’bridewealth”, as one of the most important 
institutions of marriage, and he notes that the giving of 
consideration of some kind at the time of marriage - either
1. See e.g. Linton, The Study of Man, op.cit., p.178;
Farran, Matrimonial Laws of the Sudan, op.cit.t p.282.
2. Maine, Ancient Law, op.cit., p.139.
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by goods, service, or even exchange of women - is the rule 
among the overwhelming majority of peoples in traditional 
societies."*"
Marriage by consideration was almost universal, 
and a few examples will amply demonstrate this fact.
It has prevailed in all branches of the Semitic
2
race. In Babylonia, a suitor had to give his intended
wife's father a bride-price or present which varied in
amount according to the rank of the parties, and if he could
not afford the sum required, his parents were expected to
assist him.^
According to the book of Genesis, Jacob served
his uncle, Laban for a period of seven years for each of his
wives, Leah and Rachael.^ But Westermarck notes that "the
usual method of obtaining a wife in ancient Israel was by
5
paying a bride-price called mohar or mahr" This statement 
receives support from the fact that David was told that 
King Saul "desireth not any dowry but an hundred foreskins 
of the Phillistines" for the marriage of his daughter 
Michal. David therefore slew two hundred Phillistines 
and brought their foreskins to the king that he might be 
the king's son-in-law. And Saul gave him Michal his 
daughter to wife.^
Among the ancient Arabs, a bride-price, mahr was 
given by the bridegroom to the father or guardian of the 
bride; this custom has survived in Islamic law where it
7
has been confounded with sadak.' Before the advent of 
Islam, the payment was made to the father or guardian of 
the bride. Islam reformed the law so that the payment now
1. Diamond, Primitive Law, ojd . cit. ,p .225; see also Hobhouse, 
Wheeler and Ginsberg, The Material Culture, op.cit.,p.153; 
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, African Systems of Kinship and 
Marriage, op.cit.,p.47.
2. Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, op.cit.,
Vol.II, p.407.
5. Ibid.,p.407.
4. Genesis, Chpt. 29, 16-30.
5. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit., Vol.II, 
p. 407.
6. See 1 Samuel, Chpt. 18, 17-27; see also L.M. Epstein, 
Jewish Marriage Contract: A Study of the Status of Woman 
in Jewish Law, p7l2.
7. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage,, op.cit., p.408.
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known as sadak is given to the girl herself.1 In the
Northern Emirates of Nigeria, where Islam prevails, it
will be seen later, that although sadak is paid and may
be used mainly for the benefit of the girl, a dowry is
also paid to her father or guardian, a relic of the old
2
customary law of marriage by payment of dowry.
Marriage by consideration was also widespread in
old China. A present had to be given by the suitor*s
father to the bride*s father, and the amount payable was
stipulated by the negotiators of the marriage. The marriage
could not be celebrated until the stipulated amount was duly
paid. Several emperors tried to educate the people to
eliminate money as a factor of the marriage contract and
many famous writers condemned the practice, but it proved 
3
ineradicable.
In Japan marriage by consideration was said to 
4have been common, as it was also among the lower classes
5
of Hindus, although Manu attacks the custom and forbade 
it altogether. The laws of Manu provides: **No man who 
knows the law must take even the smallest gratuity for his 
daughter; for a man who, through avarice, takes a gratuity 
is a seller of his offspring'*. Westermarck asserts that 
notwithstanding the prohibition in the laws of Manu 
"marriage by purchase occurs to this day even among high
7
castes and is frequently practised among the Sudras".
cc
1. See Umaru Abdullahi, The Influence of Customs upon Marriage 
Under Islamic Law in the Far Northern States of Nigeria39 
in African Indigenous Laws, eds. T.O. Elias et.al.,
0£.cit., pp.123-124, WestermarckT op.cit.r pp.408-409.
2. See further below, Chapter IX, pp.56-58.
5. See Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, (New Haven 
Yale University Press, 1946), pp.^b-37; see also Mace 
and Mace, Marriage East and West, op.cit. ,pp.154-155; 
Westermarck, op.cit.,p.^06.
4. Westermarck, op.cit., p.406.
5. Mace and Mace, op.cit.,p.155; Westermarck, op.cit., 
pp.409-410.
6. The Laws of Manu: The Sacred Books of the East, Vol.
XXV, trans. by G. Bdhler, Vol.Ill, p.51.
7. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.,Vol.II, 
p.410. The accepted custom of the East generally 
however is not for the bridegroom*s family to pay a 
bride-price, but for the bride*s family to provide her 
with a dowry to take to her husband*s home.
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Westermarck also states that "marriage by con­
sideration was' a custom of all Teutonic - peoples". ^  The
Kentish law of King Aethelbirht speaks of a man buying a
2
maiden with cattle. In Germany, the expression to
"purchase a wife", was in use till the end of the middle 
3
ages. Marriage by consideration prevailed among the early
Slavs, and among the Southern Slavs Westermarck notes that
4it partially prevailed until fairly recently. In Serbia, 
at the beginning of the ninth century, the price for 
girls reached such a height that Black George is said to
5
have limited it to one ducat.
The ancient Celts also paid a price for their 
brides. In Ireland the price usually consisted of cattle 
to which the bridegroom and his family, as well as his 
neighbours, subscribed. A caution was taken from the groom 
for restitution in case the bride died childless within a 
certain date, limited by agreement, and if this event 
occurred, every manfs beast had to be restored to him.
Brides were purchased in seventh century Britain,
7
as is revealed by the Laws of Wessex, and Trevelyan, the 
English social historian notes that, in the middle ages, 
usually thought of as a period of chivalry and love, the 
choice of partners for marriage had normally nothing what­
ever to do with love. He says:
"...often the bride and bridegroom were small children 
when they were pledged for life, and even if adults, 
they were sold by their parents to the highest
1. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op.cit.,Vol.II, 
p.411; Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit.,p p .225-228.
2. Laws of King Aethelbirht, chpt.7; see Diamond, op.cit., 
pp.224-226; Westermarck, op.cit.tp.4l2; Goodsell, op.cit., 
pp.198-199.
3. Westermarck, op.cit.,p.412; Goodsell, op.cit.,p.199.
4. Westermarck, op.cit., p.413.
5. Ibid., p.4l3;see also Goodsell, op.cit., p.199 - "In 
Saxon law in the early 9th century women were sought 
in marriage for 300/."
6. See Thurneysen, Studies in Early Irish Law, op.cit., p.127; 
Arensberg and Kimball, '*The Small Farm Family in &ural 
Ireland” in Sociology of the Family, edit* by M.Anderson, 
op.cit., p.32; Westermarck, op.cit., pp.413-414.
7. See 0*Faolain and Martines, op.cit. ,p.101; see also 
Vinogradoff, op.cit., Vol.I, p .252.
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bidder...If the victim destined for the altar resisted, 
rebellion was crushed - at least in the case of a 
daughter or female ward — with physical brutality 
almost incredible”.-^
These examples show that marriage by consideration 
was fairly universal, and this fact should be borne in mind 
in any consideration of the future of dowry in Africa in 
general, and in Nigeria in particular. Simons bewails the 
fact that South Africans generally are unaware of the 
historical parallels, as in his opinion, a knowledge of 
them might assist non-Africans to correct the wrong notions 
that they hold about the significance of dowry. He con­
cludes :
’’Africans too would benefit from a deeper insight 
into the antecedents of European marriage customs.
The recognition that lobola [dowry] is not a peculiarly 
African practice should enable them to be less sen­
sitive and on the defensive when discussing the 
institution. If they were to see it in its historical 
perspective, they might the more readily realize that 
lobola belongs to an archaic type of marriage.and is 
unsuited to the needs of a progressive community” .2
9. Dowry and the Status of Women
What effect has the system of payment of dowry on
the status of women? Many writers and others refer to the
system as one of purchase of women, dowry being the price
paid. Adherents of this viewpoint regard women subject to
the dowry system as chattels or property offered to the
■3
highest bidder. The opinion that women are property to be 
purchased is not supported by the evidence of the operation 
of the dowry system in traditional societies. In addition
1. Trevelyan, English Social History, op.cit., pp.64-65.
2. Simons, African Women, op.cit., p.87.
3. For views for and against marriage by consideration, see 
Richard Thurnwald, Black and White in East Africa,
(London: Routledge and Sons Ltd. 1935), p.l47; Radcliffe 
Brown and Forde, 0£.cit.,pp.46-47; Phillips, Survey of 
African Marriage, o£. cit.,pp.360-370; Obi, Ibo Law of 
Property, op.cit.,pp.186-187; Mudiaga Odje, The Law of 
Succession in Southern Nigeria and Special reference to 
the Mid-Western Region, Ph.D. dissertation, University
of London, 19&5, pp.268-269; Coker, Family Property Among 
the Yorubas, op.cit.,p. 53; Basden, Niger Ibos, op.ci t ., 
pp.2l7-2l8; Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit., pp.226-228; 
Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit., p
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to the fact that the principle, of sale as a commercial 
transaction was unknown in the self-sufficient domestic 
economy of pre-literate peoples,^* there is no evidence 
that Nigerian husbands, even in the earliest period of 
their known history, ever had the power of life or death 
over their wives. There is no evidence that they had the
2
legal right to dispose of their wives by sale or otherwise,
a power illegally exercised by Englishmen as late as the
nineteenth century.
Although Nigerian husbands generally had a
limited right of chastisement in relation to their wives,
excessive brutality could result in the removal of a wife
A
from her husband1 s home by her family. There is, therefore, 
no justification to regard women as the property of their
5
husbands, bought by the payment of dowry. .
It has been seen that, in most communities in 
traditional society, payment of dowry was in the nature of 
a token of the value of a woman, and an appreciation of the 
care and expense involved in rearing her. The occasional 
labour services, and relatively small amount of farm produce 
given to the parents of the bride by the bridegroom could 
not be justifiably regarded as a price paid for her.
1. See Diamond, Primitive Law, op.cit., p. 226.
2. See Obi, Ibo Law of Property, op.cit., p. 186; Uchendu, 
"Concubinage Among I^gwa Igbo", op.cit., p.189; but see 
Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., pp.216, 218; 
"An Idoma husband could sell an unfaithful wife into 
slavery if, on the dissolution of marriage she fails to 
refund his bride price".
3. See Braddock, The Bridal Bed, o£.cit.,pp.155-157;
The Times 17 March, 179b, mentions the sale by John Lees 
of his wife for sixpence. MAt a sale attended by hundreds 
of people at Dudley in 1859, the highest bid was six­
pence. Three years later, at Selby, Yorkshire, the price 
of a pint of beer was the best offer made...Even these 
prices, low though they were did not touch rock bottom, 
for at Alfreton, in 1882, the price of a glass of common 
ale was accepted, so eager apparently was the husband to 
get rid of his spouse". See also Thomas Hardy Mayor 
of Casterbridge (London: Reprint, 1964)*
4. See Obi, Law of Property, op.cit.,p.186, and below, 
Chapter VIII.
5. See Ogongo v.Aseke.le and Anor.r 19671 N.M.L.R.21; Seberu 
v. Sunmonu [1957J £ F.S.C. 35, 54. _
6. See above,pp. 459 et.al.
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However, the present level of dowry operating 
in some societies in Nigeria, and the temptation it offers 
to unscrupulous parents to sacrifice their daughters wel­
fare in exchange for a high dowry payment, increasingly 
gives the system the appearance of a sale, justifying the 
criticism of "wife-purchase11.
Writing in 1958, Basden expressed the opinion that
it was within the hounds of possibility that, within the
next few years, dowry as such will be abandoned by Igbo
communities.^ Sixteen years later, the Bride Price
Committee reported that everywhere they went they made the
suggestion that the payment of dowry should be abolished
altogether. A few of the educated men and women agreed
with the idea : the "vast majority received the suggestion 
2
with horror".
In fact, Mr. J.A. Ekpe, one of the members of 
Parliament who opposed the Limitation. o.f Dowry Bill in 
the Eastern House of Assembly, stated that he had been 
asked by the people of his constituency to oppose the Bill. 
As several of the reasons he gave for his objections are 
relevant to this discussion, his speech on the second 
reading of the Bill are set out at some length:
"Mr. Speaker, I must oppose this Bill because I have 
been asked by my people to oppose it. After the 
release of the Report of the Bride Price Commission 
I went round my constituency and read to them the 
recommendations of the Committee and my people were 
alarmed. They said they could never agree to the 
Regional Government coming to meddle with the 
marriage system. Sir, marriage as we all know is as 
old as man, in fact it is older than Government, and 
this Bill, if it is passed, will disrupt our local 
customs and traditions.
The Bill is premature. We have not yet reached 
the stage when we can regulate bride price in our 
community.
The very fact that the Minister stipulates the 
amount of money to be paid for a bride really shows 
that he admits the principle of bride price which in
1. Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,pp.217-218; Contrast the 
opinion of Lord Lugara expressed at the beginning of the 
present century: "so engrained and so universal is the 
conception of wife-purchase that I fear it will be long 
before the progress of education will effect the emanci­
pation of women", Political Memoranda,1906, op.cit.,p.250; 
See also Ward, Marriage Among the Yorubas, op.cit., p.21.
2. See Bride Price Committee Report, 1954, op.cit., p.8.
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a civilised nation should be abhorred. How does the 
Minister arrive at £30, as the price for a bride?
What is the basis? How does he arrive at that? It 
seems unscientific.
Again, Sir, the Bill emphasises money, as if it were 
the main aim of marriage. Another wicked thing that 
the Bill does, Sir, is to make us regard our daughters 
as interest on investment. Marriage becomes investment 
and daughters become interest. Such a thing should be 
discouraged by Government. Its outlook is wild, Sir.
It now appears that if I marry a wife, that is an 
investment. If I have a daughter she begins to yield 
interest, and the interest on my one daughter is £30; 
if I have two - £60; and if I have three - £90 
interest. I think that is not moral at all, Sir” .
The Bill, as I have said, is premature. If we are 
convinced that we want to adopt the English system of 
marriage let us wait for a time when we shall say so 
and abolish bride prices altogether.
There is another point. There is no half and half 
measure. Marriage is a holy institution and this 
Government cannot meddle with it. We still have in 
our community, Sir, some old men and old women who 
still expect and take the whole of their future sub­
sistence on the daughters they have.
Now by stipulating or laying down the exact amount 
of money to be paid we are going to increase the 
difficulties. In fact, we are going to drive marriage 
underground and bring about a black market in marriage 
- that is what is going to happen. As my honourable 
Friend from my division has rightly pointed out, if the 
Government says you must pay £30 for a bride and I 
cannot afford to pay the £30, certainly what I am going 
to do is to try and find a way of eloping with a 
girl"
Some of the points mentioned in this speech will 
be discussed later, but it is pertinent to note that the 
economic aspect of the system loomed large, and the chief 
objection seems to be the economic loss to the parents 
if dowry level is fixed.2
Thirty-nine years after Basden made his prognosis 
of the abolition of dowry, and twenty-three years after the
1. Parliamentary Debate, Eastern House of Assembly, Official 
Report, Vol. II, 28 March, 1956, p.675.
2. See Childs, "Christian Marriage in Nigeria", op.cit., 
p.243: the dowry system "tends to put too much emphasis 
on the money side, and while money must be considered 
under any system, it is most undesirable that it 
should take a large part".
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Bride Price Committee1s Report, the present writer found 
the same measure of opposition to the abolition of dowry- 
experienced by Basden and the Bride Price Committee.
During field-work, informants, particularly women, and 
older Igbo men, gave a variety of reasons for the 
retention of the dowry system. The reason which appeared 
most frequently was the economic reason - that dowry com­
pensated parents for the time and money spent in bringing 
up their daughters. Appreciation for the bride,that the 
husband would know the value of the girl, and erase the 
idea that women were obtained cheaply - ranked high in 
the answers given by women; while the fact that dowry 
commands the respectful obedience of the wife, and enables 
the husband to control her, was foremost in the replies 
given by men. The commercial aspect also appeared in the 
opinion that dowry demonstrates the wealth of the parties 
concerned, and gives prestige and high status to both 
families - the paying and the paid. In the religious 
sphere, it was said to be necessary to appease the God of 
marriage, while legally, it was the opinion of all inter­
viewees that dowry was essential to make the marriage valid 
and to distinguish it from concubinage.
Informants stress the fact that the payments are 
only a token, or a formality, and can in no way be equated 
with purchase of the woman as such. One is tempted to ask 
if it is only a token why different amounts are asked for, 
and paid, in accordance as to whether a girl is illiterate, 
ugly, or comes from a poor family, or whether she is 
educated, beautiful or is the daughter of a prestigious 
family?'*' In modern Nigeria, possession of education 
increasingly qualifies for a higher level of dowry payment 
in some areas.
One may also ask, if dowry is merely a token, 
why is it repayable, and in some societies, the amount paid
1. See Nsugbe, Ohaffia, op.cit.,p.82; Bride Price Committee 
Report, op.cit., p p .10 et,al; Uka, op.cit., p.l6 
Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit., p.26.
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is doubled on repayment, ^  despite years of marriage 
life, and regardless of the wear and tear suffered by 
the wife in the process of child-bearing?
Nsekero, in his article, "The Nature and Function 
of Marriage-Gifts" states:
"To the traditional African mind the bride*s rep­
roductive capacity is so valuable that its 
acquisition needs some recompense, token and 
merely symbolic though this may be".2
If this is so, why in many societies in Nigeria does a 
woman, long past child-bearing age, have to refund the 
"token? What is dowry a token of - respect, appreciation 
or friendship between the families of the spouses? Why 
then does the appreciation, respect or friendship dis­
appear on the death of a woman* s husband, and she can be 
cruelly hounded by his relatives for the refund of dowry, 
as was done in Osiekiyovwe and Anor. v. Akporuvbeku.
Whatever the nature of dowry in traditional 
society may have been, undoubtedly, in many areas of 
Nigeria today, it has deteriorated to simple bargaining, 
no different from the transactions conducted by the 
ordinary housewife daily in the markets, except that the 
subject of the haggling over price is not foodstuff, or 
clothes, but women, the cornerstones and foundation of any 
nation.
The evils of the dowry system.
The evils and injustices wrought on women by 
the present system of dowry are many, but a few examples 
will illustrate some of the difficulties women are con­
fronted with because of the laws relating to the payment 
and refund of dowry.
1. See further above,p .484, n. 3; see also Talbot, Tribes of 
the Niger Delta, op.cit.,p.!80: "among Owerri if a 
girl ran away from her betrothed, the latter could 
claim back double dowry"; refund of twice the amount 
of dowry paid is also a.recognized method of divorce 
among some communities in the Northern States, see 
Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., p.218.
2. Nsekero, op.cit.^.103; Cf. "Rattray, Ashanti Law and 
Constitution" (.London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 
p.24: "all that is bought and sold is a sexual
footnotes 2 and 3 continued.......
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Among the disadvantages inherent in the present 
dowry system may be mentioned the following:-
(a) it jeopardises women1s opportunity for marriage and
encourages prostitution;
CD it lowers women*s opportunity to have a free choice
of spouse;
(c) it may be confused with sale of women and is conducive
to slavery;
(d) it produces an adverse psychological effect on some
husbands;
(e) it is conducive to hostilities between families and
often results in endless claims and counterclaims;
CD it robs many women of the custody of their children;
(s) it hinders women from divorcing xmdersirable
husbands.
CD Jeopardy of marriage opportunities: The Bride Price
Committee reported that the high level of dowry in the 
former Eastern Region of Nigeria was responsible for a 
fall in morality. Both men and women are forced to 
remain single long past the usual marriage age because the 
man cannot afford the high dowry demanded. In some areas, 
it was alleged, girls flocked to the towns to practise 
prostitution when they failed to get married in their 
villages
There is evidence that high dowries prevent 
young men from marrying. Many men have to work for years 
in order to accumulate the high sums demanded. Some men 
who dare to borrow money in order to get married spend a 
large proportion of their married lives paying interests 
to unscrupulous money-lenders. Egwuonwu, writing on 
marriage problems in Nigeria, gives an eye-witness account
Footnotes 2 and 5 continued...
2.... prerogative, coupled with the benefit of her services 
and later those of her children, the last two within 
strictly defined limits.
5. [1975] Law Notes and Review, 1973, No. 1; for facts of
this case, see below, Chapter VIII, p. 696.
1. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.6.
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of a young man!s property being auctioned to the public 
three months after his marriage* He had borrowed money 
to finance the dowry and wedding ceremony expenses, but 
unfortunately lost his job soon after.^
In the process of field-work for this thesis, 
the present writer had the opportunity of talking to many 
young people in different parts of the country. Quite a 
few of the young men stated that they simply could not 
afford to get married, after years of government and other 
employment, because of the prohibitive costs involved. 
Undoubtedly, the high level of dowry remains the chief 
single reason for enforced bachelorhood, with its 
attendant temptations. The insistence of dowry as a 
legal essential of marriage results in many beautiful 
girls "becoming financially shipwrecked on the island of 
non-matrimony'1
(11) Restriction of the free choice of spouse
The dowry system encourages parents to wed their 
daughters to the highest bidder, with little regard for 
the happiness of their daughters. Choice of spouse becomes 
largely a matter of who can afford to pay the dowry 
demanded - a sure recipe for mismating and resultant 
disaster in marriage. This is clearly illustrated by the 
case of Ubuku v. Ubeku.
A
The evidence in Ubeku v. Ubeku revealed that 
the two parties were never in love. In fact the respondent 
had been in love with someone else before she was approached 
by a cousin of the petitioner, on his behalf. She did not 
know the petitioner until after he had paid some money to 
her parents as dowry. It was then that she went to Lagos 
and saw the petitioner for the first time. The petitioner
1. Anikputalu Dike Egwuonwu, Marriage Problems in Nigeria. 
(Nigeria: Ijideani Publisher, 19y5), p.^5.
2. See Euna E. Amechi, "The Legal Rights of Women in 
Nigeria in Relation to the Law of Property", in A Year 
to Remember. Papers delivered at a Symposium, University 
of Nigeria, Nsukka, May, 1975.
5. [1968] 2 All N.L.R. 180.
4. Ibid.,p.180.
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was in very good employment and was in search of a woman 
who could enhance his social position. The respondent 
was a very pretty girl and it was the opinion of the Judge 
that the petitioner must have paid a handsome sum for her. 
Evidence advanced by both parties showed that the marriage 
broke down completely within a short time. The wife 
alleged that she was subjected to a series of indignity 
including severe beatings in order to compel her obedience. 
Commenting on the case the Judge said:
"This is an unfortunate case but as long as the system 
of marriage by payment of dowry without any basis of 
love between the parties continues, there would 
continue [to be] a breaking up of homes because the 
present day educated Nigerian woman would not stand 
up to a system that makes the husband the master in 
the home. It is however inequitable for a husband 
who has to pay a large amount of money as dowry, and 
in addition expend money on the merriments connected 
with the marriage ceremony, to agree to subject him­
self to a woman, who for all intents and purposes he 
had actually acquired for monetary consideration”
This statement emphasizes the psychological effect 
of payment of dowry, and leads to a discussion of another 
ill-effect of the dowry system.
(Ill) Psychological effect of the dowry system
Any man who has gone through years of scrimping 
and saving, depriving himself of essentials in order to 
amass the high sum of dowry demanded for his wife, invariably 
becomes the victim of an irresistible psychology which com­
pels him to regard her as an item of property. Freeman, in 
her article on dowry observes:
"When a man pays bride-price he tends to look on 
his new wife as property. She is in the same 
category as. his chairs, pots, goats or his clothes, 
part of his domestic equipment"^
Although Begho accepts this as true among the 
illiterates in the rural areas of Nigeria, he seems to deny
1. Ibid., p. 185.
2. Freeman, "The Psychology of Bride Price: The Voice of 
Eve, Nigerian Sunday Times, 13 May, 1956, p.7.
508
this attitude among the educated,*^. but Freeman maintains
that quite surprisingly, it is "very true not merely among
the unsophisticated masses in the rural areas, but almost
equally so among the more enlightened elements in the urban
areas", and that it is one of the most important factors
2
contributing to the break up of home and family life.
There is evidence that the psychological effect 
of payment of dowry is not confined to uneducated husbands. 
Many educated men believe that the earnings of their wives 
for whom they have paid a dowry, legally belongs to them. 
Any sums in excess of what they have paid, earned by the 
wife is regarded as interest on the capital expended.
Two cases illustrate the general tendency of Nigerian hus­
bands in this respect.
In Tagbo v. T a g b o the petitioner, a teacher, 
claimed that her husband, a barrister, suggested that she 
should assure him that she would pay over to him the salary 
she would earn as a teacher. When she pointed out that it 
was not proper to discuss such a subject while they were on 
their honeymoon, and especially since she had not yet 
found a job, the respondent nagged her and refused to speak 
to her. When she later refused to deposit her salary in 
his bank account as he requested, the respondent stopped 
her from working, and locked her up in a room for one week. 
He said that the purpose of the marriage had been defeated, 
since he came from a poor family, and was not interested in 
remaining married to a woman who wanted to spend her salary 
as she pleased. The petitioner alleged that as a result of
1. Begho, "Law and Culture...",1971* op.cit., p.57.
2. Freeman, "The Psychology of Bride Price", op.cit.,p.7.
5. See Ralph Linton, The Study of Man, op.cit., p.178; 
wives are a highly desirable form of interest bearing 
investment.
4. [1971] Suit No. 0/ID/71, unreported, Onitsha High Court.
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her refusal to hand over her salary, the respondent 
frequently beat her and refused to eat food prepared by the 
servants on the ground that he saw no reason why he should 
"waste his money in buying a woman”, and yet eat food 
prepared by servants. Because of his cruelty she was 
forced to leave the matrimonial home at one o ! clock in the 
morning. The husband, in his answer, stated that he wanted 
them to have a joint account^so that they can pay the 
expenses of his relations (as well as hers), who were 
studying at universities-. The wife was granted a divorce 
on the ground of her husbandTs cruelty.
In the second case, Henson v. Ekpo»^ the parties 
were Ibibios, married according to customary law. The 
wife claimed that the husband, a trader, drove her away 
from the matrimonial home allegedly because she was ”an 
aged woman not befitting him as a wife”. Attempts at 
reconciliation failed,and eventually the wife was granted 
a divorce. The husband then sued her for the salary she 
earned during the period after he had driven her away, but 
before she was granted the divorce. He claimed that during 
this period, although they were separated, she was still 
his lawful wife and therefore he was legally entitled to 
her salary. His claim was dismissed by the Customary 
Court on the ground that since he had driven his wife 
away and she refused to reconcile with him, he was not 
entitled to her salary. The judgment implied that if she 
was still living with him as his wife, he would have been 
entitled to her salary.
2
These are not isolated cases. They illustrate 
the attitude of many men towards the earnings of their 
wives. Many of the midnight beatings of wives at the
1. [1972] Suit No. 277/72/8361, unreported, Eket Customary 
Court, 23rd June, 1972.
2. See also Uwaemelulam v. Uwaemelum [1972] Suit No. AD/ID/72, 
unreported, High Court Aba, 1972, where.the petitioner 
alleged that all her marital troubles only began when
she refused to hand over her pay-packet to the husband, 
as usual. After her refusal,the slightest 
offence resulted in severe beatings from the husband, 
a Public Health Inspector; see the comments of Thompson,J. 
in Akinsemoyin v. Akinsemoyin [1971] N.M.L.R. 272 at 275.
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campus of the University of Nigeria are allegedly adminis­
tered by husbands whose wives are reluctant to. hand over 
their pay-packets intact. Some of these cases are so 
bizarre as to be almost unbelievable, but they portray 
the psychology inherent in the dowry system.1
(IV) The similarity between dowry payments and sale
In some cases, the dowry system is so similar to
a sale, that it is often difficult to distinguish whether
the transaction is a sale, or a genuine marriage. Such a
2
difficulty faced the Court in R. v. Akwari and Anor.
The accused, a brother and a sister, were jointly
charged with two counts of slave dealing, contra section
369(2) of the Criminal Code Act. Each of these counts
charged the accused jointly with transferring or taking a
girl in order that she should be held or treated as a slave.
In each case a marriage was proposed between the girl and
a relative of theirs. They persuaded the parents to allow
them to take the girl to meet the proposed husband. The
understanding was that the girl should be brought back
within a specified time, and if the intended bridegroom
was willing, dowry would then be fixed. In each instance
the girl was not returned to her parents. In fact, both
girls were never seen again. Neither girl was of marriageable
age,and no payment of dowry was made. Both transactions
were separate, though practically simultaneous. The
accused claimed that the girls were given in marriage by
their parents. Waddington, A.J., noted:
In slave-dealing cases where [the] subject is a 
girl [the] question almost always ..arises whether 
[the] transaction was a marriage or a sale, and it
1. Nigerian women often complain that foreign women
married to Nigerian men are generally treated better 
than they are. One reason for this may be the fact; 
that no dowry is usually paid for foreign wives.
2. [19^1] 16 N.L.R. 37.
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is often a matter of some difficulty to discern a 
definite dividing-line between the two.^
■ Both involve a money payment and a laxity in 
the observance of such ceremonial as attends a 
native marriage would result in there being little 
left to distinguish the transaction from a sale.
The importance of this point is that if the 
transaction must be held to be a sale, then the 
parents and others taking part would have to be 
held to be accomplices in a slave-dealing trans­
action. If, on the other hand, their intention is 
a bona fide marriage (whatever secret intention 
those who take the girl may have) then they are not 
accomplices.
In the present case this question must be decided 
for this purpose.
A suspicious feature is the presence of Irozuoke 
as witness to both marriages and there are other 
somewhat dubious features.
On the other side there is the important point 
that no money was paid in either case before the girl 
was handed over, and it is difficult to believe that 
the parents would have allowed the girls to go with­
out payment, if their intention had been a sale and 
not a marriage.
The evidence supports the theory that both were 
marriages - the presence of witnesses, the stipulation 
for the early return home, and so forth - and so I 
hold them to have been11^
The accused were found guilty of slave dealing.
In the debate on The Age of Marriage Law in the
Eastern House of Assembly, the Minister of Welfare, in
introducing the Bill noted that it is "well known to the
Police and Administrative Officers and others that there
are cases, which amount to slavery, which cannot be
prosecuted because the guilty party is able to claim that
3
the child he has bought as a slave is his wife”.
1. For a similar opinion, see Lugard, Political Memoranda, 
1906, op.cit., p.230.
2. R. v. Akwari and Anor. \ 194-11 16 N.L.R. 37 at p.41.
3. Parliamentary Debates, Eastern House of Assembly, 28 
March, 1956, p .&71.
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(V) The system results in hostility between families
Claims and counterclaims, which in some cases 
may be prolonged for years,^ often result in hostility 
and acrimony, not only between the spouses, but between 
their respective families. The girl's parents often threaten 
to remove their daughter from the husband*s house if he is 
slow in paying the balance of dowry. In a few cases, they
seize the children of the marriage if they are not paid.
Hostility more often occurs, however, when the dowry has
not been refunded on divorce, and this can often lead to
2
murder, as it did in the Queen v.Okoburu. In this case 
the accused returned home and found that his wife had left 
him and gone to the deceased with all her property. He 
demanded refund of his dowry of £79. 17. 3d, from the 
deceased. The deceased offered the sum of £10, at a 
meeting convened for the purpose by the elders of the town. 
This offer was refused by the accused, and he was supported 
by the elders to the extent that they warned the deceased 
that if he did not add another £25, the £10 he offered 
would be treated as "adultery fee” and the woman would be. 
returned to her husband. At a subsequent meeting, however, 
the elders changed their minds, and turned against the 
accused. A quarrel ensued,and the meeting dispersed without 
the accused getting his money or his wife. Later that 
night, the accused felt frustrated. He went and demanded 
his money directly from the deceased, and killed him when 
the latter failed to refund the dowry. Held: the taking
away of his wife by the deceased, the failure of the deceased 
to pay the dowry, and the change of attitude of the elders 
in favour of the deceased, amounted to provocation. Con­
sidering the standard of life of the accused, the Judge, 
Savage J., thought there was evidence of sufficient
1. See Suit No. 135/20, High Court Record, p.438, IBA.
Prof. 3/2 Civil Record Book, Register of Records of 
Appeals from Native Courts, 1942, Ibadan National 
Archives, where the Appellant appealed against the 
decision of the Bale Court which ordered him to refund 
dowry paid in 1922, on a girl who had died after the 
marriage, whose husband had died, and whose father who 
received the dowry had also died.
2. [1959] Charge No. P/14C/1959, unreported; High Court,
Port Harcourt, 1959.
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provocation to reduce the charge to manslaughter.
The other evils inherent in the laws governing 
the payment and refund of dowry will be examined in the 
next two following Chapters.^
10. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summary
Marriage by payment of dowry is contracted by the 
overwhelming majority of Nigerian couples. The most 
significant legal function of dowry is that it is an 
essential for the validity of most marriages contracted 
under customary law. In traditional society the payments 
took the form mainly of labour services rendered by the 
bridegroom accompanied by gifts of farm produce such as yams 
and corn, or fish, game or small domestic animals like goats 
or sheep. In a few communities, the level of dowry has 
remained relatively low, but in others, it has risen to 
such an extent that the system can justifiably be described 
as "wife-purchase11. Although the rises in the level of 
dowry payments may compare favourably with the rise in the 
general cost of living in Nigeria, the very fact that 
marriage payments are measured in terms of "cost of living" 
lend an economic flavour to the transactions which derogates 
from the idea that it is only a token of appreciation of 
the trouble and expenses involved in rearing the bride.
Legislative attempts to curb rises in the level 
of dowry have not been generally successful, and although 
women are the chief victims of the system, they are the most 
vociferous protesters against its abolition. There is no 
evidence that dowry will be voluntarily abolished in some 
communities, for example, the Igbos, in the foreseeable 
future.
1. See below, Chapter VII, pp.592-607 and Chapter VIII,
pp.695 et al.
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B. Conclusion and recommendations
Many people in Nigeria are hypersensitive about 
the payment of dowry and use emotive terms and reasons to 
justify its continuance. The dowry system, formerly 
practised by nearly all countries, and now rejected as an 
archaic type of marriage totally unsuitable to the moral 
ethos of a progressive society, however, is the greatest 
single factor contributing to the depression of the legal 
status of women in marriage.
Many of the social functions attributed to the 
payment of dowry in traditional societies, for example, 
the fact that dowry was responsible for the relatively 
stable marital relationship in traditional societies, no 
longer obtain in modern societies. The number of divorces 
in Nigeria testify to the fact that stability of a marriage 
cannot be ensured by the payment of money. The legal 
functions which still remain, and in some communities are 
rigorously applied, adversely affect the status of women in 
most cases. As shall be seen later, a woman for whom a high 
dowry has been paid may be unable to sever the legal bonds 
which tie her to an undesirable husband if she cannot afford 
to refund his dowry.^ As previously seen many other evils 
result from the dowry system, especially in relation to 
women. Should the dowry system be abolished? Hastings 
has correctly said that:
"When a system is recognized to be anachronistic and 
outmoded or has become evil to the core, why keep it 
with the excuse that it was better in another time?
As it is practised today in the Southern Cameroons 
and in certain other territories, the bride-price is 
a plague, an obstacle to the development of Africa.
It is illusory to try to correct the system with 
odds and ends".2
1. Madam Bardi, a wealthy business woman from Bendel State 
stated that while she was a prison wardress at a 
Government prison in Warri, most of the prisoners
"were women who had left their husbands and were serving 
sentences for not having returned their traditional 
marriage dowries". Many of these women were pregnant, 
see West Africa, 15 May, 1954, p.437.
2. Adrian Hastings, Church and Mission in Modern Africa 
(London: Burns and Oates Ltd., 1$67), p.185.
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There is no doubt that dowry should be abolished, 
but the pertinent question is, can it be effectively 
abolished?
The greatest obstacles to the abolition of dowry 
are the desire of parents to get as much dowry as they can 
from prospective sons-in-law, and the reluctance of women 
generally to even consider the abolition of dowry payments, 
for fear that their status will be endangered as a result 
Not many people object to dowry being fixed at a reasonable 
amount; M10, H15 and M20 have been most suggested, but every­
one admits that enforcement is difficult, if not impossible. 
Among suggestions made by informants, the cooperation of 
local chiefs and other traditional rulers in making and 
enforcing the laws relating to dowry seems most feasible.
The suggestion that all dowry should be paid through the 
medium of the courts, or the local traditional authority, 
and receipts obtained therefor, is worthy of note. None of 
these suggestions is foolproof.
The first step that Government should take is to 
render the payment of dowry legally ineffective by legis­
lation. In other words, the payment of dowry or other 
monetary consideration to the parents or legal guardian of 
a female person on account of her marriage should no longer 
be a legal necessity for a valid marriage in any system of 
law operative in Nigeria; neither should the refund of any 
property or money given be an essential of a valid divorce. 
The legal paternity of children should also be divorced 
from the payment of dowry, and no man should be entitled to 
claim legal paternity or custody of a woman’s children 
simply because he has paid dowry on her behalf} whether she 
has lived with him as his wife, or not. No action involving
1. See Binns, op.cit. ,p.195, who, writing of South Africa, 
notes: "It is the women themselves who prefer it and 
insist upon its maintenance"; see also Hilda Thurnwald’s 
observation in respect of women in East Africa - "The 
girls do not want to have all these customs abolished 
and are in favour of a rising bride-price which flatters 
their pride;" see also, Thurnwald, Black and White in 
East Africa, op.cit.,p.l48; Hastings, Church and Mission 
op.cit.,p,173.
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payment or refund of dowry, whether in contract, or other­
wise, should be entertainable by the courts. Payment of 
dowry need not be made illegal. At the present time, gifts 
including money are given to the bride by her family at the 
time of her marriage, but these gifts are not compulsory, 
neither do they have any legal effect on the validity of a 
marriage, or on the dissolution of, a marriage. The payment 
of dowry should have a similar status.
Money or other property contributed voluntarily 
by either family should be given to the spouses directly 
to enable them to have a good start in marital life, and 
should be the joint property of both spouses, except where 
given with specific conditions to the contrary. In the 
event of divorce, such joint property should be shared 
equally between the spouses. In the event of death of 
either party, the property should be shared by the surviving 
spouse and the children of the marriage if any.
B. Marriage Ceremonies
1. Introduction
There are wide variations in specific details of 
marriage ceremonies observed by the various Nigerian 
communities, many of which are non-legal in character. The 
main purposes of this discussion of marriage ceremonies are:
(I) to examine the extent to which marriage ceremonies may 
be indicative of womenfs status;
(II) to indicate the extent to which they are essential to 
the validity of a customary law marriage contracted by 
payment of dowry.
In view of the variations found even among sub­
groups of the same ethnic group, the marriage ceremonies 
currently observed by the Onitsha community will be des­
cribed. Although there may be differences in minor details, 
the basic pattern is similar to that which obtains among
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most of the other communities'^ where marriage payments, and 
the participation of both families are involved, and is not 
drastically different from the general pattern which obtains 
in traditional societies.
2. The Marriage Ceremonies
The ceremonies performed on the occasion of a 
marriage generally involve:
(I) betrothal or engagement ceremony;
(II) marriage ceremony;
(III) the ceremony of leading the bride home.
(1) The betrothal
In traditional society, a girl*s marriage was 
usually arranged by her parents, and the choice of spouse 
was mainly theirs. If the girl was old enough she would 
be consulted, but it was rare for a girl to choose her own 
prospective husband. The choice of spouse was generally 
made by the man*s family, especially his mother and other 
female relatives,who made behind-the-scene advances. 
Invariably, a middle-man was employed,whose role was to 
pilot the initial formal introduction between the families, 
and to take an active part in each step of the betrothal and 
marriage.
Nowadays, however, at least in Onitsha,young 
people, more often than not, choose their own spouses and, 
depending on the strictness of the family, have considerable 
freedom to associate with each other before their intention 
to get married is made known. When the couple decide to
1. For marriage ceremonies among the various Nigerian 
communities; see Elias, The Nigerian Legal System. 
o p .cit.. pp.292-295; Chukwudebe, Onitsha Quo Vadis, 
op.c i t ;., pp.31-54; Forde, Marriage and the Family"
Among the Yako. o^.cit.,pp72o-35; Talbot, The Peoples 
of Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,pp.443-443. et.al; Thomas, 
Anthropological Report...ibo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., 
Part I, p.b3 et.al; Welch, The Isoko Tribe, op.cit., 
p.171; Meek, Northern Tribe~o? Nigeria, op.citTT"Vol.II, 
p.98-102; Spdrndli, Marriage Customs Among the Ibos,
°P«cit»tPP« 116 et.al. t Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit. , 
pp.269-271; Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op.cit., 
pp.116-117. ------------------------  ---
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marry, the girlfs family would be approached and told of 
the boy’s intention to marry their daughter. The first 
formal approach is not usually made by the bridegroom him­
self, but by his parents or other responsible member of 
his family.'1' If the girl’s parents approve, a date is 
fixed for the formal betrothal.
On the appointed day, the man and his family, led 
by the Okpala (head of the family), and other senior members 
of the family, and a few close friends, take kola-nuts, two 
pots of palm wine and two bottles of gin to the house of the 
girl’s father. There they are welcomed by the girl’s family 
and presented with the customary kola-nuts. After they have 
partaken of the kola-nuts, the Okpala of the boy’s family 
formally state the object of their visit, and asks for the 
consent of the girl’s family to the proposed marriage. The 
presiding Okpala of the girl’s family calls her and tells 
her the object of the visit and asks her whether they 
should give their consent or not to the proposed marriage. 
She is given a glass of palm wine. She takes a sip of it 
and if she consents to the marriage, she then presents the 
remainder to the boy and he drinks from it also. If she 
does not consent she hands the cup back to the Okpala of 
her own family. Once the girl signifies her consent, the 
drinks and other things brought by the boy’s family are 
accepted and shared among the gathering. A part or the 
whole of the dowry is then paid, prayers are said, and 
good wishes for the prosperity and general welfare of the 
parties and their families expressed.
The importance of this ceremony, however, is the 
opportunity it gives for the girl to formally express her 
wishes and to withhold her consent if she does not agree 
to the choice of spouse. The formality is the same 
irrespective of the ages of the spouses. In some Igbo 
communities, this ceremony is held when the girl is an 
adult and can confirm or reject a match made on her behalf 
when she was a child. In other communities, however,
1. In some communities the ”middle-man” receives a fee for 
his services, see Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit., 
p.- 274; see further Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit.,
pp.215-216.
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for example in Onitsha, the consent ceremony is only per­
formed once, whatever the age of the girl.
(II) The marriage ceremony
The next important ceremony is the igo muo or 
actual marriage ceremony, usually performed the same day 
the bride is taken to her husband1s house. It is a simple 
ceremony. The families of both parties meet at the bride’s 
house and prayers are offered to God by the Okpala of each 
group, imploring his blessings for the prosperity and 
happiness of the spouses and the unity of the two families.
(III) The ceremony of leading the bride home
This ceremony is usually performed in the night 
of the same day the igo muo ceremony is performed. It 
consists of the formal delivery of the bride to the home of 
the bridegroom, and is referred to as idu uno (leading the 
bride to the man*s house). The bride is usually accompanied 
by all the young people of her village who sing and dance as 
they lead her to her new home together with all the gifts 
which have been given to her by members of her village, her 
immediate families and other friends. Unless the gifts are 
very heavy, or immovable, for example land, they are taken 
on the heads of the young people, each person taking as 
much as he or she can conveniently carry. One of the pur­
poses of this exercise is to give the village an opportunity 
to exhibit its wealth, evidenced by the quantity and quality 
of the bride's trousseau, and a car or. other . similar transport 
is never used to take these gifts, although at one idu uno 
ceremony witnessed by the present writer in Onitsha the 
gifts were loaded into open hand carts. Traditionally, the 
idu uno was performed in the night, but due to the 
opportunity it offered to the young people who participated 
in the taking home ceremony to misbehave, it is now the 
rule that the ceremony must be performed in the early 
evening between the hours of five and seven o'clock.
On arrival at the bridegroom*s home, the trousseau
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is placed where it can be seen and admired by the bridegroom1 s 
family and friends gathered for the occasion. Subsequently, 
the visitors are treated to kola-nuts, palm wine and other 
drinks, and tobacco or snuff. Speeches are made and prayers 
said, and the bride and bridegroom are given advice on the 
duties and rights of marital life.1
The Legal Significance of the Marriage Ceremonies
At what point of time is a customary marriage as 
described above legally contracted? Is it when the dowry 
is agreed on, partially paid, or fully paid, or when the 
marriage ceremony, or the leading home ceremony is actually 
performed, that a marriage is considered legally binding? 
The question is of vital importance to the legal status of 
women in marriage and in view of the conflicting academic 
and judicial opinions the position will be discussed as 
follows:
(a
(b
(c
(d
(A
among the Yorubas
among the Igbos
among the other communities
conflict in judicial opinions
Among the Yorubas
The majority opinion of academic writers on 
Yoruba customary law marriage suggests that once the con­
sents of the prospective spouses to the marriage, and the 
consents of their respective parents have been given, the 
performance of the betrothal ceremony, accompanied by the 
payment of some part of the dowry, constitutes a valid cus­
tomary marriage. In other words, the delivery of the bride 
to her husband or his family is not a legal essential of a 
marriage. The views of Fadipe,2 Ajisafe,^ and Ellis^to
1. See generally, Bosah, The History and Culture of 
Onitsha, op.cit., pp.122-125.
2. Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, op.cit., p.75.
5. Ajisafe,•Law and Customs of the Yoruba, op.cit., p.55.
4. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., p.184.
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this effect have been noted previously,^ Similarly,
Coker says:
"For our purpose it is sufficient to point out that 
the important essentials of a valid customary marriage 
are:
(a) the consent of the bride and her family, and
•(b) the giving and acceptance of the 'Ano' (dowry).
These two events are a sine qua non of a valid marriage 
under native law and custom and it is only when and 
after these functions are performed that a valid 
marriage is constituted;.. .the woman then becomes the 
wife of the man, and thus entitled under native law and 
custom to reside with him in the family house or com­
pound'1^
Delano, in his book The Soul of Nigeria, pointed out that the
payment of dowry is the legal culmination of the marriage,
but that the notoriety which usually accompanies the other
functions especially the public "taking homd' of the bride
gives to the whole event a social sanction which is univer-
3
sally acknowledged and respected.
These sentiments express the majority view as to
i±
the essentials of a valid marriage under Yoruba dustomary law.
5
In The Queen v. Uladejo, the accused was charged with 
abduction, rape and assault occasioning harm contrary to 
section 361, 358 and 355 respectively of the Criminal Code 
/ Act.^ The charges arose from the accused having allegedly 
lured the girl concerned out of her father's house, and 
bundled her into a waiting car, in the company of other lads.
1. See above, Chapter V, pp 378-379.
2. Coker, Family Property Among the foruba, op.cit., p.263.
3. Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, op.cit., pp.126-127; see 
also Obi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.,pp.l6l and 180, who 
lists "formal giving away’* of the bride as one of the 
essential requirements of a valid customary marriage.
4. For opinions to the contrary see, Elias, Nigerian Legal 
System, op.cit.,p.293; Ward, Yoruba Husband - Wife Code 
(Washington Catholic University of America, 1937), p.15.
5. [1959] W.R.N.L.R. 181.
6. Cap 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
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He covered the girl's face with a cloth and took her to his 
house where he had sexual intercourse with her. Subsequently, 
he also took her to two other towns where sexual intercourse
between him and the girl also took place, allegedly against
her will on all.occasions.
In his defence, the accused alleged that he had
paid consent money^ and dowry on the girl and had given her
presents of money and other articles as his prospective wife. 
He argued that it was not against native law and custom for 
a husband to go to his wife's house and bring her to the 
matrimonial home himself. Both the girl and her father 
denied that any dowry had ever been paid by the accused. 
Taylor, J., held that whilst the native law and custom might 
be as the accused alleged, the fact remained that the 
accused had not satisfactorily explained why the girl had 
not been welcomed by someone at his house as he himself 
had deposed to be customary for a newly wedded wife arriving 
at the matrimonial home. The Judge stated that on the 
evidence there was no doubt that the accused without having 
paid any dowry on the girl did take her away by force and 
against her will with an intent of carnally knowing her, 
and he was therefore guilty of abduction contrary to 
section 561 of the Criminal Code Act. He was found not 
guilty of rape.
It is evident that the Judge in this case dis­
believed the accused's allegations that he had paid dowry 
on the girl's behalf, and that the girl had not been taken 
by force against her will. Had she consented to the 
abduction, a marriage by "mutual consent only", would have 
been validly contracted, whether dowry had been paid, or 
not, and irrespective of whether her father had consented, 
provided the girl was aged sixteen or above. Had dowry 
been paid and the girl's parents consented to the marriage 
and accepted the gifts-and dowry, it is submitted that the
1. "Consent money" refers to the money payment made by the 
bridegroom at the formal I.johun ceremony, when the bride 
and her parents are formally asked for their consent to 
the marriage; see Johnson, op.cit., p.114; Fadipe, 
op.cit., pp.72-73.
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fact that she was not taken to the husband*s home by her 
own relatives in the manner customary among the Yorubas, 
or that she was not welcomed by the man’s family when she 
was taken to his home would have no effect on the legal 
validity of the marriage.
The legal essentials of a Yoruba customary 
marriage contracted by payment of dowry may be summed up 
as:
(I) the consents of the prospective spouses;
(II) for a previously unmarried girl, the consent of the 
bride*s parents;
(III) payment of a part o the whole of the agreed dowry, 
a promise to pay, or a waiver of payment by the 
bride’s family.^*
If the girl has been previously married,all that 
is necessary for a subsequent marriage are the consents of 
the spouses, and the refund of the former husband’s dowry to 
him, or if he is dead, to his family. The taking home 
ceremony is not legally essential, although it has 
evidentiary value, and in fact, is performed once only for 
any woman.
B. Among the Igbos.
Writing in 1938, Basden categorically states 
as follows:
’’Nowadays, a girl is said to be engaged and the 
term covers the period between the payment of 
the first instalment of the bride-price and the 
last, that is, the day when the marriage contract 
is fulfilled. Under Ibo law and custom, the girl 
is technically the man’s wife from the moment the 
first payment is accepted by the parent or guardian...
1. Contrast, the view of Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, 
op.cit.,p.293: "the ’dowry* is the deciding factor, 
but its mere settlement does not clothe the contract 
with legal validity. The notoriety of the public act 
of the marriage ceremony would seem to be inseparable 
from the legal incident of the marriage payment, since 
the people look upon the subsequent event as indispensable 
to a properly solemnized marriage” .
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..In the eyes of the people they are legally man and 
wife"
It is difficult to say what the writer specifically 
meant by this statement, but insofar as it would suggest that 
the couple are legally man and wife when a part of the dowry 
has been paid, presumably at the betrothal ceremony, it is 
not supported by evidence, at least as far as Onitsha is 
concerned. In Onitsha, a marriage is legally valid only when 
the ceremony of igo muo or igo mmuo ina uno (the asking for 
the permission of the Okpala and the family for the girl to 
go and live with the husband and his family) is performed. 
Before this ceremony the man has certain rights, for example 
the right to claim the legal paternity of the children 
begotten by the girl for another man, if he has paid the 
dowry, or even a part of it. But he has no right to con­
summate the marriage before this ceremony. On the other 
hand,, once this ceremony is performed, whether the marriage 
is subsequently consummated or not, or whether the girl is 
formally taken to the man*s home, is legally irrelevant to 
the validity of the marriage.
This point was clearly brought home in a case in 
which the present writer participated during field-work in 
Onitsha. The betrothal ceremony had been performed,and the 
dowry paid in full when certain difficulties arose, and the 
girlfs family were debating as to whether to continue with 
the proposed marriage or not. The elders of the family 
stated that she was not yet legally married^ and if the 
union was broken off at that point, she would not be regarded 
as a previously married girl, but if the igo muo ceremony was 
performed, she would be a divorcee if the union was ended 
subsequently, even if the final ceremony of idu uno (taking 
the bride home) was not performed. The girl was warned to
make up her mind one way or the other before the igo muo
1. Basden, Niger Ibos. on.cit.. p.219; cf. Jordan, Bishop 
Shanahan, op.cit.,p.220; a girl was not considered fully 
married in Ibo law until the final instalment of the bride- 
price was paid at a great festival which included large 
quantities of palm-wine"; see also Sporndli, op.cit.,
p.117; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit.. p.180.
2. See Chukwudebe, Onitsha Quo Vadis, op.cit., p.51-32;
Bosah, Groundwork of "the tiistory ancL Culture of Onitsha, 
op.cit.,p.l24-iz5.
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ceremony was performed.
Some writers^ assert that the girl legally
hecomes the man's wife once the Inu mmanya (presentation
of palm wine and gin) ceremony involving the payment, or
promise of payment, of dowry, has been performed. This
conclusion is based on the fact that the man is legally
entitled to all children borne by the girl from this time,
whether he is the genitor of such children or not. But
legal paternity of children in customary law is not always
dependent on a valid marriage. For example, a man may pay
a sum of money and become the legal father of a child
begotten for him by an unmarried woman. In other words,
2
he can legitimize a child not born in lawful wedlock.
The Customary Law Manual, 1977, states that
betrothal entitles the man to live with the woman as
husband and wife in about sixteen of the thirty-nine
Divisions in Anambra and Imo States, including Onitsha
Division. Whatever may have been the traditional customary
law in Onitsha, it is clear that this is not the law at the
present time. In fact, all Onitsha older informants deny
that this was ever the law. They maintain that the igo
muo ceremony must be performed before a man has a legal
right to live with a girl as husband and wife.
The provisions of the Customary Law Manual in this
respect seem inconsistent. For example, section 286 states:
”When a woman is betrothed to a man, the legal effects 
are as follows:-
(1) The man is free to live with the woman as husband 
and wife inAfikpo Division, Mbaloye and Mbanasa 
clans of Aguata Division, Arochukwu Division 
excluding Ihechiowa clan, Etiti, Ezeagu, Ezzikwo, 
Igbo-Eze, Ihiala, Mbano, Nnewi, Ossomari in 
Ogbaru, Oguta, Okigwe, Onitsha, Oru, Owerri,
Udi and Uzo-Uwani Divisions.
He has no such freedom in other places”.
Section 312, however, provides:
” (1) A formal handing over of the bride to the bride­
groom or his family is necessary for a valid 
marriage.
1. See e.g. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit., 
p .^+5.
2. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit., pp.316-318.
5 2 6
Local variations - This is neither nor usually
done in Afikpo clan of Afikpo Division, Etiti, 
Ishielu, Mbano and Ogbaru Divisions."
It would seem from these two statements that in 
some Divisions, for example, Onitsha, Okigiwe and Owerri 
Divisions, although a man has the legal right to live with 
his ’’betrothed" as man and wife, the parties are not legally 
married until the betrothed girl has been formally handed 
over to him or his family. Consequently, the man who asserts 
his legal right and lives as man and wife with his betrothed 
who has not been formally handed over to him, is living 
with a woman to whom he is not legally married - a sort of 
legally recognized concubinage. Such a law does not obtain 
at Onitsha at the present time, and it is doubtful whether 
it ever did.
It is not possible to state precisely when a 
marriage is actually contracted among the Igbos, in view of 
the wide variations which exist among the different groups. 
For example, an essential of marriage in Ogidi is the making 
of a small gift known as the "uku-itor". It is usually in 
the form of a token payment of three pence and its acceptance 
by the girl signifies her consent. It is. usually given 
after a substantial part of the dowry has been paid, and 
thereafter the girl goes to live permanently in the bride­
groom’s house. ^
C . Among other communities
The precise point at which a marriage is con­
tracted among the other Nigerian communities is not very 
clear. Among the Ibibios, Forde and Jones state that the
dowry had formerly to be completed before the marriage was 
2
consummated, while Talbot asserts that the "marriage takes 
place on the day of leaving the fatting-house for the last 
time, and, in some parts, after a separate gift called
1. See Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p.11.
2. See Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, 
op.cit., p.77.
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!The He-goats Entry1 has been made by the fiance”.^ Among
Oron Ibibio, Lieber records that the initial bride payment
(okuk unyime nlo) is in essence the marriage contract,
although the bride does not usually join her husband until
2
after the fattening and circumcision rites are performed.
Among the Efiks, Lieber notes as follows:
"Before both families agree that the prospective 
partners can make a go of it they investigate 
each otherTs origin, parentage and character.
Should the prognosis for a marital union be good 
the young man proceeds to deluge the family of 
his prospective bride with gifts of assorted drinks, 
cloths for dresses, and money. These gifts having 
been accepted, the young woman is considered to be 
married but does not yet join her husband in his home"
4
These and other evidences suggest that the payment
of the dowry is the essential legal element of a valid
marriage according to Ibibio customary law in general, 
although the marriage is not very often consummated until 
after the fattening and circumcision ceremonies.
An old account of marriage among the Benins
states:
"There is no marriage ceremony. A young man desirous 
of getting married demands the girl from her parents 
who rarely refuse; he gives them one or several 
pieces of cloth and takes his wife home. If she be 
too young, and show no sign of puberty, the husband 
confines her to the supervision of the women, who 
notify him when the marriage should be consummated, 
which is at the age of eleven or twelve years".^
This description suggests that the marriage is contracted 
by payment of dowry and the handing over of the bride to her 
husband. This accords with the account given by Thomas of
1. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op.cit., p.451. 
Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, op.cit., p.204.
2. Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages, op.cit., p.61.
5. Ibid. p .18.
4. See generally, Cotton, "The Calabar Marriage Law and 
Custom", op.cit.,p.427; Bride Price Committee Report, 
op.cit.,pp.41-42.
5. Roth, Great Benin, op.cit..p.58.
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an Amoya (big-dowry) marriage among the Northern Edo- 
Speaking Peoples in 1910. "An Amoya wife is acquired at 
Fuga (Avianwu) when she is only four or five years old; 
the husband pays her father £5 or less and takes her away 
without ceremony. She is brought up in his household"^ 
Egharevba, on the other hand, states that the wedding 
ceremonies among the Binis generally last for a period of
2
about one week before the bride is delivered to her husband.
Among the Isokos, Welch notes that the betrothal 
ends with the puberty rites of circumcision, when the dowry 
must be paid in full. He says:
"The girl is then led at night to the house of the 
husband by four relations from her father !s side 
and three from her mothers;.. .The next day comes 
the final token of her break from her old life, 
when her parents send messengers bearing her domestic 
utensils, and, after accepting them, she is hence­
forth a wife11. ^
4In view of the varying practices relating to 
wedding ceremonies, no general principle can be confidently 
stated, except that most communities regard the payment of 
the dowry as the legal essential of the marriage, although 
in almost all cases the bride is formally handed over to 
the husband before the marriage is consummated.
4. Conflict in Judicial Decisions
There is considerable conflict of judicial 
decisions on the precise moment when a customary marriage 
can be regarded as legally valid. For example, in
5
Ogunremi v. Ogunremi, the evidence given on behalf of both 
parties to the suit was that after payment of dowry, "the
1. Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Edo-Speaking 
Peoples, op.cip., p.55-5b.
2. Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op.cit.,p.17*
3. Welch, The Isoko Tribe, op.cit.,p.!71.
4. See generally, Ottenberg, "The Afikpo Ibo of Eastern 
Nigeria", op.cit.,p.2Q; Thomas, Anthropological Report
of the Edo-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., Part I, p.48:
"It is difficult to say which part, if any, is regarded 
as essential - payment of bride price is undoubtedly the 
important feature".
5. [1971] U.I.L.R., 466.
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girl is regarded as married to the man and both of them
could do what they liked with themselves11. This evidence
was accepted by Craig, J., as correctly representing Yoruba
customary law. A similar decision was reached in Re Spenser
and Boyle.^ In this case, a caveat was entered tyr the
caveatrix against the proposed marriage between the
applicant, S.A. Spencer and Wilhemina Boyle on the ground
that the caveatrix and the applicant had contracted a valid
and subsisting customary law marriage. It was held that the
caveat ought to remain because, although the applicant
stated that he was tricked into going to live with the
caveatrix, whom he said he never had the intention to marry
because she was ten years his senior, he had paid £20 dowry
to the brother of the caveatrix. This payment constituted
a lawful marriage according to Benin law and custom. Since
the parties were already living together the symbolic act
of handing the bride over to her husband was unnecessary.
2
In Opanum v. Okpanum as previously noted, 
parental consent, mutual agreement of the parties, coupled 
with payment of dowry constituted a valid customary marriage 
according to Igbo customary law.
■3
In Ayorinde v. Aina however, it was held that 
the bride must be formally handed over to the bridegroom 
or his family in order to create a valid marriage under 
Yoruba native law and custom as it obtains in Lagos. This
4
case followed the decision in Beckley v. Beckley and Anor. 
in which it was held that the idana or betrothal ceremony 
among the Yorubas did not constitute a valid marriage 
according to customary law, and that there must be, in
addition, an actual delivery of the girl to her husband*s
5
home. This decision has been criticized by legal writers
1. [1964] 2 All N.L.R. 171.
2. [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 561.
5. [1964] L.L.R. 71.
4. [1945] 17 N.L.R. 59.
5. See e.g. Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, 
op.cit.,pp.82-85♦
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on Yoruba customary law and is directly contrary to the 
earlier decision of Savage v. McFoy^ in which the essentials 
of a valid Yoruba marriage by payment of dowry was stated as
the consent of the girl and her family, the consent of the 
bridegroom and the presentation and acceptance of the ano 
(dowry). Nothing was stated about the delivery of the 
bride to her husband.
2
Beckleyfs case was followed in Egri v. Uperi,
a case concerning Isoko customary law, and also in
3
Ikedingwu v. Okafor, a case involving Igbo customary law,
where it was held:
,!When parties contemplate marriage under customary 
law and part of the dowry is paid, the girl is 
loosely regarded as having been married to the man 
who paid or on whose behalf such payments were made, 
but until the girl according to custom is taken to 
the home of the man and there is cohabitation, the 
marriage is not complete11.
This decision introduced a new dimension to the
requirements of a valid customary marriage - cohabitation.
The learned Judge, Mbanefo, C.J., did not define cohabitation
but in view of a similar decision in a later Supreme Court
case it is necessary to examine the necessity of cohabitation
as an essential of a valid customary marriage.
Cohabitation:
L
In the recent case of Osamwonyi v. Osamwonyi, the 
Supreme Court approved the finding of the trial Judge that 
under Benin customary law, payment of dowry alone does not 
constitute marriage; there must be cohabitation as well.
The Court did not define cohabitation. The dictionary 
meaning of cohabit is lfto live together11. "Cohabitation” 
as used in a matrimonial sense means to dwell together as 
husband and wife. Matrimonial courts make a very plain 
distinction between matrimonial cohabitation and matrimonial
1. [1909] RennerTs Gold Coast Report, 504.
2. [1974] E.C.S.L.R.
3. [1966-1967] 10 E'#,.L.R. 178.
4. [1972] U.I.L.R. 527.For the facts of this case see above
p . 442.
5» The Concise Oxford Dictionary. 6th Edit.
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intercourse. Although invariably combined, one may exist 
without the other. For cohabitation to exist, therefore, 
the parties must have lived together as husband and wife.^ 
Must the parties to a customary marriage- actually 
live together as husband and wife before the marriage is 
considered legally valid? With due respect it is sub­
mitted that the suggestion is a startling one, and is not 
supported by evidence, at least, insofar as it relates to
marriage among the Igbos, Yorubas, Ibibios, Benins, and
other main ethnic groups. There are a few communities
among the Igbos, where a "trial marriage" operates,, and a
betrothed woman lives in her "betrothed*s house for a period
of time, which may be years, before finally deciding whether
her parents should accept the dowry or not to convert the
2
union into a marriage, but in the overwhelming majority of
Igbo communities "cohabitation” is not a legal essential of
a valid marriage. In fact the Customary Law Manual states
specifically as follows:-
314. Cohabitation -
" (1) It is not necessary for a man and woman to live 
together as husband and wife before a valid 
marriage can exist between them. A man and a 
woman can validly marry each other even if they 
have never met, and their marriage may subsist 
even if they never consummate it".
No exceptions to this law are stated.
A similar law applies to the other main Nigerian
tribal groups, and a marriage by proxy is legally valid in
most systems of customary law. To hold that a marriage has
not been contracted, because there has been no cohabitation
may result in injustice to women if applied as a general
principle of customary law. For example, occasions often
arise in these modern days, when a marriage is consummated
while the girl is still living with her parents. The
husband may not be in a position ;to obtain a house for his
wife if he is employed in a distant part of the country,
1. See further, below, Chapter VII, pp. 536-544.
2, See Sporndli, "Marriage Customs Among the Ibos”, op.cit., 
pp.116-117; Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit., p737; 
Meek, A Sudanese Kingdom, op.cit. .p.577.
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he may be a student in an overseas university, or he may be 
constrained by mere financial straits. In any of these 
circumstances it may be expedient for the girl to remain 
with her parents for a considerable period after the 
marriage, and even after the birth of several children. To 
hold that there has been no marriage in such cases, because 
there had never been cohabitation, is unrealistic as it may 
be unjust. The Yorubas, especially, are accustomed to main­
taining separate homes, and cases are not unknown in which 
husband and wife have never lived in the same home.^
Cohabitation is not a legal essential of a
statutory marriage, and there is no reason why it should be
introduced as an essential of modern customary marriage. In
2
Oduneye v. Oduneye, the spouses had three children, but had 
never lived under one roof since their marriage, although 
they spent time together during exchange of visits. The 
Judge held that the relationship of husband and wife 
existed even though they had never lived together under one 
roof in any matrimonial home.
It is customary for Nigerian men resident abroad, 
to contract a marriage by proxy under customary law, in 
many cases to a girl they had never met before. These girls 
are then entitled to join them abroad as their wives. The 
requirement of cohabitation as an essential for a valid 
customary marriage can put an end to such a procedure in 
those cases where the man is in a foreign country which only 
issues visas for "wives" to join their husbands. The man 
in such a case cannot claim that the girl "married” by proxy 
in his name is legally his wife until she joins him and 
cohabitation follows. But to join him she must be legally 
married to him or he would not be entitled to the necessary 
permission under the Immigration laws of various foreign 
countries.
1. See e.g. Oduneye v. Oduneye, f 19761 2 CC.H.C.J. 439.
2. Ibid.
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The 'requirement of cohabitation for the validity 
of a marriage can have other effects. For example, some 
communitiesparry” a woman for a deceased person. Such 
marriages would no longer be valid, since cohabitation 
of the spouses is impossible.
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CHAPTER VII
THE INCIDENTS OP MARRIAGE
"Marriage is the union of a man and woman 
forming an association during their entire 
lives, and involving the common enjoyment 
of divine and human privileges"
[The Digest]1
1. Introduction
Customary law marriage is principally a contract,
and conforms to a large extent to the rules of an ordinary
2commercial contract, but it has been mentioned previously 
that marriage also creates a status, that is, the "condition 
of belonging to a particular class of persons [married 
persons] to whom the law assigns certain peculiar legal
capacities or incapacities."-^
4
In Hyde v. Hyde, Lord Penzance, in relation to a
monogamous marriage observed:
"Marriage has been well said to be something 
more than a contract, either religious or 
civil - to be an institution. It creates 
mutual rights and obligations, as all 
contracts do, but beyond that it confers a 
status... the laws of all Christian nations 
throw about that status a variety of legal 
incidents during the lives of the parties, and 
induce definite rights upon their offspring."^
1. Digest XXII, ii, i, cited in O rFaolain and Martines,
Not in Godts Image, op. cit., p. 46.
2. Chapter I above, pp. 100-102.
3. Allen, "Status and Capacity", op.cit., pp. 277* 278.
4. Hyde v. Hyde [1866] L.R. IP- and D. 130; see also 
Sottomayer v. De Barros [1879] 5 P.D. 94; Salvesen v. 
Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] A.C. 641 at 
p. 653. cf. Argyll v. Argyll [1965] 2 W.L.R. 790 
(1965] 1 All ETrToTI, per Ungoed-Thomas, J.,
"Marriage is, of course, far more than mere legal 
contract and legal relationship, and even legal 
status; but it includes legal contract and 
relationship".
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A customary marriage also creates rights and 
duties. These rights and duties do not only apply between 
the spouses, but also to third parties, and may even endure 
after the death of a spouse. For example, in some systems 
of customary law, a man owes a variety of duties to his 
wife’s family. Thus a Yor-uba husband is liable for debts 
incurred for the funeral celebrations of his wife’s parents 
and grandparents.^
This Chapter examines the main rights and duties 
created by customary law between the spouses, and between 
them and third parties, especially their children, in so 
far as these latter rights and duties are relevant to the 
discussion of the former.
The following topics will be considered:
(i) conjugal rights and duties, including 
consortium and maintenance;
(ii) remedies available for breaches of conjugal 
rights;
(iii) parental rights and duties, including the 
affiliation and custody of children of the 
marriage.
The property rights of the spouses will be discussed 
in Chapters XII and XIII.
2. Conjugal Rights and Duties
(A1) Consortium
The principal duties and rights of the spouses are 
bound up in the concept of ’’consortium”. In English 
matrimonial-law,consortium means living together as husband 
and wife with all the incidents, legal, social and domestic,
1. See Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, op.cit.,
PP« 75-77* See also Egharevba, Benin law and Custom, 
op. cit. p. 19 and Isaac 0. Delano, An African Looks 
at Marriage (London: United Society for Christian
Literature, Reprint, 19^-5)* P» 55; Ajisafe, The Laws 
and Customs of the Yoruba People, op. cit., p. 8^.
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that flow from the relationship.1 It comprises a b u n d l e d  
rights and corresponding duties which are enjoyed by husband 
and wife; "a bundle of rights some hardly capable of 
precise definition”, and which may vary from society to 
society in its incidents.
Consortium in English law involves, inter alia:
(i) matrimonial cohabitation;
(ii) domestic duties;
(iii) right of a wife to use her husband's name;
(iv) matrimonial intercourse;
(v) mutual marital confidence.
How far does customary law recognize a concept 
comparable to that of "consortium” as described above?
There is no doubt that, in so far as the concept of con­
sortium entails rights and duties between the spouses, it
exists in customary law, although, as previously noted, 
the particular rights and duties may differ from society 
to society, and variations may exist even in the same 
society at different periods of time. The extent to which 
the various incidents of consortium as stated above apply 
to a customary marriage will be examined.
1. Matrimonial cohabitation
(a) The right of cohabitation
Matrimonial cohabitation means to live together as 
husband and wife in the same house. In English law the 
spouses have a duty to share a common home referred to as 
the "matrimonial home”, wherever this is possible. It may
1. Bromley, Family law, op. cit., p. 109; see Black's 
Law Dictionary, 4th edit. 1968, 382; consortium refers 
to "the conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and 
the right of each to the company, co-operation, affection 
and aid of the other in every conjugal relationship”.
2. Per Lord Reid in Best v. Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd. [1952]
A .C . 716, 756 [19521 2 ALL E.R. 39^* ‘401.
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not be possible to always share the same roof, for example, 
the husband may be working away from home for most of the 
time, or the wife may be confined to a hospital or other 
institution,'1' but normally, the spouses live together in 
one house, and the refusal by one spouse to share a common 
house in the absence of a reasonable excuse may be a breach 
of the duty to cohabit.
Some degree of cohabitation is a common, if not almost
universal feature of marriage in human societies. It has
been seen above that the courts, including the Supreme Court
of Nigeria,have held that "cohabitation" is an essential of
2
a valid customary marriage. A number of questions arises. 
What are the distinctive aspects of cohabitation as a right 
and duty of each spouse in Nigerian customary law? Does
the concept of"matrimonial home" as known to English law 
exist in customary law? Must the "matrimonial home" be a 
common house, or a group of houses to satisfy the duty of 
"matrimonial cohabitation".
In traditional society, and to a large extent in the 
rural areas of Nigeria at the present time, it is unusual for 
a husband and wife to live under the same roof. The more 
frequent practice among all the communities in Nigeria is for 
the husband and each of his several wives in a polygymous 
family to live in separate houses. This pattern also 
obtains where the husband has only one wife. In most 
patrilineal Nigerian societies, a wife usually joins her 
husband’s household in the compound of his family. The
1. Ibid., p. 733, per Lord Goddard: "Where the exercise 
of a profession or the call of duty involves prolonged 
absence abroad of one of the spouses, there is not an 
interruption of consortium, nor is there because one 
of them may become a permanent invalid to be waited
on and nursed by the other".
2. See above, Chapter VI, p.530-5331*
3. See above, Chapter IV, p.350.
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husband has a legal duty to provide a home for his wife, 
and she has a duty to live in the home provided for her by 
the husband. Each wife has a legal right to be provided 
with a house, or one or more rooms in a house, in the family 
compound, separate from the house or room of her husband 
and those of the other wives. The use of such a house or 
room is exclusive to a wife and her young children, and no- 
one, including her husband, can make use of her allotted 
accommodation without her consent, so long as she remains 
his wife.'1' The husband, on the other hand, also has an 
exclusive right of occupation and user over his own house 
or room, and his wives have no right of entry there except 
on his invitation.
A wife in customary law, therefore, has no right to 
share her husband’s house or room any more than he has a
2
right to share the house or room he provides for her use.
In such circumstances what constitutes "matrimonial cohabi­
tation"? Is "matrimonial cohabitation" a legal duty 
imposed on either spouse?
The distinctive feature of "matrimonial cohabitation 
in customary law, unlike English law, is not the spouses 
living together under the same roof even in cases where such
1. See, Fadipe, Sociology of the Yorubas, op. cit., p. 98* 
Basen, Niger Ibos, p7 208; Bohannan and Bohannan,
The Tiv of Central Nigeria, op. cit., p. 16; Forde and 
Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op.cit., 
pp. 17 and 72-73; Green, Igbo Village Affairs, op.cit., 
p. 18; Nsugbe, Ohaffia: A Matrilineal Ibo People,
op. cit., pp. 52-55; Simon Ottenberg, "inheritance and 
Succession in Afikpo", in Studies in the Law of Succession 
in Nigeria, edit, by J.D.M. Derrett, op. cit., p. 39; 
cf. the position in a small dowry marriage, see Kay 
Williamson, "Changes in the Marriage System of the 
Okrika Ijo" [Ijaw] 1962, 32 Africa, pp. 55-60 at p. 56.
2. See generally, Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op. cit. 
p. 295* Partridge, Cross River Natives, op. cit., p. 255; 
Ward, op. cit. p. 38! Mockler-Ferryman, op.cit., p. 57; 
but see Thomas, Antrhopological Report on the Ibo- 
Speaking Peoples, Part I., op. citT7 p. 64 "If she is 
the first wife, husband and wife live in one house;
if there is already a wife, the husband usually sends 
her to live with the first wife"; Forde, Yako Studies, 
op.cit., p. 90.
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living together is possible.1 Undoubtedly, the spouses
have a legal duty to live together. For example, Egharevba
says of Benin customary law:
"It is contrary to Benin laws and customs for 
husband and wife to live separately from each 
other except in the time of sickness, disagree­
ment or during the period of female treatment by 
the wife or nursing of a child. She should not
be allowed a refuge or abode in any other house
than those of her parents."2
In traditional society a husband and wife living in 
their separate houses or rooms, but nevertheless forming 
part of a composite domestic household, are not regarded as 
living separately, even though they may not be sharing a
common roof. The position as stated by Egharevba, obtains
among the large majority of patrilineal societies and among 
almost all matrilinieal societies. To constitute 
"matrimonial cohabitation", the wife must live in a house 
or room provided for her use by the husband, and such house 
or room must form part of his household taken as a whole.
It is not necessary for the parties to live under the same 
roof to constitute matrimonial cohabitation.^
To sum up the general position which obtains in 
most Nigerian societies: a husband has a legal duty to
provide accommodation for his wife which makes her a part 
of his domestic household, even though such accommodation may 
be separate from his own and exclusive to her use; the wife 
has a legal duty to live in the accommodation so provided 
by her husband for as long as she remains his wife.
1. Cf. W.C. Ekow-Daniels,uLaws Relating to Husband and 
Wife in Ghana", in Integration of Customary and Modern 
Legal Systems in Africa, op.cit., p. 368: "In Ghana,
consortium does not literally mean the ’right to live 
together in one household’".
2. Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op. cit., p.20.
3. Cf. Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, Ibid., p.20,
"It is contrary to Benin laws and customs for husband 
and wife to live separately".
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The position under Yoruba customary law needs closer
examination. In Cole v. Cole, Griffith, J., in trying to
explain the differences in the incidents of a statutory
marriage and one under Yoruba customary law, stated:
"By native law a man pays the parent of his 
wife a certain sum known as dowry, a relic of the 
times (not so long ago) when a man bought his 
wife. Having paid for her he naturally owes her 
less duties than if she brought him a dowry. By 
native law a man can marry as many wives as he 
can afford to pay for. The wife does not take 
her husband's name nor do the husband and wife 
become one person, but the wife remains a member 
of her family and often continues to live in her 
own house apart from the husband... The wife 
and her children are part of the wife’s family".
Ajisafe, however, writing twenty six years later, 
in 1924, noted:
"it is repugnant to native law for a woman to 
live separately from her husband or her husband’s 
family"*2
Ekundare criticizes Griffith, J.’s statement in 
Cole v . Oolep9 and he submits that "the learned Judge erred 
as to the customary law regarding the wife living in her 
own house". It is the law", he says, "that the wife must 
live in the matrimonial home or a place which could be
regarded as such and provided for her by the husband.
With respect, it is submitted that there is evidence 
of Yoruba wives living separately and apart from the house­
hold of their husbands, in accommodation neither provided nor 
paid for by the husbands, in some parts of Yorubaland. The
position in the indigenous Yoruba society may have been the
same as in most other patrilineal societies. The wife 
lived in her husband’s household in his family compound, where
1 . [I898] 1 N.L.R. 15.
2. Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the Yoruba, op.cit., p.62.
3 . [I898] 1 N.L.R. 15.
4. Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce under Yoruba Customary
Law, op. cit., p. 22.
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she was usually given at least a separate room for her 
exclusive use. She had a legal right to be given such 
accommodation and she also had a legal duty to live in the 
accommodation provided by her husband.'1'
Owing, to pressure of accommodation in large urban 
centres, however, there was a change in the traditional 
pattern and it became customary for a polygnous husband 
to provide living accommodation for some of his wives away 
from his household. He usually visits such a wife or 
wives from time to time for the purpose of matrimonial 
intercourse, and the wife may perform certain domestic 
services for him,such as cooking his food or washing his 
clothes. In these circumstances,it is not difficult to 
argue that such accommodation remains a part of the 
husbandfs household, even though it may be separated from 
his main household by considerable distances.
But it is not impossible that under certain circum­
stances, a wife after marriage may continue to live in her 
parentTs home, and as previously noted, some spouses have 
never shared a "matrimonial home" in any sense of the 
term.^
Marris, who conducted social research in Lagos
around i960, reported of the households interviewed:
"Even when there is no question of divorce, 
husbands and wives may not live together, 
especially if the husband has several wives.
Eleven per cent of the married men were not 
living with any of their wives, and half the 
men with several wives lived apart from at least 
one of them. In all, a quarter of the wives were 
not living in their husband's household. A 
third of these were still in Lagos - from lack of 
space, or because he could not afford to maintain 
her, the husband had sent his wife to live with 
his parents or her own family, or rented her a 
room of her own. Two-thirds lived outside 
Lagos altogether.^
1. See e.g. Oloko v. Giwa [1939] 15 N.L.R. 31*
2. See further, Chapter VI, p.532.
3 . Marris, Family and Social Change in an African City,
op.cit., p. 51-
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Of the eighty women interviewed by the present writer 
among the Yorubas,. sixteen were not living in the same 
households as their husbands in the sense that the domestic 
dwellings were widely separated. All the women living 
separately from their-husbands were living in Ibadan, and 
in many cases, this may have been due to lack of accommo­
dation. In a few cases, the accommodation was not paid for 
by the husbands.
With the growing economic independence of Yoruba 
women, it is now possible for a wife to obtain separate 
accommodation for herself away from her husband and his 
other wives, and even away from her own family. She may 
maintain some marital relationship with her husband. Pro­
viding and paying for her own accommodation give her a 
greater degree of independence and freedom.
There is no evidence that the pattern of separate 
"far-removed" dwellings of husband and wife, which obtains 
among some Yoruba married couples exists among other 
societies. For example, all the women interviewed among 
the Igbos were living in their husband's houses, and in 
many cases, they shared the same house with their husbands, 
although they invariably had their own separate apartment or 
room.
In rural areas, the traditional pattern of a wife 
living in a separate house, or in separate rooms in a house 
apart from her husband or his other wives, remains basically 
the same. In the urban areas, economic necessity often 
compels a wife to share a room with her co-wives, or even 
with her husband. The practice of husband and wife 
sharing the same room is so foreign to Nigerian custom that 
among educated Westernized monogamous families, the husband 
and wife invariably have separate bedrooms. Comparison 
may be drawn here with the practice in England where a bed­
room is usually shared by husband and wife, at least among 
the middle and lower classes. Poverty may compel a 
Nigerian family to share the same bedroom, and cases were 
noted during fieldwork of a man and his wife and children 
living in one room.
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Shields1 reports a polygynous family in Ogui Urban
Area., Enugu, who "lived in one room, the wives taking turns
to sleep in the only bed with the man , and invariably when
the wives quarrelled each related in detail the performance
of the other in bed. Families have no private life11.'
This case illustrates how unsuitable polygamy is
for the average low-income city dweller; unfortunately
those who could afford the "luxury" of polygamy often reject
2
it,while those who cannot are sometimes propelled into it.
It should be noted that the duty of a wife to live 
in accommodation provided by her husband also obtains in 
most matrilineal societies in Nigeria.-^ There is no 
evidence that matrilocal marriage, properly so-called, is 
found in any society in Nigeria. In a few societies, the 
husband resides with his wife's family for some time, but
4
his residence is never permanent. In many societies, 
previously mentioned, which operate a double level of dowry 
payment, where a "small dowry" is paid, the wife has the 
legal right (which is often exercised) to live with her own 
family, unless the husband has performed the ceremony of
1. Nwanganga Shields, Ogui Urban Area: A Social Survey 
(Economic Development Institute, University of Nigeria, 
Working Paper, No. 2, 1965)5 P« 56.
2. As in the case of a member of the Jehovah's Witness 
who, in spite of his church's bann on the practice of 
polygamy, and his straitened financial circumstances 
was forced to fulfil his customary obligation and 
consequently had to marry two wives, see further, above, 
Chapter IV, p.325.
5 . See Nsugbe, Ohaffia, op.cit., pp. 52-55; Ottenberg,
"inheritance and Succession in Afikpo", op.cit., p.39;
4. See Thomas, who notes that in the Sobo country, there
is a curious custom which suggests a transitional form. 
There are some peoples whose custom requires that a 
husband should go and reside with his wife's family,
i.e. matrilocal mairiage. In other cases, the wife goes 
and resides with the husband, while in still others, 
the husband resides first with his wife's family, and 
then removes to his own district. See Thomas, 
Anthropological Report, Edo-Speaking Peoples, Part 1, 
op. cit., p. 59*
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"buying the mouth" which places an obligation on her to 
live with the husband at his home and to perform domestic 
duties for him. If this ceremony is not performed, the 
husband has a right to her sexual services,but not to 
matrimonial cohabitation.'1'
(b) The enforcement of matrimonial cohabitation
Although there is a legal duty to cohabit, it will
not be physically enforced by the courts at the instance
of either husband or wife in today’s modern society. There
is considerable evidence that in traditional Nigerian
society, a woman was often physically forced to cohabit with
her husband, and there is no doubt that this may still be
the case in certain parts of the country. Usually, the
force is used by the wife’s family who, for fear that they
may have to refund the husband’s dowry, often exert pressures,
including physical force, to ensure that the wife stays
with her husband. Several informants gave instances of
women who were bound with ropes, beaten and taken back: to
their husband’s homes by their own families. Some of
these cases were fairly recent. The old South African
2
divorce case of Nomatusi v. Nompetu illustrates the plight
of women in this respect. The judgment revealed that to
gain freedom from her husband the wife fled from one place
to the other:
"She fled to West Pondoland and to every
district in East Pondoland in her vain attempts
to escape [from] him. Her evidence shows that
for three years she had no rest for the soles of her feet
in her fruitless endeavours to escape a union
which was in every way repulsive to her. Her
evidence shows that again and again she was
dragged back to the defendant once even at the
end of a rope, and that she was on one occasion
severely beaten by her brother for refusing the
bridegroom whom he and her father had provided
for her".
1. See Bride Price Committee Report, op. cit., pp. 30-37; 
Williamson, 0£. cit., p. 56; and further above, 
Chapter III, p. 256"."
2 . [1915] 3 N.A.C. 165.
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The wife in Ogunsanya v. Musliatu Atoke^ had a
more effective way of regaining her freedom. In this
Nigerian, case, brought before the Customary Courtr Abeokuta,
the evidence established that the parents of the defendant,
realizing that she was planning to elope with, another man,
decided that she should be taken forcibly to the plaintiff’s
home. The plaintiff had already paid the dowry and other
necessary expenses connected with the marriage. Two men
and two women escorted the defendant to the plaintiff’s
home. The plaintiff disclosed in his evidence that the
defendant arrived at his home in a very wild and excited
condition, and that "she was armed with dangerous weapons,
like blade and pieces of broken bottles”. The plaintiff
had to run away to avoid any physical injuries, while the
defendant escaped from her escorts without spending an hour
in the plaintiff’s house. The plaintiff had no alternative
but to seek the legal remedy of a divorce.
2
In Nomatusi v. Nompetu the judges held that any
customary law which sanctioned such cruel treatment in order
to force a wife to cohabit with her husband was ’repugnant
and in conflict with all principles of law and humanity”.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nigeria in E g n  v. U p e n ,
which involved a claim for the return of a wife stated:
”... it is arguable whether any order made 
by a customary court or by any other court, 
that a wife should return, against her will, 
to her husband would not be inconsistent 
with her freedom of association as guaranteed
by the provision of section 26(1) of the
Constitution of the Federation. It is also
arguable whether such an order would not be 
contrary to the principles of natural justice 
equity and good conscience”.
T. [1961] Suit No. B/644/61, unreported, Grade "B.±u
Customary Court, Abeokuta, see Ekundare, op.cit., p. 21; 
see also Akiga, Akiga’s Story, op.cit., p. 166; and 
the Correspondence Relating to the Welfare of Women 
in Tropical Africa, 1935-37* Cmd. 5784, 1938, P- 32*
2. [1915] 3 N.A.C. I65.
3. [1974] N.M.L.R. 22, at p. 21 [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 6^2,
at p. 638.
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In. view of. such strong obiter dicta from the 
Federal Supreme Court, it is doubtful whether a wife could 
be physically compelled to cohabit with her husband, what­
ever the customary law may have been in the past.^ In 
1852, the English Court of Queen’s Bench held that they 
would not force a wife to return to her husband against
her will by enabling him to obtain custody of her by
2 1 habeas corpus. In R. v. Jackson,^ the wife refused to
live with her husband. He seized her on her way from
church, confined her to his house, and prevented her from
returning to her relatives. Lord Halsbury and Lord Esher
refused to follow the old English case of Re Cockrane,
and they held that no English subject had a right to imprison
another English subject, whether his wife or anyone else ,fof
full age and sui juris.” Similarly, in R v. Reid,^ the
English Court of Appeal held that a husband who steals,
carries away, or secretes his wife against her will is guilty
of the common law offence of kidnapping her. As Cairns,
L.J., said in delivering the judgment of the court:
’’The notion that a husband can, without 
incurring punishment, treat his wife, whether 
she be a separated wife or otherwise, with any 
kind of hostile force is obsolete.”
1. See J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa (London: 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., New Imp., 1970), p. 206; 
but see Bukar Fantami v. Fanta Dambu [1977] Appeal 
No. S.C.A/CV/27/B.O./76, unreported decision of the 
Sharia Court of Appeal, Bornu State, Nigeria, where 
a wife was ordered to cohabit with her husband’, 
see f u r t h e r C h a p t e r  IX, below, p. 99.
see also Begho, op.,cit., p. 52-53*
2. R^ v. Leggatt [1852] 18 Q.B. 781*
5. [1891] 1 Q.B. 671, at p. 685.
4-. [1840] 8 Dowl. 650.
5 . [1972] 2 All. E.R. 1550, C.A.; [1973] Q.B. 299*
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The right of a husband to physically force his 
wife to cohabit with him must now be regarded as obsolete 
in Nigeria,
(ii) Domestic duties’
In every society, a wife has certain domestic and 
other duties to perform. For example, in a typical English 
family, the wife will usually be primarily responsible for 
the running of the "matrimonial home", a duty which may take 
the form of management of a large domestic staff, or may 
involve the performance of the household chores, such as 
cooking, cleaning, mending and looking after the welfare of 
her husband and children. If the wife has paid employment,
some of the domestic duties may be shared by her husband.
The Nigerian wife also has a number of domestic and 
other duties which may include a duty
(a) to cook food for her husband. In a polygynous 
family this duty is usually shared by an agreed 
rota^each wife undertaking to cook for her husband 
for a week, during which time she also shares his 
bed. In some families, it is the duty of the
youngest wife, (with reference to her date of
marriage, and not to her age)1 to do all the cooking 
and other domestic chores for the husband;
(b) to help her husband with his farm work; weeding and
planting minor crops such as corn beans, nuts, etc.;
(c) to keep the husband's apartment clean and tidy, and
to keep the general premises neat and clean;
(d) to wash her husband's clothes, and to do necessary
repairs on them;
1. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit.,
pp. 205* e_t. al^ . Leith-Ross, African Women, op. cit., 
pp. 199-200; Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the 
Yorubas. op.cit., p. 62.
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(e) to provide water for the husband's use, especially
water for bathing. Water is usually fetched from 
considerable distances and fetching of water is 
mainly the work of women and children;
(f) to look after the husband's children which may include,
not only her own children, but the children of a co­
wife who, for some reason, is unable to look after
her own children;
(g) to entertain her husband’s friends and relatives, this
is usually the duty of the senior wife, but each wife 
may be asked to contribute labour, or food;
(h) to take care of her husband in illness and old age;
(i) to perform the necessary mourning ceremonies for her
husband if he predeceases her; this is one of her 
most important functions, and for this reason, a man 
will make as sure as possible that he has a wife 
who will remain to mourn for him, even if it means 
marrying at a very old age, or at the point of death.1
The husband has few domestic duties. In some 
communities he has a duty to do the heavy work on his wife’s 
farm^such as clearing the bush or ploughing the land. He 
also has a duty to repair his wife’s house when necessary.
He performs a short period of mourning if his wife dies
p
before him^and he has a duty to bury her in some societies.
Whether the wife has paid employment or not, the 
average Nigerian husband considers it infradig to perform 
such domestic chores as cooking, sweeping, or washing his 
own clothes, even among the most Westernized families.
1. See further Chapter VIII, pp.690-694 ; and see 
Customary Law Manual, op.cit., p. 276; Basden,
Niger Ibos, op. cit., p. 270 et_. al.
2. For the matrimonial rights and duties of the spouses 
of a customary marriage see generally, Customary Law 
Manual, op.cit., pp. 272-277; Ajisafe, 0£. cit., p.62, 
Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit., pp. 205 
et. al; Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba, op. cit.
pt m . ------------ —
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(b) The enforcement of domestic duties
A husband' may compel his wife to perform her domestic 
duties by reasonable chastisement, in traditional societies. 
The most effective method, however, is to appeal to the 
umuada (wives of the family), who may persuade the wife to 
perform her duties. If there is a serious- breach^the wife 
may be fined a goat or a chicken or two. Alternatively, 
the husband may appeal directly to the wife’s own family^ 
who may be successful in compelling her to perform her 
domestic duties. If the breaches are serious enough^the 
husband may be justified in divorcing his wife if she refuses 
to mend her ways. Similar remedies are available to a wife 
whose husband fails to perform any recognized domestic duty, 
except that she has no right of physical chastisement in 
relation to her husband.
(iii) Right of a wife to use her husband’s name.
It is very unusual for a wife in traditional society 
to use the name of her husband, and in some circumstances 
it can be quite absurd. For example, amongst the Yorubas, 
a child may be ’’born with a name”, that is^the peculiar 
circumstance of its birth may be expressed by a name which 
is applicable to all children born under like circumstances. 
Thus, in the case of twins, the first born child of either 
sex may be called Taiwo or Ebo, the shortened form of 
To-aiye-wo (have the first taste of the world).^ The : 
second born of the twins is called Kehinde (he who lags 
behind); while the child born after the birth of twins is 
called Idowu, whether male or female. Special names are 
also given to children born in other circumstances, for 
example, a child b o m  when its mother is on a journey, or 
away from home is called Abiona, and a posthumous child 
is given the name of Babarimisa.
1. The first b o m  twin child is considered to be the 
youngest, because according to Johnson,he is sent 
forward to announce the coming of the later born 
twin,see Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op. cit.,
p. 80.
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Children not born with a given name, are named from 
circumstances connected with the child itself or with 
reference to the family fortunes at the time of the child’s 
birth. For example, among the Igbos, a couple who have 
waited several years for a child may name it Ife-yi-nwa - 
(there is nothing like a child).
Children generally had no surnames, and the prefixes 
Mr. and Mrs. were unknown. Most families had a totem 
denoting the family origin,and this was often added to the 
name of a child, for example, Erin the elephant is said to 
be the original line of the Kings. A child b o m  to this 
royal family would have Erin attached to its other names, 
and his family could be traced from it. Johnson notes 
that "a married woman cannot adopt her husband’s totem 
much less his name”, and that intermarriage within the same 
totem was originally not allowed as coming within the degree 
of consanguinity. Children usually take their father’s 
totem, but an illegitimate child who is not acknowledged by 
his father takes the totem of its mother.^"
With the coming of the Europeans, especially the 
Missionaries, many of the indigenous names were abolished 
or used as surnames. For example, the first born of twins 
who was named Taiwo would be given an English name and become 
James Taiwo. His wife may be called Mrs. Taiwo, even though 
she was not twin born, and in some cases even the husband 
may not have been twin-born, since with the advent of the 
Missionaries the system of names giving were corrupted in 
several ways.
The pertinent point to note here, however, is that 
originally, a wife never adopted her husband’s name on 
marriage, and the prefix Mrs. was unknown. Women who 
became Christians and were married under the Nigerian 
Marriage Act or other statutes were first referred to as 
’’Mrs'; followed by their husbands’ surnames. This became 
a mark of prestige and the envy of other women who were 
married under customary law only.
TI For the giving, and significance, of names, see
generally Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op. cit.,
PP* 79-89; Thomas, Edo-Speaking Peoples, Part 1, 
op. cit., pp. 61-62; Meek, Law and Authority in a 
Nigerian Tribe, op. cit., pp. 295-297; Basden,
Niger Ibos, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
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In the modern society, quite a few women, especially 
among the Igbos, use their husbands1 surnames, whether they 
are married under customary law or not, and among educated 
Igbos,the use of the husband’s surname may be regarded as 
the general custom. Among other peoples> for example the 
Yorubas, educated women generally use their husbands’ surnames, 
but most of the other women retain their own names. For 
example, in only twenty, of more than a thousand matrimonial 
cases examined at Ibadan Customary Courts were the surnames 
of the husbands and wives identical.
The popular method whereby a woman married under 
customary law changes her name on marriage is to place an 
advertisement to that effect in one or more of the local 
newspapers. For example, of sixty-four ’’changes of names” 
advertised in the ’’Daily Star" (a local paper published at 
Enugu) of 14 September, 1977, thirty persons changed their 
surnames, and the prefix "Miss” to "Mrs", seven changed from 
Miss to Miss, with only a change of surname, one Mrs. to 
Mrs. with a change of surname, and two from Mrs. to Miss 
with a change of surname. The others were men. Judging 
from these newspapers advertisements, changes of names are 
quite frequent in Nigeria, especially among women, who use 
the advertisements as marriage certificates.
( iv) Matrimonial intercourse
Matrimonial intercourse is distinguished from 
matrimonial cohabitation. The latter signifies living 
together as husband and wife (with or without sexual inter­
course between the spouses), while the former may take place 
even though the spouses are not living together as husband 
and wife. Normally, however, both are coexistent, and 
each is a constituent of consortium.'*' Under the general
1. See National Insurance Commissioner’s Decisions, R(G) 
5/68 where a woman C lived in the flat of Mr. D, for 
some years, adopted D ’s surname and was known as Mrs.
D. Allegedly there was no sexual relationship between 
C and D, and the latter, whose work involved travelling, 
was only in the flat at weekends. Held,the relation­
ship constituted cohabitation, and that proof of 
sexual relations is not an essential element of co­
habitation, see M.D.A. Freeman, Cracknell’s Law Students 
Companion, Family Law 2nd edition (London:Butterworths, 
1976), pT 89, Case No. 535*
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law, each spouse owes the other a duty to consummate the
marriage and,(with certain exceptions), the incapacity of
either, or the wilful refusal of the respondent to do so,
will entitle the petitioner to a decree of nullity.1 This
mutual right to sexual intercourse continues after the
marriage has been consummated, provided it is reasonably
exercised; one spouse is not legally bound to submit to the
sexual demands of the other, if such demands are unreasonable,
2
inordinate or perverted. The right to have sexual inter­
course is exclusive in the case of either spouse to the 
marriage.
Under the old English common law, by the act of 
marriage,a wife consents to intercourse with her husband, 
and thus confers on him a privilege which she is not entitled 
to withdraw at will.-' The general rule therefore was that
a husband could not be guilty as a principal, of rape on his
4 5own wife. A series of cases-' have attempted to limit
the common law rule, and to bring it into line with modern
1. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973* S. 12(a), 12(b); and 
further, below,Chapter XI, pp.260-265 .
2. See Holborn v. Holborn [19^7] 1 All E.R. 32; husband 
over-sexed; demanded sexual intercourse with the wife 
at all times of the day and night, and made revolting 
suggestions to her when she was reluctant to have sexual 
intercourse in the normal way. The wife's health 
suffered and she eventually left. Held, the husband’s 
conduct was sufficiently grave and weighty to justify 
withdrawal from cohabitation, see also Foster v. Foster 
[1921] p. 438, C.A.
3 . Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1, p. 629 as cited in 
R. v. Clarence [1889] 22 Q.BD. 23; R. v. Clarke 
fl949] 2 All E.R. 448; cf. Stephen’s Digest of Criminal 
Law, 1877, p. 172.
4. R. v. Miller [1952*] 2 ALL E.R. 529; [195^] 2 Q.B. 282.
5 . See R. v. O ’Brien [1974] 3 ALL E.R. 663; a husband
could be guilty of rape if a decree nisi had been
obtained; he may also be guilty of aiding and abetting
the commission of a rape - see Lord Audlev’s ' Case.
[1631] 3 St. Tr. 401, H.L.; R. v. Leak [1975] 2 All
E.R. 1059* C.A.
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public sentiment which would abhor the idea of a man being
legally allowed to use force to compel an unwilling-wife to
have sexual intercourse with him. In R. v. Reid,1 the
2
Court, following R. v. Jackson, held that a husband canhot 
insist upon his right to have sexual intercourse by force, 
and that he could, in the circumstances, be convicted of 
an assault on his wife, even though he used no more force 
than was necessary to effect his aims.
There are several points of differences and 
similarities between the rights and duties of the spouses 
of a marriage under the general law as described above, 
and the spouses of a customary marriage, with reference to 
sexual intercourse.
(a) Under customary law, both spouses have a legal duty 
to consummate the marriage, and to satisfy the reasonable 
sexual demands of the other spouse during the marriage. 
Incapacity or wilful refusal of either spouse to consummate 
the marriage, or to satisfy the reasonable demands of the 
other spouse, entitles the other spouse to a divorce under 
most systems of customary law. In addition, under 
traditional customary law, the husband had the right to use 
reasonable force to compel his wife to submit to his reasonable 
sexual demands, and a wife who complained that her husband 
had raped her under normal circumstances, would receive 
scant sympathy. In this respect,the position under 
customary law is the same as it was under the old common 
law. A husband cannot be guilty of rape on his own wife.
Customary law in this respect has been changed by
4 5
the Criminal Code Act , and the Penal Code Law^ in the
1 . [1972] 2 All E.R. 1350, C.A.; [1973] Q.B. 299, 302.
2. [1891], 1 Q.B. 671, C.A.
3 . Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., p. 182.
4. 1916, Cap. 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria,
1958 Revision Ss. 6 and 357*
5 . Cap. 89* Laws of Northern Nigeria, 19^3 Revision,
Ss. 264-265; and S. 268, "Whoever assaults or uses 
criminal force to any woman intending to outrage or 
knowing that he will thereby outrage her modesty, 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which 
may be extend to three years or with fine or both".
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Southern and Northern States of Nigeria respectively.
Under the Criminal Code Act, regardless of the type of
marriage contracted,^ a husband cannot be guilty of rape on
2his own wife as a principal, although he may be.convicted 
as an accessory. A husband is not entitled to use force 
or violence for the purpose of exercising his right to
intercourse, and if he does so, he may be guilty of
4 5 6wounding, doing grievous harm, indecent assault, or
7
assault according to the circumstances.
o
In Alawusa v. Odusote, the accused shaved the 
pubic hair of his wife married to him under customary law.
He was convicted of indecent assault on a female. On 
appeal to Lagos High Court, the Judges, Butler Lloyd,
acting C.J., Brook, J., and Jeffreys, J., held that a husband
could be convicted of a rape upon his wife as an accessory
1. See s. 6 of the Criminal Code Act. The reference to
husband and wife is not restricted to the parties to
a Christian marriage contract, ss. 10, 33, 34, and 
36 of the Criminal Code Act.
2. See ss. 6 and 357 of Criminal Code Law; Alawusa v.
Odusote [1941] 7 W.A.C.A. 140; of State v Ward [1944]
2b S.E. 2d. 785.
3. Criminal Code Act, s. 7; cf. Penal Code Law, s. 282.
4. Ibid., ss. 322 and 338.
5. Ibid., s. 335.
6 . Ibid., s. 351.
7. Ibid., s. 351.
8. [1941] 7 W.A.C.A. 140 at p. 141.
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and that he could also be convicted of indecent assault upon 
her. They stated, however, that "Indecent assault is not a 
lesser form of rape. An assault upon a wife is not rendered 
indecent by Circumstances which would render it indecent 
in the case of another woman". The judges were of the 
opinion that
"In the present case the appellant undoubtedly 
committed an assault the enormity of which a 
very short acquaintance with native ideas will 
suffice to make apparent, but we do not think 
that as between husband and wife it could • 
properly be characterised as indecent".^
The appeal court substituted a conviction for common
assault, contrary to section 351 of the Criminal Code Act.
The accused was sentenced to six weeks imprisonment with
hard labour. It may be noted that although the accused in
2
Alawusa v. Odusote, was found not guilty of indecent 
assault, a husband may be found guilty of an indecent 
assault upon his wife under certain circumstances. What 
is "indecent" in the particular circumstances is a question 
of fact.^
(b) Under the common law, the right to have sexual inter­
course is exclusive in the case of either spouse to the marriage. 
Under most systems of customary law, a husband has an exclusive 
right to the sexual services of his wife.
1. Among many Nigerian communities, much pubic hair is 
considered a matter of pride, as it is thought that 
men prefer women with a lot of pubic hair. It is
alleged that a womanfs pubic hair will not grow if
she has too frequent sexual intercourse, and conse­
quently, to abuse a woman about her lack of pubic 
hair is a serious offence. To shave a woman’s 
pubic hair is considered a grave offence, see Green,
Igbo Village Affairs, op. cit. , p. 202.
2. [19^1] 7 W.A.C.A. 140.
3. See generally, Lionel Brett and Ian McLean, The Criminal
Law and Procedure of Lagos, Eastern Nigeria and Western
Nigeria (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 19o3)» PP. 73— 732 
par. 1960-1961.
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A married woman, however, under the customary laws 
of most communities in Nigeria has no corresponding exclusive 
right to her husband's sexuality.1 Not only must she share 
him with the other wives in a polygamous marriage, but the 
wives, individually or collectively, have no legal right to 
restrict their husband's access to other women. This is 
a glaring instance of discrimination against women, which 
still persists in modern customary law, and which offends 
against the fundamental rights under the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979. This discrimination 
will be discussed further in relation to adultery.
Because of the importance attached to procreation, 
customary law gives a wife the right to have reasonable 
opportunities for sexual intercourse with her husband.
Refusal by, or incapacity of, a husband to satisfy the 
reasonable demands of his wife in this respect justifies 
a divorce by the wife.
(v) Mutual marital confidences and the law of evidence
It is a fundamental principle that in any legal 
proceedings, civil or criminal, no relevant evidence which 
will help the court to ascertain the truth should be excluded. 
The intimate and confidential nature of the marital relation­
ship, and the need that the law should protect marital
1. See Begho, Law and Culture, op. cit., p. $1; cf. Ekow- 
Daniels, "Laws Relating to Husband and Wife in Ghana',' 
op. cit., p. 369.
2. Begho, op. cit., p. 51; Forde, Yako Studies, op>. cit., 
p. 127.
3 . See Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, op. cit.,
"the boy and girl must have sexual intercourse a few 
times before consent for hearing [to a marriage 
proposal] is given. Sometimes it is the girl herself 
who insists on this, in order to make the man who 
wishes to take her in marriage prove his manhood”.
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confidence is also important.^ In some cases, the two 
principles of .public policy.may conflict. For example, 
to force the spouse of an accused person to reveal the 
confession of guilt made to him or her by the accused 
spouse would ultimately destroy the confidential nature of 
the marital relationship. On the other hand, the confession 
of an accused person to his or her spouse may be the only
p
evidence available to the prosecution to prove the guilt.
Under the English common law certain rules were 
devised which attempted to effect a compromise between these 
two rules of public policy. In civil proceedings, neither 
the parties nor their spouses were competent witnesses, and 
in criminal cases, with a few exceptions, the spouse of the 
accused was equally incompetent. These principles of
2i
common law, as amended by statute, have been received in 
Nigeria^and apply to a statutory marriage by virtue of the 
provisions of the Nigerian Evidence Act. Although most of 
the principles of common law in this respect have been 
gradually eroded by statute, and in civil proceedings the 
principle that relevant evidence should not be excluded has 
completely ousted the principle that marital confidences
R
should be protected in modern English law, Nigerian law
in this respect remains relatively the same and applies to
6
the spouses of a marriage under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
1. See Argyll v. Argyll [1965] 1 ALL E.R. 6ll, 619;
[1967J Ch. 302, 322.
2. See Rumping v . Director of Public Prosecutions [1964]
A.C. 8154 H.L. per Lord Morris: Respect is due to the
confidences of married life: but so is respect due
to the ascertainment of the truth. Marital accord 
is to be preserved: but so is public security...
Public policy and public safety would alike require 
that vital evidence should not be withheld.
3 . See Bromley, Family Law, op.cit., pp. 117-118.
4. See e.g. Evidence Act, 1851* 12 Stats. 815* s.l; and
Evidence Amendment Act, 1&53* 12 Stats: 822.s.3; "No
husband shall be compellable to disclose any 
communication made to him by his wife during the 
marriage, and no wife shall be compellable to disclose 
any communication made to her by her husband during the 
marriage"; Criminal Evidence Act, 1898.
5 . See Civil Evidence Act, 1968, 12 Stats., 910* s. 14,
16(3 ).
6. See Evidence Act, s. 2.
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Under customary law, however, spouses are compellable 
and competent to give evidence in cases where the other
spouse is a party. In civil and criminal cases heard in
Customary Courts, the common law rules do not apply, neither
• does , the Nigerian Evidence. A.ct which has altered the common
law rules to some extent, and which is applied in cases heard
in the Superior Courts. Under the Evidence Act, a spouse of
a customary marriage is a competent and compellable witness.
Section l6l provides:
’’When a person charged with an offence is 
married to another person by a marriage other 
than a monogamous marriage such last named 
person shall be a competent and compellable 
witness on behalf of either the prosecution or 
the defence: Provided that in the case of a
marriage by Mohammedan law neither party to 
such marriage shall be compellable to disclose 
any communication made to him or her by the 
other party during such marriage”.
This provision has been criticized as discriminatory
2
against the spouses of a customary marriage and is discussed 
further when dealing with statutory marriages.^
3.REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR BREACHES OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS
Remedies for interference with consortium by third parties
Interference with consortium may take the form of 
(l) adultery - the impairment of the husband’s (and in
a few societies, the wife *s ), exclusive right of sexual 
intercourse;
1. Ibid., s. l6l; see also ss. 157 and 162.
2. But see Faremilekun and Ors. v. The State [197^] 3 
W.S.C.A. B6, where it was held that the disabilities 
under s. l6l of the Evidence Act are not against any 
citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, tribe, 
place of origin, religion or political opinion.
3. See below, Chapter XI, pp. 215-218.
559
(ii) enticement;
(iii) seduction-- total interruption of consortium, 
depriving the husband, not only of the sexual 
services of the wife, but of the domestic, economic 
and other services habitually rendered by the wife.
(iv) harbouring of a wife - usually done by her parents
or other relatives, and resulting in total interruption 
of consortium.
Legal remedies for these breaches of consortium will 
be examined in order to see how far they discriminate against, 
or in favour of women.
A . Adultery
(1) Definition of adultery: Adultery in English law
usually means voluntary sexual intercourse of a married
person with a person other than his or her spouse.'*' In
traditional customary law, there need not be evidence of
actual sexual intercourse for a wife to be guilty of
adultery. Certain acts which are repugnant to customary
law, as leading to the act of adultery, were treated as
adultery, and were punishable by fine or otherwise. For
example, an indication of what constituted adultery in
traditional societies is given by Kingsley: "the adultery
itself is often only a matter of laying your hand, even in
self-defence... on a woman - or brushing against her in the
path”. Mary Slessor tells the story of two young wives
of a famous Calabar chief who had left the women*s yard
and entered one where a boy was sleeping. This action was
counted as adulterous, and the wives together with two young
girls who had known of the incident, but had failed to
T~, See Denis v. Denis 11955 1 2 ALL E.R. 727. C.A.; [1955J 
p. 155* Clarkson v. Clarkson [1950] 1^5 L.T. 755 and 
further, Chapter XI,pp. 265-266.
2. Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op.cit., p. 550;
see also Phillips, Survey of African Marriage, op. cit. 
p. 415, for the viewpoint expressed in the Report of 
a Missionary Conference (Protestant) at Calabar, 1911* 
that failure to recognize such acts as adultery by the 
Nigerian Marriage Act was harmful as it tended to lower 
the moral tone; cf. Nyendael, quoted by Roth in Great 
Benin, op. cit., p. 59; the husband has to surprise 
the wife"in the fact, without which evidence he 
cannot punish her”.
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report it, were condemned by the chief and his councillors 
to one hundred strokes each.^
The Efik Marriage Law, drawn up by the Efik National 
Society, and printed for private circulation only in 1905, 
as amended in 1918, makes a distinction between sexual adul­
tery and non-sexual adultery. Non-sexual adultery is 
defined as follows.
”1. Playing, through love, with another manTs 
wife.
2 . Keeping secret friendship with another man’s 
wife.
3* In the way of love, giving another man’s wife 
any cash or present.
4. In the way of love, touching another man’s
wife in any part of her body, such as shaking 
hands or touching the breast etc.”
Actions which, in traditional law would have con­
stituted adultery, would not be considered as such under 
modern customary law which tend to regard as adultery, only 
unlawful sexual intercourse. For example, in Atansuyi v. 
Gbadamosi^tthe husband sued in Ikare Customary Court for 
damages for adultery and seduction. The evidence showed 
that the plaintiff’s wife was found on several occasions in 
the house in which the defendant lived, and that she had 
left the plaintiff’s home with the intention to divorce him. 
There was further evidence that the defendant was the man 
she intended to marry if her petition for divorce was 
granted, and that the defendant was financing the divorce 
action. The President of the Customary Court found for 
the plaintiff and awarded the £100 damages claimed against
1. See Livingstone, Mary Slessor of Calabar, op. cit., 
pp. 41-42; Mary Slessor succeeded in getting the 
punishment reduced to the infliction of ten stripes; 
cf. Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce under Yoruba 
Customary Law, op. cit., p. 33; '’Indecent familiarities 
and caresses alone are sometimes sufficient for 
alleging adultery.”
2. A copy of these rules, was given to the present writer 
by the President of Calabar Customary Court, Chief
O.E. Adim; grateful thanks are hereby recorded.
3. [1969] 2 ALL N.L.R. 222.
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the defendant. The defendant appealed to the High Court 
of the Western State on the ground* inter alia* that the 
lower court erred in law and in fact in finding for the 
plaintiff when the adultery.complained of was not proved 
beyond reasonable doubt. Odumosu*. J.* defined, adultery 
as ,fconsensual sexual intercourse between a married person 
and a person of the opposite sex* not the other spouse* 
during the subsistence of the marriage". He held that the 
standard of proof in all adultery cases is the same* and 
that apart from association coupled with opportunity there 
must be evidence of illicit affection or familiarity before 
adultery can be inferred. Under the circumstances it could 
not be said that the presence of the plaintiff’s wife in the 
defendant’s house had no other objective than that of 
illicit sexual intercourse.
This decision evidences a decided shift from what 
constitutes adultery in traditional society.
(ii) Liability for adultery:
Almost all systems of customary law recognize sexual 
intercourse with a man’s wife without his consent, or the 
consent of his family in some communities, as a personal 
wrong done to him* entitling him to redress from the wrong­
doer.^ In very few societies* is adultery with a woman’s 
husband regarded as a wrong done to her* and even where it 
is recognized* the only redress available to her in most 
cases is divorce. Allott sums up the general position in 
customary law:
"In customary law everywhere in Africa a man’s 
adulterous connection (or even suspect behaviour) 
with a married woman is an actionable wrong* 
usually sounding in damages. A wife does not 
have a similar action in adultery if her husband
l"! See Basden* Niger Ibos* op.cit.* pp 233-4; Talbot, 
Tribes of the Uiger Delta* op. cit.* pp. 199-203; 
Peoples of Southern Nigeria* op. cit. Vol III, pp. 629 
et. al.; Forde* Marriage Among the Yako* op. cit.* 
p. 102; Hoth* Great Benin* op. cit.* p. 39; Thomas, 
Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples* 
op. cit.* pp. 59-60* 75 et. al.
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indulges in illicit relations with a woman 
other than one of his wives - there is thus 
a double standard of behaviour, even in Africa”.^
(iii) Punishment for adultery:
So jealously do men protect their exclusive rights
to their wives1 sexuality that in most systems of customary
law, adultery was often punished by the death of the male
adulterer, and in nearly all systems, it provided a ground
2
for divorce by the husband. Among.the Yorubas, Talbot
notes that ,Ta chief’s wife could be punished with death
for adultery, but the usual procedure was for the husband
to claim heavy damages before the chief of the ” quarter”.-^
If the husband divorced his wife for this cause he was
4
entitled to the return of his dowry. Mockler-Ferryman
noted that Ibo laws were few at the end of the last century,
but infringement was rigorously punished:
,fFor adultery a heavy fine is levied on the
man, though generally the outraged husband
demands satisfaction at the point of the
spear. Should a chief’s wife be deemed
guilty, both she and her paramour are required
to drink sassa-water to satisfy the honour of the
chief”.- 5
1. A. N. Allott, Essays in African Law, (Westport, 
Connecticut Greenwood Press, 1975)> P« 220;
Begho, op.cit., p. 51* Aniagolu, op.cit., p. 109;
Aguda, Select Law Lectures and Papers, op. cit., p. 75*
2. In most systems of customary law adultery was formerly
treated as a crime, see Aguda, Select Law Lectures and
Papers, op. cit., p. 73; Thomas, Anthropological Report 
... Ibo-Speaking Peoples, Part IV, ojq. cit.. p. 75; 
Begho, 0£. cit., p. 51; Meek, Northern Tribes of 
Nigeria, 0£. cit., Vol. I, p. 275; Basden, Niger Ibod, 
op. cit., p. 233; Meek, Sudanese Kingdom, op. cit.,
P* 3^97 see also R. v. Ottio Enwa 11945f 9 W.A.C.A.
5. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit.,
p. 635; cf. Thomas, Anthropological Report ... Ibo- 
Speaking Peoples, Part IV, op. cit., p. 76"; "The 
punishment for adultery on the part of a married woman 
depends on the status of her husband”.
4. Ellis, Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., p. 186; cf. 
the position among the Romans, see Corbett, ojd. cit., 
p. 41.
5 . Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, op. cit., p. 33,
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Kingsley confirmed this statement as applied to the whole 
of West Africa: "The laws against adultery are theoretically, 
exceedingly severe. The punishment is death and this is 
sometimes carried out." She describes the ordeals a chief’s 
wife accused of adultery had to Undergo; One ordeal most 
frequently employed was for the accused wife to put her finger 
into a pot of boiling palm-oil, after which the finger was 
dipped into water. If blisters appeared the next day, 
as a result of this treatment, the accused wife was adjudged 
guilty and punished. In order to escape this horrible 
ordeal, the wife often testified falsely. The writer 
concludes:
"These accusations of adultery are next to 
witchcraft, the great social danger to the 
West Coast Native and they are often made 
merely from motives of extortion or spite 
and without an atom of truth in them".^
The severity of the punishment for adultery in
traditional society among the Ibibios was narrated by an
aged informant in Eket. She noted that adultery is much
more frequent in Eket today than it was when she was a
young girl nearly one hundred years ago. She attributed
the increase to the severity of the punishment adultery
attracted, at least for the male offender, in those days.
He was often strung up on a tree and a sharp spear thrust
through his body. After mutilation of his private parts,
his body was left there until it rotted, or was eaten by
2
crows, as a deterrent to others.
This information was confirmed by other informants
in Eket who stated that usually adulterous wives were not
killed, but merely beaten, made to perform certain sacrifices,
and to give specified items, such as a fowls, kola-nuts, or
■2
goats, to appease the husband’s ancestors.
1. Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op.cit., p. 350; 
see also Egharevba, o j d. cit., p. lB; Thomas, 
Anthropological Report ... Ibo-Speaking Peoples,
Part IV, op. cit., p. 75; Begho, o jd. cit., pp. 60 
and 105•
2. See also Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., 
p. 664.
5- See also Talbot, Woman Mysteries... op. cit., p. 97;
Basden, Niger Ibos, op.cit., p. 233; of. the position 
among the early Germans where an adulterous woman was 
dragged through the village until she died, see Goodsell, 
op. cit., p. 210i
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The impression should not be created that adultery 
did not exist* It did, and was tolerated if* not actively 
encouraged, in many societies.1 For example, another old 
Eket informant, when asked how the several wives of a 
polygynist were able to satisfy their, natural sexual urges 
stated that the husband usually had one wife ’’whom he 
always kept before his eyes” (i.e. he loved and agreed with 
well). The other wives were tacitly allowed to have 
paramours, and the husband ’’would not bother with them much”, 
although he claimed all the children produced as a result 
of their illicit unions. She also explained that this 
practice enabled men who were too poor to marry to have 
sexual relations.
Uchendu reports that among Ngwa Igbo, a woman can
get the husband to share his ’exclusive sexual right' with
a paramour chosen by the bride, and acceptable to the 
2
bride-groom . Some systems of customary law, for example, 
many Igbo communities, allow a married woman to be assigned 
to another man, usually for the purpose of making her 
pregnant, where the husband is, or is suspected to be, in­
capable of procreation. In some communities, such 
assignments may be done by the husband’s family without 
his knowledge or consent.^ Theoretically, the wife's 
consent is necessary for an assignment,but threats of 
divorce, or other pressures may force an unwilling wife to 
acce de to such requests. In this respect, it may be 
noted that the practice whereby "the husband of a woman,
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit., p. 233; Ward is of
the opinion that adultery is more common in polygynous
unions, see Ward, Marriage Among the Yoruba, op. cit., 
p. 40.
2. Uchendu, Concubinage Among Ngwa Igbo, op. cit., p. 189.
3 . See The Manual of Customary Law, op. cit., p. 272;
Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit., p. 233! Meek, Law and 
Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, op. cit., p. 2jU~.
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his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to 
another person for value received or otherwise ” has been 
condemned as similar to slavery, by the international 
community.1 Assignment of a wife, without her consent, 
for the purpose•of-procreation, may also be regarded’as 
slavery.
If the husband's or his family’s consents express 
or tacit were not given, adultery by a wife was treated 
with severity.
(iv) The reasons for harsh penalties for a wife’s adultery
Several reasons have been advanced why a wife’s
adultery is harshly treated, including the old idea that a
wife is regarded as the property of her husband,2 and the
desire to preserve the morality of the community^. The
latter reason cannot be defended, since in many cases, a
married woman was permitted to have sexual relations with men
4
other than her husband. Adultery has a deeper connotation, 
and in many societies it was,and still is regarded as a sin 
which had to be purged by sacrifices. As it is believed 
that adultery results in various evils for the husband, and
1. See the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery, 1956, which had sixty-seven States Parties 
as of 30 Sept. 1966. ’’institutions and practices 
similar to slavery which specially affect women have 
been found to persist in some countries despite the 
efforts of the Governments concerned to suppress them”.
See the United Nations Assistance for the Advancement 
of Women, E/CN.6/467, 1966, p. 14.
2. See further, Chapter XIII, pp. 435-438.
3 . According to the Emperor Constantine, severity of 
punishment for adultery was designed to make the 
relatively decent woman more resistant to temptation,
see Corbett, The Roman Law of Marriage, op. cit., p. l4l .
4. See below, Chapter VIII, p.639; see further, Bradbury andLloyd,
The Benin Kingdom, op. cit., p. 108; Forde and Jones,
The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., p. 18.
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sometimes even for the wife,1 various measures are 
adopted to avert these consequences. For example, in 
Abakaliki and Izzi Divisions in Anambra State corporal 
punishment by her natal family is meted out to an adulterous 
wife; This is followed by ikpofu ekwu; a ceremony by 
which the husband’s ancestors are appeased.
This practice gave rise to unfortunate results in
at least one recorded case in Izzi Division. In the
2
State v. Nwaelem Nweri and Ors, a case decided in 1975, 
at the Abakaliki High Court, the deceased who complained of 
heart pains, confessed her adultery to her husband. Her 
husband sent for the first accused,the deceased’s brother, 
and told him of the adultery which they believed had brought 
the illness on her. It was decided to carry out the 
custom. They tied her hands with bicycle tubes, and her 
legs with rope, while four men beat her. Her daughter 
gave evidence that the beating started when she was on her 
way to school (at about 8 a.m.) and was still in progress 
when she returned from school at noon. They left the
1. For e.g. Talbot notes that it is believed amongst 
nearly all ethnic groups in Southern Nigeria that if 
a wife commits adultery while her husband’s food is 
being cooked, the husband will probably die. A 
woman who does not confess to such a sin before giving 
birth will endanger both her own, and her offspring’s 
life, see Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit. 
p. 712; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit. 
pp. 206, 215; among Northern Ngwas (Igbo) the wife, 
holding a fowl, had to confess before the umuada after 
which the fowl was killed and the blood sprinkled on 
the shrine to wash away the ’’sins” - see J.C.J. Eluwa, 
Inter-Group Relations of Northern Ngwa Before the 
Colonial Era, M.A. dissertation, University of 
Nigeria, 1975, p. 50; see also Thomas, Anthropological 
Report ... Ibo-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., Part IV,
pp. 67-69.
2. [1975] Charge No. AB/5/C/74, unreported, Abakaliki
High Court, 50 June, 1975*
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deceased helpless, vomitting, and still tied. She died 
the same, evening. ' The beating was done in the presence 
of her husband, but he did not take part.
Witnesses testified that the custom was still in 
existence, and that no.other penalty was recognized, by custom 
for adultery. A woman confesses her adultery when she, 
or one of her children, is sick. No precise number of 
strokes is prescribed. Another witness stated that the 
flogging given to the woman was ,fnormal,f. MI have in the 
past”, he said, “seen such flogging custom performed.
The flogging of the deceased was the normal flogging. It 
is the custom that several people join in flogging the 
adulteress J1
A medical doctor gave evidence to the effect that 
the beating was not excessive, and could not have caused the 
death of a healthy woman. He concluded that the deceased 
must have been very ill at the time of the beating, and 
but for the beating, may have died later, but the beating 
hastened her death. The Judge, S. Amadi-Obi, said, inter 
alia. "There is no evidence that any death has resulted from 
the performance of this custom hitherto. I therefore find 
as a fact that that is the custom and belief of the people 
of Izzi”. As to whether the belief was reasonable within 
section 25 of the Criminal Code, the Judge distinguished 
explicable belief from inexplicable belief:
11 In the explicable belief there are present 
facts from which one can forsee the realization 
of oneTs belief either (l) concrete facts as 
for instance that mixture of two atoms of hydrogen 
and one atom of oxygen will always result in water, 
or facts of history, or existence, as for example, 
that Julius Caesar lived or that the planet of 
Mars exists and (2) statistical facts as in the 
instant case.
In an inexplicable belief one attached no 
reason to it. It is said to be a take it or 
leave it belief. It is in some cases described 
as superstitious, as a belief in witchcraft.
It is my view that explicable belief is reasonable 
and an inexplicable belief is unreasonable.”
The Judge concluded:
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T,In the instant case this custom has been 
observed with good results in the. past. Past 
statistics-have shown that the custom has been 
efficacious to cure ailing adulterous woman (sic). 
This is so far the only known case where it 
resulted.in the death of the recipient. I 
therefore find that the belief of the accused 
persons is not unreasonable. I find the 
accused persons not guilty of murder. Each is 
discharged and acquitted of murder ... and I am' 
of the view that the first accused flogged the 
deceased a little more than the other accused 
persons expected him to do and that this contri­
buted to the death of the deceased.”
The first accused was found guilty of manslaughter. 
Another reason advanced for the harsh treatment of 
adultery in most societies is that men consider it a 
heinous offence to be palmed off with other m e n ’s children. 
Rousseau regards such an offence as the crime of treason.1 
To preserve their property for inheritance by their own 
blood the argument runs, it is necessary to preserve the 
wife’s chastity. This argument neglects the fact that 
among most traditional societies in Nigeria women had a 
degree of sexual freedom. In many societies,the time of 
sexual licence coincided with the period between puberty and 
just before they took up permanent residence in their 
husbands’ households. Children begotten by other men 
during this period brought disgrace in certain societies,^
1. See Rousseau, Emile, op. cit., p. 325*
2. Among the Hausas, this period of sexual licence was 
known as Tsaranchi, see Meek, Northern Tribes of 
Nigeria, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 188; see also 
Partridge, Cross River Natives, op. cit., p. 254; Thomas, 
Anthropological Report... Ibo-Speaking Peoples, Part TV, 
op. cit., pp. 69-70; Ward, Marriage among the Yoruba,
op. cit., p. 49; Forde, et^ . al_., Peoples of the Niger- 
Benue Confluence, op. cit., p. 68; Bradbury and Lloyd,
The Benin Kingdom, op. cit., p. 154.
3. E.g. among the Hausas, see Meek, Northern Tribes, op.cit. 
Vol. I, p. 188.
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but in others they were simply claimed by the husbands.1 
In Onitsha, the period of sexual freedom for a wife was 
just before she was taken to her husband*s home for per­
manent residence, and many older informants alleged that
if a woman could not show that she had attracted many lovers
2
during this period, she was derided by her husband. In
some $OC iC’tiGS which practised "fattening”, other men were
allowed access to the girls in the "fattening houses".^
Moreover, in matrilineal societies,children do not
generally inherit property from their fathers, yet adultery
4
in these societies attracted similar harsh penalties. 
Schlegel,^ in a study of sixty-six matrilineal societies, 
found that almost double the number allow adultery by the 
husband (60 per cent) as allowed it by the wife (352.1 per 
cent), in spite of the fact that children resulting from an 
adulterous union belong to their mother’s descent group and 
are not, therefore,cuckoos in the father’s lineal nest.
She says:
1. See Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples, Part I, pp. 68-69.
2. Information given by Chief P.O. Anatogu, the Onuwu of 
Onitsha in a recorded interview, at Onitsha, 19 July, 
1978; see also Henderson, The King in Every Man,
op. cit., p. 20^.
3 . Information collected at Eket and Calabar. This 
practice also obtained among some Igbo communities.
4. See Forde, Yako Studies, op. cit., p. 126.
5 . See Alice Schlegel, Male Dominance and Female 
Autonomy, (London: Hraf Press, 1972), p. 89.
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"It is hard to explain why wives should be 
expected to be sexually faithful so much more 
than husbands. I can think of no biological 
or psychological reason for this and the usual 
structural explanation of the child’s membership 
in his father s descent group is not valid for 
matrilineal societies."
Modern psychologists and psychoanalysts have 
advanced evidence which validates greater female unfaith­
fulness, ^ but in spite of this, the law in many societies 
continues to regard a wife’s infidelity more harshly than
o
it does a husband’s.
(c) Modern attitude to adultery
In Nigeria, the modern position as regards adultery, 
although still discriminatory in favour of husbands, is very 
different from what it was in traditional society. For 
example:
(a) adultery is not a crime unless specifically defined
as such in a written law. Under the Penal Code Law i960,
of Northern Nigeria, adultery (zina) is a criminal offence
“Zl c
which may be committed by males, and females, and may
involve married or unmarried persons. Under the Criminal
1. See Masters and Johnson, Human Sexual Response, op. cit.; 
Masters and Johnson, "Orgasm. Anatomy of the Female1*
in Encyclopaedia of Sexual Behaviour, edit, by A. Ellis, 
and A. Abarbanel, (New York, Hawthorn Books, 1961), 
p. 792; L. J. Ludovici, The Final Inequality: A
Critical Assessment of Woman’s Hole in Society (London: 
Frederick Muller Ltd. 1965)* p. 246; Judd Marmor, 
"Changing Patterns of Femininity: Psychoanalytic
Implications", in The Marriage Relationship: 
Psychoanalytic Perspectives, edit, by Salo Rosenbaum 
and Ian Alger (New York: Basic Books Inc. 1968),
pp. 31-^5 at P* 39*
2. See further,. Chapter VIII,pp. 637-638.
3 . Cap. 89, Laws of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1963
Revision.
A . Ibid., s . 387•
5. Ibid., s. 388; any extra-marital intercourse constitutes
the offence.
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Code Act1 which operates in the Southern States, adultery
is not a crime, and cannot therefore- be treated as such in
those societies where adultery was a criminal offence under
customary law. In Aoko v. Fagbemi,^ the appellant pleaded
guilty to a charge of adultery, in that she lived with
another man without judicial separation from her husband.
In February 1961, she was sentenced to imprisonment for one
month, or a fine of £2.10, by a Grade D. Customary Court.
She was also ordered to pay £5 compensation to her husband,
and £1.75 In costs.
On appeal, the High Court held, inter alia, that the
conviction of the accused violated her rights as guaranteed
by section 2(1) of the Constitution of the federation of
Nigeria, i960, which provides that a person shall not be
convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is
defined, and the penalty therefor is prescribed in a written 
4
law.
(b) the traditional penalties, -such as death, ordeals of 
various kinds, severe beatings, and sale into slavery can 
no longer be imposed;-'
1. Cap. 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1963 
Revision.
2. Adultery may be made a criminal offence under local 
bye-laws, see e.g. the Customary Courts Manual of the 
former Western Region of Nigeria; s~. 163, (which 
provides: ,Tif adultery is a criminal offence under a 
local council bye-law, a criminal prosecution can be 
brought. This will be a separate proceeding from the 
claim for divorce. A conviction for adultery should 
not be included in the judgment in a divorce action”.
3. [1961] 1 ALL N.L.R. 400.
4. See S. 33(12) of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1979* No. 25 of 1978.
5 . See Ordeal, Witchcraft and Juju Ordinance, 1903* No.
13 of 1903, s. 2, which provides: "Trial by the ordeal
of sasswood, esere-bean or other poison, boiling oil,
fire, immersion in water or exposure to the attacks 
of crocodiles, or other wild animals, or by any ordeal 
which is likely to result in the death or bodily injury 
to any party to the proceeding shall be and is hereby 
prohibited". Ten years imprisonment with hard labour 
was imposed for any infringement, and if death resulted 
as a result of an infringement of the Ordinance, the 
penalty on conviction was death.
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(c) secret societies, such as egbo among the Ibibios, and 
egungun among.the Yoruba, which were used as instruments to 
suppress adultery, by driving fear into the heacfcs of women, 
are now illegal}'*’
■■■(d) trivial acts- which formerly■ counted as adultery would
2not now be legally considered as adultery;
(e) the amount of damages obtainable for adultery in a 
civil suit is fixed by local legislation in some areas.^
Although there has been general improvement in the 
laws relating to adultery, sexual inequality in the appli­
cation of the law continues to operate. In most communities, 
a husband of a customary law marriage may claim damages 
for adultery from the adulterer, from the adulterous wife, 
or from both of them. A wife is not entitled to claim 
damages for adultery under customary law in most communities, 
and this is another example of the infringement of the right 
to freedom from discrimination entrenched in the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979* It may be noted 
here that a wife of a statutory marriage is entitled to claim 
damages from anyone who commits adultery with her husband.^
1. See Bums, History of Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 35-36; 
Clarke, Travels and Explorations in Yorubaland, 1854- 
1858, op. citTj p. 284; Latham, Old Calabar, l600-l891, 
op. cit., pp. 36-^8; S.P. 1139/Vol V, Annual Report of 
the Calabar Province, 1926 - C.S.E. 1/12/2, National 
Archives, Enugu; see also the treaty signed by the 
Alake and Chiefs of Abeokuta with Commander Beddingfield 
and others on 7 Nov. l86l; Burton, Abeokuta and the 
Cameroon Mountains: An Exploration (London: 186),
Vol. II, pp. 5* 7-6*
2. E.g. crossing over the outstretched legs of a wife or 
touching her waist, see Begho, op. cit., p. 101, cf. 
Atansuyi v. Gbadamosi [1969] 2 All N.L.R. 222; but see 
Henderson, The King in Every,Man, op. cit., p. 213*
3. See Apon v. Fayemiwo [1969] 1 N.M.L.R., 233» see
The Ibadan District Council Marriage Divorce and 
Custody of Children Bye-Laws, 1965- s.l.
4. See below, Chapter VIII, p.637.
5 . See further,below, Chapter XI, p. 279.
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Enticement
A breach of the duty of consortium may be occasioned 
by anyone who wrongfully entices, or procures, or induces a 
spouse to., abandon- the. duties owed to the other s.pouse. The 
latter spouse, as a consequence, can recover damages for 
enticement resulting in loss of consortium.1 Enticement is 
not a customary law remedy, although it is analogvous to 
seduction and harbouring of a wife, which, as shall be seen 
later, are known to some systems of customary law. Entice­
ment is a common law concept founded in tort, and although
2
it has recently been abolished in English law, the action is 
still available in Nigerian law.
Since enticement is a tort, actions for enticement
may not be brought in a customary court, but it is available
to both husband and wife of a customary marriage. In
4
Wagbara v. Wobo, the plaintiff brought an action in the 
High Court claiming £550 damages against the defendant for 
the enticement of the plaintiff*s wife married to him under 
customary law. The defendant’s Counsel contended that 
since the marriage on which the action was founded was a 
customary marriage, the High Court had no jurisdiction; 
also that an action for enticement was only available to a 
spouse married under the Marriage Act. The Court held:
”(1) that the action for enticement was
available to the spouses of a customary 
marriage and was not limited to spouses 
married under the Marriage Act;
1. Winsmore v. Greenbank [17^5]* Welles, 577*
2. See Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970,
55 Stats., 555, s.5 (a) and (c) which abolished actions 
for enticement seduction and harbouring of a spouse; 
see the Report of the Law Reform Committee, 1965*
Cmnd. 2017, P* 25: "The only importance of the action 
of enticement at the present day is in the field of 
husband and wife, where we think that on adequate 
remedy is available in divorce proceedings...”
5 . Welton v. Broadhead [1958] The Times, 19 June, 1958.
4. [1970-72] 1 R.S.L.R. 14.
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(2) that the High Court had jurisdiction
to try the action, since the action was 
not one to enquire into the validity or 
otherwise of the marriage as such or for 
the•dissolution of the marriage, but for 
redress for an injury done to the plaintiff's 
right of- consortium.”
Similarly, in Solomon v. Chukwuani,^ in a claim for 
enticement of a wife married under customary law, it was held 
that the action had nothing to do with status, or with the
p
formalities and or incidents of customary law marriage.
A wife, whether of a customary marriage or not, is
entitled to sue for enticement. ObiTs argument that
enticement is not available to women married under customary law,
it is respectfully submitted, cannot be supported. In the
4
English case of Newton v. Hardy and Anor, it was held that 
a married woman has a legal right to the consortium of her 
husband and can recover damages for enticement from anyone
who violates that right. In view of the decisions in
S 6Wagbara v. Wobov and Solomon v. Chukwuani, that enticement
is a remedy for infringement of a legal right possessed by
all husbands and wives under Nigerian Law, it is iifficult
to see on what basis wives of a customary marriage are
excluded.
1. [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 619.
2. Compare the Ghanian case of Mate v. Amanor [1973] 1 G.L.R.
469* where it was held that a husband1s rights and 
obligations appertaining to marriage contracted under 
customary law, ought to be distinguished from his legal 
rights arising out of torts committed in respect of the 
said marriage.
3. Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., pp. 2^2-233.
4. [1934] 149 L.T.R. 165, 168; [1933] All E.R. 40;
see also Gray v. Gee [1923] 39'T.L.R. 429; and obiter 
dicta in Place v. Searle [1932] 2 K.B. 497; and Best 
v. Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 394.
5 . [1970-72] 1 R.S.L.R. 14;
6 . [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 619;
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In the English case of Smith v. Kaye,1 it was stated
that an action for enticement is wholly independent of
sexually immoral factors, and therefore the action may be
against a brother, or brother-in-law, of the wife concerned.
2But in the later case of Gottlieb v. Gleiser, Denning, L.J.,
held that such an action cannot be brought against a wifeTs
mother, whom the husband claimed had enticed his wife.
Gottlieb v. Gleiser, was followed in the Nigerian case of   ---------
Nelson-Peregba v. Zaidan, where Atake, J.,extended the 
principle that actions are not maintainable against parents- 
in-law to cover the defendant who had enticed and harboured 
the plaintiff!s wife as a favour to her parents.
In order to recover damages for enticement, the 
plaintiff must prove that the spouse has been enticed, 
procured, or persuaded by the defendant to cease from co­
habiting, and consorting with her. Where, therefore, a 
plaintiff proved that the defendant had committed adultery 
with her husband, but failed to prove that the defendant had
induced him to cease from cohabiting and consorting with her,
r 6
the action failed.-' In Adu v. Gillison, it was held that
for the defendant to be liable for enticement, some positive
act, which must be clear and unambiguous, is expected to
have been done by him in the decision of the wife to leave
the husband’s house and society, and that the defendant’s
merely helping her to carry out the decision which she had
1. [1904] 20 T.L.R. 26l; see also Mate v. Amanor [1973]
1 G.L.R. 469; Elliot v. Albert [I9jPT] 1 K.B. 650 at 
p. 662, C.A..
2. [1957] 3 ALL E.R. 715.
3. [1957] 3 ALL E.R. 715.
4. [1973] 3 U.I.L.R. 217;
5 . Newton v. Hardy, [1943] 1^9 L.T.R. 165.
6. [1962] W.R.N.L.R. 390; see also Smith v. Kaye [1904]
20 T.L.R. ' cf. Berthonv. Cartwright [1796] 2 Esp. 480 
170 E.R.99; Philip v. Squire [1791] Peake 114; 170 E.R.99 
Sharpies v. Barton [1951] 13 W.A.C.A. 198.
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taken herself, did not amount to enticement. Similarly, 
where a. wife, apparently dissatisfied with conditions in the 
matrimonial home, due, it was suggested, to the polygamous 
propensities of the husband,solicited the help of her clan 
head in obtaining-a shop, and living apartment, it was held 
that he had not enticed the wife in the strict sense in which 
the law interprets the word "enticed.”
Under the Penal Code Law of Northern Nigeria, whoever 
takes or entices away any woman who is, and whom he knows, 
or has reasons to believe, the wife of any other man, with 
intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person 
or conceals or detains with that intent any such woman shall 
be punished with imprisonment for a maximum term of two years, 
or with a fine,or both.^ There is no similar provision for 
the enticement of a husband.
Seduction
Under English common law, a parent who lost the 
services of his or her daughter due to the daughterTs 
pregnancy and child-birth as a consequence of sexual inter­
course with the defendant was entitled to claim damages for 
2
seduction. A right to claim damages in similar circum­
stances also obtains in many systems of customary law in 
Nigeria.^ A parent whose daughter has been seduced in 
Nigeria may therefore claim damages for seduction under 
either the common law, or under customary law. In
1. Penal Code Law, I960, Cap. 89* Laws of Northern 
Nigeria, 1963 Revision, s. 389-
2. Actions for seduction were abolished in England by 
s.5 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970 
which provides that no action shall lie for loss of 
services due to rape, seduction, enticement or 
harbouring; see the Eleventh Report of The Law Reform 
Committee, 1963; Cmnd. 2017 par. 22: "We think that the 
action for seduction as an offshoot of the action for 
loss of services no longer serves any useful purpose”.
3 . See Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 645 
Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People,
op. cit., p. 57; Forde, Marriage and Family Among the 
Yako, op. cit., p. 19; Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. 
p. 321; Customary Law Manual, op. cit., pp. 368-369.
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Nkumatolu Nwagu v. Ezienyi1, the plaintiff claimed the sum 
of £200 as damages for seduction resulting in pregnancy and 
consequent loss of services of his daughter. Magistrate 
Ekwulugo disbelieved the defendant's denial that he knew the 
girl‘carnally and awarded the plaintiff £60 damages." I f  
was not stated in the judgment, however, which law the 
learned judge had applied. But under Yoruba customary law, 
seduction is the deprivation of a husband's right of 
consortium with his wife, by a man who takes her away with 
the intention of living with her as husband and wife. For 
a husband to obtain damages for seduction, it must be 
established that the defendant was responsible for the wife
leaving the matrimonial home. In Atansuyi v. Gbadamosi,2
Odumosu,J.,held that for the defendant to be liable in 
damages for the plaintiff's loss of consortium of his wife,
married to him under customary law, it must be established
that the defendant was responsible for the wife leaving the 
matrimonial home, and that he had enticed her away from her 
husband. Seduction in Yoruba customary law is, in a sense, 
akin to enticement under the common law, except that it is 
not available to a wife whose husband has been seduced, and 
it involves sexually immoral factors.
Among the Yorubas, seduction is also a legal form of 
marriage, and is effected when a wife is seduced, and the 
dowry paid by the former husband is refunded by the seducer. 
Such a divorce followed by remarriage is referred to as 
"marriage by seduction"^ in order to differentiate it from
1. [1970] Suit No. ME/52/70, unreported; Enugu Magistrates 
Courts, decided on 17.12.70.
2. [1969] 2 ALL N.L.R. 222.
5* See Faremilekun and Ors. v. The State [197^] 3 W.S.C.A.,
86 at p. 109; the position in England where a Bill
to prevent women marrying their seducers was introduced
into Parliament in 1801; see Haydon's Dictionary of 
Dates, 1892, 20th edit. Actions for seduction are now 
abolished under English law, see Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1970, s.5-
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"marriage in maiden", in which the wife is taken directly 
from her parents and the dowry is therefore paid to them.
Repayment of the dowry to the first husband is
necessary for the legal validity of a "marriage by seduction". 
In Chawere v,. Aihenu and Johnson,1 the wife of a Yoruba 
customary marilage was seduced by the plaintiff who repaid 
£20 dowry to the first husband. He thus became her husband 
by seduction. Later, the wife, the first defendant, left 
the plaintiff and went to live with the second defendant.
The plaintiff sued both defendants, for £24.10s. being the 
dowry he had repaid to the first defendant's first husband, 
and also for the purchase price of a sewing machine given by
the plaintiff to the first defendant. It was held on appeal
that the lower Court was wrong in holding that ipsis factis 
of a woman leaving her husband, and living in adultery with 
another man, the woman became the wife of the adulterer under 
native law and custom. It was held also that the second 
defendant could have been liable by way of damages for 
adultery, but upon the evidence the Court below was right in 
holding that such a claim was not made out since there was 
no evidence or suggestion that the second defendant was in 
any way responsible for the first defendant leaving the 
plaintiff.
If a husband is responsible for his wife leaving the
matrimonial home, he cannot claim damages from her nor from
2
any man with whom she subsequently lives.
The difference between adultery and seduction in 
Yoruba customary law is a tenuous one and Customary Court 
judges do not generally distinguish between damages for 
adultery and damages for seduction. The Ibadan District 
Council (Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children) Bye-
1* F1935] 12 N.L.R.4; cf. Evoroja v. Evoroja and Anor
[1961] 2 W.R.N.L.R.6.
2. Chawere v. Aihenu and Johnson [1935] 12 N.L.R.4; 
Ekundare, op. cit.,pp. 46-47*
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Laws, 1965* provides:
"Adultery:. Where a married, woman leaves her 
husband and lives with another man as his wife 
for more than five days without instituting a 
■divorce against her husband, the husband may 
... take, a criminal action for adultery against the 
woman or that other man (hereinafter called the 
seducer) the maximum punishment for which shall 
be £2/10 for the woman, and £5 for the seducer."^
Under this provision adultery is confounded with
seduction, and adultery is not committed by mere illicit
sexual intercourse with a married woman.
Harbouring a wife
Under the common law, a husband has the right to an
action for damages against anyone who unlawfully harbours
his wife. This remedy was never available to the wife,
presumably on the ground that it was based on the quasi-
proprietary interest which the husband had in his wife and
2
in her services at common law.
Under some systems of customary law, a husband, but 
not a wife, had a similar right against anyone who unlawfully 
detains his wife. If the wife, as is usually the case, is 
detained by her parents or other legal guardian, the husband 
is expected to appeal to them to return his wife to him. If 
such appeal fails, his normal remedy is to claim the refund 
of dowry he had paid with reference to the marriage.
Under modern customary law, where a husband fails to effect 
the return of his wife unlawfully detained, he may institute 
an action for her return in the Customary Court. It is 
usual to make an alternative claim for the refund of dowry
1. S. 5 .
2. See Winchester v. Flemming [1957] 5 ALL E.R., 7 H «
3 . See Ajisafe, op. cit., p. 58 J Talbot, The Peoples of
Nigeria, 0£. cit., Vol. Ill, pp. 449 and 450-455; Forde, 
Marriage and the Family Among the Yako, op. olt., p.72; 
Charles Partridge, Cross River Natives, 1[London:
Hitchinson and Co., 1905)* P« 25b; Obi, (Modern 
Family Law, ojo. cit., p. 229; Nwogugu, Family Law 
in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 91*
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in the event of failure to return the bride, especially where
she is detained by her parents.. In Egri v.. Uperi1, the
plaintiff claimed return of his "wife", married under
customary law, from her father. The father denied the 
2
marriage. ■ Commenting on the claim the UghelliHigh
Court observed:
,fSuch claim are justifiable, and the general 
opinion of the judges in this area is that it 
is impossible to limit by construction the 
beneficial jurisdiction of the customary court 
to grant a sort of mandatory relief to a husband 
against the parents of the wife where it is just 
and convenient to do so.1'
The Court, however, noted:
"When such a relief is granted and the parents 
fail to return their daughter to the husband 
on any ground the only right open to the 
aggrieved husband is to reclaim a refund of the 
bride-price as the customary court cannot 
enforce the observance of the order. The court 
cannot compel a wife to return to her husband as 
any attempt to do so will be an infringement of 
her fundamental rights under the Constitution of 
this country." [Supreme CourtTs italics]
The learned Judge, in spite of this pronouncement, 
nevertheless ordered the return of the defendant’s daughter 
to the respondent. On appeal, the Supreme Court, com­
prising, Elias, C.J.N., Fatayi-Williams, J.S.C., and the 
late Ibekwe, J.S.C., said:
"For our part, all we can say and we will put 
it no higher than that, is that it is arguable 
whether any order whether made by a customary 
court or by any other court, that a wife should 
return against her will, to her husband would 
not be inconsistent with her freedom of association 
as guaranteed by the provision of section 26(1 ) 
of the Constitution of the Federation. It is 
also arguable whether such an order would not be 
contrary to the principles of natural justice, 
equity, and good conscience. However, as
1. [1974] 4 EC.SLR, 632; [1974] N.M.L.R. 22.
2. See Chapter p. 442 for the facts and other
aspects of this case.
3. Egri v. Uperi [1974] 4 EC.SLR, 632 at p. 634.
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these points were not argued before us in this 
appeal we do not propose-to express any views 
about them.”^
This obiter dicta of the Supreme Court has already 
been noted in connection with cohabitation, but is repeated
phere because of the alarming case of Erurhobare v. Otebrise » 
The plaintiff, who alleged he was married to the 
defendant’s daughter under native law and custom, brought an 
action in the Adeje Customary Court for an order asking the 
defendant to return the plaintiff’s wife to him. The
plaintiff’s only witness gave evidence of the marriage as 
follows:
’’The plaintiff approached me that he would 
marry the daughter of the defendant. I then 
accompanied him to the defendant who agreed 
to give his daughter to the plaintiff. We 
then went and paid the bride price. And the 
lady was handed to the plaintiff”.
The customary court ordered that the defendant should 
return the plaintiff’s wife within two weeks of the date of 
the order. This order was confirmed by the Acting Chief 
Magistrate. The defendant appealed further to the High 
Court and argued, inter-alia, that the decision of the 
customary court was against the weight of evidence; and 
that the acting Chief Magistrate erred in law in holding that 
the plaintiff was married to the defendant’s daughter 
according to native law and custom. It was also urged 
that the order made by the Customary Court was unenforceable, 
being in the nature of an order for the specific performance 
of a personal contract, and that the decision of the court 
offended s. 22(a) of the Customary Courts Edict as it was 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
The learned High Court Judge, Mrs. Omo-Eboh, held:
1 . Ibid., p. 638.
2 . [1970] 1 U.I.L.R. 33.
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1 . that there was sufficient evidence on record to
show that the customary marriage between the plaintiff 
and the defendant’s daughter had been proved;
2. That the order of the Customary Court, Adije was lawful 
under customary law, and that the application of the 
principles of English law or common law to the instant 
case would defeat the purpose of the legislature in 
establishing customary courts;
3 . that an order of mandamus would lie to enforce a duty 
arising under native law and custom;
4. that the rescission of the Order of the Customary 
Court, Adeje, for the return of the wife would have 
the effect of abrogating the unwritten customary law 
of the natives of Adeje, and that no court possessed 
the power to change the custom of the natives.
The learned Judge dismissed the appeal,and in effect 
ordered that the defendant return the plaintiff’s wife to 
him.
The decision and judgment in this case is,disturbing 
for several reasons:
(a) The learned Judge apparently did not consider the 
bride’s consent to the marriage as necessary to the validity 
of the marriage. The evidence as accepted by her, fails 
to show that the girl’s consent was given, or even asked 
for. Whatever may have been the custom in olden days, a 
sufficient number of cases, including cases decided by the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, have decided that a woman’s 
consent to her marriage is a sine qua non of a valid marriage 
under customary law.'*" The evidence of the bride’s consent 
was specially relevant in the instant case, since the 
appellant consistently denied that a customary marriage had 
been concluded between the respondent and his daughter.
1. See Osamwonyi v. Osamwonyi [1972] 1 ALL N.L.R. 357*
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(b) The learned Judge’s opinion that the principles or 
procedure of English law, or common law, would defeat the 
purpose of the legislature in establishing customary courts 
did not deter her from applying the English procedure of 
’’mandamus to enforce a duty arising under customary law,
(c) The learned Judge’s statement that ”no court possessed
the power to change the custom of the n a t i v e s c h a l l e n g e s
a number of legislative provisions which provide for the
application of customary law only ”in so far as it is not
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience
nor incompatible with any written law for the time being in
force”, as well as numerous decisions in which this principle
2
has been applied in the superior courts of Nigeria. As 
seen earlier, the application of this principle, from the 
middle of the nineteenth century onwards has been a potent 
factor in liberating women from the stranglehold of vicious 
customary practices. The principle is also a valuable aid, 
enabling the courts to bring customary law into line with 
the moral ethos of contemporary society.
(d) The Judge did not think it necessary to direct her 
mind as to whether the wife was willing to return to her 
husband or not. This consideration should have been the 
whole crux of the matter, since the subject matter of the
1. Erurhobare v. Otebrise [1970] 1 U.I.L.R. 33 at 
p. 3^.
2. See Chapter II above, for cases concerning the 
status of women in which this principle has been 
applied. The Customary Court Edict of the Mid- 
Western (now Bendel State) State, 1966, s. 22 (a) 
provides that a Customary Court shall administer 
the appropriate customary law ”in so far as it is 
not repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience,, nor incompatible either directly or 
by necessary implication with any written law for 
the time being in force.
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action, the res to be returned, was not an item of property, 
but an adult with a mind and will of her own and a right, 
granted to her under the Nigerian Constitution of freedom 
of association. There is no evidence of any system of 
customary law in Nigeria which provides that a wife who 
refuses to live, and whose parents also refuse that she 
should live, with her husband, should be forcibly handed 
over to the husband. In such cases, customary law provided 
an alternative remedy - the immediate return of the dowry 
paid by the husband on the occasion of the marriage. It 
seems contrary to public policy of the present Nigerian 
society, to expect a father to comply with such an order if 
the girl is unwilling to return or to stay with the husband, 
or to expect the girl to cohabit with anyone against her 
wishes.
(e) It is a cause for regret that the High Court Judge
concerned in this case is a woman. Women judges have been
seen in other countries, for example, Vietnam,1 as more
likely to have special insight and sympathy which may help
to liberate women from the inferior position ascribed to
them by customary legal systems; the dignity of women is
seen as their particular concern. It is disappointing that
a female Judge should treat a woman as if she were an item
of property to be bandied between husband and father as this
passage from the judgment of the learned Judge reveals:
"It appears to me that it is customary for a 
Customary Court to order the return of a wife 
married under native law and custom. The 
fact that it is the custom of certain natives 
of Nigeria that it is the father who has the 
right to give away his daughter in marriage to 
a man from whom he has accepted bride-price
T~. To make sure that recent reforms of marriage and
family laws are duly observed in the spirit of the 
law, all judges in cases relating to marriage in Viet Nam 
are women, who it is expected will "protect women in 
enforcing the laws against polygamy, and other feudal 
marriage practices, see Bergman, "Women of Viet Nam", 
1974, ojd• cit., p. 195*
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cannot be overlooked.... As this case stands it 
is the defendant/appellant who gave his daughter 
away in marriage for consideration under native 
law and custom and in the same way under the 
same native law and custom he can order the return 
of his daughter to the plaintiff/respondent.
The defendant/appellant must bow to the custom of 
his native land and as such I am of the opinion 
that he owes it a lawful duty under the custom of 
his native land to return his daughter to the 
plaintiff/respondent".^
One would have liked to see some reference being
made to the consent of the girl being required,and her willing­
ness to return to her husband being proved.
Under customary law there is no corresponding action
for the harbouring of a husband, and this is yet again another 
instance of discrimination against women, contrary to the 
Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1979*
(1) The Right to Maintenance 
From the discussion on the economic status of women
above, it is evident that under most traditional systems 
of customary law, there was no obligation on a husband to 
maintain his wife in the sense usually understood in English 
common law, or in modern Nigerian law.-
The majority of societies in the olden days were
wild animals caught in hunting, and fish provided the
1. Erurhobare v. Otebrise [1970] 1 U.I.L ,R. 33 at pp. 
35-36.
2. See above, Chapter I, pp. 126-130.
3. See Guy Hunter "From the Old Culture to the New", in
The Study of Africa", op. cit., p. 321; Colonial
Reports, No. 409 of 1902.
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predominantly 
sufficient economically.
The family was generally self- 
Farm products, supplemented by
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main sustenance for the family.^ Responsibility for
support of the household was divided between husband and 
2
wife.. In most traditional societies,women were expected 
to make some contribution to the support of the household, 
and among a few communities they were entirely responsible 
for feeding the members of the family, the husband allotting 
land to them for this purpose. Effective fulfilment of
■5
this obligation determined their status in the family.
Nigerian women in traditional societies, were never,
nor are they now, simply housewives maintained by their
husbands, in the same way as middle class English women
4
were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There 
is abundant evidence that in most societies, the women were 
the industrious workers who performed the greater part of 
the agricultural chores. A considerable proportion of 
the menTs time was spent in political discussions. Mockler- 
—  Perryman, who accompanied Major MacDonald on his mission 
to the Niger and Benue Rivers around 1890, speaking of the 
toils of women in traditional society notes:
1. See Okigbo, "Social Consequences of Economic Development", 
in Social Problems of Change and Conflict, edit., by
Van Den Berghe, op. cit., pp. 41b, et. al., Fadipe, 
op. cit., p. 151.
2. See Phoebe Ottenberg, "The Changing Economic position 
of Women among the Afikbo IboT, 0£. cit., p. 207;
Green, Igbo Village Affairs, op. cit., p. 36.
See Okonjo, op. cit., p7 I£)7, and Table VII; Talbot, 
Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit., p. 196; Daryl 
Forde, "Land and Labour in a Cross River Village in 
Southern Nigeria", reprint, Geographical Journal,
Vol. XC, No. 1, July, 1937* p. ?0.
3 . R. N. Henderson and H. K. Henderson, An Outline of 
Traditional Onitsha Ibo Socialization^ (Ibadan:
Ibadan University Press, 1966), p. 14.
4. There were a few exceptions, e.g. Kalahari wives,
see Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit., p.196
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"For real delightful idleness the African 
Mohammedan man 1licks creation’ and I fancy 
no human being knows better how to laze away 
time. We studied him here for the .first time 
from the deck of the Boussa. We were not 
overbusy ourselves - in fact only reading 
newspapers and watching natives; but our Mohammedan 
friends gave us many points and a severe beating.
There they squatted all day long on the river bank, 
elbows on knees and one hand shading their eyes, 
their daily task being to watch their wives toil.
These are the working'bees of Africa, they it is 
Who do all the labour of the factory and all the 
trading, their husbands seeing that they are not 
idle, for the woman’s work means wealth to the 
husband, and wealth means more wives and yet again 
wealth. Doubtless with civilization relief will 
come to these hardworking women; at present they 
have not been educated up to a ’strike’, and know 
not the beauties of woman’s rights and woman’s 
wrongs”.^
The common law rules whereby a husband had a legal
duty to maintain his wife were the inevitable consequence
of the legal principles relating to property: the wife was
legally incapable of holding property, and of making contracts
on her own accord. The husband, therefore,had a legal duty
to provide ’’necessaries” required by his wife according to
2
his station of life. The very fact of marriage raised the 
presumption at common law that a husband was bound to maintain
3
his wife. There was no such presumption in most Nigerian
k
systems of customary law, even where, as among the Idomas, 
and some Igbo communities, the wife’s property legally
1. Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, op. cit., p. 52.
2. See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England,
op. cit., p. 4421 Manby v. Scott LlbbOJ Smith s Leading 
Cases, 13th edit., p. 417; Povey v. Povey [1972] Fam. 
40, at p. 50*
3. See National Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Ainsworth [1965]
A .C . 1229;
4. See H. G. Armstrong, ’’Intestate Succession Among the 
Idona”, in Studies in the Laws of Succession, edit, 
by J. Duncan M. Derrett, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1965)5 pp. 212-229, at p. 225.
5. See Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 3 H «
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belonged to her husband. The absence of duty of husbands 
to maintain their wives obtained even in societies where 
women were not predominantly engaged in agricultural.
For example, among the Yorubas, where women traditionally 
engaged in trade, Bowen, in the middle of the last century 
observed:
’’every woman is a free dealer, who labours 
for herself... Even during the continuance 
of the marriage relations the woman is sole 
owner of her property and her earnings. She 
is not obliged to work for her husband, and 
has no claim on him for support, either for 
herself or her children. In this way the man 
escapes the burden of supporting his wives and 
children, except that he is obliged to furnish 
them with house room.-^
Similarly, older interviewees testified to the fact 
that among the Ibibios formerly, ’’women got nothing from 
their husbands. They were given lands to farm and were 
expected to feed and clothe themselves and children, andp
also feed their husbands.” This was also the position
among many other communities in Nigeria,^ except among the
kingly and chieftaincy classes, whose wives did no or 
4
little work.
The right to maintenance, which it is alleged now 
exists in customary law,-* was brought about by European 
civilization and the introduction and penetration of common 
law principles into customary law and practice, and 
represents a change In the legal status of a wife married
1. Bowen, Central Africa, op. cit., pp. 304-305; Fadipe, 
op. cit., pp. 67-89; Ajisafe, ojd. cit., p. 62; Clarke, 
Travels and Explorations in Yorubaland 1854-1858, op. cit., 
p. 245; Lloyd, “The Yoruba of Nigeria, in PeopTes of 
Africa, edit, by James Gibbs, ojd. cit., p. 543 et. al.
Esenwa, ojd. cit., pp. 64-75* Bascom, The Yoruba of 
Southwestern Nigeria, op. cit., p. §5; Ag'isafe, op.cit.p.62. .
2. Information obtained by recorded interviews with women 
in Eket, esp. Madam Anne Edem, Madam -C. Umoffia, Mrs.
J. Ohpoh and Madam Bello Essenowo.
3. See Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, op. cit., p. 140.
4. See Green, Land Tenure in an Ibo Village, op. cit., pp. 13-14;
Green, Igbo Village Affairs, op. cit., pp. 34-36; see also 
Jerome Barkow, "Hausa Women and Islam”, 1972, Canadian 
Journal of African Studies, Vol. VI, p. 325* for the 
position of non-Moslem women in Northern Nigeria.
5. See e.g. Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. pp.
215-216; Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., pp. 245-246; 
Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op. cit.,
pp. 195-196.
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according to customary law.
Unfortunately, the right to maintenance of a wife 
in customary law is more evident in academic literature 
than it is in judicial decisions or actual practice.
The present writer found more cases of husbands of 
a customary law marriage, claiming a breach of the wifefs 
duty to provide them with food, than wives claiming lack 
of maintenance by their husbands. This is especially the 
case among the Ibibios. For example, in Nathan Bassey v. 
Etuk Udo Harry,^ the plaintiff claimed damages from the 
wife for "depriving the plaintiff of her services, including 
feeding and conjugal rights since four months now". The 
husband alleged that he had allotted land to the wife, and 
as a result she had a duty to feed him from her crops.
The wife denied liability on the ground that she was no 
longer married to the plaintiff and asked the court for a 
divorce. The couple were given some time to settle their 
domestic differences.
(ii) The enforcement of the duty of maintenance
The opinion expressed by writers on Nigerian family
law and a few Customary Court judges, that a man has a
"legal obligation to provide his wife with the necessaries
of life according to his means and station in life", is a
common law precept which has not penetrated deeply enough
to be accepted as a legal principle of Nigerian customary
law, and therefore enforceable by Nigerian Customary Courts.
In only one of the numerous cases recorded by the present
writer from the Customary Courts,was maintenance claimed by
■3
a wife of a customary marriage. In Isong v . Isong, the
1. [1972] Suit No. 43/72, unreported, Eket Customary Court,
2 Feb. 1972.
2. See e.g. the Customary Court decisions cited by 
Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce under Yoruba Customary 
Law, op. cit., pp. 67 et. al.; most of these cases
were decided by judges who are legally qualified lawyers.
3 . [1972] Suit No. 171/72/8055, unreported, Eket 
Customary Court, 20 April, 1972.
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wife claimed maintenance from the husband for herself and 
two children of the marriage. She alleged that her husband 
who was a teacher, had allotted no farming land to her, and 
had given her no maintenance. The Eket Customary Court 
ordered the husband to give £5 monthly to the wife for 
maintenance.
Nwogugu notes that customary law does not provide 
judicial machinery for the enforcement of the husband’s 
duty to maintain his wife. If he fails to discharge his 
obligation, the wife may resort to extra-legal processes”. 
After narrating some of these extra-hgal alternatives 
available to the wife, the writer concludes that it is ”a 
social rather than a legal sanction that compels a husband 
to maintain his wife under customary law.”1
The writers who assert the existence of a husbandTs 
legal duty to maintain his wife under customary law, admit 
that the alleged duty cannot be enforced, and that ”the 
only course open to a wife who has not been maintained by 
the husband is to bring an action for the dissolution of 
the marriage on that ground”. It is not easy to appreciate 
why the right of maintenance cannot be enforced by Customary 
Courts, if such a right exists. It is submitted that 
contrary to the assertion of some writers, no such right 
existed under traditional customary law; this explains why 
such actions are very rarely brought to the Customary Courts
A husband’s duty in traditional customary law was to
2
allot each of his wives a piece of land for her use, and 
in those communities, like the Yorubas, where wives usually 
did little farming, to give each wife some kind of capital 
with which to start her trade. Once the wife was provided 
with land, or given trading capital, the main duty of the
1. Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, bp. cit., p. 217.
2. Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, 
op. cit., p. 50*
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husband in this respect was satisfied, and the wife was
expected at least to feed herself and her dependent
children,1 with little help from the husband.
This unsatisfactory state of customary law with
regard to maintenance of married women led to the proposal
2
of a Bill by a female member of the former Eastern Nigeria
Legislature - The Married Women (Maintenance) Bill^ -
which aimed at remedying the law. The Bill proposed
giving Customary Courts the power to enforce maintenance
of a wife in cases where the husband had deserted her,
or had been guilty of persistent cruelty or wilful neglect
to provide her with reasonable maintenance, or had ever
4
compelled her to submit herself to prostitution. Un-
R
fortunately, the Bill never became law.
A few native authorities in the Northern States have 
made statutory provision for the maintenance of wives married 
under customary law. For example, under the Native 
Authority (Declaration of Idoma Native Marriage Law and 
Custom) Order, 1959* a wife is entitled to maintenance, 
including food, clothing and housing at a standard commen­
surate with the husband’s means, for herself and her 
dependant children.^
Divorce actions brought by women in Customary Courts 
which alle ge lack of care as a ground, nearly always include 
one or more other matrimonial offences, such as cruelty
1. See Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, op. cit. 
p. 65; Ajisafe, op. cit., p. 65.
2. The Bill was introduced by Mrs. J. N. Mokelu, member 
for Enugu.
3 . See Supplement, Eastern Nigeria Gazette, No. 75* Vol.l4, 
14 November, 1965*
4. Section 2(1) Married Women (Maintenance) Bill, 1965*
5 . The Bill was overtaken by events mainly occasioned by
the Nigerian Civil War, and after the war, it was not
revived.
6. S. 8(2) (c).
592
or desertion. This is perhaps because Customary CourtsT 
judges do not usually grant a divorce solely on the ground 
of failure by the husband to maintain his wife. In 
Esther Amoke v . Alimi Bello,'*' where the plaintiff petitioned 
for divorce solely on the ground of ,Twant of care,f, the 
Court held that a better solution was for the husband to 
pay reasonable subsistence allowance to the plaintiff and 
the twin children of the marriage. The defendant was 
ordered to pay, through the court, a monthly subsistence 
allowance of £2, and a divorce was refused.
Parental rights and duties
A . Introduction
There is, perhaps, few other aspects of customary 
law which is presently surrounded by so much judicial 
confusion, and differences in practice, as the principle 
of law regulating the legal affiliation and custody of
p
children born to a woman married under customary law.
Legal affiliation and custody of children obviously 
affect the status of women. The right of a woman to take 
care of her own children and to participate in decisions 
affecting their welfare, may be jeopardised by the choice 
of the man adjudged to be their legal father. For example, 
a woman whose children are affiliated to, and given into the 
custody of a man with whom she has had no, or little, 
physical contact, except that he has paid dowry on her 
behalf (in some cases when she was a child), may be deprived 
of the right of every mother to take care of her children. 
While affiliation and custody of children are important to
1. [1964] Suit No. ECCA/5A/52/64, unreported, Abeokuta 
Customary Court, Grade A, see Ekundare, Marriage and 
Divorce under Yoruba Customary Law, op. cit., p. 67*
2. See Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, 1897* ££. cit., 
p. 498; "The ownership of children is a great source 
of palaver", remains true today; see also Okoro,
The Customary Laws of Succession, op. cit., p. 102.
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men, they are no less equally important to women, and vitally 
affect their status.
The present confusion surrounding the legal paternity 
and custody of children in customary law, specially affect 
women. ' It is desirable in all cases that law should be 
certain, but where marital and family relationships are 
affected, the need for certainty is perhaps greater than in 
some other areas. This discussion on custody and affilia­
tion of children attempts to show how women are specially 
affected by the present uncertainty of law and practice in 
many Nigerian communities.
B. Affiliation
(1) Patrilineal societies
The customary law principle which previously applied 
in the overwhelming majority of patrilineal societies in 
Nigeria was that the children of a married woman are legally 
affiliated to her husband, or the man who paid dowry with 
respect to her marriage, regardless of who may have been the 
actual genitor. There is evidence that this was also the 
rule in other parts of Africa (and in many cases still is), 
Europe and Asia.'*'
1. See e.g. Forde, ’’Double Descent Among the Yako”, in 
African Systems of Kinship and Marriage”, o j d. cit., 
p. 291; Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Edo- 
Speaking Peoples of Nigeria, op. cit., Part 1, p. 50; 
Elias, Groundwork of Nigerian Law, op. cit., p.297;
Esenwa, ojd. cit., p. 73; Egharevba, ojd. cit., p. 19;
E. C. 0. Ilogu, Christian Ethics in An African Background, 
197^* P* 30, Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit.~ p. 22b;
Crocker, Nigeria: A Critique of British Colonial
Administration, ojd. cit., p. 175; see Bradbury and 
Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit.,pp. 190;-191* who 
describe a contrary rule as obtaining among the 
Itsekiri; Aniagolu, o jd. cit., p. 101. cf. Max 
Gluckman, ’’Kinship and Marriage Among the Lozi of 
Northern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal”, in African 
Systems of Kinship, edit, by Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, 
op. cit., p. 201; and the Tanzanian case of Madole v. 
MPTogUTtf Dododo [1973] High Court, (P.C.) CIV App.ll- 
DDM-72, Law Reports Tanzania, No. 18, 1973* p. 30 where 
it was held: ’Among Tanzanian patrilineal tribes, all 
children conceived during wedlock, including adulterous 
children, belong to the husband”. Kwikima, Ag.J., 
stated that ’’even if such were not the accepted custom, 
the ethics of our present time would not tolerate an 
adulterer benefitting from his sin to the detriment of 
his cuckold”.
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Vinogradoff states that the principle in all cases
,,/i.the wife, belongs/^" This statement is confirmed by 
2
Smith in relation to law in Arabia:
”... a man is father of all children of the 
. woman by whom he has purchased the right to 
have offspring that shall be reckoned to his 
own kin... The fundamental doctrine of 
Mohammedan law is that the son is reckoned
to the bed on which he is born”.
Various other writers attest the existence of this
rule in societies in other parts of the world. ^
So tenacious has been this rule in some societies,
that there is a rebuttable legal presumption that a woman*s
husband is the father of her children. This presumption
of law existed in English law as early as the twelfth
4
century. To rebut this presumption it is necessary to 
prove that the husband and wife could not, or did not, have 
sexual intercourse at the relevant time, or by establishing 
by medical evidence that the husband could not be the father 
of the child. Moreover, the common law rule was that 
neither spouse could give evidence of non-access to bastardize
1. Vinogradoff, Historical Jurisprudence, op. cit., Vol. I. 
p. 197.
2. W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early 
Arabia, 2nd. edit., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1907)* pp. 109;110.
3 . See e.g. Linton, The Study of Man, op. cit., p. 179; 
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde, o j d. cit., pp. 201;
4. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, op. cit. 
Vol. I, p. 457; Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of 
England: Trans, by Samuel E. Thorne (Harvard University
Press, 1968), Folio 6; Gardner v. Gardner [1877] 2
App. Cases, 723, H.L.; R. v. Luffe IlM07 J 8 East, 192; 
Anon v. Anon [1856] 23 BEAV. 273; but see Poulett Peerage 
Case [19^3T"A.C. 395* H.L.
ft a  tS A A-— /& tLciC okilcUeiv sbtLowa t, the male to u?hov*,
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the wife's children.1 This rule of evidence, of course, 
rendered the rebuttal, of the presumption more difficult.2
In those systems of customary law in Nigeria where 
the rule applies, the presumption of law is irrebuttable.
The affiliation of a child is. governed by payment of dowry, 
and in most societies, all the children conceived before the 
dowry has been repaid legally "belong" to the man who paid 
the dowry.^ This rule obtains even in cases where the 
husband dies before the child was conceived.^ Provided the 
dowry has not been repaid before conception, all children 
begotten by the widow by a stranger to her husband's family, 
legally belong to the dead husband and can be claimed by 
his family.-' In many societies, the children of a betrothed 
girl also belong to the man who has paid the dowry for her, 
even though her marriage to him has not been consummated, 
and she has never cohabited with him. The fact that she 
was engaged to him as a child is irrelevant.
1. Per Lord Mansfield in Goodright and Stevens v. Moss 
[1777] 2 COWP'. 591* 'The House of Lords, in Russell v. 
Russell [1924] A.C. 687 H.L. unanimously held that 
evidence of non-access by a husband or wife was in­
admissible in legitimacy proceedings, and by a majority 
also held that it was inadmissible in divorce proceedings; 
but see Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949*
S.7(1)* which abrogated the common law rule applied in 
Russell v. Russell the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973*
s. 48(1) and Re Ampthil Peerage Case [1976] 2 All E.R.
411, a reverberation of Russell v . Russell, see below, 
Chapter XII, for the position under the statutory laws 
of Nigeria.
2. See Banbury Peerage Case [l8ll] 1 SIM and St. 153*
H.L.; Gardner v. Gardner [1877] 2 App. Cas. 723 H.L.
3 . See Mockler-Ferryman, ojd. cit., pp. 302-505; Nwogugu, 
Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 183; Leith-Ross, 
African Women, op. cit., p. 103* Basden, Niger Ibos, 
pp. 215, 226; Leith Ross, African Conversation Piece 
(London: Hutchinson, 1944), p. 71; Esenwa, ojd. cit., 
p. 73; Talbot, Tribes of The Niger Delta, op. cit., 
p. 195; Williamson, op. cit.^  pp. 55 and 577
4. See Nwaribe v. President and Registrar, Eastern Qrlu 
District Court, [1964] S E.N.L.R. 24 and above, Chapter 
II, p.187.
5 . See authorities cited at n.l, p.593 above.
6 . See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 224; 
Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo,... ojd. cit. 
p. 68. Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 2287 par.
287 (2 ).
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The reason for this rule has been ascribed by 
Vinogradoff .to- the fact that marriage is a form of property 
more than it is the law of relationship, not to speak of 
affection. If someone plants a tree or builds a house on
the property (land) of another, without his consent, the 
owner of the land can claim the house or the tree. The 
same idea is expressed in the Yoruba saying that "the man who 
owns the tree owns the kola nut" and the Ibo: "the man who
p
owns the mother goat owns the kid".
The reason advanced by traditionalists, however, is 
that the rule protects the sanctity of marriage and the 
morality of the society. Any rule to the contrary would 
break the "whole fabric of social life in the Ibo community".-^ 
In Nwinya Ike v . Offia Nwa Una and Anor,^ Okagbue, J., 
commenting on the application of the rule, said: "Customary
law has several built in checks and balances and this is 
one of those rules by which adulterous associations have 
from time immemorial been checked".
Another reason for the retention of the rule is that 
an impotent man who, under the orthodox custom, could have 
children by providing the marriage payment in respect of a 
woman and allowing her to have sexual intercourse with an 
approved man, will not have children to inherit his property 
and perpetuate his lineage . In this connection it is worth
1. Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence, 
op. cit., pp. 197-202.
2. Cf. Pater est Quern Nuptiae Demonstrat, applicable in 
English common law, see Glanville, ojd. cit., book 
chpt. 12.
3. See Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession, op. cit.,
p. 102.
4. [1974] Suit No. E/1A/74, unreported, Enugu High Court; 
see also Eziekel v. Alabi and Ors. [1964] 2 All N.L.H.
43.
5. Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession, op. cit., 
pp. 102-103.
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noting Manu’s opinion that "such advantage as a man would
gain who should attempt to pass deep water in a boat made of
woven reeds, that father obtains who passes the gloom of
death leaving only contemptible sons".'1'
The, High Courts, manned by judges trained in English
law, no doubt influenced by the rebuttal rule applicable in
English law, have attempted to change the law, and have held
that once it is proved that a child does not belong to the
legal husband in fact, to award him legal paternity simply
because he had paid dowry for the mother of the child is
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.
2
In Edet v. Essien the Commissioner of the Provincial Court 
found that the appellant had paid dowry for one Inyang Edet 
when she was still a child. Apparently, she had never lived 
with him as his wife. When she grew up, the respondent, 
having agreed with the girl to marry, obtained her parents' 
consent, paid dowry to them and took her as his wife. They 
lived together and had three children. These children were 
quite grown up at the time of the trial, and when asked by 
the judge to go to their father, of course went to the
3
Respondent, since they were entire strangers to the appellant.
The case of the appellant was that:
"Having conformed to the requirements of native
law and custom whereby I became the husband of
Inyang Edet I continue to be her husband and 
am entitled to any children she may bear (to whom­
soever) until the money I paid as dowry for her is 
refunded to me. She cannot contract another legal 
marriage until the dowry is refunded to me".
The local Customary Court held his claim valid in 
law. The appeal was heard in the Provincial Court, which, 
dissatisfied with the evidence led to substantiate the claim, 
allowed the appeal. On appeal to the Divisional Court,
Carey, J. held:
1. Manu. IX, l6l, as quoted by Maine, Early Law and Custom,
1883, o jd. cit., pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 .
2. [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47.
3 . This background information to the case was given to the
present writer by His Royal Highness Ntoo A. Etim, clan-
head of the Ikpais, retired High Court Registrar, who 
was present at the tzial.
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”... even assuming that the native law and 
custom as alleged by the appellant had been 
definitely established I am inclined to think 
that it should properly have been over-ruled 
in this case as being repugnant to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience having 
regard to the circumstances”.
The special circumstances of the case were that the
girl had been only a child when the dowry was paid, and any
consent given at that time was consequently illusory. The
fact that the defendant and the girl had lived together for
a number of years, and had three children before the claim
was brought, and also that the two surviving children did
not know the appellant and showed strong preference for their
natural father, must have influenced the courts considerably.
There is no doubt that the strict application of
this rule can result in grave injustice, as it actually did
2
in Aja v. Ejiofor and Anor, a decision of the High Court 
Okigwe. The case was on appeal from the decision of a 
Magistrate's Court. The first and second plaintiffs were a 
brother and sister whose father had died. The defendant 
married the second plaintiff and they lived together for ten 
years without issue. The second plaintiff left her husband1s 
house and returned to her father's compound. Two years 
later the child whose custody was in dispute was born. The 
natural father of the child died, but three months after the 
birth of the child, another man repaid the dowry to the first 
husband, and became the second husband of the second plaintiff. 
This second husband was not interested in the child, and so 
the child was brought up by the first plaintiff, her uncle, 
until she was fourteen years old. The defendant then laid
1. Edet v. Essien [1932] H  N.L.R. 47 at p. 48.
2. Although the report of the case states that one of the 
children died, Registrar Etim remembered three children 
being present in court. He described them as ”two 
grown up boys and one girl”. See above, p.597, n.3.
3. [1974] Suit No. 40/10A/74, unreported, Okigwe High Court.
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claim to her on the ground that at the time of conception
and birth the dowry he had paid for her mother had not yet
been repaid to him. The plaintiffs brought this action,
claiming custody and maintenance of the child which they had
borne from her birth, until she was fourteen years old.
Evidence, which was accepted by the Magistrate, established
that when the child was born, the defendant had not been
interested in her, and had publicly called her a "bastard”.
During the time she had been growing up he had shown no
interest in her. The magistrate, however, held that since
the plaintiffs and their witnesses agreed that ”by their
custom, the child, even today, was that of the defendant,
who can have the child on payment of these expenses incurred
by the plaintiff in the training of the child”, they
[plaintiffs] had no ground on their evidence for claim of
custody, except that the defendant had not paid them their
expenses for maintaining the child. He concluded:
"That is not enough for the court to award 
the legal custody. However,-in the interest 
of the child I hereby declare that the child 
will remain in the physical custody of the first 
plaintiff until she is eighteen years of age.
The defendant is given free access to the child 
as is reasonable to a father. Case is dismissed.
I make no order as to costs.”
Against this decision the defendant appealed on the 
ground, inter alia that "the totality of the judgement of 
the learned magistrate is contradictory, vague, uncertain, 
unjustifiable and arbitrary”. Obi-Okoye, J., held on 
appeal:
"Undoubtedly there is a lot of morals in favour 
of the order for custody made by the court below, 
but the courts administer law not morals and 
since the claim for custody made by the plaintiffs 
was dismissed the grant of custody even for one 
hour thereafter, is to give them back with the 
left hand what the court had just denied them with 
the right hand”.
The Judge rejected the argument of Counsel for the 
plaintiffs, "that this was an independent order based on the 
welfare of the child and which the court could make indpen­
dent of its judgment", as untenable on the ground that
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"He [counsel] has not referred me to any 
statutory or decided authority that once the 
welfare of a child is raised in a case the 
court is obliged after giving its decision in 
that case to award the custody of that child 
to a party to the suit. Even if this power 
exists it can never be exercised in spite of the 
court's decision in the case. ... I am satisfied 
that having come to the conclusion to dismiss the 
respondent s case it was inconsistent of that 
decision to award the custody of the child to the 
"first plaintiff".
He allowed the appeal and awarded the respondent
$10 costs in the court below and N25 on the appeal.
Although the contention of the learned Judge that
the "courts administer law, not morals" is appreciated,
substantial justice could have been done in this case
within the provisions of the law. The various Native and
Customary Courts Laws of the States provide:
"In any matter relating to the guardianship 
of children, the interest and welfare of the 
child shall be the first and paramount 
consideration.
This section allows Native and Customary Courts to 
deviate from the strict application of customary law in 
guardianship cases. There are also several cases where 
this section has been utilized in the Superior Courts of 
Nigeria, and the principle of recognizing the child’s 
interest and welfare as paramount, in cases arising under
1. See for e.g. Customary Courts (No. 2) Edict 1966
(Eastern Nigeria) s. 24; Customary Courts Edict (Mid 
West State) No. 38 of 1966, s. 25; Customary Courts 
Law, Cap 31, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959*
S.23; Kwara State Area Court Edict, 19&7 (No. 2 of 
1967), s. 23. Native Courts Law of Northern Nigeria 
(N.R. No. 6 of 1956) s. 23; Marriage, Divorce and 
Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958, 
W.R.N.L. 456 of 1958, s. 14(1); see generally Kasunmu 
and Salacuse, op. cit., pp. 256-257; Nwogugu, Family 
Law in Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 260-262.
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customary law has been applied in a number of cases.^
Customary law itself recognizes the principle of the
best interests of the child being paramount, and in cases
where the child is too young to be separated from its
mother, it would postpone a grant of custody to the legal 
2
father. Very few people would deny that it is not in the 
best interest of a female child, fourteen years of age, to 
be given into the custody of a man, unrelated to her by ties 
of blood, who had publicly called her a "bastard'’, and had 
ignored her existence until she was old enough to render 
him various services. Many people would consider her 
chastity at jeopardy under these circumstances, in view of 
the lack of blood relationship between her and the man into 
whose custody she had been given at the advanced aged of 
fourteen years.
The learned Judge confounded affiliation and custody 
which, it is respectfully submitted, are two different and 
separate concepts in most- systems of law, although the 
legal right to affiliation, in many cases, establishes a 
claim to legal custody. The Magistrate in the trial court 
was perfectly justified in separating the concepts in the 
particular circumstances of this case.
The repugnancy principle was not considered in the 
case. Although it may not have been pleaded by counsel 
for the plaintiffs, such an omission was not a bar to its 
application by the High Court.
1. See Mariyama v . Sadiku Ejo, [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 8l;
Nkala y. Nkala [1971J suit "No. ME/j/1597/71, unreported 
decision of Enugu Magistrate Court, decided on the 350th 
October, 1971. See further, post p6fl^ Kasebiye v. 
Adeyemi [1961] Suit No. J.D/22A/60, unreported, 1 Sept. 
1961, Jos, High Ct.
2. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 260.
By virtue of the High Court Law, Cap 61, Laws of 
Eastern Nigeria, 19§3 Revision, s. 22(1).
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The facts and decision of this case was put by the 
present writer to several of the Customary Court Judges 
who were interviewed. Although they were almost unanimously 
in favour of the rule that a husband whose dowry has not been 
refunded should be- entitled to all children of the wife, by 
whoever begotten, they asserted that in the circumstances 
of this case, giving the child to the legal father was 
repugnant to customary law. The customary law in most areas 
seems to be that if the legal husband does not recognize and 
lay claim to the child within a reasonable time, he would be 
considered as having waived his legal right, and his claim 
fourteen years later would be unenforceable. Some judges 
were of the opinion that a grant of custody, even in cases 
where the claim was expeditiously brought, would be denied, 
until all expenses connected with the birth had been fully 
paid by the legal husband.
Park’s1 assertion that a customary rule of law should
be evaluated in abstracto, and that a decision should confirm
or nullify a rule for all purposes, and not merely for those
2
of the particular case has already been noted. In certain
later cases, however, Judges, have correctly distinguished
the broad rule which some writers claim has been laid down
in Edet v. Essien^. Thus in Nwinya Ike v. Offia Nwa Una   -      --------------
and Anor, where the second appellant had lived with her 
husband, deserted him and ’’married” another man without the 
consent of her parents, or repayment of dowry to the first 
husband, Okagbue, J. held himself not bound by Edet v. Essien.^ 
He decided that the children of such a union legally belonged
1. See Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, op. cit., p. 72.
2. See above, Chapter 7J.
3. [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47.
4. [1974] Suit No. E/1A/74, unreported, Enugu High Court.
5 . [1932] 11 N.L.R. 47.
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to the first husband, and confirmed the decision of the
Senior Magistrate at Awgu in this respect. He referred to
the fact that the headnote in Edet v. Essien^ is grossly
misleading and gives the impression that the applicant was
married to his wife under customary laws and. that she left
him and went to live with another man, and concluded
"I do not consider it [the rule in Edet v.
Essien] repugnant to equity and good conscience 
because if the natural father really intends to 
claim his children the family of the legal husband 
will tell him what to do if he does not know.”
A similar opinion was expressed by Nwokedi, J., in 
2
Iloka and Anor v. Ibe . In this case the second plaintiff 
was married to the defendant in i960, in accordance with 
Urualla customary law, and later at Onitsha Roman Catholic 
church. During the Nigerian Civil War, the defendant asked 
her to leave the matrimonial home and accused her of poisoning 
him. The couple remained separated for five years, when 
the wife met the first plaintiff who approached her family 
with an offer of marriage. All members of the family, 
except the senior brother who was her legal guardian, agreed. 
The latter informed the second plaintiff that his sister was 
still married to the defendant. The plaintiff allegedly 
returned the defendants dowry of N150(£80), but the defen­
dant refused to accept it, and the money was lodged with a 
lawyer. The plaintiffs called two witnesses in support of 
their case, including a ninety-years old Chief who gave 
evidence of the Urualla custom, and who stated that the 
defendant refused to accept the dowry. The defendant 
alleged that he used to visit the second plaintiff's parents' 
home and sleep with her, that she became pregnant after one 
such visit and gave birth to twins, one of whom died. The 
plaintiffs claimed return and custody of the remaining twin 
detained by the defendant. The Judge found that the second
1. Ibid.
2. [1965] Appeal No. HOW/CCA/41/65, unreported, Owerri High
Court.
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plaintiff and the defendant were still validly married under
customary law and under the Nigerian Marriage Act. He held
that giving the child to the legal husband represented a more
rational approach to an apparently difficult situation, and
stressed the fact that the parties in the case were -f,primitive
people living in the primitive society of Urualla, and that
in such circumstances only refund of dowry could confer status
of legitimacy”. He noted:
"All the parties concerned are primitive people 
living in a primitive society of Urualla and it 
is difficult to see how any of them could escape 
the rules and tenets governing a primitive society 
such as theirs. The rules and norms of a modern 
society do not apply to the circumstances of this 
case... although illicit association may be 
permissible in Ibo society, the association between 
the plaintiffs is yet to acquire a measure of 
respectable acceptance of marriage status by the 
generality of their Urualla community. It there­
fore follows logically that any issue of such 
illicit association can never legally be said to 
belong to the parties. Such a child would be 
considered as a product of clandestine association 
of lovers and no more”.
It is interesting to note that although the learned 
Judge found that the second plaintiff and the defendant were 
spouses of a statutory, as well as a customary marriage, he 
applied customary law exclusively. No reference was made
to the general law of Nigeria under which the child may have
1 2 been adjudged illegitimate and custody given to the mother.
1. See Egwunwoke v. Egwunwoke [1966] 2 All N.L.R. 1,
pp. 3-4; Section 147 of the Evidence Act, Cap 62, Laws
of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, as 
amended by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, Decree 
No. 18 of 1970, ss. 84 and 115(3)•
2. See Enwonwu v. Spiro [1965] 2 All N.L.R. 233J Adu v.
Family Welfare Officer and Ruby Mae Lincoln [1970J Suit
No. LD/14A/70, unreported, Lagos High Court, 9 June, 
1970, where the custody of an illegitimate child of a 
Nigerian and a female U.S. citizen was granted to the 
mother, see Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., 
p. 258, n.12.
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The above decisions may be compared with the decision
in Mbiereonwu v . Okorie and Qrs.1 The wife in this case
lived with her husband the plaintiff, for about fourteen
years. She then left him, and cohabited with another man'
by-whom she had a child. The husband claimed legal paternity
and custody of the child, as his dowry had not been repaid.
The Oru District Court affiliated the child to him, but
deferred grant of custody until the child had grown. The
County Court dismissed the appeal of the defendants against
this decision, but on further appeal to the Magistrate1s
Court, the decision was reversed. The plaintifffs appealed
to the High Court. Egbuna J. said:
"I cannot see how the plaintiff would claim this 
child just because the dowry was not refunded 
before the child was b o m .  This is clearly 
against the principles of natural justice and 
equity... I have read the case of Edet v. Essua 
[sic] 11 N.L.R. p. 47, referred to and I fail to 
see where the learned Magistrate misinterpreted 
the principle of that case”.
It can be seen from these few cases that the appli­
cation of the rule governing the affiliation of children is 
in general disarray. This confusion is reflected, not
2
only in judicial decisions, and among academic writers,
but in a diversity of practice in the various communities.
Older people generally are opposed to any change in the
law, and assert that, regardless of court decisions, such
children would continue to be treated as the legitimate
children of the legal father.
This is the view also of most Customary Court Judges,
unless they are obliged by legislation to change the rule,
and even then they apply the legislation with apathy and
distaste. ^ The younger elements, on the other hand, see
the abolition of the rule as progressive. Their main
T. [1965J Suit No. HOW/CCA/41/165, unreported, Owerri 
High Court.
2. See e.g. Okoro, op.cit., p. 104; who argues that 
paternity of a child should be awarded to its biological 
father; and Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., pp. 305- 
306 who argues to the contrary.
3 . The Judge of Calabar District Customary Court told the 
present writer that from time immemorial, the child is 
given to the legal husband in Efik land and among the 
Qua Efut, and that there has been no change; inter­
view held on 25 October, 1977 at Calabar.
The Customary Court in Eket, following the decision in 
Edet v. Essien; awards such children to the actual 
genitor.
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contention seems to be that, since such children lack ties
of. blood to the family of the legal father, they also lack
loyalty to them. According to an informant from Uyo,
an Ibibio community:
,!0ur community from time- does not recognize 
that rule. Such children are traitors to the 
family. Wherever your enemies are, there they 
will be. If you have a court case with another 
family, they would take all your secrets to the 
other family so that they can defeat you in 
court. They have no love for the family.”
This was the opinion of several other informants in
the various communities, who substantiated their assertions
from their practical experiences.
The greatest sufferers in this legal dilemma are
perhaps the children themselves who are liable to be rejected
by both families. In Onitsha where the community observes
the old rule, such children are often treated with distrust
by the family of the legal father, while they may be despised
as "bastards” by the family of the natural father. In
addition, in some systems of law, for example in Enugu-Ezike,
and Etteh clans of Ibo-Eze Division in Anambra State, the
natural father has the right to reject or accept such children
at his option,'1' and, if he chooses the former course, the
children have no legal claim on him, nor on their mothersf
legal husbands. In most societies, the legal father has the
right to disclaim such children at his option, even though
the natural father is not entitled to claim the children.
The result of this is that the children belong to neither
family, which is a very serious situation for a person,
especially a male person, to find himself in.
The injustice of the system is evident. It demonstrates
the unfortunate consequences of regarding dowry as a sine qua
non of a marriage contract and a refund of it as a necessary
element of a divorce. Men who refuse to accept the refund
1. See The Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 315*
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of dowry are anxious, to claim children subsequently born to 
the wife and another man, in order to increase their own 
lineage. In practical terms, the system is little removed 
from "child-buying".1
Tying the affiliation of children to the payment of 
dowry may prejudice a woman’s opportunity to remarry. Many 
men are not prepared to refund the first husband’s dowry 
until the woman has proved her ability to bear children for 
them, especially where she had none for the former husband, 
yet when she has borne the children, they are legally 
affiliated to the first husband, because his dowry has not 
been repaid at the time of the children's conception.
(ii) Matrilineal societies:
Among some matrilineal societies in Nigeria, children
are affiliated for some purposes to their mothers’ family,
2
where they also claim rights of inheriance. As previously 
noted5there are a few such societies in Nigeria including 
some Igbo communities, for example Chafia, and Afikpo clan 
of Afikpo, Divisions. The only matrilineal society actually
o
visited by the present writer was the Ekoi (Ejagham)J of
4
Calabar. In an interview with the head of the Ikapi clan,
His Royal Highness Ntoo A. Etim, he stated the position in
relation to the affiliation of children:
"Among our people, a woman virtually owns the 
children. She has the right to take all the 
children away if she leaves her husband, and 
it Is better for her to do so, since every­
thing the children inherit will be from her 
own family. Women wield very powerful 
position among us".
1. See Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv. of Central Nigeria, 
op. cit., p . 77
2. See Okoro, Customary Laws of Succession, op. cit., 
pp. 160-167.
3. In 1971* the projected population of the Ejagham, based 
on the 1963 Nigerian Census was 20, 867, comprising
10, 856 females and 10,011 males; see Statistical 
Digest, South Eastern State, 1971, p. 10.
4. The interview was held at his palace in Calabar on 
26 October, 1977 .
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The Chief also stated that about three years ago
the Government of the former South-Eastern State appointed
the Ikpeme Commission to record the customs and usages of
the peoples of the State, The Ekois met in Council and
decided that the custom.whereby children are affiliated to
the family of the mother should be changed, as it was not
in the best interest of the community. It was the general
view that, since children do not inherit from their fathers,
there was no incentive for a man to produce or amass wealth.
The decision of the Council was recommended to the Ikpeme
Commission for adoption.
Among the Ikpais, it was alleged that a husband
cannot claim a child begotten by his wife for another man.
This is also the position among the Igbos of Ohaffia
Division, a matrilineal society, where the adulterer has a
right to claim his child,'1' and both laws may be compared with
the position among the Yako, where a double-descent system
obtains. Forde, who conducted extensive research among the
Yako reports:
"There is no doubt that it is the transfer 
of the libeman [dowry] which gives the husband 
legal rights to his wifeTs services and to the 
social fatherhood of the children born to her 
during the marriage."2
Meek^asserts that among most non-Moslem communities 
in the Northern States, a very marked difference in the 
status of children b o m  of a marriage exists. Where the 
dowry is low,the wife*s family usually has some claim on the 
children b o m  of the marriage, but where the dowry is high* 
there is no such claim. The position is the same as in 
those societies in the Southern States, previously noted, 
which operate a two-tiered system of dowry payments.
1. Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 315* par. 3$2,
(1) (a).
2. Forde, "Double Descent Among the Yako", ojd. cit., p.223*
3. Meek, A Sudanese Kingdom, op. cit., p. 376.
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C. Custody
Custody in this section is used in its' wide sense
to connote the whole bundle of rights and powers vested in
a parent or guardian, including physical control.1 Under
most systems of customary law in Nigeria, the husband has
an absolute right to the custody of children begotten by his 
2 .
wife. Thus in Nkala v_. Nkala, , where the parties were 
married under Igbo customary law, it was held that the claim 
of a father must prevail, unless the court is judicially 
satisfied that the welfare of the child requires that the 
parental right should be superseded. This was also the 
position under the common law, where his right was so ex­
tensive ,Tthat it inevitably reminds us of the position of the 
paterfamilias in Roman law”.^ This absolute right enabled 
him to claim, even from the childTs mother, the custody of 
a child still in the suckling stage. In R. v. De Manneville. 
a child eight months of age was taken forcibly by its father 
from its motherTs breast. Lord Ellenborough, C.J., refused
1. For the legal meanings of the word custody and the
rights involved in the concept see Hewer v. Bryant
[1969] 3 ALL E.R. 578, 585, C.A.; [1970J 1 Q.B. 357, 
3735 See also J.C. Hall, ’’The Waning of Parental 
Rights”, S.L.J., 1972, 248.
2. See Nwogugu, Family Law, op. cit., p. 260; Ellis,
Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., pp. 186-187;
Lawson v. Lawson [1973J 7CC HCJ.l.
3. [1971] Suit No. ?ME/J./1597/71, unreported, Enugu 
Magistrates Court, 30 October 1971, the judgement was 
upheld on appeal.
4 . R. v. Manneville [1804 ] 5 East, 221; Thomasset v.
Thomasset [1894J P. 295, C.A.; see also Graveson and
Crane, A Century of Family Law, op. cit., pp. 17-195
Cf. Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, edit, 
by C.K. Ogden (London Kegan Paul, French, Trubner & 
Co. Ltd). 1 9 3 l) ,P P -7 A -7 6 .
5. P. H. Petit, ’’Parental Control and Guardianship”, in 
A Century of Family Law, edit. Graveson and Crane, 
op. cit., p. 5^7
6. [1804] 5 EAST, 221.
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to disturb the father’s custody, and Lord Eldon took the same
view in the Court of Chancery.'1' So absolute was this right
that the courts had no jurisdiction to grant even a right
2of access to the mother. In Ball v. Ball, Sir A. Hart,
Vice Chancellor, said, he ..knew "no act more harsh or cruel
than depriving the mother of proper intercourse with her
child", yet he found no grounds on which he could have taken
an alternative decision.
Customary law was less harsh. In the interests of
the child, it would award care of the child to the mother at
4
least until the child was weaned.
The customary law principle of a fatherTs absolute
right of custody to his legitimate children has been eroded
by legislative provisions. The various Native and Customary
Courts Law of the various States provide that
"in any matter relating to the guardianship of 
children, the interest and welfare of the child 
shall be the first and paramount consideration."^
As previously seen this section allows the courts to deviate 
from the strict rules of customary law, as it applies to the 
custody of children. In Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo , the court
1. De Manneville v. De Manneville [1804] 10 VES. 52.
2. [1827] 2 SIM. 35.
3. See further, below Chapter X.
4. See Partridge, 1905* ££• oit., p. 257; Ellis, Yoruba-
Speaking Peoples, op. cit., p. 187.
5 . See also the recommendation of the Economic and Social
Council resolution 1068F (XXXIX), 16th July, 1965;
the child’s welfare should be the overriding consider­
ation in determining questions of custody and guardian­
ship.
6. [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 81.
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said that ,Tthe child's benefit was of paramount importance".
Specific statutory enactments, have in addition,
encroached on the rights of a father to custody of his
children in certain parts of the country. For example,
the Ibadan.District.Council (Marriage Divorce and Custody
of Children) Bye-Laws provide that the custody of all
children should normally be awarded to the natural father
whether or not such natural father is married to the mother,
"Provided that no child shall ordinarily be 
removed from the custody of its mother until 
it has reached the age of at least five years, 
and provided also that in the application of
the provisions of this bye-law, the court in
exercising its discretion, shall have due 
regard to the welfare of the child in all the 
circumstances of the case."^
2
In spite of these provisions , Customary Courts do 
not grant custody, to a mother except when the child is 
very young. In 154 disputed affiliation cases examined 
by the present writer, which were decided in 1976 at Grade
B Customary Court, No. 4 at Mapo, Ibadan, custody was
invariably granted to the man adjudged the natural father. 
The welfare of the children was not considered, and custody 
to the mother was only granted when the children were under 
five years of age.
This may be compared with applications for custody, 
in the High Courts, in divorce cases involving a statutory 
marriage. The principle laid down in the English case of 
In Re Thain (An Infant)^ is frequently applied, and custody
1. Par. 8.
2. This provision changed the traditional Yoruba customary
law, by which a woman’s husband was the legal father of
her children begotten during the marriage, and thus 
gave him right to their custody. The Customary Court 
Judges in Ibadan are not in favour of the change, and 
honour the old law as far as they are able to do so, 
see Kansummu and Salacuse, ojd. cit., p. 218; Ekundare 
Marriage and Divorce Under Yoruba Customary Law, op. 
cit. p. 69*
5 . See the cases of Ojo v. Ojo [1969] 1 All N.L.R. 4^5;
Babalola v. Babalola [1972]" H  CC HCJ, 110; Oloyede v.
Oloyede [1975] 3 W.S.C.A. 73; Okafor v. Okafor 1.1971] 
Suit No. 0/6D/71 unreported decision of Onitsha 
High Court. Cf. Oni v. Oni* [1973] 7 CC HCJ 41 and 
Oguntokun v. Oguntokun [1972] 12 CCHCJ 106.
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is generally awarded to the successful party. In Afonja v. 
1
Afonja, however, it was held in the Western Region Court 
of Appeal
"in deciding the question of custody the 
. welfare of the children is the paramount . 
consideration, though the conduct of the 
guilty party is also a matter to be taken 
into account, and where the father places 
the child with other persons not with­
standing the fact that they might give it 
a very good home, the mother should have the 
custody where (as in this case) it appears 
that she can also give it a good home."
2
Similarly, in Apara v. Apara the Supreme Court held 
that it should not be assumed that the successful party 
must have custody of the children, or that he is the proper 
party to whom the care of the children should be entrusted. 
This principle has now been incorporated into the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970, which does not apply to 
customary nor Moslem marriages.^ Social and psychological 
evidence which might be of vital importance in estimating 
the effect which living with a particular parent may have
on the child is rarely resorted to even by the Superior
4
Courts in Nigeria.
1 . [1971] 1 U.I.L.R. 105.
2. [1968] 1 ALL N.L.R. 241; cited with approval by the
Nigerian Supreme Court in Ojo v. Ojo [1969]* 1 ALL
N.L.R. 435 at pp. 440-441.
3 . For the application of the principle in the Higher
Courts, see Jegede v. Jegede [1972] 12 CCHCJ. 121, 
which followed Re L. (Infants) [1962] 3 ALL E.R.l C.A.; 
"Whilst the welfare of the children is the first and 
paramount consideration, the claims of justice cannot 
be overlooked", per Lord Denning M.R., but'see Re L.
[1974] 1 ALL E.R. C.A.; Cole v. Cole (1941] 16 N.L.R.
9, the wishes of a child are not enough to over-ride 
the general rule; Oyedu v. Oyedu, [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R.
4l; the custody of the parents, including the mother,
is preferred to that of a foster parent however benevolent. 
See further, below, Chapter X.
4. See Naomi Michaels "The Dangers of a Change of Parentage 
in Custody and Adoption Cases", 83 L.Q.R. pp. 547-568.
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The absolute right of the father to the custody of
his children under customary law may be inherited by his
family after his death, even if it results in depriving
the widow of her children. Thus in the case of In The
Estate of Agboruja,.^ it was decided that to make the half
brother of the deceased father the legal guardian of the
deceased1s children in prefernce to his widow was not
2
inequitable, but in Laromeke v. Nekegho, the Divisional 
Court of the Gold Coast held that the Urhobo (Nigeria) 
customary law whereby a widow who refuses to marry her dead 
husbandTs heir must hand over her children to him was 
"repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience 
within the meaning of the Courts Ordinance.
1. [1949] 19 N.L.R. 38; see also Nwaribe v. The President
and Registrar Oklu District Court [1964] 8 E.N.L.R. 24.
2. [1958] 3 W.A.L.R. 306.
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CHAPTER YIII 
DISSOLUTION OF CUSTOMARY LAW MARRIAGE
For women, divorce is not
Respectable; to repel the man, not possible.
... And if in this exacting toil
We are successful and our husband does not
struggle
Under the marriage yoke, our life is enviable. 
Otherwise death is better. If a man grows tired 
of the company at home, he can go out, and find 
A cure for tediousness. We wives are forced to 
look to one man only.
Euripedes, Medea.1
1. Introduction
There are two ways by which a customary marriage 
may be dissolved:
(i) by an act which is recognized by the community as 
legally ending the marriage, i.e. divorce
(ii) by the death of either spouse (subject to the 
argument that customary marriage being essentially 
the union of two families may continue even after 
the husbandfs death).
Divorce
Divorce spells the end of a marriage, and has 
always been, and present evidence indicates always will be, 
the method by which a high percentage of marriages are 
dissolved, legislative or customary law provisions which 
prohibit divorce, not withstanding. Marriage is a 
personal relationship and therefore cannot be entirely 
controlled by law. Restrictive regulations which fetter
1. Euripedes (c. 480-406 B.C.), Medea, trans. by Philip 
Vellacott (London: Penguin Classics, 1971), P* 24.
2. See further, below, pp. 678-685.
3. See e.g. Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba 
People, op. cit., p"! 5B1 Egharevba, op. cit., p. 20; 
Begho, Law and Culture, op. cit., p. 50; Talbot, 
Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 632.
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the freedom of either spouse to effect a divorce are
invariably unsuccessful, and in the present society, may
be regarded as also immoral.
Divorce is a necessary concomitant of marriage
in the same way as death is a necessary concomitant of
living - the difference is only a matter of degree.
Muhammed described it many centuries ago as the most
detestable of all permitted things,^" and recently, Epstein
2
has referred to it as "a lugubrious subject”. This not­
withstanding, divorce has always been possible among 
nearly all communities, to various extents. This fact 
renders Lord Penzance’s classic definition of marriage as 
a "life-long union” , in Hyde v. Hyde-1 incomprehensible, 
although admittedly, divorce was less prevalent in 1866, 
than it is now, in English society. Bromley has suggested 
that the only interpretation that can be put on Lord Pen­
zance’s statement is that the marriage lasts for life un­
less it is previously determined by a decree or other act
4
of dissolution.
There is some evidence that it was legally 
impossible to dissolve a marriage by divorce in a few 
traditional systems of customary law in Nigeria. In the 
majority of Nigerian customary laws, however, divorce was 
traditionally possible, although relatively rare. There 
are very few societies in contemporary Nigeria which 
absolutely prohibit divorce, at least, divorce initiated 
by the husband, and most customary law systems also per­
mit a wife to divorce her husband. It may be noted that 
the wife’s equality in this respect is due to the fact 
that a customary marriage is essentially a union between
1. See Chapter IX, below, p. 84.
2. Joseph Epstein, Divorce: The American Experience
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), p . 12.
3. [1866] L.R.I.P. and D. 130, 133.
4. Bromley, Family Law, 19773 ££. cit., pp. 15-16.
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two families of equal legal status, and a wife cannot 
dissolve her marriage without the consent and active 
participation of her family in traditional society. The 
right to dissolve a customary marriage resides, not in 
the wife, but in her family. This is the legal position 
in some systems of customary law, even in contemporary 
Nigerian society. For example, among the Igbos, a wife 
can only institute a divorce action in court by suing 
through her legal guardian, who must be a party to the 
action. The wife on the other hand, need not be a party 
to the divorce suit initiated on her behalf.
A customary marriage may be dissolved either
extra-judicially, that is, by mutual agreement between
the spouses and their families, without the intervention
of a court or other judicial body, or judicially, by the
order of a customary court. In either case, customary
law draws a clear distinction between spouses who are
divorced and those who are merely separated. The procedure
for obtaining an extra-judicial divorce is relatively
informal, but as will be later seen, certain acts must be
performed before there can be a valid divorce,^ except in
the case of a marriage by "mutual consent only", which as
2
previously noted, only operates among some Yoruba commun­
ities .
In most systems of customary law, refund of 
dowry, or its waiver by the husband, is the only sine qua 
non of a valid extra-judicial divorce, although certain 
other acts such as a symbolic public severing of the 
marital bond may have important evidential value.
Usually a refund of dowry, or its waiver by the 
husband is also necessary for a judicial divorce unless
1. See Rafatu Morin and ORs. v. Yewande Soyemi [1973] 3 
U.I.L.R. 42b at p. 429: "Proof of divorce, even that
by native law and custom, requires much more than just 
an oral statement that the parties to a customary 
marriage are divorced."
2. See further, above, Chapter III.
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there are local bye-laws to the contrary.
It should be noted that in contradistinction to 
divorce in English law, no formal grounds need be advanced 
for a divorce in customary law, since the spouses may 
effect a divorce by mutual consent. Recently, however, a 
few local authorities have enacted bye-laws enumerating 
certain defined grounds which must be established before a 
divorce may be granted by the courts.^ As will be later 
seen, many of these provisions discriminate unduly against 
women, and in this respect infringe the constitutional 
right to freedom from discrimination on grounds of sex.
Laws regulating the capacity to effect a divorce, 
divorce procedure, and the validity and incidents of divorce 
are patently vital to the legal status of women in marriage. 
This section discusses the divorce laws of the various 
systems of customary law in Nigeria, which are particularly 
relevant to the status of women. As in previous sections 
the laws and practices which, obtained in traditional 
societies, and which to some extent, are still found in 
various parts of the country are discussed, as they provide 
important evidence of change, and also provide a background 
for an assessment of the effect of the changes on the 
position of women.
2. The Recognition of Divorce.
A. The traditional society.
To what extent was divorce possible in traditional 
society? There is some evidence which supports the alleg­
ation that in a few traditional Nigerian societies a marriage 
could not be legally dissolved by divorce. The parties 
may separate and live apart from each other, but the legal
1. See further, below, pp.645-647.
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bond nevertheless remains.^ Thus in Yoruba customary law,
various writers have stated that traditionally, divorce was
not possible. Ajisafe states;
Divorce is not permissible in native law.
Husband and wife may be forced to separate.
The woman may go and live with another man.
In that case the man is bound to pay back 
the dowry to the husband. But the family 
of the woman will not receive any dowry from 
the other man nor regard him as the lawful 
husband of the woman.2
This statement is interesting because, as will be later
seen, refund of dowry legally dissolves the marriage, and
the refund must be made to the husband or his family to
effect a valid divorce, but as previously noted, payment of
dowry to the parents or other legal guardian of the bride
o
is an essential legal element of a dowry marriage. The 
legal position seems to be, therefore, that the woman is 
divorced from her previous husband (by refund of dowry), ' 
but she is not married to the man who refunded the dowry 
to the husband, since no dowry is paid by the former to the 
parents of the woman.
Ekundare criticizes Ajisafefs statement on divorce 
in Yoruba customary* law. He. submits that the statement is 
’’wrong” because Ajisafe failed to appreciate the customary 
position of the man who returns the dowry to the husband.
He says;
Ajisafers interpretation of the customary 
law on divorce is wrong as it contradicts 
both the old and the modern concept of 
divorce among the'Yorubas.^
1. See Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit. , p.
190; ”A ceremony performed before the ancestors to 
solemnize marriage can never, according to strict custom 
be revoked”; see also Lopez and Ors. v. Lopez and Ors. 
Il924]5 N.L.R.47; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op. 
cit., p. 216; Trimmingham, Islam in West Africa, op. cit.,
p. 170.
2. Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the Yorubas, op. cit. , p. 53; 
see also Forde, The Yoruba-speaklng Peoples of South-Western 
Nigeria, op. cit. , p . 2d ; Delano , The Soul of Nigeria,
op. cit. , p. 142.
3* See further, below, Chapter VI.
4. Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce under Yoruba Customary
Law, op. cit. , p. 29.
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In support of his contention, Ekundare cites the unre­
ported case of Paramola Ikotun y. Sebolatan Tayc,1 decided 
by the Grade B Customary'Court, Ilesha in 1958, in which 
it was held that dowry could be repaid to the first husband 
of a woman by a man who wanted to marry her. Refund of 
the dowry in this manner constitutes a marriage to the man 
who made the refund. Undoubtedly this is the position in 
the present Yoruba customary law, but Ajisafefs and other
similar statements of the previous indissolubility of
2
customary marriages should not be summarily dismissed as 
inaccurate. It is a well-known fact that customary law is 
not stagnant and its changing nature has.already been noted
"3
m  a previous chapter. A closer examination of the state­
ments seem to indicate a transition in customary law in 
this respect, and it is interesting to imaginatively recon­
struct the development of divorce in Yoruba customary law.
Ajisafefs statement may be taken as representing 
the law in the known earliest period, during which divorce 
was legally impossible, although the spouses may separate.
There is evidence of the fact that a woman who 
was cruelly treated by her husband had the right to seek 
refuge from his cruelty by running to the Oba's palace and 
taking hold of one of its pillars. No one, including the 
husband, was permitted to remove her from the pillar. The 
Oba (King) or other Chief, after listening to the evidence 
of both spouses, if the husband was adjudged guilty of 
excessive cruelty, would keep the wife at his palace until 
an acceptable suitor repaid the dowry paid by the former
1. [1958] Grade B Customary Court, Ilesha, see Ekundare, 
op. cit. , pp. 15, 20, and 29.
2. See e.g. Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op. cit., p. 
298; Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, op. cit., p. 
116; Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoplesa op. cit. , p. 
82; Bradbury and Forde, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit., 
p. 52; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria  ^ op. cit., 
p. 632; Temple, Notes on the Tribes, op. cit. , pp. 43,
3. See above, Chapter II, pp. 178-180.
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husband. A divorce was thus legally effected.1 Since no
payments were made by the second husband to the woman’s
parents they would continue to regard the first husband as
the legal husband and the second one as only a paramour.
Thus Johnson says:
Divorce is very rare; so rare as to be 
practically considered as non-existing.
It is by no means easily obtained especially 
when there are children of the union... a 
divorce is never granted by the rulers of 
the town until all possible means of recla­
mation have been exhausted.
A woman divorced from her husband can never 
be married or taken up legally by another 
man; hence the saying A ki isu opo alaye 
(no one can inherit the relict of a living 
man. ^
The third stage was marked by direct negotiation 
between a husband who was separated from his wife and who 
was willing to accept a refund of dowry paid when the 
marriage was contracted, and a prospective husband willing 
to refund the dowry and take over the woman as wife. In 
such a case, the wife’s parents, not having received pay­
ment of dowry from the second man would continue to regard 
the first husband as the legal one. This would be’the 
position until the practice of direct refund to the husband 
has become sufficiently general as to be regarded as creat­
ing a binding marriage between the divorced wife and the 
man making the refund.
The last stage in the transition, the present 
stage, is one under which divorce may be effected by the 
repayment of the dowry by the wife herself, whether or not 
she has a prospective husband in view. Refund of dowry by 
the prospective husband automatically constitutes a marriage
1. See Elias, The Nigerian Legal System, op. cit. , p. 298; 
Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 142; Delano, 
An African Looks at Marriage, op. cit.a p. 31*
2. Johnson, ojd, cit., p. 116; cf. Fadipe, Sociology of 
the Yoruba3 op. cit. , p. 91; ’’Divorce was effected by 
the process of refunding what was known as ife, that is, 
what was paid in the course of courtship”.
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between him and the divorced woman (marriage by seduction).^
If evolution of the law is thus viewed, Ajisafe Ts
statement becomes rational, and is certainly supported by
evidence, not only from, other writers on Yoruba customary
law, but also from the practice in other societies. For
example, Egharevba writes:
According to Benin law and custom no 
divorcement or refund of dowry was known 
in ancient days. The modern system of 
divorcement or refund of dowry is quite 
foreign and is an introduction of the 
British Government^
It should be noted that a divorce by refund of 
dowry existed among many Nigerian societies before colon­
ization by the British Government, For example, Bowen, as 
early as the mid-eighteenth century, and Ellis a few years
later, refers to divorce by refund of dowry as practised
■5
by the Yorubas. There is evidence that this was the trad­
itional method of divorce among several other communities
h
before the advent of the British.
Whatever the position may have been with refer­
ence to the recognition of divorce in Yoruba customary 
law, and a few other customary law systems, in the large 
majority of traditional societies as defined in this thesis, 
divorce, by the mutual consent of the spouses, or by uni­
lateral action of either spouse was legally possible, 
invariably by refund of dowry.
In a few societies divorce could be effected by 
the family in opposition to the wishes of the spouse 
concerned. This was especially so in the case of the wife. 
In some societies the wifeTs parents had the right to
1. See further, above, Chapter VII. pp. 577-579.
2. Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op. cit. , p. 20.
3. Bowen, op.cit. , pp. 304-305; Ellis, Yoruba-Speaking 
Peoples, op. cit. , p. 186.
4. See e.g. Begho, op_. cit. , pp. 49-50; Talbot, Peoples
of Southern Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 632; Meek, Northern
Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 216; Talbot, Tribes
of the Niger Delta, op. cit. , p. 218.
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remove her from the husbandTs home, and refund the dowry, 
without regard to the wishes of the wife. Fear of being 
deprived of his wife was a safe-guard against her ill- 
treatment by him, and an insurance of the performance by 
the husband of his customary obligations to the wife's 
family.1
B . The modern society.
The general rule which obtains in Nigeria at 
present is that a customary marriage may be legally 
dissolved by mutual consents of the spouse^ or unilaterally
2by either spouse, whether the other spouse consents or not. 
Grounds for divorce which have to be established by a wife 
may be more stringent, and some grounds, for example, 
adultery, may be entirely denied to a wife, but there are 
not many societies, even those where divorce was tradition­
ally never permitted, which now prohibit divorce if both 
spouses desire it, or which deny the wife's right to a 
divorce, while permitting a husband to divorce his wife 
unilaterally.
This represents a great improvement in a wife's 
legal status in relation to divorce, and is in accordance 
with the general practice of the various communities in 
Nigeria,
There are, however, a few communities which 
continue to observe the traditional law under which divorce 
is absolutely impossible, or the husband1s freedom to
1. See Fadipe, The Sociology of the Yoruba3 op. cit. , pp.
76-77; Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria,
op. cit.3 p. 61; Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the 
Yoruba, ojd. cit., p. 83; Tremearne, Tailed Head-Hunters, 
op. cit. 3 p. 237; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, 
op. cit. , p . 217.
2. See, Obi, Modern Family Law, op, cit. , p. 366; Kasunmu
Salacuse, o£. cit. , pp. 175-17o; Nwogugu, Family Law
in Nigeria, op, cit. , p. 179»
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initiate a divorce is denied to the wife, unless the 
husband consents.^" For example, under Okrika customary 
law, an Iya (big dowry) marriage can be dissolved at will 
by the husband. All that he has to do is to return his 
wife to her parents. The wife can also divorce the 
husband provided he consents, but if he refuses to accept 
the refund of dowry and other marriage expenses, including 
the Ikpo and Okuru clothes he gave her at the time of the 
marriage, the marriage continues to subsist. There is 
nothing the wife could do to regain her freedom to remarry. 
Any children she subsequently begets for another man 
legally belong to the husband, but nevertheless are treated
as illegitimate by the society.
2In Solomon v. Gbobo, the Port-Harcourt High 
Court-held that such a custom was contrary to natural 
justice, equity and good conscience, and therefore unen­
forceable under section 20(1) of the High Court Law,^ of 
the former Eastern Region.
This decision may be regarded as a blow struck 
for equality of rights and duties between the spouses of 
a customary marriage, and anticipated the right of freedom 
from discrimination of the new Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1979* One point should however be 
noted here. This was the decision of a High Court.
Customary Court judges might' have taken a very different 
view of the enforcement' of traditional customary law.
Resort to a High Court was only possible in this case, 
because Customary Courts were not in operation in the 
State at the relevant time. With the re-establishment of 
Customary Courts in all Southern States, discriminatory 
customary laws are -less likely to be rejected as repugnant 
to equity and good conscience or contrary to the funda­
mental rights entrenched in the Constitution. While appeal 
to a Higher Court is possible, it is expensive, and beyond
•1. See Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. , p. 28.
2. [197*04 E.C.S.L.R. 457.
3. Cap 61, Laws of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, 1963 
Revision.
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the reach of most women.
Adherence to traditional customary law which
adversely affects women is not confined to Customary
Court judges. Some superior court judges are also prone
to enforcement of customary laws which have been rendered
ineffectual by changing social and other conditions. For
example, in Nwaribe v. President and Registrar, Orlu
District Court.^  Egbuna J., cited with approval, and
applied the following passage:
Under ancient customary law marriage was 
almost always indissoluble, as it was 
looked upon as a permanent social and 
spiritual bond between man and wife on 
the one hand and their respective families 
on the other.2
The learned Judge failed to refer to the pertinent 
fact that this ancient law has been changed and that 
divorce is now prevalent in Nigeria society.
3. Divorce Procedures
A. The traditional society.
In traditional society, a marriage could be 
dissolved extra-judicially, and it was unnecessary for 
either husband or wife who wanted a divorce to resort to 
a court, or any other central authority. In most cases, 
it was purely a family affair.
The procedures for obtaining a divorce differ 
in details in various communities, but general broad 
principles may, nevertheless, be identified, and may be
1. [1964*] 8 E.N.L.R. 24.
2. Ibid., p. 26; cited from Elias, Nigerian Legal System 
op. cit., p . 298.
3. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , pp. 363-365; 
Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 178-179; 
Kasunmu and Salacuse, op. cit., pp. 172-175; Leith- 
Ross, African Women, op. cit. , p. 103; Basden, Niger 
Ibos, op. cit. , pp. 239-241; Meek, Law and Authority, 
op. cit-. , p . 279.
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divided into four stages;
(i) separation of the spouses;
(ii) negotiations as to the amount of dowry, if any, 
refundable;.
(iii) refund of dowry;
(iv) performance of symbolic customary rites, signifying 
the dissolution of the marriage.
Although the refund.(or waiver of the liability 
to refund) of dowry is the only legal essential of a valid 
divorce,^ the method by which the separation of the spouses 
is effected, and the performance of the customary rites, are 
not. devoid of legal effect.
(i) Separation of the spouses. The first step towards a 
divorce is the physical separation of the spouses. The 
divorce may be initiated by either husband or wife, but 
there is a good deal of evidence which shows that, more
2
often than not, it is the wife who initiates the divorce.
The first step towards a divorce may be accomplished 
verbally or symbolically. In the case of a wife who 
wishes to divorce her husband, in many cases, she simply 
collects her few personal property and returns to her 
natal family. In a few cases she may g£ directly and live 
with a prospective husband.
Her initiation of divorce is usually accompanied 
by symbolic acts, some of them pregnant with legal conse­
quences. For example, among the Ekoi (Ejagham), if a
1. See further below, pp. 651-654.
2. See e.g. Bohannan and Bohannan, The Sin of Central 
Nigeria, op. cit., p. 77; Forde, Marriage and the 
Family Among the Yako, op. cit. , p. 72; Fadipe, op. 
cit., p. 90; Kasunmu and Salacuse, o j d . cit. , p. 177.
3. This is especially the case among the Yorubas, see 
Chawere v. Aihenu and Johnson, [1935]12 N.L.R.4;
Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 364; By Kalahari 
custom, if a woman wishes to leave her husband, she 
must beat the drum called Kpokpo round the town while 
stating her reasons, see Talbot, Tribes of the Niger 
Delta, op. city, p. 216.
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woman wished to divorce her husband, all she had to do 
was to rake out the fire, pour water on the embers till 
they died out, cover herself with white ’paint’ and cut 
off her hair. After such a rite she could never return 
to her husband, even though both parties wished a recon­
ciliation.^ Similarly, a wife who, in a quarrel with her 
husband, uncovers her private parts and curses him, is
thereby irrevocably divorced from him in some parts of 
2Ibibioland. These procedures may be compared with cases 
where the wife, perhaps after.some disagreement with her 
husband, simply departs for her natal home. The husband 
if he wishes to do so, may follow her and effect a recon-
•3
ciliation.J
The husband may also initiate a divorce by a 
symbolic act indicating that he no longer wishes to remain 
married to his wife. Some of these acts terminate the 
marriage irrevocably, while others leave room for a recon­
ciliation. For example, among some Ibibios, should the 
husband decide to terminate the marriage, he removes his 
wife’s property from the house and throws them outside, 
or he may eject her physically and forcibly from his com­
pound. Attempts at reconciliation may succeed and the 
wife be allowed to remain, after she has been fined for 
her wrong-doing. But if the husband places plaited palm 
leaves (ofut ekpo) outside the wife’s hut or removes her 
cooking stand from the hearth, no reconciliation is
4
possible, and the wife must leave his compound forever.
1. See Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush, op. cit. , p. 113;
Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit. , Vol. Ill, 
p. 67^; Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages, op. cit.,
p. 23; Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit. ,
pp. 217-218; see also Thomas, Anthropological Report 
of the Ibo-Sheaking Peoples, op. cit., p. 17; Meek, 
Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 217; Temple, 
Notes on the Tribes, op. cit., p. 251.
2. See Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages, op. cit. , p. 23;
see also Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking
Peoples, op. cit., p. 77.
3. Among some communities the husband has a duty to follow 
his wife and beg her to return, see Esenwa, 0£. cit. ,p.73«
4. See Lieber, Efik and Ibibio Villages, op. cit. , p. 23; 
Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit. , pp. 239-2T0.
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Similarly, among some Igbo communities if the 
husband hands his wife the stick symbolizing his Ofo 
and asks her to return to her parents, this is enough to 
initiate a divorce. Among other sub-groups, the husband 
may ask the wife to bring him a basket. He then puts 
the broom with which the wife sweeps her house into it 
and tells her to take it and return to her parents. The 
husband thereby initiates a divorce.^
(ii) Negotiations for refund of dowry. Once it is con­
ceded that reconciliation between the spouses is impossible 
or undesirable, the next step is for the spouses and 
their respective families to decide in a meeting the amount 
of dowry and other gifts which must be refunded by the 
briders family to effect the divorce. Various consider­
ations, for example, the number of children the wife has 
for the husband, the duration of the marriage, and the
spouse who is mainly responsible for the break-up of the
2
marriage are taken into account.
(iii) Refund of dowry. The amount of dowry mutually 
agreed on by the families is refunded by the bridefs family. 
Invariably this is done in a meeting at which both families, 
the spouses, the middleman and other witnesses are present. 
The elders of both families then declare the marriage 
dissolved.J
1. See Aniogulu, ”Aspects of Customary Marriage and Divorce
and Their Incidents Upon Family Life”, 0£. cit.3 p. 110;
Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Deltaa op. cit.3 p. 218; 
Lieber, Ibo Village Communities, op. cit. 5 p. 17;
Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit., p. 277-279*
2. See Bohannan and Bohannan, o£. cit. , p. 76.
3* See Customary Law Manual, op. cit.a pp. 292-29^*
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(iv) Performance of customary rites. Among some commun­
ities, especially among the Igbos, certain ceremonies 
are performed to symbolize the severance of the marriage 
ties. For example, among some Igbo communities, the 
spouses hold two ends of a string, which is then cut, 
after which oaths are taken on behalf of the families 
of the- spouses. ^  The tenor of such oaths is generally 
that each family will refrain from doing injurious acts 
to the other family. The oaths and ceremonies, although 
not legally essential for the validity of the divorce, 
nevertheless provide valuable evidence that the dowry 
has been refunded and a divorce effected, since in 
ordinary circumstances, the husband would refuse to per­
form the ceremony if the dowry agreed on has not been 
repaid.
B . Modern society.
In addition to extra-judicial divorce which 
prevailed in traditional society, judicial divorce to 
dissolve a customary marriage is now possible in most 
societies. In some communities, for example, the Yorubas, 
resort to a court to obtain a divorce has become institu­
tionalised, so much so that some writers claim that a 
judicial divorce is now necessary in order to effect a 
valid dissolution of a marriage in Yoruba customary law. 
Thus Ekundare says:
In Yoruba customary law, a proper dis­
solution of marriage is by the decree 
of the customary courts. The parties 
themselves have no legal right to grant 
themselves a divorce, though they could 
separate by agreement^
It is respectfully submitted that in the absence 
of a statutory provision to this effect, this proposition
1. See Customary Law Manual, op. cit., pp. 292-294 for 
the symbolic ceremonies performed by various Igbo 
communities.
2. Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce Under Yoruba Customary 
Law, op. cit., p. 29; cf. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op. 
cit., p . 175 .
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cannot be supported, with respect to the present practice
among the Yorubas, at least at Ibadan. Undoubtedly a
considerable number of disputes between the spouses are
brought to the courts and are invariably recorded as
divorce cases, but closer examination reveals that these
cases nearly always involve incidental disputes. For
example, the Grade B, Customary Court, No.4 at Mapo Ibadan
recorded 1116 divorces cases decided in 1976. Of these
cases 276 involved disputed paternity only, the spouses
having mutually effected a divorce extra-judicially before
instituting an action for affiliation in court. Many of
the other cases were brought, either because the husband
absolutely refused to divorce his wife and accept the
refund of dowry, or more often, because he rejected the
amount of dowry refund offered by the wife,1 or in cases of
divorce initiated by the husband, the wife refused to leave
the matrimonial home; or having left to cohabit with
2another man, refused to refund the husband's dowry. In 
some cases, the wife had refunded the dowry, but not the 
incidental payments and other gifts which had been expended 
or given by the husband with reference to the marriage. In 
other words, it is mainly divorce cases which involve 
incidental disputes which cannot be mutually settled by the
1. The amount of dowry refundable is fixed by legislation, 
and in many cases, where the husband had paid a higher 
sum of dowry, he refused to accept the statutory amount, 
since before this legislation the whole amount of dowry 
paid was refundable when there was a divorce; see 
further, below, pp. 654-656.
2. See e.g. Raufu Alao v. Sherifatu Owero [1976] Suit No. 
728/76, unreported, Ibadan Customary Court, Mapo. The 
husband claimed he had married the wife Min her maiden" 
(as a virgin). The wife allegedly removed to her 
parents1 home, from where she married another husband, 
but failed to refund his dowry. The Court found that
he had not actually paid dowry, although he had expended 
N70.00 on the occasion of the marriage. He was advised 
to bring a separate action to recover his marriage 
expenses. No dowry was refundable, since none had been 
paid.
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parties that are brought to the courts for settlement.
This evidence was confirmed by the Judges of 
the Grade C, Customary Court, Agodi, Ibadan, who stated 
that it was not necessary to bring a court action for 
divorce if the parties could settle the matter amicably, 
and that the usual practice is for the prospective 
husband to refund the dowry to the previous husband, 
thereby simultaneously affecting a divorce, as well as a 
remarriage of the divorced woman to the man who refunded 
the dowry.'1' Consequently, the number of ’’divorce” cases 
brought to the Customary Courts reflects the number of 
cases involving incidental disputes rather than the number 
of actual divorces.
Among the other ethnic groups, judicial divorces
are less frequent than among the Yorubas, and among the
Igbos of Anambra and Imp States, where Customary Courts
had been abolished, and were not in operation at the time
field-work was conducted, non-judicial divorces were the
rule rather than the exception. Very few divorce cases
were brought to the Magistrates and High Courts which then
2had jurisdiction over customary marriages.
It has been previously seen that a divorce could 
be initiated by either spouse of a customary marriage by a 
symbolic act which demonstrates the spouse’s intention of 
bringing the marriage to an end. This procedure is still 
followed among certain sections of the community. For
3
example, in a caseJ recently brought to the Welfare Office 
at Onitsha, the wife, married under customary law, alleged 
that she was ’’divorced” by her husband and left at her 
parents’ home without any means of support for herself and
1. Information given by the panel of Judges at an interview
held at the Court on 7 Sept., 1977* The panel consisted
of Acting President of the Court, B.O. Abidogun, Esq.
and 4 other Judges. The Court Clerk acted as interpreter 
since no member of the panel spoke the English language.
2. See E.I. Nwogugu, "Abolition of Customary Courts - The 
Nigerian Experiment", [1976] J.A.L. , p. 1; the abolition 
of Customary Courts was inconvenient for women who
wished to divorce their husbands. See further above,
Chapter VI, p.
3. File No. ONZ/SWU/12/5642/1976.
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the infant children of the marriage. She stated that the 
husband bought a native pot and filled it with one gallon 
of palm wine. He told her to prepare to go with him to 
visit her parents. After exchanging greetings with her 
family, the husband calmly put two leaves from a pear tree 
into the wine he had brought with him, intimating that he 
had thereby divorced her. The husband waived his right 
to the refund of dowry. Consequently, the parties were, 
by the husband’s act, legally divorced. It should be 
noted that the wife was divorced without any prior know­
ledge of her husband’s intention to divorce her. She 
alleged that when they left for her parents’ home she had 
no inkling of the husband’s intention, and had therefore 
failed to remove her personal belongings from the matri­
monial home.
This is a perfectly valid method of divorce 
among some Igbo communities, although where the husband 
has not waived his right to a refund of dowry, the marriage 
would not be regarded as legally dissolved until the 
husband’s dowry has been refunded, usually by a prospective 
husband.*^
Some High Court judges, while fully cognizant 
of the fact that the husband can effect an extra-judicial 
divorce by such a symbolic act, and a waiver of dowry, 
seem to forget that in most communities a wife has a 
similar right to an extra-judicial divorce, initiated 
invariably by a symbolic act, and a subsequent refund of 
dowry. Significantly, Aniagolu J., (as he then was) in 
his lecture, ’’Aspects of Customary Marriage and Divorce 
and their Incidents upon Family Life”, delivered at The 
Workshop of African Indigenous Laws, held at the Univer­
sity of Nsukka in 1974, enumerated seven usual methods 
by which a husband could divorce his wife in the tradit­
ional society. The learned Judge failed to mention even 
one method by which a wife could divorce her husband,
1. See Aniagolu, op. cit. , pp. 109-110; Begho, op_. cit., 
p. 53* Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit.,
p. 218.
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thus giving the impression that only husbands can initiate 
a divorce.^*
2
In Re Briggs and Osagie, Begho, J. stated:
In these modern days with an abundance 
of customary courts, I would hold that 
to constitute a divorce, a person 
claiming to be a divorcee before a 
Registrar of Marriages must be able to 
show that he was grapted divorce by a 
competent customary court.^
The Judge also held that the mere refund of
4dowry, in the manner alleged by the respondent, could not 
constitute legal divorce. He accepted the evidence of 
the male caveator that to constitute legal divorce accord­
ing to Beni customary law, an action had to be taken out
in the Native Court, or the dowry had to be refunded at
a meeting of both families. At such a meeting the husband 
would issue a receipt to discharge the woman from further 
obligations as his wife.
5
This decision has been criticized. Customary 
law certainly knew no writing, and non-judicial divorce 
was common to most societies under traditional customary 
law. Customary law is not constant, but if the law has 
changed to the extent that judicial divorce, or a receipt 
for the refund of dowry is now required, in the absence of 
a statutory provision to this effect, it is doubtful
whether the testimony of an interested party in a single
case can be regarded as sufficient evidence of such a 
change. Unfortunately, the alleged change was to the
1. Aniagolu, 0£. cit., pp. 109-110.
2. [1964]M.N.L.R.95.
3. Ibid., p . 96.
4. The respondent alleged that she refunded the dowry 
directly to the husband.
5. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 179;
Kasunmu and Salacuse, op. cit., p . 1T?.
6. For the manner in which a change in customary law
could be established see the judgment of Kingdon, C.J. 
in Balogun and Anor. v. Ashodi, [1931]10 N.L.R.36; 
see also Oshilaja v. Oshilaja L1972]10 CCHCJ11; see 
below, Chapter II, pp. 178-180.
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disadvantage of the wife in this particular case.
In Okpanum v. Qkpanum,^ it was noted that dis­
solution of marriage under native law and custom can be 
extra-judicial. Agbakoba J., held:
Under customary law no ground for divorce 
need be alleged nor proved. It was enough 
for the husband to arrange a meeting where 
he duly informed his parents-in-law of
his intention to bring the marriage to an
end... It does not often happen but it is. 
lawful for a marriage to be terminated by 
mutual consent of husband and wife.
The Judge expressed the opinion that it was
advisable to have recourse to the courts, not only to
obtain a divorce which would then be a matter of course,
but to determine and settle collateral questions in cases
in which paternity of children, or refusal to accept the
refund of dowry by the husband, or refusal by a wife to
leave the matrimonial home after the husband had terminated
the marriage, were involved.
Many communities have legislative provisions
which make resort to a court necessary in order to terminate
2a customary marriage. Thus, The Efik Marriage Law pro­
vides that neither husband nor wife could effect a divorce 
unless an action is brought in the Customary Court and a
divorce bill granted. A similar provision is found in
3 4Benin Marriage Rules . It is submitted that such provisions
represent a change in the traditional customary law which
cannot be justified. Resort to a court or a receipt for
the refund of dowry may be important as evidence of the
fact that a divorce has taken place, but they never were,
and should not now be made a legal essential of a valid
divorce in customary law. Evidence of a divorce could be
1. [1972]2 E.C.S.L.R.561, 565.
2. Section VI; these rules were drawn up by the Efik 
National Society in 1905, and are still followed by
the Customary Court at Calabar, see further, below, p. 645.
3. Section II; these rules are applied locally in the 
Benin Area and are issued as amendments to the Native 
Court Instructions, see CC.47/Vol.2/17, Customary Courts 
Registry, Benin Division Benin City, 12 Aug., 1963.
4. For similar provisions see Section 5(2) of the Native 
Authority (Declaration of Tiv Native Law and Custom) Order 
1955. (N.R.L.N.149 of 1955); section 9 of the Native 
Authority (Declaration of Idoma Native Marriage Law and
 Custom) Order. 1959 (N.R.L.N.63 of 1959).___________________
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effected by a simple method of registration similar to 
the registration of a customary marriage, a birth or a 
death.1 Compulsory resort to a court in order to dis­
solve a customary marriage, even where it is applicable 
to both parties in law, in actual fact, discriminates 
against the woman. A husband married according to 
customary law is not prevented from contracting further 
marriages, but the wife is unable to do so. The husband 
therefore has no need to initiate divorce proceedings in 
order to remarry. The wife who wishes to remarry must 
obtain a divorce. This is the main reason why most 
divorces are initiated by women.
To bring an action even in the Customary Courts, 
costs money, and may be an added financial burden to a 
wife struggling to accumulate enough funds to repay the 
dowry. The costs of bringing an action may be higher 
than the dowry to be refunded. The modern trend in many 
countries is to make divorce procedure as simple as pos­
sible. Customary law has always provided the simplest 
procedures. There is no justification for the reversal 
of this principle of customary law.
4. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
A. The traditional society.
Strictly speaking, no "grounds” for divorce, in 
the technical sense of an obligation to establish facts 
which in law would justify a grant of divorce, were 
necessary for the dissolution of a customary marriage in 
traditional customary law. Divorce was an extra judicial 
matter in all societies, and could be effected by either 
spouse, for the simple reason that he or she no longer 
wanted to continue the marital relationship. If such a 
desire was evinced, and all attempts at reconciliation
1. See e.g. The Kalahari Council Registration of Marriages, 
Bye-Laws, 1965, E.N.L.G. No.l of 1966.
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proved fruitless, divorce would ensue, in spite of the 
fact that no serious matrimonial offence had been com­
mitted by the other spouse.^
The position could be contrasted with English
law where, until recently, a divorce could only be
obtained if the party seeking a divorce justified a grant
by proving the commission of at least one of a number of
specific enumerated offences. Divorce by mutual consent
was impossible. In traditional customary law, (as it
now is under English law, and under the Nigerian Matri-
2monial Causes Decree), the only ground for divorce was 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Once this stage 
was reached, the cause of the breakdown was immaterial, 
serving only as evidence of the fact that the marriage 
had indeed broken down.
The burden of a spouse wishing to justify a 
divorce was to convince the families, (especially his or 
her own family) - the chief arbiters in matrimonial 
disputes, that the marriage had indeed broken down. It 
has been seen that the families of the spouses took an 
active part in the formation of a customary marriage. 
Similarly, they also took an active interest in the 
stability of the marriage. This was especially so in 
the case of the wife’s family.
In many systems of customary law, dowry paid 
by the husband on the occasion of the marriage had to be 
refunded to him immediately, by the wife!s family, when 
the marriage is dissolved. The wife’s family, therefore, 
had an economic, as well as a social reason, for ensuring 
that the marriage remained intact. A wife who wished to 
leave her husband must be able to marshall convincing
1. See Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op. cit
pp. 175-176; Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., pp.
366-368; Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , pp
181-182; cf. the position in Sierra Leone, see Olive 
P. Taylor, ’’The Position of Women Under Sierra Leone 
Customary Family Law”, in African Indigenous Laws, 
edit, by T.O. Elias, et al~ (Enugu: Government Printer 
1975), pp. 194-231, at p. 225-226.
2. See further, below, Chapter XI, pp. 258-260.
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reasons for doing so.^
It has been mentioned previously that the main
tribunal for domestic disputes was a meeting of the
families concerned, higher authority only being referred
to when no settlement could be arrived at, and the peace
2
of the community or village was threatened as a result.
The. spouse who desired a divorce would therefore be anxious 
to satisfy, not only his or her family, but the community 
as a whole, that a divorce was justified. This was 
necessary, in order to enlist the support of the family, 
and the sympathy of the community, against any action 
taken by the other spouse. If it is remembered how 
important a part the sanction of a community plays in the 
enforcement of law in traditional society, the importance 
of enlisting the sympathy or active support of the com­
munity as well as the family would readily be appreciated.
Among the usual reasons generally acceptable 
as sufficient to justify one spouse leaving the other 
were:
(i) adultery by the wife;
(ii) sterility of either spouse;
(iii) cruelty of either spouse (but especially the 
husband);
(iv) desertion;
(v) persistent stealing by either spouse;
(vi) the practice by either spouse of witchcraft, making
poisonous medicines or other potions, with an 
intention to harm the husband, a co-wife, or her 
children;
(vii) failure to give respect to the senior members of
. the other spouse’s family (especially in the case of
the wife);
(viii) refusal of either spouse to have sexual intercourse 
at reasonable intervals; and
1. See Aniagolu, op. cit. , p. Ill; Delano, An African 
Looks at Marriage, op. cit. , p. 31*
2. See above, Chapter V.
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(ix) failure by the husband to. honour his customary 
obligations to the family of the wife.
Some of these reasons will be briefly discussed.
(i) Adultery^
In most systems of customary law, if adultery was
committed by the wife, the husband had the option of 
2
divorce, which did not exclude his right to claim damages
from the male adulterer, and in some societies also from
? 4the adulterous wife. It has been previously seen, that
in most societies a wife had no exclusive rights to her
husbandTs sexuality, and consequently a wife was denied
a corresponding right to divorce her husband on account
of his adultery, or to claim damages from a female adult-
5
erer. The right of a husband to claim damages from 
persons committing adultery with his wife was grossly mis­
used and had to be limited or abolished in some areas of
g
the country, for example, among some Igbo communities.
7
Divorce for adultery is rare' in traditional
1. Adultery has been discussed previously in Chapter VII 
above. Its treatment here refers solely to adultery 
as a ground for divorce.
2. See Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. , p. 186;
Obi, Modern Family Law  ^ op. cit., p. 367; Nwogugu, Family 
Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 181; Aguda, Select Law 
Lectures and Papers, op. cit. , p. 75.
3. Example, among the Yorubas, Ibibios and some Igbo communi­
ties, see Customary Law Manual, op. cit., pp. 278-282; see 
Delano, An African Looks at Marriage, op. cit. , p. 319 who 
excludes adultery from his list of grounds for divorce.
4. See above, Chapter VII, pp. 564-565.
5. But see Forde and Jones, ojo. cit. , p. 18 who include 
adultery as a ground for divorce by a wife; see also the 
Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 291; adultery by a wife 
is not a ground for divorce in Ukwa Division of Imo State; 
cf. Elias, op. cit., p. 299; Aguda, o j d. cit. , p. 75; Obi,
Modern Family Law, op. cit., p. 367. Delano, An African
Looks at Marriage , op. cit. , p. 31.
6. See Iepowa Adebiyi, MA Short History of Brass and Its People",
J.R.A.S., Vol.7, 1907/1908, p. 60; Basden, Niger Ibos, op.
cit., p . 233.
7. See Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, op. 
cit. , p. 77; Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, o p . cit..
p. 186. Nadel, Black Byzantium, o p . cit. . p. 152;
Temple, op. cit. . p . Wj,
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society and is only resorted to if the adultery is
habitual or aggravated,1 or if the guilty wife refuses
to perforin the propitiatory customary sacrifices necessary
2
to. cleanse the.pollution, and to appease the Gods. In
■2
Qdu Kalu v. Odah Odu, the husband discovered his wife 
committing adultery on his bed. He requested her to buy 
two goats and to return to their hometown to perform the 
necessary sacrifice to their Juju. Unless this sacrifice 
was performed, the husband claimed that he was forbidden 
to eat food cooked by her. The wife at first refused his 
request to perform the sacrifice but was persuaded to do 
so when he gave her £6 for the purpose. She went home 
and performed the sacrifice. On her return to Calabar, 
where the couple had their matrimonial home, however, 
instead of joining her husband, she went to live with the 
man she had been caught committing adultery with. She 
later delivered a female child for her lover. The husband 
sued her for damages for adultery. The Calabar Customary 
Court ordered her to pay £20 compensation to him as damages 
for aggravated adultery.
(ii) Sterility
Generally, it can be said that in most systems of
customary law the husband*s sterility would justify a
4
divorce by the wife. In some societies, the husband*s
1. For example, adultery with a husband*s blood relation, 
see Johnson, History of the Yorubass op. cit. . p. 116; 
cf. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., Vol. 
Ill, p. 712: '*Amongst nearly all tribes, for a woman 
to cook food for her husband when she has just returned 
from committing adultery is looked upon as a very grave 
sin, and it is specially heinous should the connection 
take place while it is being cooked; in such cases it 
is thought that the husband will probably die**. See 
further, above, Chapter VII, pp. 565 et_
2. See Thomas, Anthropological Report of the Ibo-speaking 
Peoples 3 op. cit., Part IV, pp. 75-78.
3. [1963] Suit No. 533/63, unreported, Calabar Customary 
Court.
4. See e.g. Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958, W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958.
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sterility was the chief ground available for divorce by a 
wife,1 and in nearly all societies, a woman was justified 
in either divorcing her husband, or giving him spurious 
children. For example, among the Tiv, it is not adultery 
if illicit sex by the wife is for the purpose of pro­
creation. The word for adultery (idiar) in Tiv language
2
is the same as that for sexual passion. Similarly, among
the Ibusa community of Igboland, if a wife is not pregnant
within four months of marriage, customary law allows her
to return to her father’s home to have sexual intercourse
with any of her male friends.
Although Obi and other writers mention impotence
4
of a husband as a possible ground for divorce, it is 
submitted that in Nigeria, impotence is confounded with 
sterility. In traditional society, provided a husband 
can' impregnate his wife, his sexual potency is regarded as 
irrelevant. Similarly, a potent but sterile husband may 
be divorced by his wife. There are a few cases where the 
husband’s sterility was allegedly the reason for his wife 
seeking a divorce.
The importance of children in' traditional society 
cannot be over-emphasized. There is no evidence, however, 
that either husbands or wives were divorced because of 
their sterility alone. If the husband is sterile, the
c
wife is permitted to produce children by other men. In
1. See Talbot, Life in Southern Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 211;
Young girls just out of the fatting-house hope to become
mothers within a year of marriage and, by native law
can claim divorce from a husband who proves incapable
of fulfilling their wish within that time; cf. Dennett, 
Nigerian Studies, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
2. Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv, op. cit., 
p. 80; see also Leith-Ross, African Conversation Piece, 
op. cit., p . 71.
3. See The Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 367; Ezeife,
The Sociology of Ibusa, op. cit. , p. 39.
4. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., p. 366; Talbot,
Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit. , p. 216; cf. Fadipe, 
op. cit., p. 90, who notes that impotence was usually not 
a cause for divorce among the Yorubas.
5. See e.g. Evoroja v. Evoroja and Anor. [1961] W.N.L.R. p.6 .
6 . See Forde and Jones, op. cit. , p. 18; The Customary Law
Manual, o£. cit., p. 272; Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit. ,
p. 241; Thomas, Anthropological Report on the._lbo-Speaking 
Peoples, op. cit. , p. 67.
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some communities the husband’s consent or knowledge is
unnecessary for this purpose,3, but in most communities,
such a course is usually initiated by the husband’s family
2
with his consent. If, on the other hand, it is the wife 
who is sterile, the husband was free to marry further wives 
and often did so with the financial help of his sterile 
wife. In this manner, the wife compensated for her dis­
ability by her economic contribution, and thus averted a 
■5
divorce.J
(iii) Cruelty
Under traditional customary law, a husband had
the right to beat his wife. The beating had to be done,
however, in a reasonable manner. Any treatment which was
regarded as unreasonably cruel would result in the wife
4being removed from the matrimonial home by her family.
Delano notes:
In the olden days, when women were considered 
as the property of the husband, divorce was 
rare by the woman and only obtained for bar­
baric and brutal cruelty. In such a case a 
woman had the right to hold on to the pillars 
of the King’s palace. A husband could not
touch her there.c
5
1. See Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 273; the husband’s 
consent is not required in Arochukuri, Awgu, Bende, Idemili, 
Mbaise, Nkanu, Northern Ngwa, Nsukka, Oru, Ukwa and 
Umuahia Divisions.
2. See Thomas, Ibo-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. , Part IV, p.67; 
Manual of Customary Law, op. cit.3 p. 367 ; Gunn and Conant, 
Peoples of the Middle Niger, op. cit., p. 44; Padipe, op. 
cit. , p . 91 •
3. See Delano, An African Looks at Marriage, op. cit., p. 27; 
R.N. Henderson and H.K. Henderson, An Outline of Traditional 
Onitsha Ibo Socialization (Ibadan: Nigeria; Ibadan Univer- 
sity Press, 1966), pp. 12 and 14; and further above,
Chapter III, pp. 243-244.
4. Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria, op. cit.,
p. 77; Thomas, Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. ,
Part I, p. 69; Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op. cit., 
p. 116, who notes that ”a woman may apply for divorce for 
extreme cruelty” .
5 . Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 142.
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The husband’s right of chastisement was some­
times misused by thoughtless and cruel husbands. Talbot’s 
wife records a particularly horrific instance of man’s 
inhumanity to woman. She recounts a case where, in order 
to extract an adultery confession from his wife whom he 
suspected of infidelity, the husband
... tied her hands firmly to two stakes 
firmly driven into the ground and so far 
apart that she lay with arms extended as 
if crucified. He then proceeded to torture 
her by forcing native pepper into her eyes 
and in other ways, which, though recounted 
in Court as mere matters of everyday 
occurrence, are such as it is impossible to 
describe. Yet the man only acted within 
the rights given him by the law and custom 
of his tribe.^
The writer attributed the cruelty of Ibibio husbands to
the fact that ’’many husbands still regard their wives as
2
mere chattels” .
It is doubtful whether such a high degree of 
cruelty was lawful in traditional Ibibio society.
Although adultery by a wife was generally regarded as a 
serious offence which often produced illness in the 
husband, evidence obtained from older informants among 
the Ibibios indicates that the usual penalty meted out 
to adulterous wives was not unduly severe. More import­
ance was attached to the purification rites which had to 
be observed in order to cure the effect of the adultery,
”3
than to the punishment of the female adulterer.
With regard to the mental element, although the
idea of women being regarded as property cannot be ruled
4
out as a reason for the husbands’ cruelty, there is
1. D . -Amaury-Talbot, Woman’s Mysteries of a Primitive 
People a op. cit., p"[ F5"i
2 . Ibid. , p . 98
3. See further above, Chapter VII. pp.565-568.
4. See Tremearne, Tailed Head-Hunters, op. cit_., p. 231; 
Leith-Ross, African Women» op. cit. 3 p. 125 .
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evidence of gross cruelty by husbands in societies where
wives are not. regarded as property. For example, in a
letter written to Erin Pizzey, founder of a home for
battered English wives, in 1971, a wife described the
cruelty of her husband:
He kicked me, stood on me, punched me and 
throttled me into insensibility time and 
again. I don’t know if this was the cause 
but our child was born blind and mentally 
retarded ... it is incredible that one 
person can treat another so diabolically.
He smashed my toe with a hammer one night 
and I didn’t dare tell the hospital.
Another battered English wife reported that the
last time her husband beat her
he smashed her head against the wall in 
the passage until she was unconscious, 
and then pushed her head under the cold 
tap in the scullery until she came round, 
and then banged her head against the wall 
again.2
These are only two of a catalogue of cruelties 
perpetrated by English husbands in a society where at 
least in legal theory, the legal rights of men and women 
are almost identical, and where assault on a wife is a 
criminal offence. It is evident that cruelty of husbands, 
and indeed of wives in a few cases, does not arise merely 
from the mental attitude of proprietorship.
(iv) Desertion
Desertion in English law consists of the unjust­
ifiable withdrawal from cohabitation, without the consent 
of the other spouse and with the intention of remaining 
separated permanently. The separation may be actual, as 
when one spouse leaves the matrimonial home to live else­
where without the consent or approval of the other with an
1. Erin Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear, 
(London: Penguin Books, 197*0, PP • 22-23.
2. Ibid., p. 19.
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intent to remain separate, or constructive, that is,
where one spouse behaves in such a way that the other is
justified in leaving the matrimonial home, the former
is in law, in desertion.^
Both types of desertion are found in customary
law, but in traditional society it was very rare for a
husband to desert from the matrimonial home in patrilineal
societies, or in societies where the spouses cohabited in
2
the husband’s family compound. In most cases, the wife 
was the deserter, since invariably she returned to her 
own family when she found it impossible to live with her 
husband. It was possible, however, for the husband to be, 
and in many cases husbands actually were, in constructive 
desertion, by withdrawing from any marital relationship 
with the wife, and by their actions indicating that the 
marriage was at an end, without actually divorcing her. 
Such behaviour was usually actuated by fear of losing the 
refund of dowry if they initiated a divorce.
B. The modern society
The position with reference to grounds for divorce
1. See further, Bromley, Family Law, op. cit., pp. 194-213; 
see also Pulford v . Pulford [192~3]P.l8 at pp. 21: "in 
order to ascertain whether there has been desertion, you 
must look at the conduct of the parties ... Desertion is 
not the withdrawal from a place, but from a state of 
things” ; see Tinubu v. Tinubu [1959] W.R.N.L.R.314; 
where the petitioner married the respondent without her 
father’s consent and went to live with her father for 
seven years before returning to live with the respondent 
when her father failed to give his consent to the marriage, 
was held to be constructive desertion.
2. Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., p. 227; Nwogugu,
Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 182.
3. For grounds of divorce in customary law generally, see
Forde, et_ al. . Peoples of the Niger Benue Confluence,
op. cit. , p. 44; Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio- 
Speaking Peoples, op. cit., p. 18; Obi, Modern Family 
Law, op. cit., pp. 366-368; Tremearne, op. cit., p. 237; 
Esenwa, Marriage Customs in Asaba Division, op. cit.,
p. 75; Fadipe, op. cit., pp. 90-91; Delano, An African 
Looks at Marriage, op. cit., p. 31*
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remains basically the same in modern Nigerian customary 
laws as it was in traditional society, especially in the 
case of extra-judicial divorce. All of the reasons given 
above as justifying divorces in traditional Nigerian 
society remain valid as "grounds" for divorce in contemp­
orary Nigeria, except where local authorities' bye-laws 
provide to the contrary. It may be noted in this respect 
that Lord Lugard, in his Political Memoranda, advised 
that the grounds for divorce in customary marriage should 
not be based on English standards.1 The fact that a 
divorce in a statutory marriage could only be obtained by 
the establishment of a few precise grounds, was, and still 
is, one of the chief reasons for the unpopularity of stat­
utory marriages in Nigeria.
Strictly speaking, no reasons need to be advanced
for extra-judicial divorce of a customary marriage in
contemporary Nigerian society. Families no longer strive 
to preserve marital stability, and a wife has a greater 
measure of freedom to dissolve her marriage than she 
usually had in traditional society.
A few local authority bye-laws now provide specific
grounds which must be proved by a spouse before he or she
may be granted divorce in a customary law marriage. Many 
of these provisions discriminate against women. Thus they 
all provide that the wife's adultery is a valid ground for 
a divorce claimed by a husband. The husband's adultery, 
however, is not a valid ground for divorce instituted by 
the wife. There is a concerted attempt to define adultery 
as an act which may only be committed by a married woman 
with any man. For example, the Gold Coast Marriage 
Ordinance provides:
Adultery shall not be held to include 
the intercourse of a man married by 
native customary law with an unmarried 
woman.2
1. See Lugard, Political Memoranda, op. cit., p. 84.
2. Gold Coast Marriage Ordinance, 1884, S.49(2). This 
provision was added to the Ordinance in 1909*
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This provision discriminates not only against 
customary law but also against married women.
Similarly, Ellis notes: ,TAdultery can only be
committed with a married woman” .^ Marris lists the most 
common causes of marital instability among his interviewees
in Lagos as, ”a wife’s jealousy, her adultery, or the
2financial failure of the husband” . The husband’s infidel­
ity is expressed in terms of the ’’wife’s jealousy” , but 
her infidelity is ’’adultery”. The fact that customary law 
permits polygyny is no justification for the discrimination. 
A husband should be guilty of adultery if he has illicit
sexual intercourse with women other than his legally married 
■3
wife or wives.
Other discriminatory bye-laws include:
(a) The Eflk Divorce Law.
In 1965, the Efik National Society drew up rules 
pertaining to Efik Marriage Law which were to be observed 
by Customary Courts within the area of jurisdiction.
These rules were reprinted with alterations in 1918, and 
are currently used by the Customary Courts in Calabar. The 
section dealing with divorce provides:
1. The misconducts of a wife entitled a husband to a 
dissolution of marriage are as follows:
(a) Adultery (sexual or non-sexual);
(b) Theft;
(c) Making charms for her husband with intent to do 
harm;
(d) Drunkenness, to disgrace herself;
2. The misconducts of a husband entitled a wife to 
dissolution of marriage, are as follows:-
1. See Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit.,
p. 186.
2. Marris, op_. cit., p. 50.
3. This is the position under the Penal Code Law, Cap. 89
Laws of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1963 Revision,
S. 387, where adultery is treated as a crime.
646
(a) Brutally assaulting his wife;
(b) Not providing for his wife-;
(c) Theft;
(d) Making charms for his wife with intent to do harm.
Non-sexual adultery is defined as;
1. Playing, through love, with another 
man's wife.
2. Keeping secret friendship with another 
man? s wife.
3. In the way of love, giving another
man’s wife any dash or present.
4. In the way of love, touching another
man*s wife in any part of her body,
such as shaking hands or touching the 
breast etc. etc.
There is no provision entitled a wife to a divorce 
on the ground of her husband’s adultery. The divorce rules 
as stated above attempt to enforce morality on a community 
solely at the expense of one sex, and the number of divorce 
cases involving alleged adultery by wives brought to the 
Customary Court at Calabar testify to their failure.
(b) The Ibadan Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Bye-Laws 1965*
The Bye-Law sets out the grounds on which a 
divorce may be granted. In the case of the husband, con­
viction for a crime involving a sentence of at least five 
years imprisonment may justify divorce by a wife, but a 
husband may be granted a divorce if his wife is convicted 
of a crime involving a sentence of more than three years 
imprisonment.1 The Ibadan Bye-Laws provide that a wife 
may be granted a divorce on the ground of her husbandTs 
adultery. This provision illustrates the high legal status 
of Ibadan women, but the importance of the provision is 
somewhat diminished by the fact that Judges in Ibadan Cust­
omary Courts grant a divorce as a matter or course, once 
the marriage has broxen aown irretrievably. None of the 
cases examined by the present writer involved a wife’s 
claim for divorce on the ground of her husband’s adultery. 
The wife’s adultery was alleged in numerous divorce suits
1. S .6(d) and 7(c).
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brought by husbands.
( c) Biu Native Authority Declaration.
A. few of the local authorities in the Northern 
States have issued rules governing divorce. Some of these 
rules reflect Islamic divorce laws which are heavily biased 
against women. For example, section 8 of the Biu Native 
Authority (Declaration of Biu Native Marriage Law and 
Custom) Order, 1964 provides that a husband and wife shall 
be deemed to be divorced;
(a) upon the granting of a divorce by a court 
on the application of either husband or 
wife; or
(b) upon oral repudiation of his wife by the 
husband in her presence before two adult 
male witnesses of full capacity; or
(c) upon repudiation of his wife by the 
husband in writing signed by himself and 
dated.
Thus extra-judicial divorce available to the husband is 
denied to the wife, which is obviously discriminatory 
against the interest of women, and contrary to the 1979 
Constitutional provision which guarantees freedom from 
discrimination on the ground of sex.
Similar discriminatory provisions are found in 
other local written customary laws.^
C . Grounds for Judicial divorce.
Where there are local bye-laws which provide 
specific grounds for divorce, judges are constrained in 
their jurisdiction to grant a divorce. In the absence of
1. See e.g. The Benin Marriage Rules, 0£. cit., S.2, which 
provides: "No divorce can be granted under any cir­
cumstances where it is proved that the woman is pregnant 
until the child is born and shown to the Native Court 
for settlement of guardianship". The husband*s right 
to remarry is unrestricted * See also the Declaration of 
Borgu Native Law and Custom Relating to Marriage and 
Divorce, N.A.L.N. 52 of 1961, S. 7(2) which has a 
similar provision.
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such provisions what are the grounds on which a judicial 
divorce is granted?
Examination of decided cases at Ibadan and Calabar 
Customary Courts, where there are written rules providing 
specific grounds for divorce, and at Eket Customary Court, 
and the Magistrates Courts in Nsukka, Enugu and Onitsha, 
where there are no written rules, reveals a consistent 
practice - judges invariably grant a divorce on whatever 
ground or grounds the petitioner alleges.
The most frequent reasons for which divorces were 
granted to female petitioners include cruelty, "lack of 
care" (which includes lack of maintenance); polygyny, most 
often expressed as inability to live amicably with the 
other wife or wives of the husband, or an allegation that 
the husband loves one wife more, or treats her better than 
another. In a few cases wives claimed, and were granted, 
divorce on the husbands1 alleged disrespect to members of 
their families.
In the cases of male divorce petitioners, the 
wife's adultery is a common complaint. More than sixty 
percent of divorce cases brought by husbands in Ibadan and 
in Eket, Customary Courts,, included allegations of adultery. 
Other grounds included "waywardness", translated as failure 
to obey the husbands1 lawful orders, disrespect to the 
husband or his relatives,^- and surprisingly, cruelty.
A few of the many cases involving alleged cruelty 
of wives may be usefully given here as an indication of the 
status of women in contemporary Nigeria.
2
In Olufemi Adedeji v. Aduke Adedeji, the 
petitioner, a baker by trade, complained that, his wife 
broke a bottle of stout over his white lace agbada (Yoruba 
native suit), after which she threw a gallon of baking oil 
on his head, The wife, whom he had seduced from her
1. See e.g. Tommy Orpo y. Grace Charlie [1972] Suit No 276/ 
72/8360, unreported, Eket Customary Court, 22 June 1972.
2. [1976] Suit No. 729/76, unreported, Customary Court, 
Grade B, Mapo, Ibadan.
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previous husband eleven months previously, admitted 
throwing the gallon of oil on the petitioner, but she 
alleged that she did so because he was trying to push her 
into a hot oven. A divorce was granted in spite of the 
wife’s opposition to the grant.
In Taiwo Alotu v. Janet Adekunle,^ the husband 
petitioner alleged "gross cruelty" and "domestic perse­
cution" by his wife. He claimed that after he had separ­
ated from his first wife after some disagreement, he 
married the defendant. As a result of his father’s inter­
vention, reconciliation with his first wife who had borne 
two children by him, was effected. As a result the second 
wife, the defendant, became angry. She allegedly cursed 
him everyday and on several occasions she beat him and 
locked him in his room. She also frequently went to his 
office to fight with him. In fact, it was on one of these 
occasions when she went to attack him in his office that 
the divorce petition was served on her.
2
The petitioner in Friday Bassey v. Eduah Isich 
alleged a series of cruelties against his wife. He 
claimed that on one occasion his wife beat him without any 
just cause and wounded him with an elephant carving, which 
left his finger deformed.
These are just three of the many cases which 
illustrate the fact that Nigerian wives today are not docile 
partners in the marital relationship.
1. [1974] Suit No. 311/74, Civil Record Book, Vol.25,
unreported, Customary Court, Grade B, Mapo, Ibadan.
2. H1972] Suit No. 43/72, unreported, Eket Customary
Court, 2 Feb., 1972.
3. For reported cases involving physical cruelty of wives 
see: Abisuga v. Abisuga [1974] CCHCJ.819, in which the 
husband needed hospital treatment several times due to 
his wife’s cruelty; Adeyemi v. Adeyemi [19^9]2 ALL N.L.R. 
181 - the Judge described the wife’s alleged cruelty as 
"stranger than fiction"; Akponor v. Akponor - [1974] 
7CCHCJ 1047 - the wife had a proclivity to draw a knife
on the husband whenever there was a dispute; Williams v. 
Williams [1976] 3CCHCJ.805.
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In spite, of the definition of express grounds 
for divorce, decided cases in Ibadan and Calabar reveal 
few cases in which a divorce was not granted. Some 
feeble efforts were made to reconcile the spouses, espec­
ially at Eket and Calabar, but in most cases divorces 
were granted as a matter of course. The judges seem to 
regard a marriage as having irretrievably broken down 
once it had reached the courts.
The only case where a divorce was not granted 
was decided in Eket Customary Court.^ The husband in this
case petitioned for a divorce on the grounds of adultery,
2
disrespect shown to his mother by the wife, and cruelty.
The parties were married for nineteen years and had six
children. The wife objected to a grant of divorce on the
ground that she was unable to care for the children on her
own. The Judge said:
The issue of the children is very important 
in this case. It is observed that the 
custody of children is always in the mother’s 
care. The defendant should learn a lesson 
to always maintain peace and to show some 
sign of respect in view of the children.
He ordered the spouses to remain as husband and wife for
the period of one year to allow the defendant to show some 
signs of improvement in her behaviour.
Such decisions are, however, few.
It is submitted that, despite laws to the contrary,
issued by the various Local Authorities, restricting the
■5
grant of divorce to specific grounds, this approach of the 
Customary Court judges to an action for divorce, is the
1. See Friday Bassey v. Eduah Isich [1972] Suit No. 43/72,
unreported, Eket Customary Court.
2. cf. Anakwenze v. Anakwenze [1972] 2E.C.S.L.R. where
the husband accused the wife of ’’insubordination 
laxity and disrespect” .
3. The Efik Marriage Law imposes a fine, or not more than
two months imprisonment on a spouse who, without
sufficient grounds, insists on obtaining a divorce 
after a decree of judicial separation observed for 
six months.
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correct one, since it is consonant with the actual practice 
of the people. Evidence collected during field-work, even 
in the most rural areas, indicate that parties to a marriage 
separate when the marriage relationship has become intoler­
able to one or both of them. Older people bewail the 
present instability of marriage compared with their own 
times, but everyone recognizes the fact that marriage is 
no longer regarded as indissoluble. The reasons why a 
marriage has broken down have become increasingly irrele­
vant. Refusal to grant a divorce, which affects women in 
particular adversely, since they cannot remarry without 
such divorce, (whereas the husbands can), will not protect 
the sanctity of marriage. It merely encourages concubinage.
5. The Refund of Dowry on Divorce.
A. Introduction
It has been previously mentioned that refund of 
dowry, or its waiver by the husband is legally essential 
to a valid divorce in most systems of Nigerian customary 
law, whether the marriage is dissolved extra-judicially 
by mutual consent of the parties or by a court,1
The spouses may separate and live apart from each 
other for years, but provided the dowry has not been refunded 
they are still legally married, and certain incidents of 
marriage, notably affiliation of children, continue to exist.
Refund of dowry is an important aspect of the 
legal status of women in marriage, since it is the sine qua 
non, and in many societies, the only legal essential of a 
valid divorce, especially in modern Nigeria where less 
importance is attached to rituals. Failure to refund the 
dowry can adversely affect a woman and the children she 
bears for another man subsequent to separation from her 
husband. This aspect of the problem has been discussed
1. See further above, Chapter VI, pp. 457-464; see also 
Leith-Ross, African Women, op. cit. , p. 103; Childs, 
’’Christian Marriage in Nigeria", ojd. cit. , p. 243.
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previously. In this section certain legal questions 
relevant to the refund of dowry and other payments made 
on the occasion of a marriage by the husband or on his 
behalf, to the bride’s family, when a marriage has broken 
down irretrievably, will be examined.
The following topics will be briefly discussed:
(i) the legal effect of a refund of dowry;
(ii) the amount of dowry refundable;
(iii) responsibility for the refund of dowry;
(iv) the time at which a refund is due.
B. The traditional society
(i) The legal effect of a refund of dowry.
In most communities in Nigeria refund of dowry 
legally dissolves a marriage according to customary law, 
although certain rituals symbolising the severance of the 
marriage ties between the spouses and their respective 
families are considered important and are invariably per­
formed in certain communities. The rituals provide valu­
able evidence of divorce, but are mainly religious in 
nature.
Once the dowry, or an agreed portion of it is
refunded, or refund is waived by the husband or on his
behalf in traditional society, the marriage is legally
dissolved and all legal incidents of the relationship
ceases.^" Meek notes that even where elopement and wife-
stealing are recognized modes of obtaining wives, the
wife's abductor usually ends the wife’s former marriage by
refunding to the former husband all marriage payments the
2
latter had made with reference to the marriage.
1. See generally, Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 368; 
Tremearne, op_. cit., p. 237; Begho, Law and Culture, op 
cit. , p. 50; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit. 
p. 215; Temple, Notes on the Tribes, op. cit.
2. Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, Vol. 1, op. cit.,
pp. 215-216.
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An Onitsha informant stated that according to 
Onitsha customary law, divorce by refund of dowry is 
irrevocable in the sense that the former spouses are pre­
vented from ever remarrying. If, however, dowry has not. 
been refunded the couple are free to settle their differ­
ences, regardless of the fact that they may have led 
separate lives for a number of years. He cited the case 
of a couple'who had lived apart for more than sixteen years. 
During the Nigerian Civil War, they met accidentally in a 
village away from their hometown, where they had both gone 
to seek refuge. A reconciliation was effected. It was 
claimed that this reunion would have been legally impossible 
if dowry had been refunded, when no further marriage between 
the couple would have been legally possible.1
All Onitsha informants agree that refund of dowry 
is necessary for a valid divorce, and it is very unusual 
for a husband in traditional society to waive refund of 
dowry. It is interesting to note that where a couple have 
contracted a customary marriage, as well as a statutory 
marriage, and the statutory marriage has been dissolved by 
a court of competent jurisdiction, Onitsha people'still 
regard the couple as married if dowry has not been refunded. 
According to them,all the legal incidents of the marriage 
subsist.
If dowry is not repaid, the woman is still con- 
2
sidered a wife, and if she dies, her natal family must 
seek the husband’s wishes as to the disposal of her corpse. 
He could insist that her corpse be brought back for burial 
in his own village, if he so wishes. If the husband dies, 
she has to perform all the burial and mourning ceremonies
*3
imposed on a widow. During field work the present writer
1. Cf. the Manual of Customary Law, op. cit. , p. 306, p. 306, 
which states that a man and woman whose marriage was 
dissolved by divorce are free to remarry if they so desire. 
Opinions in Onitsha were divided on this issue.
2. See Fadipe, op_. cit. , p. 91; Odje, Laws of Succession in 
Southern Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 316; cf. Thomas, Anthro- 
pological Report of the Edo-Speaking Peoples, Part 1, p.
70.
3. See further below,pp. 690-694.
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interviewed a woman whose husband had just died. The 
couple had been separated for twenty-three years. She had 
left him because of extreme ill-treatment and neglect. The 
head of her family insisted that she should not perform 
any mourning ceremonies for the deceased husband, since 
the husband had made no attempt at reconciliation for all 
those years. Everyone, however, conceded that the action 
of the head of the family, although justified in this 
extreme case, was against Onitsha customary law.
These cases demonstrate the need for dowry to be 
repaid if a valid divorce is to be effected.
There are some exceptions to the general rule 
that a refund of dowry is essential for a divorce. An 
obvious example is where no dowry had been paid with refer­
ence to the marriage. Thus, in a marriage by mutual consent 
only,1 since dowry has not been paid, no refund has to be 
made to effect a divorce. In a marriage by exchange, the
2
union is dissolved by return of the woman given in exchange.
There are some societies, however, where refund of dowry
is not essential for the dissolution of the marriage by 
-a
divorce, especially where the husband has been responsible 
for the break-up of the marriage.
(ii) The amount of dowry refundable
The amount of dowry and other marriage payments 
refundable on a divorce varies from community to community.
In some communities, the entire dowry paid, as well as the 
pre-marriage gifts, are refundable on a divorce. In other
1. See further above, Chapter III.
2. See Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central Nigeria,
op. cit., p. 76 ‘9 Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria,
op. cit., p . 215 .
3. Divorce without a refund of dowry is possible in Afikpo
clan of Afikpo Division and Awkunanaw community in Nkanu
Division if ido nwani (ritual expulsion of a wife) is 
performed, see Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 29^, 
p. 352(a).
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communities, the amount refundable depends on who initiates
the divorce, or who is responsible for the break-up of the
marriage. Thus among the Efik, if a husband divorces his
wife without cause he forfeits his marriage payments.1 
2
Ellis notes that according to the customary laws of the 
Ycrubas:
If a husband should divorce his wife for 
adultery he can claim the restitution of 
the money he paid for her but not if he 
sends her away for any other cause.
This statement of Yoruba customary law, although supported
by other writers on Yoruba customary law in traditional 
■5
society-" does not represent contemporary Yoruba customary 
law, under which dowry paid is refundable, irrespective of 
fault.
In some communities, account is taken of certain
factors in the refund of dowry. Such factors include the
duration of the marriage, the number of children the divorced
wife produced by the husband, and the general contribution
the wife made to the welfare and prosperity of the family
as a whole during the subsistence of the marriage. There
are some communities where the birth of a child absolves
the wife's family from any obligation to repay dowry on the
termination of a marriage whether by divorce or death of 
4
the husband. On the other hand, in a few communities the 
divorced wife and her family have to refund double the 
amount paid by the husband as dowry, although this is 
usually the case only when it is the wife who initiates the
1. Forde, Efik Traders of Old Calabar, op. cit., p. 14.
2. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit. , p. 186.
See Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit_., p. 49 
who records a similar custom for the Benins; Forde and 
Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples of South-Eastern 
Nigeria, op. cit., pi 18; cf. Meek, Northern Tribes of
Nigeria, op. cit., p. 215.
3. See Bowen, Central Africa, op. cit. , p. 305, of the Yoruba
wife: tTIf divorced for adultery, she or her family are
obliged to refund the dowry to the husband” .
4. See generally, Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit., pp. 280-284 
Customary Law Manual, op. cit., pp. 294-299; Thomas, Anthro­
pological Report of the Edo-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., p.
57; Meek, A Sudanese Kingdom, op. cit., p. 389.
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divorce.1 This practice is illustrated by the following 
agreement which was attached to the registration of a 
customary marriage at Onitsha Local Government office.
3rd July 1963 
An agreement to marry 
Agreement made between A and B of 
Mgbagbu, Owa town, in Ezeagu District, 
Enugu Province.
Total amount (70) seventy pounds 
already given (20) twenty pounds 
to be paid (50) fifty pounds
If I, A, refuse that B will no longer 
marry my daughter Esther, I agree to pay 
him back double all the amounts he B gave 
to me. But if I, B, refuse to marry the 
girl in my own fault, then I shall take 
from him A, the only amount I gave to 
him.
The agreement was signed by both parties and 
witnessed. It is evident that such laws, which impose a 
penalty on the bride and her parents if she should leave 
her husband, unnecessarily restricts her freedom to leave 
an unsatisfactory husband, for fear of incurring financial 
obligations on her parents. The laws are obviously dis­
criminatory and infringe section 39 of the Nigerian Con­
stitution 1979*
(iii) Responsibility for refund of dowry
In most societies it is primarily the duty of the
wife’s father or other legal guardian to refund the dowry
2due in the case of a divorce. As seen above, the dowry 
is usually payable to the girl’s fat-her, and in many
1. See Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit_. , p. 281, who notes 
that in Owerri Division, it had been customary, ’’for the 
members of the wife’s family to swear that, if she left 
her husband without reason, twice the amount of the bride- 
price would be repaid”; see also Aniogulu, op_. cit. , p.111.
2. See Customary Law Manual, op. cit. , p. 300, p. 361(1); 
Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 183.
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societies he has no legal duty to share it with anyone, 
including the bride and her mother. In other societies, 
although the father may be entitled to the largest share, 
he has a duty to give some defined portion of it to the 
bride’s mother and to other members of the family.1 When 
the dowry has to be refunded, however, it is the legal 
duty of the father to make the refund, whether or not 
individual members of"the family may have shared the dowry 
originally. Other members of the family may contribute 
to the refund of dowry but the legal responsibility is 
that of the wife’s father, or other legal guardian who 
takes the place of her father.
Among some communities, for example Eket and Oron 
Ibibios, when the father of a family dies, the girls of 
the family are distributed among the boys of the family.
The male to whom a girl is allotted is legally entitled 
to receive dowry on her behalf. Correspondingly, he has 
a duty to refund any dowry paid on behalf of her marriage 
when there is a divorce. If he himself is ill parentis loco, 
his legal guardian undertakes the responsibility on his 
behalf.^
In some communities, notably among the Igbos, 
dowry is not repayable until the wife has found a suitor 
who pays dowry to her father. It is then the father’s
1. See further above, Chapter VI, pp. 491-493.
2. Information obtained from informants in Eket, but see 
Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit., p. 156; 
the division of the marriage-paymentensures the assist­
ance of both the father’s and the mother’s families 
should it later have to be returned.
3. See Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit. , p. 49; 
Forde and Jones, The Ibo and Ibibio-Speaking Peoples, op. 
cit., p. 18; Bohannan and Bohannan, The Tiv of Central 
Nigeria, op. cit., p. 76; Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., 
p. 364; Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit. , p . 2~Q0 Contrast 
the position among the Hausas, see Smith, Government in 
Zazzau, op. cit. , p. 256: ”A woman collects from her pro­
spective husband the money she needs to repay portions of 
bridewealth to the husband she is leaving”; cf. the pro­
vision of the Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children 
Bye-Laws, W.R.L.N.,456 of 1958: ”If any parent of a bride 
receives a dowry from another man before the dowry repaid
by the existing husband or bridegroom has been refunded, 
that parent shall be guilty of an offence” .
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duty to refund the dowry to the husband. It should be 
noted that until the dowry is refunded, the wife cannot 
remarry, and any purported marriage to the suitor who has 
paid dowry to the father is invalid.1 The suitor in 
such circumstances has no legal duty to refund the dowry 
directly to the husband, although obviously it is in his 
interest to see that the husband has been repaid. Among 
the Yorubas, it is now customary for the suitor to repay 
the dowry directly to the husband, or the wife may herself 
repay the dowry and effect a divorce without the inter­
vention of any member of her family, or a suitor.
Among the Igbos, a woman cannot refund the dowry 
directly to the husband. Even where she provides the money, 
refund must be made through her legal guardian, who is 
generally her father, or someone acting on his behalf.
(iv) The time at which a refund is due
The time within which a refund of dowry must be 
made also varies from community to community. In Eket, 
for example, dowry is repayable as soon as the parties and 
their families agree that the marriage has broken down 
irretrievably. Informants In Eket say that it is considered 
a serious social disgrace for the family who Is unable to 
repay the dowry once there is a permanent separation. As 
a result, the family makes frantic efforts to raise the 
money and thereby save their reputation. This is borne out. 
by the fact that the Eket Customary Court usually orders 
an immediate refund of dowry when a divorce has been 
granted. The Ibibios in Calabar also have the same rules, 
evidenced by the orders for the immediate repayment of 
dowry by the Calabar Customary Court.
In Onitsha, on the other hand, the dowry is not
repayable until the wife finds another suitor who is pre-
2
pared to refund the husband’s dowry. This rule obtains
1. See Edet v. Essien [1932]11 N.L.R.47.
2. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 364; but see 
Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit., p. 2 82.
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amongst the Yoruba also. The prospective husband pays 
dowry in order to marry the woman, and from this payment 
refund is made to the womanrs husband.1
In some communities, the time at which dowry 
becomes repayable depends on whether the wife was respons­
ible or not for the break-up of the marriage. Where the 
wife is responsible for the break-up, or in some cases 
where she initiates the divorce, the dowry becomes repay­
able immediately. If the husband is the guilty party,
however, he has to wait until another man wishes to marry
2
the wife and pays dowry in order to do so.
C. The modern society
The laws relating to refund of dowry discussed 
above remain valid with reference to extra-judicial divorce, 
in contemporary Nigeria. Generally, refund of dowry 
continues to be essential to a valid divorce from a custo­
mary law marriage in most Nigerian societies. In some 
communities, for example, Onitsha, the attachment to pay­
ment and refund of dowry as the legal criteria of a valid 
customary law marriage and divorce respectively, is so 
strong that a statutory marriage, unaccompanied by payment 
of dowry is not recognized as a valid marriage. Similarly, 
a pronouncement of divorce by a court of any kind is not 
recognized by the community, unless and until the dowry 
has been refunded. Thus The Customary Law Manual states;
For divorce to take place, the bride- 
price and other marriage payments must 
be repaid to the husband or his family.
It is immaterial that the husband is the 
party at fault or that the marriage is 
dissolved at the instance of the wife or
1. See Forde, The Yoruba-Speaking peoples, op. cit. , p. 28; 
Chawere v. Aihenu and Johnson j_ 1935] 12 N.L.R.4 .
2. Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit. , pp. 281-282; Nwogugu, 
Family Law in'Nigeria,' op. clfc'.'Y p. 184; see s.11, 
Declaration of Biu Native Marriage Law and Custom Order, 
1964, N.R.L.N.9 of 1964; Obi, Modern Family Law, op.
cit., p . 364.
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her maiden family. Husband and wife 
cannot rightly be said to be divorced 
unless and until the bride^-price paid
on the wife has been refunded to the
husband or, if he is dead, to his
family; or is paid into court and 
divorce is pronounced by the court. ^
Attempts have been made by some local authority
bye-laws to restrict the right of a husband to a refund of
dowry on divorce under certain circumstances. For example,
the Ibadan District Council Marriage Divorce and Custody
of Children Bye-Laws, 1965 3 provides that "no dowry shall
be refundable in the case of a woman divorced on the
ground of having contracted leprosy subsequent to her 
2
marriage.1
With reference to judicial divorce, generally, 
refund of dowry is held to be the sine qua non of a valid 
divorce, in most systems of customary law except where the 
law has been specifically changed by local enactments.
Considerable confusion relating to the refund of 
dowry in customary law divorces has been introduced by the 
conflicting decisions of the courts, especially those in 
the former East Central State, where no written rules of 
customary law have been generally adopted. There has been 
an attempt to dispense with the payment of dowry as an 
essential of a valid customary law divorce by some judicial 
decisions. The abolition of payment and refund of dowry 
as essentials to a valid customary law marriage and divorce 
would be a boon to the legal status of women, but unfortun­
ately, most of these particular decisions were not in 
favour of the woman.
4
For example, in Qkpanum v. Okpanum, the respondent
1. Customary Law Manual, op. cit. , p. 294, par. 352; see 
also Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 141; cf. 
Shelton, The Igbo-Igala Borderland, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
2. Marriage, Divorce and Custody of Children, Adoptive Bye- 
Laws, 1965, Proviso to S.6.
3. Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 183;
Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 29^7 par. 352 .
4. [1972]2 E.C.S.L.R.56-1.
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filed a notice of marriage between himself and the. co­
respondent, The caveatrix entered a caveat against the 
issue by the Registrar of marriages of a certificate 
pursuant to the notice of marriage on the ground that- she 
was lawfully married to the respondent in June 1969* by 
native law and custom, and that this marriage was still 
subsisting up to the time of the present action. The 
respondent denied the existence of the marriage, asserting 
that only preliminary steps had been taken when he decided 
not to continue with the marriage. He testified that no 
rituals or ceremonies which are necessary to the validity 
of a marriage under customary law, had been performed. He 
admitted paying £120 out of an agreed total of. £170 dowry.
The respondent further stated that he had called a meeting 
of the representatives of both his own and the caveatrix 
families, at which he announced that he no longer wished 
to proceed with the marriage.
The court had to determine two questions
(i) whether there was a marriage contracted between the 
caveatrix and the respondent according to customary law;
(ii) if there was a valid marriage, whether it had been 
validly terminated by the respondent.
The Court found that all the necessary elements 
of a valid customary marriage were present and that'there 
was, consequently, a valid marriage contracted in June 1969* 
With reference as to whether the marriage had been 
validly terminated by the respondent, the counsel for the 
caveatrix argued that a marriage is not terminated until the 
dowry is refunded. Agbakoba, J.»rejected this argument.
He said:
Where dowry is not refunded the marriage 
is nevertheless terminated although certain 
incidents of the marriage are not terminated 
until the dowry is refunded. I am unable 
therefore to sustain learned counsel’s sub­
mission and the learned expositions of 
eminent writers like Basden on the Niger Ibos. 
Wieschooff on Divorce Laws and Practices in 
Modern Ibo Culture, and even the recent work 
of Obi on Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, 
to mention a few of such writers, do not 
support his argument. In my view the facts 
I have found in this case amount to a
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dissolution of marriage under native law 
and custom and. I must therefore hold that 
the marriage between the respondent and 
the caveatrix had been terminated by the 
respondent■and was not subsisting when 
the respondent and the co-respondent filed 
their notice of marriage.
I must advert a while to the last para­
graph of the caveatrix’s affidavit which 
averred that she is pregnant with a child 
the paternity of which is attributable to 
the respondent. I can only say that the 
averment lacked fullness and disclosed no 
grounds to show that the respondent had 
access to the caveatrix. Earlier in her 
affidavit the caveatrix said the respondent 
sent her home in 1970 to stay with his 
mother at Nibo whilst he lived at Enugu.
The age of the pregnancy was not stated but 
in any case I am bound to take judicial 
notice that human gestation enures for nine 
months and I cannot therefore say that the 
pregnancy of the caveatrix in 1972 was as a 
result of association with the respondent in 
1970 when he last had access to her.2
The Judge ordered that the caveat should be
removed and a Registrar’s certificate of marriage issued
to the respondent and co-respondent to enable them to marry
under the Marriage Act.
There are several points of interest in this
decision.
(a) It is respectfully submitted that the learned
Judge’s averment that a refund of dowry is net essential
to dissolve a marriage under Igbo customary divorce law
cannot be supported. There is abundant judicial and academic
evidence to the contrary both in traditional and contemporary 
2
society. The strongest evidence militating against the
1. Ibid., p. 565.
2. See Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 372; Nwogugu, 
Family Lav; in Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 133; Kasunmu and 
Salacuse, op.' cit., p‘. 172; Achike, ’’Problems of 
Creation and Dissolution of Customary Marriages”, op. 
cit., p. 153; Ikedingwu v. Okafor [1966-1967110 E.N.L.R. 
T7B\
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decision is the current practice of the Igbos. In all 
Igbo societies refund of dowry is necessary to,dissolve 
a customary marriage (although a reduction may be mutually 
agreed to in certain circumstances), unless the refund 
of dowry has been specifically waived by the husband, or 
his family acting on his behalf and with his consent. At 
least one of the authorities cited by the learned Judge 
does not support his contention. A search of Obi’s book 
failed to reveal any support for his statement. In fact 
Obi asserts that refund of dowry is essential to a valid 
divorce with reference to the whole of Southern Nigeria.^
(b) It is interesting to know what incidents of the
marriage are not terminated until the dowry is refunded, 
since in the instant case the caveatrix averred that she 
was pregnant with a child whose paternity she attributed 
to the respondent. The learned Judge, however, held that 
the averment of pregnancy disclosed no grounds to show 
that the respondent had access to the caveatrix.
It is not clear which law was applied by the
learned Judge in this respect. According to Igbo customary
law, provided the dowry is not repaid, all children begotten
by the wife, regardless of the actual genitor, are legally
2
affiliated to the husband. The principle of English common 
law justifying judicial notice being taken that human
"3
gestation enures for nine months^ does not apply to such
1. Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit., p. 372.
2. See further, Chapter VII, pp. 593-607.
3. In Preston-Jones v. Preston Jones [1951]1 All E.R.124,
H.L., the House of Lords were agreed that the Court 
could take judicial notice of the fact that there is
a normal period of gestation (variously given as 270- 
2 80 days or nine months) but Lord Macdermott added that 
judicial notice must also be taken of the fact that the 
normal period is not always followed, and the actual 
period may be longer or shorter. It may be 360 days. 
See Rone-Oruboh v. Rone-Oruboh [1973] 7 CCHCJ., 80 
where the Court declared that it was unable to say 
whether a child borne eleven months after the last act 
of sexual intercourse between the parties, was a child 
of the husband.
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cases in customary law. Once a valid marriage has been 
contracted, and dowry has not been refunded, or its refund 
waived, the husband should have been adjudged the legal 
father of the child conceived by the wife. The period 
of human gestation is irrelevant in such cases. It is not 
easy to see what incidents of the marriage remained until 
dowry had been refunded if legal paternity was thus denied.
(c) It is respectfully submitted that affiliation of 
the child yet unborn, was not a matter before the court.
The matter was referred to the Court under section 15 of 
the Marriage Act, and the parties were required to show 
cause why the Registrar’s certificate of marriage should 
not be issued. Whether the caveatrix was pregnant by the 
respondent, or not, was irrelevant to the issue before the 
court, as was the question as to whether or not the 
respondent had access to the caveatrix at a particular date. 
Pregnancy of a woman neither creates a marriage, nor is
it a bar to a divorce in Igbo customary law.
(d) It is pertinent to consider whether, without
refund of the dowry, the wife was free to contract another 
marriage, either under customary law or under the Marriage 
Act. Since the husband was free to contract a marriage 
under the Marriage Act, it meant that he was no longer 
married to the caveatrix. Consequently, she was not 
married to him, and therefore had capacity to marry another 
man according to customary law or under the Marriage Act. 
Would the children begotten for a husband married to the 
caveatrix under the Marriage Act in such circumstances be 
legally affiliated to the first husband?
On the other hand, to deny that the wife could 
remarry under the Marriage Act would only be justified if 
she was considered as still married to the first husband.
In such a case, the. husband should not be permitted to 
marry another woman under the Marriage Act, since polygyny 
is forbidden thereunder.
It is respectfully submitted that this decision 
introduces a great deal of confusion into the law. Under 
customary law as practised in most areas of the country 
today, refund of dowry, or some agreed portion, is recognized
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as necessary for the dissolution of a marriage, unless the 
refund has been specifically waived by the husband. In 
Ikedingwu v. Okafor,^ it was held that since the respondent, 
had renounced the bride, and the £100 paid as dowry, the 
caveat against his proposed marriage to another woman 
under the Marriage Act could not be sustained, as both 
parties were free to remarry.
A husband whose dowry has not been refunded, and
who has not waived his right to a refund, should not be
permitted to marry under the Marriage Act, unless the 
divorced wife is permitted to remarry under customary law 
or the Marriage Act.
There are conflicting decisions as to the legal­
ity of a divorce without refund of dowry. For example, in
2
Iloka and Anor. v. Ibe, Nwokedi, J., held that a customary 
marriage could only be dissolved by the refund of dowry 
by the wife or by the death of one of the spouses and re­
marriage by the surviving spouse. The learned Judge held 
that "Outside these two conditions in Igbo customary law 
the marriage, even where the parties are living apart, 
still persists". He refused to follow what he described 
as "the academic approach of Agbakoba, J. in Okpanum v. 
Okpanum”. Although it is difficult to see why remarriage 
is necessary to dissolve a marriage, (at least in the case 
of the surviving husband), after the death of one of the 
spouses, it is respectfully submitted that this decision Is 
more consonant with the actual practice of the people as 
observed by the present writer in all the communities visited 
during field-work, than Agbakoba, J.'s decision in Okpanum v.
Q
Okpanum.J
1. I1966-1967J10 E.N.L.R.178.
2. [1973.1 Suit No. HO/32/735 unreported, Okigwe High Court.
3. [1972] S.C.S.L.R. 561.
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D . When is a customary law marriage dissolved by a 
divorce?
It is necessary to determine the point in time 
at which a customary marriage is dissolved by divorce and 
what legally terminates the marriage. It has been seen 
that, when the dissolution of a customary marriage is 
effected extra-judicially, the marriage is not dissolved 
until the dowry has been.paid and accepted.^ This is so 
even where the marriage has broken down irretrievably, and 
the parties have separated for many years with no intention 
of resuming the marital relationship. In other words, mere 
separation does not constitute divorce in a customary 
marriage. In such cases it may be said that it is the
2refund of dowry which legally terminates the marriage.
Where the divorce is granted by a Court, however, 
the divorce takes effect from the issue of the court order 
dissolving the marriage, even though the dowry has not been 
refunded. Here, it is the order of the court which termin­
ates the marriage.
■5
In Egri v. Uperi, the plaintiff had been granted
£20 as the refund of dowry allegedly paid by him, although
he had sued, not for dissolution of the marriage, but the
return of his wife detained by her father who denied the
marriage. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that
... in proceedings before a customary court, 
an order for the repayment of bride price 
or dowry... is usually made subsequent to 
an order for the dissolution of a customary 
marriage.
This statement could be contrasted with the decision in
4
Nwanko and Anor v. Uba. The wife, one of the plaintiffs
1. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit . , pp. 182- 
183; Kasunmu and Salacuse, op. cTt. , p. 17b.
2. See further above, pp. 652-654.
3. Egri v. Uperi [197*0 4 E.C.S.L.H. 632 at pp. 627-628.
4. [1974] Appeal No. HO/1A/74, unreported decision of 
Okigwe High Court.
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claimed that because of her husband’s cruelty to her, she 
wished to return the dowry of N60 paid by him. The pro­
ceedings were recorded by the Magistrate as follows:
Charge read and explained to defendant.
Defendant pleads not liable as there is 
no divorce to the said marriage. Case is 
adjourned to 30/8/73 for plaintiff’s 
counsel to satisfy the court that the 
defendant’s plea is not [a] complete 
answer to his claim.
The next day, the case was dismissed with costs against the
plaintiffs on the submission of a preliminary objection
that the writ disclosed no cause of action, and ought to be
struck out under Order 2, Rule 2 of the Magistrates Court
Rules. The Magistrate said:
By our custom which this court takes 
judicial notice of, the right for the 
refund of dowry does not arise until 
there is divorce. The writ does not 
say there was such a divorce and there­
fore there is no liability on the 
defendant to accept the refund of dowry 
by the plaintiffs.
The Okigwe High Court granted an appeal on the ground that 
the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate was unortho­
dox. It is, however, the statement of law by the learned 
Magistrate that is particularly relevant here. His state­
ment seemed to suggest that under customary law, a divorce 
is effected without a refund of dowry, or an order of a 
court.
It is respectfully submitted that this is not a 
correct view of Igbo customary law. The plaintiffs could 
not have stated in their claim that there had been a 
divorce, since the dowry had not been refunded, nor had a 
court order dissolving the marriage been obtained.
The Magistrate had jurisdiction to dissolve the 
customary marriage under the Magistrates’ Courts Law 
(Amendment) Edict, 1971,^ of the former East Central State. 
The correct procedure would have been for the plaintiffs 
to sue for a divorce, and an order compelling the defendant 
to accept the refund of the dowry.
1. Section 5.
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Because of the hardship experienced by women 
as the result of the abolition of Customary Courts, many 
wives seeking to divorce their husbands have attempted 
to find a way out by depositing the money in the Magistrates 
Courts when their husbands refuse to accept a refund of 
dowry. Generally, Magistrates have rejected this proce­
dure, and have insisted that such deposits are only accept­
able after a court order dissolving the marriage had been 
obtained.1
6. The Incidence of Divorce in Customary Law Marriage
A. The traditional society.
Observers of African customary law marriage have
stressed the ease with which the marital tie may be legally
dissolved. This has led to the unfortunate view that
African customary marriage is inferior to European marriage.
It has been seen that, in some quarters, even the name
2
"marriage” is denied to customary unions.
There is evidence of the fact that marriages in 
other traditional societies were no less easily dissoluble 
in legal theory, and examples of societies which tradition­
ally permitted divorce with relative ease are not difficult 
to find, especially with reference to the husband1s ability 
to divorce his wife. A few examples will suffice to support 
the contention.
Foremost among communities in which divorce was 
relatively easy was the early Hebrew society. It is said 
that the "right of the husband to divorce his wife at his
pleasure is the central thought in the entire system of
■?
Jewish divorce law”. The Mosaic law states that ”if a
1. This is the practice at Enugu, Nsukka and Onitsha 
Magistrates * Courts.
2. See further, above, Chapter III, pp. 201-205.
3. See Westermarck, The History of Human Marriage, Vol. Ill, 
p. 307.
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wife finds no favour in her husbandTs eyes, because of 
some uncleanness in her: then let him write her a bill 
of divorcement and give it in her hand, and send her out 
of his house” .^
That the right of divorcing his wife belonged 
to the Roman husband in very early times cannot be doubted, 
since it is expressly recognized in the laws of the Twelve 
Tables.^
In the historic period of Greece, divorce was 
far from unusual. Only one restraint was imposed on the 
Greek husband who wished arbitrarily to repudiate his wife: 
he must return her dowry. If she was adulterous, he was 
legally bound to repudiate her, but must still restore her 
dowry. There seems to have been little ceremony involved 
in dismissing a wife.
The pagan Arabs permitted a husband to repudiate 
his wife whenever he pleased; and this ancient privilege 
was too thoroughly fixed in Arabic custom, and too con­
genial to the nature of the Prophet and his followers to 
4
be changed.
In the law-books of Celtic peoples are found 
various rules relating to divorce from which the conclusions 
may be drawn that divorce was by no means an uncommon 
occurrence. MIn ancient Wales either husband or wife may
5
practically separate whenever one or both choose” . In
1. Deuteronomy XXIV, Verses 1-4; see also Isidore Epstein. 
Judaism: A Historical Presentation (Penguin Books, 1975 
reprint), p. 167.
2. See Goodsell, A History of Marriage and the Family, op. 
cit. , p. 125; see also Bryce, Studies in History and 
Jurisprudence » Vol.II, ojd. cit. , p . 602 ; Corbett, The 
Roman Law of Marriage, pp. 218-248; Westermarck, History 
of Human Marriage, op. cit., Vol.Ill, pp. 320-323;
Pollock and Maitland, ojd. cit., Bk.II, p. 392.
3. See CHFaolain and Martines, Not in God's Image, op. cit. , 
p. 23; Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, Vol.Ill, 
op, cit., pp. 318-319*
4. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, Vol.Ill, pp. 311; 
see also Ameer Ali, Mohammedan Law, Vol.II, ojd. cit. , p. 511.
5. Westermarck, History of Human Marriage, op. cit., p. 324.
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ancient Ireland separation might take place either by
mutual consent or as the outcome of legal proceedings.^
Among the Teutons, marriages could be dissolved
by agreement between the husband and the family of the
wife, and the husband was permitted to repudiate his wife
if she was sterile, or guilty of conjugal infidelity, and
2
perhaps for some other offences. It was Christianity
'which revolutionised European legislation with regard to
divorce, yet by 1953 an English lawyer could write that a
valid marriage is the only condition precedent to divorce
which cannot be circumvented somehow.
Divorce, it is almost universally agreed, is
now a civilized institution, ”a rightly sanctioned escape
mechanism from an intolerable and potentially damaging
situation”. In most countries today marriages are easily
dissolved in law, as well as in fact. Epstein, writing of
divorce in America notes:
In some circles, not to have gone through a 
divorce seems more exceptional than having 
gone through one; here living out oneTs 
days within the confines of a single marriage 
might even be thought to show an insufficiency 
of imagination, evidence that one is possibly 
a bit callow emotionally.^
A similar statement may be made of certain circles
4
in other European societies, but no one denies that these 
marital unions are marriages. The criteria of a marriage 
should not be the ease, nor the simplicity of the method 
of dissolution. Lowie has pointed out that it is important 
not to confound the actual frequency of divorce with its
5
theoretical possibility.
1. Ibid., p. 323.
2. Goodsell, 0£. cit. , pp. 210-211.
3. Epstein, Divorce, op. cit., p. 18.
4. See M.D.A. Freeman, ”The Search for a Rational Divorce 
Law”, Current Legal Problems, 1971, pp. 178-210.
5. Lowie, Primitive Soclety, op. cit. , p. 65.
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In traditional Nigeria, although marriage may
have been in theory easy to dissolve, in practice, divorce
was very difficult to achieve. Jordan reports:
A man divorced his wife by simply ordering 
her out of the compound. There was no 
other technicality about it, though he 
generally added a wealth of symbolism by 
flinging her cooking pots after her. The 
fact that he had this extraordinary power 
served more than anything else to keep 
woman in subjection. In practice, it did 
not occur without, very serious reason-, 
because it caused endless complications.^
Nwogugu describes the mediatory role of the
families of the spouses as "a bedrock for the stability of 
2the marriage". There is no difficulty, as will be later
seen,J in finding couples among the older generation who
have remained husband and wife for-more-than fifty to
sixty years. The only ground for the dissolution of a
marriage in the traditional society was the irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage, and before a decision to this
effect could be reached repeated efforts at reconciliation
4of the spouses would have been made by their families.
There is sufficient evidence to support the 
statement that divorce in the traditional society was very 
rare, and "the husband and wife concerned usually parted 
with heavy hearts, having been convinced that their union
c:
had not been of benefit to the community."^
The position is quite different today, and in 
some parts of Nigeria, divorce may be described as extremely 
frequent.
1. Jordan, Bishop Shanahan of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., 
p. 225; Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit., p. 28qT
2. Nwogugu, Nigerian Family Law, op. cit. , p. 178.
3. See below, p. 678.
4. See Nwogugu, Nigerian Family Law, op. cit., p. 178.
5. Delano, An African Looks at Marriage, op. cit., p. 31;
see also Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. 
cit. , p . 190.
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B. The modern society.
There are no reliable statistics of the incidence
of divorce in contemporary Nigeria. The lack of adequate
systematic recording of vital statistics of family life in
Nigeria has been the subject of academic comments;^ but
inadequate recording of divorce statistics is not peculiar
to Nigeria, and is a problem even in more advanced computer
ised communities. Epstein, pointing out the deficiencies
in the reporting and recording of divorce statistics in
America, notes:
even if reporting were complete beyond the 
dreams of the most demanding statistician, 
statistics on divorce would nevertheless 
still elude the full reality ... They do not 
capture those couples whose marriages have 
dissolved both in spirit and in flesh but 
who continue to share a common roof, living 
in what sociologists call 'empty shell 
families'. And they most especially do not 
capture those couples who, for want of 
patience or money or both, do not seek the 
imprimatur of a court of law for their 
splitting up.2
Although written of divorce in America, this 
statement applies equally to Nigeria. The fact that non­
judicial divorce is recognized in most communities makes 
the situation infinitely more difficult.
Traditionally, the practice in Nigeria was that 
when a marriage breaks down irretrievably, the spouses 
simply separate. Unless the wife wished to remarry (which 
was rare in some areas), a formal divorce was unnecessary. 
This pattern has been continued in modern society, and
1. See e.g. R.C. Duru, "Problems of Data Collection for
Population Studies in Nigeria with Particular Reference 
to the 1952/1953 Census and the Western Region”, in 
Population of Tropical Africa, edited by Caldwell and 
Okonjo, op. cit., p. 72; A.B. Kasunmu, "Proof of a 
Polygamous Marriage in Nigerian High Courts", op. cit. a 
p. 42.
2 . Epstein, Divorce, op. cit., p. 20.
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there are many married couples who are separated, but
not legally divorced.
There is no lack of statements confirming the
opinion that the rate of divorce in Nigeria has increased
within the present century, and in some places is now so
high as to be a cause for concern.^ In most cases, however,
these statements are not supported by concrete evidence,
especially among legal writers.
A few anthropologists and sociologists have
attempted to measure marital instability in numerical terms.
Marris, who conducted a social survey in Lagos,
found that four-fifths of the marriages contracted by the
householders interviewed had been successful, and the
relationship between husband and wife was generally
affectionate and co-operative. But he nevertheless asserts:
... divorce is still relatively frequent - 
a fifth of the householders had contracted 
one or more marriages which failed, a higher 
rate than any European country^
In 1939, Forde found that among the Yako (a double­
descent community in South-Eastern Nigeria), of the 152 
younger married women between approximately 22 and 36 years 
of age interviewed, 38 (25 percent) had already been divorced 
once in their marital history. From the data collected, he 
concluded that the divorce rate had increased, and that at 
the time of his interviews, at least 30 percent of the 
women in Umor had been divorced at least once in their
3
history.
Similarly, Ottenberg found from records obtained 
among the Igbos of Afikpo, in 1952-1953 that about one 
marriage in three ended in separation or divorce. Case
1. See Kasunmu and Salacuse, 0£. cit. , pp. 180-181; Bascom,
The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 65;
Parrinder, Religion in an African City, op. cit., p. 171*
2. D * Almeida v. D*Almeida [1973] 4 CCHCJ. 88; where the 
wife-petitioner, 39 years old, had three marriages and 
the longest any one had lasted was for two years.
3. See Forde, Marriage and the Family Among the Yako,
op. cit., p . 75 •
histories of marriages did not indicate that this 
instability was a new development.^
For the purposes of this research, 268 married 
women were interviewed in Oyo and Anambra States. Of 
these women, 80 were Yorubas, and 183 Igbos. As shown 
in Table 8:1, of all the women interviewed, 214 (79*9 per­
cent) were married once only; 43 (16 percent) were married 
twice; 10 (3*7 percent) three times, and 1 (.4 percent) 
four times. The total number of marriages contracted by 
all the women was 334, an average per woman of 1.2 marriages. 
Approximately one marriage in five ended in divorce. The 
rate of divorce among the Yorubas is higher than among the 
Igbos. The average number of marriages per Yoruba woman 
is 1.5# while among the Igbos, it is 1.1. Approximately 
one in every seven marriages end in divorce among the Igbos, 
while among the Yorubas it is approximately one in every 
three marriages.
TABLE 8:1
EEPORTED INCIDENCE OF MARRIAGE AMONG SAMPLES OF YORUBA
AND IGBO WOMEN FROM DATA COLLECTED DURING FIELD-WORK.
No. of Yoruba women Igbo women
times N 
married ma^rled Total no. marriages
Percent. 
of no. 
inter­
viewed
No. Total no. 
married marriages
Percent. 
of no. 
inter­
viewed
1 49 49 61.25 165 165 87.7
2 22 44 27.5 21 42 11.2
3 8 24 10.0 2 6 1.1
4 1 4 1.25 Nil Nil Nil
80 = 125 100.00 188 213 100.00
80 women were interviewed among the Yorubas and 188 women 
among the Igbos.
1. Ottenberg, The Afikpo Ibo of Eastern Nigeria, op. cit.,
p. 21.
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Another angle, from which the rate of marital 
discord may be viewed is to. consider the number of divorces 
or other matrimonial disputes brought before the Customary 
Courts. In Ibadan, and among the Yorubas generally, 
divorce granted by a Customary Court is now the accepted 
norm. Statistics were obtained from two Customary Courts 
in Ibadan. The numbers of cases dealt with in these' two 
courts are tabulated in Table 8:2 below. They provide 
some evidence (though inconclusive) of the rate of judicial 
divorce in Ibadan.
TABLE 8:2
NUMBER OF DIVORCE CASES DECIDED IN TWO CUSTOMARY COURTS,
'IBADAN.
Year Grade ,fB ” Court 
N o . 4 Mapo
Grade ffC" Court 
No. 1A, Agodi.
1969 — 447
1970 - 681
1971 - 513
1972 (6 months only) 404 448
1973 857 548
1974 827 339
1975 1030 316
1976 1116 410
Jan.-June 
1977 641 213
The Table 8:2 above shows that, for the first 
full year [1973] for which statistics were available for 
both courts, a total of 1,405 divorces were recorded.
There are twelve Customary Courts in Ibadan City Area.
Two of these Courts are Grade ,TA", (mainly Appeal Courts), 
six Grade ’’B" and four Grade TtC,f. On the assumption that 
a similar volume of work is done by each of the six Grade 
"B” Courts and four Grade "C” courts respectively, the 
number of cases heard by the Grade B courts would be 5,142, 
and in the Grade C Courts, 2,192; a total of 7,334 divorce
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cases for the entire Ibadan City Area in 197.3 • By a 
similar assumption, the number of cases instituted in 
1976, the last year for which complete statistics were 
available for both courts would be 8,336. This repre­
sents an increase of 1,002 (13*7 percent) cases in three 
years. This may be compared to the rate of increase in 
divorces in England. The number of divorce petitions 
filed for the whole of England are as follows: 1971 - 
110,017; 1972 - 109,822; 1973 - 115,048; and 1974 - 
129,993> The rate of increase over a period of three 
years is 19,976 divorces (18.2 percent).^
The rate of increase in the Ibadan figures, is 
not consistent. There was a drop in 1974, and the 1975 
total is lower than that of 1973. There is no justification, 
therefore, for a general conclusion that the divorce rate 
is increasing. The figures for England show a similar 
inconsistency in the rate of increase.
Marital disputes recorded in Social Welfare 
Departments in different parts of the country afford no 
clear evidence to support the allegation that the rate of 
divorce is increasing in contemporary Nigeria. The stat­
istics are similarly inconclusive, as Tables 8:3 and 8:4 
below show. The tables show the number of marital disputes 
handled by the Social Welfare Departments in the former 
East Central State, (now Imo and Anambra States) and 
former South-Eastern (now Cross River) State. The figures 
were obtained from the Annual and other Progress, Reports 
examined by the present writer at the Headquarters of the 
Social Welfare Department m  anugu ana Caiaoar.
None of the above evidence is conclusive as to 
the rate of divorce in any part or .Nigeria;, collectively, 
however, they indicate that the assertion that '’divorce 
is rare” no longer’pertains to Nigerian society.
1.’Extracted from the Civil Judicial Statistics Annual 
Report, 1974, Cmnd, 6361V
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TABLE 8:3
MARITAL DISPUTES HANDLED BY SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENTS, 
FORMER EAST CENTRAL STATE,- NIGERIA.
Year No. of Cases handled Number settled
1970 951 584
1971 2,256 1,075
1972 4,159 2,458
1973 4,470 2,912
1974 4,053 3,012
TABLE 8:4
MARITAL DISPUTES HANDLED BY SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENTS, 
FORMER SOUTH-EASTERN STATE, NIGERIA.
Year No. of Cases handled
1972/1973 2,541
1973/1974 2,476
1974/1975 2,464
1975/1976 2,194
1976/1977 2,752
Note: Data refers to 1 April to 31 March, of each year.
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The Legal Status of Women After Termination of
Marriage by Death
7• The Legal Effect of Death on the Marital Relationship.
A. Introduction.
Are customary marriages terminated by death?
Many writers claim that the death of a wife
terminates a customary marriage, but the death of a husband
does not. Thus Obi asserts:
The death of the wife terminates a marriage 
completely and for all purposes. It also 
abrogates all the usual customary rights 
and obligations which exist between the 
families of the two spouses by virtue of 
the marriage.
The death of the husband, on the other 
hand, does not necessarily terminate the 
marriage, more accurately, perhaps, a 
husband1s death does not terminate the 
customary law status of his wife as a 
married woman.^
The position where either spouse of a customary 
marriage dies will be examined in order to see how far such 
assertions are legally justified.
B. Death of the husband.
On the death of her husband the wife may either:
(a) voluntarily choose, or be compelled by law, to remain 
as the wife of her deceased husband; or
(b) be inherited by a member of her husband’s family; or
(c) marry someone who is not a member of her husband’s 
family.
1. Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 378; see also 
Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeriaa op. cit.a p. 186;
Kasunmu and Salacuse, op. cit. 3 p. 181; Bascom, The 
Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeriaa op. cit., p. 65;
Uchendu3 The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, op. cit.3 p. 50.
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In all the above, cases the consensus of opinion 
seems to be that the widow remains the wife of her deceased 
husband. If, after the death of her husband she marries 
a man who is not a member of her husbandTs family, the 
previous marriage is terminated, it is claimed, not by the 
death of the husband, but by divorce. In the other two 
cases, the marriage to her deceased husband continues.
This conclusion is based on the fact that a marriage is 
not terminated until dowry has been repaid.
In order to analyse the position the alternatives 
must be examined separately.
(i) Where the widow chooses, or is compelled to remain as 
the wife of her deceased husband.
There are a few societies in Nigeria where the 
remarriage of a widow is absolutely forbidden.^- In the 
majority of societies, however, the widow has an option.
She may remain a widow or not as she wishes. In either 
case, what is her legal status? Is she a "wife” or a 
"widow”? The assertion that she is a "wife” is based on 
the fact that the dowry is not usually repaid, and any 
children subsequently borne by the woman after her husband1s 
death are legally affiliated to her dead husband. In this 
sense, her position differs from that of a woman married 
according to "English” law. In the latter case, children 
subsequently conceived, are not regarded as the children 
of the deceased husband. The assertion therefore seems 
justified.
But a marriage cannot be defined merely in terms 
of payment and refund of dowry, or affiliation of children. 
It has been seen that the status of marriage entails certain 
rights and obligations as between the parties to the mar­
riage, Is the wife whose husband is dead, still subject to 
such obligations, or entitled to the rights, as are inherent 
in the marital relationship? It is submitted that the 
rights and duties of a wife are terminated on the death of 
her husband. For example, her duty of fidelity to her
1. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit. , p. 218, 
for such marriages among the Kalahari,
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deceased husband is not operative, Although actions 
for adultery and seduction involving wives are numerous, 
there seems to be no cases in which such actions have 
involved a widow. The deceased husband’s family has no 
right to bring such actions, since they involve personal 
rights and duties of the husband and wife only.
Similarly, the wife’s duty to cohabit with her 
husband can no longer be enforced. If in defiance of 
the wishes of her deceased husband’s family, she returns 
to live with her natal family, or with anyone else, no 
action for harbouring of a wife can be brought by her 
deceased husband’s family. On the other hand, on the 
death of the husband, the husband’s family is entitled to 
sue for a refund of the dowry paid on behalf of the widow‘d 
unless she marries a member of the deceased’s family.
It has been seen previously that a customary 
marriage involves two separate contracts. One between 
husband and wife involving personal rights and obligations, 
and the other between the husband or his family and the 
wife’s family. On the death of the husband, the contract 
between husband and wife terminates, but the contract 
between the husband and the wife’s family does not. This 
latter contract is only brought to an end when the dowry 
has been refunded, or when the wife, the subject matter of 
the contract, dies. The principle of frustration of con­
tract applies, and all rights and obligations cease.
The position in this case can be summed up: the
status of marriage is terminated by the death of the 
husband and the woman can no longer be legally referred to
1. See e.g. Laromeke y. Nekego and Ayo £1958] 3 W,A,L,R,306. 
See also Qguntuko v. Famuke L1910J' Ilesha Native Council 
Record Book, Case N0 .6F, where a widow successfully 
brought an action for the recovery of dowry her deceased 
husband paid on a junior wife, and Felicia Abeni v.
Theresa Anike [1962] Egba Odeda, Grade B, Customary Court, 
Case No. B,237/62,. where a sister obtained refund of 
dowry from her deceased brother’s wife, see Ekundare, 
op. cit. , p . 39 •
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as a ’’wife”; the contractual relationship between the 
husband and the wife’s family, however, is unaffected 
by the death of the husband until the dowry is refunded.
(ii) Where the widow is "inherited" by a member of the 
deceased husband’s family
Two customs are involved in such situations,
(a) the levirate custom, and (b) the so-called ’’widow- 
inheritance” . Radcliffe*-Brown has rightly shown that a 
distinction must be made between "widow-inheritance” and 
the true levirate marriage as practised by the Hebrews and 
many other societies, whereby on the death of a man, his 
widow is taken over by his brother, whose duty it is to 
raise children in the name of the deceased husband. Children 
born to the brother and the widow are affiliated to the 
deceased. In the different situation of widow-inheritance, 
the widow marries a member of the deceased husband1s family, 
but the children she bears by the new husband are affiliated 
to him and not to her deceased husband.1
(a) The levirate custom. In those communities where the 
levirate custom is practised, the death of the husband 
does not legally terminate the marriage. The member of 
the deceased husband’s family who takes over the widow 
simply takes the place of the deceased husband. Children 
borne by the widow subsequent to her husband’s death are 
legally affiliated to the deceased and inherit from him.
The rights and obligations of the deceased husband are also 
enforceable by or against the man who steps into his shoes 
by taking over his widow. By a legal fiction, the marriage 
is not dissolved by the death of the husband, and the argu­
ment is stronger in cases where the levirate custom is 
compulsory, since no consents are necessary.
Nigerian societies which observe the levirate 
custom are very- few and are mainly found in the Northern
1, See Radcliffe^Brown and Forde, African Systems of 
Kinship and Marriage, op. cit,, p".
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States, especially among the peoples of the middle Niger
region and the non-Islamic peoples of the central area of
Northern Nigeria.^ There is no evidence of compulsory
levirate marriage at least in contemporary Nigeria. Ellis
reports that a sort of limited compulsory levirate custom
was formerly practised among the Yorubas where a man died
without issue. He says:
Formerly the levirate was in force, and 
when an elder brother died the brother next 
in order of age married the iyale, or head 
wife, and so in succession from brother to 
brother. There was no obligation to marry 
the subordinate wives of a deceased elder 
brother, and they usually devolved upon the 
legal heirs. If the deceased were childless, 
the son first born of the new union of the 
younger brother with the widow was named 
after the deceased, and was considered to 
fill the place of the son; he did not, 
however, as among the Jews, succeed to the 
property to the exclusion of the Levir - his 
inheritance lay solely in the house of his 
actual father.^
Although the Tiv practise the levirate custom, it is not 
compulsory.
(b) The custom of "widow-inheritance" . In communities 
where the custom of "widow-inheritance" obtains, the 
position is different, and it is submitted that the death 
of the husband terminates the marriage, because of the 
following reasons:-
(i) The consent of the widow is necessary for the new 
marriage, and in most societies her consent must be formally 
obtained. For example, in Nnewi (Igbo) area, each of the
1. See e.g. The Tiv, Akiga, AkigaTs Story, op. cit., pp. 316- 
317; Downes, The Tiv Tribe, op. cit., p. 18; see also 
E.J. Alagoa and A. Fombo, A Chronicle of Grand Bonny,
(Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1972), p. 12; the state- 
ment in Kasunmu and Salacuse, ojd. cit . , p. 182, to the 
effect that "Many Nigerian tribes practise levirate marriage" 
refers to "wife-inheritance"; see also Meek, Northern 
Tribes, ojd. cit., Vol. I, p. 193.
2. Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, op. cit., pp. 185-186.
3. See Akiga, AkigaTs Story, op. cit. , p. 317.
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inheritors of.the deceased hold out a knife, and the 
widow must grasp one to. indicate her choice of a new 
husband. If she fails to accept any knife, or if none 
is held out for her to grasp, she is deprived of certain 
rights, for example, when she dies, no one will shave his 
hair for her,, "because no one is her husband".^
(ii) The consent of the widow’s natal family is also 
necessary, and in some, communities has to be formally 
obtained. For example, in Onitsha, palm wine and kola- 
nuts are taken to the family, which if accepted by the 
family signifies their consent to the new marriage. They 
have the option to refuse the offer and withdraw their 
daughter. In such a case, dowry has to be refunded to
2
the deceased’s family if and when the widow remarries.
(iii) The consent of the new husband is also necessary.
In some communities, the person who is entitled to marry 
the widow is regulated by law, In other communities, he 
may be chosen by the members of the deceased husband’s
family from among themselves, but in all cases, he has
■5
the right to refuse. There are many cases recorded in 
the Social Welfare Offices where a person entitled or
4
chosen to marry a widow has actually refused to do so.
(iv) A ceremony is usually performed when the widow 
marries the new husband. This ceremony does not differ
1. See Emmanuel Alutu, Death and Funeral Rites Among Igbo 
People of Nnwe Division, B.A. dissertation. University
of Nigeria, 1976, p. 28; see also Thomas, Anthropological 
Report of the Ibo^Speaking Peoples of Nigeria, Part I, 
op. cit. , p . bFl Johnson^ History of the Yorubas, op. cit 
pp. 115"ll6; and 140; the widow exercises her choice by 
ballot; cf. Ellis, West African Sketches, op. cit., p. 42 
the wishes of the widow are never consulted.
2. See Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit, 3 p. 3139 the 
deceased’s heir has to present palm^wine, salt and 240 
cowries to the widow’s relatives, before escorting her 
back as his wife to his home,
3. See Esenwa, Marriage Customs in Asaba Division, op. cit., 
p. 74.
4. See below, Chapter XIII, pp. 440.
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in essential details, whether she marries a member .of her
deceased husband'1 s family or not* In both cases the
elaborate procedure which usually accompanies a woman’s 
first marriage is never repeated. It is performed once 
only in a woman’s life-time. This custom has led to the 
statement that ”No woman is married a second time’’.1 In 
actual fact it simply means that the ceremonials of a 
marriage is performed once only for a woman.
(v) Any children the widow conceives after the death of
her husband are legally affiliated to the new husband and
not to the deceased. Such children inherit rights and
duties in the family with reference to the new husband and
2
not to the deceased. This provides convincing evidence 
that it is a new marriage. The dowry paid by the deceased 
is transferred to provide the dowry for the new marriage, 
and the picture becomes clear if this situation is compared 
with the one where the widow marries outside her deceased
husband1s family. Here, the new husband refunds the dowry
to the deceased’s family, and they, in turn, can utilize 
it in marrying another woman. If this is done, the woman 
thus married, is never considered as being married to the 
deceased.
(vi) When the first husband dies, the widow has to mourn 
for him, and perform other rituals signifying the severance 
of their marital relationship. If she marries a member of 
the deceased husband’s family who subsequently also dies, 
she has to perform another mourning ceremony for the second 
husband. In other words, the identities of the husbands 
remain separate and are not merged.
In many societies, after the second burial of the 
husband, a woman performs, certain rituals which symbolises
1. See Delano, The Soul of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 142;
Fadipe , op. cit., p . 89; Johnson, op_. cit., p. 116 ; 
Bascom, The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, op. cit., 
p. 65; Ward, I^ he Voruba riusband-wife Code, op. cit.,
p. 110.
2. See Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, op. cit. , 
p. 50.
685
the severance of the marital tie between her and the 
deceased husband, in much the same way as in the case of 
a divorce.^ Unless these rituals are performed she is 
prohibited from remarrying to anyone, including a member
p
of the deceased’s family.“
For these and other reasonsJ it is submitted, 
that legally, a customary marriage is terminated by the 
death of the husband, except in societies where the levirate 
custom is practised, and as previously mentioned such 
societies are rare in Nigeria.
C . Death of the wife
In some communities, on the death of a wife, her
family has a legal obligation to provide the husband with
another wife, usually the deceased wife’s sister, or to
refund the dowry paid on behalf of the deceased wife. This
obligation is most often imposed in cases where the deceased
wife had borne no children by the husband before her death.
Any children borne by the substituted sister are legally
affiliated to the deceased wife and are reckoned as having
been begotten by her in some societies. In such cases the
substituted sister merely ’’steps into the shoes” of the
deceased. The practice referred to as the "sororate”
4
custom is similar to the levirate custom, and it may be 
argued that the marriage is not terminated by the wife’s 
death for the same reasons as were advanced in the case of 
the levirate custom.
1. See Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit., p. 279? among some 
Igbos, a woman breaks her owulu necklace and substitutes 
another of beads or other finery, which indicates that 
she is again marriageable* see also Keek, Law and 
Authority, op. cit., pp. 310i-313.
2. Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit., p. 291.
3. See Keek, Law and Authority, op. cit., p. 313? who 
describes a ceremony performeT“by a widow by which she 
apparently divorces herself from her dead husband.
4. See J.S. Boston, The Igala Kingdom, (Ibadan: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), p. 63T
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Where the substituted wife bears children in 
her own right * however, it is a new marriage, since she 
does not take the place of the deceased wife. The 
situation here is similar to ’’widow-inheritance” , and may 
be termed ’’widower-inheritance”. The fact that no dowry 
is payable for the second wife does not alter the situa­
tion, since the deceased wife’s family has an obligation 
to refund the dowry if they do not offer another wife 
to the widower.
In some societies, the"sororote*custom, or 
"widower-inheritance* does not apply, but where the deceased 
wife’s family and the widower had a good relationship, 
another member of the deceased wife’s family is given to 
the husband, without further, or with a reduced payment of 
dowry.1 In such cases, it is a new marriage; the family 
waives their right to payment of dowry for the second 
daughter.
The general conclusion is, therefore, that the 
death of either husband or wife terminates the marital 
relationship which exists between husband and wife, with 
the possible exceptions of those communities which 
practice the levirate and sororate customs. The contract­
ual relationship which exists between the husband and his 
wife’s family continues after the husband’s death, and 
is only terminated by the death of the wife , or the refund 
of the dowry after the husband’s death.
8. Mourning Ceremonies
Among nearly all communities in Nigeria, the
severance of the marriage ties by the death of either
2spouse is accompanied by ceremonies. These ceremonies 
may be preceded by a period of mourning which, in the case
1. See Meek, Law and Authority, op. cit. , p. 284.
2. See Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit. , 
pp. 468-537; Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op. cit., 
pp. 138-139.
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of the widow may be extensive and degrading. In many 
cases, the wife was traditionally burled with her husband.
One of the greatest changes in the legal status 
of married women relates to the observance of mourning 
ceremonies in the different parts of the country. Some of 
the various practices imposed on women in the traditional 
society are examined in order to appreciate the changes 
in the law; changes mainly due to the influence of 
Christian missionaries.^
A. The traditional society
Among most communities in Nigeria a wife was
2traditionally buried with her deceased husband. Talbot 
notes that among many of the Ibibios, by old custom, the 
best loved wife and many of her fellows were killed and 
buried with their dead "lord0. ^  The killing of wives of a 
deceased husband was especially important in cases where 
the dead husband was a king, a chief, or other wealthy
4person.
Mockler-Perryman, in 1892, recorded the case of 
the chief of an Igbo town who had died, and, according 
to custom, his wives, five in number, as well as a con­
siderable proportion of slaves, were placed alive in the 
grave of the chief, their wrists and ankles having been
1. See Waddell, op. cit. pp. 550-556; Macfarlan, Calabar:
The Church of Scotland Mission, op. cit., pp. 62-63•
2. See Roth, Great Benin, op. cit., p. 97, and old authorities
cited therein; see also Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, 
op. cit,, Vol.II, pp. 125-126; Jervis, Of Emirs and Pagans, 
op. cit., p. Ill; Macfarlan, Calabar: The Church of Scot­
land Mission, op. cit., pp. 32-33; no human sacrifice was 
offered among some communities, e.g. Jekri, see Talbot,
The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 481.
3. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 517.
4. See Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op. cit., p. 484; 
Talbot, Peoples ot Southern Nigeria, op. cit., Vol.Ill, 
p. 479 et. al.~ "Four women were buried alive at the 
head of the Alafin, another four at the feet and four 
boys on each side, as well as the lamp-bearer. In 
addition, many wives and nearly all the principal members 
of the royal family and his immediate entourage were 
forced to commit suicide'’.
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previously broken in order to prevent them from escaping.
Around the grave, which was a huge open pit, guards with
massive clubs were also stationed, ready to strike down
anyone attempting to crawl out.1 Similarly, Meek describes
the funerary honours which were paid to Ajetto, the Olu
of Aworo when he died in 1895. He noted:
to mark the importance of the event about 
twenty slaves were immolated. Some of his 
wives were also slaughtered, and others 
were buried alive with their husband; 
several little boys and girls were entombed 
(to fetch water and light the old man’s pipe), 
and the cries of these little ones were 
heard three and four days after.2
Lander describes how two wives of a lately
deceased chief hid themselves in order to avoid being
clubbed to death. One was discovered and forced to drink 
■5
poison. The practice of killing the wives of a deceased
king or chief was confirmed by many older people during
field-work. The opinion was expressed that the practice
still obtains, although done secretly, in some parts of
the country, notably Benin.
The reason advanced for the custom of burying
wives with their deceased husband is that the deceased
needs people to serve him in the next world and no one
could be better for this purpose than those who had served
4him in this world. A more prosaic and common-sense 
reason, however, is that if the wife knows she is to be 
buried with the husband, she would do nothing to hasten 
his death, for example, by poisoning^.
1* See Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, op. cit., p. 6.
2. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit., Vol.2,
p. 126*:-------------------------------  —  —
3. See Richard Lander and John Lander, Journal of An 
Expedition to Explore the Course and Termination of the 
Niger, op. cit., pp. 64-66.
4. See Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op. cit., p. 491- 
492; Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, Vol.Ill, op. 
cit. , p. 472 ; Meek, Northern' Tribes of Nigeria, Vol.2, 
op. cit., p . 126 .
5. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 472. 
Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op. cit. , pp. 488-489.
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It is said that women happily embraced death 
in this manner, and a woman considers it an honour to be 
chosen as the wife worthy to be buried with her deceased 
husband.1 This proposition is doubtful. Preservation 
of life is an innate tendency even among the lower 
animals. It is more probable that dispassionate resign­
ation may have been mistaken for real happiness.
(i) Ordeals and tortures
Wives not sufficiently worthy to be buried with
their deceased husbands, and wives whose husbands were
not kings or chiefs or other important men, were subjected
to gruelling ordeals. The object of such ordeals, was to
discover the degree of their responsibility for their
2
husbands’ deaths.
This tendency to regard wives with suspicion,
in relation to their husbands’ death, still lingers in
present day Nigeria, although suspected wives may no
longer be subjected to ordeals or tortures to prove their 
h
innocence.
Trials by ordeals in the case of widows, to 
prove their innocence of causing their husband’s death, 
were similar to those conducted to prove innocence in
1. See Roth, Great Benin, op. cit. , p. 43; for evidence 
to the contrary see Waddell, op. cit. , p. 337«
2. Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op. cit_., p. 333; 
Egharevba, op. cit. , p~l Leonard, The Lower Niger 
and Its Tribes, op. cit., p. 480; Meek, Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit. , Vol.l, p. 2 66"! cf. the 
early English law ’’trial by ordeal” .
3. Such accusations figure prominently in divorce cases, 
see e.g. Sotomi v. Sotomi [1976] 7 C.C.H.C.J. 1901; 
Folawiyo v. Folawiyo [1970] 2 All N.L.R. 208; D ’Almeida 
v. D ’Almeida [1973] 4 C.C.H.C.J.88.
4. See Ordeal, Witchcraft and Juju Ordinance, 1903 * S. 2; 
see below, p. 692, n.l.
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cases of alleged adultery.^*
(li) Mourning
Wives fortunate enough to escape trial by 
ordeal, or who were proved innocent after such trials, 
had to mourn for their husbands, regardless of their 
personal feelings or relationships with their deceased 
husbands. The practices which widows had to observe 
were rigorous, and the penalties imposed for breaches 
in some societies, were severe. During the early part 
of the mourning period, widows were not permitted to 
bathe even during periods of menstruation. They could 
not change their clothes, nor comb their hair. An old 
chief in Nsukka described the appearance of a widow in 
traditional society as "a mad woman with matted hair,
p
filthy appearance and smelling like carrions” .
Such harsh practices were observed mostly among 
the Igbos, and Ibibios, but the overwhelming majority 
of communities, including the Moslem communities in the 
Northern States, imposed strict mourning ceremonies on widows.
1. See above, Chapter VII,pp. 562, 568; except in the
case of very old people, death is never regarded as stem­
ming from natural causes. It is always attributed to 
either poisoning or a form of divine retribution.
2. Recorded interview with Chief Ozo, of Ovoko Town, Nsukka, 
held at Nsukka, 29 August 1977; cf. the position of 
widows under customary law in Sierra Leone, where water 
used for washing the corpse of the deceased husband is 
mixed with clay and smeared over the body of the widow
to indicate that she is mourning, see Olive P. Taylor, 
"The Position of Women under Sierra Leone Customary 
Family Law” in African Indigenous Laws, op. cit., p. 223.
3. See Leith-Ross, African Women, op. cit. , pp. 212-214; 
Basden, Niger Ibos, op. cit., p. 279; Forde and Jones, 
op. cit., p . 27.
4. See Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op. cit., p. 487. 
Talbot , Woman’s Mysteries, op. cit. , pp. 223-229.
5. See e.g. Hodge, Gazetteer of Ilorin Province, op. cit. , 
p. 48; Jervis, Of Emirs and Pagans, op. ciT. , p. Ill; 
Ajisafe, op_. cit. , p . 8T] Talbot , Tribes of the Niger 
Delta, op. cit., pp. 222-230; Johnson, History of the 
Yorubas, op. cit., p. 138; Macfarlan, op. cit., p . £2".
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The question may be asked whether these 
practices were legal or merely social in nature. Undoubt­
edly they were socio<-religious. The main reason why the 
widow was forced to neglect her personal appearance and 
cleanliness was to render her as unattractive as possible 
to other men, while some of the rituals had a religious 
overtone: they were regarded as essential to the welfare
of the deceased husband in the spirit world.^ But the 
rules were enforced by the various law-enforcing agents in 
the society - male secret societies charged with the duty
2
of enforcing laws, such as the egungun among the Yorubas,
■3
and egbo among the Ibibios. The legal status of women 
was also affected. For example, a woman could not remarry 
until she had observed the prescribed period of mourning 
for her deceased husband and performed the necessary
4
ceremonies to symbolise the severance of the marital tie.
1. See Lieber, Ibo Village Communities, op. cit., p. 21; 
Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op. cit., p. 487.
2. See Ajisafe, 0£. cit., pp. 30, and 90-94; Johnson, 
op. cit. , pp. 138-140.
3. See Waddell, op. cit., pp. 421-423; Talbot, Life in 
Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 170; See Andre J.F.
Kobben, ”Law at the Village Level, The Cottica Djuka of 
Surinam” , in Law in Culture and Society, edit. by Laura 
Nader (Berkeley:- University of California Press, 1969), 
pp. 117-140, as to whether the term ”law" should be used 
when the sanction is a psychological one, e.g. ostracism, 
ridicule, withdrawal of favours etc; cf. Frederick Pollock, 
First Book of Jurisprudence, 6th ed. (London: Macmillan 
and Co. Ltd., 1929), p.24; Maine, Early History of Inst­
itutions, op. cit., Lecture 12, p. 364 and Lecture 13,p. 380.
4. See Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op. cit. , p. 222;
”a woman may never give herself, or be given to, another 
man until the ceremony for her late husband has been 
completed” among the Igbo and Ibibio. ”Any infringement 
of this rule is treated as a grave offence and entails 
terrible punishment and disgrace;” see also Basden,
Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 121; Kingsley 
Travels in West Africa, op. cit., p. 487; Boston,
The Igala Kingdom, op. cit. , p. 139, n.l.
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B . The modern society
(i) Ceremonies performed by widows.
Widows in contemporary Nigeria are more fortunate 
than women in traditional society, with reference to 
nourning rites for their deceased husbands. Missionaries 
played an active role in the abolition of those laws which 
degraded the social status of women, especially in the 
Calabar area. With the advent of Colonial administration 
and the introduction of English laws, rude practices such 
as the burial of wives with their deceased husbands, and 
trials by ordeal were made criminal offences.1
The rigours formerly imposed on widows mourning 
for their deceased husbands, as well as the duration of 
the period of mourning, are considerably reduced in all 
areas of the country. Article six of a Treaty signed at 
Calabar in 1878, by the kings and chiefs of Duke Town 
provided:
The custom of compelling widows to remain 
in their houses in filth and in wretchedness, 
after the death of their husband until his 
devil-making is over (they having been 
sometimes kept for even years in this state 
of misery), is abolished.
The widows are to remain mourning for 
one month after the death of their husbands, 
and after that no further restraint will be 
put upon them.^
1. See Ordeal, Witchcraft and Juju Ordinance, 1903, No. 13
of 1903, S.2, and see further above, Chapter VII, p.5*72 i 
see also Richard Burton, Abeokuta and the Cameroon 
Mountains: An Exploration, (London, Tinsley Brothers, 
1863) , Vol.II, pp. 4-6, for a treaty abolishing human 
sacrifice signed by the Alake and Chiefs of Ake; and 
Herslets, Commercial Treaties, Vol. IX for a treaty 
concluded on 5 Jan. 1852, with the Chief of the Egbas 
for the abolition of all forms of human sacrifice.
2. Macfarlan, Calabar; The Church of Scotland Mission 
Rounded 1846 , op. cit., p. bFj Waddell, op. cit., p .
422 et.al., Nair, Politics and Society, op. cit., pp. 
50-54"J cf. Begho, Law and Culture, op. cit. , pp. 61-62.
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This Treaty, was the result of persistent pressures 
exerted by the missionaries on the kings and chiefs of 
Calabar and its environs. The success of their efforts 
is attested by evidence collected during field-work in 
Eket .
It has been previously noted that Ibibio widows 
were among the chief victims of oppressive traditional 
mourning ceremonies and taboos. Not only were they forced 
to observe excessively long periods of mourning in filthy 
conditions, but during the initial burial ceremonies they 
were flogged by the members of egbo (male secret society) . 
Their clothes were torn, their faces defiled and all their 
household utensils broken. The laws imposed by the com­
munity were intended to make them as miserable as possible.
The position of widows in Eket and Calabar today 
is very different. Not only are women no longer subjected 
to floggings by egbo, but the period of mourning for a 
deceased husband is relatively short, or, in some cases 
non-existent. The process of change was illustrated by 
the experience of the women in a household interviewed at 
Eket. The household included four generations of women.
The widow who represented the oldest generation, was about 
eighty years old. She stated that after her husband1s 
death she had to mourn for five years, after undergoing all 
the traditional punishments. Her daughter, also a widow, 
had mourned for three years but suffered no degrading 
practices like egbo floggings, or rubbing of filth on her 
body. Her grand-daughter, however, who was married, but 
not widowed, stated that in her generation - the present 
one - "the husband whose wife mourns for him for one month 
would be regarded as extremely fortunate”. The law had 
changed to such an extent that the saying 11 the mourning 
chamber is the same as the birth chamber^, indicating that 
many widows became pregnant during the mourning period of 
one month, had become a popular jocular statement.^"
1. Information obtained in recorded interviews at Eket.
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In many areas,, for example Nsukka, where the 
population has always had an excess of males, the initiat­
ive to reduce the mourning periods for widows was taken 
by the men themselves. This was due to the fact that the 
long periods of mourning, and the abject state to which 
the widows were reduced increased further the imbalance 
between male and female as it affected the number of 
marriageable women available.^
The present mourning period generally lasts for 
one month. But in many areas, once the first burial of 
the husband has been performed, the widow is allowed to 
bathe and change her clothes. Most widows shave their 
hair off entirely, but if they do not, they may comb their 
hair during the period of mourning. In many areas, for 
example, Onitsha, a widow is also required to wear black 
clothing for a further period of six to nine months, but 
this is not compulsory. In Onitsha a wife Is not permitted 
to remarry before the "second burial” of her deceased
p
husband has been performed. A "second burial" may be 
performed at any time after death, but since it involves 
considerable expenditure it may be postponed for years.^
(ii) Ceremonies performed by widowers.
The mourning rites imposed on husbands for a 
deceased wife have always been comparatively slight and of 
a short duration. For example, among the Ibo (Nnewi) in 
the past, the husband had to lament the death of his wife 
by night alarms sounded for about three (native) weeks.^
1. Information obtained in recorded interviews at Nsukka.
2. See Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 121; 
Meek, Law and Authority , op. cit. . p. 311; Meek, Northern 
Tribes Nigeria, op. cit., Vol.II, pp. 130-131; Boston, 
The Igala Kingdom, op. cit., p. 138.
3. See Meek, Law - and' Authority, op. cit. , pp. 310-319.
4. See Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op. cit., p.ll6 : 
"The outward signs of mourning on the part of males are 
not extravagant... A husband should restrict himself to 
the confines of his compound for seven Ibo weeks (28 days) 
when mourning the loss of his wife."
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To sever the marital relationship with his dead wife the 
husband tears his necklace. After burial he has his hair 
shaven bald.'1'
9. The Refund of Dowry After Death
The rules governing the refund of dowry after the 
death of one of the spouses vary from community to community, 
and in most cases are similar to the rules applicable to a 
refund of dowry in the event of a divorce.
Generally, there is no liability to refund the
2
dowry after a wife’s death. The wife's death not only 
terminates the personal contract between the spouses,but 
also frustrates the contract between the wife's family and 
the husband or his family.
Where the husband predeceases the wife, however, 
the general rule is that dowry is refundable, but there 
are some exceptions, and the rules vary even among sub­
groups of the same group.
In some communities, there is no liability to 
repay any part of the dowry, even in cases where the widow 
marries outside her deceased husband's family. In other 
communities, the obligation to refund the dowry only arises
1* Ibid., p. 116. Cf. the position of widow and
widowers in Sierre Leone, see Oliver Taylor - op. cit., 
p. 223. —
2. See Customary Law Manual, op. cit. , p. 302, par. 362(5). 
but see Akuonyeume and Anor. v. Qgban.je. [1964] Suit No. 
0/98/1963, unreported, Onitsha High Ct., 2, Nov. 1964; 
where the plaintiffs alleged that the testatrix could not 
dispose of her self-acquired property by will to her own 
children, because she had not refunded the dowry. See 
further, below, Chapter XIII, p.
3. For example, in Ezzikwo Division, Orri, Effium and Eziagu 
clans and in Ezilo community in Igbo-Ato clan of Ishielu 
Division, refund of dowry is not made after the death of
a husband, even where the wife marries outside her deceased 
husband's family, - see Customary Law Manual, op. cit. , 
p . 302, par. 362(3).
696
where the widow marries a stranger.'1’ In most of these 
communities where dowry -is repayable, no refund is usually 
due until the widow remarries, but in a few communities, 
for example Owerri Division, as soon as the widow leaves 
her husbandTs family, the dowry is immediately repayable, 
regardless of the duration of the marriage, the number of 
children the widow had for her deceased husband, or the
- 2
fact that she is too old to bear further children. If 
she refuses to marry her husbandTs hair the dowry must be
“5
repaid.
Recently, judges have modified the rule and have
held that the dowry repayable should be reduced according
to the circumstances of the particular case. The factors
to be taken into account would include, inter alia, the
duration of the marriage, the age of the woman, the
possibility of her remarriage, the ages of the children,
the services rendered by the wife to the husband when they
were together, whether the person to whom the dowry was
paid is still alive or not, and, in a divorce case, the
4
causes and reasons for divorce.
5
In Osieklyovwe and Anor. v. Akporuvbeku, the 
wife had been married to the husband for about twenty one 
years before his death, and had borne three children for 
him. After his death, she refused to marry his heir, and 
returned to her father*s compound. Her father agreed with 
the heir, brother of the deceased husband, and plaintiff 
in the case, to refund £95 dowry. He paid £20 before he
1. This is the position among the Yorubas generally, and 
among the majority of Igbo communities; see Oustomary 
Law Manual, op. cit., p. 302, par. 362(3) •
2. See Customary Law Manual, op. cit., p. 302, par. 362(4)(b)
3. This is the position among the Tiv, but an allowance is 
usually made for children she has borne by the deceased, 
see Bohannan, Justice and Judgment Among the Tiv, op. cit.
p. 87.
4. See Qsiekiyovwe v. Akporuvbeku [1973] Law Notes and 
Review, 1973. No.l; see also Okaludo v. Omama [i960] 
W.L.N.R.149.
5. [1973] Suit No. UHC/6A.7I 3 Law Notes and Review, 1973, 
No.l.
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died five years later. His son, the first defendant,
and brother of the second defendant, the widow, paid a
further £25 after the death of their father, leaving a
balance of £50, which formed the subject matter of the
claim. When the claim was instituted, eight years had
elapsed since the death of the husband. The Customary
Court was divided in its judgment. The President of the
court dismissed the action. The other member found for
the plaintiff, but awarded him £40 only. The findings of
the President became the judgment of the court. The
plaintiff appealed to the Magistrates Court, Ughelli.
The appeal was allowed, but the Magistrate reduced the
amount of dowry repayable to £30 as against £50 originally
claimed by the plaintiff. Against this judgment both
parties appealed. Justice Ogbobine of the Ughelli High
Court set aside the judgment of the Magistrates Court.
In his judgment he said:
Although there is no Native Custom which 
deprives a husband of a refund of his 
dowry, the Courts must be reluctant in 
encouraging a woman whose marriage has 
virtually failed to continue remaining 
with the husband for fear of having to 
refund her dowry, or the husband to 
continue to hold the wife in perpetual 
servitude on the failure of her parents 
to refund the dowry. There is no doubt 
that Customary Courts must be extremely 
cautious in determining what amount of 
dowry is refundable when a marriage 
breaks up.^
The Judge held that the £45 already refunded was adequate. 
He allowed the appeal of the defendants and restored the 
judgment of the Customary Court.
The JudgeTs statement that there is no Native 
Custom which deprives a husband of a refund of his dowry 
is not strictly true if applied to the whole of Nigeria, 
since there are societies where a husband is not entitled 
to such a refund. Nevertheless the passage is important 
in that it pinpoints the tragedy of a woman whose parents
1, Qsiekiyovwe and Anor. v. Akporuvbeku^ ibid.a p. 5.
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cannot afford to. refund dowry received for her, and 
suggests the attitude courts should take.
10. Summary and Recommendations.
A. Summary
Viewed from a legal point of view, the traditional 
position of the large majority of women in Nigeria in regard 
to divorce, presents a picture of near equality with that 
of their husbands. In legal theory, divorce could, in the 
majority of communities, be initiated and effected by the 
unilateral action of either spouse, and no specific grounds 
had to be established in order to obtain a divorce.
In actual fact, however, it was more difficult 
for a wife to obtain a divorce, than it was for her husband 
to divorce her. She had to seek for and obtain her family’s 
approval; and this was not an easy task, since it usually 
meant the obligation to refund the dowry paid with reference 
to her marriage. If the dowry was not refunded the wife 
could not remarry. Because of the financial obligation to 
refund the dowry, pressures were brought to induce the wife 
to remain in a marriage which had become intolerable to her, 
in many cases.
Society regarded divorce as justifiable when 
effected by a husband for reasons which were not regarded 
as valid in the case of divorce by a wife. For example, a 
wife’s adultery justified a divorce by the husband; the 
husband’s adultery was dismissed as irrelevant.
A husband had the right to chastise his wife, and 
a divorce for cruelty was only justified if the cruelty was 
excessive or administered in an insulting manner. The 
wife, on the other hand, had no right of chastisement, and 
trivial acts, such as making love charms and potions, 
invariably done in an attempt to gain, or retain, her 
husband’s love, would constitute cruelty on her part. No 
actual physical injury was necessary to justify a divorce 
on the ground of cruelty.
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Unless the wife’s economic contributions 
compensated for her sterility, a wife who had no children 
was liable to be divorced. Even if she was not divorced 
her position in a polygynous family was not an enviable 
one. Often the happier choice for a childless wife, or 
one who had no male children, was separation from her 
husband. On the other hand, society provided a remedy 
for the sterile husband. The wife was permitted, and in a 
few cases coerced to beget children by other men. These 
children were affiliated to the husband and if the trans­
action was secretly done, and in most cases it was the 
husband’s dignity was protected.
Additionally, there were other influences operating 
to restrain a wife from effecting a divorce which were 
absent in the husband’s case. The obligation to refund the
dowry is particularly relevant in this respect. In some 
societies, a wife was required to take an oath, either 
! during or before the marriage ceremony, or after the marriage,
that she would never leave her husband. In many cases,
I superstition prevented her from effecting a divorce, even
j when the circumstances justified her doing so.^ Unless the
! husband could be persuaded to release her from the oath,
| she had to remain with him for fear of the consequences
! which would result if she broke the oath.
I
In actual practice, therefore, the legal status
i
! of a wife with reference to divorce was less favourable
! than it was in theory.
1. For example, it is a common practice in some parts of 
the country to subject a wife to a secret juju oath, 
by which she swears not to remarry unless the husband 
gives his consent and revokes the oath. Many cases of 
women who had divorced their husbands, but could not 
remarry because of superstitious fear of the conse­
quences of the oath they had taken, were recorded in 
the Social Welfare Departments, especially in Anambra 
State. In some of these, cases, the husband had effected 
the divorce, but still refused to release the wife from 
her oath, so that she can marry someone else; see The 
Ihiala Monthly Progress Report for August, 1976, October, 
1976, and August 1977, where several such cases are 
reported.
7 0 0
On the. credit side, however, it is undoubtedly 
the fact that divorce was relatively rare in traditional 
societies and the evidence seems to indicate that wives 
were reasonably treated and happily married. Although 
there were few specific law-enforcement agencies, several 
factors militated against a husband's excessive cruelty 
to his wife, or her unjustified expulsion from the matri­
monial home. The influence of the family was one factor, 
but perhaps the greatest restrain was imposed on the 
husband by the sanctions of a close-knit society which 
generally frowned on divorce.
Women's traditional position under customary 
laws of divorce has changed to some extent, but generally, 
the changes are not beneficial. The old discriminatory 
provisions legally remain, and have even been endorsed in 
legislative enactments in some parts of the country.
The desire to curtail marital instability now
evident in the country has prompted some local authorities
to Inake stringent rules for obtaining a divorce.^ These
new laws, in most cases, are made and administered by men,
and are therefore patently male-biased. In many cases,
traditional laws favourable to the husband are retained,
even when those laws are manifestly impracticable in the
realities of the modern society. Laws favourable to the
wife, however, are either totally abolished or severely
curtailed. For example, the traditional legal right of a
wife to non-judicial divorce has been abolished in some 
2
areas. The similar right of the husband is, however, 
retained.
1. See e.g. S.5(2) Declaration of Tiv Native Law and 
Custom, Order,*N.H.L.N.149 of 1955; S.9* Declaration 
of Idoma Native Marriage Law and Custom) Order, 19599 
N.A.L.N.63 of 1959; S.8. Declaration of Biu Native 
Marriage Law and Custom Order, 1964, N.R.L.N.9, of 1964; 
Benin Marriage Rulesy rop. cit. : S.7* Marriage, Divorce, 
and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws Order, 1958, 
W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958.
2. See e.g. S.8. Biu Native Authority (Declaration of Biu 
Native Marriage Law and Custom) Order, 1964, N.R.L.N.9 
of 1964.
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Some communities attempt to prevent divorce by
imposing terms of imprisonment on a spouse who refuses to
cohabit with the other spouse.1 Although these provisions
legally apply bo both spouses, they may be oppressive to
the wife, but not to the husband who is free to marry
other wives. Such rules of law conflict with the provisions
of the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria which
guarantees freedom of association to every citizen of 
2
Nigeria. Marital stability cannot be enforced by oppres­
sive laws.
Some communities still observe the traditional 
law and refuse the wife a divorce unless her husband con­
sents, while no such restraints are imposed on the husband.^ 
These laws do not prevent women from leaving their husbands. 
The stigma attached to divorce in the traditional society 
has disappeared. Marital status for women is still desir­
able, but if a woman has been married once, especially if 
she has some children, failure to remain with her husband 
does not affect her social status.^
The liability to refund the dowry in divorce has 
a debilitating effect on the ability of the woman to divorce 
an undesirable husband. The level of dowry which now 
obtains in some communities has aggravated the situation.
B . Recommendations.
It has been previously recommended that the 
payment of dowry should not be a legal essential of a
1. See The Benin Marriage Rules, 0£. cit. , S.8 3D., which 
provides: If a man wins an action for restitution of
conjugal rights and the woman fails to obey the order 
of the court, the man may take a criminal summons for 
failure to obey a court order, and the court may commit 
the woman to prison or inflict a fine.
2. S. 39*
3. See Forde and Jones, The Ibo and lbibio-Speaking 
Peoples , op. cit., p .177 .
4. Ibid., p. 77.
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customary marriage in. contemporary Nigeria. Similarly 
the refund of dowry should not be the sine qua non of a 
valid divorce. On the death of either husband or wife 
a marriage should be legally dissolved, and a wife per­
mitted to marry to anyone acceptable to her, without a 
refund of dowry. Any children she subsequently conceives 
should be legally affiliated to their natural father 
whether dowry has been refunded or not.
In the discussion on statutory marriage and 
divorce it will be seen that a divorce may be effected by 
the mutual consent of both parties, or by the unilateral 
desire of either spouse to terminate the marriage. This 
as previously noted has been the position in most Nigerian 
customary law systems. Informal divorce by mutual consent 
should be retained, accompanied by the compulsory registr­
ation of such divorces.
No marriage should be sustained by the law where 
it is obvious that the marriage has broken down irretriev­
ably. Evidence of irretrievable breakdown should be the 
refusal of one spouse to continue to cohabit or to maintain 
a marital relationship with the other. His or her reasons 
for doing so should be largely irrelevant, except where 
it is felt that a reconciliation is possible. Attempts 
should be made to reconcile the parties. Where possible, 
or advisable, the spouses * families may be invited to 
participate in reconciliation attempts. In addition, there 
should be trained marriage guidance counsellors to advise 
the parties and the courts.
No person should be forced to cohabit with another 
person or be imprisoned for his or her refusal to do so.
The only basis for a marriage should be the desires of the 
spouses to get married or to remain married. Where one 
spouse desires a divorce but the other does not, the 
objecting spouse should be notified of his or her right to 
appeal to a Customary Court against a registration of 
divorce, but only for the purpose, if possible, of effecting 
a reconciliation.
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3CHAPTER IX
MARRIAGE ACCORDING TO ISLAMIC LAW
"Woman is like a rib: if you want to 
straighten her out, you will break 
her, and if you want to use her, 
you must use her with her curve"
Sahih of al-Bukhari
1. Introduction
A brief historical account of the incursion of
Islam into Nigeria, as well as of the general nature and
2
sources of Islamic law has already been given. This 
chapter examines the impact of Islamic law on the traditional 
legal status of those women who are Moslems.
As a general statement, it may be said that the 
impact of Islamic law on the traditional position of women, 
so far as it relates to marriage and family life has not 
been revolutionary, since basically, Islamic law as it is 
applied in Nigeria, does not differ significantly from the 
indigenous customary laws of the various Nigerian 
communities.
Before discussing the provisions of classical 
Islamic law^ relating to marriage, and the extent to which 
these principles of law have been discarded or distorted in 
deference to local customary laws, certain general points 
must be noted.
2. The nature and Applicability of Islamic Law.
A. The General Nature of Islamic Law.
The core of the Islamic law of marriage is
1. 0. Houdas, Les Traditions Islamiques, French, trans. 
by, 1908. Vol. Ill, p. 583.
2. See above, Chapter II, pp. 189-192.
3. The law as laid down by the Koran and classical jurists. 
The term "classical” is used to distinguish Islamic law 
actually practised in Nigeria from the law of the Koran 
and classical jurists.
ancient Arabian customary law."1* As shown in previous
chapters, the customary laws of patrilineal traditional
societies in all parts of the world show few significant
differences in the general principles of marriage, family
life, and the position of women*, Islamic law, as a result,
portrays striking similarities to the traditional
indigenous customary laws of many of the converts to Islam.
This, perhaps, explains why the fusion of Islamic and
customary law has, comparatively speaking, been easier to
accomplish than the fusion of English law with either of
the two, at least as far as family law is concerned; it
may well also account in part for the success of Islam as
a proselytising religion in Africao
During the pre-Islamic era in Arabia, the
customs regulating marriage and the relationships between
the sexes were vague and indefinite, and there is evidence
that polyandry, polygamy, marriage by capture, illicit
connections, temporary marriage, and frequent divorces 
2were common.
At one time in the ancient past Arabian women 
had played a dominant role in social relations. For 
example, it was possible for a woman to have sexual inter­
course with a number of men, and on the birth of a child, 
she had the sole right to assign it to any one of them.
Her paramours had no right to refuse paternity, when thus 
3
assigned.
1. See Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, op.cit0, p.25;
2. See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, 
op.cit., p.7; Ullah Ibns Jung, A Dissertation on the 
Muslim Law of Marriage, (Allahabad: Law Journal Press, 
1926), p .iii; Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of 
Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957)« 
p.l2l.
3. See Jung, op,cit., p.iv; Alexander D. Russell and 
Abdullah A. Suhrawardy, First Steps in Muslim Juris­
prudence consisting of excerpts from Bakurat-al-Sa'd 
of Ibn Abu Zayd. (London: Luzac and Co., 190&), P»xv; 
(Reuben Levy, Social Structure of Islam, op.cit.91« 
et al; Abdur Rahim, The Principles of Muhammadan 
Jurisprudence According to Hanafi, Maliki. ShafiTi and 
Hanbali School's (London: Luzac and Co., 1911),
pp.7 - 8.
5The power of divorce was not limited to men.
Women also had the power to divorce their husbands by 
the simple expedient of turning their tents around 
so that if the door had previously faced the east, it 
faced the west instead. This action signalled dismissal 
which had to be accepted by the husband.^
By the time of the Prophet Muhammed, 
however, women had lost their once dominant position,
and their status was said to be "no better than that of 
2
animals". In youth, they were the chattels of their
fathers, and after marriage the husband replaced the
3
father as their lord and master; a woman was an integral 
part of the estate of her husband or her father* and the 
widows of a man .descended to his sons by right of
4inheritance, as any other portion of his patrimony.
Polygamy was unrestrained and limited only by lack of 
means or inclination, while the power of divorce, denied
5
to women, was frequently and indiscriminately exercised 
by men.^ Female infanticide to avert the shame of
7
producing girls was prevalent.
1. See W. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early 
Arabia. 2nd. edit. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1907), p.65; Ameer Ali, Mohammedan Law, compiled from 
Authorities in the Original Arabic. 5th edit. (Thacker, 
Spink and d o . , 1929), Vol. II, p.//-. See generally, Levy, 
op.cit., pp.91-134.
2. Levy, op.cit., p.91; Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 
op.cit., p .6. See generally, Abdur Rahim, op.cit., 
pp.7-12; Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit., 
pp.6-9; Ameer Ali, Mahommedan Law, op.cit., pp.15-1?.
3. Levy, op.cit., p.91.
4. Ameer Ali, op.cit.,p.!5; B.A. Rafiq, The Status of 
Women in Islam (London: Orchard Publications, 1975), p.6.
5. Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,pp.9-10; R. Smith, op.cit., p.291.
6. Levy, op.cit., p. 121.
7. Abdur Rahim, op.cit,,p.12; R. Smith, op.cit.,p.
Rafiq, op. cit., ppTTo-7. See also Far in Mirvahabi, "The 
Status of Women in Iran”, 14 Journal of Family Law, 
1975-1976, pp. 383-404; Levy op.cit., p. 91-9^.
6An Arab could dispose of all his property by 
will and the cardinal rule of inheritance, also found in 
the majority of traditional customary legal systems, was 
that no female could inherit from her father or from her 
husband.
Arab customary law, like Yoruba customary law, 
recognized the right of all adults to hold property. 
Although a woman was debarred from inheritance, she was 
under no disability in the matter of owning property.
It was possible, as in Yorubaland, for women to acquire 
riches by trade and commerce and to become the owners 
of land and houses*
A woman, however, was not free to contract her 
own marriage. Marriage was an alliance between families 
and the father or other male guardian of a woman, regard­
less of her age or marital status, had the right to give 
her in marriage to the man of his choice. Her consent 
was unnecessary. Money or other property given by the 
bridegroom in consideration of the marriage belonged to 
the brideTs father.'1’ In short, the position of women in 
Arab customary law was very similar to the position of
women in the traditional customary law as shown in the
2foregoing chapters.
Jung records the fact that "the process of the
subjection of the women and children was totally complete
before the dawn of Islam, and the endeavours of the
Prophet of God were to emancipate the woman from hereditary
bondage, restore her position, and give her a legal status
3
in the eye of the law". But all religions tolerate, and 
even encourage in some respects, the predominance of the 
male over the female,^ and Islam is no exception. The 
Koran states that
1. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit., p.9.
2. See Part Two above, Chapters III-VIII.
3o Jung, op.cit.. p. xiii.
4• Ibid., p . xiv•
7"Men are superior to women on account of the 
qualities with which God had gifted the one 
above the other, and on account of the outlay they 
make from their substance for them'J^
Muhammad recognized,and in some cases reinforced, the
notion prevalent in most societies of his time, that
men were superior to women. This is explicit in many
provisions of the Koran. For example, in the laws of
succession, a male gets double the inheritance rights of
a female, and in the law of evidence two female witnesses
2
may be required instead of only one male witness.
However, Muhammad made some attempts to ameliorate the
total subjection and degradation of women under the
existing Arabian customary laws of his time, and many of
his reforms, if liberally interpreted, were advantageous
to women. Islamic law did not profess to establish a new
system of law, nor do the legal verses of the Koran
represent a complete set of legal principles. They are
largely either general exhortations, or solutions to
specific problems that arose from time to time. The aim
of the Prophet "was not to create a new system of law; it'
was to teach men how to act, what to do, and what to avoid
in order to pass the reckoning on the day of Judgement and
3
to enter Paradise" The reasons for the Koranic legislation 
on marriage and family life were said to be "dissatis­
faction with prevailing conditions, the desire to improve 
the position of women, of orphans, and of the weak in
general,” to restrict the laxity of sexual morals and to
strengthen the marriage tie\
The entire pre-Islamic customary laws were 
retained, subject only to such changes as Muhammad decreed.
1. The Koran, trans. by J.M. Rodwell, (London: Dent, 
Everymans* Library, 1974), Sura, IV, V.38, p.415.
2. According to Maliki law, a woman may not be a witness
to a marriage, nor to a divorce, see F.H. Ruxton,
Maliki Law.(London: Luzac and Co., 1916, p.90.)
3. See also Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,p. 16.
4. See Levy, op.cit.. p. 100.
Only such customary laws as were inconsistent with the 
principles of sound reason and good conscience were 
repealed.1 Islamic law acted more or less in the same 
way on Arabian customary law as equity did on the English 
common law. It did not replace customary law in its 
entirety, but was simply a gloss, which modified or 
occasionally replaced customary principles, and made 
them more acceptable to a religious legal system.
According to Ameer Ali
"The Prophet, in his efforts to introduce a purer 
faith and a healthy organization among his people, 
did not so entirely overlook the exigencies of 
society and the requirements of human growth as to 
denounce all existing institutions, the inevitable 
result of which would have been to reduce everything 
to chaos. His constructive mind perceived in them 
the germs of development, and accordingly he allowed 
them a place in his system, with such modifications 
and alterations as would bring those institutions 
into harmony with a progressive condition of society"^
In many cases prudence dictated the adoption of 
a middle course which would be more acceptable, and there­
fore more likely to be observed by converts, even when 
total abolition was desirable. For example, Muhammed did
1. Jung, o£.cit.,p. ii; but see Coulson, "Custom and Case 
Law", World of Islam, Vol.VI, pp.13-14; "Customs which 
were in direct conflict with the principles derived 
from the koran or the sunna or by analogical reasoning 
based thereupon nevertheless found their way into the 
body of the positive law” .
2. This is generally the view of the Sunnis schools of law, 
according to the Shi1a, however, any rule of customary 
law not expressly ratified by the Koran was tacitly 
rejected, see N.J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions in 
Islamic Jurisprudence, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1969), p.32; Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the 
Muslim World, (London: The Athlone Press, 1976), p.10; 
Anderson, "The Adaptation of Muslim Law in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in African Law. Adaptation and Development.
edit, by Hilda Kuperand Leo Kuper (Los Angeles: University 
Press, 1965), pp.149-150; Tyabji, Muhammadan Law, op. 
cit.. pp.2-10.
3. Ameer Ali, Mahommedan Law, op.cit., p.l.
9not approve of polygamy, tut he did not prohibit it. He
restricted the permitted number of wives to four, and 
hedged this permission with a proviso that all the wives 
should be treated equally. Some jurists interpret this 
condition in such a way as to make the practice of poly­
gamy impossibleo1
B. The Ap-p lie ability of Islamic Law in Nigeria
It has been previously stated that in Nigeria,
Islamic law has always been de .jure, a particular type of
2
"native law and custom", and, until 1957, when the Moslem 
Court of Appeal came into force there was scarcely a 
reference to Islamic law as such in any Nigerian statute. 
Anderson notes:
"It would at first sight seem somewhat of an anomaly 
that the Ordinances of a territory in which, so far 
as its Northern Provinces are concerned, Islamic law 
is in fact applied more widely than in any other part 
of the British Empire, except the Aden Protectorate, 
should include virtually no reference whatever to 
that law".^
Islamic law is applied under the provisions con­
cerning the application of native law and custom. Thus 
the High Court Law 1955, of the former Northern Region of 
Nigeria provides:
"The High Court shall observe, and enforce the 
observance of, every native law and custom which 
is not repugnant to natural justice, equity, and 
good conscience, nor incompatible either directly 
or by implication with any law for the time being in 
force, and nothing in this law shall deprive any 
person of the benefit of any such native law or 
custom".^
1. See further below, pp. 23-28.
2. See above, Chapter II, p. 189.
3. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.t p. 171.
4. Cap. 49, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 Revision,
S.34(1).
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| The Native Courts Law, 1956, expressly provides
! that "native law and custom includes Moslem law” . Section
I
| 23 of the Law provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Law, and in 
I particular of section 24, a native court shall
| in civil causes and matters administer -
(a) The native law and custom prevailing in the 
area of jurisdiction of the court or binding 
between the parties, so far as it is not 
repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience nor incompatible either directly 
or by necessary implication with any written 
law for the time being in force".
If no native law and custom is applicable to any 
particular matter in controversy, "the court shall be 
governed by the principles of natural justice, equity and 
good conscience”.
The designation of Islamic law as native law and
2
custom has been confirmed by judicial and academic
3
■ authority". The 1963 Nigerian Federal Constitution
Zi
refers to "Moslem law or other customary law". As already
mentioned there has been protests against the lumping of
5Islamic law with customary law, and it is significant 
that the Federal Constitution 1979* speaks of "Islamic 
law and customary law", thereby recognizing that Islamic 
law is not customary law. In view of this it is questionable
1. No. 6 of 1956, Cap. 78, Laws of Northern Nigeria, S.2;
See also High Court Law, Cap. 49, Laws of Northern
Nigeria, 1963 Revision, S.2.
2. See Adesubokan v. Yinusa [1973] 3 U.I.L.R.22., where
the Supreme Court stated that the definition of native
law and custom in Northern Nigeria includes Moslem Law. 
See also Ayoola and Ors. v. Folawiva and 0rs.ri942] 8 
W.A.C.A. 39.
3. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, o£.cit.,pp.171-183. 
Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit.. p.xxiv; Keay 
and Richardson, The Native and Customary Courts of 
Nigeria, op.cit.. p.228; Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian 
Family Law, op.cit..pp.21-22; In this respect see the 
recommendations of the Area Courts Reform Committee, 
1976; see further, .above, Chapter II, p. 189, n.3.
4. See Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1963; Item 23, 
Exclusive Legislative List, cf. Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, Item 58 which speaks 
of "Islamic law and customary law".
5. See above Chapter II, p. 189, n.3.
6. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
footnote continued ............ ..
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whether it can now be said that Islamic law is de jure 
customary law..
C. The Nature of Islamic Law in Nigeria
Ruxton asserts that "with no exception, every
Muhammadan in British West Africa belongs to the Maliki
School and it is that law which alone prevails”.^ How
true this assertion may be for the whole of Nigeria is 
2
debatable, but it is the consensus of opinion that the
Maliki School generally applies in the Northern States.
Thus Lord Lugard, in his Political Memoranda, notes that
there are many schools of Moslem Jurisprudence founded on
the Koran, but the Maliki Code is the one adopted by the
3
Moslems of the Northern Provinces.
Mention has already been made of the fact that
A
there are various schools of Islamic law. One of these
schools, the Sunni School, has four sub-schools, the
second in point of time of which was founded by the
scholar Malik ibn Anas, who developed Islamic law and
5practice in Medina, and is the author of the first com- 
prehensive law book to survive. His School is predominant
7
in Upper Egypt, North and West Africa, including Nigeria.
8The school was founded in the second century. The law
Footnote 6 continued 1979, Item 58 Exclusive Legislative
 List, Second Schedule, Part I.
1. Ruxton, Maliki Law, op.cit., p.vi.
2. See Trimmingham, Islam in West Africa, op.cit., pp.230- 
232, for a brief description of the Ahmadiyya: a modern 
Islamic Missionary movement which was first introduced 
into Nigeria in 1916; see also Ashodi v. Ashodi [1963]
2 All N.L.R. 214 where the defendant was allegedly 
married under Yoruba Islamic law and custom pertaining 
to the Ahmadiyya; see Edward G.S. Parrinder, Religion 
in an African City, (London: Oxford University Press.
195357'pp176-86.
3. See Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit,.. p.92; Report 
of the Native Courts. Western Provinces. Commission of 
Enquiry. 1952. p.18; Sharia Court of Appeal Law. 1960.
Cap. 122, S.15. See also Apatira and Anor. v. Akanke
T1944] 17 N.L.R. 149; cf. Ayoola and Ors. v. Folawiyo 
and Ors.r1942] 8 W.A.C.A., 39.
4. See above, Chapter II, p. 192.
Footnotes 5, 6, 7 and 8 continued........
1 2
actually applied in the Native Courts in the Northern 
States is not the pure Islamic law contained in the Maliki 
Code, but an admixture of indigenous customary law and 
Islamic principles. Various writers have attested to the 
mixed nature of Islamic laws applied in West Africa.
Anderson points out that "in some localities Islamic law 
has become as inextricably combined with indigenous law 
as has Arabic with the indigenous language in Kiswahili".'*' 
Trimmingham observes that in West Africa, "social life is
ruled primarily by custom often in contradiction to the .
2
absolute laws of Islam". Lord Lugard, in his instructions 
to political officers observes:
"The administration of Moslem Law is modified by the 
local law and custom in Pagan Districts, provided that 
by so doing the Judge does not directly oppose the 
teaching of the Koran. There is no doubt that even 
in Moslem Districts, the.law, as administered today, 
especially in the Emir’s Judicial Councils, is often 
modified by recognition of the Native law and custom 
which has been much influenced by the system the 
Fulani found in operation at the time of their 
conquest"
Traditionally, Islamic Jurists have always taken 
full cognizance of the force and validity of customs. "That 
which is established by custom is also regarded as established 
by the law",^ provided the custom is not opposed to a clear
Footnotes 5, 6, 7 and 8 continued........
5. See Alfred Guillaume, Islam (London: Penguin Books, 
reprint, 1977), P P  *94, 102; R.K. Wilson. Anglo-.
Muhammadan Law. 5th edition (London: Thacker, Spink &
Co., 1921), p.11.
6. Guillaume, op.cit., p.102.
7. Guillaume, Islam, op.cit., p.102; Vesey-FitzGerald, 
Muhammadan Law: An Abridgement, according to its Various 
Schools (London: Oxford University Press. 1951).p p .15-14.
8. See Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, op.cit., p.26.
1. Anderson, Islamic Laws in Africa, op.cit., pp.3-4.
2. Trimmingham, Islam in West Africa, op.cit., p.126.
3. Lugard, Political Memoranda, op.cit., p.92.
4. Jung, op.cit., p.iii.
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text of the Koran or of an authentic tradition. A custom 
which is immemorial, continuous, certain, reasonable and 
consistent with the Koranic injunctions will always, be 
upheld.^
It is therefore not as strange as at first sight
it may seem that in Nigeria Islamic law is generally
included under the provisions concerning the application
2
of "native law and custom". Even in Maiduguri, which is
3
essentially a Moslem town, observance of local customs 
in marriage and family life is not insignificant. Inter­
viewees in Maiduguri stated that customary law is generally 
followed, except where the practice is forbidden by Islam, 
but in fact customary and Islamic law principles are so 
interwoven that many of the younger generation of Moslems 
there would have considerable difficulty in assigning the 
rules to one or the other system of law. For example, the 
simple method of marriage permitted by Islamic law is not 
generally followed by Nigerian Moslem communities, and the 
tendency is towards a fusion of the civil contract with 
indigenous social and religious rites. The legal essentials 
of offer and acceptance of marriage, in the presence of 
witnesses are observed, but in addition, elaborate social 
celebrations which vary considerably in different tribes 
and areas, and which are customary in origin,are also 
performed.
1. Ibid.. p.iii: Abdur Rahim, on.cit.. p.55.
2. See Native Courts Law, 1956; Cap. 78, Laws of Northern 
Region of Nigeria, 1965 Revision, S.2 which provides 
that "native law and custom includes Moslem Law".
See also Federal Constitution, 1965, Item 25
Exclusive Legislative List; Zaidan v. Mohssen [1973] 
N.M.L.R., 427; [1973] All N.L.R. 86, where it was stated 
that customary law includes Moslem law. Compare 
Surah v. Sagnia [1956] 1 W.A.L.R. 97, a Gambian case, 
where Islamic law was.treated as customary law.
5. Trimmingham notes that Sokoto and Maiduguri are Moslem 
towns in the same way as Fez or Tripoli; see Islam in 
West Africa, op.cit.. p.126.
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This fusion of Islamic law and local customary 
law, insofar as it relates to marriage and family life, 
is one of the reasons why the position of women under 
Islamic law of marriage, does not differ greatly from 
that of women married under indigenous customary law.'*’
D. Persons to whom Islamic law applies
Generally, Islamic personal law only applies to
Moslems. This is so even in the Northern Emirates where
2
the population is predominantly Moslem.
"Any person who professes the religion of Islam, 
in other words, accepts the unity of God and the 
prophetic character of Mohammed is a Moslem and 
is subject to the Musulman law".^
A person may be a Moslem by birth to Moslem parents, or by 
4conversion.'
In the Sudan, persons who preserve to some extent 
their own customary laws, even when these are inconsistent 
with the provisions of Islamic law, for example, persons 
who marry more than four wives without a divorce, or 
practise levirate marriage, but who nevertheless accept
5
the above basic religious tenets, are considered Moslems.
1. See Alan Lethbridge, West Africa the Elusive, (London: - 
John Bale, Sons and Danielsson Ltd., N.D.), p.233 who 
notes that "Mohammedanism is far more easy of assimilation 
by the Pagan than Christianity".
2. See Map 8, Chapter I, p. 194.
3* Ameer Ali, op.cit.. p.22; Narantakath v. Parakkal [1922]
45 Madras, 986; Asaf A.A. Fyzee, Cases in the Muhammadan 
Law of India and Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon 
Press,1965}, p.57; Abdur Rahim, op.cit.. pp.248-249.
4. Abraham v. Abraham [1863] 9 M.I.A.199, 239-240; Fyzee 
Cases, p.39, 46-47; Chandrashekharappa v. Government of 
Mysore, A.I.R. [1959J Mysore, 26.
5. Farran, Matrimonial Laws of the Sudan, op.cit.,
Po 36.
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The position is the same in Nigeria. In Lawal v«
Younan, the deceased who had nine wives was described
as a "strict Moslem and an Alhaji". His status as a
Moslem was not disputed, although the legality of some
of his marriages was regarded as doubtful by the Court.
In Nigeria, converts to Islam are Moslems, as
2
well as persons born to a Moslem father. The position 
of a child born to a Moslem mother and non-Moslem father 
is not clear. Islamic law does not permit marriage 
between a Moslem woman and a non-Moslem man, and con­
sequently, any offspring of such a union would be regarded
3
as illegitimate. The vast majority of non-Moslem women
married to Moslem men in Nigeria, convert to Islam, and
are governed by Islamic law.
In theory, Islamic law should apply to all
Moslems. In Nigeria, however, Islamic law is applied
L
territorially rather than on a personal basis. Its 
judicial application is confined mainly to the Moslem 
Emirates of the North, and its practice, at least in 
marriage and family life is not observed by Moslems who 
are indigenes of the Southern States, for example, the 
Yorubas, although some Yoruba communities are predominantly 
Moslem. It is therefore convenient to discuss the 
application of Moslem law in (1) the Northern States and 
(2) the Southern States.
(1) The Northern States
As a general statement it may be said that Islamic
1. [1959] W.R.N.L.R. 155, [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 245.
2. Information given by Alhaji Yusuf Wali of the Department 
of Islamic Studies, University of Maidugari, at an 
interview held on 12th December, 1977, at Maidugari.
5. See below, p. 14; Himat Bahadur v. Sahebzadee [1870]
14 W.R. 125; see also Ameer Alif on.cit..Vol.II. 0.235: 
Neil B. Bailee, Digest of Moohummudan Law.(1875) p.42.
4. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.,p. 222.
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law is applied to all Moslems in the Northern States, 
although as previously stated, the actual practice of the 
people is not pure classical Islamic law, but a mixture 
of Islamic law and the traditional customary law of the 
particular community. Islamic law is observed especially 
in matters concerning marriage and family life. For 
example, 106 Kanuri households were visited during field­
work for this thesis, in Maidugari and its environs. All 
the members of the households professed the Moslem religion 
and the marriage and family life of the persons interviewed 
were governed by Islamic law. Informants stated that it 
would be difficult to find a Kanuri who is not a Moslem, 
or who does not practise the Moslem law of marriage.^
There is evidence, however, that in some parts
of the Northern States customary law may be applied to
2
Moslems. For example, in Mariyama v. Sadiku E,jo, both 
parties were Moslems belonging to the Igbirra community.
The appellant was the divorced wife of the respondent, 
and she had remarried as soon as the dowry had been 
refunded to the former husband, instead of observing the 
period of chastity said to be ten months imposed by 
Igbirra customary law on a divorced woman before she can 
contract another valid marriage. A child was born to the 
divorced woman about fifteen months after she and her 
former husband last had intercourse, but less than ten 
months after the divorce. The period of chastity imposed 
on a divorced wife (idda) before she could legally remarry 
according to Islamic law was stated as ninety days by the 
Assessor, an Igbirra and also a Moslem. The divorced hus-
1. See-Report of the Area Court Reform Committee. 1976, which 
found that Area dourts try as high.as 99%.of all civil 
cases in some parts of Northern Nigeria;.95% of all 
cases, civil and criminal are tried by the Area Courts in 
the Northern States, see Adrian Collett, "Recent Legis­
lation and Reform Proposals for Customary and Area Courts 
in Nigeria", [1978] J.A.L. Vol.22, No. 2., pp.161-166.
2. [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 81.
3. The period of iddat for a divorced non-pregnant wife is 
three menstrual periods or, if the wife does not men­
struate, three months; for a non-pregnant widow four 
months and ten days. It is evident from cases brought
footnote 3 continued.  .......
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band claimed, and was awarded the child, by the Customary 
Court, in accordance with Igbirra law and custom, whereby 
a child born within ten months of a divorce belongs to 
the divorced husband. Since the parties were both Moslems, 
it was suggested that Islamic law should apply. On 
appeal it was held that
’’From their conduct throughout and from the way the 
parties both speak now it is clear that they con­
sider themselves bound by Igbirra native law and 
custom in this matter, and not by Muslim law. We 
therefore consider that Igbirra native law and 
custom is applicable” .2
The above cases mav be compared with Asiata v.
3
Goncallo, in which it was held that Islamic law should 
govern the distribution of the estate of a deceased 
resident of Lagos, who had lived all his life as a devout 
Moslem, and had plainly considered himself subject to 
Islamic law.
Islamic law is not generally applied to civil
cases involving non-Moslems in the Northern States. In
Zj.
De.jo v.Agundiwin, the parties were both Yoruba non- 
Moslems married according to customary law. The suit con­
cerned the custody of a child. The trial court said that 
in the absence of evidence on Yoruba customary law it was 
applying ’’righteousness”. The High Court held this to be 
the wrong approach. It held that the trial Court was 
required by section 20 (1) (a) of the Area Courts Edict 
to apply either the native law and custom prevailing in 
the area of the jurisdiction of the court or the law 
binding between the parties. The first duty of the court
Footnote No. 3 continued......... to the Social Welfare
Office, however, that most Moslems regard three months 
ten days as the minimum period for a divorced non­
pregnant wife. See further below, pp. 103-106.
1. Under Islamic law, the child could have belonged to the 
second husband in law, since the minimum period of 
gestation is said to be six months, see further below, 
p.74.
2. In the event, the Court refused to apply the Igbirra 
provision on the ground that although it was basically 
sound and almost in every case would be fair and just, 
in the very exceptional circumstances of this special 
case it was contrary to natural justice, equity and 
gpod conscience. See further, above Chapter I, p.
footnotes 4 and 5 continued..............
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was said to be to decide which Jaw to apply, and if it
held Yoruba law applicable, it should have made use of
Assesors. A retrial of the case was ordered.
Similarly, in Osuagwu v. Dominic Soldier,'*' the
Moslem court in Kaduna decided in accordance with Moslem
law, a civil suit in which the native law and custom of
both parties was that of Okigwe (Igbo) community. The
High Court held on appeal that section 23 (l) (a) of the
Native Courts Law, 1956, provides a court with two
alternatives, it may try the case by the native law and
custom prevailing in the area of jurisdiction of the
court, or by the native law and custom binding between the
parties. Since in Kaduna there is no law and custom which
2
prevails in the area of jurisdiction, if the Moslem Court 
tried the case, it should apply the native law and custom 
binding between the parties. The court had no power to 
determine the case by Moslem law.
•Z
In Igwe v. Garba na Alhaji, Garba, (a Moslem) 
sued Igwe (an Ibo non-Moslem) as surety for a debt owed 
by a third party. The court applied Moslem law, and after 
Garba had called two unimpeachable witnesses to support his 
claim, gave judgment for Garba, without giving Igwe an 
opportunity to rebut GarbaTs case by giving evidence, or 
calling witnesses. This procedure was correct in Moslem 
law. On Appeal, it was held that, applying section 21 (1) 
of the Area Courts Edict, no Native Law and Custom applied, 
and that the trial court should be governed by the principles 
of natural justice, equity and good conscience. It was 
further held that as Moslem law did not apply, it was not 
a Moslem case within the meaning of the Area Courts (Civil 
Procedure) Rules of 1971, and Part I of Order II did not 
apply. Being a f,non-Moslem case”, the trial court was bound
Footnotes 3 and 4 continued .......
3. [1900] 1 N.L.R. 42.
4. [1973] Suit No. J.d/29A/72, decided on 20th March, 1973 
by Reed, C.J. Benue Plateau State High Court.
lo [1959] N.R.N.L.R.- 39.
2. The area was the cosmopolitan sabon gari where most of the 
southern immigrants live when they reside in the Northern 
Emirates. Since the population is mixed there is no 
prevailing customary law0
3. [1973] Suit No. NCH/45A/72, unreported, 8 March, 1973.
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to apply Part II of Order II, and by rule 8 thereof, the 
trial court was requested to call upon Igwe to make his 
defence, and to allow him to give evidence and call 
witnesses.
In criminal law, however, before 1959, non- 
Moslems were governed by Islamic law in the Moslem Emirates 
of Northern Nigeria. In Ekpo v. Kano Native Authority,^ 
the appellant, a native of Calabar and a non-Moslem, con­
tended that the Court of the Emir of Kano had no juris­
diction to try him. It was held, inter alia, that the 
Emir of Kano's Court had jurisdiction over all persons 
who were within the area of the native authority's juris­
diction, and whose general mode of life while there was 
that of the general native community. Although the 
appellant was not a Moslem, the Court had jurisdiction 
to try him by Moslem law. Since 1959, customary criminal
law, including Islamic law, has been replaced by the Penal 
2
Code in the Northern States. Islamic criminal law as
3
such is therefore no longer applied.
The position in the Northern States may be summed 
up as follows:
(a) generally,. Islamic law applies to all Moslems, especially
in the far Northern Emirates, for example, Borno,
l±
Sokoto and Kano•
(b) if, however, there is evidence that from the conudct of 
the parties, they consider themselves to be bound by 
customary law, Islamic law will not be applied even
5
where both parties are Moslems.
1. [1957] N.R.N.L.R. 129; see also R. v. Ilorin Native Court 
ex parte Jimo Aremu [1955] 20 N.L.R. 144, where it was 
held that for criminal purposes Islamic law prevailed
in Ilorin Emirate.
2. Cap. 89, Laws of the Northern Region of Nigeria, 1963 
Revision.
3. See J.N.D. Anderson, "Islamic Law in Africa: Problems of 
Today and Tomorrow", in Changing Law in Developing 
Countries, editj by J.N.D. Anderson, op.cit.,pp.To4 et.al.
4. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Enactment) Decree, 1978, S,242 (2) which sets out the 
jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal. Cf. S.247, 
which sets out the jurisdiction of the Customary Court 
of Appeal.
3. Marivama v. Sadiku E.jo [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 81.
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(c) where both parties are non-Moslems, Islamic law does 
not apply.
(11) The Southern States
The position is very different in the Southern 
States. Anderson notes that no specifically Moslem court, 
nor any formal application of Islamic law is known through­
out the South, even in those areas where the proportion of 
Moslems is high, as for example among the Yorubas, who do 
not generally observe Islamic law in matters concerning 
marriage and family life. This phenomenon can be 
illustrated with reference to Ibadan.
In the 1953 and 1963 census, the population of
Ibadan Province was shown as 58.2 and 62.4 percent
respectively, Moslem, compared with 28.3, and 32.2 per-
2
cent Christian, and 13.5 and 5.4 of other religions. The 
percentage of Moslems may be even higher in Ibadan City 
Area. Of 1,116 marital cases examined by the present 
writer in Ibadan Customary Court Grade B, which were 
decided in 1976, 958 (85.8 percent) of the women involved 
swore on the Koran. Swearing on the Koran signified that 
formally they were Moslems, but the legal essentials and 
incidents of their marriages, as well as questions of 
divorce, paternity and the custody of children, were all 
governed by Yoruba customary law as modified by the Marriage, 
Divorce and Custody of Children Bye-Laws. In no case was 
any aspect of Islamic law cited, much less applied, even 
though the circumstances warranted such application. For
1, Osuagwu v. Dominic Soldier [1959] N.R.N.L.R. 39*
2. See Population Census of Nigeria; 1952-53, Summary 
Tables, p.9; Population Census of Nigeria. 1963, West, 
Vol.2, pp.102-124; cf. the Report of the Native Courts. 
Western Provinces. Commission of Enquiry, 1932, which 
stated that the number of Moslems in the Western Region 
is relatively small; see also Burns, History of 
Nigeria, op.cit..p.35. who asserts that Yorubas are 
still mainly pagans”. Actual number of population for 
Western Region are 21.4 and 43.4 percent Moslems in 
1952-53 and 1963 censuses respectively, compared with 
73 and 71.7 percent Moslems in the Northern Region in 
1952 and 1963 respectively.
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example, in Olade.jo Akindele v. Aduke^ the divorced husband 
sought an order of the court that his former wife, whom he 
claimed, was pregnant with his child, should remove from 
the home of her lover to her parentsf home, until such 
time as she had delivered the baby. The Judges refused 
to grant the order on the ground that, since the woman 
had divorced him and refunded his dowry, the former 
husband had no right to direct where she should live.
The judgment stated:
"The act of the Mover [plaintiff] in this motion 
is against fundamental human right. It will be 
a great injustice to curtail or curb the movement 
of the Respondent who is no more the Mover*s wife”.
This decision is contrary to Islamic law, which 
provides that the divorced husband of a pregnant wife 
has the right of control over his wife until her delivery, 
and may even require her to remain in his home during the 
period of gestation (idda). The husband also has a 
corresponding duty to maintain his divorced wife during 
this period. Since both parties were Moslems, Islamic 
law should have been applied, but was not.
The letter of the Muslim Congress of Nigeria to 
the Brook Commission stated that in Ibadan "over four 
thousand.cases of divorce, ninety-five percent of them 
between Muslims, were handled annually by two native courts 
which separated couples like dogs without regard to the 
instructions laid down by the Holy Qur*an".^ The law seems 
to be the same in other areas.
In the case of In the Estate of Aminatu Alayo,
l
Administrator General v. Tunwase. the deceased woman was
1. [1976] Suit No. M/481/76,•unreported, Customary Court
Grade.B. No. 4, Mapo Ibadan, 23 Oct. 1976.
2. see Jung, op.cit.,pxxviii; Ruxton, op .cit., p.142 and 
see further, below, pp. 68-70.
3. See Anderson,' Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit*« pp.222-223: 
The Brooke Commissions were appointed m  1948 to inves­
tigate the position with regard to Native Courts in 
Nigeria and to make recommendations.
4. [1946] 18 N.L.R. 88; see also S.A. Adesanya, "Marriage 
According to the Local Islamic Rites of Southern 
Nigeria", Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, Vol.2, 
1968, pp.26-33: Anderson Islamic Law in Africa, “op.cit., 
pp.222-224; Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, .op.cit., p.277
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an Ijebu (Yoruba), and a Moslem. There was evidence that 
she was married according to Moslem rites and had lived 
and died a Moslem. There had been no divorce, although the 
deceased and her husband had lived apart for forty-five 
years before her death. Brooke, J., declared that he could 
find no evidence either of practice or of one occasion in 
which an Ijebu who married according to Moslem rites, and 
died without issue and intestate, had his or her property 
distributed in accordance with Islamic law. The learned 
Judge said:
"There has been nothing to satisfy me that any local 
Mohammedan law or custom should be applied. No such 
custom has been established with regard to converts 
to Mohammedanism in this particular area and it is 
well known that in cases brought before the court 
such local custom (as found among the adherents 
elsewhere in the Yoruba country but not in Ijebu 
land) differs fundamentally from principles usually 
observed in Islam: the law of the religion of any 
person is that law subject to any special custom 
recognized and adopted by co-religionists in that 
area and there is no evidence as to this” .^
The Judge concluded that the law applicable was 
Ijebu native law and custom, since the deceased woman was 
a native of Ijebu and had lived there.
Similarly, the Report of the Native Courts, 
Western Provinces Commission of Enquiry, (1952), states:
"There is no personal religious law in this country 
and strictly the customary law is that prevailing 
in the area of Jurisdiction of the Court. It has 
been accepted, however, that there is a personal 
law to the extent that where there is a conflict 
of law the custom to be followed is that applicable 
to the particular cause and the parties to it,.... 
there is no fixed set of rules observed by a Muslim 
community and decisions in the Courts have shown 
that among the Yoruba there may be adherents of the 
religion but the local customary law is observed"^
1. Alayo v. Tunwase [1946] 18 N.L.R. 88.
2. Report of - the Native Courts. Western Provinces. 
Commission of Enquiry, 1952. p.l8. The Commission 
refused to recommend a Moslem Judiciary (Sharia) for 
Southern Nigeria. They also held that the Maliki Code 
of the North has never been in force in the South.
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From the above evidence it may be said that 
Islamic law relating to marriage and family life does not 
generally apply to Yoruba Moslems in the Southern States.
The number of Moslems who are natives of the 
other Southern communities is insignificant and, like the 
Yorubas, most of them do not observe Islamic law in their 
personal relationships.
3. Polygamy in Islamic Law
A. Polygamy in classical Islamic law
Prior to Islam, there was no legal limit to the
number of wives an Arab could take. As already noted, in
ancient Arabia, a man usually had several wives, and in
addition a number of concubines. The marital relationship
was characterised by frequency of divorce, loose unions and
promiscuity, which sometimes made it difficult to draw a
2
line between marriage and prostitution. In order to
remedy this unlimited licensed promiscuity, Muhammad is
said to have limited the number of wives to a maximum of
four. The Koranic injunction reads:
,!And if ye are apprehensive that ye shall not deal 
fairly with orphans, then, of other women who seem 
good in your eyes, marry but two, or three, or four: 
and if ye still fear that ye shall not act equitably, 
then one only; or the slave whom ye have acquired: 
this will make justice on your part easier.
This is the only verse in the Koran which deals 
with the question of polygamy.^ As seen, it occurs only 
in connection with the treatment of orphans, and the question 
may be asked whether polygamy is permitted except when the
1. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit., pp.222-224.
2. See Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit.. p.7.
see also Jung, op.cit., pp.xxxi-xxxiv..
3. Rodwell, The Koran. Sura, IV., V.3; see also Schacht,
An Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit..p. 162; a man 
who is already married to a free wife may not marry a 
woman who is a slave.
4. See Kurshid Ahmad, Studies in the Family Law of.
Islam, p.62.
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protection of the rights of orphans is involved? Moslem 
jurists disagree as to the legality of polygamy in Islamic 
law. ■
Ameer Ali asserts:
"There is great difference of opinion among the followers 
of Islam regarding the extent to which polygamy or, 
more properly speaking, polygyny is tolerated or 
allowed in the Islamic system. An influential and 
growing section holds that the conditions under 
which it was permitted are so difficult of com­
pliance that they amount to a virtual prohibition 
and that the circumstances which rendered it per­
missible in primitive times having either passed 
away or not existing in modern times, the practice 
of polygamy is in contravention of the law".
Similarly, Abdur Rahim observes:
"The Muhammadan law undoubtedly contemplates 
monogamy as the ideal to be aimed at, but concedes 
to a man the right to have more than one wife, not 
exceeding four, at one and the same time, provided 
he is able to deal with them on a footing of equality 
and Justice".2
In the opinion of many jurists, the latter 
provision makes the practice of polygamy virtually 
impossible. Thus Syed says:
"Now, let me state as emphatically as I can that 
polygamy is not a part of Islam; or to put it a 
little differently, it is as much a part of the 
Islamic system as any other disagreeable institution 
common in the West is a part of Christianity"
He considers the Koranic injunction about poly­
gamy mere toleration of an existing and extravagant custom, 
and says that the condition attached is so stringent that 
it virtually amounts to a prohibition, since the passage 
of the Koran does not signify mere equality of treatment 
in the matter of1lodgement and maintenance *, as some of 
the archaic schools of law have construed,-but also
1. Ameer Ali, op.cit., p. 159.
2. Abdur Rahmin, op.cit..pp. 327-328.
3. Ameer Ali (Syed) The Legal Position of Women in Islam 
(London, University of London Press, 1912), pp.25-2b.
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complete equality in love, affection and esteem, an 
impossible provision in practical terms.^
The views of the majority of Moslem jurists, 
however, are expressed in this sentiment of Jung’s:
’’Monogamy may be an ideal, but polygamy remains 
a lawful institution recognized by the law all 
over the Muslim world, in Arabia, Egypt and 
other parts of Muslim Africa, in China, India 
and other countries inhabited by the Muslims”,2
Most jurists, however, agree that polygamy is 
permissible, not mandatory. ”It is not specifically 
forbidden, nor is it contrary to the essence of marriage 
that a man should have only one wife".
The reasons advanced by Moslem writers for the 
prohibition or restriction of polygamy by the Prophet
3
Muhammad, who himself did not observe such restrictions, 
was the desire to improve the position of women, of 
orphans, and of the weak in general, to restrict the
Zf
laxity of sexual morals, and to strengthen the marriage tie. 
These reasons seem strange when it is considered that, 
although the number of wives was limited, the number of con­
cubines or "slave wives" was not. Muir notes that, "as 
regards female slaves with whom (irrespective of his four
wives), a Moslem may, without antecedent ceremony or any
5
guarantee of continuance, cohabit, there is no limit".
1. Ibid.,pp.28-29; In Itwari v. Asghari [i960] A.I.R., 
Allahabad, 684; Fyzee, Cases N0T17, p.188; Dhavan, J., 
held that, in India, the Islamic institution of polygamy 
was "tolerated but not encouraged". He refused to grant 
a husband who had married a second wife a decree of 
restitution of conjugal rights against his first wife 
who refused to live with him,on the ground that under 
the social conditions of India today, the taking of a 
second wife must be regarded as an insult to the first 
wife, which was likely to cause her mental suffering 
and affect her health. See also Badruddin v. Aisha 
Begum [1957] All L.J. 500; and Shahulameedu v. Subaida 
Beevi [1970] K.L.T.4, where polygamy was described as 
*’-fche rather ..unholy practice of a conjugal quadrangle".
2. Jung, op .cit., pp.xxxi-xxxiii. The M ’utazalas are 
strict monogamists.
5. The Prophet is reported as having as many as nine wives 
at the same time, see Bello Daura, "The Limit of poly­
gamy in Islam, 5 Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law. 
1969, pp.21-26 at p .£4; see also,Ameer Ali. The Spirit 
of Islam, or The Life and Teachings of Mohammed 
(Calcutta: Lahiri and Co., 1902).
4. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit..p.13.
Footnote 5 continued...............
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Some jurists even argue that these "slave, wives” were
legally married, since any offspring of such unions was
legitimate.^"
In addition, the Koran expressly provides that
if a man ”be desirous to exchange one wife for another,”
provided he gives the discarded wife the dowry he had
given, or promised to give to her at the time of the
2
marriage, he may do so. It is difficult, therefore, to 
see how the marriage tie could be strengthened by the 
restriction of the legal wives to four, except among the 
very poor classes.
Among those jurists who claim that polygamy is 
legal in Islamic law, there is disagreement as to the 
validity of a fifth marriage, or further polygamous 
marriages where none of the first four marriages has 
been validly dissolved. Jung maintains that it is a 
"fundamental doctrine of Moslem law that a man cannot
have more than four wives. If he desires to marry another
3
woman then he must divorce one of the four”. He cites 
various authorities to show that a convert to Islam who 
had five or more wives in ancient Arabia, was obliged to 
divorce all, except four, and that according to Muhommad 
and Zafar, the man is at liberty to select any four out 
of the number of his wives, but according to Imam Abu
Hanifa, Shafi, Malik and Hanbal, the first four marriages
4
are valid, and the rest should be separated. A fifth 
wife is therefore expressly prohibited to a man whose four
Footnote 5 continued........  William Muir, The Life of
Mahomet (From Original Sources, 3rd. edit. (London: 
Smith, Elder and Co. 1894), P*323; Anderson, Islamic 
Law in Africa, op.cit.,p.25.
1. Adesanya, "Marriage According to the Local Islamic 
Rites", op.cit., p. 31.
2. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit.. Sura IV, 24, at p.413.
3. Jung, op.cit.-.p.23; Russel and Suhrawardy, op.cit., 
p.19, par. 55.
4. Jung, op.cit., p.24
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legally married wives are alive at the. relevant time.
”If a man marries five women consecutively then 
_the marriages of the first four are valid and 
the fifth one is void, hut if a man marries five 
woman (sic) by one contract then all of them are 
invalid”.
Jung attributes the confusion surrounding the 
legality of the marriage of a fifth wife to an indis­
criminate use of the words batil and fasid. Some jurists 
have used them synonymously. But in legal terms, batil 
signifies that no legal results follow, and that the 
transaction is void, ab initio, while fasid denotes an 
act which is not wholly devoid of legal consequences.
In a batil marriage, there is no dower or idda;- nor is 
parentage established, while in a fasid marriage, after 
cohabitation, idda and a customary dower become obligatory. 
If cohabitation has not taken place, then no legal results
follow. In a batil marriage, whether cohabitation has
2
taken place or not, there are no legal consequences.
Jung argues convincingly that the marriage 
of a fifth wife during the iddat of a fourth wife is 
quite distinct from the marriage of a fifth wife during 
the life-time of the four legally married wives. Both 
marriages are not unlawful, but while the former is fasid, 
the latter is absolutely void, that is, batil. He 
criticises the erroneous conclusion of Ameer Ali who treats 
the contract of marriage with a fifth wife as fasid only, 
and says that such a view is not supported by any authority.
Zi
In Aizunnisa Khatoon v. Karimunnisa Khatoon,
1. Jung, op.cit.,p.24, quoting Fatawa Kazi Khan; see 
also Ruxton, op.cit., p.99.
2. Jung, op.cito, pp.24-27; Fyzee, op.cit., p.112; Abdur 
Rahim, op.cit., p.530; Cf. Farran, o p .cit.f pp.52 and 
158; he translates batil as irregular and fasid as 
meaning absolutely void.
5. Jung, p.26; see also S.A. Adesanya, "Marriage According 
to the Local Islamic Rites of Southern Nigeria”,
Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law. 1988, Vol.2, 
p.2b, who, following Fyzee, argues that marriage to a 
fifth wife is only fasid; Cf. Bello Daura, ”The Limit 
of Polygamy in Islam”, Journal of Islamic and Comparative 
Law, Vol.5, pp.21-26, who argues to the contrary.
4. [1895] 1 A.25, Cal.150; see also Lawall v. Younan [1959]
W.R.N.L.Ro 155, where the Supreme Court of Nigeria,
footnote 4 continued.............
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the Calcutta High Court observed, that
"the authorities are indeed agreed in saying that a 
marriage with a fifth wife during the iddat of the 
fourth after divorce is not void, but invalid only, 
but that is clearly intended to be an exception to 
the rule that a marriage with a fifth wife, while 
four other wives are in existence and none of them 
have been divorced, is absolutely void."^
B. Polygamy among Moslems in Northern Nigeria
Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the 
Koranic injunction in r.egard to polygamy, in Northern 
Nigeria, possession of many wives confers social prestige, 
and many Moslem men marry not only the four wives allegedly 
permitted by the Koran, but also many additional wives, 
who are, however, referred to as "concubines".
Before the abolition of domestic slavery in 
Nigeria, concubines were slaves. Three of the former wives 
of the late Shehu of Bornu were interviewed during field­
work in Maidugari. They all described themselves as 
"concubines" or "servants" of the Shehu. They claimed that 
they were seized by order of the Shehu while they were 
children of about six to eight years old, and married to 
the Shehu as concubines. They grew up in his palace, and 
two of them had children for him. After his death, they 
were married off to other men. One of them married three 
husbands after the Shehu*s death, but they all returned 
to the Shehu*s palace after they were divorced by their 
husbands. They explained that this was due to the fact 
that they never knew who their natural parents were, and 
regarded the Shehu and his first legal wife (Gumsu) as 
their father and mother. They all preferred the Shehu 
as a husband than any of the other men they had married.
Footnote 4 continued........ expressed the opinion, obiter
dicta, that only four of the nine wives of a "strict'* 
deceased Moslem could be lawful wives, although the 
Court did not sav which four. See also Lawall v.
Younan [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 254 at 251.
1. See S.F. Nadel, Black Byzantium, 1942, 1965, p.151;
Adesanya, op.cit., p. 54. "
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At the time of the interview they were living in an 
adjunct of the palace, and were being maintained by the 
Shehu*s heir in office.
Although slavery has been officially abolished,1
many Moslem men, especially the wealthy and influential
2
ones, continue to marry more than four wives. The 
additional wives are described as slave wives, but they 
are in fact not slaves,^ or the descendants of slaves.
In one compound visited in Maidugari, the head 
of the household, an Upper Area Court Judge, had, in 
addition to his four legal wives, several other wives, 
described as "servants’*, nearly all of whom had borne 
children by him. These "servant wives" were not permitted 
to stand in the presence of the legal first wife. They 
had to assume a crouching position while she gave them 
her orders. One of these "servants" appeared extremely 
young: although she must have been about fifteen years 
old, since she already had a child, yet in appearance she 
seemed not more than twelve. The legal wives were in khul,^ 
but the "servant wives" were not.
The level of polygamy among Northern Moslems is 
still very high, and there is no sign of a significant 
decrease in the near future, since it is the educated and 
wealthy men who set the standard in marrying several wives.
1. See the Slavery Ordinance, 1916, (as amended in 1936) 
abolished the legal status of slavery in the whole of 
Nigeria. Slave Dealing Ordinance, No. 1 of 1874 
Section 2 which applied to the Colony and Protectorate, 
declared dealing in slaves unlawful.
2. The Penal Code Law of the Northern States, S.384, 
provides that "Whoever having a husband or wife living 
marries in any case in which such marriage is void by 
reason of its taking place during the life of such hus­
band or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to seven years and shall also 
be liable to fine". If the view is taken that the 
marriage of a fifth wife by a Moslem man who already 
has four wives is void, a Moslem man who contracts such 
a fifth marriage may be punished under this section.
3. See Trimmingham, op.cit.. p.168; Nadel, o£.cit.,pp.151- 
154. J.N.D. Anderson,"The Eclipse of the Patriarchal 
Family in Contemporary Islamic Law}’ in Family Law in , 
Asia and Africa, edit. J.N.D. Anderson, 1968, p.233-
women who occupy the legal position of slave con­
cubines", are still found in Northern Nigeria.
4. For the meaning of khul, see below, p. 59.
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This is the reverse of the position in the South, where 
very few educated or wealthy men opt for simultaneous 
polygamy. A gross disparity in the relative ages of the 
spouses is also more noticeable in the Moslem areas of 
the Northern States than it is in the South. This is due 
to the fact that a Moslem father has the legal right to 
dictate the choice of spouse for his daughter, and Moslem 
women, being less educated than the women in the Southern 
States are less vocal about their rights, and more amenable 
to parental discipline. They accept with resignation that 
a good Moslem girl ought to marry the man chosen for her 
by her parents, and, as a result, there is a greater 
tendency for fathers to marry their young daughters to
very old but wealthy men as second or additional wives.
2
Isa Shani notes that it is "extremely doubtful 
whether there is a woman in the North who is in favour 
of having a co-wife". However, many of the older wives 
of polygamous households interviewed in Maiduguri reported 
a preference for polygamy. This was more apparent among 
the wives who were in seclusion, as there was greater 
fraternity among co-wives. The majority of women inter­
viewed preferred monogamous marriages, and a few educated 
younger women were forceful in their assertions that they 
would not tolerate a co-wife, regardless of the status or 
wealth of the husband. Many wives had quarrelled with and 
left their husbands when they had taken second wives.
Barkow views polygamy as a sort of social 
insurance against the desertion of a wife, since
"a woman with thoughts of home must consider leaving
her husband in the hands of a rival. And though
some co-wives get along well and some even request
their husbands to marry again in the hope of reducing
their share of the household labor, rivalry among
wives is more common".,3
1. For example, during the writer!s stay in Maiduguri, a 
high ranking education officer about sixty years of age 
was married to a girl in her early teens. This is 
typical of the general pattern of marriage among members 
of the upper strata of society.
2. Ma'ajl Isa Shani, "Divine Revelation and Custom in the 
Islamic Law of Divorce", Journal of the Centre of Islamic 
Legal Studies, Vol.l, No. 1, pp. 36-49.
3. Jerome Barkow, "Hausa Women and Islam", op.cit., p.322.
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He notes that the Hausa word for co-wife, kishiya. 
derived as it is from the term kishi, jealousy, tells 
much about the relationship among rival wives"
Polygamy among poorer Moslems showed a different 
pattern to that practised by the upper echelon of the social 
ladder. Because of economic circumstances, many men cannot 
afford simultaneous polygamy, and their efforts to emulate 
the wealthier men, and to fulfil what they regard as a 
religious duty, are translated into frequent changes of 
wives. Many cases are recorded of men marrying two or 
more wives, when financially they are incapable of main­
taining even one. A wife who is kept in relative luxury 
would be tolerant of the tantrums of a co-wife, but where 
she is deprived of basic essentials such as food and 
clothing, there is no incentive for her to remain in a 
polygynous household.
Disenchantment with marriage leads to promiscuity 
and marital instability© Nadel observes of Nupe society:
"This classbound polygamy deeply affects the sex 
morality of the women and, indirectly, of the 
society at large. Respect for chastity and the 
sanctity of matrimonial ties dominates the 
traditional moral concepts of Nupe. But this 
double morality of a social system which legitimizes 
unrestricted sexual desire of the men in one 
privileged stratum, but would force similar desires 
in other strata into the realm of illegitimate and 
indictable action, is in danger of defeating itself.
In Bida it has clearly provided a strong stimulus 
to extra marital sex relations in all classes"^
Immorality in the community results in frequent 
changes of spouses among the poorer men, especially in 
urban areas, and is evidenced by the number of marriages 
an average person contracts. It is difficult to find many 
women over forty years of age who have only been married 
once. The fifty-two women interviewed in Maiduguri during 
field-work reported a total of 152 marriages, which means
1. See also Yeld, A Study of the Social position of Women, 
op.cit..p.6?.
2. Nadel, A Black Bzyantium, op.cit.. p. 152.
that each woman on average married 2.6 times.
Data from Zaria suggest that on the average,
Hausa women marry three or four times each.^*
The average number of times, individual men
2
marry is nearly double this figure. In 1969, Barkow 
found that twenty-three percent of the men in a small Hausa 
Moslem community were polygynous,^ but a survey in Kano 
revealed that of all the married men in the survey area,
64.9 percent had one wife, 27.6 percent had two wives,
5.9 percent had three wives and 1.5 percent had four wives. 
The percentage of polygynous husbands was therefore 35 
percent.
Among the Kanuri, Cohen notes that one out of
5
every two marriages is a polygynous one.
More revealing are the figures recorded by 
Hardiman in a survey carried out in Maiduguri in August 
1974, which showed that of 149 women married to men from 
more than six tribal groups, 91 of the women had no co-wife, 
34 had one co-wife, 14 had two co-wives, and 10 had three 
co-wives; 38.9 percent of all the women interviewed were 
therefore in polygamous marriages. The two main tribal 
groups of the husbands of the women interviewed were the 
Kanuri (66) and the Hausa (32). Of the women married to 
Kanuri men, 40.9 percent of them lived in polygamous house­
holds, while only 28.1 percent of the Hausa shared their 
husbands.^ These figures may be compared with the 11 women
1. See M.G. Smith, The Hausa of Northern Nigeria, op.cit., 
p. 143. For Kano see Polly Hill, Population, Prosperity 
and Poverty: Rural Kano, 1900 and 1970 (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), pp.113-115; see also M.G.Smith, 
Government in Zazzau, 1800-1950. op.cit.. p.256.
2. See Table 9:1 and 9:2 below, pp. 93 and 94.
3. Barkow, nHausa Women and Islam”, op.cit., p.322; see 
also Hill, op.cit., pp.113-115.
4. See M-.Jo Mortimore and J. Wilson, Land and People in the 
Kano Close Settled Zone; A Survey of £ome Aspects of 
Rural Economy in ~bhe iJngogo District, itano ProvinceTop. 
cit., p.39; See also"Yeld, A Study of the Social 
Position of Women, op.cit.,p. 98 who reports that in 
Kebbi Village of Felende, out of 183 marriages inves­
tigated in 1959, 142 men had only 1 wife, 37 men had
2 wives, 3 men had 3 wives and 1 man had 4 wives.
5. See Ronald Cohen, The Kanuri of Bornu; Case Studies in 
Cultural Anthropology.(New York: Holt, Rinehart and
footnotes 5 and 6 continued..........
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interviewed who were married to Iho/Yoruba husbands, none 
of whom had a co-wife.'1' As will be shown later in the 
section on divorce, Kanuri marriages are not only 
characterised by a high degree of polygamy, but an extremely 
high rate of divorce and remarriage among both sexes.
The argument that prostitution does not exist
in a polygamous society has been fully explored in an
2
earlier chapter, but further evidence to rebut this 
proposition is available in the Northern Moslem societies.
In spite of the high rate of polygamy there, prostitution 
is still rife. As Baba of Karo, an old Hausa woman notes:
"Some prostitutes were the daughters of mallams, some 
were the daughters of noblemen, some were the daughters 
of commoners; if their parents had arranged marriages 
for them against their will they ran away- and became 
prostitutes. Then and now, it*s the same; there have 
always been prostitutes"
Of the men who patronize these prostitutes she says :
"The men were always coming, they had wives, they 
had their concubines, then they went out and had 
prostitutes too".^
This is not only typical of Hausa society where traditionally
prostitution was ritualised in the Bori cult, but also of
5
other Moslem communities in the North.
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued.
3.... Winston, 1967), p.43; see also Ronald Cohen, Dominance 
and Defiance: A Study of Marital Instability in an 
Islamic African Society,,(Washington: American Anthrop- 
ological Association, 1971), pp.142-143.
6. These figures can also be compared to the rate of poly­
gamy among the Southern communities in Nigeria, dis­
cussed above, see Chapter IV, pp. 339-347.
1. See Margaret Hardiman, Women in Maiduguri,(Report of a 
Survey carried out on behalf of the Max Lock Group,
Nigeria, 1974), Chapter 6, Part 7, p.11. Table 5.
2. See above, Chapter IV, pp. 332-333.
3. M.F. Smith, Baba of-Karo: A Woman of the Muslim Hausa. 
op.cit.,p .b3; see also M.G. Smith,"The Hausa of_Northern 
Nigeria," in Peoples of Africa, edit, by James Trlbbs, op. 
cit., p.143. .......
4. M.F. Smith, op.cit., p.64.
5. See e.g. Nadel, A Black Byzantium, op.cit., pp.152-155, for 
prostitution among the Nupe A survey of Maidugari 
carried out by the Social Welfare Department in 1970 
estimated that there were about 7,000 prostitutes in
footnote 5 continued............
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It is true that a large number of the prostitutes 
found in the North are from the Southern States, but a 
Moslem woman who may be too ashamed to practise her trade 
among her own people may also migrate to other Northern 
States, or to Lagos, where she is assured of anonymity in 
the cosmopolitan population of the larger towns.
Illicit sexual relations are not confined to 
prostitution. Many cases of seduction of young unmarried 
girls are recorded in the Social Welfare Office in MaidugariJ 
In some of these cases the seducers are well-placed older 
men who invariably are already married to several wives.
Extra marital relations, even with a consenting adult un­
married woman, is absolutely forbidden by Islamic law, and 
(unlike the Criminal Code Act of the Southern States) is a 
criminal offence under the Penal Code Law, 1960,^ of 
Northern Nigeria. In practice, however, evidence seems to 
indicate that the law is not vigorously enforced.
Footnote 5 continued.........Maiduguri at that time
according to information extracted from the tax lists 
of Ward Heads. But the survey carried out by the Max 
Lock Group (Nigeria), in July-Sept., 1973, estimated 
that there were about 1,456 prostitutes in Maiduguri. 
Given an estimated female population of about 43,000 
over fifteen years of age, this figure means that one 
in every six women was a prostitute.
It was suggested that the discrepancy in the two 
estimates may have been due to the fact that shortly 
before the second survey, prostitutes were rounded 
up and driven out of town, as their presence was 
connected with the drought afflicting the area. 
Although, probably, the majority quickly returned, 
this incident may have made them less willing to 
declare their occupation - see The Reuort on the 
Household Survey, 1973: The Domestic Group in 
Maiduguri, Part 7, Chapter 4, par. 203.
1. Cap. 89, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 Revision, ss.
387 and 388. Section 387 provides:
"Whoever, being a man subject to any native law or 
_custom in which extra-marital sexual intercourse 
is recognised as a criminal offence, has sexual 
intercourse with a person who is not and whom he 
knows or has reason to believe is not his wife, 
such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence 
of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery and 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which 
may extend to two years or with fine or with both".
In Obeya v. Soluade and Solicitor General for Benue
footnote 1 continued
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For example, in a complaint^ brought to the 
Social Welfare Department, it was alleged that a seventeen 
years old girl had been seduced by a doctor, on the pretext 
that he would cure her of her illness- As a result of their 
association she became pregnant. The doctor persistently 
denied paternity, but was forced to admit that the child was 
his when blood tests revealed that he, the girl, and the 
child were all group N. He eventually signed an agreement 
to pay £3 per month for the maintenance of the child until 
such time as the boy was old enough to be taken care of by 
him. The girl married someone else, but was divorced after 
only eighteen months. In desperation,she again sought the 
help of the Social Officers. She reported that she was 
divorced because of her "disclaimed child", and that she 
wanted the doctor to take his child so that she could 
marry again without having to face the same problem she had 
with her first husband.
2
Another complaint involved an employee of the 
Ministry of Works and Survey. A girl who went to him for 
help in finding a job was seduced by him, and as a result 
became pregnant. When she wrote him about her condition, 
he refused to answer her letters, but when approached by 
Social Welfare Officers, he admitted his relation with the 
girl.
In neither of these two cases, nor in any of the 
many others recorded, was any mention made of a criminal 
prosecution. The most the Social Welfare Officers did was 
to try to persuade the men involved to support the children 
begotten as a result of the illicit intercourse.
Many Moslem jurists adopt an apologetic attitude 
about polygamy in the Koran, and assert that it was only 
sanctioned in Islam, because, during the early days of 
Islam, the wars decimated the male population, leaving
Footnote 1 continued........Plateau State.[1970] Suit No.
125/69, unreported, 6 March, 1970, it was held that 
sections 587 and 588 of the Penal Code Law do not 
contravene the Nigerian Constitution.
1. Ref. No. SWO/F.C.W/10/7, Social Welfare Dept., Maiduguri.
2. Ref. No. SWO/F.C.W./9/5, Social Welfare Dept. Maiduguri.
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women and orphans in. need of care and protection. Abdur 
Rahim claims:
f,If we leave out of account that class of people who, 
owing to abnormal conditions of society, are not, 
generally speaking, influenced by the ideals of law 
and religion or by healthy public opinion, monogamy 
is certainly the general rule and not the exception 
among the Muhammadans while polygamy is regarded by 
them as a safeguard, however undesirable in itself 
against greater social evils” .1
Similarly Ameer Ali states
”In India hardly more than two percent of men have 
more than one wife; in Persia it is about the same, 
whilst in Turkey, polygamy is extremely rare”^
However true these observations may be for other 
Moslem communities, the position is different in Nigeria, 
where the level of polygamy is still relatively high and 
the number of wives a man has is a symbol of his prestige. 
Moslem men in the Northern States are monogamous by force 
of financial circumstances, and not by desire, and they 
justify the practice of polygamy by reference to the Koran.
Fafunwa reports that the Moslem Governor of Rabat 
was shocked when he heard that Nigerian Moslems are still 
quoting the Koran to support their practice of polygamy.
The Governor was quoted as saying that he had no objections 
to Nigerian men having many wives but they should not quote 
the Koran to justify their personal desires and wishes. He 
also allegedly said that the practice of monogamy in 
Morocco is over a hundred years old, and that if a man 
does have two wives, he will be too ashamed to advertise
Modern legislation in several Moslem societies 
in various parts of the world has set strict limits to, or
1. Abdur Rahim, op.cit., pp.340-341.
2. Ameer Ali (Syed), The Legal Position of Women in Islam, 
p. 29. .
3. See Fafunwa, "Islamic Concepts of Education with 
Particular Reference to Modern Nigeria”, op.cit., p.19.
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abolished, outright,, the practice of polygamy.1 There is 
no evidence of similar steps being taken in Northern 
Nigeria to reduce the practice of polygamy.
4. The status of women in relation to the 
formation of marriage
The status of women in relation to the formation 
of marriage is discussed under three main headings:
A. the nature and essentials of a valid marriage;
B. consents to marriage;
C. capacity to marry;
D. marriage consideration.
A. The nature and essentials of a valid marriage
Under classical Islamic law marriage (nikah) is
2 ----a contract and not a sacrament. It is an institution
ordained for the protection of society, and in order that
human beings may guard themselves from foulness and
unchastity. That it is a civil contract is manifested 
by the various ways and circumstances in and under which 
marriages are contracted or presumed to have been contracted. 
There are, however, some Moslem jurists who assert that the 
institution of marriage is not merely contractual and civil, 
but that it is a "secular contract partaking of the nature
of ibadat (religious r i t e ) " a n d  therefore that is is also
1. For example, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco. See generally Norman 
Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World. (London: The 
Athlone Press, 197b); Levy, op.cit., p. 101-102 .
2. See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit.,
p.l6l; Abdur Rahim, Principles of Muhammadan Juris­
prudence, op.cit.,pp.328-329; Fyzee, op.cit.,p.90:
Farran, op.cito,pp.47-48. See also STC. Sircar,
Mahommedan Paw, Tagore Law Lectures. 1873, Vol.l., p.74; 
and Abdul Kadir v. Salima 11866 1 8 All 149, 154-153;
Fyzee (?ases, 103, 108.
3. Syed Ameer Ali, Mahommedan Law. 1929, Vol.2, p.269.
4. Jung, op.cit., pp.xviii and-40; G.H. Stern, Marriage
in Early Islam,1939. pp.104-108; Abdur R a h im~op.cit., 
p.327. See also Annis Begam v. Muhammad Istafa r1933 I
55 All 743, 756, Pyzee Cases, 187"271 ;
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1a Sacrament.
Whatever may be the true nature of marriage in 
Islamic law, it is generally agreed that the validity of 
the marriage does not depend on the observance of any 
religious rite or ceremony. The law does not prescribe 
any particular form in which the contractual performance 
should be effected. It does not provide that the agreement 
should be evidenced by any writing nor is the presence of 
witnesses essential for its validity in some schools of 
Islamic law.
(11) Essentials of a valid marriage
The essentials of a valid Islamic marriage are:
(a) an offer, and an acceptance of that offer, made 
by the contracting parties or their recognized 
agents at the same meeting;
(b) the absence of any impediment to marriage between 
the parties - e.g. a Moslem woman cannot marry
a non-Moslem man;
(c) the consent of the bride1s guardian is usually
3necessary.
The formality required by the law that the contract 
must be concluded in the presence of two or more witnesses 
is to ensure due publicity, and seems to be an evidential 
rather than an essential legal requirement# Maliki law 
does not insist upon the presence of witnesses to the con­
tract, provided due publicity is given to the commencement
bf
of marriage life. In those schools where the presence of 
witnesses is essential, there is a difference of opinion
1. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit.tp .327; Jung, op.cit.t p.xviii; 
Mariyama v. E.jo [1961J N.R.N.L.R. 81 cf. Vesey-Fitz- 
gerald, op.cit..p.36; "Although a religious duty, 
marriage is emphatically not a sacrament. There are no 
sacraments in Islam"; Abdur Kadir v. Salima [1886] 8 
All.149 at 154-155; Fyzee Cases, p.105« 108.
2. See Ameer Ali, Mahomedan Law, op.cit..Vol.2. p. 286;
Coulson, on.cit.r p.10. Witnesses are not necessary
under Shi!i law.
5. Abdur Rahim, op.cit..p.529; N.J. Coulson, Succession in 
the Muslim Family,op.cit..pp.10-12; Russel and Suhrawardy,
1 1 Rahman, Institutes of Musulman Law
4. Abdur Rahim, op.cit. ,p#.329; Coulson, Succession in.tha
footnote 4 continued.........
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among jurists whether a marriage contracted without wit­
nesses is void ah initio (batil) or merely invalid (fasid).^
The witnesses required are two Moslem men, or one man and 
2
two women. Women cannot he witnesses to a marriage in 
Maliki law.
Among the Kanuri of Maidugari, two witnesses, who
L\
must he men, are always required, and in addition a Mallam
5
is invited to recite the surat-ul-fathia.
It has heen seen that marriage under customary 
law is essentially a contract between two families and 
not between two individuals as such. In spite of the fact 
that among Nigerian Moslems communities, all the marriage 
negotiations are conducted by the parties* parents, the 
stress in Islamic marriage is on the two individuals who are 
the actual parties to the marriage. A wife among the Moslems 
is never regarded as the "wife" of her husband*s family, as 
a wife married under customary law in the Southern States 
usually is. Islam brings the nuclear family into greater 
prominence through its inculcation of duties to the actual 
father of a family. The Malikite system gives absolute 
authority to the husband as head of the family and as a 
result the extended family is undermined. Schacht notes 
that "Islam is opposed to tribal feeling because the 
solidarity of believers should supercede the solidarity 
of the tribe1*.^
Footnote 4 continued.......Muslim Family, op.cit.,
pp.10-11; in Shi*a law witnesses are not necessary.
1. See Ameer Ali, op.cit.. Vol.2., pp.309-312.
2. Ibid., pp.309-312.
3. Ruxton, Maliki Law, op.cit..p.90; Russel and Suhrawardy, 
op.cit., par. 58.
4. A Mallam is a Koranic scholar and teacher with knowledge 
of the Islamic texts. Imams and Alkalis (judges) are 
usually chosen from among the Mallams. In Nigeria today, 
the term is used in reference to any Moslem man of good 
social standing.
5. Verses from the Koran and other religious texts, 
especially the opening Chapter of the Koran.
6. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit.,
p. 161.
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Although an engagement is envisaged in Islamic 
law, a mere betrothal does not create any rights in Islamic 
law. An action for breach of promise of marriage is there­
fore not possible.'*’ Unlike the marriage ceremony which 
should be celebrated in public, according to the Maliki 
school, the proposal of marriage should be made in private. 
Among the Moslems of Nigeria, however, the ceremony 
equivalent to an English engagement is a semi-religious one. 
Relatives of both parties, as well as friends, attend. The 
mallam will also be invited to say prayers and bless the 
proposed marriage. This ceremony is predominantly customary.
As a result of marriage in Islamic law being 
essentially a contract, the parties may make stipulations 
which add to or detract from their legal rights and duties,
but any stipulation which is contrary to an express command
2
of the Koran would not be enforced.
Bo Consents to Marriage
All schools of Islamic law recognize the
institution of marriage guardianship under which the father
or other close male relative of a woman has a measure of
control over the marriage of his ward. The distinguishing
feature of Islamic jurisprudence in this respect is that it
empowers a father to impose the status of marriage on his
minor children. This power of imposition is known as jabr,
- 3and the guardian so empowered is known as wali. This 
rule is followed by all schools as far as a minor girl is
1. If an engagement is broken, the ornaments, clothes and 
money given by the groom can be returned; see Faiz 
Badruddin Tyabji, Muslim Law, 4th. edit. (Bombay, 1969), pp.
105-106 par .90; William Macnaghten, Principles and 
Precedents of Moohummudan Law. (Calcutta, 18^5),pp.250-252.
2. See N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1964), p.190; Ameer Ali, 
Mahommedan Law, op.cit.,pp.521-522; see also Wilson,
Anglo-Muhammadan Law. 5th. edit., 1921, p.152, paras.
56-58.
5. See Ruxton, op.cit., pp.89-96; Ameer Ali, op.cit..
541-556; Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,pp.550-551; Coulson, 
Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit♦, pp.11-12.
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concerned, but there is a divergence of practice among
the schools in relation to the powers of the guardian to 
contract a marriage on behalf of an adult woman.^
Hanafi law puts male and female basically on
the same footing with respect to their legal capacity to
conclude marriage contracts. "A woman who is adult and
of sound mind, may be married by virtue of her own consent,
although the contract may not have been made or acceded to
by her guardians, and this, whether she be a virgin or 
2
saibbah” . Legal majority is associated with physical 
puberty, when it is presumed, (unless there is evidence 
to the contrary), that the person concerned has attained 
that degree of sound and mature judgment which enables 
him or her to manage his or her own affairs. The 
irrebuttable presumption is that a person attains majority 
at age fifteen, but the Hedaya lays down that the earliest
•3
period for a boy is twelve years, and for a girl nine years.
According to the Hanifi school, therefore, a girl 
may be married without the consent of her guardian, at the 
age of nine, provided she can prove by appropriate evidence 
that she has attained physical puberty, or at age fifteen 
without any proof of physical puberty. Correspondingly, 
her guardian cannot force her to marry against her wishes 
once she is nine years of age and can prove physical
4puberty, or she has attained the age of fifteen years.
The Maliki school, however, observes this rule 
with regard to males, but holds that a previously unmarried 
woman, regardless of age, cannot marry without the consent 
of her marriage guardian, and may be married without her 
consent if she is married by her father or his appointed 
executor.
1. Ameer Ali, op.cit.. pp.343-345.
2. Abdur Rahim, op.cit.. pp.330-331.
3. Ameer Ali, op.cit., p. 233.
4. See Schacht, op.cit., pp. 117, 161-162.
i
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"A father may impose marriage: 1. On his daughter who
is insane.- 2. On his virgin daughter, even should 
she be emancipated and old, unless he proposes to 
marry her to an eunuch or a lunatic. 3. On his 
young daughter, who is no longer a virgin either 
owing to an accident or to illicit intercourse".-^
A testamentary guardian has a similar power to give in
marriage an orphan daughter in accordance with her fatherTs 
2
wishes. The power of giving his daughter in marriage is 
virtually absolute in Maliki law, provided she has not been 
previously married, or emancipated.
Throughout most of Northern Nigeria, in accordance 
with Maliki law, a father is entitled to conclude marriages 
on behalf of his minor sons, or his virgin daughters, up to
3
any age, at his unilateral discretion. This is consonant 
with the principles of customary law which obtain in most 
of the Nigerian societies as already noted in a previous 
chapter.^ Members of the extended families may be consulted, 
and the mother of the boy or girl in practice has considerable 
powers of persuasion, but in law, the right of consent 
belongs to the father or his recognized deputy. Maternal 
relations are not generally regarded as matrimonial
5
guardians, and only relations through males are recognized.
Most Moslem parents give only a limited choice 
of spouse to their daughters.^ The normal procedure adopted
1. Ruxton, op.cit., p.92. There are certain exceptions to 
the rule. The Maliki School considers the right of .jabr 
as belonging exclusively to the father of the person to 
be married. In the absence of the father the right 
passes to his appointed executor, or to the Kadi - see 
Ameer Ali, op.cit.. p. 348. The Hanifi School allows 
the right to all natural guardians; the Shafei School
to the father or the paternal grandfather only.
2. Ruxton, op.cit., pp.92-93; Coulson. Succession in the 
Muslim Family, op.cit.. p.l^T
3. See Muhammad Yahaya, op.cit.. p.3., 5; Anderson,
Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.. pp.204-206.
4. See above, Chapter Y.
5. See Russel and Suhrawardy, op.cit. .pp.3-7«
6. See Trimmingham, Islam in West Africa, op.cit.. pp.164- 
165. See also M.F. Smith, Baba of Karo, op.cit.. p.267, 
who records that the only instances of suicide which 
were encountered despite continual enquiry among the 
Hausa were those of girls who were the victims of 
forced marriage.
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is for the girl to receive several offers of marriage 
accompanied by suitable gifts. Of these suitors, the 
girl may be given a choice. If the father approves of
her choice, all will be well, but if there is a difference
in opinion, more often than not, he makes the choice, and 
she has no option of refusal. In some cases, she may not 
even be consulted. In order to cement a friendship, to 
repay a debt of gratitude, or simply to pay honour to 
someone, a girl may be given by her father in marriage as 
an unsolicited gift. The father himself gives the girl a 
dowry, foregoes the payment of bride-price usually paid by
the bridegroom, and makes a valid contract of marriage
between the man and his daughter in the name of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Such marriages, referred to as alms-marriage or 
sadaqa, are said to be peculiar to West Africa and not of 
Islamic origin.^ The bridegroom is often a mallam, student, 
orphan or other person, too poor to afford to give a dower 
himself, but the category is not restricted in practice 
in the Northern States, and may even be utilised to get 
rid of an unruly daughter.
In a case recorded at the Social Welfare Office 
at Maidugari, a girl was given in such a marriage by her 
father, a lieutenant in the Nigerian army. Her husband, 
who already had two other wives, was forced to divorce her 
after a few months of marriage. Twice she used a heavy 
metal to hit him on the head, tore up his clothes and 
left him naked on the streets, and according to the evidence 
of the police, seemed to be under the influence of bad 
company and drugs. Although she may have been uncontrollable 
in her fatherTs house, there is a suspicion that she was 
revolting against the marriage in the only way possible to 
her. She expressed intense dislike for the husband, and
1. In Nigeria, it is practised among the Kanuri and Hausa 
who have introduced it among the Nupe and Yoruba, see 
Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.. p.208;
M.F. Smith, Baba of Karo, op.cit., pp.99-100, 151-154; 
R.E. Ellison] ^Marriage and Child-birth among the 
Kanuri11, 9 Africa, 1936, pp.526-527; Johnson, History 
of the Yorubas, op.cit., p.116-117; Ahmadu Suka,
"Conflict of Islamic Law and Customary Law of Family 
Relations in Northern Nigeria", Journal of the Centre of 
Islamic Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.l3-14.
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the police had to intervene on his behalf several times.
She was only sixteen years old, and eight months pregnant 
when she reported to the Social Welfare Office that her 
husband had given her a letter of divorce, but provided 
no maintenance for her.
Judging by the frequency with which such marriages 
were recorded at the Welfare Office, they seem to be quite 
common, and generally to have a high degree of instability.
C. Capacity to marry
Every Moslem of sound mind who is not a minor, 
is competent to enter into a contract of marriage.
Majority is attained at puberty. A person who is an 
infant in the eyes of the law is disqualified from entering 
into any legal transaction, and is consequently incompetent 
to contract a marriage. A marriage contracted by a minor, 
whether male or female, who has not arrived at the age of 
discretion, or who does not possess understanding, or 
who cannot comprehend the consequences of the act, is a 
mere nullity.^
The marriage of minors can, however, be con­
tracted by their marriage guardians, even without their 
consent. Among some schools of Islamic law, such a 
marriage, although valid, can be repudiated. A person 
married during minority, has, on attaining majority, the 
right to terminate the marriage by exercising the option 
of puberty. This rule is applied to both men and women, 
but the right of repudiation does not exist in the case of 
a marriage contracted by a father or grandfather, on the 
presumption that they must have acted in the best interests 
of the minor. Under Maliki law a minor cannot repudiate 
a marriage contracted by the father or his appointed
1. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit.. 
p.11; Fyzee, op.cit., pp.95-9b; Ameer Ali. op.cit.. 
pp.273-276; Abdur Rahim, op.cit., pp.330-33T7
45
executor. ^
Islamic law permits child marriages, and indeed,
the precedent is set by Muhammed himself who was betrothed
to Ayesha when he was fifty years old, and "she but six or
seven years of age". The marriage took place about three 
2
years after. Child betrothal and marriage is a feature
of most systems of indigenous customary law, and this
accords with Islamic law. Consequently, conversion to
Islam necessitated no change in law in this respect.
The Criminal Code Act, 1916, which originally
applied to Northern Nigeria, has no provision making it an
offence to consummate a marriage if the bride is still a
child, although it is a misdemeanour unlawfully to defile
girls under the age of eleven and thirteen respectively.^
It has been noted previously, that section 561 of the
Criminal Code Act may be utilized against a father or other
guardian who, in exercise of his right under customary law,
marries a woman of any age against her will, and this
section was equally applicable to a Moslem father or his
executor who exercised his power of marriage by compulsion
(nabr). although such a power was unexceptionable under the
Maliki principles of law.
The present Penal Code of Northern Nigeria^
provides that a man commits rape who has sexual intercourse
with a woman who is under fourteen years of age. Her
7
consent is immaterial. Sexual intercourse by a man with 
his own wife, however, is not rape, if she has attained
1. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, on .cit.. 
p. 12; Ruxton. op.cit.. p. 92"
2. See Muir, The Life of Mahomet, op.cit..p.110;
Guillaume, Islam, op.cit.. p.172; see also Farran, 
Matrimonial Laws of the Sudan, op. cit..p .59; In some 
Islamic States the law is such that scholars dispute 
whether a child en ventre can effectively contract a 
marriage. Cf. the position in customary law, see above, 
Chapter V ., p . 570.
5. Cap. 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
Ibid.,s.222 "Sixteen” for the original "thirteen” and 
"thirteen” for the original "eleven”has been substituted, 
but the substitution applied only to Lagos.
5. See above, Chapter III, pp.269-271.
6. Penal Code Law, I960, Cap.89, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 
1965 Revision.
7. Ibid.,s.282 (l).
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p u b e r t y P h y s i c a l  puberty depends basically upon proof of
sexual maturity established under the normal rules of
evidence, rather than the attainment of a specific age.
There is an irrebuttable presumption of Islamic law that
a girl below the age of nine, and a boy below the age of
2
twelve has not reached puberty. The husband of a girl 
under nine years of age who has sexual intercourse with 
her, would, therefore, be guilty of rape. There is also 
an equally conclusive presumption that puberty is attained 
by both sexes at the completion of the fifteenth year. No 
man can therefore be guilty of rape if he has sexual inter­
course with his wife when she has once attained the age of 
fifteen years.
The question may be asked whether it is not
inconsistent to have a criminal offence under which sexual
intercourse with a girl under fourteen years of age (whether
or not she consented) is a crime, if a girl of nine could
marry. As Lord Buckmaster asked in the House of Lords
during the debate on the English Age of Marriage Bill, 1929,
when pointing out a similar anomaly in the English Law:
"Does it not seem to you a remarkable thing that what the
girl is incapable of consenting to once she can consent to
in perpetuity?” The result, of course, is that men
threatened with prosecution for unlawful intercourse with
a girl under fourteen would stifle it by marrying her, as
A
happened in the case of The State v. Audu. , Between these 
two ages, puberty may have to be medically proved, and in 
the case of a girl, is usually proved if she has commenced
1. Ibid.. s. 282 (2).
2. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit.. 
p.11; Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions, op.cit..
pp.25-26; see also Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan v. Jai Kishori 
[1928] 30 Bombay L.R. 1346, 1351, (P.C.) where the
Privy.Council decided that majority in the case of a
girl is attained at the age of nine, according to 
Shiite Islamic law.
5. See Hansard, House of Lords, Vol. 72, col. 962.
4. [1973] 1 N.M.L.R. 105; For criticism of this case,
see above Chapter V, pp. 400-401.
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menstruation. Some girls begin to menstruate at ten, or 
1
eleven, and consummation of marriage may be valid in
these cases under the Penal Code Law, but there is evidence
that serious physical injury may be done to such immature 
2
wives.
There is a tradition of chiId-marriages among 
the Moslem communities of Northern Nigeria. Many of the 
older women interviewed reported having been married at 
ages ranging from five to twelve years,and there is 
evidence that many of these marriages were actually con­
summated before puberty. Quite a few informants said that 
they first had connections with their husbands as soon as 
their breasts began to show, and this seems to be more 
frequent when the child-bride was actually living with the 
husband in his own home. The case of Mohammed v. Knott^ 
has already been noted in this connection. Anderson was 
reportedly told by the Waziri of Sokoto that child marriage 
is very common among the upper classes, and sometimes takes 
place when the girl is as young as five, whereafter she is 
often brought up in her husband’s house and the marriage 
is consummated as soon as he considers her able to bear it.
1. During her teacher career in England from 1959-1966, the 
present writer witnessed English school-girls who began 
menstruating at the tender age of eleven, and in two 
cases at a little under ten years of age, although 
scientific evidence given to the Latey Committee showed 
that the age of puberty of girls in England had been 
going down by approximately four months in every 
decade since 1830, and is now just over thirteen years. 
Consequently, the Committee rejected the proposal that 
the minimum age for marriage be raised to 18 years - 
see Latey Committee Report of the Age of Marriage, 1967, 
Cmd. 3542, paras. 116-177•
2. See Katharine Mayo, Mother India, op.cit., pp.39-65. 
esp. pp.55-57, 60-63, for statistics.
3. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.,p p .204-203.
4. [1968] 2 All E.R., 563 [1969] 1 Q.B.l.
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Similarly, Majasan states:
"Child marriage is the rule rather than the exception 
in Hausaland and girls are married away at the age of 
five or six for reasons which it is believed will make 
them better wives and good mothers. It prevents pre­
marital relationships with other men. She is also 
more likely to accept her parent's choice at this 
time than later".^
- The frequent marriage of minor girls on much the
same terms in Bornu was confirmed by the Wali of Maidugari.
A girl's ability to consummate the marriage "will be judged
by her 'type condition and physical strength' but will
2
often precede puberty” .
There are indications that forced marriages, and
child marriages, both more prevalent among Northern Moslems
than among the Southern groups, may decrease to some extent
in the future. This is because educated fathers are keen
on educating their own daughters, at least up to secondary
school level, although many of the girls in secondary
■3
schools are already married. A good standard of education 
usually secures a better husband, and a few parents post­
pone marriage until after secondary school. Educated girls, 
on the other hand, insist on marrying men of their choice, 
or rather, they resist paternal efforts to marry them to men 
whom they do not wish to marry.
1. J.A. Majasan, "Traditional System of Education in Nigeria" 
Nigeria^Magazine. No. 119, 1976, pp.23-28, at p.24; but 
see David Lucas, "Women in the Nigeria Labour Force" in 
Population in African Development, edit, by Pierre 
Cantrelle, op.cit., Vol.l.t p.482.
2. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.. p.205; see 
also Yeld.~op.ci’fc... p.85.
3. Information obtained in Maiduguri revealed that more than 
half of the girls in Class Three at the Government 
Secondary School for girls were already married. Many 
girls left before graduation to live with their husbands. 
See also M.F. Smith, Baba of Karo, op.cit.t p. 268 where 
it is reported that "administrative pressure on the Hausa 
rulers and chiefs to secure the return to school of 
girls who run away from school to get married, placed 
the native officials in an unenviable position, since 
they only were aware of the issues at stake; the fact 
that the concept of an unmarried adult woman is one 
which does not exist in Hausa culture, and the importance 
of education for girls".
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For the daughters of the less educated, and 
poorer men, however, the future seems bleak. There is 
less tendency for such girls to be educated. Efforts to 
get parents to send their daughters to school under the 
"Free Primary Universal Education Scheme" have not 
received much support in the Northern States, even though 
the incentives provided are greater, and opportunities for 
qualified women are almost limitless in these States at 
present.
Because of the practice of wife seclusion, the 
education of Northern Moslem women has always lagged 
behind that of her male counterpart, and also behind the 
education of women in the Southern States.^* While the 
position has been considerably improved for the daughters 
of the wealthier and socially influential Moslems, the 
daughters of the majority of the poorer Moslems remain 
largely uneducated.
Unfortunately, educated men, while opting for
higher education for their own daughters, use their
privileged positions to entice poorer fathers to give
them their minor uneducated daughters in marriage, as
additional wives. Moslem marriages in the North are
characterised by a wide disparity of age between husband 
2
and wife, and this disparity in age, a direct result of
forced marriages and child-marriage, is a potent factor
contributing to the unstability of marriage at the present 
3
time.
1. For the educational imbalance between Moslem women in 
the Northern States and women of the Southern States 
generally see, above, Chapter I.
2. See Nadel, Black Byzantium, op.cit., pp.151-152; See
the submission of Mallama Hassu Kaita in the paper she 
submitted to the National Curriculum Conference; see 
further above Chapter I,p.122,n.5; Ogunsola, op.cit.,
p.84; Mallam Aliyu Zaria, Education of Women and Girls 
in the Northern Provinces, op.cit., p.51 et. al."
5. Yeld reports that forced marriages are still frequent 
in the villages of Northern Nigeria according to her 
informants, although only two cases came to her notice 
in Argungu during a period of two years. See Yeld,
A Study of the Social Position of Women, op.cit., p.86.
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In the Southern States, especially among the 
Igbos, many illiterate or poorly educated wives are sent 
for further education by their husbands after marriage.
This may be stipulated for in the marriage contract by the 
wifefs parents, and often the dowry payable for the 
marriage is reduced as a resuitJ Moslem husbands, however, 
do not generally educate their wives in this manner after 
marriage, although a few of them are now beginning to do 
so, and five of the women interviewed at the University of 
Maidugari were sent there by their Moslem husbands.
The most effective weapon to erase child-marriages 
in the North is the education of women.
D. Marriage consideration
In order to constitute a valid marriage, Islamic
law requires that there should always be a consideration,
moving from the husband in favour of the wife, for her
sole and exclusive use and benefit. This consideration
is called mahr or sadak (Hausa sadaki).1 If no dower,
which may be a sum of money or other property, or even
2personal service, is stipulated at the time of the marriage, 
the legal Validity of the marriage is not affected, and the 
wife is nevertheless entitled to the dower customarily fixed 
for the females of her family, provided the marriage has 
been consummated, either in fact, or in law. Dower, says 
Bailee, ”is not the exchange or consideration given by the 
man to the woman for entering into the contract; but an 
effect of the contract, imposed by the law on the husband 
as a token of respect for its subject, the woman” . Coulson,
1. See Jung, op.cit.,p.x; Ruxton, op.cit. ,p.106-114.
2. Jung, op.cit.,p.x; but see Roland Wilson, Anglo 
Muhammadan Law, op.cit.,p.H5. who asserts that personal 
services renderea*by the prospective husband for the 
wife do not count as property for the purpose of sadak; 
see also Bailie, op.cit.f p.91. Ameer Ali, op.cit.,
p.440, notes that such a marriage would be valid in 
Hanifi law, but the wife would be entitled to her 
customary dower, but see p. 441, Vesey-Fitzgerald 
op.cit.. r p.65.
3. Bailie, op.cit.,p.91; see also Abdur Rahim, op.cit., 
p. 534; see Levy, op.cit.. p.95.
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however, holds that the husband obtains the right of sexual 
union in consideration of the dower that he pays to the 
wife” •1
Dower in Islamic law owes its origin to the pre-
Islamic customary payments made by an intended husband to
his future wife (sadak), and to the parents of the wife
(mahr). The latter payment is identified with the payment
of dowry in the majority of customary law systems. The
Prophet, in order to ameliorate the position of women,
combined the two payments, so that it became a settlement
2
or provision for the wife. Fyzee maintains that although
mahr was originally analogious to sale-price, since the
inception of Islam, it is hardly correct to regard it as
the price of connubial intercourse, since Islam insisted
on its payment to the wife as a provision for a rainy day,
and socially a check on the capricious exercise by the
husband of his unlimited power of divorce.
4In Saleh v. Odhams Press, the plaintiff, a 
Moslem, claimed that he had been defamed by an article in 
the defendants newspaper headed "Child Wife Bought for 
£800” . The article described the plaintifffs marriage 
with a Moroccan girl in Casablanca, under the Islamic law 
of the Maliki school, in terms of a sale. The £800 
apparently was arrived at by inclusion of the air fare from 
England to Morocco, and the amount of dower paid by the 
plaintiff in consideration of the marriage. The defendants 
pleaded justification, on the ground that the marriage was 
concluded by the uncle of the bride, and involved the pay­
ment of a sum of money. It was held that this was a gross 
misrepresentation of the nature of an Islamic marriage, and 
that the uncle, the marriage guardian, was in no sense 
acting as a vendor, since it was not he, but the bride
1. Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions, op.cit., p.25.
2. Robertson Smith, Kinship, op.cit., p. 93*.
3. Fyzee, op.cit., p.135.
4. [1963] Times Law Report, 25 June, 1963.
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herself, to whom the dower was paid. The uncle had in 
accordance with Maliki law, merely acted as her 
representative, and upon her wishes. The defendant was 
accordingly held liable in damages for libel.
Khalil, however, fully equates the payment of 
dower with a sale, for he says:
"Dower is analog, .ous to a sale price, that is, dower 
comprises the same fundamental conditions as those 
attached to a sale. When a woman marries, she sells 
a part of her person. In the market one buys mer­
chandise, in marriage the husband buys the genitale 
orvum mulieris. As in any other bargain and sale, 
only useful and ritually clean objects may be given 
in dower"
The payment of mahr is sanctioned by the Koran.
"And give those with whom ye have cohabited their 
dowry. This is the law. But it shall be no crime 
in you to make agreements ove^ and above the law. 
Verily, God is knowing, Wise. ^
As stipulated by the Prophet Muhammad, mahr may
be paid in money or any other property or services, except
things which are haram, such as wine or pork. A pair of
shoes in one case, and a handful of dates in another, was
3
considered as a sufficient dower by the Prophet. The
minimum amount payable varies but according to Maliki law
o 4is fixed at a quarter of a dinar or three drachma.
The rules governing the payment of mahr. or sadak. 
are numerous, precise and show interesting variations among 
the various schools, but the most that can be attempted 
here is to indicate the essential legal differences between 
the payment of sadak in Islamic law, and the payment of 
dowry in customary law, insofar as they affect the position 
of women. To crystallize these differences, comparison will 
be confined to the Maliki school of Islamic law and the
1. See Ruxton, Maliki Law, op.cit., p.106; see also Seymour 
Vesey-Fitzgerald, Muhammadan Law According to its 
Various Schools. (London: Oxford University Press. 1931), 
p.62; Vesey-Fitzgerald, op.cit., pp.62-63; Dower is
Recompense for the burden of child-bearing and suckling 
and hizanat of children which weigh upon the woman,* 
quoting Zeys, Marriage. p.17.
2. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit.. Sura IV, verse 4., p.411.
3. See Jung, op.cit.. p.29; Ronald K. Wilson, Digest of 
Anglo-Muhammadan Law, 5th. edit. (London: Thacker, Spink 
& Co.” 1$21J? p.LL4-116;Vesey-Fitzgerald, op.cit,, p.63«
4. Ruxton, op.cit.,p.!06.
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customary law of the Igbo (Onitsha). The differences may 
be briefly summarised•as follows:
(i) The agreement for the payment of sadak is made 
between the husband and wife, although one or both 
parties may be represented by their marriage guardians. 
The agreement for payment of dowry in customary law
is between the husband on the one hand, and the 
father or other guardian of the bride, on the other.
The bride is not a party to the agreement. The 
important result of this difference is that, while 
both payments are legal debts due from the husband, 
payment of sadak may be enforced by the wife, whereas, 
payment of dowry cannot.
(ii) A man may not stipulate in his contract of marriage 
that there should be no payment of sadak. Such a
marriage, if contracted, is void.'1' Under customary 
law an agreement that there should be no dowry 
payable does not affect the validity of the marriage.
(iii) A marriage contracted without any agreement as to
the payment of sadak is nevertheless valid in Islamic
law; and the wife may demand the customary dower
2
after consummation of the marriage. A marriage 
contracted without any agreement as to the payment 
of dowry is invalid in customary law.
(iv) Sadak is paid to the father or other guardian of 
the bride, in favour of the bride, and is for her 
sole and exclusive use and benefit. As a result 
sadak must be composed of property which is of 
material advantage to the wife. In customary law, 
dowry is paid to the father or other legal guardian 
of the bride. It is not for the benefit of the bride,
1. See Ruxton, op.cit., p.106; this is according to Maliki 
law, but see Jung, op.cit., p.30 "where no dower is 
fixed or it is stipulated that there should be no 
dower, nevertheless marriage is valid and the customary 
dower is obligatory”.
2. See Ruxton, op.cit.,pp.108, 110. Customary dower is the 
expression of the local value attaching to the bride 
with reference to her religious worth, her beauty and 
the renown of her family, and varies according to the 
wealth of the country. The amount may also be deter­
mined by what the bride*s sisters have already received 
as their dower - see Ruxton, op.cit., p.111.
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and only a small portion is given to the bride. The 
dowry may not be of direct benefit to her e.g. pay- 
ment of a brother Ts education may be stipulated as 
dowry.
(v) If the sadak is below the value of the legal minimum,
that is less than one quarter of a dinar or three
drachma, the marriage is null and void. Certain 
property, such as wine or pork, is also prohibited 
as sadak. There is no minimum dowry payable under 
customary law and no property is prohibited, 
provided it is mutually acceptable to both parties.
(vi) If a man says to another "Give me thy sister as a
wife in return for a dower of one hundred drachma
and I promise thee my sister or daughter as wife
for one hundred drachma, such a proposal would mean
a marriage of privation and is null and void"**" in
Islamic law, but such an arrangement would be per-
2
fectly valid in customary law.
(vii) The husband may, at any time after marriage, increase 
the sadak agreed on at the time of the marriage. 
Likewise, the wife may remit the payment of sadak or 
part thereof, and may use it for the benefit of the 
husband at her absolute discretion.^ Agreement for 
payment of dowry in customary marriage is made before 
the marriage, and may not be legally changed by the 
unilateral act of either party to the contract. Since 
the wife is not a party to the contract, any alteration 
by her of its terms, has no legal validity.
(viii) Payment of sadak may be prompt or deferred. On the
death of the husband, or wife, any sadak remaining
unpaid, is immediately payable, and ranks as an
unsecured debt due to the wife from the husband,
4
or his estate. In customary law, on the other hand,
1. Ruxton, op.cit., pp.109-110.
2. This type of marriage is reported among the Igbos, see 
Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, op#cit.,p p .426,
440; see further below, Chapter III, p. 258. It existed 
among pre-Islamic Arabs but was forbidden by Muhammad; 
see Abdur Ramin, op.cit.,pp.8-9; Levy, op.cit.,po105;
R. Smith, op.cit.,p. TIZ. -----
3. Ruxton, op.cit.,p p .112-114.
4. Abdur Rahim, op.cit., p.334.
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on the death of the wife, the dowry may still be 
claimed by her relatives as a debt due to them, 
but on the death of the husband, any dowry already 
paid must be repaid by the father, or other legal 
guardian, if the wife remarries to a non-member of 
her husband's family.
(ix) If the marriage has been consummated, or if the wife 
has lived for one year in the husband's house, even 
though intercourse may not have taken place and the 
husband divorces the wife, sadak, if not already 
given by the husband becomes immediately payable to 
the wife.^ In customary law, dowry must be repaid 
in the event of a divorce, regardless of who 
initiates the divorce.
(x) In Islamic law, the affiliation of children does
not depend on the payment of sadak. Provided there
is a valid legal marriage, all children born to the
parties during the continuation of the marriage, and
the appropriate period of iddat, legally belong to 
2the husband. In customary law, if the husband 
divorces the wife, provided the dowry has not been 
repaid, all children subsequently born to the wife, 
legally belong to the husband. If dowry is not 
repaid after the death of the husband, children 
begotten by the widow for a non-member of the 
deceased husband's family legally belong to the 
deceased husband. There is no limitation of time.^
(xi) If payment of sadak is not completed, and no agree­
ment for deferment has been made, the wife may refuse
the husband access to herself, and she has no duty to
4return any amount he has already paid. A customary
1. See Ruxton, op.cit.,p. 108.
2. See below, pp. 73-76.
3. See above, Chapter VII, pp.593-607.
4. See Bailee, op .cit.,p >126; Ameer Ali, op.cit.,p.456-461.
Jung, op.cit.,pp.34-37; Ruxton, op.cit.,p.±08; see also 
Wilayat Husain v. Allah Rakhi [1880J l.L. 2 All.831; 
Nasarat Husain v. Hamidan [18821 4 All.205; Nur-ud-Din 
Ahmad v. Masuda Khanam j 19571 P.L.D.Dacca 242; the right 
of refusal is lost on consummation - see Wilson,
footnote 4 continued........
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law wife may not refuse to consummate a marriage on
the ground that all the dowry has not been paid,
provided an agreement for payment has been made.
The above comparison reveals the essential nature
of sadak in pure Islamic law as a settlement or provision
specially made for the benefit of the wife. Although the
minimum payable is so low as to negative this, it must be
remembered that the provisions apply to all strata of
society, and if placed at a higher minimum may make the
marriage of certain classes of men difficult, if not
impossible, to attain. There is no legal maximum, and if
the amount is placed sufficiently high it may act as an
effective deterrent to arbitrary divorce by the husband,^
since a "husband thinks twice before divorcing a wife
when he knows that upon divorce the whole of the dower would
2
be payable immediately”.
The practice in regard to marriage payments in
the Northern States of Nigeria shows an amalgam of Islamic
law and indigenous customary law. The resulting admixture
may vary in details among the various ethnic groups and
sub-groups, but it is doubtful whether any Moslem
community in Nigeria observes the strict Islamic provisions
in regard to marriage payments.
In most communities, in addition to the sadak
given for the exclusive use of the bride, the customary
dowry payable to the father, and other payments under
■3
traditional customary law, are also paid. For example,
Anderson notes that in Zaria:
"local custom prescribes seven different payments 
by the groom - some to the girl herself, some to 
her guardian, and some for distribution to members 
of her family - including the *sadaki* which is handed 
to the guardian but is intended, nominally at least,
Footnote 4 continued.........op.cit.. par. 48; and Anis
Begum v. Muhammad Istafa WallTlpian [1933] 55 All. 743; 
Cases 18. criticising certain dicta in the leading 
Indian case of Abdul Kadir v. Salima [1886] 8 All.
149; Fyzee Cases. 103.
1. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,pp.333-334.
2. Fyzee, op.cit., p.133.
3. Nadel, Black Byzantium, op.cit.,p p .339-340; Trimmingham, 
Islam in West Africa.""op.cit.. pp.167-168.
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for the bride herself; while all those relatives 
who have received a share in these payments will 
contribute towards her ta.jhlz". \a wife*s trousseau]^
Among the Kanuri of Maidugari, three main payments 
are usually made. First, kokoram, the money included in 
the gifts (kare-rafaki-be) presented by the boy!s family, 
when they first approach the family of the girl to ask for 
her hand in marriage. These gifts, beside money, may 
include cosmetics, clothes and small items of jewellery, 
the value of which depends on the wealth of the groom*s 
family. A popular girl may receive ten or more such gifts 
from various suitors, and if a boyfs suit is not finally 
accepted, these gifts are refundable. The second main 
payment is luwaliram, money given at the ceremony when the 
date of the marriage is fixed. It is given to the marriage 
guardian of the bride luwali, usually her father, by the 
parents of the bridegroom. Finally, sadaga (Moslem-sadaki), 
given by the bridegroom and his parents, to the parents of 
the girl. The sum of money may be "seventy-five kobo to 
millions of naira, according to the wealth of the bride­
groom, his family and his friends. In addition to money,
other property like clothes, jewels etc., may also be 
•3
given". Whatever is given, however, belongs exclusively 
to the girl, and she can do as she likes with it. There 
is nothing preventing her from sharing it with her family.
On the day of the marriage, the girl!s parents 
present the bridegroom with gifts often equal to or 
surpassing those given to the bride by the groom and his 
family. These may consist of money, several changes of 
clothes, shoes, and traditionally a horse, which today 
may be replaced by wealthy parents of the gift of a car.
In addition, when the girl is taken to her husband's home,
1. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit.,p.207*
2. The Daura Local Authority (Declaration of Daura Native
Marriage Law and Custom) Order, 1972, provides that 
"dowry" means sadaki as laid down by Moslem law" - see
N.C.S.L.A.N. 7 of 1972, Schedule, par. 1.
5. Information relating to Kanuri wedding was given by
Kachalla Bura, 67 years old Kanuri employee of the Arts 
Council Maidugari, in a recorded interview held on 
Friday the 2nd and Monday, 3rd December, 1977, at the
footnote 3 continued..........
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her parents send with her provisions, like millet, rice 
and meat which could last the married couple for a year or 
more.
As a result of the retention of customary law 
payments in relation to marriage by Moslem communities 
in the North, the position is not very different to what 
obtains in modern non-Moslem communities in the Southern 
States. The cost of marriage is prohibitively high, and 
many young Moslem men cannot afford to marry because of 
the exhorbitant marriage expenses, Moslem parents are 
prepared to give their daughters to the highest bidder, 
and the meagre amounts envisaged by the Prophet Muhammad, 
are never followed in practice, even among the very poor. 
Although the actual dowry paid may not be as high as among 
the Igbo for instance, the marriage gifts and other 
property demanded by custom for both bride and bridegroom 
may be very costly,1
Efforts to peg marriage expenses by local 
authority legislation, have not been more successful in 
the Moslem areas than they have been in the South. It is 
worth noting that the Daura local authority, while 
specifying the maximum amounts which may be expended on 
the customary gifts, ana the marriage property given by 
the husband to his bride on the occasion of a marriage, 
does not restrict the amount of dowry (sadaki) payable.
The Law provides:
"In the case of a woman on her first marriage the 
bridegroom or his family shall provide the woman 
with the property set out in the First Schedule and 
in the case of [the] second or subsequent marriage 
the bridegroom or his family shall provide the bride 
with the property set out in the Second Schedule^
Footnote 3 continued...... Arts Council, Maiduguri: Thanks
are hereby recorded to him, also to Alhaji Abatcha, 
who contributed to the information; and to Mallam 
Kellu, Secretary to the Arts Council, who translated 
the information during the process of the recording.
1. Provision of .iihaz (wife*s trousseau) by a father is not 
essential for a marriage under Islamic law, although it 
is customary among most Moslems. In Algeria, the bride* s 
father is not bound to provide her with .jihaz and if he 
does provide one, he may recoup his expenses out of his 
daughter*s sadak: cf.the position in India, see Ameer
footnotes 1 and 2 continued.......
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In the case of any first or subsequent marriage the 
dowry shall consist of such property as may be agreed 
by the parties to the marriage or their respective 
families"
Failure to specify a maximum sadaki payable 
demonstrates the reluctance of Northern Moslem authorities 
to introduce reforms which.may be construed as contrary to 
divine law, even though the social circumstances may 
justify such reforms.
5. The Status of Women During Marriage
A. Purdah (kulle)
Purdah, or wife seclusion, also known as kulle
among the Hausa, involves physical seclusion of Moslem
wives in their homes* Although purdah has been a Moslem
2
institution for about a thousand years, some writers 
insist that wife-seclusion or veiling of women is not 
compulsory since neither the Koran nor the legal text­
books have unequivocally ordered women to stay in seclusion,
and that the verses in the Koran which enjoin it were
3
addressed to the Prophet and his wives. The relevant 
verses read:^
"0 wives of the Prophet I ye are not as other women.
If ye fear God, be not too complaisant of speech, 
lest the man of unhealthy heart should lust after 
you, but speak with discreet speech.
Footnotes 1 and 2 continued.....
1. Ali, op.cit.* p. 469.
2. The Daura Local Authority (Declaration of Daura Native 
Marriage Law and Custom Order, 1972, N.C.S.L.A.N. 7
of 1972, s. 6.
1. Ibid., s,7.
2. See Mazhar U1 Haq Khan, Purdah and Polygamy; A Study in 
the Social Pathology of the Muslim Society. (Pakistan,
1972), p.17.
3. See e.g. Haroun Adamu, The North and Nigerian Unity;
Some Reflections on the Political. Social and Educational 
Problems of Northern Nigeria. (Zaria. Nigeria; Gaskiya 
Corporation, 1 9 7 3 PP.3-4;Muhammad Yahaya, "The Legal 
Status of Muslim Women", op.cit.. p.23.
4. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit., Sura 33, V. 32-33.
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And abide still in your houses, and go not in public 
decked as in the days of your former ignorance,....”
Oh Prophet! speak to thy wives and thy daughters, and 
to the wives of the Faithful, that they let their 
veils fall low”.
Thus will they mere easily be known, and they will not 
be affronted” .
Adamu argues convincingly that the interpretation
of the phrase ”And abide still in your houses”, to mean
physical seclusion, is untenable, and he concludes that the
phrase was no more than a code of behaviour for the wives
of the Prophet, to be emulated by other Muslim women, and
does not justify the physical seclusion of women such as
is practised today in most parts of Northern Nigeria.1
With regard to purdah, the traditional legal
textbooks say, ”the husband has the right to stop his wife
from going out of the marital home, no matter how vital
that may be to her, even if she wants to pay a visit to
her parents regardless of their state of health, or she
2
wants to attend the funeral of one of them” . This is no 
more than the right of ihtibas (the control of a husband 
over his wife), which the Sharia has given to the husband 
in marital affairs because, generally speaking, he is 
mentally and physically superior to his wife.
In Nigeria, the degree of seclusion actually
practised varies, and may be so strictly observed that the 
wife is secluded from any man who is not within the prohibited 
degrees of marriage with her. This necessarily means 
absolute confinement within the boundaries of her home, and
1. Adamu, The North and Nigerian Unity, op.cit.. pp.4-6.
2. See Levy, op.cit., p.126-131, who notes that ”the 
exceptions that can be enumerated’ to the general practice
" of the veiling and seclusion of women are comparatively 
few”, see also, Tyabji, 2nd. edit. 1921, op.cit., 
pp.107-108; Wilson, Digest. 5th. edit., 1921, p.56; 
Muhaammad Yahaya, op.cit.7 p.23., See Muhammad Yahaya, 
op.cit.. p.24, citing Al-Mughni, Vol. 7, p.20.
3. See Ameer Ali, The Legal Status of Muslim Women, op.cit.. 
p.31, who asserts that sitting behind a screen is a 
mark of honour, a privilege, jealousy regarded as such 
by the ladies themselves.
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inability to do ordinary things like shopping, going to 
the library, or cinema, conducting business, except by 
means of an agent, or household chores like fetching 
water or gathering firewood. Many of the activities 
which would elsewhere be done by the wife, have to be exe­
cuted by .the husband himself, or by servants, if he can
afford to employ them. In practical terms, therefore, 
wife-seclusion is an expensive institution which is found 
only among the privileged classes, and mainly in the urban 
areas. Cohen notes that
"In a society where male dominance is such a strong 
value and where purdah or wife seclusion is con­
sidered a primary indicator of such a value, there 
is a culturally accepted relationship between a 
man’s social rank and the degree of purdah. In
other words, one way of looking at purdah is to
see it as a status enhancing practice for the 
husband".^
In theory, wife-seclusion is regarded as an enviable 
attainment for every Moslem male.
Among Moslem women there is a division of opinion 
as to the merits of seclusion. Women actually in purdah 
who were visited during field-work in Maiduguri, expressed 
complete satisfaction with the system. They feel sincere 
pity for less fortunate women who have "to go about and 
work like slaves" because their husbands cannot afford 
to keep them in seclusion. Muhammad Yahaya gives some of 
the reasons for their satisfaction. He says:
"Any woman in the Northern States who experiences the 
life of purdah will hesitate to leave it because 
she is the queen in the harem. Her husband and his 
servants are her subjects. The husband must do all 
that she requires including visits to her relatives. 
Seclusion is a mark of honour and privilege to a 
lady".2
This description conjures up an exciting picture 
of the harems of the rich oil sheiks of Arabia, so well
1. Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit.. p.138; see also 
Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the 
Fears of Minorities, op.cit.. p.5$«
2. Muhammad Yahaya, "The Legal Status of Muslim Women", 
op. cit., p .25
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known in popular literature, but it is far removed from the
stark reality of the actual condition of women in seclusion
in Northern Nigeria, except perhaps for the very few really
wealthy men.'*’
If women in purdah in Nigeria are satisfied to
remain secluded, or entertain pity for those women who are
not secluded, it is not because of the luxury of their
existence, but because, never having experienced freedom
or the satisfaction derived from direct contribution to
the economy of the country, the idea that any woman could
reject seclusion is unintelligible to them. They consider
themselves as the favoured creatures of Allah; yet the
futility of their existence and the resultant loss to
national productivity are easily apparent to secondary
school children in both Northern and Southern States. Many
2of these children, when asked to write essays on "The 
Position of Nigerian Women", expressed the opinion that,
had Nigeria educated and trained women, instead of keeping 
them in purdah and ignorance, the present pressing need for 
foreign skills would have been considerably less. This 
point, although coming from the fmouths of babes and 
sucklings' is worthy of note by the rulers of Northern 
Nigeria.
Among the younger, educated Northern Moslem women,
there is evidence of considerable resistance to the system
of wife-seclusion, summed up in the attitude of a young
university graduate, wife of a Kanuri top civil servant in
Maiduguri, who says:
"I would not consent to remain in seclusion, even if 
I were given a million naira, or all the gold in Arabia".
1. See Elizabeth Cooper, The Harim and the Purdah, (London: 
1915), esp. pp. 166-167; for an interesting account of 
life in purdah in India; the Indian system is very 
similar to purdah practice in Nigeria.
2. These essays were given during field-work for this thesis, 
in an attempt to get the opinions of the younger 
generation of Nigerians as to the status of Nigerian 
women. See further, Chapter I, p. 68.
3. See P.C. Lloyd, Power and Independence: Urban Africans 
Perception of Social Inequality. (.London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1974), p.84.
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Kanuri women especially, demand a high degree 
of freedom-, and refusal of the husband to allow this, 
seems to be the greatest single cause of marital discord 
in Maiduguri. In cases of marital disputes brought to 
the Social Welfare Office in Maiduguri, the most frequent 
complaint of the husbands, was their inability to control 
the movement of their wives by preventing them from going 
out without express permission; and of the wives, the 
refusal of their husbands to allow them to visit even their 
parents and other close relations.^*
The middle-aged night guard of the compound where 
the present writer was accommodated in Maiduguri was 
married to a wife in her early twenties. During the six 
weeks spent there, the couple had no less than five major 
fights, one of which ended in injuries to the husband, 
and two in the wife "packing” out of the matrimonial home. 
Each quarrel was the result of an attempt by the husband 
to keep the wife in seclusion. It was evident that she 
was extremely lonely during the day when the husband either 
slept or went to visit his friends. Because of communication 
difficulties (she spoke no English), she could not converse 
with her husband*s employer, the only other female on the 
premises, and she was forbidden to speak to the young male 
cook employed in the house. The situation was not made 
easier by the fact that the husband's meagre salary was 
unable to give her the things she craved to compensate 
for such seclusion. The most violent quarrels coincided 
with pay day. This is an extreme case but seclusion can be 
a lonely life, and many Kanuri wives resent it, although 
husbands insist on it.
In one case where a young wife went to visit her 
parents without the permission of her husband who was then 
absent from home, she was divorced instantly by her mother- 
in-law, and his mother*s action was endorsed by the husband
1. In strict Maliki law, the wife could visit, or be 
visited by, her near relations, the male members of 
whom she is prohibited from marrying; the husband has 
no legal right to prevent these visits provided the 
wifeTs virtue is free from all suspicion. See Ruxton, 
op.cit., p.148.
i
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on his return. The wife was six months pregnant, and 
probably homesick for her own mother.
Botting, commenting on the freedom of women in 
Bornu writes:
"The position of women in Bornu society is much freer 
than in most Muslim countries, for the veil is unknown 
and seclusion in the house of parent or husband is 
much rarer. Women may dance in public with men,walk 
freely around the streets and talk openly with anyone 
they choose, and they play an active and significant 
part in ordinary day to day business especially on 
Market day. Women in Bornu are not usually regarded 
as either chattels, slaves or beasts of burden, and 
the Kanuri!s prime occupation of agriculture is 
shared by both men and women”. ^
Similarly, Schultze, in a very early account of the population 
of Bornu says:
"The ordinances of the Koran are very laxly observed, 
as is shown openly by the very slightly secluded 
life of the extremely coquettish Kanuri lady, who 
is thus enabled to play a definite part in public 
life, and who even apart from this shows none of 
the reserve of her sisters in strict Mohammedan 
countries. This freedom goes so far that, at least 
in the larger towns, the women show themselves in 
the streets and exhibit an exceedingly wanton 
demeanour, to which even the ladies of royal blood 
form no exception” ^
Ma'aji Isa Shani writes in similar vein, but it is evident 
that he is echoing the sentiments of Botting, for he says:
"The position of women in Bornu society is much freer 
than in most Muslim countries. The veil is known 
but the seclusion of women in the house of their 
parents or husbands is much rarer. Women may dance 
in public with men, walk freely around the streets 
and talk freely with anyone they choose”.^
1. Douglas Botting, The Knights of Bornu.1961. p.55.
2. A Schultze, The Sultanate of Bornu. Translated from the 
German by P. Askell Benton, 1913, pp. 17l-l?2.
5. Ma'aji Isa Shani, "Divine Revelation And Custom in the
Islamic Law of Divorce", Journal of the Centre of Islamic 
Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 58.
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However, true these statements may have been of
early Bornu society, or of Kanuri women in the rural areas
of Bornu State, it is not true of Kanuri women in present
day Maiduguri. The first feature of social life that
strikes a visitor to Maiduguri today, is the relatively
small number of women to be seen on the streets during
the day.^ It is a fact that seclusion is practised more
extensively in the urban areas. Cohen notes that "urban
marriages require no agricultural work and the wife is in
much greater seclusion than her rural counterpart”• In
his sample he found a high incidence of seclusion in the
city. In fact 11 all urban marriages were reported as kulle
2and all rural unions as non-kulle". Of the 52 Kanuri 
women interviewed by the present writer in Maiduguri, only 
four were not in seclusion, and all four were highly 
educated women. It is difficult to find Kanuri women on 
the streets during the day, except very young girls below 
the age of eleven, and old women. Most of the traders and 
business people are men, and the few women who do engage 
in such activities are generally non-Kanuri. After prolonged 
search and investigation, one Kanuri woman was found, who 
sold small items of local cosmetics, but she admitted that 
she could only do this trade when her husband goes to the 
Sudan, but when he is present in Maiduguri she has to stay 
indoors. Although there are allegedly many prostitutes in 
Maiduguri, they seem to ply their trade unostentatiously 
and at night. Even during salah time, the public presence 
of women was not observed.
It is relevant to note Hill's description of 
seclusion in rural Kano (predominantly a Hausa town), in 
1972. She observes:
"Little pre-nubile girls of nine and ten were being 
thrust into full purdah (kulle-lit. locked) never 
to be allowed outside their husband * s compounds
1. The contrast Maiduguri presented with the busy market 
towns of Onitsha and Ibadan, the two other major research 
areas, with their preponderance of women traders, was 
particularly interesting. One felt transported to a 
different world.
2. Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit.
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during the day except (with permission) on special 
occasions or, at.planned intervals., to visit their 
parental home. Older wives, too, usually remained 
secluded, to the point that any sixty-year-old seen 
walking towards Kano city was almost certain to he 
husbandless"
Yet Robinson, speaking of Hausa women in Kano in 1896, 
says:
"Women occupy a much more favoured position in 
Hausaland than in an ordinary Mohammedan country. 
With the exception of the wives of the king and 
one or two of his chief ministers, they are not 
kept in seclusion, but are allowed to go about as 
they please"*2
This contradiction seems to indicate that, in all areas of 
the North, more wives are being secluded today, than they 
were at the turn of the century. In fact, Hill notes that 
until quite recently in Kano, only the wives of the more
3
notable mallams were in strict purdah. This increase' 
in the purdah system may be due to better provision of 
basic facilities, for example, running water in the com­
pounds. Increased individual wealth, a direct result of 
greater national prosperity, may also have contributed as 
seclusion of wives is a status symbol and an indicator of 
wealth.
In addition, as Cohen observes, all men wish to 
have their wives in the compound as much as possible, and 
are prepared to make physical and financial sacrifices in 
order to prevent their wives from gaining economic 
independence, since in their view, a loss of economic 
dependence may lead to a loss of their control and
1. Polly Hill, Population. Prosperity and Poverty,
op.cit.. p. 84.
2. Charles Henry Robinson, Hausaland or Fifteen Hundred
Miles Through the Central Soudan. (London: Sampson
how Marston and Co., l89b),.pp ..205-206.
3. Hill, Population. Prosperity and Poverty, op.cit.,
p.84; see also Anderson, Islamic Law, op.cix.,
p.209.
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dominance in the marital relationship.^
The proponents of the seclusion of women in 
Northern Nigeria justify the system on the ground that it 
is necessary to protect women, who are by nature morally 
weak. Implicit in this contention is the argument that 
men are by nature strong. If this is so, then there is 
no need to restrain the women, for the strength of the 
men will ensure the morality of women.
The fact is that men’s sexual aggressiveness 
and moral frailty are recognized, and this, coupled with 
men’s distrust and jealousy of each other, predicates the 
seclusion of women.
Sexual morality or virtue which can only be
maintained by women being shut up is illusory, and is
seldom attained in actual fact. It is false to think
that because women are secluded, they are virtuous. In
spite of seclusion, or probably because of it, divorce
2
rates are remarkably high.
B. Conjugal rights and duties
(1) Introduction
In common with other systems of law, marriage 
under Islamic law confers important rights and imposes 
duties on each of the parties to the marriage. According 
to strict Islamic law, the husband has absolute authority over 
the person of his wife. Such decisions as the choice of the 
matrimonial home, the degree of wife-seclusion, and the 
standard and mode of life, are entirely his to make, subject
1. Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit..p.75; see also 
Ursula M. Sharma, "Women and Their Affines: The Veil 
as a Symbol of Separation, Man. Vol.13, June 1978, 
pp.218-233 at p.229.
2. See Hill, op.cit..p.84; see M.F. Smith, Baba of Kano, 
op.cit., p7o4, where Baba, the old Hausa woman, relates 
the deception of Hausa wives in purdah; these wives 
indulge in illicit sexual affairs in spite of 
seclusion.
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to any especial stipulations which the parties might have
entered into at the time of the marriage or afterwards• On
Islamic law marriage as under any other contract, the
parties are free to some extent to curtail or extend the
rights and duties granted to them under the law.^
The general principle of Islamic law, is that
the wife is hound to reside with the husband, unless there#
are valid reasons to justify her refusal to do so. Abdur
Rahim notes that:
!,The husband has the right to insist that the wife 
should live in his house and afford him access, 
abstain from due familiarity with strangers, obey 
him in all reasonable matters and be faithful to 
him. He can control her freedom of movement within 
certain limits and correct her for unseemly 
behaviour”
Although the law allows the husband the right to beat his
wife if he believes that violence will be an effective
means of enforcing the desired behaviour, the "blows are
3
to cause no fracture, wound or serious bruise". In the
Indian case of Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoon-Nissa4 ----------------------------  -----------------
Begum, the Judicial Committee observed that "The Muhammadan
law on a question of what is legal cruelty between man and 
wife would probably not differ materially from our own".
If the husband treats her with unmerited cruelty or in 
such a manner as to endanger her personal safety, she is
5
not bound to live with him.
(11) Maintenance
The Moslem wife is entitled to be provided with 
proper accommodation, at least a separate room, suitable
1. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit..p.333; Schacht, op.cit.,
p p .167-168.
2. Abdur Rahim, op.cit., p.333.
3. Ruxton, op.cit., p.119.
4. [1867] 11 M.I.A. 551.
5. See Ameer Ali, op.cit., pp.423-424.
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to her position in life, and that of her-husband. She is
also entitled to clothing and food provided by her husband,
although she may be financially able to maintain herself,
and he is not."*"
The standard of maintenance, according to Maliki
law, must be on 11 a scale commensurate with the social
position of the parties and in accordance with the customs
2
of the country” .
If the household is a polygynous one, each wife 
has the right to be treated with equality. Each wife, 
whether Moslem, or Christian, has equal claims on the 
husbandTs time, and he shall "under all circumstances 
spend an equal number of nights with each of his wives, 
but he need not, however, have an equal amount of sexual 
intercourse with each but may follow his own desires".^ 
Equality of treatment poses a problem for a man who marries 
wives from two different stratas of society. For example, 
if one wife is the daughter of an Emir, her social status 
demands the provision of servants and other luxuries. If 
these luxuries are given also to the other wife, the 
daughter of a poor peasant, this may amount to unequal 
treatment in law, since the Emirfs daughter is being treated 
according to her social status, while the peasant wife is 
being treated above her social status. On the other hand, 
if he treats them differently, and according to their 
sO'Cial status, he would not be treating them equally in 
actual fact.
1. Schacht, op.cit., p.167; Ameer Ali, op.cit., 
pp.404-422esp. p. 408. No maintenance is usually due 
if the wife is too young for intercourse; see Jung, 
op.cit., p.41., or in a void (batil) marriage.
2. Ruxton, op.cit.,p.147; Jung, op.cit., p.41; Abdur Rahim, 
op.cit.. p .334.
3. A newly married virgin wife is entitled to seven con­
secutive nights of her husbandfs time, or three nights 
if she is not a virgin, see Ruxton, op.cit.tp.ll9.
4. Ruxton, op.cit., p.118.
70
This problem, does not exist among Northern 
Nigerian Moslems. The maintenance due to a wife is 
calculated by exclusive reference to the husband!s means, 
and this, while reasonable enough, is directly contrary 
to the strict Maliki law.1
Customary law, which generally accords more 
prestige and respect to the senior wife of a polygamist 
seemed to have triumphed over Islamic law in this respect. 
Among the Kanuri the senior wife of a man is the head of 
the household. In most households interviewed, the senior 
wife directed the activities of the two or three other 
wives, who had to go to her for everything they needed, 
including money. The 11 slave” wives or concubines usually
do most of the work in the household.
This special position of the senior wife is 
observed among all classes of peoplr, including the Shehu 
of Bornu, whose senior wife is called Gumsu. Interviewees 
say that formerly the Gumsu of the Shehu was held in high 
esteem by the entire community. It was customary for her 
to hold a sort of court to which cases peculiar to women 
would be brought for decision, and from time to time, laws 
regulating the conduct of women in all aspects of life 
were made. Girls attending secondary schools in Maiduguri 
used to be taken to her for caning, in cases of gross 
misbehaviour.
Recently, however, the power of the Gumsu seems 
to have been lessened, or rendered nugatory, because the 
present Shehu has chosen as his Gumsu the youngest of his 
wives, and the last to have been married. This breach of 
custom has created resentment among the older wives of the 
Shehu, and as a result, whenever the Shehu is absent from 
the palace, the Gumsu is literally ostracised by the other 
palace wives, who, however, allegedly maintain a semblance of 
fraternity when he is present.
1. See Ahmadu Suka, op.cit.t pp.14-15.
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Unequal treatment of wives is a frequent cause 
of complaint among Moslem couples. In a case recorded in 
the Social Welfare Office in Maiduguri, the husband had 
three wives. One of the wives complained that the husband 
had no love for her, and that she wanted to divorce him, 
but he refused to grant her a divorce. Her reason for 
wanting a divorce was that the husband gave everything to 
his senior wife, but nothing to her, or to the one child 
she had for him. The husband refuted this accusation, 
and stated that the wife was jealous of his other wives, 
especially the most junior one, whom he had sent to England 
to be educated, and who got on well with his senior wife.
He described the complainant as a quarrelsome woman who 
refused to cooperate with her co-wives, but he resolutely 
refused to divorce her. In another case, the wife, who was 
the second of three wives, described herself as 11 one-third 
wife in the home”, and complained bitterly that the husband 
neglected to buy food, or even medicine for her when she 
was ill, took no notice of the needs of her seven children, 
"while he lavished his youngest wife with all she needed".
Barkow has correctly observed that:
"From a manTs point of view the burden of polygamy is 
that of diplomacy: he must not show favouritism" •
The wives must cook for and share the husbandfs 
sleeping room in strict rotation, whether they are aged 
fifteen or fifty, sexually available or socially unclean, 
and a gift to one wife necessitates a gift to the other, 
yet "quarrels among co-wives are common, and a polygynous 
household is seldom a totally peaceful one” .*^
The duty of the husband of an Islamic marriage to 
maintain his wife may be enforced by the courts. Where a 
husband, having failed to make adequate provision for his 
wife, absents himself and cannot be found, the wife may 
apply to the court for maintenance. Provided she proves 
her right to maintenance, the Judge has the right to order 
maintenance for her out of her husband*s property. If the
1. See Barkow, op .cit., p.322.
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husband, has no personal property, his real property may
be sold for this purpose. The wife also has the right to
pledge her husbandTs credit for necessaries on the authority
of the Judge.^ Anderson notes that in Nigeria, however,
most Alkalai (Hausa judges) say that they would dissolve
the marriage, but would neither seize nor sell property
2to provide maintenance for a wife.
This reluctance to enforce the husband* s duty to 
maintain his wife may be due to the fact that, according 
to the customary law of the non-Moslem Hausas, the husband 
has no obligation to maintain his wife.
(Ill) Adultery
Consonant with the practice in most traditional
societies, adultery in Islamic law is a crime. Zina.
illicit sexual intercourse attracts the punishment of
stoning in the case of the free offender "who has ever
enjoyed valid married life”, and one hundred lashes in
■3
the case of one who has never had this experience. Illicit
intercourse, which includes adultery by either sex, is a
criminal offence under the Penal Code Law, I960 of Northern 
4
Nigeria. Sections 387 and 388 of the Law provides:
”387 Whoever, being a man subject to any native 
Adultery by law or custom in which extra-marital sexual
a man intercourse with a person who is not and
whom he knows or has reason to believe is not 
his wife, such sexual intercourse not amounting 
to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence 
of adultery and shall be punished with imprison­
ment for a term which may extent to two years 
or with fine or with both”.
1. See Ameer Ali, op.cit., pp.410-414; Ruxton, op.cit., 
pp.131-152; Jung, op.cit.. p.42; See also Schacht, 
op.cit., p.168; and Abdur Rahim, op.cit.t p.334.
2. See further, Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, pp.210-211.
3. See Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World, op.cit.,
p. 100; Coulson, Succession in the Muslim ifamily, op.cit., 
p.25.
4. Cap 89, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 Revision. In 
Obey a v. Soluade and Solicitor General for Benue Plateau 
State [1970J Suit No. S.C. 125/69, it was held that £.387 
of the Penal Code Law does not contravene the freedom from 
discrimination provision of the Nigerian Constitution, 
although illicit sexual intercourse is not a criminal 
offence in the Southern States.
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”388' Whoever, being a woman subject to any native
Ad lterv bv law or cus^om in which extra-marital sexual
u y y intercourse is recognised as a criminalo woman
offence, has sexual intercourse with a per­
son who is not and whom she knows or has 
reason to believe is not her husband is 
guilty of the offence of adultery and shall 
be punished with imprisonment for a term 
which may extend to two years or with fine 
or with both".
Although the crime of adultery under the Penal 
Code Law may be committed by a married or unmarried person, 
male or female, in practice, adultery with, and by, a 
married woman is by far the most serious crime, punishable 
traditionally among the Kanuri by the lash and even by 
death in appropriate cases.'1'
Infidelity by husbands, especially in the urban 
areas, is extremely common. Although it is known and 
accepted that extra-marital affairs by men are a type of 
adultery, it is also considered extremely common for 
married men to have sexual liaisons of shorter or longer 
duration with unmarried and divorced women.
Barkow notes the double standard of sexual 
morality which obtains in Hausa Moslem society:
"Hausa maintain an explicit double-standard and a 
husband*s unfaithfulness is not considered adultery 
unless it involves a married woman, though a wife 
who catches her husband with another woman is 
expected to physically attack her rival. On the 
other hand, women are accorded considerable liberty 
between marriages, while accusations of adultery 
are common: that women are not * permitted* license 
does not mean they do not take it".2
C. Parental Rights and Duties
Affiliation. Acknowledgement and Custody of Children
(1) Affiliation
As in most systems of customary law, under
1. See Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op .cit. ,0 .107: 
Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World, op.cit., 
p.100; the prescribed punishment for zina in Islamic 
law is death by stoning, or one hundred lashes.
2. Barkow, op.cit.,p.323; see also Cohen, Dominance and 
Defiance, op.cit.. p.107; E.R. Yeld,"A Study of the
footnote 2 continued........
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Islamic law the husband of a woman is presumed to be the 
father of her children conceived during the subsistence 
of the marriage, and is expressed in the Arabic maxim, 
al-walad li!l firash or, "the child belongs to the marriage 
bed.1
The minimum period of gestation according to all
the schools of law is six months, but the maximum period
shows considerable variation among the schools. The old
Hanifi lawyers, upon the authority of a tradition reported
by Ayesha, hold two years as the longest period of gestation.
Other schools extend the period to four years and, the period
according to the Maliki school varies between four and seven 
2
years.
A child born during the idda of its mother,
legally belongs to her divorced husband, even if he had no
access to her at the relevant time. If, after accomplishing
the idda, a divorced woman or a widow remarries, and has a
child within six months, the child is affiliated to the
husband to whom she was married immediately preceding the
idda, and her second marriage would be voided by .judicial 
3decree.
The presumption of paternity, except in Shi*i 
law, is not rebutted by proof of non-access between the
Footnote 2 continued Social Position of Women in
Kebbi” (Northern Nigeria), M.A. Thesis University of 
London, I960, p.55.
1. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op,cit., 
p.25; Schacht, op.cit.,pp.21,39; Ameer Ali, op.cit., 
p.191; Abdur Rahim, o£.cit.,pp.341-343; see also 
Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed Hoosein Khan Bahadur v. Hyder 
Hossein Khan 11866 | 11 Moo. 1.A.94, 115 where the Privy 
Council laid down the principle that under Mahommedan 
law, f,the presumption of legitimacy from marriage follows 
the bed and is not ante dated by relation1*.
2. See Ameer Ali, op.cit.,p.!91; Ruxton, op.cit., p.41;
Coulson, op.cit., p.24; Levy, op.cit., p.133.
3. See Ameer Ali, op.cit. ,p .194 who asserts that the
maximum period after a divorce is now 10 months unless
there is any exceptional circumstances retarding the 
birth of the child.
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spouses at any possible time of conception.^ A
repudiation of paternity by the husband involves an
accusation of illicit intercourse (zina), which is a
criminal offence with a penalty of whipping attached,
and which, in theory, can only be proved by the testimony
of four eye-witnesses to the very act of sexual inter- 
2
course. The practice under traditional Sunni law,
however, is for a husband who wishes to repudiate the
paternity of a child born to his wife, to swear four
oaths (taking the place of the four witnesses required
to prove zina) that the child is not his, and then invoke
the curse of Allah upon himself if he is lying. The
court will then pass a decree dissolving the marriage and
declaring the child illegitimate. The wife may then take
four contradictory oaths and also invoke the curse of
Allah upon herself if she is lying. But whether she does
so or not, only affects the question of her punishment for
zina. This procedure is known as lian and illustrates the
partiality of Islamic law towards the male sex. The wife*
knowledge of the paternity of her child is more certain
than her husband*s, and yet the law, upon his evidence
3
alone, declares the child a bastard.
Anderson notes that cases of lian are not
4 -----frequent in Nigeria. Probably this is because a Nigerian
Moslem man in the North is satisfied with simply divorcing 
the wife if he suspects infidelity, and the pregnant wife
5
thus repudiated, is too scared to go to the courts. Numerous
1. See Coulson. op.cit.. p.25.
2. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit,.. p. 194;
the orthodox rule is generally applied in Northern 
Nigeria, although a charge on the same facts couched 
in different terms can be sustained by the normal 
minimum of two witnesses.
3. See Coulson, op.cit.,p.25; Ameer Ali, op.cit.,p.!95;
Abdur Rahim, op.cit..p.342; Fitzgerald, op.cit., pp.82- 
83. ------
4. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit., p.213.
5. See Ameer Ali, op.cit.,p.!96 who asserts that a
proceeding by l ^ a n  is resorted to only where the husband 
makes the charge.
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cases are recorded in the Social Welfare Office of Moslem 
husbands denying paternity, and refusing to support children 
whom they suspect are not their own. Unlike Yoruba men, 
who have a penchant for claiming paternity of children whom 
they know are not theirs, Moslem men in the North renounce 
their legal right to such children, and if the .natural 
fathers also refuse to maintain the children, the mothers 
and children are left destitute.
(11) Custody of children
Islamic law makes a distinction between custody
and guardianship of children. A Moslem mother has the
right of custody (hidanah) of her male child until he
reaches the age of puberty, and of her female child until
the girl's marriage. The guardianship of all children,
however, remains with the father, who has the duty to
maintain them, whether he is living with them or not, to
watch over their moral education, to correct them and
send them to school, or to a master or mistress who may
instruct them.'1' In Maliki law, the father may appoint an
executor as guardian of his children after his death. The
appointment vests in the executor all the rights of the-
2
father pertaining to jabr.
If the mother remarries, or for some reason is 
adjudged unsuitable to take care of the child, there is a 
prescribed order in which custody will revolve, which 
varies considerably among the various schools of law, but 
generally, the maternal female relatives of the child will 
be given precedence, even over the father himself. For 
example, according to Maliki law, the child1 s maternal
1. See Ruxton, op.cit. ,p.!55; see also Ameer Ali, op.cit., 
p.248 et.al.,for the variations in regard to custody 
among the schools of law. See also Anderson, op.cit., 
pp.214-215. ---
2. See Ruxton, op.cit. .p.93; see further below, pp.4l-42.
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grand-aunts take precedence over the child*s father 
for a grant of custody.^"
It can therefore be seen that, compared to
2 3customary law, or early English law, Islamic law has
always adopted a more practical and realistic approach to 
the custody of children. It recognizes the fact that all 
things being equal, a child*s mother is the best person to 
be given custody of her children. The law also recognizes 
the fact that a child usually feels greater affinity with 
its mother*s relations than those of its father, and the 
further fact that a child is usually cared for by a woman. 
The law will not award custody to a male, unless he can
prove that he has a capable woman to look after the child.
The paramount welfare of the child has always 
been the prime consideration in Islamic law, and con­
sequently "custody is given to those persons most likely 
to bestow care and kindness on it**.^- The almost absolute 
right of custody which is given to a mother is lost however,
(i) by her subsequent marriage to a person not related 
to the infant within the prohibited degrees of 
marriage;
(ii) by her change of residence which would prevent the 
father or tutor from exercising the necessary super­
vision over the child; the distance should not
A 5
exceed six barid;
1. Ibid., p. 155; Ameer Ali, ojD.cit.,pp.253-254 for the order 
of priority in Maliki law and, according to the other 
Schools of Islamic law.
2. For the position under customary law, see above,
Chapter VII, pp. 609-613.
3. See below, Chapter XI, pp. 221-225.
4. No male has the right of custody to a female child unless 
he is within the prohibited degrees, and consequently 
cannot marry her under Islamic law.
5. A barid is the interval between two stages, see Ruxton, 
op.cit., p. 156; in Nigeria a barid is calculated as 
12 miles, see below, p.80.
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(iii) by her abduration of Islam;^
(iv) by her misconduct, neglect of, or cruelty to the 
child;
(v) by a change of residence of the child’s father or
a
legal guardian beyond six barid.
The courts in the Northern States of Nigeria
seem to observe the strict rules of Maliki law governing
the custody of children as is illustrated by two decisions
2
of the Sharia Court of Appeal in Maiduguri.
In the first of the two cases, Mikakila Yorubo v.3 ----------------
Jumai Kaburi, the plaintiff husband sued his former wife,
claiming custody of two female children, aged five and
seven years, on the ground that the wife was planning to
take the children to the Sudan without his knowledge. The
wife denied this, and said that she was maintaining the
children without any maintenance from the plaintiff, but
as soon as she applied to the court claiming help from
him, he said he wanted the children. The children were
brought into court and interviewed by the Judge. The
pertinent part of the judgment read as follows:
”In accordance with Islamic law, the upbringing of 
either son or daughter remains with the mother and 
the feeding with the father until such time that the 
son/daughter reached the age of puberty. Because 
of this, the daughters will not be taken away from 
her” .
The court decided that the children should live 
with the mother; the father was ordered to maintain the 
children. The judgment of the trial court was upheld in
1. See Ameer Ali, op .cit., pp. 256-268, p. 261.
2. The right of hidanah appertains equally to non-Moslem
mothers, see Ameer Ali, op.cit., p. 225. Some courts 
in Nigeria follow the variant Maliki view which 
corresponds more closely to local custom, that a boy 
may be claimed by his father or other guardian at 
between five and seven years of age; see Anderson, 
Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit., pp.214-215. See also 
Yahaya Kanam, "The Effect of Custom on Certain Aspects 
of Maliki Law in the Northern States of Nigeria”,
Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law, Vol.2, 1968,
pp. 79-87 at p.85; Anderson, Adaptation of Muslim Law,
op.cit., p. 154.
3. [1973] Appeal No. SCA/CV/11/BO/73, unreported, Sharia 
Court of Appeal Maiduguri, 1973. Translated from the
footnote 3 continued.........
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further appeals to the Upper Area Court, and Sharia 
Court of Appeal.
In the other case of Goni Madu Damboa v. Ya 
Ashe,1 the father claimed his daughter, aged nine years, 
from the custody of her maternal grandmother. The 
grandmother objected to his claim on the ground that the 
plaintiff divorced his wife (her daughter), who returned 
home five months pregnant. She delivered the child, who 
was now nine years old, and that during all that time, 
she (the grandmother) was the one who took care of the 
child, providing clothing, food and schooling. She also 
claimed that for the nine years she looked after the child, 
the father never came to see the child, nor sent a message 
of greeting, and that taking away the child from her would 
be a miscarriage of Sharia (justice). However, she agreed 
that, as the father, he could take the child when she 
attained the age of majority, during which he would give 
her hand in marriage.
The trial Judge based his judgment on the Sharia, 
and cited his authority from a book of Islamic Juris­
prudence - Muhammadiyati - which says that 11 it is not 
allowed for a father to take away his daughter from the 
hands of her grandmother, until she attains the age of 
majority and is ready for marriage”.
The father appealed to the Upper Area Court, 
stating that he was moving from his present address to 
Damboa and wanted to take his daughter with him so that 
she can go to school there, a fact he had not mentioned 
in the court of trial. The Upper Area Court held that "it 
would be unfair to separate the daughter from living with 
her father, since the law was that the daughter should 
stay together with her father at his own domicile". The
Footnote 3 continued...... Kanuri language by Elisha
Samwarenso, Law Student, University of Maiduguri.
Thanks are hereby recorded.
1. [1975] Suit No. SCA/CY/30/B0/74, unreported, Sharia
Court of Appeal, 5th March, 1975. Translated by 
Abrahim M. Bukar, see above, p. 78,n.3.
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Judge gave as authority for his judgment, a passage from 
Tufatun Hakkami, a Sharia text, Vol.l, page 275. The 
appeal was allowed and the father granted custody.
The grandmother appealed to the Sharia Court of 
Appeal. The Sharia Court based its decision purely on 
Islamic law, and cited as their authority, Bahja,
Commentary on Islamic law of Tufatun, Vol. 1, page 411. 
which says that "if the father or guardian migrates from 
where the daughter, or son, is living to a new town, he 
is required to take the child with him even if the person 
looking after the child refuses to follow him to his new 
domicile. This, however, is subject to the condition 
that the migration is at least a distance of 72 miles, or 
six barid".
The court calculated the distance of the proposed 
migration as 70 miles and said:
"Under Sharia it is said that the least distance of 
migration is 72 miles, then the responsibility of 
taking care of the child by the grandmother will 
fail. However, the least distance required by Sharia 
is not complete, and thus this Honourable Court is 
of the view that there is no any [sic] reason why 
the child should be taken away from her grandmother, 
Ya Ishe, because the child is under her care, and 
Sharia has no concrete reason in taking the child 
away from her".
The Sharia Court set aside the decision of the 
Upper Area Court, and confirmed the decision of the trial 
court. The father was ordered to execute all the res­
ponsibilities which fell on him as a father, and the grand­
mother to have custody until the marriage of the daughter.
This case illustrates the technical approach 
adopted by the Moslem Judges in the Northern States, in 
their application of Islamic law. In the circumstances, 
justice was done, but since justice more or less depended, 
not on principles, but on mileage, the decision could 
easily have swung the other way, had the proposed migration 
been seventy-two instead of seventy miles. Two miles 
tipped the scale in favour of justice. Nothing was said 
by any of the Judges about the dominant principle.* 
of Islamic law - the paramount welfare of the child. Had 
this principle been applied, the basis for the decision
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would have been more logical, although the decision might 
have been the same, since a father who, without any good 
reason, made no effort to see or provide sustenance for 
his child for nine years, could hardly be regarded as the 
most likely person to bestow care and kindness on the child.
The decision could also be compared with A.ja v.
1
E.jiofor, where the custody of a child who had been cared 
for by her uncle, from birth to fourteen years of age, 
was given, in accordance with customary law, to a man who 
was not her natural father, and who had disclaimed her at 
birth as a bastard, but whose dowry paid on her mother
2
had not been repaid at the time of the childTs conception.
(Ill) Acknowledgement of children
It is possible for a father to acknowledge a child
as his own under Islamic law. Unlike acknowledgement of a
child under customary law, however, acknowledgement under
Islamic law assumes a prior marriage, and a child who is
the product of an illicit relationship cannot generally be
acknowledged. Ameer Ali asserts.
,!The acknowledgement of legitimacy proceeds upon the 
basis of a prior lawful relationship between the 
parents"
For a valid acknowledgement under Islamic law, 
there must be -
(i) no bar to the marriage of the acknowledger and the 
mother of the child;
(ii) nothing to render the relationship impossible (for 
example, the ages of the acknowledger and the child 
must not be such that the former cannot possibly
be the father of the latter);
1. [1974] Suit No. H0/10A/74, unreported decision of Okigwe
High Court.
2. For the facts of this case and comments thereon, see 
above, Chapter VII, p.598.
3. Ameer Ali, op.cit., pp.218-223.
4. Ibid.,p.223; Ashrufood Dowlah Ahmed Hoosein Khan 
Bahadur v. Hyder Hossein Khan 118bb | 11 Moo. 1.A.94; 
Mardansaheb and Or s. v. Ra.jaksaheb and Or s . 1910] 34
I.ft.ft. Bombay, 111; it is not permissible to acknowledge 
a child born of zina.
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(iii) no proof that the acknowledger is not the father of 
the child, for example, that he is the child of 
another man;
(iv) consent of the person to be acknowledged, if an 
adult, to the acknowledgement.^
Acknowledgment under Islamic law can be contrasted
2
with legitimation per subsequens matrimoniam in English law, 
and acknowledgment in Yoruba Customary law.^ Islamic law, 
like the English common law, does not recognize the legiti­
mation of ante-nuptial children by the subsequent marriage 
of the parents; and it also refuses to attach the status 
of legitimacy to any child not conceived, though born, in
Zi
wedlock.
6. The Status of Women on the Dissolution of Marriage
Dissolution of marriage under Islamic law may be 
effected by:
(i) divorce; or
(ii) death of either spouse.
A. Divorce
(1) Divorce in Islamic law
As shown in chapter six, the right of divorce in 
most traditional societies was regarded as a natural
1. See Ameer Ali, op.cit.,pp.218-223; Seymour Vesey- 
Fitzgerald, Muhammadan Law. An Abridgement (London:
Oxford University Press, 1931, p.92.
2. See the English Legitimacy Acts 1926 and 1929; and 
Bromley, Family Law, op.cit., pp.292-297. See also the 
Legitimacy A c t 1929, Cap 103, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, 1958 revision, and similar statutes in the 
States.
3. See Nwogugu, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit.,pp.229-239«
A.B. Kasunmu, HAdultery, Acknowledgement and the 
Illegitimate Child in Nigeria,” U.G.L.J.. Vol. X, 1973, 
No. 1,pp.1-15; Nwogugu, "Legitimacy in Nigerian Law”, 
[1964] J.A.L. Vol.8, No. 2, p.97.
4. See Ameer Ali, op.cit., pp.199-200.
83
corollary to the marital relationship, and in some
communities was exclusively vested in the husband.
Several authorities testify to the fact that prior to
Islam, divorce among the ancient Arabs was easy and of
frequent occurrence.
Ameer Ali says:
MThe pre-Islamic institution of divorce required no 
formula to make its operation valid, and as there 
was no check on the irresponsible power of the 
husband, a simple intimation from him to the effect 
that the tie was dissolved was considered sufficient".^
Ease of divorce by the husband has been preserved
to a large extent in Islamic law, and is responsible more
than any other factor for the opprobrium with which Islamic
marriages are regarded by moralists. "The law of divorce"
says Fyzee, "whatever its utility during the past, was so
interpreted, as least in the Hanafi school, that it had
become a one-sided engine of oppression in the hands of the 
2
husband" Similarly Coulson notes that
Without doubt it is the institution of talaq which 
stands out in the whole range of the family law as 
occasioning the gravest prejudice to the status 
of Muslim women,•..
A Moslem husband has the power to terminate his 
marriage unilaterally at his absolute discretion and without 
assigning any reason therefor. No intervention by the court 
or any other official body is required, and repudiation of 
a wife may be effected simply by the husband pronouncing 
the appropriate words. This form of divorce, known as 
talak, signifies in law, the absolute power which the 
husband possesses of divorcing his wife at all times,
A
while a reciprocal power of divorce is denied to the wife.
1. Ameer Ali, op.cit., p.473.
2. Fyzee, op.cit., p. 148.
3. Coulson, Islamic Jurisprudence, op cit., p.45.
4. See generally, Ruxton, op.cit..pp.121-133; Jung, op.cit., 
pp. 46-57; Ameer Ali, op.cit., pp.473-492.
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Divorce is said to be repugnant to the 
Muhammadan religion and ”should not be resorted to unless 
it has become impossible for the parties to live together 
in peace and harmony, but once it is pronounced it is 
upheld as valid although there may be no good cause for 
it".1
Divorce is described in a precept of the
2
Prophet as 11 the worst of all things which the law permits”,
3
and a most abominable act hated by God”.
In spite of the ease with which divorce may be
effected by a Moslem husband, in the contemplation of
Sharia law, marriage, or nikah, must be intended as a
life-long union, hence in Sunni law, any condition or
stipulation by which the parties seek to set a time limit
to their union renders the whole contract a nullity, since
4it is an agreement contrary to the essence of marriage.
Divorce in Islamic law may be of three kinds:
(a) by prouncement of talak by the husband;
(b) by common consent of the parties;
(c) by judicial process, usually at the suit of the wife.
(a) Divorce by Talak
Talak, or divorce pronounced by the husband, may 
be revocable or irrevocable. A divorce is revocable when 
the husband is able to retract it during the idda of the 
wife. However, he is not allowed to withdraw a repudiation 
against the same wife more than twice, hence a third talak 
is final and irrevocable. Divorce is said to be irrevocable 
also if pronounced once only, while the wife is in a state 
of purity (tohur), provided there is no sexual intercourse 
between the parties during that period, and until
1. Abdur Rahmin, op.cit., p.335.
2. Ibid.,pp.335-336.
3o Ameer Ali (Syed), Position of Women in Islam,op.cit. 
Rafiq, op.cit.» p.11.
4. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit., p.328; Coulson, Succession 
in the Muslim Family, op.cit.,p.l7> Schacht, however. 
notes that the effect of a temporary marriage (mutTa ) 
can be achieved by an informal agreement outside the 
contract of marriage, see Schacht, op.cit., p.163.
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completion of the wife's idda. Divorce is irrevocable upon
the pronouncement of words-expressing irrevocability, for
example, MI have divorced thee irrevocably", or "I divorce
thee", said three times in succession, or "I have divorced
thee thrice", if only said once.^
Immediate irrevocable divorce is regarded as
particularly "blameworthy" from a moral standpoint, but
2
nevertheless it is legally valid0
A pronouncement of divorce by the husband is 
valid even if said in jest, or in a moment of anger,
3
provided he is of sound mind, is not a minor, and is awake. 
According to Maliki law, divorce pronounced by compulsion 
is invalid.^
The divorce operates from the time of the
pronouncement of talak. The presence of the wife is not
5necessary, nor need notice be given to her. It is for­
bidden for a man to repudiate his wife during her menstrual 
period, and according to Maliki law, a husband who does so 
will be constrained to take her back, and may be imprisoned 
and even beaten if he fails to do so.^ Repudiation of a
wife cannot be qualified by an option, but it may depend
on the fulfilment of a condition. Repudiation may be 
effected by an agent of the husband, who may even be the
7
wife herself. Fyzee notes that this type of delegated
1. See Ruxton, op.cit.t p. 129.
2. See Schacht, op.cit., p. 164.
5. See Jung, op.cit., p.50; Abdur Rahim, op.cit.« p«337.
4. See Ruxton, op.cit.t p.128; The Hanafi jurists consider 
divorce under compulsion as binding, see Jung, op.cit,.. 
p.49; Abdur Rahim, op.cit..p.537.
5. See ' Mohammad Shamsuddin v. Noor Jahan Begum [1955]
l.L.R. - Hyd. 418. .
6. See RuxtonLog. cit.,pp. 127-128.frut see Abdur Rahmin, op.cit.,
pp.336-337, a divorce pronounced while the wife is not 
in a state of purity is valid, although not regarded 
with approval.
7. See Ruxton, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
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divorce is perhaps the most potent weapon in the hands
of a Moslem wife to obtain her freedom without the
intervention of any court and is now beginning to be
fairly common in India. An agreement by which the
husband authorizes the wife to divorce herself from
him has been repeatedly held to be valid and irrevocable
in the Indian courts,'*’ but it is doubtful whether it would
be so regarded by the majority of Nigerian Moslem jurists.
A repudiation which is effected by a third person
who is neither an agent nor a proxy, but who has merely
the husband’s vague directions, has the same validity as
a bargain concluded by a third person who is not the
2
recognized agent of the buyer.
This unfortunate position of the wife under 
classical Islamic law, with reference to divorce, is com­
pounded by the fact that the power of divorce granted so 
liberally, to the husband, is virtually denied to the wife. 
The ease with which a husband can divorce his wife is only 
matched by the difficulty she faces when she wishes to 
divorce him against his wishes.
(b) Divorce by mutual consent
A divorce may be effected in Islamic law by the
mutual consent of husband and wife. If the desire to
separate emanates from the wife, it is called khul, but
if the divorce is effected by mutual aversion (and consent)
•3
it is known as mubara’ a . Fyzee asserts that
"Dissolution of marriage by the common consent of the 
spouses is a peculiar feature of Islamic law. Prior 
to Islam the wife had practically no right to ask for 
a divorce; it was the Koranic legislation which 
provided for this form of relief” .^
1. See Fyzee, op.cit.,p.!59; see also Fyzee, "The Muslim 
Wife’s Righx of Dissolving Her Marriage", 36 Bombay Law 
Report. 1936, pp. 113 and 123.
2. See Ruxton, op.cit.,p. 128.
3. See Coulson, Succession....fop.cit..p.19; Ameer Ali, op. 
cit.,p.507; Ruxton. op.cit., p.TZT,
4. Fyzee, op.cit., p.163; but see R. Smith, op.cit.,p.112 
et.al., who says that khul was known even before Islam. 
The first instance of Khula recorded by Muslim historians 
is the classical case of Sabit-bin-Kais, see Jung,
op.cit., p.54.
87
Contrary to this assertion, divorce by mutual 
consent is permitted by most customary law systems which 
allow divorce to a wife. It has been seen previously,^- 
that in most systems of customary law, the husband has 
unrestricted power to divorce his wife, although the 
formality involved may be greater than it is under Islamic 
law. In many systems, the wife has a similar right. Where 
both parties agree to the divorce, the position is rendered 
easier, and many divorces are actually effected by the 
mutual consent of the parties. The inducement offered by 
either party for the consent of the other is legally 
immaterial.
In Islamic law financial compensation is usual, 
but except in Shafifi law, is not an essential part of 
khul. Fyzee points out that
"The true position is that once common consent is 
proved and the dissolution has been effected, the 
question of releasing the mahr or making compensation 
is a question of fact to be determined with reference 
to each particular case, and there is no general 
presumption that the husband has been released of his 
obligation to pay dower
It seems that under Maliki law, release of a
wife from her marital bonds is "also lawful even without
■5
an indemnity or compensation being paid (musara1a )".
The nature of a divorce by talak and by khul was
explained fully in the Indian case of Moonshee Buzul-ul-
4Rahim v. Luteefut-oon-Nissa as follows:
"A divorce by Talak is the mere arbitrary act of the 
husband, who may repudiate his wife at his own 
pleasure, with or without cause. But if he adopts 
that course he is liable to repay her dowry, or 
dyn-mohr, and, as it seems to give up any jewels 
or paraphernalia belonging to her.
"A divorce by koola. fkhul1 ] is a divorce with the 
consent, and at the instance of the wife, in which
1. See above, Chapter VIII.
2. See Fyzee, op.cit., p.165.
5. Ruxton, op.cit.,pp.122-125.
4. [1861] 8 Moo. 1.A.379.
8 8
she gives or agrees to give a consideration to the 
husband for her release from the marriage tie. In 
such a case the terms of the bargain are a matter 
of arrangement between the husband and the wife, and 
the wife may, as the consideration, release her dyn- 
mohr and other rights, or make any other agreement 
for the benefit of the husband".-^
While khul* may not have been present in customary
law, mubara*a certainly was in most systems.
Khul1 and mubara1a operate as a single irrevocable
divorce, therefore marital life cannot be resumed unless
2
there is a formal remarriage.
(c) Divorce by .judicial process
Marriage may also be dissolved in Islamic law by
a judicial divorce granted by a court. The Maliki school
is most liberal in its provisions enabling a wife to obtain
divorce from her husband in a court of law, although the
other schools, to varying degrees, also recognize the right
of a wife to petition for judicial divorce on the broad
ground of the husband*s failure to fulfil his marital 
■3
duties. The grounds on which a Maliki wife may obtain 
a judicial divorce have been summarised by Coulson under
Zj.
four major heads.
(i) Physical or mental disease: which covers all cases of 
serious illness of the husband which would jeopardise 
the health of the wife if the marriage is allowed to 
continue.
(ii) Failure to maintain: whether due to inability or 
wilful refusal of the husband to do so.
(iii) Desertion: even where property of the husband is 
available to provide the wife with maintenance and
1. Moonshee Buzul-ul-Raheem v. Luteef1ut-oon-Nissa [l86l] 8 
Moo. 1.A.379 at 395: Fyzee Cases, op.cit.t p p .159»167»
2. See Fyzee, op.cit.,p.166; Coulson, Succession..., 
op.cit.,p.19?
3. See Coulson, Succession..., op.cit., p.19; traditional 
Hanifi law knows no doctrine of dissolution of marriage 
by judicial decree. If a decree of divorce is granted 
for a cause imputable to the husband, it has, generally 
speaking, the effect of faskh or annulment of marriage, 
see Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,p.329.
4. See Coulson, Succession..., op.cit., pp.19-20.
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support, she is entitled to a dissolution where the 
husband has absented himself without lawful reason 
and thus deprived her of the right of consortium.
(iv) Prejudice (Arabic darar), a residual ground which 
includes the husband*s physical or mental cruelty, 
and also covers cases of incompatibility which in 
effect amounts to a decree of divorce based on the 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
Judicial divorce and the procedure to be adopted 
to effect it are sanctioned by the Koran.
"Virtuous women are obedient, careful, during the 
husband*s absence, because God hath of them been 
careful. But chide those for whose refractoriness 
ye have cause to fear; remove them into beds apart, 
and scourge them: but if they are obedient to you,
then seek not occasion against them: verily God is High, 
Great'*
And if ye fear a breach between man and wife, then send 
a judge chosen from his family, and a judge chosen 
from her family: if they are desirous of agreement,
God will effect a reconciliation between them'*.2
These arbitrators, trustworthy adult men, are
not mere observors or witnesses, but judges who decide
whether there should be a divorce or not. According to
strict Maliki law, if they decide on a divorce, their
declaration to this effect has the force of a judicial
■3
decree. The judgment of the Kadi is not required.
In Nigeria, at least afrMaiduguri, such arbit­
rators act as advisors, and judgment is pronounced by the 
Kadi who invariably acts on their advice. The first duty 
of the court, through the arbitrators, is to endeavour to 
reconcile the parties. If reconciliation is impossible, 
and the husband is at fault, divorce is granted without 
compensation by the wife. If the wife is at fault they 
settle the amount which will secure her release, or they 
may refuse a divorce entirely.
1. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit., Sura IV, Verse 38, p.415.
2. Ibid., Verse 39, p.415.
3‘. See Ruxton, op.cit. t p. 120. Women are ineligible to
act as arbitrators.
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(d) Revocation of divorce and remarriage
If the pronouncement of divorce is revocable, a 
reconciliation between husband and wife' can take place 
during the wife's idda without a regular remarriage. The 
reconciliation may be by a formal revocation of talak or 
by resumption of marital life. The husband may revoke his 
pronouncement of divorce even against the wishes of the 
wife.^
In the case of an irrevocable divorce, however, 
the parties may only be remarried if
U ) the wife observes idda;
Ui) after observing idda the wife marries another
husband;
(iii) this second marriage is actually consummated and
lawfully dissolved, and
(iv) iddat is observed after the dissolution of the
P
second marriage.
If this procedure is not followed, remarriage to the former 
husband is batil and of no legal effect whatsoever. Con­
sequently any children born after such remarriage are
3
considered illegitimate.
The provision of a temporary husband in order to 
legalize remarriage with a thrice-divorced wife has Koranic 
approval.
"Ye may divorce your wives twice: Keep them honourably,
or put them away with kindness...But if the husband 
divorces her a third time, it is not lawful for him to 
take her again, until she shall have married another 
husband; and if he also divorce her, then shall no 
blame attach to them if they return to each other, 
thinking that they can keep within the bonds fixed 
by God"
1. Ruxton, op.cit., p.132; Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,pp.337-538.
2. See Schacht, op.cit.,p.l64; Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,p.357.
3. See Ameer Ali, op.cit., pp.202-205, for the rules of 
the various schools of law,
A. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit.
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Why did the Prophet Muhammad make such a law?
Various reasons have been advanced for the rule 
specifying the procedure for remarriage. It is said that 
the rule rendered obsolete ”a great engine of oppression 
in the hands of the pre-Islamic Arabs, who could keep their 
wives in a species of perpetual bondage, pretending to take 
them back after repeated divorces, merely for the purpose 
of preventing the wives from remarrying and from seeking 
the then much needed protection of a husband” .^ Another 
opinion is that the professed object of the law in adding 
this condition is to punish the former husband for his 
conduct in divorcing his wife, and to discourage hasty 
divorces
Cases of temporary husbands in order to legalize 
remarriages were of frequent occurrence. Muir, quoting 
Burckhardt ”A thousand lovers rather than one Mostahil; i.e. 
many lovers or gallants cause less shame to a woman than 
one Mostahil (i.e. husband procured for the occasion) says:
"According to the Moslem law, a person who has (thrice) 
divorced his wife cannot remarry her until she has been 
married to some other man, who becomes her legitimate 
husband, cohabits with her for one night, and divorces 
her next morning; after which the first husband may 
again possess her as his wife. Such cases are of 
frequent occurrence - as men in the haste of anger 
often divorce their wives by the simple expression 
(I divorce thee), which (thrice repeated) cannot be 
retracted. In order to regain his wife a man hires 
(at no inconsiderate rate) some peasant, whom he 
chooses from the ugliest that can be found in the 
streets”
Muir maintains that it is a sorry excuse that by 
this provision Muhammad wished to check inconsiderate 
divorce, since a good object is not to be sought for by 
such evil means. He says of the Koranic provision:
1. Faiz Badruddin Tyabji, Muslim Law (Bombav. 4th. edit., 
1969), p. 84.
2. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit., p.337; cf. Anderson, Law
Reform in the Muslim World, op.cit.', pp.72-73.
3. See Muir, op.cit., p.326.
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"Such flagrant breach of decency, such cruel 
violation of the modesty of an unoffending wife,, 
may be an abuse the full extent of which was not 
at that time contemplated by Mohamet; but it is not 
the less an abuse for which, as a direct result of 
the unnatural and revolting provision framed by him, 
Mohamet is responsible".-^
Divorce in Northern Nigeria
Ameer Alifs statement that divorce is rare among
2
advanced Moslem communities, does not represent the present 
position among the Moslem population of Northern Nigeria, 
where the instability of marriage and family life has 
reached alarming proportions. Anderson noted in 1959 that
"the number of divorces which occur in Northern 
Nigeria today is causing widespread anxiety among 
all thinking men and many suggestions have been 
made as to how the situation might be remedied".^
Nearly two decades later, the position has 
probably deteriorated even further, and some communities, 
for example, the Kanuri of Bornu State, allegedly have 
some of the highest divorce rates ever recorded. As 
Tables 9:1 and 9:2 show, of the 52 Kanuri women inter­
viewed during field-work in Maiduguri, 25 percent (15) were 
recorded as having married once only. Of the 16 women 
above the age of fifty, only one woman was married once 
only. The highest percentage of the women, 55.8 percent, 
were married two or three times and the 52 women together 
recorded a total of 155 marriages, an average of 2.6 
marriages for each woman. The rate of divorce is even 
higher among the men. The 54 Kanuri men interviewed 
registered 201 marriages, an average of 5.7 marriages per 
man. The highest percentage of men, 42.6 married four or 
five times and the four men above the age of fifty recorded 
forty marriages, an average of 10 marriages per man.
1. Ibid., p.526.
•2. See Ameer Ali (Syed) Legal Status of Muslim Women, op. cit., 
pp.58-59; see also Abdur kahim, op.cit., p p .340-3^1.
5. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit., p.212.
4. See Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit., p.125.
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TABLE 9:2
INCIDENCE OF MARRIAGES REPORTED BY KANURI 
MEN AND WOMEN INTERVIEWED AT MAIDUGURI BY
PERCENTAGES
Number of times 
married
Women (N.52)
°/o
Men (N.54)
%
Once only 25 14.8
Two or three times 53.8 35.3
Four or five times 21.2 42.6
Eight or more times Nil 7.4
100.0 100.1
These figures, although representing a very small 
section of the community, compare approximately with other 
surveys. For example, in 1971, Cohen in a sample of 116 
Kanuri men and 99 women, drawn equally from rural and 
urban areas, found that the men had married a total of 
504 times (an average of 4.4 marriages per man) while the 
women reported 237 marriages (an average of 2.4 marriages 
per woman).1 Of the 116 men, 10.6 percent were married
2
ten or more times, and 2.7 percent twenty or more times.
Cohen also compiled data of divorce rates from 
other parts of Africa, and from the United States of 
America which showed that "Kanuri rates in general are 
among the highest ever recorded.
1. Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit., p.67.
2. Ibid., p.66, Table 6:1.
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TABLE 9:3
KANURI DIVORCE RATES WITH COMPARABLE DATA 
FROM OTHER SOCIETIES
Divorce rates in percentages
Society A B C
Urban Kanuri (men) 74 98 75
Rural Kanuri (men) 52 79 56
Kanuri (corrected) 54 81 58
Bakweri (women) 42 66 54
Yao (women) 55 68 41
Ngoni (both sexes) 29 56 57
U.S.A. (1950, both sexes) 5 22 5
SOURCE: Cohen, Dominance and Defiance: A Study of Marital
Instability in an Islamic African Society.
Table 10:2, p.125.
A = the number of divorces as a percentage of the total
number of marriages.
B * the number of divorces as a percentage of all
completed marriages.
C = the number of divorces as a percentage of all marriages,
except those ending in death; See Cohen, op.cit., 
p.124. —
Although marriage instability seems to be highest 
among the Kanuri, other Moslem tribes of Northern Nigeria 
also record high frequency rates of marriage. For example, 
of the 27 women married to Hausa men interviewed by 
Hardiman,"*'55.6 percent (15) of them married once only,
57 percent (10) married twice, 5.7 percent (11) married 
three times, and 5.7 percent (1) married four times. These 
figures may be compared with the 10 women married to Yoruba/ 
Ibo men, interviewed in the same survey, 90% of whom were
1. See Margaret Hardiman, Women in Maiduguri. Report of 
Household Survey, Max Lock Group (Nigeria) Planning 
and Development Consultants, Part 7, Chapter 6, Table 6,
p. 7.6.11.
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married only once and 10 percent, twice.
Data from Zaria suggest that on the average 
Hausa women marry three or four times each.
Smith notes that among the Hausa "divorce is 
both frequent and easy, and the general desire for two 
wives apiece to safeguard them against dependence on one 
mate is itself a factor in maintaining the high rates of 
divorce".^ Begho states that there were 46,868 cases of
p
divorce recorded in Kano Emirate alone in 1958. Barkow 
notes that it is very common for a Hausa woman to be almost 
automatically divorced when she reaches the menopause, and 
that at least 35 percent of the women forty-five years of 
age or older he interviewed in one village were no longer 
married, compared to only 4 percent of the 30-44 age group.^ 
Moslem husbands divorce their wives with little 
or no provocation. In the Northern States it is the 
practice for a husband who has divorced his wife to give 
her a "letter of divorce". Without such authority, another 
man might refuse to marry her, since the former husband 
could easily deny his verbal renunciation. Some men who 
have divorced their wives, spitefully refuse to give them 
such a letter, hoping thereby to hamper the wives* chances 
of remarriage.
In one unfortunate case brought to the Social 
Welfare Office in Maiduguri, the husband refused to give 
his divorced wife a divorce letter, but when she took her 
case to the Market Area Court she was told by the Judge 
that he "would not solve the case with them since they have 
already divorced themselves". Although she was pregnant 
by him, the wife's lover refused to marry her or to even 
maintain her unless she produced a letter of divorce from 
her husband. She was in a dilemma, because she could not 
get a divorce either from her husband or from the court, 
and she could not get a man to marry, or be responsible 
for her unless she was divorced. She was the victim of
1. Smith, Governm ent in Zazzau\, op.cit,, p. 296.
2. Begho, op.cit., p.50.
3. Barkow, op.cit.,p.320.
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an archaic law, which has outgrown what usefulness it may 
have at one time possessed. Even when a letter of divorce 
is actually given, the husband may continue to deny the 
divorce. In one of the cases recorded in the Social Welfare 
Office, Maiduguri,"^ the husband asked the Welfare Officers 
in Kano to send back his wife and the child she had 
delivered for him in Maiduguri. Officers in Kano, after 
investigation, replied that he had divorced the wife when 
she was eight months pregnant and that the wife had shown 
them the letter of divorce duly signed by the husband 
which stated: ,fI divorce you. And after you deliver, you 
can marry any one you like. I wish you safe delivery” . 
Confronted with this evidence the husband confessed that 
the letter had been written in anger. He continued to
demand the return of his wife.
2
In another case, the husband claimed that the 
wife was quarrelling with the housegirl. He tried to 
settle the matter. The wife told him she could get married 
to some one else if she wanted to. He told her to go ahead 
.and do so. She packed her clothes, and when she was leaving, 
she asked him for a divorce paper. He gave her a letter of 
divorce. Later the wife wanted a reconciliation and said 
that it was anger that caused her to ask for the divorce 
letter, but the husband refused to take her back. The 
Social Welfare Officers were able to persuade him to pay 
her N6.00 a month maintenance allowance.
A divorce letter is usually a simple one. A 
typical example follows.
20/6/72
” To whom it may concern.
This is to certify that I the undersigned had 
devorced [sic] my wife by name S.P and henceforth 
duly authorise her to be married to anybody of 
her choice.
Signed. J.K.B.”
1. File No. SW0/FCW/50, dated 8 Nov. 1977.
2. File No. SWO/17/117. The actual names of the parties
have been withheld in order to protect their identity.
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Once such a letter is given, divorce is irrevocable, 
but if both parties want reconciliation, nothing stops them 
in fact, though not in law, from resuming marital life.
There were many instances recorded of couples divorcing and 
remarrying without any formalities, and it is doubtful 
whether the more uneducated elements of the society make a 
distinction between revocable and irrevocable divorce.
Cohen notes that the relative ease of divorce 
cannot fully explain the frequency of marital breakups, and 
quotes the example of North Dokota where, until recently, 
it was easier to obtain a divorce on legal grounds than in 
most of the States of the United States of America. Yet 
Dakota had, if anything, more stable unions than some other 
parts of the country.^ This is confirmed by the relative 
ease with which a husband in most systems of customary law 
in the Southern States of Nigeria could repudiate his wife, 
but until recently, divorce was relatively rare among such 
peoples.
Although ease of divorce may not be the most 
potent factor contributing to instability of marriage, there 
is no doubt that when a marriage can be effectively dissolved 
by the utterance of a few words said in the heat of anger, 
then it affects the regard with which the relationship is 
viewed by the parties, especially the wife, the subject of 
the repudiation. The mere threat or fear of divorce causes 
many wives to leave their husbands.
On the other hand, judicial divorce at the instance
of a Moslem wife is difficult to achieve in Nigeria.
Anderson notes that the vast majority of divorces in
2
Northern Nigeria are at the instance of the wife. This is 
because the wife cannot obtain a divorce without the consent 
of her husband, unless she obtains it in court. Men often 
exhibit a "dog in the manger"attitude, and cases are not 
infrequently found where a husband who does not really want
1. See Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit.
2. See Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa, op.cit., p.209: 
Greater frequency of divorce by wives is also a feature 
of marriage under customary law, and of marriage under 
the Nigerian Marriage Act; see further, Chapters VIII 
and X respectively.
99
his wife, nevertheless refuses to grant her a divorce,
or imposes such terms as he knows she is unable to fulfil,
Fyzee observes that
"greater suffering is engendered by the husband*s 
withholding a divorce than by his irresponsible 
exercise of this right. Under such conditions 
the power to release herself is the surest safe­
guard for the wife".-^
A wife may be powerless to release herself from a distasteful
2
marriage, as the case of Bukar Fantami v. Fanta Dambu shows. 
The husband in this case claimed that his wife refused to 
return to his house. Asked the reason for her refusal, the 
wife simply said that she did not love him. Pressed 
further for the reason why she did not love him, the wife, 
said "I hate him without any reason. It is my heart that 
hates him11. She refused to swear that it was not another 
man who had seduced her, and that she was not being forced 
to leave her husband by her parents. She was vehement, 
however, that she would not go back to her husband*s house, 
and offered to divorce him by the payment of money. Her 
guardian supported this offer. The court appointed two 
arbitrators each, for husband and wife, who agreed that the 
wife should pay M200.00 to the husband for the divorce.
Out of this sum the Area Court took away the dowry (bride- 
price) of N100.00, representing the price of a cow and a 
calf which the husband had given to the wife at the time of 
the marriage (sadak). The court gave the remaining H100.00 
to the husband and dissolved the marriage, since, said the 
Judge, "marriage will never be successful unless if there 
is love".
The husband appealed to the Upper Area Court, which 
ordered the wife to repay the entire N200.00 khuli to the 
husband, but confirmed the dissolution of the divorce. The 
husband further appealed to the Sharia Court of Appeal.
1. Fyzee, op.cit.t p.147.
2. [1977] Appeal No. SCA/CV/27/B0/76, unreported, Sharia
Court of Appeal, Bornu State, Nigeria, 11 Jan. 1977.
This case was translated from Kanuri, for the present 
writer, by Abrahim M. Bukar, former Registrar of the 
Sharia Court of Appeal, Maiduguri and his team. Thanks 
are hereby recorded to them and also to Mr. Segun 
Yerokun, Lecturer in Law, University of Maiduguri who 
organized the team.
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Three Judges, including the Grand Kadi Alhaji Baba Kurr 
Imam, allowed the appeal, and ordered that the wife should 
stay for a period of three months before having conjugal 
relations with her husband if she had contracted another 
f,marriage,,, but if not, then she should immediately return 
to her husband’s house. The court refused to grant her a 
dissolution of the marriage."1'
In Mallam Jidda of Gonamari v. Fatume Abu
2
Sakki, the husband alleged that the wife went out at 
random without his express permission, and did not do her 
domestic duties. The wife admitted that she had never 
starved for one day during the five and a half years of 
marriage to him, but she said she did not love him 
because he was too old. She refused to live with him any 
longer. The four arbitrators appointed by the court agreed 
that she should pay the husband H400.00, as the price of 
her divorce. The husband accepted the money, and the 
Court dissolved the marriage. The husband, however, later 
appealed to the Upper 'Area Court revoking his acceptance 
of the N400.00 payment on the ground that he had paid M886.00 
dowry, and had committed no wrong. He argued that he was 
either entitled to his wife, or the refund of the entire 
dowry. The Upper Area Court held that there was substance 
in the appeal, since the only offence of the husband was 
his old age, ’’which by itself is not an offence per se”.
The court ordered repayment of the entire dowry of M886.00 
by the wife.
In both of the above cases the husbands had 
committed no matrimonial offence considered sufficient to 
justify a divorce being granted to the wife. But the wife
1. Compare the case of Jamila, the wife of Quais, who 
demanded separation from her husband on the ground that 
she did not like him. She stated that she did not find 
any fault with him on account of his morals or his 
religion. She just did not like him. The case was 
heard by the Holy Prophet Muhammad himself who granted 
Khul a on condition that she should return the orchard 
received from the husband as dower, see Rafiq op.cit., 
p. 13.
2. [1976] Suit No. BUAC/CVA/284/76, unreported, Bornu Upper 
Area Court, Maiduguri, Nigeria - translated by Ibrahim 
M. Bukar, see above, p.78,n.3.
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may be denied a divorce even in cases where she alleges 
and proves the commission of a matrimonial offence by her 
husband. This fact is illustrated by the case of Jummai 
Muhammadu v. Alha.ji Dan Binta.~*~ In this case the wife 
sought a divorce on the grounds of
(a) physical cruelty of the husband which resulted in 
her deafness;
(b) insufficient food;
(c) the insulting language used by her husband of her 
parents;
(d) ill-health which she suffered whenever she had sexual 
intercourse with her husband, and which often left her 
ill for a week afterwards, and in need of medical 
assistance;
(e) confiscation by the husband of all property he had 
given her whenever they had a fight.
The wife swore to the truth of all five grounds.
The Area Court dissolved the marriage without awarding any 
payment to the husband, because of the fact that he had ill- 
treated the wife. The Court ordered the husband to refund the 
Ml,500 which the wife paid him as kulle before she instituted 
the divorce action. The case had a chequered career, but 
finally, the Sharia Court of Appeal ordered the wife to pay 
M800.00 to the husband, and confirmed the divorce granted 
by the lower court. In other words, in spite of all her 
complaints against the husband she had to pay to be divorced 
from him.
These cases illustrate the fact that, whether the 
husband is at fault or not, the wife may be asked to pay him 
kulle, usually the dowry, plus expenses he incurred on the 
occasion of the marriage, while if she is at fault or she 
alleges no fault against the husband she may be refused a
1. [1977] Suit No. SCA/CV/53/B0/76, unreported, Sharia
Court.of Appeal, Borno State, Nigeria, 29 March, 1977, 
- translated by Ibrahim M. Bukar, see above p. n
102
divorce.1 A husband1s old age may not be regarded as a 
matrimonial offence in law, but in the opinion of a young 
wife it may be a grave fault, since it may affect the 
performance of the husband1s marital duty.
Maliki law recognizes the right of a wife to 
the dissolution of a marriage on the grounds of:-
(a) physical or mental disease which would jeopardise 
the wifefs health if the marriage continues;
(b) failure to maintain;
(c) desertion; and
(d) a residual ground (darar: prejudice) which includes 
the husband1s mental cruelty, and also covers cases 
where the marriage has demonstrably broken down.
But a wife who claims a divorce on any of these
grounds has to prove, by reliable, legally qualified Moslem
witnesses, the truth of her statements, and this may prove
difficult in practice, since the evidence of women is not
accepted for this purpose. If she has no valid grounds for
divorce, she is forced to pay huge sums of money to regain
her freedom, sums which may be beyond her means, since the
sadak given by the husband at the time of the marriage,
2although- in law her own, may have been in fact consumed 
by her parents. The position is aggravated if she has 
been kept in seclusion, since she would have had little 
opportunity to earn money of her own, or less ability to 
do so.
Yahaya Muhammad notes that, despite the divorce 
and the general disapproval of divorce, there is as yet 
nothing concrete which the authorities of the Northern 
States have done to limit the unnecessary occurrence of
1. See also Abdu Bafillace v. Rabi, [1961] Suit No. 
SCA/CV17) 1961, unreported, Sharia Court of Appeal, in 
which it was held that the trial court had no power to 
impose a divorce on a husband upon payment of kulle by 
the wife. The Court reversed the decision of the trial 
court granting a divorce to the wife upon payment of 
kulle by her to the husband, although she was unable
to prove any of the established g rounds of divorce, 
see Isa Shani, op.cit., p.45.
2. See further, above, pp.56-57.
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divorce, by restricting the scope of its operation.'1'
Anderson correctly states that the stability of marriage 
should be safeguarded in any practicable way, but he 
also pertinently urges that
"what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the 
gander, so while a husband can divorce his wife 
at any moment and for any (or no) reason, it is 
difficult to speak convincingly about the sanctity, 
or stability of marriage; and it seems highly 
dubious how far it is wise for the Sharia Court of 
Appeal to attempt to override the customary law 
which prevails throughout the whole of West Africa".2
Refusal to grant divorce to women unless their 
husbands consent, or making it difficult for women to 
divorce unwanted husbands, is not the solution to marital 
instability, as the above statistics show. At present, in 
the Northern Islamic Emirates, the cards are all stacked 
against a woman divorcing her husband without his consent, 
yet women leave their husbands at a remarkable rate, 
whether they are divorced or not. They either set up in 
illicit cohabitation with a paramour, or indulge in out­
right prostitution, with disastrous consequences for the 
welfare of any children of the marriage. This illustrates 
the inability of law to regulate the practice of a 
community, and the wide divergence which could exist bet­
ween the theory of law, and the actual practice of the 
community. The law lags considerably behind the practice 
of the community in respect to divorce of women.
B. Dissolution by death
C. (1) The effect of death on marriage
The death of the husband or the wife operates 
in law as a dissolution of the marriage.
A widow has an obligation to mourn for her husband.
1. See Yahaya Muhammad, op.cit., p.36.
2. Anderson, "Islamic Law in Africa; Problems of Today 
and Tomorrow”, in Changing Law in Developing Countries, 
edit, by J.N.D. Anderson, op.cit.,.p.174.
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She may not, according to classical Islamic law, adorn 
herself with jewellery, khol [cosmetic], or any other 
means. She should wear only black, and avoid all perfumes 
or scented oil. The period of mourning varies, among the 
various schools, but is not less than four months, and 
ten days which is the idda required for a non-pregnant 
woman. ^
In the Northern States, however, custom seemed to 
have triumphed over Islamic law, and stringent morning 
observances are imposed on widows. Like a widow under 
customary law, the Moslem widow cannot bathe, nor change 
her clothes, comb her hair, or in any other way make 
herself attractive to other men. Interviewees in Maiduguri 
say that failure to observe the stipulated periods of 
mourning, which vary according to the circumstances, or to 
behave in the required manner, earns for the widow the 
hostility of the community, who may even accuse her of 
causing her husband1s death.
The important legal difference is, however, that
inheritance of a wife is not permitted by Islamic law. The
Koran expressly forbids men from marrying their fathers1 
2
wives. After the mourning period the wife is free to
dispose of herself as she desires, and she inherits a
portion of her husbandTs property, real and personal. This
aspect of law is dealt with in greater detail in the
chapter dealing with property, rights and succession to
property, but it may be noted here that Islamic law in
this respect, is more favourable to women than customary
law. Unfortunately for Nigerian Moslem women, as is shown
later, customary law is widely applied to matters of property
3
in the Northern States.
1. See Russell and Suhrawardy. First Steps in Muslim 
Jurisprudencet op.cit., p.41, pars, lpi-l3S. See 
also, Cohen, Dominance and Defiance, op.cit., p.115.
2. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit., Sura 4, werse 26, p.413. 
There is no legal bar preventing other relatives of the 
deceased husband from marrying the widow, see Jung,
op.cit., p . xxvii.
3. See further, Chapter XII, p. 368 and Chapter XIII, 
p p .449-451.
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(11) The practice of Idda (t)
Idda literally means counting and in Islamic
Law it is the time during which a wife must wait, after
the dissolution of her marriage, whether hy death or
divorce, before she can contract another valid marriage.
The jnarriage must have been consummated in fact or in
law^ and the period varies according to the circumstances.
The idda of a pregnant woman lasts until her
delivery. For a non-pregnant widow the period is four
months and ten days. In all other cases the term is
three periods of purity, (tohur) or if the wife does not
menstruate, for example, a very young girl, or a menopausal
2
woman, three months.
The reason for the imposition of idda on a wife 
is mainly to ascertain, with some degree of certainty, 
the paternity of a child born to the wife after the 
termination of the marriage, whether by divorce or death. 
Another reason is the opportunity it gives for reconciliation 
between the parties, as a revocable divorce can be revoked 
by the husband before the idda of the wife is ended. Since 
a woman*s marriage may be ended without her knowledge, she
3
may observe idda without her knowledge.
According to Maliki law, a repudiated wife should 
lead a retired life while keeping the idda. She may not 
change her residence without a good reason, and must be 
maintained by her husband, although the idda of a widow 
is at her own expense. If a woman remarries to another 
husband during the period of her idda, the marriage is 
void (batil) and any children born within six months of 
the divorce are affiliated to the divorced husband.
1. See Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,p.54l.
2. See Ruxton, op.cit.,pp.l4l-l45: Ameer Ali, op.cit.,pp.499- 
500; Abdur Rahim, op.cit.,p.541; Rodwell, TEe Koran,
op.cit., Sura 2, verse 229.
5. See Ameer Ali, op.cit.,p.499*
4. See Ruxton, op.cit.,pp.142-145; See also Joseph Schacht, 
nForeign Elements in Ancient Islamic Law1* Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law, Third 
aeries, Vol.XXXil, Parts HI'and IV, pp.9-17,
Although idda is not entirely unknown to customary 
law^ it is not frequently found in customary systems of law 
and thus provides an interesting contrast with customary 
law, where in most systems, all children conceived after 
the repayment of the dowry are not legally affiliated to 
the divorced husband.
7. Conclusion and Recommendations
A. Summary and conclusion
The legal status of women in Islam has been the
subject of much controversy. Moslem as well as non-Moslem
writers have made conflicting claims as to the status
2
accorded by Islamic law to women. Thus, Ma'aji Isa Shani
asserts flthat Islam proclaimed that men and women, by virtue
of their humanity, were the equal of each other and when they
lived together, just as man had certain rights over woman,
so had woman rights over man". Similarly, Muhammad Yahaya
says that from "the beginning of Islam down to the present
time her position has been one of honour in the eyes of the 
L
law", and Ameer Ali, writing as late as 1880, pointed out 
that under the Islamic laws a woman occupies ^superior 
legal position to that of her English sister.
Contrary to these sentiments, Muir is not con­
vinced that the institutions of Muhammed have tended to 
elevate and improve the status of women, for he says that 
in Islam:
1. In Igbirra customary law a divorced woman cannot remarry 
within ten months of a divorce. If she does so any child 
born of the new union belongs to the divorced husband, see 
Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo [1961] N.R.N.L.R. 81 and above, 
Chapter II, p .183.
2. See Ameer Ali, (Syed), The Legal Position of Women in 
Islam, op.cit.; also Rafiq, The Status of Women in 
Islam, op.cit.; Ameer Ali, Mahommedan Caw, op.cit., pp.15- 
lb; Levy op.cit., p.91-134; Fitzgerald, op.cit.,p.54; 
Coulson, A History of Islamic Laws, op.cit., pp.14-15;
Gui11aume, op.cit., pp.71-72»
Muhammad Yahaya, op.cit. ,p.32.
See Ameer Ali, The Legal Position of Muslim Women, op.cit., 
p.16; Rafiq, op.cit., p.b.
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nthe condition of a woman is that of a dependant, 
.destined for the service of her lord, liable to be 
cast off without the assignment of any reason and 
without the notice of a single hour...Thus restrained 
and secluded, liable at the caprice or passion of the 
moment, to be turned adrift, it would be hard to say 
that the position of a wife was improved by the Code 
of Mahomet. Indeed, it may be doubted whether she 
was not possessed of more freedom, and exercised a 
healthier and more legitimate influence under the 
pre-existing institutions of Arabia".
It would be futile to pretend that there is
equality between the sexes in Islamic law. The laws of
divorce, the toleration, if not encouragement of polygyny
and concubinage, but not of polyandry, and the rules of
succession, whereby a man is given twice the share of his
sister, are only a few of the inequalities in Islamic law
which negative any such assertion. Nawaz correctly says:
"As to equality between the sexes, Islamic law rules 
are rather notorious. True, Islamic law considerably 
improved the position of women, but it did not 
advocate equality between the sexes. On the contrary, 
the position of women, whether in respect to social 
or property rights is far inferior to that of man".^
"It is true", says Rahman, "that Islam, in theory, gives
a certain status to the woman but, in actual practice, she
is much inferior to man, and economically, a virtual slave
of the latter". In fact the superiority of the male sex
L\.
is enshrined in the Koran itself.
In spite of the unequal position of women in 
Islamic law, however, it would be unrealistic to ignore 
the fact that Muhammad made genuine attempts to alleviate
1. Muir, Life of Mohamet, op.£it.,pp.524-325; see also 
Mazhar ul Haq'ffhan, PurcTah and Polygany, op.cit., p. 195: 
"Among all the civilizations of the modern World, the 
Muslim has suppressed them [women] most. It is due to 
the institutions of purdah and polygamy and the ideology 
behind them.
2. M.K. Nawaz, "The Concepts of Human Rights in Islamic Law", 
Howard Law Journal, Vol.II, Spring, 1965, p.525 at p.528.
5. Munibur Rahman, "Movement for the Emancipation of Women 
in Persia", Bulletin of the Institute of Islamic Studies, 
No. 1, 1957, pp.2^-59, at p.26.
4. Rodwell, The Koran, Sura IV, verse 58; see also Woodsmall, 
Moslem Women Enter a New World (New York: Round Table 
tress, l<33b), p.375.
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the legal iniquities imposed on women in many respects.
His reforms of the traditional Arabic customs must.be 
viewed in the light of the contemporary societies of his 
day. Today, his reforms may fall short of perfection, 
and compare unfavourably with the legal status of women as 
propounded by the different organs of the United Nations, 
but at the time they were initiated by the Prophet, they 
must have been revolutionary.'*'
Comparatively speaking, Islamic law as propounded 
in the Koran, and the theoretical writings of the classical 
jurists, is generally favourable to women. But unfortunately, 
there is a wide gulf between theory and actual practice. The 
laws which rule the lives of the Moslem peoples have never 
been co-extensive with pure Islamic law, although this last 
has always formed an important ingredient of them. Schacht 
says:
l!We must think of the relationship of theory and 
practice in Islamic law not as a clear division 
of spheres but as one of interaction and mutual 
interference, a relationship in which the 
theory showed a great assimilating power, the 
power of imposing its spiritual ascendancy even ^ 
when it could not control the material conditions11.
Robinson notes that this dichotomy of theory and 
practice is observable "nowhere more so than in the 
Central Soudan". This - statement, although made in 1896, 
remains basically true today, in reference to the practice 
of Islamic law in the Moslem areas of Northern Nigeria.
The aim of this work is not to ascertain the 
theoretical legal status of women, but to provide evidence 
of the legal rights and obligations actually accorded to 
women in marriage and family life, and it is in this sense
1. See Rafiq, op.cit., pp.6-7.
2. Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, op.cit.,p.84.
See also "Islamic Law and Customary Law in French North 
Africa," Journal of Comp, and Int. Law,Third Series Vol. 
XXXII, Parts III and"IV, pp.57-65 at p.59.
3. See Charles Henry Robinson, Hausaland: or Fifteen
Hundred Miles through the Central Soudan, op.cit.,
p. 192. '
that the legal status of women in Islamic law must be 
evaluated. Islamic law has infiltrated the customary 
law and become fused therewith, but it has been seen that 
in a number of important points, even in the most conser­
vative Islamic areas of the Northern States, customary law 
has continued to prevail over the pure Maliki doctrine.
Consequently, the factors which serve as indices 
of the low legal position of women in customary law 
marriage are all present, and for the most part intensified 
among the Moslem community.
Thus polygamy, which made sense in an earlier 
stage of human development, but which is now regarded as 
offensive to civilized conscience in most modern 
communities, (Moslem communities not excepted),^ flourishes 
to a much greater extent in the North than it does in 
Southern Nigeria. The pressure of progressive public 
opinion against polygamy, due to the influence of modern 
education, and the exposure to modern ideas through 
Western contact, which may act as an effective factor in 
reducing the practice, is totally absent. An educated 
wife precludes the idea of polygamy. Education among 
Moslem women in the North is sadly deficient.
Similarly, the twin evils of child-marriage and 
forced marriages are more prevalent in the Moslem areas 
than they are in the South. Arbitrary divorce by husbands 
does not aid marital stability. Indiscriminate divorce is 
the rule rather than the exception among Northern Moslems. 
Consequently, marital instability is extraordinarily high, 
and the main casualties are the children of the marriage.
The practice of purdah is considered prestigious, 
yet it has been established that purdah system robs 
its practitioners, not only of physical but of mental 
vitality. Mazhar ul Haq Khan writes of the unfavourable
1. See Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World, op.cit., 
pp.59-64, et al.
2. See above, Chapter I, p.117.
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conditions in which purdah girls live and grow up. He 
says:
They soon begin to suffer in body, mind, health 
and vitality. Naturally, the incidence of ill- 
health and disease is much greater among purdah 
women than among men. They are, therefore, less 
healthier, and live shorter lives, as they have 
lesser chances of survival in times of ill-health 
and disease than their men folk due to their lowered 
vitality.
Some of their bodily troubles are specially -caused by 
the Purdah system, such as osteomalacia, or the - 
gross deformity of bones, especially of the pelvis, 
due to malfunctioning of calcium metabolism, caused 
by lack of sunlight and open air...."^
Similarly Vaughan, who worked as a doctor in a 
hospital in Kashmir, writes of purdah :
"This miserable state of affairs, all too common in 
the East, whereby the woman is to all intents and 
purposes a prisoner in her own home, leads to gross 
pelvis deformity, rendering the birth of children 
difficult, and unnecessarily dangerous, if not 
impossible, and can be prevented by providing her 
with light”.2
The impact of the purdah system as an obstacle
to effective female education and the active participation
of women in public life is too obvious to need further 
3
emphasis.
B . Re c ommendati ons
Islam as practised in Northern Nigeria calls 
for modernisation. A change in social circumstances
1. Mazhar ul Haq Khan, Purdah and Polygamy: A Study in 
Social Pathology of T;he Muslim Society, op.cit.,pp.77- 7?.
2. Kathleen Olga Vaughan, The Purdah System and its 
effects on Motherhood, (.Cambridge, 1928,), pp.3?-38.
3. See Report of the Commission Ap-pointed to Enquire 
into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying 
them, op.city, p . w h e r e  it is stated that the non- 
Moslem communities in Northern Nigeria expressed fears 
that the system of purdah "would be extended and made 
compulsory".
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provides an adequate justification for a change in the 
law. Urgent progressive reforms are necessary, especially 
in relation to the laws of divorce, child-marriage, forced 
marriages and the purdah system. Universal compulsory 
education for girls, which is necessary in order to safe­
guard the effectiveness of the legal reforms, is also 
urgently necessary.^
The whole of the Sharia is regarded as based on 
divine revelation, and this is particularly true of family 
relations. Provisions in the Koran relating to marriage
and family life are more abundant and explicit than in any
2
other sphere of life. Moslem rulers were therefore 
unwilling to forsake or amend the Sharia. But from 1915 
onwards, the "wind of change" has blown across the Moslem 
world, and revolutionary changes have been made in marriage 
and family law. Recently the wind has changed into a gale 
and there is hardly any aspect of Islamic family law that 
has been left untouched. Some of the reforms include 
polygamy, the minimum age of marriage, consent to marriage, 
registration of marriages, and the laws relating to divorce 
and succession. ^
A significant feature of these reforms is that 
in the majority of cases they were promulgated by an 
executive or legislature which was predominantly Moslem. 
Nigerian Moslem leaders, therefore, have no valid justification 
for the failure to effect family law reforms either in theory 
or in practice. The need for reform is recognized, and 
various aspects of the law which need reform has received 
attention from Northern Moslem writers, but so far nothing 
has been done.
1. See P. Thomas, Indian Women Through the Ages (Bombay,
Asia Publishing House, .196^+), pp.pl5-3k; _the abolition 
of child-marriage in India was a crucial -factor in opening 
up the' alternative of education to 'the female -child.
2. See Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World,o p .cit., p.38.
3. Ibid.,pp.100-162; see also Coulson, Succession in the 
Muslim World, op.cit.,p p .13-28; -Munibar Rahman, Movement 
for the" Emancipation of women, in Persia, -op. cit.,
pp.26-39.
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CHAPTER X
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN STATUTORY MARRIAGE
1. Introduction
i
| In contradistinction to the introduction of
[
| Islamic law, the introduction into Nigeria of English law
and monogamous marriage revolutionized the laws of marriage 
and family life in Nigeria. It is a little less than a 
I century since the first statute regulating the formation
of a monogamous marriage was introduced into Nigeria.
| What has been its effect on the legal status of Nigerian
! women?
| It has been seen that the number of marriages
| contracted under the Nigerian Marriage Act is relatively
few in contrast to the number of marriages contracted under
customary or Islamic laws.^ But the impact made on women1 s
status by the introduction of English laws cannot be
judged solely by a statistical criterion. Although English
marriage laws are confined to marriages contracted under
2the Nigerian Marriage Act, and to marriages celebrated 
elsewhere which are recognized as valid monogamous marriages 
in Nigeria, their impact has a more far-reaching effect.
Until the introduction of English law and statutory 
marriage, Nigerian societies were characterized by male 
predominance, and in the eyes of the law the status of
women was subordinate to that of men. It has been seen in
previous chapters that in both customary and Islamic law 
marriages,in traditional society, the husband is the 
authoritative head of the family, with extensive powers over 
the person and property of his wife. Many legal rights 
given to the husband - for example, the practice of poly- 
| gamy - are denied to the wife in nearly all Nigerian
| 1. See further, Chapter II, p.175.
I 2. Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958
i Revision.
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societies. In many societies the wife is legally in the 
custody of her husband.
The legal supremacy of the Nigerian husband was 
unassailed until, with the introduction of English law, 
some measure of equality between husband and wife was also 
introduced. The principle of equality of rights and duties 
between husband and wife removed many of the legal dis­
abilities to which women were subjected under customary 
and Islamic law marriages. The favourable position 
accorded to women under English laws has imperceptibly 
pervaded the spirit and practice of customary law. Many 
of the innovations observed in modern customary law - for 
example, the wife*s right to maintenance by her husband‘d - 
can be indirectly traced to the introduction of western 
ideas and English law. The introduction of English law 
has affected, not only the practice of the people, but also 
judicial and legislative attitudes. In this respect, the 
introduction of English law has had a greater impact on the 
legal status of Nigerian women than is evident from the 
relatively small minority of women whom it affects directly.
The laws which govern the celebration, validity, 
and incidents of monogamous marriage herein referred to as
"statutory” marriage are found mainly in the Nigerian
2 3Marriage Act, 1914, the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970
and the common law, equity and relevant statutes of general
4
application received into Nigeria.
As previously noted, under the Republican con- 
stitution of Nigeria 1963, as well as under the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, the Federal 
Government has exclusive legislative jurisdiction in all
1. See further, above, Chapter VII, pp.589*3 and below 
Chapter XII, '
2. Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
5. Decree No. 18 of 1970.
4. See above, Chapter II, pp. 193-196.
5. Section 69, item 23 of the Schedule, Part I
Exclusive Legislative List; see also Babalola v.
Babalola [1974] N.M.L.R. 55.
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matters relating to the "formation, annulment and dissolution 
of marriages other than marriages under Islamic law and 
customary law including matrimonial causes relating 
thereto"
The present chapter gives a brief account of the 
historical antecedents of the Marriage Act and the Matri­
monial Causes Decree, 1970.
The history of a statute, although usually 
ignored by lawyers, very often reveals the reasons which 
prompted its enactment, and the social, economic, or 
political policy inherent in its provisions. Such know­
ledge leads in turn to a greater understanding of the 
statute which may create an empathy between the inter­
preters and the promulgators, which, eventually may result 
in a more harmonious interpretation of the statute.
The historical antecedents of a statute embraces 
not only the parliamentary debates, but, and this is 
especially relevant in the colonial context, the various 
confidential reports, observations, letters of advice, 
criticisms and instructions contained in dispatches which 
were necessarily transmitted between the officials in the 
Colonial Office in London, and the administrative officers 
in the colony. Very often, the history of a statute 
reveals that it is the brainchild of a single administrator 
bent on imposing his social policy on the local inhabitants, 
regardless of the social reality in which the statute is 
forced to operate. The reaction of the people to the 
particular piece of legislation may, in such a case be 
very important in an assessment of the statute, and may 
explain the effectiveness or otherwise of its provisions.
The history of the statute is particularly 
pertinent in the case of the Nigerian Marriage Act. This 
statute had a chequered career before it eventually 
reached the statute books, has been the subject of bitter
1. Sections 4(2) - 4(5); item 58, Second Schedule, Part I, 
Exclusive Legislative List, Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
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controversy and criticism since then, and, as shall he 
seen shortly, has produced conflicts in its interpretation 
and application, many of which are not yet resolved.
Some of the conflicts produced by the introduction 
of statutory marriage into Nigeria will be spotlighted here.
The primary aim of this, and the next chapter, 
however, is to examine the extent to which the laws of 
statutory marriage are similar to, or vary from, those of 
customary and Islamic law marriages, and to consider the 
effect in real terms of some of the innovations on the legal 
status of women in marriage. In pursuance of this aim, on 
most of the topics discussed in these two chapters, 
especially in relation to the formation, incidents and 
dissolution of marriage, attention will mainly be focussed 
on areas of significant change in the law.
The topics discussed in this chapter are centred 
on the history and formation of statutory marriage, while 
the incidents and dissolution of the marriage are post­
poned for discussion in Chapter XI.
HISTORY AND NATURE OF STATUTORY MARRIAGE
A. The Historical Background
(1) Introduction
The earliest statutory provision relating to
marriage in Nigeria was the Marriage Ordinance 1863,^ which
provided for 11 the granting of licences for marriage in the
2
Settlement of Lagos and its dependencies” . The Registration 
Ordinance, providing for registration of births, deaths and
1. Ordinance No. 10, Lagos, 1863.
2. The Lagos dependencies were territories near or adjacent 
to Lagos not extending further to the westward than the 
second degree of east longitude - see C.0.879/20,
Dispatch No. 441, dated 18th Sept. 1882, p.208.
1 1 6
marriages, was also enacted in 1863."^ But the first
legislation regulating the form of marriage, and the
manner in which it is celebrated, was the Marriage
2
Ordinance, enacted on 19 November, 1884. This Ordinance 
repealed all existing Ordinances relating to marriage, and 
extended to the whole of the Gold Coast Colony and the 
protected territories. In 1886, Lagos was separated from 
the Gold Coast Colony,^ but the Marriage Ordinance 1884 
continued to apply to Lagos.
None of the above Ordinances applied to the
5
Protectorates of Northern or Southern Nigeria, but in 1900^
g
and 1907, Marriage Proclamations, were enacted for the 
Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria, respectively. 
These Proclamations., contained provisions similar to those 
of the Marriage Ordinance 1884. When the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria and the Colony of Lagos were merged in 
1906 to form Southern Nigeria, the Proclamation, of 1900, 
which had applied to the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 
was repealed, and the Marriage Ordinance 1884 applied to 
the new entity, Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1914, on 
the merger of Northern and Southern Nigeria, the Marriage
o
Ordinance 1914 was enacted. This statute repealed all
1. Ordinance No. 21, Lagos, 1863, enacted on the 18th 
October, 1863.
2. No. 14 of 1884.
3. The Ordinances repealed were Ordinance No.10 of 1863,
No.21 of 1863 f,as relates to the registration or 
solemnization of marriages, and any Ordinance or part 
of any Ordinance now in force relating to the solemn­
ization or registration of marriages within the Colony’1.
- see S.l Marriage Ordinance, 1884.
4. See further, above, Chapter I, pp.70-78.
3. Marriage Proclamation, 1900. For the history of this 
proclamation see H.F. Morris, ’’The Development of 
Statutory Marriage Law in 20th Century British Colonial 
Africa”, in the forthcoming issue of Journal of African 
Law, r 19791.
6. Marriage Proclamation, 1907, No.l of 1907, Laws of the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.
7. See above, Chapter I, p. 75.
8. No. 18 of 1914. This statute repealed the Marriage 
Ordinance 1908, the Marriage Proclamation 1907, and the 
Foreign Marriage Ordinance 1913.
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previous marriage Ordinances and Proclamations, and applied 
throughout Nigeria. The 1914 statute, with minor amendments, 
and renamed the Marriage Act, continues to regulate the 
celebration and validity of marriages in Nigeria. Its 
provisions are substantially similar to those of the 
Marriage Ordinance 1884. A brief discussion of the history 
of this important legislation would therefore help to clarify 
the issues in the subsequent analysis of some of the more 
important provisions of the present Nigerian Marriage Act."*'
2
(11) The Marriage Ordinance, 1884
Parr suggests that African statutory marriage 
laws were enacted out of deference to the wishes of the 
early Christian Missions, who were hostile to certain features 
of customary law marriages, such as the practice of polygamy, 
widow inheritance and the payment of dowry. These Missions, 
it is alleged, were generally unable to enforce their 
religious ideas of marriage on the native population by 
mere persuasion, and needed the authority of the Government,
4in the forms of laws, to enable them to effect their purpose.
It is an undeniable fact that the Missionaries 
generally disapproved of African customary law marriage, 
especially in its treatment of women, and the low position 
to which wives were relegated in marriage and family life.
But it is also a fact that the Marriage Ordinance, 1884, was 
not initiated by the Missionaries for the purpose of 
imposing the English monogamous form of marriage on the 
population, nor, in fact, did they approve of some of the
5
provisions of the statute when it was finally enacted.
1. Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, 
retitled "Act" in accordance with the Designation of 
Ordinances Act, 1961, No. 57 of 1961, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, s.2(1). See further, Chapter I,p. 58,
2. No. 14 of 1884.
3. See Martin Parr, "Marriage Ordinances for Africans",
27 Africa, 1947, pp.1-7; Dorothy Dee Vellenga, "Attempts 
to Change the Marriage Laws in Ghana and the Ivory Coast" 
in Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modern­
ization edit, by Philip Foster and Aristide Zolberg, 
on.cit.. pp.123-150 at p.134.
4. See Kasunmu and Salacuse,Nigerian Family Law,op.cit.,p.49.
footnote 5 continued.............
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For example, most Missions wanted the marriage age at which 
parental consents are required for a marriage under the 
statute to be fifteen to eighteen years, especially for 
women, instead of the twenty-one years for both spouses, 
which was finally enacted.^"
p
The Marriage Ordinance, 1884, originated as a 
direct result of a letter written by Mr. Buhl of the Basle 
Missionary Society to Governor Lees, requesting him to 
certify as lawful, marriages celebrated between German sub­
jects in the Gold Coast. These marriages were celebrated 
"according to English law, viz., according to the law of the 
Gold Coast Colony", and certification was necessary, in 
order for the marriages to be recognized as legal in 
Germany.
Mr. Buhl*s letter was sent by Governor Lees to 
Acting Chief Justice Jackson for his comments. Justice 
Jackson noted that banns had been published and marriages 
solemnized by ministers of the different Christian sects, 
but he was of the opinion that valid legal marriages could 
only be solemnized in the Gold Coast Colony by a priest in 
Holy Orders of the Church of England. It was therefore 
necessary to make provisions for the solemnization of 
marriages by Ordinance under which all marriages celebrated 
by the churches would be legally valid. He stated his 
opinion thus:
"Native law of marriage there is not. The con­
ception of marriage is utterly unknown to that 
law. The native contract euphemistically trans­
lated as 1marriage1 is utterly different from 
marriage.
This being so, and it being also true that the 
English law here is to be sought entirely on the 
Ordinances passed by that legislative authority 
which has been acquired by the Government, it is
Footnote 5 continued  See Philips, Survey of African
Marriage, pp.412-413, for the viewpoints of the Missions 
on statutory marriages in Nigeria* see below, pp 146-147.
1. See e.g. the letter dated 26 March, 1879 from Rev. P.
Lonapre, of the Roman Catholic Mission Lagos, suggesting
17 years for women, and the letter of Rev. F. Buhl of the 
Basle Missionary Society, dated 25 April, 1879 suggesting
18 years - C.0.879/20-216, p.30. See further below,pp.170-171.
2. No. 14 of 1884.
footnote 3 continued..........
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necessary to observe that there is not any special 
marriage ordinance".^
The recommendations of Justice Jackson were sent
by the Colonial Office to Sir Chalmers, who agreed that there
was a sufficient reason for passing an Ordinance providing
definitely for the legal constitution of marriages "where
either of the parties professes the Christian religion", and
2for the registration of such marriages.
He recommended that an Ordinance following the
principles and, in most respects, the details of the Hong
Kong Ordinance, with such modifications as may be requisite
to adapt its provisions to local circumstances, would be 
3
appropriate.
The recommendations of Chalmers, as well as copies 
of the Hong Kong and Ceylon Marriage Ordinance, were forwarded 
by Sir Michael Hicks Beach, Secretary of State, to the 
Governor of the Gold Coast with instructions that a draft 
Ordinance for the Colony should be prepared by Justice 
Jackson, and forwarded to him (Beach) for consideration.^
It is therefore clear that the Marriage Ordinance 
was a direct response to the need to provide legal machinery 
for marriages of Europeans in the Gold Coast Colony, and in 
the drafting period, there is little evidence of ouvert 
pressure by Missionaries to influence its provisions, 
although their presence behind the scenes cannot be 
entirely ruled out.
From its drafting stage, the Ordinance attracted 
a great deal of adverse criticism which has continued 
throughout the century of its existence. Initiated in 1879, 
it had a turbulent career, before it was finally enacted 
on the 19th of November, 1884. Four drafts were prepared, 
three of them by eminent lawyers, but each draft was criticized 
as not being suitable, by one sector of the community, or the
Footnote 3 continued....
3. See dispatch No. 203, dated 12th October, 1878, enclosurel 
in No. 1, dated July 29, 1878, C .0.879/20-201.
1. Ibid.,See enclosure 2 in No. 1, p.202.
2 . No.3, dated 3 December, 1878, pp.202-203.
3. Ibid., p.203.
4. C.O. 879/20, p.203, Dispatch No.190, dated 9 Jan. 1879.
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other.
The first draft, prepared by Mr. Justice Jackson,^ 
would have legalised only such marriages as were solemnized 
in a place of worship, thereby making marriage a purely 
religious affair. The relevant section of his draft 
provided:
"No marriage shall be valid which would be null and 
void on the ground of kindred or affinity in England 
or Wales. A marriage shall be null and void if both 
parties knowingly and wilfully acquiesce in its 
solemnization in any place other than a licensed 
place of worship (except when authorised by special 
licence), or under a false name or names, or without 
publication of banns or licence duly issued or by a 
person not being a competent minister.
But no marriage shall after celebration be deemed 
invalid, by reason that any provision of this ordinance 
other than the foregoing has not been complied with".2
In a letter accompanying the draft he explained 
his reasons for making such a proposal:
"Regarding as I do marriage as the foundation of 
social progress, I think that care should be taken 
not to discourage it, and in my opinion the publication 
that the law regards it as a mere civil contract, and 
that the religious ceremony is not of its essence, 
would tend thereto by immediately quenching the 
enthusiasm kindled by the ministers. This is why I 
have changed the Pagan Celebration* into the 
Christian * solemnization*"
3
The learned Justice conveniently forgot, that in 1879, the
L
overwhelming majority of the Nigerian population, and
many of the Europeans, were non-Christians. He also forgot
that marriage in English law, as well as in many other
5
European countries,was a civil contract.
1. Ibid., Dispatch No. 441, dated 18 Sept. 1882, Enclosure 6 ,
pp.210-211.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid..Dispatch, 441, dated 18 Sept. 1882, enclosure 5* 
dated 11 Feb. 1879, p.210.
4. See the letter Sir Samuel Rowe, K.C.M.G.sent to the Colonial
Office, dated 1 August, 1882, explaining his reasons for 
introducing his own Marriage Ordinance Bill into the 
Legislative Council. C.O. 879/20. pp.206-207.
5. Ibid., See the comments of Robert Campbell in a letter
written to the Acting Assistant Colonial Secretary,
dated 3 March, 1879: "fully three-fourths of the popu­
lation of Lagos are Mohammedans and pagans” .
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Two comments, representative of the general 
reaction to this proposal are reproduced' here. The first,
from a member of the native population of Lagos, Mr. J.H.
1 2 Willoughby, is produced in full in the appendix; the
orher is a paragraph taken from the letter of Mr. Alfred
Maloney, Administrator of the Gold Coast:
"African marriage is different to that which obtains 
among Christian communities. But notwithstanding 
the looseness of the tie, as understood among the 
natives, and however wanting in our estimation it 
may be in any attribute of sanctity, it is desirable 
that the action taken by the Government should not 
if possible be allowed to operate so as to render the 
tie even looser and less sacred than it is under 
present circumstances, and to convert, through 
ignorance or the ignoring social circumstances, a 
union looked upon in native estimate (although 
perhaps of not a high standard) with respect, from 
the position now occupied by it to the lower, even 
in their minds, one of concubinage which I believe 
it is considered already in a Christian sense, or 
may be worse, of prostitution. Whatever we do, our 
action, executive, or legislative, should elevate 
generally rather than degrade".^
More practical, but no less penetrating, was the 
criticism of Mr. Robert Campbell. He reminded the 
authorities that fully three-fourths of the population of 
Lagos were heathens and Mahomedans, both of whom observe 
some formality in engaging in marriage, but neither of whom 
solemnize it by means of religious rites or ceremonies in a 
church. He asked the pertinent question:
"Will these then be considered by the law as unmarried 
and consequently acquitted of all obligations of 
parents for their progeny"?^
Lord Ussher, the Governor, no doubt actuated by 
these and other adverse criticisms of Justice Jackson*s 
draft, asked Thomas Woodcock, Queen*s Advocate, to prepare
1. See C.O. 879/20, p.213 - Dispatch No. 441 dated 18 Sept. 
1882, letter dated 8 Mar. 1879.
2. See Appendix I,below, p.123.
3. C.O. 879/20, p.208 - Dispatch 441, dated 18 Sept. letter 
dated 18 Sept. 1882.
4. Ibid.,pp.14-15.
5. See C.O. 879/20-212. p.23, Dispatch 441, 18 Sept. 1882, 
letter of 3 March, 1879.
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an alternative draft. This latter draft, followed the
Hong Kong Marriage Ordinance.^" It differed from Justice
JacksonTs draft in that it gave the parties to a marriage
the option of celebrating their marriage by a religious
ceremony in a church, or by a civil ceremony before the
2
registrar of a district.
Governor Ussher died and was succeeded by Sir
Samuel Rowe. The fate of the drafts prepared by both
Justice Jackson and Mr. Woodcock, does not appear from the
3correspondence on the subject, but in 1882, Sir Samuel Rowe
prepared another draft marriage ordinance which actually
received a first reading in the Legislative Council of the
Gold Coast before it was withdrawn by order of the Colonial 
4Office. The highlights of this short Bill (reproduced
R
below in Appendix 2), were that it attempted to legalize
all marriage celebrated in accordance with any Christian
ritual. The Bill also provided:
,!the offspring of parents duly married in accordance 
with such Christian ritual shall be declared to be 
legitimate and entitled to all such rights in respect 
of succession to property, as if their parents had 
been married according to native law, any native 
customs or law to the contrary notwithstanding”
This Bill was severely criticized by Chief Justice
7
Marshall, who had himself prepared a draft marriage 
ordinance in 1879. The Earl of Derby, then Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, who agreed with the criticisms of 
Justice Marshall, resuscitated Mr. Woodcock's draft, and
1. Ibid.,Enclosure 14, p.33-42.
2. The Hong Kong Marriage Ordinance was based mainly on the 
Ceylon Marriage Ordinance. For the history of these 
Ordinances see Shirley Zabel, ”The Legislative History
of the Gold Coast and Nigerian Ordinances”, 13 J.A.L.1969, 
No. 2, pp.64-79 and 158-178.
3. See C.O.879/20-223, p.45, Dispatch 122, 23 Mar. 1883.
4. Ibid., pp.6-7, Dispatch 200, 23 May, 1882, Enclosure No.9.
5. See below, pp.125-127.
6 . C.O. 879/20-204, Dispatch 200, 23 May, 1882, Enclosure 
No. 9. See further below, Appendix 2, p
7. C.O. 879/20-205/206, pp.8-10, letter dated 6 July,1882.
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amended it, by inserting provisions which invalidated the
practice of polygamy in a marriage under the Ordinance.^
He also made other amendments which will be noted in the
appropriate sections. The draft thus amended was sub-
2
sequently enacted as the Marriage Ordinance, 1884.
APPENDIX 1
COMMENTS OF A CORRESPONDENT ON THE 
MARRIAGE ORDINANCE, 1884
Mr. J.H. Willoughby to the Acting Assistant 
Colonial Secretary.
"Marriage Ordinance"
Oko Olowogbowo, Lagos,
March 8 , 1879.
Sir,
I am afraid I may be Writing something foreign 
to the subject in question, for I see nothing provided 
for the natives of the Colony in the Bill of marriage for 
British subjects.
How far it is necessary for the Governor to have 
power to give or withdraw license for any church or chapel 
to marry, &c. I am not in a position to know. I only think 
that a Governor, being a "Nonconformist", or a "Churchman", 
or "Roman Catholic", and administering the government for 
the time being, and who may be illiberal in his views, may 
do great mischief against denominations other than his own 
by the power he seems to possess by the "Marriage Bill".
However, permit me to leave the above to those who 
know better the workings of "Marriage Ordinance" in civilised 
countries, I want much to write of Lagos native customs of 
marriage as may be affected by the laws of civilised England.
A new born baby girl is immediately espoused by a 
man, the consent of the mother is given, the man goes on 
contributing services of various kinds to the parents and 
friends until she be grown up, and when she becomes marriage­
able, she is given to this man, with whom she must perforce 
go, willing or not?
Two respective parents, from being old frients 
together, would cement the friendship by agreeing to marry 
the one, their daughter, to the son of the other, at the 
expense of the feelings of the children?
1. Ibid., 223/224, Dispatch 122, 22 March, 1883. pp.45-47.
2. No. 14 of 1884.
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A man gets to the property and belongings of 
his deceased relations, be those his father, mother, uncle, 
aunt, elder brother, &c., among these belongings, there are 
home-born girls, call them slaves or dependents as you please, 
the man takes and makes wives of them with or without their 
consent?
A man takes to himself a number of women whom he 
called his wives, he may get them with the respective con­
sent of the parents and women themselves, which among these 
women is the wife in the English legal sense?
A man representing an ancient family dies intestate. 
Shall his properties go to his wife? She thereby impoverishes 
this ancient stock to enrich her own. Can a native wife, 
married after native customs, and being British subject, 
claim intestate properties as does a civilised married 
woman?
A man, be he civilised or not, gets a wife; in 
course of time, and from some causes or other they could not 
live together, they therefore agree to separate altogether 
and for ever. Shall this man take to him another wife? If 
so, which is legal, the first or second? Could the first 
have any claim at all on the husband from whom she thus 
separates herself?
A Mahomedan, a British subject, marries his four 
wives, with consent of respective parents of himself and 
wives, who are also British subjects; which is the wife in 
the legal sense? He also contracts 'other marriages by him­
self with other women, by paying to his priest a sixpence 
and some kola nuts for each woman respectively; are they 
legally called wives, which of them can claim intestate 
properties?
A father gets his daughters, and when they are 
grown up and marriageable he takes and gives them to any 
man he may think pleased to gratify, and like a goat he 
distributes them, despite the feelings of the daughters.
This is prevalent with our Mahomedan fellow subjects under 
British rule. Is this right? A man, old or young, takes 
a young girl, before she gets to make her choice the man 
gets the consent of the parents to marry the young woman 
at his convenience; in the interval the mother keeps 
exacting and extorting services of various kinds from the 
man. In course of time, the mother, gets another richer 
man for her daughter, and desires her to refuse the usual 
address of the former man, who is denied her altogether.
Is this right?
Wishing these few knotty country customs of 
marriage may get the legal consideration of our judges,
I beg, &c.
C.D. Turton, Esquire, (Signed) J.H. Willoughby.
Acting Colonial Secretary, Lagos.
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APPENDIX II
MARRIAGE ORDINANCE BILL 1882
Date.
Gold Coast Colony.
In the forty-fifty year of the reign of Her 
Majesty Queen Victoria.
Sir Samuel Rowe, K.C.M.G., Governor. 
[ May, 1882]
At a legislative Council held on the day of
May, in the year of our Lord, One thousand eight 
hundred and eighty-two.
Title. An Ordinance to declare legal all Marriages 
solemnized in accordance with any Christian 
ritual, in the Gold Coast Colony.
Preamble. Whereas it is right and expedient that marriages 
solemnized in accordance with Christian ritual 
should be declared to be legal, and that the children 
born of such marriages should be declared to be 
legitmate;'
Enacting Be it therefore enacted by the Governor of the
clause. Gold Coast Colony, by and with the advice and
consent of the Legislative Council thereof, as 
follows:-
Marriages 1. 
in accord­
ance with 
Christian 
ritual 
legal.
Legitimacy 2. 
of children 
of such 
marriages.
All marriages in accordance with any 
Christian ritual shall be declared to be 
legal, any native custom or law to the 
contrary notwithstanding.
The offspring of parents duly married in 
accordance with such Christian ritual shall 
be declared to be legitimate and entitled to 
all such rights in respect of succession to 
property, as if their parents had been married 
according to native law, any native custom 
or law to the contrary notwithstanding.
5. Every minister having the power according Every 
to the doctrine of his religion, to perform the minister shall
ceremony of marriage in accordance with any be a registrar
Christian ritual shall be a marriage Registrar of marriages,
for the district in which he resides.
4.. Every such Minister before performing 
any marriage ceremony shall require from each 
party to such proposed marriage a declaration 
signed by each of theim in the form given in 
Schedule A. of this Ordinance.
Declaration
before
marriage
obligation.
5. Any person knowingly and wilfully making 
any false statement in such declaration shall 
be liable to pay a penalty not exceeding fifty 
pounds, or in default thereof to be imprisoned 
and kept to hard labour for a period not 
exceeding six months.
6 . Every marriage registrar so constituted 
by the third section of this Ordinance shall 
be required to register and certify according 
to the forms given in Schedule B. of this 
Ordinance every marriage performed by him. A 
copy of such certificate shall be signed by the 
registrar and handed to the parties to the 
marriage on payment of the fee of ; 
half of such fee shall be retained by the 
registrar and the other half shall be paid into 
the general revenue of the Colony.
7. Every such registrar shall forward to the 
Colonial Secretary on the twelfth of January 
and on the twelfth of July in each year, returns 
of all marriages performed by him during the 
past half year.
8 . Nothing in this Ordinance shall be 
construed to preclude any minister from charging 
such fees as he may have been accustomed to 
receive hertofore on performance of the 
ceremony of marriage.
9. This Ordinance may be cited as "The 
Marriage Ordinance, 1882” .
SCHEDULE A.
I do solemnly declare, that
there is not any impediment of kindred or alliance or any 
other hindrance either according to English law or native
law or custom, to my marriage with
SCHEDULE B.
FORM OF REGISTRATION
Name Condition Rank or 
Profession.
Age Dwelling or 
• Place of 
Abode.
Husband Bachelor or 
Widower.
Wife Spinster or 
Widow
Schedule B. continued
Penalty for 
false state­
ment in 
declaration.
Registrars 
to register 
and certify.
Returns of 
marriages 
to be made 
to the 
Colonial 
Secretary.
Savings as 
to ministerfs 
fees.
Short title.
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SCHEDULE B. continued:
The parties above-mentioned were married by me on 
the day of , 188
Signed
Minister and Registrar.
Form of Certificate.
I certify that was duly married to
by me on the day of in accordance
with the ritual of the religion I profess.
Signed
Minister and Registrar.
B. The monogamous nature of the Marriage Act.
(l) Monogamy enshrined in the Marriage Act.
Marriage under the Marriage Act is monogamous.
As previously seen,"*' a monogamous marriage, following 
2
Hyde v. Hyde, is universally accepted by all common law 
countries, as nthe voluntary union for life of one man 
and one woman to the exclusion of all others”. The 
Interpretation Act, 1964, however, recognizes the 
possibility of divorce, (relatively rare at the time of 
Hyde*s case), and accordingly defines a monogamous marriage 
as:
”a marriage which is recognized by the law of the 
place where it is contracted as a voluntary union 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others during the continuance of the marriage” .
Enforced monogamy, hitherto an unknown feature 
of Nigerian marriage laws, is one of the most radical
1 . See above, Chapter III, p.204.
2. [1866] L.R.l P. and D. 130, 133.
3. No. 1 of 1964, s. 18, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.1
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innovations:.introduced by the Marriage Act, and, while wel­
comed by the female members of the community, it has always 
been, and continues to be one of the provisions of the Act 
most resented by a large proportion of the male members of 
the Nigerian population. It would therefore be interesting 
to see how the prohibition of polygamy became enshrined in 
the Marriage Ordinance, 1884.^"
Under the four drafts submitted by Justice Jackson,
Mr. Woodcock, Chief Justice James Marshall, and Governor Rowe, 
polygamy was not specifically prohibited. In the draft 
prepared by Mr. Woodcock, if the marriage was celebrated 
before a registrar of marriages, the parties were told that 
if either of them contracted another marriage during the 
subsistence of the one they were presently contracting, he
or she would be guilty of bigamy and liable to the punish-
2
ment inflicted for that offence. Nevertheless, the sub­
sequent marriage, once- celebrated,would have been valid, and 
in fact, the penalty of bigamy only attached to a subsequent 
marriage, and not to one contracted prior to the marriage 
under the Ordinance. A man, therefore, could contract 
several polygamous marriages before contracting a marriage 
under the Statute, without incurring any penalty for bigamy, 
and all the marriages would be legally valid.
3
There is no doubt that some of the draughtsmen 
intended to prevent a polygamous marriage from being con­
tracted under the Ordinance, but failed to see that their
4
drafts would not legally enforce monogamy. The express 
prohibition of polygamy, and the consequent invalidation of 
a statutory "marriage" during the subsistence of any prior
1. No. 14 of 1884.
2. C.O. 879/20-217/222, pp.33-42. Dispatch No. 441, 18 Sept. 
1882, enclosure No. 14, para.34.
3. Ibid.,para. 34.
4. See e.g. the Bill prepared by Governor Rowe, and 
introduced into the Legislative Council, which declared
all "Christian marriages" as legally valid marriageJ^Appdx.2) 
Polygamous marriages celebrated by the African "Christian" 
Churches would have been included under this provision.
But see Oke v. Gansallo [1923] 4 N.L.R. 109 where it was 
held that an article stating that the tenets of the 
African Church were "pernicious" was not defamatory, on 
the ground that the African Church profess that polygany 
is acceptable as a doctrine of a Christian Church.
129
marriage, was due to the legal perspicacity of the Earl of
Derby, who discovered the lacuna, when he was amending Mr.
Woodcock1s draft. The Earl was of the opinion that.the
draft prepared by Mr. Woodcock and based upon the Hong
Kong Marriage Ordinance of 1875, with certain modifications,
would meet the requirements of the Colony.^ After making
some alterations to the draft, the Earl observed:
"With the foregoing modifications, and, subject to 
such further alterations as may be thought desirable 
in respect of the points which I have referred for 
your consideration, the draft ordinance will, in my 
opinion, provide sufficiently for all marriages 
except those of natives, but to meet the requirements 
of natives who may desire to contract marriage under 
the ordinance, some further provisions are required"^
"These provisions should, I think, be based on the following 
propositions viz:-
(1) A native between whom and any person a marriage 
valid by native law or custom is subsisting should 
not be allowed to marry under the ordinance any 
other person.
(2) A native married under the ordinance should not be 
allowed during the continuance of that marriage
to contract a marriage according to native law 
with any other person, but in all other respects 
the ordinance should not affect marriages 
according to native law and custom".^
These provisions are significant in that they
(a) affirmed the fact that a customary marriage could be 
legally valid after the enactment of the statute, and
(b) kept a rigid separation between customary marriage and 
marriage under the statute by (1) excluding a customary 
marriage from the incidents of a,statutory marriage and
(11) preventing parties from mixing a customary marriage 
with a statutory marriage, and vice versa, except where 
both marriages are between the same parties.
1. See C.O. 879/20, Dispatch 122, 22 March, 1885.
2. Ibid.,section 18.
5. Ibid., ss. 19(1) and 19)2).
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It should be noted that Lord Derby1s proposition 
as stated above in paragraph 2 would not have prohibited 
persons married under the Act from marrying each other sub­
sequently under customary law. The draughtsmen in Accra 
carried out these proposals faithfully, but when the draft 
of the 1884 Ordinance was sent to Lord Derby for his approval, 
he changed section 37 of the draft, i.e. para 2 above, and 
inserted the provision precluding persons married under the 
Act from contracting a subsequent customary marriage even 
with each other.^ The result is that once a marriage under 
the Act has been celebrated, no subsequent customary 
marriage is possible whether the parties are the same, or 
not.
2
Section 35 of the Act provides:
11 Any person who is married under this Act, or whose 
marriage is declared by this Act to be valid, shall 
be incapable, during the continuance of such marriage, 
of contracting a valid marriage under native law or 
custom, ....’*
The incapacity to contract a valid customary 
marriage subsequent to a marriage under the Act is not 
restricted by any words of limitation, and the prohibition
3
is therefore absolute. This provision has been described 
as discriminatory, in view of the fact that persons married 
under customary law may, in addition, marry each other under 
the Act, but once they are married under the Act, no further 
marriage under customary law is legally possible.
Although the law was expressly changed by the 
noble Earl of Derby, he gave no reasons for the change.
Kasunmu and Salacuse, commenting on section 35 of the 
Marriage Act, say: that a possible reason for the absence 
of a provision permitting the conversion of a monogamous
1. See C.O. 879/2 - 226/230, pp.50-59, Dispatch 216,
29 March, 1884, enclosure 1, draft Ordinance of 1884, 
and Dispatch 758, 5 Sept. 1884, p.62, para. 6 , 
enclosure No. 188, s. 37-
2. Marriage Act, 1914, Cap. 115, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
3. Compare s.35(1) of the Nigerian Marriage Act, 1914,
Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
4. See e.g. Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit. 
p.49; Nwogugu, "The Position of Women in the Changing 
Family Law in Nigeria." on.cit.. p.101; D.A. Ijalaye. 
"Marriage Laws in Nigeria, Harmonisation o r ^ U n ^j^gtjgg^^
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marriage to a polygamous one, is that the Marriage Act was 
passed for the purpose of encouraging monogamy which was 
thought to be superior to polygamy.^
It is difficult to see how the prohibition of 
a subsequent customary marriage after a statutory marriage 
between the same parties could encourage monogamy, since 
monogamy would have been already imposed on the parties by 
their statutory marriage, and any subsequent customary 
marriage between them, in the absence of an express provision 
allowing them to do so, would not have given the parties the 
right to marry anyone else under customary law. In other 
words, their marriage would remain a monogamous marriage, 
whether they contracted a subsequent customary marriage, 
or not.
To allow the parties to convert their monogamous mar-
2riage into a polygamous one as Tanzania*s new marriage law does 
discriminates against monogamous marriages, since a marriage 
which is polygamous in fact obviously cannot be converted 
into a monogamous marriage. Many of the allegations of dis- • 
crimination against the Nigerian Marriage Act result from a 
failure to recognize that spouses of a marriage that is 
polygamous in fact cannot convert their marriage into a 
monogamous one under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
There is no evidence of an intention on the 
part of the colonial administrators to impose wholesale 
monogamy on the native population of the Gold Coast Colony.
The intention of the Earl of Derby, the architect of the 
prohibition of polygamy in statutory marriage, may be 
gleaned from his answer to the objections of Governor Young 
to the 1884 Marriage Ordinance.
Footnote 4 continued  Nigerian Bar Journal, Vol.XII,
1974, p .21 at p.24.
1. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit.,p.49.
2. See Tanzania!s Law of Marriage Act, 1971, Act No. 5 of 
1971, s.11: A marriage under this Act may be converted 
by a joint voluntary declaration by a husband and wife 
before a court of law. A marriage between two 
Christians cannot be converted into a polygamous one 
as long as both spouses profess the Christian faith; 
see James S. Read, ,!A Milestone in the Interaction of 
Personal Laws: The New Law of Marriage and Divorce in 
Tanzania" [1927] 16 J.A.L. No.l, pp.19-39; Y.P.Ghai,
"The New Marriage Law in Tanzania", 11 Africa Quarterly, 
1971-72, pp.l.
132
Governor Young, had not read the draft of the 
Ordinance and he was of the opinion that the Marriage 
Ordinance 1884, would be imposed on all natives of the 
Gold Coast Colony. He considered this inadvisable, in 
view of the fact that little real progress had been made 
on the Gold Coast towards any substantial civilization. He 
was of the opinion that a "marriage law to meet the social 
requirements of Europeans in this Colony and of the small 
portion of the community which is civilized", was all that 
was necessary at that stage.^
Lord Derby*s answer to these observations was 
stated thus:
"...while I agree that it is not expedient to 
supplant the native laws and customs on those subjects 
by a law adapted to a civilized community, except in 
the case of those natives who prefer to bring them­
selves within the operation of the latter law by 
entering into the contract of marriage in accordance 
with its provisions, I consider that natives who thus 
accept the status of marriage recognized by civilized 
communities should be precluded from violating the 
contract by contracting polygamous marriages though 
sanctioned by native custom, and that their widows 
and children should enjoy the rights of succession 
ab intestato to their property which are recognized 
by the laws of civilized nations, and that to this 
extent the law may properly, as the proposed Ordinance 
will, interfere with native law. I do not suppose 
however, that any but Christian natives will contract 
marriages under the Ordinance"
Thus, it was clearly envisaged that only Christian
natives would marry under the Ordinance, and since all
established Christian Churches at that time forbade the
3
practice of polygamy among their members, the prohibition 
of polygamy would entail no additional hardships.
Lord Derby*s proposals were incorporated into
1. C.O. 879/20-231, pp.60-62.
2. C.O. 879/20-232, p.62.
3. African Churches which permit polygamy were not estab­
lished until the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, e.g. The United Native African Church was 
established in 1891; see J.F. Ajayi, Christian Missions 
in Nigeria, 1841-1891: The Making of An African Elite 
(London, 19b5), pp.253-234.
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the Marriage Ordinance, 1884,^ and were retained in all
subsequent marriage regulations enacted in Nigeria since
then. They create a legal barrier against polygamous
marriages under statute law, and a rigid separation between
the two types of marriages. Nq one can be validly married
under the Nigerian Marriage Act, and under customary law,
including Islamic law, at the same time, unless it is to
the same person, and the customary law marriage preceded
2
the statutory marriage.
The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970 has 
reinforced the monogamous nature of statutory marriage by 
providing that a marriage that takes place after the 
commencement of the Decree is void where either of the 
parties is, at the time of the marriage, lawfully married 
to some other person.
(11) Breaches of the monogamy provision of the Marriage Act
The Marriage Act provides that whoever contracts
a marriage under the Act when already married by customary
A
law to a third party, and whoever contracts a marriage by 
customary law when already married under the Act, whether
5
the parties are the same or not, commits an offence, 
carrying a maximum punishment of five years imprisonment.
The spouses of a customary marriage, however, may subsequently
7
marry each other under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
A person who contracts a statutory marriage during 
the subsistence of a prior statutory marriage also commits
1. Marriage Ordinance, 1884, No. 14 of 1884, s.37.
2. Marriage Act, 1914, Cap.115, Laws of the Federation,
of Nigeria, ss.33(l) and 35.
3. Decree No. 18 of 1970, s.31(1)(a): see also the Criminal 
Code Act, 1916, Cap.42, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, s.370.
4. S.33(1) Marriage Act, Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
5. Ibid., s .35 .
6. Ibid., ss. 47 and 48.
7. Ibid., s.35.
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an offence under the Criminal Code Act.'*'
Various assertions of the number of Nigerian men 
who commit breaches of the monogamous provisions of the
Marriage Act have been made by writers, but most of these
statements are based on inadequate facts. For example,
Aguda says:
"...the vast majority of Nigerian men, may be the 
percentage is over 95, practise polygamy in one 
form or the other. A number of these ostensibly 
practise monogamy but have one or two other *wives*. 
Some of them who are cautious do not perform * marriage
ceremonies* with the other 1wives*. But some in fact
do perform these ceremonies to which they in fact 
invite people who have to do with the administration 
of justice including Police Officers, Doctors,
Lawyers, Ministers of State and Religion, top Civil 
Servants, etc., who attend such ceremonies with full 
knowledge of the correct situation. The fact is 
that...some of these people themselves have perhaps 
indulged in a similar breach of the law" .2
Similarly, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, 
the Honourable Dr. Taslim Elias, has been reported as 
saying that 95 percent of Nigerian men married under the 
Act would be in jail, if the strict rules of the Act were 
to be enforced.
It would be interesting to know how these learned
members of the Judiciary arrived at their percentages, but
it is not difficult to see that they are mainly conjectural.
From these and other similar vague statements, however,
legal writers have advocated the abolition of the sanction
against the practice of polygamy under the Act, on the
ground that it is unrealistic to expect "the registration
of only one wife in Nigeria as this will not agree with the
4natural inclination of the people” .
1. Cap.42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, 
s. 370, referred to as bigamy, see Nwankpele v. Nwank- 
pele [1973] 3 U.I.L.R. 184.
2. Akinola Aguda, Select Law Lectures and Papers, op.cit.,
p.84; see also itse Sagay, ’’Multiple Marriages in Nigeria: 
A Conflict of Law and Culture, Nigerian Bar Journal,
Vol.XII, 1974, p.82.
3. See the Nigerian, Daily Times. 26 Oct. 1973, p.3. under 
the caption "Daily Times Opinion".
4. Ijalaye, "Marriage Laws in Nigeria", op.cit., p.28.
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How valid, are such assertions? To assess these 
statements 'it is necessary to differentiate between the 
various types of polygamy that may be found in Nigeria.
It has previously been stated that polygamy in Nigeria 
may be mainly of two types, namely, cases where (1) a 
husband cohabits simultaneously as husband and wife with 
two or more women -"simultaneous p o l y g a m y a n d  (2) a man 
owes marital obligations to two or more women, although 
at any one time he may be married to or living with only 
one of the women -"consecutive polygamy".^
It has been seen also that in both customary and
Islamic law marriages, in all parts of Nigeria, the majority
of men are monogamously married in fact, that is, they live
with one wife only at any one time. This is especially the
case in the Southern States where the level of polygamy is
2
relatively low. It is also men mainly from the Southern 
States who contract statutory marriages. It follows, 
therefore, that the large majority of men who contract a 
statutory marriage does not practise simultaneous poly­
gamy. It is undoubtedly true that a few persons, men and 
women, do commit breaches of the monogamy provisions of the 
Marriage Act, but most of these involve"consecutive poly­
gamy," or as some writers prefer to call it,"consecutive 
monogamy" there is no evidence to support the large per­
centages advanced by writers, of men who are in breach 
of the monogamy provision of the Act, nor are the breaches 
mainly due as alleged to the polygamic tendencies of Nigerian 
men.
A study of the cases involving breaches of the 
monogamous provisions of the Marriage Act, which have come 
before the courts in recent years, reveals that in the 
majority of cases, a subsequent customary marriage during 
the subsistence of a statutory marriage, is contracted,
1. See further,above Chapter IV, pp.296-301.
2. See above, Chapter IV, Table 4:1,and 4:2, pp.344 and 345.
3. None of the Moslems interviewed in Maiduguri had con­
tracted a statutory marriage.
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not because of the desire to practise polygamy, but simply 
because of the difficulty and expense, as well as delay, 
involved in the dissolution of a statutory marriage. In 
actual fact, marital relations are seldom maintained with 
more than one woman at a time. Often when the subsequent 
purported customary law marriage is celebrated the spouses 
have already separated. If divorce from a statutory 
marriage were as easy'*'and inexpensive to obtain as divorce 
from a customary marriage there would be few breaches of the 
monogamy provision of the Marriage Act in contemporary 
Nigeria. The difficulty of obtaining a divorce from a 
statutory marriage contributes to breaches of the law more 
than a preference for polygamy does.
The position is clearer in this respect when it is
2a woman who is in breach of the statutory provisions. For
3
example, in Ochei v. Ochei and Onyenekwe, the respondent 
husband claimed a divorce on the ground of his wifefs 
adultery with the co-respondent Onyejekwe. .The parties had 
been married under customary law, as well as under the 
Marriage Act. The wife, who wanted a divorce, repaid the 
dowry paid with reference to the customary marriage, to the 
respondent’s family in Onitsha, for onward transmission to 
him, then stationed in Lagos. Without obtaining a divorce 
of her statutory marriage, the evidence revealed that the 
wife married Onyejekwe according to customary law. As a 
result of this marriage, she was allowed all the rights 
and privileges of an Onitsha housewife, including the 
allocation of a stall at the Onitsha market reserved for 
the Ikporo Ogbe (Housewives* association) of Odoje village, 
the village of Onyejekwe.
It is evident that the wife in this case did not 
intend to practice polygamy, but simply to avoid the 
difficulty and delay of a statutory divorce. This fact
1. See Sagay, "Multiple Marriages in Nigeria", op.cit.,p.84; 
see also Evoraja v. Avoratja and Anor.T 19611 W.N.L.R.6. .
2. There are quite a few women married under the Nigerian 
Marriage Act who purport to contract subsequent customary 
marriages without first obtaining a divorce from the 
statutory marriage. Such cases come less often before 
the courts, however.
3. [1971] Suit No. 0/9D/71, unreported, Onitsha High Court.
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would not have been so evident, had it. been the husband 
who was involved in a breach of the Marriage Act. If 
breaches of the monogamy provision of the Marriage Act 
is to be, at least, reduced, one solution is to make 
statutory divorce easier and less expensive to obtain.
A few of the decided cases show that parties to 
a statutory marriage who have no valid ground for a 
statutory divorce, have used the invalidating provisions 
of the Marriage Act to have their marriages declared void.
For example, the husband petitioner in I.jituyi v. I.jituyi,^ 
in an uncontested suit sought a declaration that his marriage 
to the respondent was void, on the ground that, at the time 
the marriage was celebrated, he was already married to two 
other women, one married in 1959, and the other married in 
1964. His evidence disclosed that when he married the 
respondent in 1971, the previous customary law marriages had 
not been dissolved or annulled, and that both women were 
still alive in 1971. No other witness was called. It was 
held by the High Court, that the petitioner, apart from his 
ipse dixit, had not proved that he went through any form of 
customary marriage, or at the time of his marriage to the 
respondent the prior marriages had not been dissolved, or 
that the women concerned were alive when he went through 
the form of marriage in respect of which he had brought the 
petition. A declaration of nullity was refused.
The invalidating provision of the Marriage Act is
often used by persons who wish to escape from the liabilities
of a statutory marriage. A husband of a statutory marriage
may be liable to pay maintenance to his divorced wife. If
the marriage is declared void, however, prior to the enact-
2
ment of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, no such 
liability attached. An unscrupulous husband who was sued for 
divorce would therefore make strenuous efforts to have his
1. [1976] Suit No. HOD/32/75, IOD.H.C.35; see also A.ietombi 
v. A.ietombi [1975] 11 CCHCJ. 2065.
2. See s.69, of the M.C.D. 1970 now provides: "marriage" 
includes a purported marriage that is void, for the pur­
pose of maintenance, custody and settlement under part IV 
of the Decree. This means that a husband or wife of a 
void marriage is liable for maintenance.
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marriage declared void instead.
Two cases which illustrate this strategy are
1 2 Uwaemelulam v. Uwaemelulam and Okolo v. Okolo. In
Uwaemelulam v. Uwaemelulam, the petitioner stated that 
her marriage with the respondent in 1961 had never been 
a happy one, mainly due to his demands that she hand over 
her pay-packet intact to him. When she stopped this 
practice, it resulted in endless quarrels and beatings, 
and eventual eviction of the petitioner from the matri­
monial home. She.claimed that her marriage was celebrated 
in church, and that it was her intention to go through a 
form of marriage which was recognized under the Marriage 
Act, and by the Church. The respondent, who admitted that 
he had married another woman under customary law in 1971, 
also admitted that his marriage to the petitioner was 
celebrated between the hours of 8 and 6, in the presence 
of witnesses, after publication of banns of marriage in the 
Church, a licensed place of worship; but he maintained that 
they merely went to Church to have the prior customary law 
marriage between them blessed in Church. He asked that the 
marriage be declared void. It was held that the marriage 
was a valid marriage under the Act, and that the petitioner 
was guilty of adultery on his own admission that he had 
married the woman cited and was living with her as man and 
wife.
2
In Okolo v. Okolo the wife petitioner averred 
that she was married under the Marriage Act at the marriage 
registry at Afikpo, on 3 January, 1963. She petitioned for 
the dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion. The 
respondent agreed on the facts as stated by the petitioner 
and he also wished the marriage to be dissolved. But he
1. [1972] Suit No. AD/lD/72, unreported decision of Umuahia 
High Court decided on the 10 July, 1972.
2. [1974] Suit No. AA/3D/72 unreported decision of Awka 
High Court, delivered 24 June, 1974. cf. 0tjo v. 0 jo 
[1972] Suit No. A/4D/72, unreported decision of Aba High 
Court, delivered on 1 December, 1972, where the 
petitioner obtained a declaration of nullity of her 
marriage to the respondent on the ground of his two 
prior subsisting customary law marriages, although the 
alleged customary law marriages were not proved.
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alleged in his answer to the petition, that before his 
marriage to the petitioner, he had been married to another 
woman under customary law, to the knowledge of the 
petitioner, and that this woman named.Clarice was still 
alive. He asked that the statutory marriage be declared 
void. Aseme, J., held that the effect of this allegation 
of a purported customary law marriage, if proved, would 
be to render the subsequent marriage under the Marriage Act 
void, but he further held that the onus to prove the 
alleged customary marriage was on the respondent. The res­
pondent alleged that when he swore the affidavit and filled 
the forms at the marriage registry, he disclosed his prior 
existing customary marriage to the Registrar, but the Judge 
did not believe him, and categorised him as an untruthful 
witness whose avowed aim was to stigmatise the character 
of the petitioner. A declaration of nullity was refused.
In some cases, the breach of the law is occasioned
by ignorance of the law.^ While most Christian churches do
not permit their members to contract multiple marriages,
there are several churches which do permit the practice of
2
polygamy by members of the church. The ordinary Nigerian 
citizen would therefore be justified in thinking that 
marriage is regulated by the church, and as a result may 
inadvertently commit a breach of the law. The confusion 
which may result from the different Church rules in this 
respect is illustrated by the case of Uwakwe v. Uwakwe and 
Anor. The caveatrix in this case objected to the notice 
of an intended statutory marriage between the first and 
second respondents on the ground that she too had been
1. During field-work in various parts of Nigeria, the present 
writer discovered that while most people knew that the 
spouse of a subsisting statutory marriage cannot con­
tract a valid customary marriage with a third party, very 
few people realized that the spouse of a subsisting 
customary marriage cannot contract a valid statutory law 
marriage with a third party. Most people are thoroughly 
confused about the difference between a marriage cele­
brated in church and one solemnised in a Registry Office.
2. See J.B. Webster, Attitudes and Policies of the Yoruba 
African Churches towards Polygamy in Tropical Africa,op. 
cit., p.22^; Turner, History_of the African Independent 
Church,op.cit.,Vols. I and II.
3. [1971] Suit No. HU/15M/71 unreported, Umuahia High Court.
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married to the first respondent in 1970, according to 
customary law, and that the marriage had not been dissolved. 
The evidence disclosed that the first respondent married the 
second respondent in 1948, according to customary law. This 
marriage was followed in 1949 by a marriage under the Marriage 
Act, celebrated in a Roman Catholic Church, according to the 
rites of that church. In 1964, the first respondent 
renounced the Roman Catholic religion, and joined the 
Seraphim and Cherubim Church which permitted the practice 
of polygamy. In January, 1970, he married the Caveatrix in 
the Seraphim and Cherubim Church. In September, 1970, he 
joined the church of the Jehoviah Witnesses, who decreed 
that he must abandon the second wife since the practice of 
polygamy is prohibited in that church.
and from one woman to another which landed him in the High 
Court, Umuahia". Aniagolu, J., found that the first and 
second respondents were validly married on 28 May, 1949, in 
accordance with the Marriage Act, and that this marriage was 
still subsisting at all material times, including 12 July, 
1971, when he purported to give notice to the Registrar of 
Marriages of his intention to marry the second respondent, 
and at the time of the hearing of the caveat. As a result, 
his purported marriage to the caveatrix in 1970 was wholly 
null and void, and completely devoid of legal effect. The 
Judge noted that the purported marriage contracted between 
the Caveatrix and the first respondent would appear to have 
contravened the Marriage Act, and to have been bigamous under 
section 370 of the Criminal Code Act.^
The court also held that the first respondent was 
not entitled to marry the second respondent again, they being 
already lawfully husband and wife. The notice of marriage 
to the Registrar of Marriage was accordingly declared 
forbidden.
1. See R. v.Princewell [1963] 2 All N.L.R. 31, [1963] 
N.R.N.L.R. 3^ -. For questions arising out of this , 
interpretation of section 370 of the Nigerian Criminal 
Code Act, see A.N. Allott, [1964] 8 J.A.L. p.36.
2. The Marriage Act does not expressly forbid multiple 
marriage under the Act by the same parties, but, 
provided the first marriage is legally valid, the sub­
sequent ceremony will be a nullity, see Thynne v.
It was "this journey from one church to another
Thynne [1955]
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Penalty for breaches of the "monogamy11 provisions of the Act
As previously noted, the Marriage Act provides a
punishment of five years imprisonment for breaches of
sections 33(1) and 35 of the Marriage Act.'*' The Criminal 
2
Code Act imposes a penalty of seven years imprisonment 
on any person who, "having a husband or wife living, marries 
in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its 
taking place during the life of such husband or wife".
There is only one case, however, in which a conviction under 
either statute has been recorded. In that case, R. v*
3 “
Princewell, the accused was married under the Marriage Act. 
During the subsistence of the statutory marriage, he 
married another woman under Islamic law, as he had then 
become a Moslem and thus entitled to marry four wives.
Reed, J., noted the fact that in his experience on the Bench, 
and Bar, since 1946, he had not seen a prosecution for 
bigamy, the designated offence under section 370 of the 
Criminal Code. Princewell was found guilty of the crime of 
bigamy and sentenced to one month*s imprisonment, but the 
Judge expressed sympathy for the accused.
The position has now reached a state where the 
party who has himself committed the breach has openly 
declared this fact in court in many cases in all parts of 
the country. In most cases,these declarations pass without 
comments by the Bench as to their possible illegality„!
The question then arises: how far is it justi­
fiable to retain in the statute books a law which is 
evidently not being enforced? Reed, J., in jl. v. Princewell 
said that the reason why bigamy is severely punished in the
Footnote 2 continued  Reder- v. Reder [1948] The Weekly
Notes, p.238, C.A.
1. See ss.47 and 48 Marriage Act., Cap 115, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
2. Cap 42, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
3. [1963] 3 All N.L.R.31; [1963] N.R.N.L.R. 54.
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United Kingdom, is that the woman has been deceived into 
cohabiting with the accused in the belief that he is her
husband. Writers have claimed that the contrary is the
1 2 case in Nigeria, and indeed in other parts of Africa,
where ,fall parties are acting with their eyes open”.
Consequently, they have argued that the penal provisions
of the Marriage Act, and the Criminal Code in respect to
4bigamy, should be repealed. Collingwood points out that 
the law of bigamy is designed to uphold the sanctity of 
monogamous marriage, an idea the average African does not 
fully accept, since the African society is generally poly­
gamous .
Neither of these reasons can be supported. 
Firstly, the average Nigerian woman may know that the man 
is married to another woman under the Marriage Act, at the 
time she goes through a form of customary law marriage 
with him. But very often,she does not realise the legal 
effect of her purported marriage to him under the present 
law. She -does not realise that many of her rights, and 
the rights of any children she may produce by him, may be 
adversely affected, and in some cases that the consequences
5
can be disastrous. The Registrar of marriage or Minister
1. See Itse Sagay, "Multiple Marriages in Nigeria”, op.cit., 
p.87; D.A. Ijalaye, "Marriage Laws in Nigeria: Har­
monisation or Unification? Nigerian Bar Journal, Vol.XII, 
1974, pp.21-31 at p.29.
2. See e.g., the position in Uganda, - H.F. Morris and 
James S. Read, Uganda: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution (London: Stevens and Sons, 1966), p.398
3. Ibid., p.398.
4. J. Collingwood, Criminal Law of East and Central Africa, 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, African University £ress,1967), 
p. 134; See also Sagay, "Multiple Marriage in Nigeria, op. 
cit.. p.85; Ijalaya, "Marriage Laws in Nigeria, op.cit.,
p. 28.
5. See e.g. the numerous cases which held that children born 
to an intestate as a result of his purported customary 
marriage during the subsistence of a statutory marriage 
are illegitimate and are, therefore, not entitled to 
inherit from him, - Cole v. Akinyele [i960] 5 F.S.C.84; 
Olympio v.Oluwole and Anor. [1968] N.M.L.R. 469;
Abisogun v. Abisogun |19631 1 All.N.L.R. 237; Craig v.
Craig 1*19641 L.L.R.96; Qnwudin.joh v. Onwudin.joh [19371
2 E.R.N.L.R.l; In the Matter of the Estate of Odula.ja.
footnote 5 continued
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of religion who celebrates a marriage under the Act, has a 
statutory duty to warn the spouses of the penalties they may 
incur for breaches of the "monogamy" provisions of the Act. 
They are told of the effect of any prior or subsequent 
marriages to a third party. The woman or man who purports 
to contract a subsequent customary marriage with the spouse 
of an existing statutory marriage is not warned of the con­
sequences of his or her action.
Secondly, with regard to the argument that African 
society is essentially polygamous, even if it is conceded 
that this is true, all Nigerians are free to choose the type 
of marriage they may wish to contract. The Nigerian man 
can therefore opt for a customary law marriage which allows 
him to practise unlimited polygamy. If, in spite of this 
freedom of choice he chooses to contract a monogamous 
statutory marriage, he should be made to respect his solemn 
undertaking.
As previously stated, many breaches of the law are 
not due to a desire to practise polygamy but to a variety of 
other reasons. This is especially apparent from a study of 
the more recent cases coming before the court.
3. Fundamental Requirements for a Valid Marriage under
the Nigerian Marriage Act
A. Types of marriage
Considerable confusion has resulted from a mis­
understanding of the types of marriages that are recognized
Footnote 3 continued....... T19641 L.L.R.108; Osho v. Phillips
and Ors. [1973] 3 U.I.L.R.316; Idowu v. Bakare [197^
6 C.C.H.C.J. 675; Cf. Aduba and Anor. v. Aduba and Ors. 
[1966] Suit No. 0/106/63; where Egbuna J. stated that 
"It is clear from the authorities that where a child born 
out of wedlock is acknowledged by the putative father he 
is to be regarded as legitimate and all legitimates are 
entitled to share in their father!s estate...the question 
of their parents1 marriage is not a relevant subject for 
investigation". He held that all the deceased’s children 
by purported customary law marriages, during the existence 
of his marriage under the Marriage Act, were entitled to 
share in the deceased’s intestate estate. See also Con­
stitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, (Enactment 
Decree, 1978, No.25 of 1978, s.39(2): "No citizen of 
Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation 
merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth”.
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as valid legal marriages in Nigeria. This misunderstanding
is especially apparent in the work of sociologists and
anthropologists. For example, McEwen states the types of
marriages which operate throughout the Federation of
Nigeria as”(1) Marriage by Native law and Custom, (2) Moslem
marriages (3) church marriages and (4) marriage according to
the Ordinance” and continues:
HA11 these types of marriages are legal according to 
the laws of Nigeria, and there are provisions for 
separation and in some cases divorce”.-^
Similarly, Uchendu, writing about new trends in the Igbo
family system, says:
”Many other changes have taken place in the Igbo 
family system in the last fifty years. Christian 
marriage and marriage by ordinance are among the 
important innovations. Both have given women new 
legal protection and property rights not recognized 
by the traditional system....”2
These writers differentiate ”church” marriage
and "ordinance” marriage and assign to both a legal status
under Nigerian law. The misconception of the types of
marriages, regarded as legal marriages in Nigeria, among
non-legal writers, may have been induced by the fact that
some legal writers, judicial decisions, as well as statutes
refer to "Church” marriage and "Christian” marriage as if
they were in all cases valid legal marriages, or alternatives
3
to marriage under the Marriage Act.
Strictly speaking, there are only two types of 
legally recognized marriages that may be celebrated in 
Nigeria. These are:
(a) a customary law marriage which includes Islamic law 
marriage; and
1. Winifred McEwen, "Marriage Problems in the Federation of 
Nigeria”, Women Today, June,1964, Vol.VI, No.2.pp.35-36.
2. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria, op.cit.,p.56;
see also Qkonjo, The Impact of Urbanization,...
op.cit.,pp. 164-165"!
3. See e.g. the Criminal Code Act, ss.l, 33, 34; the Act
defines a Christian marriage as ”a marriage which is
recognized by the law of the place where it is con­
tracted as the voluntary union for life of one man and 
one woman to the exclusion of all others".
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(b) marriage contracted under the Nigerian Marriage Act. 
Marriages contracted in Nigeria which are not included in any 
of these two categories are not legally valid marriages in 
Nigeria.
B. Basic essentials of a marriage under the Marriage Act 
Section 53(2) of the Nigerian Marriage Act
provides:
11A marriage shall be null and void if both parties 
knowingly and wilfully acquiesce in its celebration -
(a) in any place other than the office of a registrar 
of marriages or a licensed place of worship 
(except where authorised by the licence issued under 
section 15; or
(b) under a false name or names; or
(c) without a registrars certificate of notice or 
licence issued under section 15 duly issued; or
(d) by a person not being a recognized minister of some 
religious denomination or body or a registrar of 
marriages".
The first draft of the Marriage Ordinance submitted
by Justice Jackson made void all marriages celebrated in a
church which did not comply with the prescribed regulations.^*
These prescribed regulations were retained in all subsequent
2
drafts and enshrined in the 1884 Marriage Ordinance.
The Earl of Derby, in his amendment of Mr. Woodcocks 
draft, had suggested that the publication of banns by 
churches should be allowed as a substitute for notice to, 
and a certificate by, the registrar, as he considered the 
two-fold notification unnecessary. The Legislative Council 
of the Gold Coast Colony, however, were of the opinion that 
the notice to, and the certificate by a registrar, should, 
in all cases be compulsory, and the publication of banns, the 
form of which could vary according to the rules of the 
various churches, optional. The view of the Council prevailed, 
and is represented by section 55(2) of the present Nigerian
1. See C.O. 879/2-210, pp.19-22, Dispatch 441, 18 Sept.1882, 
enclosure 6 in No. 18.
2. See s.55, Marriage Ordinance, 1884.
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Marriage Act as stated above.
C. 11 Christian” or "Church” marriage
A '’Christian”, or ’’Church” marriage is not a 
legally valid marriage, unless certain formalities pres­
cribed by the Nigerian Marriage Act"*" are observed. For
2
example, in Obiekwe v. Obiekwe, the parties were married 
according to customary law. Without obtaining a Regis­
trar’s certificate as required under section 11 of the 
Marriage Act, they went through a religious ceremony in 
a church.
Commenting on the legal validity of the church 
marriage, Palmer, J., succinctly enunciated the law thus:
”A good deal has been said about ’church marriage’, 
or ’marriage under Roman Catholic Law*. So far as 
the law of Nigeria is concerned, there is only one 
form of monogamous marriage, and that is marriage 
under the Ordinance. Legally a marriage in a Church 
(of any denomination) is either a marriage under the 
Ordinance or it is nothing. In this case, if the 
parties had not been validly married under the 
Ordinance then either they are married under Native 
Law and Custom or they are not married at all. In 
either case the ceremony in church would have made 
not a scrap of difference to their legal status” ^
The root of the misconception as to the legal 
validity of church marriage is to be found in the historical 
origin of Nigerian.monogamous marriage. Before the enact­
ment of the Marriage Ordinance 1884, ministers of the 
various Christian churches in different parts of the 
country solemnized the marriages of members of their church 
by publication of banns, and in accordance with the rules 
and tenets of their particular denomination. As seen
3
previously, such marriages were of doubtful legal validity.
1. Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
2. [1965] 7 E.N.L.R. 196 at 199.
5. Various statutes were passed to validate these marriages:
e.g. Marriages Validation Act (previously Ordinance) 1914 
No. XI of 1914, which was an ordinance to remove doubts
as to the validity of certain marriages: ’’Whereas many
marriages according to Christian rites have been celebrated 
in the districts of Ejebu-Ode, Meko, Oyo, Ondo, Ilesha, 
Ibadan and Whereas doubts have been expressed as to the 
validity of marriages celebrated as aforesaid”, all such
footnote 5 continued.....
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and it is for this reason that the enactment of a Marriage 
Ordinance became necessary.
The Churches, however, from the beginning, were 
not happy with what is now section 33(2) of the Marriage 
Act, since they regarded marriage as being in the nature of 
a sacrement, and they resented interference by the civil 
authorities."*" They demonstrated their hostility by calculated 
non-compliance with the provisions of section 33(2) of the 
Act. Most of the churches, especially the Catholic churches, 
ignored the existence of the Marriage Act and continued to 
celebrate marriages in much the same way as they had done 
before its promulgation, - by publication of banns, followed 
by a religious ceremony performed by a minister of the 
church.
Okagbue, J., commenting on this attitude of the
churches notes:
,!It is perhaps not surprising that, in many cases, 
officiating priests, especially of the Roman Catholic 
Church, have openly declared that they could not be 
*bothered* with the law of the land and that what 
mattered to them was a celebration of marriage in 
accordance with the rites of the Roman Church” ^
The certificate of marriage issued after a church 
ceremony is usually different in form from that prescribed 
in the Marriage Act (Form E of the first Schedule).
In Obi v. Obi the certificate issued by a 
Catholic church in Onitsha, was not signed by the parties 
to the marriage, nor by the witnesses, and certain vital 
information required by the Act was omitted. In addition, 
although the certificate purported to be signed by one John 
Mary Anojulu as the officiating minister, oral testimony in 
court revealed that the minister who actually performed the 
ceremony was in fact one Reverend Father Onyekachukwu.
Footnote 3 continued.... marriages ”shall be deemed to have 
been from the time of the celebration thereof a legal 
and valid marriage”.
1. See R.O. Okagbue, ”The Marriage Dilemma” in African 
Indigenous Laws, edit, by T.O. Elias et.al., op.cit.,
p. 178.
2. Ibid.,p.178; see also Nwogugu, Nigerian Family Law, 
op.cit.,p.35.
3. [1974] Suit No. 0/8D/74, unreported, Onitsha High Court; 
see also Akwudike v. Akwudike [1963] 7 E.N.L.R.5.
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It was held that the certificate ”could not be regarded 
as a legal certificate of a lawful marriage”, and that 
it had ”no forensic weight and/or value”.^
This, nonchalant attitude adopted by the churches 
towards the legal formalities required by the Marriage Act, 
has led to legal complications and disappointments. Many 
women who had gone through a form of marriage in church, 
confident that they were contracting a legally valid mono­
gamous marriage, have now discovered, as the decisions in 
some of the recent cases become known, that they are married 
according to customary law only, or in some cases that they 
are not married by any law.
As seen previously, the validity of a marriage
celebrated in a church, contrary to section 33 of the
Marriage Act depends on the knowledge of the contracting 
2
parties. The marriage will only be void if both parties, 
knowing the particular requirements of the Act which are 
specified in section 33, wilfully acquiesce in celebrating 
the marriage without complying with the specified require­
ments. A few of the decided cases will illustrate the legal 
position.
3
In Akparanta v. Akparanta, the respondent husband 
contended that he married the petitioner according to native 
law and custom, in December, 1962, and that the ceremony in 
church in May 1963, was not intended to be a monogamous 
marriage, but merely a church blessing of the existing 
customary marriage. The respondent further contended that 
the church ceremony did not constitute a valid marriage 
under the Marriage Act, since it was performed without the 
previous issue of a registrar’s certificate of notice. The
1. See Madubuko v. Madubuko [1973] Suit No. E/18D/72, 
unreported, Enugu High Court, 13 June, 1973, where a 
certificate signed by Rev. Father Conlan, although the 
marriage had been solemnized by Rev. Father Bartley, 
who died the morning after the wedding without signing 
the marriage certificate, was held to be of “doubtful 
validity” by Justice K.O. Anyah.
2. See above, p.145.
3. [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 779.
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wife’s evidence was that she left all formal arrangements 
with the husband and trusted that he had carried out all 
the necessary preliminaries to the marriage. It was held 
that it is not enough if the evidence establishes 
acquiescence by one party, if the other party acted in 
complete ignorance of the requirements. That the evidence 
would be stronger if it is the wife who so acted, relying, 
as in this case, on the husband to perform the preliminaries, 
"since the raison d ’etre of the provision is to protect the 
unsuspecting party, usually the wife,- from the exploitation 
of her ignorance of the statutory requirement or her con­
fidence in the party, usually the husband, in arranging the 
marriage". The marriage was held to be valid.
Similarly, in Obiekwe v. Obiekwe,^ where the court 
found that both parties believed at the material time that 
they had contracted a valid marriage under the Marriage Act, 
it was held that it could not be said that they "knowingly 
and wilfully" acquiesced to a marriage without a Registrarfs 
certificate. Accordingly the marriage was held valid even
though it had been celebrated without the prior issue of a
Registrar’s certificate. Palmer, J., said:
"knowingly” by itself might be ambiguous, but ’wilfully* 
must, I think, mean a deliberate act. The attitude of 
mind must, I think, be I know there ought to be a
certificate; I know there is not a certificate;
nevertheless I shall go through with the ceremony"^
This attitude seemed to have been the frame of
3
mind of the parties in Maraizu v. Maraizu, where the wife
1. [1963] 7 E.N.L.R. 196.
2. Ibid., p.198.
3. [1974] E.C.S.L.R. ; see also E.jikeme v. Ejikeme [1971] 
Suit No. 2/1/0D/71, unreported, Onitsha High Court.
Mbagwu v. Mbagwu, [1972] Suit No. AB/4D/69, unreported,
Aba High Court, 21 June, 1972 and Dike v. Dike [1973]
Suit No. E/14D/72, unreported, Enugu High Court, 28 March, 
1973 where the wife stated that she left all arrangements 
to the husband and thought all statutory requirements had 
been complied with; it was held that she had not know­
ingly and wilfully acquiesced in the celebration of the 
marriage contrary to s.33(2).
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petitioner admitted that she knew that a certificate was 
necessary. In fact, she looked for the Divisional Officer 
to get the Registrar*s certificate from him, but when she 
could not find him, both parties nevertheless signed a 
marriage certificate issued by the minister. This marriage 
certificate indicated that the marriage had been celebrated 
after publication of banns, and was signed by the minister, 
one G.U. Agbasimoro. In actual fact, no banns had been 
published. Although the marriage certificate had been 
signed by the parties on the 1st day of May 1969, the 
marriage actually took place on the 2 May 1969. The certificate 
allegedly issued by the minister, clearly told a lie. The 
marriage was held null and void, since both parties, knowing 
that a Registrarfs certificate was necessary, had "knowingly 
and wilfully” celebrated the marriage without obtaining one.
This case was an unfortunate one, because attempts 
by the parties to conclude arrangements for the celebration 
of a marriage according to customary law did not materialize.
As a result, the parties were not validly married by any law, 
and the child born as a result of their union was consequently 
illegitimate.
In Obi v. Obi,^ the wife petitioner claimed that 
her marriage with the respondent was not valid by reason 
of failure to comply with sections 7, 11, 12, 181,21, 22, 25,
25 and 26 of the Marriage Act. She petitioned for a 
declaration that the marriage was void. She also claimed 
alimony pendente lite and costs of the proceedings.
The respondent husband claimed to be lawfully 
married to the petitioner, and stated that at the time the 
priest performed the ceremony, he was satisfied with it, 
and did not know that anything was wrong with the ceremony.
The Judge, in declaring the marriage void, said:
"The positive evidence of the petitioner was that 
it was a purely Catholic ceremony, as opposed to 
one amounting to a lawful marriage under the Act.
This evidence was not rebutted by the evidence of 
the respondent who failed to testify that a legal 
marriage was intended by the parties”.
1. [1974] Suit No. 0/8D/74, unreported, Onitsha High
Court.
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He refused the petitioner's claim for alimony^ and costs, 
on the ground that, where-a wife wilfully went through a 
ceremony of marriage which she knew to be void, and waited 
some three years before bringing a petition of nullity, 
she ought not to be entitled to award of any alimony, or 
costs.
This case may be compared with Anyaegbunam v. 
Anyaegbunam^ where the Supreme Court held that the wife 
petitioner's failure to dispute the testimony of the res­
pondent that no Registrar's certificate had been obtained 
before the church ceremony, and also her failure to testify 
that the1 omission to obtain the certificate was not done 
"wilfully and knowingly" made the purported marriage null 
and void.
On the other hand in Udoiwed v . Udoiwed.^ the 
petitioner claimed dissolution of her marriage within three 
years of marriage on the ground of exceptional hardship due 
to the husband's adultery. Her evidence was that she and 
the respondent were married according to customary law after 
which they went through a ceremony in church. She believed 
that it was a form of marriage which recognized "the union 
of one woman to a man to the exclusion of all others". The 
respondent claimed that the marriage which was celebrated 
in the Qua Iboe Church was a polygamous marriage, and that 
it was clearly pointed out to himself and the petitioner at 
the time of the marriage that he could marry more than one 
wife.^ He produced a marriage certificate written in Efik, 
which translated into English, stated that a Christian 
marriage was intended and a Christian marriage was performed 
in the Qua Iboe Church. The respondent contended that this 
meant that it was not a marriage under the Marriage Act, but
1. Under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, the spouses 
to a void marriage may claim all financial benefits 
available to spouses of a valid marriage, see s.69.
2. [1973] 4 S.C.121; [1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R.243.
3. [1963] Suit No. A/M30/63, unreported decision of the 
Aba High Court, 18 December, 1963.
4. The Qua Iboe Church in Eket prohibits the practice of
polygamy, but some branches of the Church in other
parts of Nigeria permit polygamy among members of the 
Chirr ch.
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one by the rites of the Qua Iboe Church only, and that 
consequently, the marriage was legally a customary marriage, 
and the High Court therefore had no jurisdiction to enter­
tain the suit. Idigbe,. J., said;
lfIt appears to me that where there is evidence of 
| the performance of a Christian marriage and the
| parties to it lived in consequence as husband and
wife and cohabited together (as was alleged in the 
affidavit) everything necessary to ensure the 
validity of the marriage should be presumed in the 
absence of decisive evidence to the contrary".
He held that the marriage, ex facie a Christian marriage,
I was in accordance with the Marriage Act, until the con­
trary was proved during the trial of the main petition, and
| that the Court therefore had jurisdiction.
! 1
| In Mbagwu v. Mbagwu, Umezinwa, J., held that the
i
I High Court had no jurisdiction to grant a decree of dis-
! solution of marriage since both petitioner and respondent
i
| testified in court that they intended to contract and
| actually contracted a purely "Church" marriage, and not one
t
under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
The principle of law to be deduced from the decided 
cases is, that a marriage celebrated without obtaining a 
; registrar's certificate, or in an unlicensed place of wor-
! ship, or by a person not being a recognized minister of
i some religious denomination, or under a false name or names,
will nevertheless be valid, if it is proved that:
i .
(1) the parties, or at least one of them had intended to
contract a valid monogamous marriage under the Marriage 
Act; and
| (11) the parties, or at least one of them who had the
I intention to contract a monogamous marriage, did not
knowingly and wilfully acquiesce in the celebration ofi
the marriage without complying with the provisions
2| specified in section 35(2).
[ 1. [1972] Suit No. AD/4D/72, unreported, 21 June, 1972.
! 2. See e.g. Akwudike v. Akwudike [1963] 7 E.N.L.R.5;
| Obiekwe v. Obiekwe [1963J 7 E.N.L.R.196.
j
i
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Numerous marriages are celebrated in the churches
without a Registrarfs certificate or a Special Licence being
obtained. Such marriages, consequently are not registered with
the Registrar of marriages. For example, in 1975, only 191
marriages were recorded as celebrated under the Act in
Onitsha Division.^ Yet examination of the Marriage Registers
of only five churches in Onitsha town, by the present writer
revealed a total of 300 marriages celebrated by those five
churches in 1975. Onitsha town alone has more than ten
churches. Aba Division recorded a total of five marriages
2registered under the Marriage Act for the whole of 1972 .
3
Yet there are many more than five churches in Aba, in each 
of which marriages are frequently celebrated.
An examination of the Marriage Registers of the 
churches visited in Onitsha seems to indicate that most of 
the certificates issued to married couples were not in the 
form required by the Marriage Act. For example, 513 
marriages were celebrated at St. Maryfs Catholic Church 
Onitsha from 1933-1973. The certificates signed by the 
parties and the particulars noted on them, showed that only 
in three cases were Registrarfs certificates obtained, and 
a form of certificate in accordance with the Act given to 
the parties. Examination of the Marriage Register of All 
Saints Cathedral, an Anglican Church in Onitsha, showed that 
before 1976, no books of marriage certificates were ever 
obtained, or kept by the Church as required by the Act. In 
1976, the Divisional Office in Onitsha sent out a Circular 
to all churches prohibiting them from conducting any form 
of marriage without obtaining a Registrar*s Certificate or
Zi
a Special Licence. It was as a result of this Circular
1. See Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Chieftancy 
Affairs, Social and Community Development, Enugu,
March, 1977.
2. Statistical Bulletin, ibid.
3. Aba is a large cosmopolitan commercial Igbo town.
4. The former practice of some Churches, whereby couples who
have contracted a customary marriage, or a marriage under
the Nigerian Marriage Act at a Registry Office would 
later go to Church to have the marriage "blessed” by a 
church ceremony was by this Circular no longer permitted. 
Church "blessing” does not constitute a valid marriage, 
nor has it any legal effect on a civil marriage solem­
nized before a Registrar of Marriages. See Martins v.
Adenugba [1946] 18 N.L.R.63.
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that All Saints Cathedral started to register marriages, 
celebrated in church, in accordance with the Act. In 1976, 
fifty-sis marriages were celebrated in the Church, under 
the Marriage Act, but three marriages were, in spite of the 
Circular, celebrated without the Registrar’s certificate or 
licence. When the Sacred Heart, Catholic Church Onitsha 
was visited by the present writer,^ four marriages were 
being celebrated. Opportunity was taken to examine the 
certificates given to three of the couples. None of them 
were in the form required by the Act. They were merely 
Church Certificates which omitted much of the vital 
information required by the Marriage Act. The reason given 
by the Catechist of the Church for the failure to get the 
requisite Registrar’s certificate, and the issue of 
certificates which were not in accordance with the form 
prescribed by the Act, was that there were no printed 
Marriage Certificate forms available at the Divisional Office 
in Onitsha. These forms previously had to be obtained from 
Lagos, and it was repeatedly alleged by the Church 
Authorities that more often than not these forms were 
unavailable. At present, however, because of complaints of 
defects in the previous system, the States are permitted to 
print their own Marriage Certificate forms, which should 
reduce the hardship experienced in obtaining these essential 
forms.
The retention of the registrar’s certificate as 
a key determinant for the validity of a marriage under the 
Nigerian Marriage Act has been criticized. Achike asserts:
’’The insistence on the compliance with the issuance 
of the Registrar’s Certificate as a sine qua non to 
the effectuation of a valid marriage attaches undue 
artifical importance to a borrowed practice which is 
wholly meaningless in the pluralism of the marriage 
system in Nigeria. It relegates to the background 
the parties intention to evolve a monogamous union 
under the Marriage Act. It is clear that the 
insistence on the compliance with issuance of 
Registrar’s Certificate affords the easiest escape
1. The visit was made on 13 August, 1977.
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from the rigours of divorce proceedings. Thus even 
at the risk of bastardizing the issue of, the marriage, 
the parties to a marriage, who may be unable to rely 
on any of the known grounds for instituting divorce 
proceedings or where the available evidence falls far 
below that prescribed by law may yet extricate them­
selves with impunity from their matrimonial bonds by 
averring in unison that fthey knowingly and wilfully 
acquiesced to the celebration of the marriage' despite 
the irregularity of non-conformity with issuance of 
the Registrar fs Certificate1'
4. Conflict of Laws Occasioned by the Introduction of
"Statutory" Marriage
A. Dual marriages ("double-decker")
(1) The legal effect of a statutory marriage subsequent to 
a customary law marriage between the same parties
The introduction of statutory marriage into
Nigeria has resulted in conflicts in the law relating to
marriage which in turn have been productive of uncertainty
and complexity, all having an adverse effect on women's
status in marriage and family life. Much of the confusion
results from the fact that parties combine a customary
marriage with a statutory marriage producing what has been
2
aptly described by Read as a "double-decker" marriage. The 
nature and some of the incidents of the two types of marriage 
are radically different and often conflicting.
It has been seen that a rigid separation of the 
two types of marriage was envisaged in Lord Derby's proposals. 
An exception was, however, made, which allowed two persons 
married to each other under customary law to marry each other
under the Nigerian Marriage Act, provided the customary r
4 5
marriage, was in fact monogamous. But the Act is silent
1. Okay Achike)y "The Myth of Registrar's Certificate in Act 
Marriages", N.B.J. Vol.XII, 1974, p.11 at p.18.
2. See James S. Read, "The Law of Husband and Wife in East
Africa", in Integration of Customary and Modern Legal 
Systems in Africa, op.cit.,p.597*
3. See above, p . 129•
4. Customary and Islamic law marriages are merged for 
treatment for convenience of exposition in the term
footnotes 4 and 5 continued.....
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on the important question of the legal effect of a 
statutory marriage on the prior customary marriage. In 
the courts, also, the question remains largely indeterminate 
due no doubt to the fact that cases in which both marriages 
have been celebrated in Nigeria, and which bear directly on 
this point, rarely come before the courts. Another reason 
may be that, as previously stated, there is a dichotomy of 
jurisdiction and the courts which exercise jurisdiction over 
a customary marriage are not the same as those courts which 
exercise jurisdiction over a statutory marriage.
Since 1974, the High Courts in the former East 
Central States have been given original jurisdiction over
all causes and matters involving customary law,including
1 2 marriages. In Afonne v. Afonne, it was noted that it is
now necessary for spouses who have contracted both forms of
marriage, and who are seeking a divorce, to state
specifically which marriage or marriages they wish to
3
dissolve.
Legal writers have largely confined their attention
to cases where one of the marriages is contracted outside
Nigeria, and for the most part have ignored the situation
4
where both marriages have been contracted in Nigeria, yet 
the legal implications are of vital importance, especially 
to the legal status of women.
Footnotes 4 and 5 continued......
4..."Customary marriage” in much of the following sections.
5. See the Marriage Act, Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 Revision, ss.ll(l)(d); 35(1),55,47 and 48.
1. See High Court Amendment Edict. 1974, and further above, 
Chapter II, p. 158.
2. [1973] Suit No. 0/6D/73, unreported, Onitsha High Court.
3. Compare the statement of Wrangham, J., in Ohochuku v. 
Ohochuku,[i960] 1 All E.R.253; it is important that the 
court which dissolves a marriage should make it clear in 
the decree which marriage it has dissolved. See also 
Thynne v. Thynne [1955] 3 All E.R.129; [1955] P.272; 
Hewett v. Hewett and Dupin [19291 73 Sol.Jo.402; Reder v. 
Reder [1948J W.N.238.
4. But see R.O.' Okagbue, "The Marriage Dilemma” in 
African Indigenous Laws, op.cit., pp.181-184.
157
To assess the legal implications it is necessary 
to identify some of the legal questions which may arise 
from a "double-decker11 marriage.
(1) Does the subsequent statutory marriage terminate the 
customary marriage or do they both exist?
Nwogugu^ asserts that a subsequent statutory
marriage supersedes a previous customary law union on the
ground that the relationship created by a statutory
marriage, as well as the rights and obligations arising
therefrom, are unknown to customary law. This contention,
with respect,cannot be supported. Every system of customary
law provides a procedure, no matter how simple, whereby a
marriage may be dissolved. The customary law of a people
can only be validly changed by an express statutory provision
implying or asserting such a change, or by the adoption of a
new custom by a significant majority of the people over a
2
long period of time. There is no statutory provision which 
expressly or by necessary implication provides that a cus­
tomary marriage ceases to exist when the spouses contract 
a subsequent statutory marriage. The customary law cannot 
be changed simply by the celebration of a statutory marriage, 
an institution unknown to customary law.
Elias also argues that a statutory marriage 
supersedes the prior or subsequent customary union, and that 
the latter is valid only if it stands alone. He submits 
that this is the net effect of sections 11(1)(d), 35, 47 
and 48 of the Marriage Act. This view cannot be supported.
1. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit., p.59;
see also Park, Sources of Nigerian Lawt op.cit.t p.132.
2. See Balogun and Anor. v. Ashodi [1931] 10 N.L.R. 36 and 
further, above, Chapter .II,'pp. 17 8-18(1.
3. See Elias, Nigerian Legal System, op.cit.,p.294; for 
opinions to the contrary see 0. Achike, "Statutory and 
Customary Marriage: A Comparison", Nigerian Law Journal 
1967, Vol.2, No.l, p.49 at p.51; 1.0. Agbede, 
"Recognition of Double Marriage in Nigerian Law,
Int« and Comp. Law Quarterly, Vol.17, 1968, p.755.
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A statutory marriage cannot supersede a subsequent customary
union since a subsequent customary marriage after a statutory
marriage is void.^ It is also illegal and attracts a 
2
penalty. The sections cited by the learned writer do not
expressly or impliedly justify the conclusion that a
statutory marriage supersedes a prior customary marriage.
3
In Akparanta v. Akparanta, Agbakoba, J., in con­
sidering the effect of the termination of a customary 
marriage on a statutory marriage, observed:
"...there is nothing in the Act which precludes the 
superimposition of a statutory marriage upon a 
customary marriage. When that happens, the latter 
is not extinguished but co-exists with the former, 
although its termination, if it happens would not 
affect the continuance of the statutory marriage".^
The learned Judge gave no reasons for his opinion, but it is 
respectfully submitted that it is the correct one for the 
reason given above.
(11) If both marriages co-exist, are the incidents of 
the customary marriage extinguished by, or merged with, the 
incidents of the statutory marriage?
An affirmative answer was given to this question
5
in Odive v. Obor and Anor, where the learned trial Judge 
expressed the opinion that the incidents of the customary 
marriage merge with and are extinguished by the incidents 
of the statutory marriage. With respect, it is submitted 
that this contention is too wide. It is obvious that some 
incidents of the customary marriage are extinguished by the
1. S. 55 Marriage Act, Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
2. Ibid., s.48.
5. [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 779.
4. Ibid., pp.782-785.
5. [1972] Suit No. 0/5/1972, unreported, Onitsha High
Court. An appeal against this decision on another 
ground was upheld by the Supreme Court, see Odive v. 
Obor [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 598.
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1 2 Marriage Act itself, or some other statute. Some
incidents'may be extinguished by the- application of the
3 4repugnancy or public policy rules . For example, the
right of the husband under customary law to marry further 
wives is extinguished by the Marriage Act itself. Similarly, 
a manTs right to legitimize his bastard children by recog­
nition, permitted under some systems of Nigerian customary 
law, is extinguished by the rule against public policy as 
laid down by judicial decisions. But not all the incidents 
of a customary marriage are extinguished. Any incident of 
a customary marriage which does not conflict with an 
incident of statutory marriage remains unaffected and may 
be enforced by the appropriate court.
6
In the recent Swaziland case of Dladla v. Dlamini, 
the effect of a marriage by civil rights upon a subsisting
customary union was considered. The plaintiff husband had
successfully instituted in the Swaziland National Court, an
action for damages on the ground of his wife's adultery with
the defendant. The parties had since 1950 been married
under customary law, but the adultery was only committed
after the parties were married according to civil rites.
It was therefore contended that the Swazi court had no
jurisdiction in view of the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950. The
Court of Appeal, however, decided that there was in this case
a "dual marriage", a civil marriage and a customary marriage,
1. See e.g. Marriage Act, s.27 which provides that a statutory
marriage can only be dissolved by a valid judgment of 
divorce.
2. See e.g. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, ss.3(l) and 15.
3. For the repugnancy rule see above, Chapter II, pp. 182-189.
4.See the Evidence Act, Cap 62, Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria, 1958 Revision, s.14(3); see also Cole v. Akinyele 
[i960] 5 F.S.C.84; Abisogun v. Abisogun and 0rs.ri963 1
1 All^N.L.R. 237; Onwudinjoh v. Onwudinjoh 119571
2 E.R.N.L.R.l; But see now, s.39(2) Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978, 
which provides that "No citizen of Nigeria shall be 
subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by 
reason of the circumstances of his birth."
5. See cases inn.4, p.159.
6. [1977] Court of Appeal for Swaziland, 17 Feb. 1977,
- reported in C.I.L.S.A. July, 1977.
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which were not mutually destructive and could stand side 
by side. Adultery was an injury done to the husband in 
either case; a plaintiff!s claim could thus be based 
either on the marriage by Swazi law and custom, or on the 
civil rites marriage. By instituting the action for 
damages in the Swazi National Court, the plaintiff had 
clearly based his claim on the customary marriage, and the 
court had jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the position is the same in 
Nigeria, with regard to claims for damage for adultery.
(III) If the statutory marriage is dissolved by divorce 
what is the fate of the customary marriage?
It is submitted that a dissolution of the statutory 
marriage by divorce does not affect the customary marriage.^" 
The arguments adduced in (1) above apply here also, but with 
greater force. In many systems of Nigerian customary law, a 
marriage can only'be dissolved by the repayment of dowry, 
or a waiver of its repayment by the husband. Only a specific 
statutory provision, or the practice of the people, can 
change this law. It has been previously seen that 
generally, the repayment of dowry is still regarded by the 
people as the only means of ending a marriage, and there are 
no express statutory provisions dispensing with repayment. 
Therefore, in spite of a judicial decree dissolving the 
statutory marriage, it is submitted that the customary 
marriage and its incidents remain intact.
(IV) What is the position where the statutory marriage 
takes place in a foreign country?
2
A few old cases in which the statutory marriage 
took place in a foreign country have engaged the attention 
of the Nigerian courts. There is no rational principle of 
law to be gleaned from the cases, and it is best to regard
1. See Afonne v. Afonne [1973] Suit No. 0/6D/73 unreported, 
Onitsha High Court.
2. See e.g. Asiata v. Goncallo [1900] 1 N.L.R. 42.
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these decisions as limited to the peculiar facts of the 
particular cases.
In Ohochuku v. Ohochuku,^ the parties were married 
under customary law in Nigeria, after which they went through 
another marriage ceremony at a register office in London.
In a divorce suit instituted by the wife, expert evidence 
was given by the Hon. Dr. Elias, as to the nature of the 
Nigerian marriage. Wrangham, J., holding that he had no 
power under English law to dissolve the Nigerian marriage 
which was potentially polygynous, granted a decree for the 
dissolution of the marriage contracted in London. This 
decision has been the subject of confusion and controversy, 
much of it unjustified. For example, the Hon. Mr. Justice 
A.N. Aniagolu, criticizing Wrangham*s J.*s decision to 
dissolve the English marriage, but not the Nigerian marriage, 
says:
,!For him to have so held meant that he regarded the 
second marriage in England as valid marriage over 
which he could entertain divorce proceedings. But 
if the Nigerian marriage was valid, then the second 
marriage solemnized in England could not be valid 
since the Nigerian marriage which was valid by the 
Nigerian Law, which was Ohochukus lex domicilii, was 
still subsisting. By holding that the second 
English marriage was a marriage, he was in effect 
saying that the Nigerian marriage was not a marriage 
for, by English law, the second marriage in England 
could not be valid without the demise of Ohochuku*s 
Nigerian wife of the Nigerian marriage*’^
Since the Nigerian Marriage Act permits the 
contract of a statutory marriage after a customary marriage, 
provided the parties to both marriages are the same, and 
the customary marriage is in fact monogamous, it is 
difficult to justify this assertion. It is submitted with 
the deepest respect,that the learned Judge (now Chief 
Justice of Imo State, Nigeria) misunderstood the facts of 
the case and mistakenly thought that the two marriages
1. [I960] 1 All E.R. 253; [i960] 1 W.L.R.183; 104 Sol.Jo.
190. _ _
2. See A.N. Aniagolu, "Aspects of Customary Marriage and
Divorce and Their Incidents Upon Family Life", in
African Indigenous Laws, ojD.cit. ,p.96.
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involved different women. This submission is reinforced 
by the fact that the learned Judge continued:
,rIn fact, the Nigerian Law forbids a person to 
contract a marriage with a different woman, under 
the Act (the counterpart in Nigeria of the English 
marriage law), while his marriage under customary 
law is still subsisting".^
Both marriages contracted by Ohochuku were to the same 
woman, therefore this provision in the Nigerian Marriage 
Act is not relevant to the case. It was possible for the 
Ohochukus to contract a statutory marriage in Nigeria after 
the customary marriage.
2
Kasunmu and Salacuse submit that Ohochuku*s 
second marriage in London should be regarded as invalid by 
Nigerian Courts, on the ground that, since English law 
recognizes the customary marriage, and no provision for 
conversion exists in English law, the purported second 
ceremony of marriage would be a nullity in English law.
They argue that once a marriage status has been created in 
English law, then any subsequent celebration of marriage 
between the same parties is a nullity. The learned writers 
conclude:
"The marital status has already been created under 
customary law before the English registry marriage 
and one fails to see what effect the re-marriage 
has on their status".^
The simple answer to this proposition is that since the 
parties were domiciled in Nigeria, their marital status 
was governed by their lex domicilii. Had reference been 
made to( Nigerian law for the incidents of the Ohochuku*s 
status it would have been found that Nigerian law allowed 
the parties to superimpose a monogamous marriage on their 
customary law marriage. The second marriage automatically 
changes their legal status. The statutory marriage has the
1. Ibid., p.96.
2. Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit., 
p.95-97.
5. Ibid., p.96.
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effect of either curtailing or extending their marital
obligations. For example, if there was no. statutory marriage
superimposed on the customary marriage, either party to the
marriage could effect a divorce unilaterally, or both
parties could mutually agree to a divorce. Once the second
marriage, the statutory one, is contracted, however, no
divorce may be effected unilaterally, or by mutual consent,
without resort to a court of competent jurisdiction to
grant a decree of divorce. Similarly, the husband1s
customary law right to take additional wives during the
subsistence of the customary marriage is lost, once the
statutory marriage is superimposed.^ This is not the
case where double marriages are contracted under the
English Marriage Act between the same parties. Here,
their marital legal status remains the same. The second
marriage is therefore superfluous, and has no legal
effect - a nullity. Such a situation would also result
where double marriages between the same parties are
2
celebrated under the Nigerian Marriage Act.
The position in Ohochuku1s case and similar
cases is quite different from the English cases of Hampson
3 4
v. Hampson and Thynne v. Thynne, cited by Kasunmu and
Salacuse in support of their submission. In the English 
cases the parties were domiciled in England, both marriages 
were monogamous, and both marriages were celebrated under 
English law. The second ceremony in these two cases, there­
fore, did not confer on the parties any rights not previously 
possessed, nor any additional duties or restrictions of 
rights.
Nigerian Courts generally treat a marriage 
celebrated under English law (or any monogamous marriage 
celebrated abroad), as similar to a marriage celebrated under
1. Nigerian Marriage Act, Cap 115, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, 1958, section 27; Matrimonial Causes Decree 
1970, No. 18 of 1970, s.3(l)(a).
2. See the case of Uwakwe v. Uwakwe [1971 ] Suit No. HU/151Y/71,
unreported decision of Umuhia High Court - above, p. 139.
3. [1908] P.355.
4. [1955] P.272.
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the Nigerian Marriage Act, for many purposes, for example, 
divorce. In Oshodi v. Oshodi,^ the petitioner petitioned 
for a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and adultery with 
one Sikiratu Elemoro, the woman-named. The respondent, 
a practising Moslem, denied the allegations of cruelty, 
and averred that the woman-named had been married to him in 
1954, under Yoruba Islamic Law and Custom, to the knowledge 
of the petitioner, and before the petitioner was married to 
him under Yoruba native law and custom. He further con­
tended that the marriage between him and the petitioner in 
England, in 1956, under the Marriage Act of England, was a 
nullity, and therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to 
the reliefs sought in her petition. Caxton-Martins, Ag.J., 
held that the marriage in 1954 between the respondent and 
the woman named, and the marriage in 1955 between the 
respondent and the petitioner, were both valid polygamous 
marriages which the law of Nigeria allowed to run side by 
side, but that the marriage of 1956 under the Marriage Act 
of England, between the respondent and the petitioner, was 
an attempt to superimpose a monogamous marriage upon a 
polygamous marriage, and so was a nullity. It was held 
obiter, that if the petitioner and the respondent had 
attempted in 1956 to get married in Nigeria under the 
Marriage Act, a caveat might have been successfully lodged 
because of the valid marriage still existing between the 
respondent and the woman named.
It is therefore clear that, if a marriage would 
be legally valid if celebrated in Nigeria, it would also 
be regarded as legally valid if celebrated under English 
law, provided the parties are domiciled in Nigeria. But 
if such a marriage would not have been valid under Nigerian 
law, its celebration in England would not render it valid 
in Nigerian law. In other words, it is Nigerian law which 
decides the capacity of parties domiciled here to contract 
marriage, and the forms the marriage can take.
1. [1965] 2 All N.L.R. 214.
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(11-) The validity of a customary marriage subsequent to 
a statutory marriage between the same parties
It has been seen that once a marriage has been 
contracted under the Marriage Act, no further customary 
marriage is legally possible during the subsistence of 
the statutory marriage, whether the parties are the same 
or not.^
The validity of a customary marriage celebrated 
subsequent to a statutory marriage, has not engaged the 
attention of the courts, possibly because most people marry 
under customary law, before contracting a marriage under the 
Marriage Act. In fact, very few people realise that a sub­
sequent customary marriage after the celebration of a
statutory marriage is not only void, but is also illegal
2under section 55 of the Marriage Act.
An interesting legal complication may arise from 
this provision. There is a modern tendency to regard a 
customary marriage as a preliminary step to the celebration 
of a statutory marriage, especially among some Igbo commun­
ities, for example Onitsha. Cohabitation is therefore 
postponed until after the celebration of the statutory 
marriage, and the parties are not regarded as legally 
married until after the statutory marriage has been per­
formed. The postponement of cohabitation, however, can
have a legal effect unforeseen by the parties. It has been
-5
seen that in the case of Qsamwonyi v. Osamwonyi, the
Supreme Court held that cohabitation is essential to the
validity of a marriage under Benin customary law, and
that a customary marriage is only legally contracted when
A
the parties have cohabited.' Where cohabitation between the 
parties to a customary marriage is postponed until after the 
statutory marriage, the customary marriage, which is
1. See further, above, p.153.
2. The fact was evident from investigations during field-work.
3. ,[197.2] U.I.L.R., 527.
4. See further above, Chapter VI, pp.550 et al.
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effected only after such cohabitation, is subsequent to the 
statutory marriage, and consequently it is void under 
section 35 of the Marriage Act which provides that a cus­
tomary marriage subsequent to a statutory marriage is 
invalid and illegal.
Similarly, where parties for one reason or the 
other (usually in defiance of their parents1 wishes) marry 
under the Act, and then (when the parents have given their 
consents), marry under customary law such customary 
marriages are not only invalid, but are illegal and incur 
a penalty.^
Summary of Significant Innovations Introduced by
Statutory Marriage
The historical origin and nature of statutory 
marriage, as well as some of the conflicts produced by 
its introduction into the Nigerian legal system, have been 
examined above. The ground has therefore been laid for an 
appraisal of the changes brought by the Marriage Act and 
other statutory provisions derived from English or other 
foreign laws, on the legal status of Nigerian women.
It would be helpful to tabulate briefly the
innovations introduced by these foreign laws, before dealing
in detail with some of the most important changes. The
greater equality of legal status of men and women in
marriage and family life is perhaps the most profound
change. The introduction of modern English law into Nigeria
affected women’s status in traditional society which was ■
previously intricately interwoven with certain social and
legal factors such as patriarchal rule, perpetual male 
2
tutelage, polygyny, the dowry system, arranged marriages, 
denial of proprietory capacity, and deprivation of rights 
of succession.
1. See Onuorah v. Onuorah [1972] Suit No. E/27D/72, un­
reported, Enugu High Court; Wachuku v. Wachuku,f1970] 
Suit No. 1/108/70, unreported, Ibadan High Court,
30 July, 1970.
2. See the South African Case Mashinini v. Mashinini [1947] 
N.A.C.91, where it was held that the principle that 
regardless of age and marital condition, a married woman 
is always under the guardianship of some man goes to the 
very root of customary law.
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Some of the most important changes are inherent
in the following
(I) the legal obligation of monogamy, already discussed 
t above;
(II) the individualization of the marriage contract, by 
the provision dispensing with the consent of parents 
or other legal guardians, once a woman has attained 
the age of twenty-one, or is a widow under that age;
(III) the changes introduced in the rules governing the 
capacity of persons to marry each other, for example, 
rules of consanguinty, religion, status etc;
(IV) the obstacles placed on the freedom of divorce, by 
the provision of specific grounds for divorce, and 
the elaborate procedure which has to be adopted for 
gaining a divorce;
(V) the maintenance and other rights granted to divorced
women after the termination of marriage, rights
unknown to customary or Islamic law;
(VI) the introduction of different rules for the affiliation 
of children;
(VII) the introduction of rules ousting the almost exclusive 
right of custody which customary law (but not Islamic 
law) generally gives to the husband and his family.
(VIII) the introduction of a different system of succession 
to property, which, contrary to customary and Islamic 
laws, favours the widow and children of a deceased 
intestate husband, to the detriment of his extended 
family; a married woman1s right to own, and to dispose 
of her self acquired, property was also entrenched;
(IX) the absence of any provision which compels a widow to
marry another member of her deceased husband*s family, 
or to remain married to her deceased husband, against 
her wishes;
(X) the absence of any legal requirement that a dowry or
sadak is payable by the bridegroom to the bride or her 
parents;
(XI) the provision of legal machinery to enforce the rights 
and obligations;
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(XII) the introduction of an action for damages for the 
breach of a promise to marry (such an action is 
unknown to customary and Islamic laws).
These are the principal changes which the 
introduction of English law and statutory marriage effected 
on the legal status of women who married under the Nigerian 
Marriage Act.
The changes in the proprietory rights of women 
will be examined later. Some of the changes enumerated 
above will be examined in this chapter, and others in the 
next chapter.
5. Changes in the status of women in 
relation to the formation of marriage
A. Consents to marriage
(1) Parental consents
It has been seen that in both customary, and 
Islamic law marriages, the consent of a woman1s parents or 
other legal guardian is absolutely necessa r y I n d e e d ,  
without such consent, the dowry, a legal essential of a 
customary marriage, cannot be paid. Under the Marriage 
Act, however, once a woman is twenty-one years old, or she 
has become a widow before that age, no consent is necessary 
for the validity of her marriage, and she can marry without 
such consent being given.^
The consent required under the Act for a woman 
who is not a widow, and is under twenty-one years, is the 
written consent of her father, or if he be dead or of 
unsound mind, or absent from Nigeria, the consent of her 
mother. If neither parent is capable of giving consent, 
the legal guardian of the woman can give the required
3
consent. If there is no parent or guardian capable of
1. See above Chapter V and Chapter I X .
2. See Marriage Act, Cap 115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 s. 18.
5. Ibid.,s.18.
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giving consent, a Governor, a judge of the High Court of
the State, or an administrative officer may give the
requisite consent.'*' This provision is important in that,
if the father is not capable of giving consent, the mother1s
consent is preferred to that of any other male relative. In
customary and Islamic law, in the absence of the father, the
2
consent of a male relative is always necessary, and 
generally, the mother!s consent is legally unimportant.
Another point which should be noted with reference 
to consent under the Act is that, although a penalty of two 
years imprisonment is imposed on any person who marries, or 
assists, or procures any other person to marry a minor, the 
marriage of a minor, once celebrated is not rendered 
invalid by the lack of parental consent.
In Agbo v. Udo the plaintiff, who was married 
under the Marriage Act, brought an action for damages against 
the respondent on the ground of the latter*s adultery with 
his wife. The respondent submitted that the petitioner’s 
marriage was invalid on the grounds that at the time of the 
marriage, the wife was a minor who had been married without 
the consent of her father as required by the Act. Consequently, 
there was no valid marriage which could give rise to a claim 
for damages for adultery. Abbott, J., rejecting this con­
tention, held that notwithstanding the absence of consent 
of the father, the marriage was valid within the meaning of 
the Marriage Act, by the operation of subsection (3) of 
section 33 thereof. The respondent was found liable for 
damages.
It should also be noted that a widow needs no 
consent for a marriage under the Act. A widow under a 
customary law marriage is also a widow within the provision
1. Ibid., s.20.
2. In Islamic law the father may by '.■will appoint an executor 
to be the legal guardian of his daughter.
3. This is by virtue of s.33(3) of the Marriage Act.
4. [1947] 18 N.L.R. 152.
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of the statute.-^- A woman, therefore, who had been married 
as a child, under customary law,and whose husband sub­
sequently dies, could contract a marriage under the Act, 
without parental consent, at any age.
In view of recent suggestions that the age at 
which Nigerian women need parental consent for a statutory 
marriage should, following England, be reduced from twenty- 
one to eighteen years; it may be interesting to consider 
briefly why the age of twenty-one was chosen for, and 
retained in, the Marriage Act.
Justice Jackson, probably following English law 
at that time, had proposed in his draft Ordinance that 
parental consent should be given for the marriage of 
minors under the age of twenty-one years. But his proposal 
was criticized, especially by missionaries, who thought the 
age for the marriage of girls should be lower than twenty- 
one. The reasons for advocating the dispensation of 
parental consent for the marriage of girls below the age of 
twenty-one can be seen from two letters criticizing the 
proposal.
Reverend P. Lonapre of the Roman Catholic Church, 
Lagos wrote:
,!As early marriages are the rule in at least this 
part of the colony I would say the age required by 
this section be changed from 21 to 17 in the case 
of females, and this in order to check in some 
degree the progress of concubinage, which unhappily 
but too much prevails in the colony"^
The reasons given by Chief Justice Marshall are more 
explicit:
!,In this country persons usually marry at an earlier 
age than in England, and to make it illegal to 
marry before 21 without the consent written or un­
written of the parent (whether father or mother) or
1. See S.18 of Marriage Act, Cap.115, Laws of the Feder­
ation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision; 11 If either party to 
an intended marriage not being a widower or widow, is 
under twenty-one years of age, the written consent of 
the father, or if he be dead or of unsound mind or 
absent from Nigeria, of the mother, or if both be dead 
or of unsound mind or absent from Nigeria, of the 
guardian of such party, must be produced annexed to such 
affidavit as aforesaid before a licence can be granted 
or a certificate issued".
2. See letter dated 26 March, 1879, enclosure in
footnote 2 continued....
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still more of the guardian (whoever that may mean, 
for the term is not defined) would place an arbitrary 
power in the hands of those persons who could often 
be most injurious and improper. Parents might extort 
large dowries before they would consent to a daughter*s 
marriage. Pagan and Mohammedan parents might make it 
impossible for their children, if Christians, to 
marry on account of their being such. In a Christian 
and civilized country this authority is rightly given 
to parents, but here, I think, it would often operate 
for the satisfaction of malice and extortion. If it 
is considered necessary to make any such enactment, I 
would recommend that the age be 16 instead of 21” .^
Similar reasons were given, and various ages 
proposed by other writers, including Lord Derby, who 
recommended 18 years, but who also thought that the opinions 
of those with local knowledge and experience should be 
obtained.^
Governor Rowe, in his reply to Lord Derby’s
recommendations, reported that "the age of minority had been
left at twenty-one for Natives, in accordance with the
unanimous opinion of the Executive Council of the Gold
Coast Colony11. This seems to be due to the fact as
stated by Quayle Jones, Queen’s Advocate, that men in the
Colony ’’rarely or never marry before they attain that age
and that women do not marry at all without the consent of
A
their parents” .
The present writer analysed 588 statutory marriage 
certificates recorded at the Local Government Office in 
Onitsha for 1976, and 512 statutory marriages contracted at 
Lagos Registry Office from 11 January to 51 July, 1975. Of 
the marriages recorded at Onitsha, 152 women (22.4 percent) 
needed parental consent. Only 57 (8.9 percent) of the 
Lagos brides married below the age of 21 years and thus 
needed parental consent. Not one of the bridegrooms was 
below the age of 21 years.
Footnote 2 continued  Dispatch No. 441, of 18 September,
1882 - C.O. 879-20-216, p.50.
1. See ’’Suggestions on the Proposed Marriage Ordinance, 
dated 19.4.79 C.O. 879/20-215, pp.28-29.
2. See Dispatch No. 122 dated 22 March,1885,para.19,section 5. 
C.O. 879-20-225/224, pp.45-47.
5- Dispatch 507,dated 27 August,1885,C.O.879-20-24,p.47.
4. Dispatch 216,dated 29 March,1884,enclosure No.2. C.0.879-
20-250/251, p.59-60.
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Table 10:1 shows that the pattern of the marriage 
age of bridegrooms- has not changed' for nearly a century.
None of the 1000 bridegrooms named in the marriage certificates 
married below the age of twenty-one years, and very few of the 
brides needed parental consent for their marriages, thus 
indicating that they were twenty-one years or older at the 
time of the marriage.
It is interesting to note the numerical disparity 
in the Lagos marriages (mainly Yoruba) and the Onitsha 
marriages (mainly Igbos), of the women between the age-group
21-25 and 26-30. The majority of women 69.2 percent in 
Lagos and 70.1 percent in Onitsha were married between the 
ages of 21-25. Not one of the women was married after age 
30. This seems to suggest that women over 30 years old do 
not contract statutory marriage, and if women do marry after 
that age, they usually marry under customary law. Second 
and subsequent marriages would therefore be contracted mainly 
according to customary law. Older men contracted statutory 
marriages in both communities.
Another interesting feature of the statistics is 
the relatively younger age at which the women married at 
Onitsha; 22.4 percent married between the ages of 15-20 
compared with only 8.9 percent in the Lagos marriages. In 
the case of the men,the percentage of marriages contracted 
by each age group in the case of both Lagos and Onitsha is 
almost identical.
The findings of an examination of marriage 
certificates in respect of marriages celebrated between 
1960-68 at the Ibadan Registry, in connection with research 
on "Family Law in Nigeria”, conducted at the University of 
Ife, showed that both parties are usually over the age of 
twenty years at the time of marriage .^
1. See A.B. Kasunmu, "Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970: A 
Critical Assessment”, Nig. J.C.L.. Vol.2, No.l, 1971, 
pp.88-212 at p.113. See also Olusanya, "Socio-Economic 
Aspects of Rural-Urban Migration in Western Nigeria”, 
o£.cit.,pp.62-63; Olusanya, The Educational Factor in 
Human Fertility, o£.cit.,p.360; the mean age of marriage 
for men is 25.8 years and for women 19.4 years.
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As a result of these findings, there seems to he 
no need for a change in the law with.respect to the age of 
parental consents for a statutory marriage, since in very 
few cases are such consents necessary.
(11) Consents of the parties to the marriage
Lack of consent of the parties to a marriage is 
not included as one of the factors which will invalidate 
a marriage under the Nigerian Marriage Act.^ For the 
Canon Law (Common law), marriage is created by the con­
sent of the parties. Consequently, if there is no consent,
2there is no valid marriage. Consent is normally con­
clusively presumed from the celebration of the ceremony of 
marriage. In certain exceptional cases, however, the 
apparent consent may not be real. Thus, the validity of a 
marriage could be impugned on the ground that one of the 
parties to the marriage was intoxicated or insane at the 
time of the marriage, and as a result, was not aware of the
3
true import of his actions. Other factors which may
vitiate consent were duress, fraud or mistake.
The lacuna in the Marriage Act has now been
filled by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, which
provides that a marriage which takes place after the
commencement of the Decree is void where:
,!(d) the consent of either of the parties is not a real 
consent because
(1) it was obtained by duress or fraud; or
(11) that party was mistaken as to the identity 
of the other party, or as to the nature of 
the ceremony performed; or
(111) that party is mentally incapable of under­
standing the nature of the marriage contract".
1. See s.33(2) and 33(3); Agu v. Agu [1971] Suit No.E/5D/70, 
unreported, Enugu High Court.
2. See Maitland and Pollock, History of English Law, on. 
cit., Vol.2, p.368; D.Tolstoy."Void and Voidable 
Marriages,” 27 M.L.R. 1964,pp.385-394 at p.385; he 
argues that in all cases where a marriage is invalidated 
for want of consent, it is void, and not voidable; but 
see Joseph Jackson, The Formation and Annulment of 
Marriage, 2nd edit. (London: Butterworths, 1969), p .26.
3. See the dictum of Lord Stowell in Sullivan v. Sullivan 
[1812] 2 Hag.Con.
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Consent of the parties to the marriage is a 
statutory requirement for the validity of the marriage 
and the consent must be real. What is real consent?
Consent will not be real if it is induced by:
(1) duress or fraud
This principle was unsuccessfully invoked by the
petitioner in Agu v. Agu,^ who sought to have her marriage
declared void, on the ground, inter alia, that when the said
marriage took place, she was only fourteen years old, that
she did not give her real consent to the marriage, did not
understand the nature of the ceremony, and was crying
throughout the ceremony. Although the petition was brought
under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, the marriage,
contracted before the Decree, was excluded from the
2invalidating provisions of the Decree. Phil-Ebosie, J., 
noted this fact. He held that lack of consent, or consent 
obtained by duress or fraud did not invalidate a marriage 
under the Marriage Act. He referred to the fact that under 
English law (common law) the consents of both parties are 
necessary for a valid marriage, but held that *the burden 
of proof to impeach marriage on the ground of want of con­
sent is heavier than in the case of impeaching a commercial 
contract” and stated that it was clear that the petitioner 
could not succeed on the ground of lack of consent.
It is respectfully submitted that the submission 
of the petitioner was correctly rejected by Phil-Ebosie, J., 
”Where a formal consent is brought about by force, menace 
or duress - a yielding of the lips, not of the mind - it
3
is of no legal effect” . But public policy requires that 
marriages should not be lightly set aside, so that the
1. [1971] Suit No. E/5D/70, unreported decision of Enugu 
High Court.
2. See the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, Decree No. 18 
of 1970, s.3(1).
3. Szetcher v. Szetcher [1971] P.286; Note: under the M.C.A. 
1970, a void marriage is not devoid of legal effect,
see section 69; see also Ford v. Stier [1896] P.l.
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principles applied to invalidate a marriage are "strict and 
not to be rashly extended" . ^ Tt is not unknown for brides to . 
cry at their wedding, although•they have consented to be 
married, but in many cases, the tears express joy. Un­
corroborated evidence of crying by the bride is not enough 
to justify a decree of nullity.
For a party to succeed in invalidating a
"marriage" on this ground, there must be proof of fear
2
overriding the party*s true intent. The fear must be 
sufficiently grave, and it has been stated that there must
■3
be a threat of immediate danger to life, limb, or liberty,
4arising from external circumstances but not necessarily
5
from acts of the other party. Thus, in Singh v. Singh, 
an English case, the marriage was arranged by the bride*s 
parents. Both husband and wife were Sikhs, and prior to 
the ceremony at a Register Office, the bride, who was seventeen 
years old, had never seen the bridegroom, but had been 
told by her parents that he was handsome and educated. She 
found him neither handsome, nor educated, and refused to 
consummate the marriage. Her petition for nullity of the 
marriage on the ground of duress failed, as there was no 
evidence that her will was overborne, or that her consent 
was obtained by force or fear. Her assertion that she only 
went through the ceremony out of a "proper respect" for her
1. per Karminski, J., - H.v.H [1954] P.258, 267.
2. See Lee v. Lee [1928] 5 S.W.2d. 672; "shot-gun marriage" 
was held void because "if there had not been a wedding, 
there would have been a funeral"; see also Scott v. 
Sebright [1886] 12 P.D. 21, 25, 51, [1886] 5 T.L.R.79; 
and the Irish case of Griffith v. Griffith [1944] I.R.55; 
Cf. United States v. Rubenstein [1945J 151 Fed. Rep.
(2nd ser.j 915: the marriage was held.void where the 
primary object of the ceremony was to evade the 
immigration laws of the United States.
' 5. Szechter v. Szechter [19711 P.286; ri97ll 2 W.L.R.170;
[197077 AiiTTTtfrgos.
4. Szechter v. Szechter [1971] P.286; Parojcic v. Parojcic
[1958J 1 W.L.R.1^80; Buckland v. Buckland [1968 1 P.296.
5. T1971] 2 All E.R. 828, C.A.'; Cooper v. Crane T18911
P.369.
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parents, and the tradition of her people, were not 
evidence of fear.
On the other hand, in H.v.H'*' the petitioner, 
a spinster aged 18 years, went through a ceremony of 
marriage with the respondent in Hungary in 194-9, in order 
to obtain a foreign passport to enable her to leave the 
country. She stated that she was anxious, in view of the 
circumstances then prevailing, to leave her native country 
because of her fear of the danger to her life, liberty and 
virtue. She was able to escape from Hungary, and in due 
course presented a petition for nullity of marriage on 
the ground of alleged duress. Karminski, J., held that 
the petitioner fs fears "were reasonably entertained” and 
were of such a kind as to negative her consent to the 
marriage, which was accordingly void. The petitioner was
granted a decree of nullity. Similarly, in Buckland v.
2
Buckland, the petitioner, resident in Malta, was 
groundlessly charged with defiling the respondent, a girl 
of fifteen. Although he protested his innocence, he was 
twice advised that he stood no chance of acquittal, but 
would probably be given up to two years imprisonment, 
unless he married her. He did so. He was held entitled 
to a decree of nullity.
The decisions on duress are not consistent, and 
in the opinion of the English Law Commission, the courts 
in fact impose their own unarticulated test of social policy 
in defining the nature of duress which would suffice to 
vitiate the apparent consent of a party to a marriage. In 
their view, however, duress is not a matter in which 
legislative action is required:
"Any attempt to define duress with the precision
appropriate to a statute would, in our view, be
likely to do more harm than good. We think that
the courts can safely be left to deal with each
case on its merits” .^
5
1. [1954] P.258; Scott v. Sebright [1886] 12 P.D.21;
Hussein v. Hussein [1938J P.159; where the respondent 
threatened to murder the.petitioner, a girl of eighteen, 
unless she married him.
2. [1968] P.296.
5. Law Commission, No. 55, 1970, Nullity of Marriage, 
para.66.
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The principle of duress is of particular importance
in the context of Nigerian social policy, with its tradition
of forced marriages. It has been seen,^ that parents often 
make a choice of spouse for their children, especially 
young girls, and exert varying degrees of pressure if their 
choice is not accepted. To what extent such pressures can 
be regarded as duress is a matter of fact for the courts.
To protect the sanctity of marriage, allegations of duress
must be strictly proved, but the courts ought not to dis­
regard the social custom of the Nigerian peoples in any 
consideration of what constitutes duress in the Nigerian 
context.
2
Thus, in Aiyegbusi v. Aiyegbusi, Odunlami, J., 
correctly, it is respectfully submitted, declared a marriage 
void on the ground that there was no real consent to the 
marriage on the part of the petitioner who adduced evidence 
showing that her father threatened to curse and punish her, 
if she refused to marry the respondent. Threats of a curse 
may produce great fear in an average Nigerian.
(11) Mental incapacity
Each party to a marriage must, at the time of 
its celebration, be capable of understanding the essential 
character of the marriage contract. It is apparent that 
a petitioner who proves that he was insane, or intoxicated 
to a high degree, at the time of the celebration of the 
marriage, will not usually have the mental capacity 
required for understanding the nature of the marriage con­
tract. There are cases, however, where lack of mental 
capacity is less obvious. For example, is age a valid 
criterion of capacity to understand the responsibilities 
attaching to marriage? Normally, persons below a certain
1. See above, Chapter V.
2. [19^7] Suit No. 1/238/71 unreported decision of the High
Court.of the Western State, of 29 April, 1974, cited in 
Nigerian Law Journal, No. 9, 1975, Survey of Legal 
Developments in Nigeria, 1974.
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age are incapable of contracting a valid statutory marriage.
It will be seen that under the common, law, a girl may be
married at the age of twelve, and that this is probably the
minimum age of marriage for girls in Nigeria.'*' Is a girl
of twelve capable of understanding the essential nature of
2
the marriage contract? The petitioner in Agu v. Agu 
claimed that she did not understand the nature of the 
ceremony because of her tender age of fourteen. There are 
two aspects to such a claim. It could mean either:
(a) that she did not know it was a marriage she was 
contracting, a question of mistake as to the 
nature of the ceremony, which would definitely 
vitiate consent under the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, 1970,^ or
(b) that she did not appreciate the consequences or 
incidents of the marriage, which at the age of 
fourteen, in Nigeria, would be difficult to 
establish, although it may be possible at the 
age of eight or ten years.
In the case of In The Estate of Park,^ a widower,
aged seventy-eight years, made a will in favour of.his 
second wife on the day of his marriage to her. Due to 
illness during the previous fifteen months, he had been in 
a very poor mental and physical condition on the wedding day, 
and in fact survived his wedding day by only eighteen days. 
Although the court declared against the will for lack of
testamentary understanding, they upheld the validity of the
marriage, which called for a different degree and kind of 
understanding, defined by the Court of Appeal as follows:
"To ascertain the nature of the contract of marriage 
a person must be mentally capable of appreciating 
that it involves the responsibilities normally 
attaching to marriage. Without that degree of 
mentality it cannot be said that he or she under­
stands the nature of the contract”.
1. See below, p.181.
2. [1971] Suit No. E/5D/70, unreported decision of Enugu
High Court.
3. Section 3(1) (d) (11).
4. [1953] 2 All E.R.408, C.A.; [1954] P.89.
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(111) Mistake
A marriage will be invalidated, if the petitioner
proves that he or she was mistaken^as to the identity of
the other contracting party to the marriage, or as to the
nature of the marriage ceremony. The principle of mistake
as to the nature of the marriage ceremony was applied in
Valier v. Valier, where the husband, an Italian with poor
knowledge of the English language, thought the usual
ceremony of marriage he contracted in an English Registry
Office was merely one of betrothal. The parties never
cohabited, and the marriage was not consummated. It was
held that he was entitled to a decree of nullity.
A marriage will not be invalidated by a mistake
2
as to the monogamous nature of the union or that one 
party mistakenly thought he was contracting a church 
marriage or a church blessing only, if all the essential 
ingredients of the Marriage Act have been complied with.
B. Capacity to marry
(1) The age of marriage
The Nigerian Marriage Act does not specify a
3
minimum age of capacity to marry. In Agu v. Agu it was
held that, in view of this omission, the English Marriage
Act, 1949, applied, by virtue of section 4 of the State
Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act, which provided for the
application of English law on matrimonial causes (including
5
the law on the age of marriage). Under the English Marriage
1 . £1925] 133 L.T. 830; Kelly v. Kelly [1932] 49 T.L.R.99;
Mehta v. Mehta [1945] 2 All E.ft.690; Kassim v. Kassim 
[1962] p.224; Cf. Ford v. Stier [1896J p.l.
2. Uwakwe v. Uwakwe and Anor. 1~19711 Suit'No. HU/15M/71 
unreported, Umuahia High Court,.see further above, p. 139 .
3. [1971] Suit No. E/5D/70, unreported, Enugu High Court.
4. Cap.177, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1958 
Revision, formerly cited as The Regional Courts 
(Federal Jurisdiction) Act.
5. See Egwunwoke v. Egwunwoke [1966] N.M.L.R. 147; [1966] 
All N.L.R.l; Enekbe v. Enekbe [1964] N.M.L.R.42. See 
also Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit., 
pp.66. Contrast, Phillips, A Survey of African Marriage
footnote 5 continued....
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Act 19^9, both parties to* the marriage must be sixteen years
or above. Any marriage below this age is void.^ Section 4
of the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act, however, has
2now been repealed by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970,
which provides that a marriage should be void if either of
3
the parties is not of marriageable age, but fails to state
what age is "marriageable age".
4
The general view is, that in the absence of a
statutory minimum age, recourse may be had to the common
law rule on the subject, since the common law of England has
5
been received into Nigerian law. If this view is accepted, 
a valid marriage may be contracted if the parties have 
attained the age of puberty, recognised as fourteen years 
for a boy, and twelve years for a girl. Any marriage con­
tracted before these ages is voidable, provided it is 
avoided by either party before that party reaches the age 
of puberty. But if the marriage is ratified (as it would 
presumably be by continued cohabitation after these ages, 
the marriage is rendered irrevocably binding.^
Table 10:1 above shows that the majority of women 
(83.1 percent) married at the age of twenty-one years or 
over, while not one of the men married below the age of 
twenty-one years. This would seem to indicate that a 
minimum marriage age of sixteen years with parental consent
Footnote 5 continued  and Family Life,op.cit.,p.258;
Arinze v. Arinze [1966J N.M.L.R. 155.
1. See the arguments advanced for and against making a 
marriage contracted under the minimum age voidable 
rather than void in the English Law Commission Report,
No. 33. 1970, Nullity of Marriage, para.17.
2. No. 18 of 1970, ss.8 and 115(2)(d).
3. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, No. 18 of 1970,s .(3)(1)(e).
4. See Adesanya, Laws of Matrimonial Causes, op.cit., p.149 
Nwogugu, Family"Law in Nigeria, op.cit., p7Z5; Phillips, 
Survey of African Marriage, op.cit.,p.258; Kasunmu and 
and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op.cit., pp. 65-66.
5. See above, Chapter II, pp. 193-196.
6. See Bromley, Family Law, 1976, op.cit.,p.50.
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and twenty-one years without parental consent would be 
adequate at the present time in Nigeria, and. consequently 
there is no need to fix the minimum age below this.^
There is need, however, for a national minimum 
age of marriage which should be made to govern all marriages 
contracted in Nigeria. The present uncertainty as to the 
legal age of marriage in Nigeria is highly unsatisfactory.
(11) Consanguinity and affinity
It has been seen in the discussion on customary 
2
law marriages that the prohibited degrees of consan­
guinity and affinity vary considerably among the various 
communities. While there are virtually no marriage res­
trictions among some groups in this respect, others prohibit 
inter-marriage by parties who are even distantly related. 
During the initial discussions on the Marriage Ordinance 1884, 
bars of consanguinity and affinity stimulated much controversy 
between those who wanted the prohibitions of English law to 
be enshrined in the Ordinance in their totality, regardless 
of local practices to the contrary, and those who thought 
that some notice should be taken of these practices, 
especially those not "repugnant to the teachings of 
scripture".
The problem has always been, and today still 
remains, a delicate one, principally because of the wide 
variation in practice among the various systems of customary 
law. The problem is also compounded by the fact that 
Islamic law differs from customary law to some extent in 
this respect. For example, marriage of a man to the widow
1. See above, Chapter V, p.381. There is evidence that the 
minimum age for customary marriage is rising in some 
parts of the country, due to enhanced educational and 
other opportunities for girls.
2. See above, Chapter V, pp.408-412.
3. See e.g. the opinion of Rev. A.W. Parker, who stated that
marriage with a deceased wife’s sister was not repugnant 
to the teachings of scripture and has been the law in
Canada and Australia. See letter dated 24 May, 1879,
enclosure 10 in Dispatch 441, dated 18 September, 1882 - 
C.O. 879-20-216/217, pp.30-32. For an interesting 
account of clerical opposition to such marriages in 
Uganda, see H.F. Morris, "Marriage Law in Uganda: Sixty
footnote 3 continued.........
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of his father is absolutely forbidden by Islamic law, 
whereas it is permissible, and in some systems tradit­
ionally obligatory, in customary lawP- To enact a law 
mutually acceptable to all groups is, therefore, a very 
difficult task.
In the draft submitted by Governor Rowe, the 
parties had to swear that there was ,!no impediment of 
kindred or alliance or any other hindrance either
2
according to English law or native law or custom”, to 
their marriage. This provision, had it been accepted, 
would have been wide enough to accommodate the native 
population, since everyone would observe their own cus­
tomary bars. It would have also accommodated the foreign 
population who would have been bound by the bars imposed 
by the law of England or other foreign country.
This provision, however, was criticized, chiefly 
by Chief Justice Marshall who, ever critical of the natives 
and of their forms of marriage, observed:
"It [the draft] appears also to legalize all impediments 
of kindred or alliance or any other hindrances which 
exist according to native law or custom. Marriage 
among the natives allows of unlimited polygamy and 
can be dissolved at will. I cannot therefore under­
stand why Europeans as well as natives should in 
Christian marriage be subjected to any prohibitions 
or hindrances which may exist among the heathen 
population”
Footnote 3 continued.... Years of Attempted Reform”, in 
Family Law in Asia and Africa”, edit. J.N.D. Anderson, 
Marriage between a man and his deceased wife!s sister 
was legalised in England in 1907 by the Deceased Wife*s 
Sister Marriage Act, and in 1921, the Deceased Brother*s 
Widow*s Marriage Act legalised the marriage of a woman 
to her deceased husband*s brother.
1. See further, above, Chapter III. p.438 et.al.
2. See Dispatch 200 dated 23 May, 1882, C.O. 879-20-204,
pp.6-7. This Bill actually had a first reading in the 
Gold Coast Legislature before it was abandoned; see 
Appendix II above.
3. See the letter dated 6 July, 1882, written to the Under­
secretary of State, reporting the action previously
taken in the Colony in the matter of the marriage law,
and submitting observations on the proposed Ordinance -
C.O.879-20-205/206, pp.8-10.
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It is difficult to appreciate the reasoning of 
the learned Chief Justice, because Europeans are not usually 
bound by native law and custom,^ and in this particular case
the alternative bars in English law would have applied to 
them.
Ultimately the provision in the drafts of Justice
Jackson and Mr. Woodcock, which was based on the law of
England of the time in this respect, was adopted, with the
single exception that a man was lawfully permitted to marry
2
his deceased wifefs sister or niece. A man, therefore,
could not marry his fatherfs wife under the Marriage Act,
even if the wife consented. This rule, as previously noted,
is in accordance with Islamic law, but is against the rules
of many customary law systems. On the other hand, first
cousins who may contract a valid marriage under the Marriage
Act, and also under Islamic law, are forbidden to do so by
3
the customary law of many ethnic groups.
The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, has obviated 
the need to refer to English law with reference to prohibited
degrees of consanguinity and affinity, as these are now set
A
out in schedule I of the Decree. The Decree has also 
ameliorated the position somewhat in regard to the 
prohibition of marriage by reason of affinity. Where two 
persons who are within the prohibited degrees of affinity 
wish to marry each other, they may now apply in writing to 
a judge for permission to do so. The judge must be satis­
fied that the circumstances of the particular case are so
1. See Savage v. Macfoy [1909] R.G.L.R.504; Fonseca v. 
Passman ]19581 W.R.N.L.R.41; and Re Bethell |18871 
38 Ch.D.220.
2. See Marriage Act, section 33(1). This section has now 
been amended by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, 
section 115(1).
3. e.g. some Yorubas, Igbos, Ibibios, Edos, Tivs.
4. The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, has amended S.33(1) 
of the Marriage Act. The provision in the Marriage Act 
relating to consanguinity and affinity was repealed by 
the Matrimonial Causes Decree, and re-enacted with 
modifications in the Decree: s.3(2) Matrimonial Causes 
Decree.
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exceptional as.to justify.giving his permission.^
With regard to consanguinity, a marriage which 
takes place after the commencement of the Decree is void 
if the parties are within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity.^
j (111) Other bars to marriage
| ^
| It has been seen that some systems of customary
| law prohibit intermarriage with persons of a certain status,
| e.g. marriage of a free woman with a slave, or descendant
| of a slave. In Islamic Law, a Moslem woman may not marry
i
i a non-Moslem man, and a Moslem man is incapable of
| marrying a pagan woman, although he may marry a woman who
I is a Christian or a Hindu. Similarly, in Islamic law also,
f persons who are related by fosterage may not marry each
| other, if they would have been prohibited from doing so
t
had the relationship been one of blood or half-blood. For 
I 4
example, a man may not marry his foster sister. Under the
5 6Marriage Act, and the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970,
these marriages are legally permissible.
I The Prohibition against persons of different
I
; religions intermarrying, is especially important, since
there are many cases where this conflict arises, and the
7only solution is marriage under the Ordinance.
1. See Matrimonial Causes Decree, s.4.
2. Ibid., s .3(1)(b).
3. See above Chapter V, pp. 415-417-
4. See Ruxton, Maliki Law, op.cit.,p.145; Coulson, 
Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit.,p.l4;
Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, op.cit., p.106.
5- See above, pp. 182-183-
6. See Schedule 1, Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
7- But see the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment)
Decree 1978, s.15, which provides for the encouragement 
of intermarriage. See further above, Chapter II, p. 156.
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(IV) Dowry (marriage consideration)
A marriage under the Nigerian Marriage Act is 
legally valid whether dowry, sadak, or other marriage 
consideration has been paid, or contracted for or not.
Such payments are not essential to the legal validity of 
the marriage. Where, however, such payments are made, they 
do not render an otherwise valid marriage, invalid.
Dispensation from liability to pay dowry to the 
parents of the bride is a radical departure from customary 
and Islamic law marriages as practised in Nigeria. It 
strikes at the root of parental control over the marriages 
of their daughters. The requirement of parental consent 
for the marriage of persons under twenty-one years of age 
helps parents to retain some control over the marriage of 
minors, since consent can be withheld until a suitable 
dowry has been paid.
The pros and cons of, and varying attitudes to,
the payment of dowry in Nigeria have already been discussed
in an earlier chapter. It is worth noting here, however,
that the payment of dowry sets the seal of parental and
social approval on a statutory marriage, and women who
have not contracted a customary marriage prior to the
celebration of their statutory marriage, invariably insist
that this payment should be made at a later date. Failure
by the husband to pay the dowry often results in marital
discord. The case of Onuorah v. Onuorah^ has already been
noted in this respect. Another interesting case which
portrays the attitude of educated Nigerian women to
customary law marriage, and the payment of dowry as an
2
essential of such marriage is Wachuku v. Wachuku. In this
1. [1972] Suit No. E/27D/72, unreported decision of Enugu 
High Court. Some Churches refuse to celebrate a marriage 
without parental consent. In Ugboma v. Morah [19^0]
15 N.L.R.78, a priest of the Church Missionary Society 
stated that "Church practice is to refuse to issue notices 
without the parents1 consent, except where the parties are 
already married by a native marriage, or where they have 
children".
2. [1970] Suit No. 1/108/70, unreported decision of Ibadan 
High Court, delivered on 30 July, 1970. For other facts 
of this case see Chapter XI,p .SOf^or non-payment of
footnote 2 continued..........
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case the wife petitioner was a medical practitioner of 
Yoruba origin, who met and married the respondent,, an 
Igbo legal practitioner, in Dublin, in 1962. The parties 
lived in Dublin until the end of 1962, when the husband 
returned to Nigeria and set up legal practice in Aba. The 
wife, in her evidence, stated that it was agreed between 
the parties that the wife should return to Nigeria later, 
and the husband would then approach her parents for the 
celebration of a marriage according to Yoruba customary 
law. The wife returned to Nigeria in October 1963 and 
established a medical practice in Ibadan. The marriage 
ran into difficulties, and the wife petitioned for a 
divorce on the grounds, inter alia, of the refusal of 
the respondent to arrange for the celebration of the cus­
tomary marriage as promised. Commenting on this aspect of 
the petition Aguda, J., said:
,fThe other evidence led in support of the petition 
relates to the failure of the respondent to per­
form some ceremonies relating to the customary 
marriage...Apparently this failure weighed very 
heavily with the petitioner....In my view the 
evidence as to the failure of the respondent to 
perform some customary rites relating to the 
marriage is immaterial as it does not come for 
consideration under the Decree. The performance 
of such rites is an unnecessary appendage to a 
marriage under the Marriage Act often demanded by 
the women folk of this country who in some cases 
feel most unhappy, as the present petitioner 
apparently is, if this unnecessary appendage is 
not added to a ceremony of marriage which by 
itself is self-sufficient” .
These and similar cases, illustrate the degree 
of importance which is still attached to customary marriage 
in contemporary Nigerian societies. The Nigerians* 
attitude towards the two types of marriage elicited the 
following comment from Okagbue, J.,
”...the generality of Nigerians do not think that 
marriage under the Act is a superior form of 
marriage. There is no denying the fact that, among
Footnote 2 continued  dowry contributing to marital
discord; see also Arinye v. Arinye [1973J C.C.H.C.J.81; 
wife baptised children of statutory marriage in her 
brother’s name because, "my husband did not pay any 
dowry on me according to our custom..." p.86.
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the so-called educated classes marriage under the 
Act has some snub or prestige value, but these 
same people, especially the women, would immediately 
resent any attempt to do away with the traditional 
marriage form. Shades of Savigny".-^
The attitude of the average Nigerian to customary
marriage belies the assertion of Chief Justice Jackson
made more than a century earlier, and which has been noted
2
in an earlier chapter, that the Missionaries, by education, 
example and other means, have been able "with great success” 
to persuade the "Natives” to become Christians, and to 
discard customary marriage which the Missionaries and the 
Chief Justice regarded as mere concubinage.
(V) Breach of promise of marriage
Damages may be awarded for a breach of a promise
3
to contract a statutory marriage. It has been seen that 
the award of damages for breach of a promise to marry is
If.
not a traditional feature of either customary or Islamic •
5
law. Its introduction into Nigerian marriage laws is 
another innovation due to the introduction of statutory 
marriage and English law.
Under the common law, ah agreement to marry is a
contract provided the parties intended to create legal 
relations. It is a peculiar kind of contract, and consists
of the mutual promises of the parties to marry, which
promise is fulfilled once the marriage ceremony has been
performed. But in Kremezi v- Ridgway,^ Hilbery, J., held:
1. R.O. Okagbue, "The Marriage Dilemma", in African 
Indigenous Laws, edit, by T.O. Elias, et.al.,op.cit.,p .182.
2. See above, Chapter, III, p.202.
3. See Uso v. Iketubosin ["19571 W.R.N.L.R.186; Ugboma v. 
Morah~Tl940l 15 N.L.R.78.
4. Ugboma v. Morah [1940] 15 N.L.R.78; see Ajisafe, Law and 
Customs of the Yorubas, op.cit.,p.75 "Should a man 
promise to marry a girl and afterwards breaks his promise, 
the girl cannot afterwards claim damages for breach of 
promise. She can only slang and abuse him. She is 
however entitled to recover anything in the shape of 
presents, gifts, or keep-sakes in the possession of the 
man"; Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit., p.44. Cf.Allott,
"Marriage and Internal Conflict of Laws in Ghana," op .ci,t.,
pp ~z
footnotes 5 and 6 continued......
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M...the exchange of mutual promises to marry ends,
_-so far as legal enforcement is concerned, on the 
performance of the marriage ceremony, none the less 
the performance which the parties contemplated at 
the time they exchanged mutual promises is not 
exhausted by the performance of a mere ceremony.
I am quite sure that no young woman, when she 
accepts a proposal of marriage and a contract is 
formed, would be satisfied if she were told that all 
the young man is undertaking by the promise is to 
go through a form or ceremony with her. What the 
parties intend is an exchange of mutual promises 
to become one another!s spouses - to become husband 
and wife with all that that should entail”.
From this statement it is evident that damages 
for breach of contract to marry are recoverable, not only 
if the marriage is not celebrated due to the fault of one 
party to the contract, but also when one party, after the 
ceremony of marriage, fails to fulfil all that being married 
entails. Consequently, damages may be recoverable for loss 
of status the wife may have had if the contract had been 
fully performed."^
The rules governing actions for breach of con­
tract to marry, generally speaking, are not very different 
to those which pertain to commercial contracts. The parties 
may include various conditions and terms in their contract,
provided that such terms and conditions are legal. Thus
2
in Smith v. Osemaka, the defendant’s promise to marry the 
plaintiff, conditional on her becoming pregnant for him, 
was held by Kassim,J., to be an agreement to have sexual 
intercourse before marriage, and therefore contrary to 
public poligy. The agreement was accordingly declared void.
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued....
5. See Mst.Zainaba v. Rahman [1945] A.I.R. Peshawar, 51 -
a mere betrothal does not create any rights in Muhammadan
6. 1 All E.R.662 at p.664.
1. See Berry v. Da Costa [1866] L.R.I.C.P.331; cf.Dunhill 
v. Wallrock [1951] 95 S.J.451, where the Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial of a breach of promise action after 
a jury had awarded £20,000 to a plaintiff, observing 
that the "jury were not called on to impose a fine on 
the defendant” .
2. [1963] Suit No. E/17/63, unreported, Enugu High Court;
See also Spiers v. Hunt [1908] IK.B.720.
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Where the promise to marry is made subject to a 
condition precedent, there can be no breach until the con­
dition is fulfilled. In Aiyede v. Norman-Williams,^ the 
parties agreed to marry each other, when they were students 
in England and Ireland. The defendant made his promise con­
ditional on obtaining his father*s consent to the marriage.
He wrote to his father requesting his consent to the proposed 
marriage. His father refused to give his consent. The 
defendant later married another woman, and the plaintiff 
sued him for breach of his promise to marry her. Coker, J., 
held that the condition precedent attached to the marriage 
proposal had not been fulfilled. The action was dismissed.
In a breach of promise action,corroboration of the
2
plaintiff*s evidence of the promise to marry is required, but
there is no legal provision that "the promise must be made in
the presence of witnesses or that there must have been an
3
eye-witness or a formal introduction to the parents’*. With
regard to parental consent for an agreement to marry, Kasunmu
and Salacuse note:
"Since parental consent is such an important factor 
in arranging marriages in Nigeria, one wonders 
whether the Nigerian courts ought not to infer such 
a condition where the family life, social background 
and conduct of the parties warrant, even though it 
was not expressly stated by the parties at the time 
they made their agreement".^
It is submitted that the duty of the courts is not 
to make contracts for the parties or to legislate; the 
insertion of such a term into the contract would amount to 
an unwarranted interference with the freedom of the parties 
to make their own contract. Interference in this manner is
1. [I960] L.L.R. 253.
2. Olusanya v. Florence Iba Diaran [1971] U.I.L.R.149.
3. Ibid. cf. the two decisions of the English Court of 
Appeal in Bessela v. Stern [1877] 2 C.P.D.263; and 
Wiedman v. Walpole [1891J 2 Q.B.,534, C.A.
4. Kasunmu and Salacuse, on.cit.. 0.56.
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unjustified, especially since an infant under the age of
twenty-one years cannot be sued for breach of promise to
contract a statutory marriage."1' It is therefore clear
that liability for damages only attaches to persons of 
2
full legal age who do not need parental consent to con­
tract a statutory marriage.
The defendant in a breach of promise action can
raise any of the defences available in other breach of con-
3 4tract cases, such as infancy, fraud, misrepresentation,
5 6mistake, or character, of the plaintiff.
Jurisdiction
The fact that there is a division of jurisdiction 
with reference to marriage in Nigeria has already been noted. 
Generally, Customary Courts have jurisdiction in matters 
relating to customary marriage, and the High Courts have 
jurisdiction relating to statutory marriage. Thus the 
High Court Law of the former Western Region of Nigeria 
provides:
11.. . except in so far as the Governor may by Order 
in Council otherwise direct and except in suits 
transferred to the High Court under the provisions 
of section 28 of the Native Courts Ordinance, the 
High Court shall not exercise original jurisdiction 
in any matter which is subject to the jurisdiction 
of a customary court relating to marriage, family 
status, guardianship of children and inheritance or 
disposition of property on death.
1. A promise to marry made during infancy is not binding; 
nor is a mere ratification of it made after twenty-one 
years. Infant Relief Act, 1874, s.2; see Hale v. Ruthven 
[1869] 20 L.T.404 where Mellor, J., thought *the point 
too clear to give leave to move upon"; Coxhead v.Mullis 
[1878] 3 C.P.D. 439.
2. A person comes of age on the -day before his twenty-first 
birthday - Re Shurey [1918] 1 Ch.263.
3. See the Infants Relief Act; 1874, s.l. which is a 
statute of general application in Nigeria: Labinjo v. 
Abake [1924] 5 N.L.R.33.
4. Wharton v. Lewis [1824] 1 Car. & P.529.
5. See Bench v. Merrick [1844] 1 Carl- and Kir. 463, where 
it was held that rescission was justified when the 
defendant learnt that the plaintiff had been unchaste 
ten years before, even though her conduct since had
footnotes 5 and 6 continued........
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(2) The jurisdiction of the High Court shall include 
such jurisdiction as may. be vested in it by 
Federal law.^.
Similarly, the High Court Law of the former
Northern Region states that the High Court shall not exercise
original jurisdiction in any suit or matter which is "subject
to the jurisdiction of a native court relating to marriage,
family status, guardianship of children, inheritance or the
2
disposition of property on death". From these provisions 
it is clear that actions involving promises to contract a 
customary marriage^ must be brought in a Customary Court, 
since obviously they relate to marriage.
The question remains however as to which courts 
have jurisdiction over breach of a promise to contract a 
statutory marriage, and which law, customary or common law, 
applies. With regard to the first question the general 
view is that the action must be brought in a non-Customary 
Court, - a Magistrate or High Court depending on the 
quantum of damages claimed. This is because an action for 
breach of contract to marry is unknown to customary law, 
and damages are not awarded for a breach of promise to 
marry under customary law.^ It is therefore necessary to
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued.....
5. .. been perfectly correct; see also Irving v. Greenwood
[1824] 1 C. and P.300.
6 . Baddeley v. Mortlock [1816] Holt N.P. 151.
1. Proviso to s.9(l) High Court Law, Cap.44, Laws of the 
Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 Revision.
2. S.17(l)(b), Cap 49, Laws of the Northern Region of
Nigeria 1963 Revision. See also High Court Law, Cap.
Laws of Bendel State, 1976 Revision, s.10(2); Magistrates 
Court Law (Western Region) 1955, s.19(4); where there is 
no Customary Court to exercise original jurisdiction in
a State, the High Court, or Magistrates* Court in the 
State may be vested with original jurisdiction; see High 
Court Law (Amendment) Edict 197^, s.3; Magistrates*
Court Law (Amendment) Edict 1971* s.5; Solomon v. Gbobo 
[1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 457.
3. Such actions may be brought by a father or legal 
guardian of a girl who has been seduced by a man who 
promised to marry her under customary law, and as a 
result the girl becomes pregnant; see Nkumatolu Nwagu 
v. Ezienyi [1970] Suit No® ME/52/70, unreported,Enugu 
Magistrates Court, 17 Dec. 1970, where a father was 
awarded £60 damages for the seduction and loss of services
of his daughter. footnote k continued.....
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distinguish clearly the type of marriage to which the 
promise refers. In Plusanya v. Florence Ibadiaran,^the 
plaintiff claimed from the defendant special and general 
damages for the breach of her oral promise of marriage.
In the court below^ evidence was led to show that the 
defendant promised to marry the plaintiff ’’according to 
the tenets of the Catholic Church”, and in pursuance of 
this promise, he spent various amounts on behalf of the 
defendant. The defendant denied the alleged promise.
The Magistrate held that the defendant committed a breach 
of the agreement to marry and awarded damages accordingly.
On appeal, the High Court held that it was essential to 
prove whether the plaintiff was a Catholic, to show what 
type of marriage the plaintiff actually intended, since 
the Magistrates Court had no jurisdiction if the promise 
was not to marry under the Marriage Act. It is respect­
fully submitted that proof that the plaintiff was a 
Catholic would not be conclusive evidence of an intention 
to contract a marriage under the Marriage Act, since there 
are numerous Catholics who marry only according to customary 
law.^
It should be noted that in Plusanya v. Florence 
Ibadiaran,^ the plaintiff was the man who was suing for 
damages for breach of promise of the woman to marry him, 
instead of the other way round, which is more usual in Nigeria.
Footnote 4 continued.
4. See Ugboma v. Morah [194P] 15 N.L.R.78; and Plusanya v. 
Florence Ibadiaran [l97l]l U.I.L.R.149; see also Pbi,
Modern Family Law, op.cit., pp.122-123.
1. [1971] 1 U.I.L.R. 149.
2. Some spouses obtain a church blessing of their customary 
law marriage, see Anyaegbunam v. Anyaegbunam [1973]
3 E.C.S.L.R.43, where the respondent alleged that the 
marriage was a oustomary marriage followed by a church 
blessing; see also Anyaegbunam v. Anyaegbunam [1973]
4 S.C.121; and Ilechukwu v. Ilechukwu and Anor.f19771 
Suit No. ME/59/77, unreported, Enugu Magistrates Court - 
the parties contracted a customary marriage which was 
blessed at Immanuel Catholic Church,Aguata.
3. [1971] 1 I.U.L.R. 149.
4. See Pbi, Modern Family Law, op.cit.,p,122 who asserts:
”A man too can sue; [for breach of promise to marry] but 
he seldom ever does, probably because he would find.it 
more difficult to prove damage than would a woman” .
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Once it is decided that the parties intended to 
contract a-statutory marriage, the common law should apply. 
The various High Court Laws provide:
(3) No party shall he entitled to claim the benefit 
of any customary law, if it shall appear either 
from express contract or from the nature of the 
transactions out of which any suit or question 
may have arisen, that such party agreed that his 
obligations in connection with such transactions 
should be exclusively regulated otherwise than by 
customary law or that such transactions are 
transactions unknown to customary law.^
Since a marriage under the Nigerian Marriage Act 
or other monogamous marriage, as well as agreements relating 
thereto are unknown to customary law, the application of 
customary law is ruled out.
The quantum of damages recoverable
Damages are recoverable for a breach of promise
to marry. Damages may be general and special, and may be
2
awarded for injured feelings, wounded pride and humiliation
3 4suffered as a result of the breach. In Uso v. Iketubosin,
the court refused to award special damages on the ground
that the gifts claimed were voluntarily made by the plaintiff
to the defendant as a mark of affection. The plaintiff was
awarded generally damages of £600, the court having taken
into account the fact that she was then thirty years old,
and had been tied to the defendant "when her prospects for
marriage were greatest”, her station in life and other
circumstances. This decision may be compared with
1. High Court Law.
2. See Ugboma v. Morah [1940] 15 N.L.R.78, 81, - "judging 
from the plaintiff * s bearing in the witness box, the 
injury has not gone very far”, per Waddington, Asst.J. 
and Smith v. Osamaka (supra) where it was held that 
disappointment to the plaintiff, a requisite for success 
in an action for breach of promise, was negatived by the 
plaintiff*s conduct in importuning the defendant to take 
her with him and his mistress on a Christmas holiday.
3. Berry v. Da Costa Tl866l L.R.l C.P. 331; Ugboma v.
Morah [1940] 1$ N.L.R. 78.
4. T19571 W.R.N.L.R. 186; cf. Cohen v. Sellar Tl926l 
1 K.B. 536.
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Ugboma v. Morah where it was held that there was no
2
"wastage” as the plaintiff was still young. In assessing
damages in this case, Waddington, Asst. J., took into
account the fact that in the customs into which both the
plaintiff and defendant were born "there is no conception
in the least comparable to that of damages for breach of
promise of marriage". As a result the quantum of damages
was reduced. This decision has been criticised on the
ground that refusal of the full remedy provided by English
law merely because there is no comparable remedy in
3
customary law is unjustified and contrary to the various 
statutes which direct how and when English common law 
shall be applied.
It is respectfully submitted that the award of 
damages is within the discretion of the court, provided 
the discretion is exercised judicially. There is no 
statute, or other law, which prohibits a judge from taking 
into account the social background of the parties, or the 
custom of the people in assessing the quantum of damages to 
be awarded/* The fact that the plaintiff could not have 
claimed damages under the customary law of the parties is 
relevant in assessing the level of damages that should be 
rewarded. Breach of promise to marry is not seriously 
regarded in customary law unless accompanied by seduction 
which results in the birth of a child. Mere refusal to
1. [1940] 15 N.L.R. 78.
2. The plaintiff was 26 years old, and had maintained a 
friendship with the defendant since she was 15 and he 
17 years old.
5. See Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law. o~p.cit. .p.58.
4. See the East African case of Kasansula v. Rai Singh and 
Anor., see [1965] J.A.L. 57 where in assessing damages for 
death due to the negligence of the defendant, Sheridan J. 
took judicial notice of the fact that African children who 
are educated, often at considerable parental sacrifice, 
are expected to contribute towards the support of such 
parents in return for the benefits received. See James
S. Read "Uganda, Nyasaland, Kenya: - When is Customary 
Law Relevant?” J.A.L. 1965, p.57.
5. If an unmarried woman who is seduced, becomes pregnant as 
a result, and the seducer refuses to marry her, the father 
of the girl or other legal guardian may claim compensation 
from the seducer for the wrong. Damages awarded may take 
into account loss of prospects of marriage, cost of her 
education etc. see Nkumatolu Nwagu v. Ezienji ri970l Suit
footnote 5 continued....
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fulfil a promise to marry invariably results in no great 
loss to the woman in traditional society, since it was 
relatively easy to find another husband, wives always being 
in great demand.
6. Celebration of Marriage
A. Introduction
The introduction of statutory marriage in Nigeria 
effected significant changes in the procedure for the 
celebration of a valid marriage. Compulsory registration 
and the observation of certain formalities are essential 
to the legal validity of a statutory marriage. Ignorance 
of the legal requirements of procedure can have unfortunate 
consequences, especially for women.
Usually, procedural details of a marriage are
entrusted to the husband, who is expected to make all the
necessary arrangements. Ignorance, inadvertence, or
deliberate intention to deceive on the part of the husband,
may result in failure to observe the correct procedure.
The facts in Martins v. Adenugba^ have all the elements of
2the Bertha Clay novel, "Irenefs Vow", and portray 
deliberate deceit. The parties were engaged to be married, 
and agreed on a registry marriage. On the appointed day,
Footnote 5 continued.... No. ME/52/70, unreported decision of 
Enugu Magistrates Court of 17 Dec. 1970, where £60 was 
awarded to plaintiff whose daughter had been seduced by 
the defendant, and had become pregnant.
1. [1946] 18 N.L.R. 63.
2. In the novel "Irene's Vow" an innocent girl was led 
to believe that she was married to an English Earl.
The latter procured his friend who pretended to be a 
priest and conducted a ceremony of marriage between 
the Earl and the girl. In the belief that she was 
legally married the girl cohabited secretly with the 
Earl, and only discovered the fraud when she read of 
the Earl's marriage to a girl of his own class. She 
vowed revenge on both of them for the wrong done to 
her, and after many years by a series of remarkable co 
incidences was able to carry out her vow - see Bertha 
M. Clay, Irene's Vow, Ward Lock Series.
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the defendant took the plaintiff to the Marriage Registry, 
where he went inside, leaving her outside. After-a while, 
he came out and informed the plaintiff that they had been 
married. Apparently, he had spent his time in the Registry 
speaking to his friends working there. He showed the 
plaintiff what purported to be a marriage certificate. She 
believed that they were married, and as a result was induced 
to live with him for three years. The parties, after the 
purported marriage ceremony at the Registry, had obtained 
a "church blessing” of the fictitious marriage, but this 
ceremony had no legal validity, and this fact was known 
by both parties. The plaintiff only discovered the 
defendant’s duplicity when she attempted to divorce him 
on the ground of cruelty, and was told that no valid marriage 
had actually taken place at the Registry. She sued for 
breach of promise to marry, and recovered damages. The 
court held that alternatively she could have sued for 
deceit.
It should be pointed out that section 46 of the 
Marriage Act provides that whoever goes through the ceremony 
of marriage, or any ceremony which he or she represents to 
be a ceremony of marriage, knowing that the marriage is void 
on any ground, and that the other person believes it to be 
valid, shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for 
five years. No mention was made of this section in the 
case of Martins v. Adenugba ^ Liability by virtue of this 
section would depend on whether what took place at the 
Marriage Registry could properly be described as a ceremony.
Many people are still not aware of the correct
procedure to be followed in order to effect a valid
statutory marriage and only the briefest outline can be 
2given /ere.
1. [1946] 18 N.L.R. 63.
2. For further details see the Marriage Act, Cap.113,
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, 
ss.21-30.
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B. Preliminaries to marriage
There are two different types of authorisation 
to marry under the Nigerian Marriage Act: (a) the registrar *s 
certificate and (b) a special licence.
(a) Before a marriage can be celebrated, notice of marriage
applying for a certificate must be given on a pres-
scribed form (supplied gratuitously) to the Registrar
of Marriage of the district where the parties intend to
marry. The notice must state the name and surname,
age, marital status, occupation and place of residence
of each of the persons to be married. Where necessary,
the notice must also state that the consent of the
father or other legal guardian has been given.
Before the Registrar issues his certificate, he enters
the details of the notice in the notice book, and
publishes the notice by fixing a copy of it to the
outer door of his office for at least twenty-one days.
Any person may enter a caveat in the notice book 
against the issue of the Registrar^ certificate. For 
example, a parent or legal guardian whose consent is 
required for the marriage of a person under the age of 
twenty-one, may forbid the marriage by entering 
"forbidden” in the marriage notice book. Whenever a 
caveat is entered, the Registrar cannot issue his 
certificate until a High Court judge has ordered the 
removal of the caveat, after the determination of the 
issues involved.
Most of the caveats entered in Nigeria challenging 
the celebration of a marriage are by persons who claim 
that one of the parties to the intended marriage has been 
previously married (usually under customary law) to a 
third party, and that such prior marriage has not been 
dissolved. Such a claim, if proved is an absolute 
bar to a marriage under the Act.^ The prior marriage
1. Compare In Re Grace Spencer [1964] 2 All N.L.R.171; and 
Registrar of Marriages v. Igbinomwanhia [1972] unreported 
decision of Benin High Court, delivered on 5 August, 1972, 
where the prior customary marriage was held valid; and
footnote 1 continued........
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must be strictly proved.^
The Registrar, even if no valid caveat has been 
entered, may refuse to issue a certificate until he is 
satisfied by affidavit that the conditions set out in 
section 1 1 (1 ) of the Marriage Act have been fulfilled.
A certificate is usually given, not earlier than twenty- 
one days after receipt of the notice to marry by the 
Registrar, and is valid for three months. No marriage 
should be celebrated before obtaining the certificate. 
The Registrar’s Certificate, however, is not
evidence of a valid statutory marriage. In Sofela v.
2Sofela, the wife petitioned for a divorce and tendered 
the Registrar’s certificate issued on 30 October, 1970, 
stating that the marriage was to take place at Christ 
Apostolic Church, Mushin, Lagos. The Court held that 
the Registrar’s certificate issued in pursuance of 
section 1 1 (1 ) of the Marriage Act is only a certificate 
of notice of the intention of the parties to celebrate 
a marriage, and that in the absence of evidence of 
the celebration of the marriage, the court could not 
hold that there was any marriage between the parties’ 
recognizable under the Marriage Act and dissolvable 
under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
This case may be compared with Akponer v. Akponer^ 
where Dabiri, J., correctly held that oral evidence of 
marriage in a divorce petition can be given in proof of 
the marriage where a marriage certificate or a copy 
thereof is not available. Non-filing of the marriage 
certificate or a copy thereof cannot, therefore, defeat 
a petition for divorce if the marriage can be proved 
by oral evidence.
Footnote 1 continued  In Re Ayorinde and Aina [1 9 6 4 ]
L.L.R. 71; Ikedionwu v. Okafor 11966-67 I 10 E.N.L.R.178; 
Ogunremi v. Ogunremi and Anor.ri97l] 2 U.l.L.R. Vol.2,
4o6 ; and In Re Beckley and Abiodun [1 9 4 3 ] 17 N.L.R. 59, 
where the"™pr!or-,,7m a H :iages1,n7ere™held invalid. In 
Okpanum v. Okpanum [1 9 7 2 ] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 561, the prior 
customary law marriage was held valid, but it had been 
validly dissolved.
1. See Ogunremi v. Ogunremi and Anor T19711 U.l.L.R. Vol.2, 
Part if, p: 466. ----------------
2. [1976] 7 C.C.H.C.J. 1923.
3. '1974] 7 C.C.H.C.J. 1047; see also D ’Almeida v. D ’Almeida 
4 C.C.H.C.J. 90.
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|
j After obtaining the Registrar!s certificate the
| marriage may then be celebrated either in the Registrar’s
l
Office by the Registrar of marriages, or in any 
licensed place of worship, by any recognized minister 
of the Church, denomination or body to which such place 
| of worship belongs, and according to the rites or usages
of marriage observed in such Church, denomination or
i
body.
! It should be noted that publication of banns,
although practised by most Churches in Nigeria, is not
a legal necessity of a statutory marriage.
\
(b) Special licence
The Governor of a Region (now State) may, if he 
thinks fit, dispense with the giving of notice to marry, 
and with the issue of a Registrar’s certificate 
authorising the celebration of the marriage. He may, 
on an application to do so, grant a special licence 
authorising the celebration of a marriage between the 
parties named in the licence, by a marriage registrar, 
or by a recognized minister of some religious denomin­
ation or body. The marriage need not be celebrated in 
a licensed place of worship, or the Registrar’s office, 
but the necessary formalities appropriate to a marriage 
celebrated by the Registrar or by a recognized minister 
must be observed.'*'
The chief aims in obtaining a special licence to 
marry are to obviate delay and the possibility of 
lodging of caveats by interested parties. No notice 
of marriage is published, and there is no waiting period 
of twenty-one days.
A marriage celebrated in the Registry by issue of 
a special licence costs Nil.00, one celebrated in a
1. See sections 13 and 29 of Marriage Act., Cap 115, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
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church or elsewhere N10.50, compared to only 75k. for 
the issue of an ordinary Registrar*s certificate to 
marry.^ In spite of the much higher costs involved, 
however, quite a few marriages in Lagos are celebrated 
after the issue of a special licence as Table 10:2 
below shows.
TABLE 10:2
TYPES OF STATUTORY MARRIAGE CELEBRATED IN LAGOS
Type of Marriage 1975 1974 1975 1976
Jan-July 
1977
Church Marriage 
(Reg.Cert.) 907 1075 1346 1547 970
Registry Marriage 
(Reg.Cert.) 629 723 775 663 545
Church Marriage 
(Special Licence) 27 45 28 19
Registry Marriage •- 
(Special Licence) 180 99 140 102 92
Total Number of 
Marriages 1716 1924 2306 2140 1626
7. Summary
Statutory marriage was introduced as a direct 
response to the need of Europeans resident in the then Gold 
Coast Colony to contract a marriage which would be recognized 
as legally valid in their countries of origin.
The framers of the Marriage Act, however, envisaged 
that the local inhabitants who had converted to Christianity 
would be persuaded to contract marriages under the Act instead 
of marrying according to customary laws, which they considered 
had certain objectionable features, the principal being that:
1. Information obtained from the marriage register at the
Central Marriage Registry Lagos; see also Second Schedule, 
Marriage Act, and section 38 of Marriage Act which 
provides for a remission of fees by the Governor in cases 
of poverty.
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(a) they permitted polygamy;
(b) the wives, and in some cases, the children, of a 
deceased husband who died intestate were deprived of 
any rights of inheritance in his estate;
(c) the payment of marriage consideration enabled parents 
of the spouses to dictate whom their children should 
marry;
(d) divorce was too easily effected.
It was also envisaged that non-Christians would 
continue to contract customary marriages until such time as 
they converted to Christianity.
As a result, complete' separation between the two 
types of marriage was specifically erected in the statute, 
although both types were regarded as legallyjbinding 
marriages. In theory, the plan was simple. Anyone and 
everyone had an option to choose which type of marriage he 
or she preferred to contract. If a person chose to con­
tract a statutory marriage, his rights and obligations would 
be governed by ,!the general law". If it was a customary 
law marriage, the incidents of the marriage would depend 
on the laws of the particular society to which the parties 
belong.
To enforce strict separation of the two types of 
marriages, stiff penalties were imposed on a person who 
contracted a marriage under the Act during the existence 
of his customary law marriage to a third party; and also on 
a person who contracted a customary law marriage during the 
existence of his statutory marriage. The spouses of a 
customary law marriage, provided it was monogamous in fact, 
could also marry each other under the Marriage Act.'*'
In practice the plan of "marriage separation” 
was beset with difficulties which have resulted in conflicts 
and uncertainties.
The main difficulty is due to the fact that, con­
trary to the expectations of the framers of the Act, very 
few members of the local population, including those who
1. See above, p.129.
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professed Christianity, opted for statutory marriage. In 
the year 1891, eight years after the enactment of the 
Marriage Ordinance, 1884, less than sixty marriages were 
registered for Lagos Colony.^ The annual number of 
statutory marriages has increased, but at present it is 
still comparatively small. Most people who did contract 
statutory marriages combined them with marriages under 
customary law, situations for the complications of which the 
Act made no provision.
The combination of the two types of marriage 
results in internal conflict of laws, many of which have not 
yet been solved by the courts. A more disturbing aspect of 
the combination of marriages is that it renders the dispen­
sation of parental consent for non-minors, and the payment 
of do’szry, largely ineffective since both requirements, at 
least in the case of the bride, are still necessary for the 
celebration of a valid customary law marriage.
The practice of the Churches in celebrating marriages 
without observing the specified formalities of the Marriage 
Act has resulted in additional complications and uncertainty 
as to the validity of such marriages. Many spouses have 
used the loophole created by the practice of the Churches 
in this respect, sometimes by mutual agreement, but more often 
unilaterally,to escape from the bond of marriage without 
going through the formalities of divorce procedure.
For various reasons, the requirement of mongamy 
imposed by the Marriage Act has been ignored by many persons 
resulting in breaches of the law. The point has been reached 
where people openly assert in court that they have committed 
a breach of the law in this respect and even seek to obtain 
advantage by their criminal act. Little or no notice is 
taken of these assertions by judicial and administrative 
officers, and the rarity of prosecutions for these open 
breaches brings the law in general, and the Marriage Act 
in particular, into disrepute.
1. See Registrar’s Returns for the Settlement of Lagos, 
Government Gazette 1892.
204
j
i
The Marriage Act attempts to state the factors 
which would invalidate a marriage, but these are incom­
plete, and thus introduce uncertainty into the law. For 
example, although it is taken for granted that parties to 
a marriage must consent to the marriage, lack of consent 
| does not invalidate a marriage under the Marriage Act.
j This defect has now been cured by the Matrimonial Causes
Decree, 1970, but other defects in the law remain. The 
most important of the remaining defects is the controversy 
which exists over the minimum age of marriage. Section 
3(1)(c) of the Decree simply says that a marriage is void 
where either of the parties is not of"marriageable age". 
What is "marriageable age" is not stated and this omission 
gives rise to uncertainty.
The advantages women derive from contracting a 
statutory marriage will be examined at the end of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER XI
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN STATUTORY MARRIAGE (CONTINUED).
THE INCIDENTS OF MARRIAGE
1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter, the formation and 
essentials of a valid statutory marriage were examined. In 
this chapter, the incidents and dissolution of such a 
marriage will be discussed.
The incidents and dissolution of a statutory 
marriage are derived from English law, and are presently 
governed by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, other local 
statutes, and the received English law in so far as it has 
not been excluded by local legislation. The incidents of a 
statutory marriage are therefore capable of more precise 
definition than was possible in the case of customary law 
marriage. Some of the rights and obligations of a statutory 
marriage are identical, or very similar, to the rights and 
obligations of a customary law marriage. For example, 
actions for enticement, and ’harbouring of a wife’, pertain 
to both types of marriages. The method adopted, therefore, 
is to isolate those topics where marked differences occur 
between the two systems, and which are particularly relevant 
to the status of women, for discussion here.
The first part of this chapter deals with some 
aspects of consortium, certain rules of evidence, and 
maintenance. The dissolution of marriage is considered in 
the second part of the chapter. Property rights of the 
spouses are postponed for discussion in later chapters.
2. Conjugal Rights 
A. Consortium.
The nature of consortium has previously been
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noted in an earlier chapter.'1' The rights and duties 
involved in the concept of consortium in relation to a 
statutory marriage are not radically different from those 
which apply in a customary or Islamic law marriage in 
contemporary Nigeria. The rights and duties of a wife of 
a statutory marriage, however, are derived from English 
law and custom.
In the early nineteenth century it was generally 
held that under English common law a wife was under the 
absolute control of her husband. Bacon, in his Abridgement, 
wrote that the "husband hath by law power and dominion over 
his wife, and may keep her by force within the bounds of
2
duty and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel manner1. 
As late as 1840, Mr. Justice Coleridge had no doubt of ’the 
general dominion which the law of England attributes to the 
husband over the wife"J ; that dominion still included 
the right of a husband to apply physical chastisement to 
his wife and to enforce his right of consortium by restraining
1. See above, Chapter VII, ppi. 535-536.
2. Bacon’s Abridgement, Tit. Baron and Feme, 7th edit. 1832, 
Vol. 1, p. 693; see Atwood v. Atwood TTfl8] Prec.Ch.492 
where it was stated that a husband is entitled at common 
law to the custody of his wife against all other persons. 
Cf. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, op. 
cit., Bk.I , p . 444, where, in 17^8, it was said: "But 
with us in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this 
power of correction began to be doubted: and a wife may 
now have’security of the peace against her husband; or 
in return a husband against his wife. Yet the lower rank 
of people who are always fond of the old common law, 
still claim and exert their ancient privilege." See
R. v. Jackson [1891] 1Q.B.671* C.A., Re Price [i860] 2 
F. and F,,263; R. v. Leggatt [1852] 18 Q.B.781.
3. Cockrane’s Case [1840] 8 Dowl.630,
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her movements.^
By the time of the reception into Nigeria of 
English law, however, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
the climate of opinion as to the legal status of the English 
married woman had undergone drastic changes. The legislature 
and judiciary had joined hands in liberating her from the 
legal shackles which bound her. The Married WomenTs Pro- 
perty Act, 1882 had accorded to a woman a measure of 
financial independence of her husband, and his right to 
restrain her personal liberty had been rejected in R. v.
Jackson.
In that case, the wife, who had gone to live with 
her relatives during her husband’s absence in New Zealand, 
refused to live again with him on her return. She failed 
to comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights, 
whereupon the husband arranged with two men to seize her as 
she came out of church one Sunday afternoon. She was put 
into a carriage and taken to the husband’s home. Although 
she was allowed complete freedom of the house, she was not 
permitted to leave it. It was unanimously held by the 
Court of Appeal, on a writ of habeas corpus issued by her, 
that it was no justification that the husband was merely 
confining her in order to enforce his right to her consort­
ium.
Lord Esher, M.R., in his judgment said:
A series of propositions have been quoted 
which, if true, make an English wife the 
slave, of her husband. One proposition 
that has been referred to is that a husband 
has a right to beat his wife. I do not 
believe this ever was the law... It was 
said by the law of England the husband has 
the custody of his wife. What must be meant 
by ’custody’ in that proposition so used 
to us? It must mean the same sort of 
custody as a gaoler has of a prisoner. I 
protest that there is no such law in England.^
1. See R.H. Graveson, ’The Background of the Century’ in A
Century of Family Law, edit, by Graveson and Crane, op_. cit., 
_ _
2. 17 Stats., 116; 45 and 46 Viet., C.75
3. [1891] IQ.B.,671.
4. Ibid. , p . 682.
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The decision in R. v. Jackson1 was inevitable■ 2 
after the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884,
which removed the power of the court to imprison a wife
who disobeyed an order for restitution of conjugal rights.
In the words of McCardie, J.,:
From the date of their [the Court of Appeal 
in R.v. Jackson] decision the shackles of 
servitude fell from the limbs of married
women and they were free to come and go at
their own will. Their high moral obligation, 
as wives, remained and their social oblig­
ations were unimpaired, but their physical 
freedom of movement was recognized and 
established by the law.^
A few years later, Parliament again intervened to
give the married woman a clear and effective remedy against
4
the physical violence of her husband. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, therefore, most of the incapacities and 
restraints which had ’succeeded for generations in degrad­
ing an entire sex and in restraining its physical, mental
and moral advance’, had been removed.
Nigerian women married under the Marriage Act
inherit the benefits of these English law reforms. Although 
the husband has a right to the consortium of his wife, he 
is not entitled to resort to extra-judicial methods to 
enforce it.
1. [1891] IQ.B.671.
2. 47 and 48 Viet.,C.69, section 2.
3. Place v. Searle [1932] 2K.B.497 at p.500; see also 
Butterworth v. Butterworth and Englefield, etc. [1920] 
P. 126 at p.133, per McCardie, J., ’the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in R. v. Jackson marked the disappear­
ance of the old and harsh view of a husband’s rights 
over the body of the woman he has taken to wife’.
4. See Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintainance) 
Act, 1895.
5. See Graveson, - ’’Introduction”, A Century of Family Law 
op. cit.
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B . Rights to sexual intercourse.
Each party to the marriage owes the other a duty
to consummate the marriage, and the incapacity of either,
or the wilful refusal of the respondent to do so, formerly
entitled the petitioner to a decree of nullity. Under the
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, however, a marriage is
voidable, if either party to the marriage is incapable of
consummating the marriage,^* but the wilful and persistent
refusal of one of the parties to a marriage to consummate
it provides a ground on which it may be held that a marriage
2has broken down irretrievably.
Unlike the position in customary and Islamic laws, 
each spouse of a statutory marriage has an exclusive right 
to have sexual intercourse with the other spouse. This 
mutual right to exclusive sexual intercourse continues after 
the marriage has been consummated, provided that it is 
reasonably exercised. One spouse is not bound to submit 
to the demands of the other if they are inordinate, per­
verted, or otherwise unreasonable, or if they are likely to
•3
lead to a breakdown in health.
Neither husband nor wife can be guilty as a
4
principal, of rape upon the other, but either party may 
be convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. 
Assault may be committed if either party, in pursuance of 
their right of sexual intercourse, uses force or violence 
for the purpose of exercising that right, and thereby causes 
harm to the other.
1. See Section 5(1)(a) Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
2. Section 15(2)(a). See further below, pp. 260-265.
3. See Holborn v. Holborn [1947] 1A11 E.R.32; Akere v.
Akere 1.1962J W.N.L.R.328.
4. See R. v. Miller [1954] 2 All E.R.529[1954] 2 Q.B.282; 
but the husband or wife may be guilty of aiding or 
abetting; Lord AudleyTs Case [1631] 3 St.Tr., 401, H.L. 
R. v. Leak [1975] 2 ALL E.R.1059, C.A, A husband may 
also be guilty of rape where a decree nisi of divorce
has been obtained, see R, v. Obrien [1974]3 ALL E.R.633*
5. R. v. Miller [1954] 2 ALL E.R.529[1954] 2 Q.B.282.
6. See R. v. Jackson [1891] 1 Q.B.671, C.A.
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C.. The wife’s use of her husband’s name.
A wife has no obligation to use her husband’s
name at common law, although it is usual for a wife to
assume her husband’s surname and, if he is a peer, his
title and rank.
In Fendall v. Goldsmid,1 Phillimore, J., noted
that in English law,"marriage confers a name upon a woman
which becomes her actual name, and ... she can only obtain
another name by reputation". However, in the later case
2of Earl Cowley v. Countess Cowley, Lord Lindley said that
’speaking generally the law of this country allows any
person to use and assume any name, provided its use is not
designed to deceive and inflict pecuniary loss’.
This was also the view in the still later case
of Re Fry, where Vaisey, J., said:
I am quite well aware that many women, both 
married and unmarried, make use of pen-names 
and theatre-names, and there is, so far as 
I know, nothing to compel a married woman 
to use her husband’s surname, so that the 
wife of Mr. Robinson may, speaking generally, 
go by the name of Mrs. Smith if she chooses 
to do so.^
In 1963j Buckley, J., stated:
It is, of course, well known that a person’s 
surname is a conventional name and forms no 
part of his true legal name. An adult can 
change his or her surname at any time by any 
means as a result of which he or she becomes 
customarily addressed by the new name. There 
is no magic in a deed poll. The effect of a 
deed poll when changing a name is merely to 
record the change in solemn form which will 
tend to perpetuate the evidence of the change 
of name. But a change of name on the part of 
an adult must, in my judgment involve a 
conscious decision on the part of the adult 
that he wishes to change his name and be 
generally known by his new name.^
1. [1877] 2 P.D.263 at 264.
2. [1901] A.C.450 at p.460; see also R.v. Whitmore [19l4]10 
Cr. App. Rep.204. Cf. Du Boulay v. Du Boulay [l869]L.R.2 
P.C.430, p.441-42.
3. [1945] Ch.348.
4. See in Re T. (Orse H.)(An Infant)[19633Ch.238, 240-241.
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Unlike the position in America, where a change 
in a woman’s name upon marriage is not only consistent 
with social custom, but apparently it is also required by 
law,^ the weight of English judicial opinion seems to be 
that the general rule is that ’there are no rules about 
surnames’, and that a wife may use any name she pleases.
In Nigeria, the use of ’Mrs’ and the husband’s 
surname was at first regarded as a status symbol, when it 
was introduced there during the early twentieth century.
It has been seen that generally, under customary law a wife 
does not assume her husband’s surname. Speaking of the 
Yorubas, Johnson notes:
A married woman cannot adopt her husband’s
totem [family origin] much less his name.2
This was also the customary law among most other
■3
societies.J
With the introduction of statutory monogamous 
marriage, the English custom of wives using their husbands’ 
surnames was first adopted by wives who had contracted 
statutory marriages, as a symbol of their enhanced social 
prestige, a statutory marriage being generally considered 
superior to a customary marriage. The practice was confined 
to such women.
This monopoly has now been broken, and many wives,
1. Many American judicial decisions have denied women’s 
requests that they be permitted to be known by their
. maiden names after marriage. See e.g. Chapman v. Phoenix 
National Bank of the City of New York [18B 1T 85' N.Y.437 at 
449, where it was stated: For several centuries by the
common law among all English speaking people, a woman upon 
marriage takes her husband’s surname. That becomes her 
legal name, and she ceases to be known by her maiden name. 
See also People v. Lipsky [19^5] 63 N.E. 2d.642, and 
generally, Leo Kanowit.z, Women and the Law: The Unfinished 
Revolution (Albuqueroque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1969), PP. 41-46.
2. Johnson, History of the Yorubas, op. cit. , p. 86.
3. See further above, Chapter VII, pp. 549-551.
regardless of the type of marriage contracted,use their
husbands1 surnames among the Igbos, Ibibios and other
communities in the Eastern States.^ The practice of using
their husbands’ surnames is less general among the Yoruba,
many of whom continue to retain their own names after 
2
marriage. It is usual for the educated Yoruba wife,
however, to adopt her husband’s surname.
4
In Oye v. Gye, the husband petitioned for divorce, 
and alleged that the wife’s consistent refusal to change 
from her maiden name,in spite of his objection, and her 
other embarrassing and humiliating conduct left him ’disill­
usioned, shattered and depressed’. The respondent wife, 
who was a medical doctor, testified that it was the practice 
in her profession for a woman to go by her maiden name, 
unless the husband requested her to change it. She main­
tained that the husband had never made such a request. 
Odumosu, J., held, that the fact that the respondent refused, 
if in fact she did, to change her name after the marriage, 
was not such grave conduct as would amount to unreasonable 
behaviour under the provisions of section 15(2)(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
1. There is still a significant number of wives in some parts 
of the Eastern States who continue to use their own names 
after marriage. In Eket and Calabar Customary Courts, 
most of the wives who were parties to cases used entirely 
different names from those used by their husbands. This 
situation may be compared to Onitsha or Enugu, where very 
few women retain their maiden surnames after marriage.
In other areas, only educated women seem to change their 
names on marriage. There is a curious practice in Eket 
whereby older married women style themselves as ’Madame’, 
while younger married women use ’Mrs.’, in both cases 
with the husbands’ surnames.
2. This practice is evident from the record of cases in the 
Customary Courts in Ibadan, examined by the present writer. 
Of 1116 cases examined, only 9 wives had the same surname 
as their husbands.
3. For a criticism of this practice, see Johnson, op_. cit. , 
p. 89.
4. [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R.494.
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The learned Judge did not. consider whether there
was a legal duty for her to use her husband’s surname.
The use by a wife of her husband’s surname has
received a greater degree of attention lately, due to the
activities of women’s liberation groups. Kanowitz, in
Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution, is of the
opinion that:
In a very real sense the loss of a woman’s 
surname represents the destruction of an 
important part of her personality and its
submersion in that of her husband^
It is interesting to note that the Nigerian wife of a 
customary law marriage had traditionally retained her inde­
pendence in this respect, and that the right which many
American and other women are now fighting for - the right
2not to use their husbands’ surnames if they so desire -
has long been her usual prerogative. Moslem wives in the
Northern States have retained their independence in this
respect, and generally continue to use their own names
after marriage.
A wife may retain her husband’s surname even after
the termination of the marriage by death or divorce.^ The
editors of Halsbury’s Laws of England note :
Having assumed her husband’s name, she [the 
wife] retains it, notwithstanding the dis­
solution of the marriage by decree of divorce 
or nullity, unless she chooses ... or acquires 
another name by reputation. On her second 
marriage there is nothing in point of law to 
prevent her from retaining her first husband’s 
name.^
1. Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law, op. cit. , p. 4l.
2. See e.g. Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank of the City of 
New York [1851] 85 N.Y.437 at 449; People v. Lipsky [1945] 
53 N.E. 2d. 642 at 647.
3. Fendall v. Goldsmid [1877] 2 P.D. 263; Earl of Cowley v. 
Countess of Cowley [1901] A.C. 450 H.L.
4. Third edition, vol. 19 (1957)? P* 829.
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A divorced wife who retains, her former husbandfs 
surname may be restrained if, by doing so, she holds her­
self out as still being married to him. The husband may 
institute proceedings for a decree of jactitation of 
marriage under section 52 of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 
1970.1
Obi states that
... if a divorced woman holds herself out 
as still married to her former husband, who 
has in fact remarried to another woman, she 
will be liable for defamation at the suit of 
the man?s current wife; the innuendo being 
that the latter is not lawfully married but 
living in sin with the man concerned.^
Although this may be the position in English law, 
where a man domiciled in England can only have one wife, 
it is difficult to see how such an innuendo can be inferred 
in Nigeria, where a woman may be lawfully married, although 
her husband has many other legal wives. It is not defama­
tory for a woman to be married under customary law, nor 
can it be said that a customary law wife is living in sin, 
since customary law marriages are legally recognized in 
Nigeria.
D. Mutual protection and other rights
(1) Mutual protection.
Each spouse is entitled to use such force as is 
reasonably necessary to protect the other from physical harm 
in the event of a physical attack. A spouse may also use 
force, if necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, to 
resist unlawful threats of violence to the other spousei
1. Section 52; Goldstone v. Smith [1922] 38 T.L.R. 403.
2. Obi, Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, op. cit., p. 
220.
3. See Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. [1929] 2 K.B. 
331s C.A. in which it was held that a reference to 
another woman as fMr. C ?s fiancee1 was defamatory of
the plaintiff, the wife of Mr. C.
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uttered In his or her presence,^"
(2) Criminal responsibility.
A married woman is not free from criminal 
responsibility for doing, or omitting to do an act, merely # 
because the act or omission takes place in the presence of 
her husband. But the wife of a statutory marriage is not 
criminally responsible for doing or omitting to do an act 
which she is actually compelled to do by her husband, and 
which is done, or omitted to be done in his presence, pro­
vided the act or omission does not constitute an offence 
punishable with death or cause grievous bodily harm to
2another person, or is not done with such an intention.
A husband and wife cannot be guilty of the crime
of conspiracy unless a third party is also involved.^ This
4
principle owes its origin to the common law, and rests on 
the proposition of conjugal unity, the husband and wife
1. See Criminal Code Act, 1916, Cap 42, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision, S.32(3); see 
generally Cyprian 0. Okonkwo and Michael E. Naish,
Criminal Law in Nigeria, (Excluding the North),(London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1964), pp.117-119 and 219-221;
Lionel Brett and Ian McLean, The Criminal Law and 
Procedure of Lagos, Eastern Nigeria and Western Nigeria 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1963)9 p.482, par. 1406.
2. S. 33* Criminal Code Act.
3. Ibid., S.34; see also Keshlro and Anor. v. I.G.P. [1955-56] 
W.R.N.L.R,84; cf. Mawji and Anor. v. R. [1957J A.C.126;
cf. R. v. Cope [1718] 1 Str.44.
4. For a criticism of the concept of unity of the spouses
in the common law, see Bromley, Family Law, 1977* 0£. cit., 
pp. 107-109; see also Glanville Williams, 1 Legal Unity 
of Husband and Wife’, 10 M.L.R., 1947, pp. 16-31; Grave­
son and Crane, A Century of Family Law, op. cit.
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being regarded as one person.^- Since, the. crime of conr-
spiracy needed at least two persons to establish the
commission of the offence, it was not possible to do so
where husband and wife acted alone. This rule of law is
not extended to the spouses of a customary or Islamic law
marriage, and the alleged discrimination has been the topic
of criticism among legal writers.
Allegations of discrimination against customary
law marriage are also made against certain provisions in
2the Evidence Act.
(3) Rules of evidence.
When a person is charged with any of the offences 
specified in section 160(1) of the Evidence Act 1945^ the 
wife or husband of such person is a competent and compell­
able witness for the prosecution or defence, without the 
consent of the person charged#- In other cases, however, a
spouse may only give evidence on the application of the
4person charged. Neither party to a marriage is compellable 
to give evidence in court disclosing communications made to
1. See Blackstone Commentaries, op. cTt., p. 442: ’The very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
the marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of
the husband; see also J.E.G. De Montmorency, 'The Changing 
Status of a Married Woman’, 13 L.Q.R. , 18973 pp.187-199 at 
p. 192; ’Not only did she convey to him her personal and 
worldly goods, but she added the entire responsibility of 
her personality to the weight of his own. The Creator 
took from Adam a rib and made it Eve; the common law of , 
England endeavoured to reverse the process, to replace 
the rib and to merge the personalities’.
2. See e.g. Kasunmu and Salacuse, op. cit. , pp. 200-201; 
Nwogugu,'Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit., pp. 88-89;
Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 268-275.
3. Cap. 62, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
4. See R. v. Adebowale and Ors. [1941] 7 W.A.C.A.142;
Ajiyola and Ors. v. Animasnaun [19^3J 9 W.A.C.A.,22;
R. v. Idiong and Anor. [1953J 13 W.A.C.A.30; Akpolokpolo 
v. Tne uommissioner of Police [I960] W.R.N.L.R.89•
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him or her by the other spouse during the marriage.
Section l6l(l) of the Evidence Act provides;
161. When a person charged with'an offence 
is married to another-person by a marriage 
other than a. monogamous marriage such last
named person shall be a competent and com­
pellable witness on behalf of either the 
prosecution or the defence: Provided that
in the case of a marriage by Mohammedan law 
neither party to such marriage shall be 
compellable to disclose any communication 
made to him or her by the other party during 
such marriage.
The reason for the protection of marital confid­
ence between the husband and wife of an Islamic law marriage,
but not of a customary marriage, is not easy to defend,
since both types of marriages are potentially polygynous.
In Faremilekun and Ors. v. The State,1 sections 160(2) and 
161(1) of the Evidence Act were challenged as discriminatory 
legislation which should be declared null and void, by 
virtue of section 28 of the Constitution of the Federation 
of Nigeria. It was held by the Western State Court of 
Appeal that the disabilities under section 161(1) of the 
Evidence Act are not against any citizen of Nigeria of a 
particular community, tribe, place of origin, religion or 
political opinion. The disabilities are against the custo­
mary form of marriage and apply to all citizens of Nigeria.
Restriction of the principle of unity of husband
and wife to monogamous marriages only, although criticized 
2
by writers as discriminatory, may be defended on the ground 
that extension of the principle of unity of husband and wife 
to polygamous marriages may discriminate against wives and 
result in injustice in some cases. Two examples will 
clarify this argument.
If a husband and his two wives conspire to commit
1. [1974] 3 W,S.C.A.86.
2. See Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, 1974, p. 88;
Cotran, * The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Kenya, op. 
cit. , p. 421; see the report of the English Criminal 
Law Revision Committee, 11th Report, Evidence (General), 
Cmnd.4991, 1972, p. 92-98.
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a. murder, the husband cannot be found guilty of conspiracy, 
since he cannot legally conspire with either of them to 
commit a crime. The two wives, however, may be found 
guilty of conspiring with each other. Similarly, the 
ability of a spouse to testify against the other spouse 
may be of crucial importance to a finding of guilt of an 
accused person, for in many cases the spouse is the only 
person who has knowledge of the guilt of the accused.^
If the unity rule were extended to polygamous marriages, 
the wives of a husband who commits a murder in their 
presence would be incapable of giving evidence against him. If one 
of the wives, however, commits an offence in the presence of 
her husband and her co-wives, although the husband would 
not be compelled to give evidence against her, the co­
wives would not be so exempted. This of course results 
in an advantage to the husband, and discrimination against 
the wives. Justice or impartiality can only be achieved 
if all parties of a polygamous marriage are considered as 
a single unity. The interests of justice demand that if 
parity between customary law marriages and statutory marr­
iages is to be achieved, this should be accomplished by 
the abolition, of the rule, rather than to its extension 
in this manner,^
1, See e.g. Wilson Udoada and Ors. v. The State, [1975]
1 S.C, 72; where the spouses were married under 
customary law. The wife’s evidence that her husband 
killed the deceased, and brought the human meat to her 
kitchen to be cooked, that after she refused to allow 
him to do so, he cooked it in his room and ate it, was 
instrumental in the convictions for murder of her 
husband and six other men.
2, See Glanville Williams, ’The Legal Unity of Husband and 
Wife’, 10 M.L.R. 19^1, P* 16 at pp. 20-22, for arguments 
in favour of abolition of the rules pertaining to the 
unity of the spouses; see the English Criminal Law Act, 
1977j S.2(2) which provides that a person agreeing only 
with his or her spouse to commit a crime is exempted from 
liability for conspiracy so far as the law of con­
spiracy still applies, fee generally, Edward Griew,
The Criminal Law Act, 1977 (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1978), PP. 45/1-45/5.
3. The Affiliation and Custody of Children
219
A. Affiliation.
It has been mentioned previously that the laws 
of most traditional patrilineal societies had similar rules 
governing the legal paternity of children of a marriage.
In English common law the legal maxim, * Pater est quern 
nuptiae demonstratT, that is, the presumption that if a 
child is born to a married woman, her husband is deemed to 
be its father, until the contrary is proved, applied.^
A child is legitimate at common law if his parents were 
married at the time of his conception or at the time of his 
birth. A child born in wedlock is presumed to be legitim­
ate .
Unlike customary law, the presumption of legitim- 
2
acy is rebuttable, but it was regarded as contrary to
public policy that either parent should give evidence that
a child of the marriage was illegitimate. Consequently
neither husband nor wife was permitted to give evidence of
non-access by the other spouse if this would have the
effect of bastardizing the issue of the marriage. In 1924,
the House of Lords held that the rule applied to proceed-
ings for divorce. This rule was changed in England by the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, which abolished the old common 
4
law rule, and allowed either party to give evidence of non- 
access, even where such evidence would result in the
1. See Blackstone, Commentaries, op. cit. , p. 457; Williams, 
op. cit., chapt.12, and Bracton, The Laws and Customs of 
England, trans. with revision and notes by Samuel E. 
Thorne, 1968, p.34; Banbury Peerage Case [1811] 1 Sim 
and St. 153, H.L,
2. The presumption of legitimacy in customary lav/ is rebutt­
able in some systems of law; see Mariyama v. Sadiku Ejo 
[1961] N,R.N,L,R.8l.
3. Russell v. Russell [1924] A,C.687.
4. The old common law rule was enunciated in Russell v. 
Russell [1924] A,C,687.
220
illegitimacy of a child of the marriage, The parties were
not compellable to give such evidence.
In Nigeria the common law rule, as amended by
the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950,1 was applied to children
2
of a statutory marriage. In Egwunwoke v, Egwunwoke, while 
a divorce suit between the parties was pending, the wife 
applied for an order to compel the husband to pay reason­
able expenses for the maintenance of D., said to be a ’child 
of the marriage’, D. was born while the parties were married. 
The husband sought to prove that D, was illegitimate and 
that he was not D.’s father. Aniagolu Ag. J., (as he then was), 
held that, by virtue of section 32 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1950, the petitioner husband was at liberty to prove 
that D, is not his child, The court also held that where 
a child is born in wedlock, intercourse is presumed to have 
taken place between the husband and the wife resulting in 
the birth of the child, until the contrary is proved.
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, was in conflict 
with the Evidence Act of Nigeria, 1945, which provided that 
a child born during the continuance of a valid statutory 
marriage, or within two hundred and eighty days after its 
dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, is presumed 
to be legitimate. Neither of the parents of such a child
was allowed to give evidence to rebut this presumption.
4
In Elumeze v. Elumeze, a husband left Nigeria 
for the United States of America in 1948, leaving his wife 
in Nigeria, She joined him there in October, 1950. A
child was born to her five months later. The Lagos High
Court held that there can be no doubt that, by the laws of
1. The common law rule that neither spouse could give evidence 
of non-access which would tend to bastardize the wife’s 
children was abrogated by the English Law Reform (Miscell­
aneous Provisions Act, 1949, S.7; see now the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, S.48(1).
2. 1966 N,M,L.R.,147; [1966] 2 ALL N.L.R.I.
3. See S.147 Evidence Act, 1945, Cap.62, Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
4. [1969] 1 ALL E.R.311.
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nature, and relying on decided cases, it would be repug­
nant that a court should hold that the husband was the 
father of such a child. The husband was allowed to give 
evidence of non-access. On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
it was held that the husband’s evidence was not admiss­
ible, because of the proviso to section 147 of the Evidence 
Act, 1945a which remained in force in Nigeria, notwith­
standing, section 32 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act,
1950, The appeal was allowed.
The law in Nigeria, until recently, therefore, 
was that neither spouse could give evidence of non-access 
if this would have the effect of bastardizing the issue. 
Egwunwoke v. Egwunwoke -^ seems to have been wrongly decided.
The law has now been altered by the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970, which has repealed the provisos to 
section 147 of the Evidence Act. Under the Matrimonial
“5
Causes Decree, 1970> either parent may give evidence to 
rebut the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during 
the marriage.
4
Unlike the position in customary or Islamic, law, 
a husband has no claims to the legal paternity of the 
children of his wife begotten by another man during the 
marriage, nor at any time after its termination by divorce 
or death. This is a drastic change, especially in regard 
to customary law, where legal paternity is governed by
5
the payment and non-refund of dowry.
B . Custody.
At common law, the father was entitled to the
1. [1969] 1 ALL E.R.311.
2. See S.115(3) Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
3. Ibid., S.84; see also Sifo v. Sifo [1972] 1C.C.H.C .J .52.
4. See above, Chapter VII, pp. 593 et al; Chapter, IX, p. 73 et al.
5. See above, Chapter VIII#
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custody of his legitimate, children until they reached the
age of twenty-one. This right was absolute, except in the
rare cases where the father’s conduct was such as to gravely
imperil the child’s life, health or morals. In mid-
Victorian England, it appeared unthinkable under any
circumstances to infringe the common law right of the
father to the sole and exclusive control and guardianship
of his children. Thus in ex p . Skinner^ the court refused
to interfere with the father’s custody, although his wife
had left him in consequence of his cruelty to her, and he
was allegedly cohabiting with a woman who visited him while
he was in prison. The child,who was six years of age, was
taken daily by this woman to visit him at the prison.
A father could defeat the right of the mother of
his children to be their legal guardian after his death,
2by appointing a testamentary guardian.
Gradually, however, the view that the welfare
of the child was the first consideration was adopted,and
in consequence, the mother was progressively given an equal
right to custody of her children. It is worthy of note
that the mother’s right to the custody of her minor
children correlated with the improved legal status of
married women. This was expressly recognized by the
■3
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, the preamble of which
1. [1824]9 Moore C.P.279; see also R.v. Mannerville [1804]
5 East, 221.
2. See the comments of J.E.G. De Montmorency on the provision 
of the law in this respect. ’Nothing shows more vividly 
that degrading subjection of the woman to the man that 
civilization sanctioned than the fact that over the chi-ld 
at her breast the mother had no legal hold, no recognized 
possession. The doctrines of the oneness of the husband 
and wife, which legitimately sanctioned this, becomes at 
once finally exposed in all its brutality, and seems 
indeed barbarous in our eyes’ - ’The Changing Status of a 
Married Woman", 13 L.Q.R. 1897, PP» 187-199 at p. 197*
3. 17 Stats. 424.
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stated;
Whereas Parliament by the Sex Disqualific­
ation (Removal) Act 1919, and various other 
enactments, has sought to establish equality 
in law bei:ween the sexes, and it is expedient 
that the principle should obtain with respect 
to the guardianship of infants and the rights 
and responsibilities conferred thereby.
The Act gave statutory effect to the rule that in
any dispute relating to a child, the court must regard its
welfare as the first and paramount consideration. It also
provided that neither parent had a superior claim, as
against the other, in regard to the custody or upbringing
of a child, and gave to the mother the same right to
appoint a testamentary guardian as the father had.
The Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, being a
post-1900 statute, does not apply to Nigeria. Its provisions
have, however, been incorporated in the Infants Law 1958,1
which applies in the Western and Mid-Western States. In
the other parts of the Federation, the pre-1900 English
statutes on custody of children, as statutes of general
2
application, apply.
The decided cases in Nigeria show that the guiding 
principle is the welfare of the child, and English decisions 
on the subject have been cited with approval in all parts 
of the Federation.
■3
In Apara v. Apara, the Supreme Court held that 
it should not be assumed that the successful party must 
have custody of the children, or that he is the proper 
party to whom the care of the children of the marriage 
should be entrusted. The welfare and interest of the children 
were the paramount considerations in a grant of custody.
1. Cap 49, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 
Revision.
2. See e.g. Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, 17 stats. 415; 
Custody of Children Act, 1891, 17 Stats, 419; Talfourd's 
Act, 1839, 2 and 3 Viet., C.54.
3. [1968] 1 ALL N.L.R.241.
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The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, now pro­
vides :
In proceedings with respect to the custody, 
guardianship, welfare, advancement or 
education of children of a marriage, the 
court shall regard the interests of those 
children as the paramount consideration; 
and subject thereto, the court may make
such order in respect of those matters as
it thinks proper.,
2In Anazia v. Anazia the court stated that the 
welfare of the minors was the first and paramount consider­
ation, and no account should be taken as to whether, from 
any other point of view, the claim of the father in respect 
of such custody or upbringing is superior to that of the 
mother, or the claim of the mother is superior” to that of 
the father.
The traditional attitude that custody of a child 
should be given to his father except where there is abundant 
evidence that he is not a suitable person, or the child is
too young to be separated from his mother,J still lingers
1. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, section 71(1)-
2. [1977] 4 C.C.H.C.J.,699; see also Jegede v. Jegede [1972]
12 C.C.H.C.J. 121; Babalola v. Babalola [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 
110; Qjo v. Ojo [1969] 1 ALL N.L.R.435, where an appeal was 
granted by the Supreme Court on the ground that the order 
for custody of the children of the marriage to the respond­
ent wife was made without due enquiry as to the welfare of 
the children in accordance with rule 33(a) of the Matri­
monial Causes Rules, 1957; see also Oguntokun v. Oguntokun 
[1972] 12 C.C.H.C.J.106.
3. E.g. Oni v. Qnl [1973] 7 C.C.H.C.J.41 at p.44; where 
custody of a child four years of age was awarded to the 
father, the Court ordered that the child should be kept by 
the mother until he was 7 years old, when he should be 
given to the father. On appeal to the Supreme Court to 
vary the custody order when the father remarried, the 
Supreme Court held that ’the mere fact of remarriage by a 
divorcee in whose favour an order for custody was made, 
does not ipso facto deprive him of the legal custody of 
his children. The circumstances must be examined to decide 
whether it is in the best interest of the children that 
custody should remain in him.’ The order was confirmed.
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on, however, and is evident in some High Court decisions.
For example, in Akapo v. Akapo,^ the Judge, Kassim, J., 
after awarding custody to the respondent, the mother of 
the children, said of the petitioner husband, that he was 
living in such a house, and in such a manner, that no 
reasonable person would give him custody of a child. He 
added, however, that it was open to any suitable member of 
the petitioner’s family to ask, at the instance of the 
petitioner, for the custody of the children of the marriage. 
There was no evidence that the mother was not a suitable 
person to whom custody should be awarded, and the mother’s 
family was not invited to apply for custody, although the 
judge had previously stated that both parties to the mar­
riage were ’indulged persons from well-off families’.
2Similarly, in Oloyede v. Qloyede, the trial Judge 
found the father to be not a mam one could trust with the 
upbringing of children. He also noted the provisions of 
section 71(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970. In 
spite of these facts, and presumably because the wife was 
an Irish national (he thought that no condition as to her 
not taking them out of the country would be effective), he 
granted custody of the children to the father, on certain 
conditions. On appeal, the Western State Court of Appeal 
reversed the decision and gave custody to the wife.
1. [1972] 7 C.C.H.C.J.105; cf. Oyedu v. Oyedu [1972] 2
E.C.S.L.R.41; where it was stated obiter: ’However
benevolent a foster parent might have been it is an 
inalienable right of parents to look after their 
children, and their custody must be preferred when 
they are able to look after the children, to that of a 
foster parent. A parent cannot stand by and see her 
children being fostered when she is alive, healthy, 
has the means with which to look after the children, 
and is not otherwise disqualified’, but see Section 71(3) 
of M.C.D. "The court may grant custody to a person 
other than a party to the marriage as it thinks fit”.
2. [1975] 3 W.S.C.A.73.
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4. Maintenance.
The husband of a statutory marriage has an
obligation to maintain his wife during the existence of
the marriage.'*' The fact that the wife has property or a
separate income greater than that of her husband is
2generally irrelevant. The general obligation of a husband
is to maintain his wife in his own home. A wife, therefore,
who claims maintenance while living apart from her husband,
■3
must justify her absence from his home. She must show
either that her husband deserted her, or that he turned
her out of his home. The wife who chooses to leave her
husband against his wishes has no claim on him for mainten- 
4ance. The wife’s right of maintenance is governed by the 
common law and by statute. The position at common law will 
therefore be discussed first, and then the position under 
relevant statutes.
A. Maintenance under the common law.
At common law a husband became entitled to most
of his wife’s property; in return, he was obliged to main-
15
tain her by providing her with necessaries. This common 
law right to maintenance is ’not a right to an allowance, 
but to be supported by being given bed and board’.^ It is
1. Williams v. Williams [1976] 3 C.C.H.C.J. 805.
2. Samson v. Samson [i960] 1 W.L.R. 190.
3. Baker v. Baker [1949] 66 T.L.R.(Pt.1)8l; Stirland v. 
Stirland [1959] 3 ALL E.R.891.
4. National Assistance Board v. Parkes [1955] 2 Q.B.506.
C.A.
5. Blackstone, Commentaries, op. cit. , p. 442; Manby v. 
Scott [1660] Smiths Leading Cases, 13 edit., p^ 417;
Povey v. Povey H971J 2 W.L.R.381; [1970]3 ALL E.R.
612.
6. Lilley v. Lilley [i960] P.169, 178.
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for the husband to. decide the scale on which the family 
shall live, and not for the court. Thus, in McGuire v. 
McGuire where a husband had not given his wife any money 
for her own use for thirty-three years, and failed to pro­
vide other home comforts, despite his comparative wealth, 
an American court held that the husband was legally 
supporting his wife, and that the purpose of the marriage 
obligation was being carried out.
The husband’s duty to provide his wife with the
necessities of life is prima facie complied with if he
2
provides a home for her. His obligation remains if the
spouses are obliged to live apart, for example, owing to
■2
the illness of one of them.
Although the common law purported to give a wife 
the right to be maintained during the marriage (unless she 
committed adultery), the right could not be effectively 
enforced. The common law rule that neither spouse could 
sue the other, precluded the wife from enforcing her right 
by action, if her husband failed to fulfil his duty to 
maintain her. The courts, however, gave a wife an indirect 
remedy instead. So long as she was entitled to be main- 
tained, the wife could bind her husband by her contract 
for the supply of ’necessaries’ such.as food, clothing and 
essential services. The power to pledge the husband’s 
credit was termed the wife’s agency of necessity. The 
husband could not escape his liabilities by forbidding his
1. [1953] 59 N.W.2d.36.
2. See McGowan v. McGowan [19^8] 2 ALL. E^R.1032; 103^;
Price v. Price 11951] P.413, 420-421, C.A. W. v. W. (No. 
2)[1954] 2 ALL E.R.829,840,C.A.; [1954]P.486,515-516.
3. See Lilley v. Lilley [1959] 3 ALL E.R.283, C.A.; [I960]
P.169, C.A.
4. The onus is on the wife to show that the husband is
liable to maintain her; Stringer v . Stringer [1952]P.171,
explained in National Assistance Board v . Parkes [1955]2 
Q.B.506. C.A. See also Pinnick v. Pinnick L1957] 1 W.L.R.
644 and Lilley v. Lilley L1960JP.169, C.A.
228
wife from pledging his credit, or the tradesmen from
T
supplying her with goods and services. The agency was
terminated, however, by anything which terminated the
common law duty to maintain. For example, if the wife
committed a single act of adultery, she automatically for-
2feited her rights to maintenance. Similarly, a wife who 
deserted her husband lost her right to be maintained by 
him, until the desertion was ended.
This common law right of the wife to maintenance, 
and the remedy of pledging her husbandTs credit to enforce 
the right, was received into Nigeria under the general 
reception of English law. In Hutchson v. Madam Olajide,^
Mrs. H. was married to Mr. H. under the Marriage Act. As a 
result of his cruelty, she left the matrimonial home in 
February 1966. The respondent, a relation of Mrs. H., sued
H. for recovery of £480 which she alleged she had lent Mrs.
H. for her maintenance, feeding and clothing between February 
1966 and the end of May 1967. Neither the respondent nor 
Mrs. H. was able to prove how this money had been spent, but
the trial judge assessed Mrs. H . ’s expenditure on necessar­
ies at £15 per month. He gave judgment In favour of the 
respondent for £240. Mr. H. appealed: it was held by the
High Court
1. That a wife whose husbandTs cruelty has
forced her to leave him is entitled to
pledge his credit for necessaries.
1. Compare the position where a wife has presumed authority 
to pledge her husband’s credit for necessaries. The 
husband’s liability may be excluded in such cases if he 
expressly forbade his wife, or a tradesman, to obtain or 
give goods on credit. See Shoolbred v. Baker [1867]16 L.T. 
359.
2. See Wright and Webb v. Annandale [1930]2 K.B.8,C.A.
3. National Assistance Board v. Wilkinson [1952]2 Q.B.648.
4. Jones v. Newton and Llanidloes Guardians [1920]3 K.B.38I; 
See also Price v. Price [195l]2ALL E.R.580,C.A.[1951]P»413; 
Naylor v. Naylor [1961]2 ALL E.R.129.
5. [1970] N.N.L.R.31.
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2. But that this right is subject to. her 
own means and earning power and the 
availability and adequacy of a court 
order for maintenance.
3. That her right is also limited to 
pledging her husband’s credit for goods 
and not for money.
4. That an action by a lender of money for 
the purpose of a deserted wife buying 
necessaries is an action in contract by 
subrogation to the right of the supplier 
of goods. Therefore he could only
recover by the proof of purchase of
specific goods.
This type of agency of necessity arises from the 
fact of marriage, not cohabitation, and is therefore not 
available to a wife married under customary law, (unless
she could prove that she had such a right under customary
law)j^or to a concubine.
A wife married under customary law, or a concubine, 
has presumed authority to pledge her husband’s credit while 
she is cohabiting with him, since this is a contractual
p
right based on cohabitation and not marriage.
B. Maintenance under statute law (pre-1970)»
Whether the wife of a statutory marriage can 
enforce her rights to maintenance by a separate action, if 
she has not petitioned for divorce or other matrimonial 
relief, is not free from doubt.
Since 1886, it has been possible for a wife in 
England to enforce her common law right of maintenance by 
obtaining a financial order on the ground that her husband 
had wilfully neglected to maintain her. Such actions were 
initially only made enforceable in Magistrates’ Courts by 
a series of Acts which became collectively known as the
1. See above, Chapter VII, pp. 585-589. See the position in 
Islamic law, above, Chapter IX, pp. 68-70.
2, Debenham v. Mellow [1880] 6 App.Cas.24(H,L.) .
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Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Acts, 
1895-1949• In 1949, a wife in England was also enabled 
to petition for maintenance alone, in an action before 
the High Court, by virtue of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1949.
Are any of the rights given to a wife in England 
to enforce her right to maintenance as an independent 
action, available to a wife in Nigeria?
The question of the applicability of the 1895 
Summary Jurisdiction Act was considered in Okpaku v. Okpaku.1 
Mrs. Okpaku, who had been married under the Nigerian Mar­
riage Ordinance, brought an action for maintenance against 
her husband. Since there was no Nigerian legislation which 
gave her the right to sue for maintenance alone, she brought 
her action under the English Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1895 
by virtue of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1943. This Ordi­
nance provided for the application in Nigeria of the common 
law of England, the doctrines of equity, and the statutes
of general application in force in England on the 1st 
2
January, 1900.
The Supreme Court of Nigeria granted her mainten­
ance. The West African Court of Appeal, however, reversed 
the decision, on the ground that the Supreme Court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain such an action, since the Summary 
Jurisdiction Act, 1895, was not a statute of general 
application, as it did not apply to Scotland or Ireland. 
Consequently, it did not apply to Nigeria.
1. [1947112 W.A.C.A.137.
2. See above, chapter II,
3. In Lawall . v. Younan [196l]l ALL N.L.R.245,256, Brett, J. 
stated unat Okpaku v. Okpaku was decided per incuriam 
because the West African Court of Appeal had failed to 
take account of Young v. Ahina [1940]6 W.A.C.A.180, where 
it was held that the words of general application are 
used with reference to the matter of the statutes and 
not only geographically’.'
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As a result,. Mrs. Okpaku, although she had a right 
of maintenance, was no better off than a wife married under 
customary law. She could not enforce her right, except by 
the indirect method of pledging her husband's credit for 
necessaries, or by bringing an action for divorce or judicial 
separation etc., and claiming maintenance as an ancilliary 
relief.
With reference to the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act, 19^99 and its successors, they are undoubt­
edly post-1900 imperial legislation, and can only apply to 
Nigeria by virtue of a different enabling, provision.
In Ekisola v. Ekisola the wife brought an action 
in the Lagos High Court for a maintenance order for herself 
and the children of the marriage. She claimed that the 
husband drove her away from the matrimonial home and that 
he wilfully neglected to maintain her. The action was 
brought under section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1950, of England. Coker, J., upheld her claim on the ground 
that the High Court was enjoined by section 16 of the High 
Court of Lagos Act, to exercise its jurisdiction in matri­
monial causes in conformity with the law and practice for 
the time being in force in England, and that this included 
the English law under section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1950.
2
This decision was followed in Ehigiator v. Ehigiator, 
by Begho, J. The application for an order of maintenance was 
brought under section 23 of the English Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1950, as an independent action. Begho, J., held that the 
Act was applicable in the Mid-Western Region by virtue of- 
section 4 of the Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act 
which reads:
The jurisdiction of the High Court of a Region 
in relation to marriages and the annulment and 
dissolution of marriages and in relation to 
other matrimonial causes shall, subject to the
1. 11961] L.L.R.8.
2. [1966] 2 ALL N.L.R.169.
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provision of any laws of a Region so far 
as practice and procedure are. concerned, 
be exercised by the Court, in. conformity 
with the Laws, and practice for the time 
being in force in England.
The application was allowed and maintenance awarded.
C. Maintenance under the Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970.
The English Matrimonial Causes Acts no longer 
apply in Nigeria, by virtue of sections 1(1), 8, and 115(2) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.^
Whether a wife may bring an independent action 
for maintenance under the Decree, has not yet been clearly 
decided. There are conflicting judicial decisions and 
opinions.
The provisions with respect to maintenance are
in section 70 of the Decree:
70. (1) Subject to this section, the court 
may, in proceedings with respect to the 
maintenance of a party to a marriage, or of 
children of the marriage, other than proceed­
ings for an order of maintenance pending the 
disposal of proceedings, make such an order 
as it thinks proper, having regard to the 
means, earning capacity and conduct of the 
parties to the marriage, and all other 
relevant circumstances.
(2) Subject to this section and to rules 
of court,the court may, in proceedings for an 
order for the maintenance of a party to a 
marriage, or of children of the marriage, 
pending the disposal of proceedings, make 
such order as it thinks proper, having regard 
to the means, earning capacity and conduct
of the parties to the marriage and all other 
relevant circumstances.
(3) The court may make an order for the 
maintenance of a party notwithstanding that 
a decree is or has been made against that 
party in the proceedings to which the proceed­
ings with respect to maintenance are related.
(underlining mine)
1. Decree no. 18 of 1970.
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In Akinwunmi. v. Akinwunmi , ^ the wife brought an 
application solely for maintenance without bringing a 
petition for a principal relief. The application was 
brought under section 22 of the English Matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1965. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent 
that the action was untenable in view of the provisions of
the Matrimonial^Causes Decree 1970, which made the English
Act inapplicable in Nigeria on the 17 March 1970. This 
submission was rejected by Adefarasin, J., who held that 
the application could be entertained. He stated his reason 
thus:
Section 70 and 71 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, 1970 make adequate provisions for 
proceedings for the maintenance of a party
to the marriage and also for the custody and
maintenance of the children of the marriage 
independently of whether there is a prayer 
for a principal relief for a decree of dis­
solution, nullity, judicial separation, etc.
It is my clear opinion that a spouse who 
desires orders for maintenance and custody of 
children is entitled to seek such orders 
under sections 70 and 71 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree 1970, notwithstanding that she 
has not at the same time presented a petition 
for a principal relief. It is my view that 
the provisions of sections 70 and 71 of the 
Decree are quite similar to those of sections 
22 and 35 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 
of the United Kingdom. By them applications 
can be made to the court for some reliefs 
independently of some petitions for dissolution, 
nullity of marriage or an order for judicial 
separation.
Two points made by the Judge in the above passage 
call for comment. First, it is respectfully submitted 
that the learned Judge!s attempt to justify the wife!s 
claim brought under section 22 of the English Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1965, because of the similarity of sections 22 
and 35 of that Act to section 70 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, 1970, is untenable. The fact that the English 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1965 no longer applies in Nigeria
1. [1971] Suit No. M/66/70 unreported decision of Lagos 
High Court, delivered on 19 March 1971*
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after the commencement, of the Decree, is abundantly clear.
The first section of the Decree provides;
1. (1) After the.commencement of this Decree, 
a matrimonial cause shall not be instituted 
otherwise than under this Decree; and if a 
matrimonial cause has been instituted before 
the commencement of this Decree but not 
completed, it shall be continued and dealt 
with only in accordance with the provisions 
of this Decree prescribed in that behalf.
Even if it is argued that the peremptory provisions 
of section 1(1) of the Decree should be confined to Patri­
monial causes1 as defined by the Decree, and should not be 
extended to independent actions for maintenance, which 
admittedly are not Patrimonial causes’ under the Decree, 
such an argument loses its validity when the provisions of 
section 8 of the Decree are taken into account.
8. The jurisdiction conferred on a court 
by this Decree shall be exercised in accord­
ance with this Decree; and any law in force 
immediately before t h e ’commencement of this 
Decree which confers jurisdiction in divorce 
or matrimonial causes on the High Court of a 
State or provides for the law and practice 
to be applied in the exercise of that juris­
diction shall, to the extent that it does so, 
cease to have effect.
This section, in effect, repeals the State Courts (Federal
Jurisdiction) Act,^ (formerly cited as the Regional Courts
2
(Federal Jurisdiction) Act), which, prior to the enactment
of the Decree, provided for the application in Nigeria of
■5
current English law on matrimonial causes. In Olu-Ibukun 
v. Olu-Ibukun, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge 
was in error in treating an application under the Matrimonial
1. See also section 115(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 
1970, which amends and repeals the State Courts (Federal 
Jurisdiction) Act.
2. Cap. 117, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
3. See the various High Court Laws High Court of Lagos Act, 
1958, Cap. 80, S.16; Eastern Nigeria - Customary Courts 
Law, 1963, Cap.61, S.11; Northern Nigeria, - High Court 
Law, Cap.49. S. 13(1), Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 
Revision, - Western Nigeria, Cap.44, Laws of the Western 
Region, 1959 Revision, S.8.
4. [1974] 1 N.M.L.R. 280; [1974] 2 S.C.41; Falobi v. Falobi 
[1974] 4 W.S.C.A.198.
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Causes Decree 1970 ?. as if it was'one. under, the English
Matrimonial. Causes Act, 1950,. which ceased to apply in
Nigeria when the Decree, came into force on 17 March 1970.
Secondly, Adefarasin J . ’s view that the provisions
of section 70 of the Decree permit an independent action
for maintenance to be brought, is supported by the opinion
of Kazeem, J. in Esua v. E s u a who stated his opinion thus;
The . . . wordings of section 70 and 71 of 
the Decree are not ambiguous and I am clearly 
of the opinion that separate applications for 
maintenance and custody of children could be 
brought under the two sections without their 
being tagged on to other reliefs.
2Ogoro, J. , in Ajiboye v. Ajiboye, after reviewing
a number of rulings in other cases stated;
The Court has jurisdiction under the plain
and unambiguous provision of Section 70(1)
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree No.18 of 
1970 to hear and determine an application 
for the maintenance of a party to. a marriage 
or of the children of the marriage notwith­
standing the fact that there is no petition, 
before the court for a principal relief under 
the Decree.
This opinion was also expressed in other, cases
4
and by legal writers.
There are, however, several other decisions^ and 
opinions^ which express a contrary view. In Babalola v.
1. [1970] Suit No. M/63/70 unreported, Lagos High Court,
4 Dec. 1970.
2. [19753 4 C.C.H.C.J.769.
3. See Asomugha v. Asomugha £1972} Suit No. M/.1.39/72
7 C.C.H.C.J.63; Oni v . Oni [1971] Suit No. M/5.2/70,, 
unreported Ibadan High Court, 27 Jan. 1971; Dawodu v.
Dawodu £1975] C.C.H.C.J.257*
4. See Itsejuwa E, Sagay, Case Law Under, the' Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, (Ife: Nigeria, 1974), p. 77-64.
5. See e.g. Esua v. Esua £1970](per George J.) Suit No.M/63/70, 
unreported, Lagos High Court, 3 July 1970; Adekoya v. 
Adekoya £1973] 2 C.C.H.C.J.73-
6. See S.A, Adesanya, Laws of Matrimonial Causes (Ibadan;
Ibadan University Press, 197.3), PP- 5-6; A.B. Kasunmu, 
’Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970’, Nigerian Journal of 
Comparative Law, 1971, Vol.2.. No.l, pTbb; and Nwogugu,
Eamily Law, op. cit. , pp. 214^215.
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Babalola^  the wife brought an application for maintenance 
of herself and the. children of the family. The application 
was brought under sections 70(1) and 71 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree. No ’matrimonial cause’ as defined in 
section 114 of the Decree had been completed or pending.
The husband/respondent submitted that the Court had no 
jurisdiction, since such relief as was claimed by the wife 
could not be brought when there was no ’matrimonial cause’. 
Ayoola, J. , held that the Court had no jurisdiction, and 
that section 70(1) of the Decree could not be invoked, 
unless it is related to a ’matrimonial cause’ as defined 
in section ll4(l)(a) and (b)-of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, pending or completed.
The learned Judge argued that to arrive at the 
true meaning of section 70, the section must be viewed in 
the context of the whole statute, including its title, 
preamble and the intention of the law-maker expressed in 
the law itself taken as a whole. He noted that section 70 
(1) is part of a Decree entitled ’Matrimonial Causes Decree’ 
and concluded as a result that the Court only had juris­
diction over ’matrimonial causes’ as defined by the Decree. 
Since independent actions for maintenance were not ’matri­
monial causes’, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain 
them under the Decree,
It is respectfully submitted that the cardinal
principle of interpretation of a statute is that external
aids to interpretation, such as reference to the title,
marginal notes, or preamble of a statute, should only be
enlisted when the text of the provision is not clear. In
1977* in the case of Mobil Oil (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Federal
2
Board of Inland Revenue, the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
reiterated this cardinal principle which had previously 
been laid down in several of its previous decisions. It
1. E1974] N ,M,L,R.57«
2. [1977] 3 S ,C .53•
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held that;
... the general rule for construing a 
statute is that where the words of a 
statute are clear the court shall give 
effect to their literal meaning. It is 
only when the literal meaning may result 
in ambiguity or injustice that the court 
may seek internal aid within the body of 
the statute itself or external aid from 
statutes in pari materia in order to 
resolve the ambiguity or avoid doing 
injustice.^
As correctly stated by Agora, J., in Ajiboye v.
2 3Ajiboye, and Kazeem, J,, in Esua v. Esua, the terms of
sections 70, and 71 are not ambiguous, nor do they conflict 
with any other section of the Decree. There is, therefore, 
no justification for not giving effect to the literal inter­
pretation of the sections.
Adesanya supports the view of Ayoola, J., mainly 
on the ground that section 5 of the Australian Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1959 > which defined ’matrimonial cause’ in 
terms identical with section 114 of the Nigerian Decree, 
was interpreted by the Australian courts to exclude inde­
pendent claims for ancilliary reliefs. The learned writer 
has ignored the fact that independent actions for mainten­
ance in Nigeria are brought under section 70(1) which is 
identical with section 84(1) of the Australian Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1959-1966, and not under section 114, which is 
identical to section 5 of the Australian Act.
The decisions which hold that independent actions 
for maintenance can be instituted under the Decree are 
based, not on an interpretation of section 114 of the Decree, 
but on section 70 of the Decree. These decisions in fact 
admit that an independent action for maintenance is not a
1. See also Obadara and Ors. v. The President, Naadan, West 
District Customary Court [1964] 1 ALL N.L.R.336;
Nablan v. Nablan 1.1967] ALL N.L.H.47.
2. [197 ] 4 C.C.H.C.J. 769.
3. [1970] Suit No. M/63/70, unreported decision of Lagos 
High Court delivered on 4 December, 1970.
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* matrimonial cause maintain that such actions are
nevertheless permissible under section 70 of the Decree.
Section 114 merely defines a matrimonial cause, 
and does not state whether only matrimonial causes as 
defined under the section may be entertained by the Courts 
under the Decree, Similarly, while section 1(1) of the 
Decree provides that a matrimonial cause shall not be 
instituted otherwise than under the Decree, it does not 
prevent the Courts from entertaining suits which are not 
matrimonial causes as defined by section 114, under the 
Decree. In other words, nowhere in the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree is there a provision that only matrimonial causes 
as defined by section 114, may be brought under the Decree.
If it was the intention that such actions should not be 
brought, there is an obvious lacuna in the law.
In view of these conflicting decisions and 
opinions, no positive statement as to whether an independent 
action for maintenance can be brought under the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970 can be given at this stage. The 
position must be regarded as undecided until an authoritative 
interpretation of the section is given by the Supreme Court, 
but the weight of authority favours the view that an 
independent action for maintenance is_ permissible under 
section 70(1).
If the definitive view of the Supreme Court is 
that such actions cannot be brought under the Decree, it 
would mean that a spouse cannot bring an action for mainten­
ance or the custody of the children of the marriage, unless 
it is related to a concurrent, pending, or completed
1. See Odive v. Obor where the Supreme Court held that the 
common law claim for the return of children of the 
marriage was not a matrimonial relief within the meaning 
of sections 54(3) and 114(1) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, 1970, and could not be brought by petition 
under the Decree; see also Falobi v. Falobi [1974] 4 
W.S.C.A. 198, where it was held by the Western State 
Court of Appeal that an independent action for mainten­
ance is not a ’matrimonial cause1 therefore it could be 
enforced otherwise than under the Decree, i.e. it was 
not prohibited by S.l(l) of M.C.D. 1970.
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proceeding for a principal relief such as divorce, 
judicial separation, nullity, or restitution of conjugal 
rights. This would result in great hardship to wives, 
who have no desire or means to divorce their husbands, 
or to institute any other *matrimonial cause*, but who 
wish to get custody of their children, and maintenance 
for themselves and such children. Unlike England,"^ 
Magistrates} courts in Nigeria have no jurisdiction to 
grant maintenance to wives of a statutory marriage, whose 
husbands have wilfully neglected to provide reasonable 
maintenance for them or any dependent child of the family.
THE TERMINATION OF MARRIAGE
A statutory marriage may be terminated:
(1) by a decree of divorce pronounced by a court of competent 
jurisdiction; or
(2) by the death of either party to the marriage.
5« Divorce
A. General introduction.
Dissolution of a statutory marriage differs in
many significant respects from divorce in a customary or
2Islamic law marriage. It has been seen that in customary 
law, divorce is a personal matter between the spouses and 
their families, and in most cases, may be effected by 
mutual consent without the intervention of any judicial or 
other authority. Unilateral divorce by either.spouse is
1. See Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistratesf Courts.) Act, 
i960, S.l(l)(h) and (1). As long ago as.1878, the Matri­
monial Causes Act l87.8r gave Magistrates the power to make 
a separation and maintenance order in favour of a wife 
whose husband had been convicted of an aggravated assault 
on her. In the Magistrates1 courts a wife without depend­
ent children is not entitled to full maintenance unless 
she can produce evidence of her incapacity to support her­
self. See Gengler v. Gengler [1976] 1 W.L.R.275*
2. See above, chapter VIII and IX.
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possible in many, cases. Similarly, in Islamic law, divorce
by the husband, or by the wife with the husband’s, consent,
is easily achieved without the intervention of the Court.
No specific reasons need be advanced to justify a divorce
under customary or Islamic law.
With the advent of statutory marriage, and the
consequent adoption of English laws of divorce, the
position has changed radically. The substantive rules and
procedure of English divorce laws have been applied to
statutory marriage, and in some cases have even been adopted
in the enactment of rules of customary law by local
authorities.^
Customary Courts, especially In the Western States,
where trained lawyers are employed as judges, have also
introduced into customary divorce law many of the specific
ideas inherent in English divorce law. For example, in
2Kadlri M. v. Kadiri S., an appeal decision of Ijebu-Ode 
Grade B Customary Court, the wife petitioned for a divorce on 
the ground that she was pregnant by another man. The husband 
claimed that she was pregnant for him (the husband). The 
trial court sent her for a medical examination, which con­
firmed that she was four or five months pregnant. Without 
hearing further evidence, the Court granted the divorce.
On appeal against this decision it was held that:
Divorce is not such a claim as should be 
granted just for the sake of it without 
recording the causes for the claim, even 
where the defendant raises no objection 
against the divorce being granted to the
1. See e.g. Section 7 of The Marriage, Divorce and Custody 
of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws 1958 of the former Western 
State, W.R.L.N. 456 of 1958, which provides specific 
grounds, similar to those of a statutory marriage, on which 
a customary law marriage may be dissolved. The Marriage, 
Divorce and Custody of Children Bye-Laws enacted by the 
Ibadan District Council In 1965 has not adopted some of 
these grounds, e,g. the provision that ’No divorce order 
would be granted to a wife nursing a child under three 
years, or a wife who has three or more children for the 
husband’, has not been adopted.
2. £1959] Appeal No. 7/59, Record Book, Vol.1/59, cited by 
R.O, Ekundare in Marriage and Divorce Under Yoruba 
Customary Law, 1969, p. 45*
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plaintiff.
It was further stated that whex*e collusion is proved it is 
a bar to divorce and therefore the court’must be satisfied 
that there was no collusion’.
The concept of collusion is evidently an innov­
ation into customary law. Collusion in English law is an 
agreement between the petitioner, and the respondent, 
whereby the initiation of a divorce suit is procured, or
its conduct provided for,1 and it is usually made with
2
corrupt intent to pervert the course of justice. Thus, 
it is collusion to agree to commit adultery in order to
“5
provide a ground for divorce, or to agree not to claim
ii
maintenance if divorce proceedings are not defended.
Where a court finds that collusion exists, it may grant 
or refuse a divorce, in its discretion.
Collusion is unknown to traditional Yoruba 
customary law, since divorce by mutual consent of the 
spouses, effected by refund and acceptance of dowry, has 
always been possible. Resort to a court to obtain a divorce 
never was, and is not now, compulsory under customary law.
In Kadiri M . v. Kadiri S .3 there was obviously
no agreement between the spouses to pervert the course of
justice, since, the husband objected to the divorce and 
claimed paternity of the wife’s child. It is therefore 
difficult to see how collusion could have been inferred 
from the facts of the case, even if collusion has now 
become a principle of divorce in Yoruba customary law.
1. Gosling v. Gosling [1968] P.l.
2. Noble v. Noble [1964] P.250,C.A.; 1 ALL E.R. 769.
3. Scott v. Scott [1913] P.52; a request by one side to
provide evidence of past adultery is not collusion.
4. Emanuel v. Emanuel [1946] P.115; Mulhouse v. Mulhouse
11966]' p.39.
5. [1959] Appeal No. 7/59, Record Book, Vol. 1/59, unreported 
decision of Grade B, Customary Court, Ijebu-Ode.
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The. chief differences between dissolution of a 
customary or Islamic law marriage on the one hand, and of 
a statutory marriage on the other, are:
(i) divorce in a statutory marriage may be effected solely 
by a decree of dissolution of the marriage pronounced 
by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) a party suing for dissolution of a statutory marriage 
must prove one or more specific grounds to justify 
his claim;
(iii) under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, which now 
governs divorce in a statutory marriage, there is 
complete equalisation of status of husband and wife.
These differences will now be discussed
B. Jurisdiction in divorce cases.
Under the Republican constitution of Nigeria,^-
the Federal Government has exclusive power to make laws
with respect to matrimonial causes, including the dissolution
of marriages, in all marriages fother than marriages under
Moslem law or other Customary law’. The Federal Government
therefore has exclusive power to make laws with respect to
the dissolution of a statutory marriage. In exercise of
this power, the Federal Government conferred jurisdiction
2
in divorce on the then Regional High Courts. This exclusive 
jurisdiction of the High Court in divorce matters has been 
maintained by the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, which has 
conferred jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, including 
divorce, on the High Courts of every State of the Federation.
1. See The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1963, No.20 of 1963, S.69, Item 23, Exclusive Legislative 
List, Schedule (Part 1); and Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1979, S. 4(3); Item 58, Exclusive 
Legislative List, Second Schedule, Part 1, which speaks 
of ’Islamic and customary law’.
2. Regional Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act, S.3, Cap.117, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958, now cited as the 
State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction) Act.
3. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, S. 2(1).
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A spouse domiciled in Nigeria^ may institute
divorce proceedings in the High Court, of any State.,
whether or not he or she is domiciled in that particular 
2
State. It is therefore possible for a spouse domiciled 
and resident in Calabar, to bring a petition for divorce 
in Sokoto, hundreds of miles away, and thus cause hard­
ship to the other spouse who wishes to defend the suit, 
and who may also be living in Calabar. The hardships to 
which this provision may give rise are somewhat ameliorated 
by section 9(2) of the Decree which gives a court in which 
a divorce suit has been initiated, a discretion, in the 
interests of justice, to transfer the petition to another 
court having the jurisdiction to hear and determine the 
petition. The court may exercise its power of transfer at 
any time, and at any stage of the proceedings, either on 
application by any of the parties, or of its own motion.
The necessity to resort to a High Court in order 
to obtain a divorce is of dubious advantage to women.
While on the one hand, it affords some protection, in view 
of the fact that a wife may not be divorced without her 
knowledge, as is possible in customary or Islamic law, and 
without an opportunity to contest the divorce petition, 
on the other hand, it may also operate as an effective bar
1. A husband who is not domiciled in Nigeria cannot obtain 
a divorce in Nigeria. A foreign national domiciled in 
Nigeria can obtain a divorce in Nigeria, see George v.
George E197^H 1 N.M.L.R.171.
2. Prom 1951, when Nigeria became a Federation, until the 
enactment of the M.C.D. ,197-0, there were conflicting 
decisions as to whether there was a single Nigerian 
domicile or whether each Region (later State) constituted 
a separate domicile; see Nwokedi v. Nwokedi £1958] LLR.
’ 9‘4; Odiase v. Odiase [19651 2''ALL N.L.R.91; [1965] N.M.L.R. 
196 ; Udom v. Hdom' 11962] LLR. 112;. Q d un jo v. Qdun jo [1964] 
LLR. 43 which held that there was a single "domicile; Cf. 
Okonkwo v. Eze [I960], N.N.L.R.80;, Arinze v. Arinze [1966]
N.M.'L"K. 155 f Machi y.Machi [I960] LL.R.103; TJchendu v. 
Uchendu. [1962J. LL.R.101;' Adepye v. Adeoye [196.2J. N.N.L.R.
63; Adeyimi y.Adeyimi [ 1$62] LL. R . 70,/ where the. contrary 
view was expressed'.
3. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, S. 9(2).,
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to a woman who earnestly wishes, to. divorce, her: husband,
but who cannot afford the' expenses, involved in a High Court
divorce. Even where both spouses agree to a divorce, need*-
less expense and time have to be spent in.complying with
the formalities of a divorce.^ There are no special courts
dealing with matrimonial and kindred matters only, and there
may be a considerable length of time between initiation of
a divorce suit, and the grant of a decree absolute.
Another disadvantage of High Court procedure
for divorce is the publicity it entails. Intimate details
of the spouses’ private life are made matters of public
knowledge and comments. The divorce proceedings must
usually be held in open court, and may be reported by the
2press. In Qviasu v. Oviasu and Anor. , the trial court Judge, 
of his own volition, heard a petition for divorce in his 
chambers. Although the hearing of the case in the chambers 
of the learned Judge was not made a specific .issue in the 
grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court, the Counsel for the 
appellant drew the attention of the Court to the fact that 
such a proceeding was irregular. The Supreme Court held 
that the learned trial Judge should not have decided on his 
own to hear the petition in chambers, because the Judge’s 
chambers are not a court hall to which the public would 
normally have access. The Court quoted with approval the 
judgment of the Privy Council in McPherson v. McPherson  ^ as 
follows:
So long as divorce, in contrast with marriage, 
is not permitted to be a matter of agreement 
between parties, the public at large - their 
Lordships are not now referring to the prurient 
minded among them who revel in the unsavoury 
details of many such cases - but the public 
at large are directly interested in them, 
affecting as they do, not only the status of 
the.two individuals immediately concerned but,
1. Cf. the present position'in England where there is a 
special procedure available for divorce by mutual consent, 
see below, p. 247, n.3.
2. [19731 11 S ,C ,315.
3. [1936] A.C. 177.
2 4 5
not remotely when taken in the mass, the' 
entire social structure and the preservation 
of a wholesome family life throughout the 
community. ,
And there is, perhaps no available way to 
.correct these tendencies more effectively, 
than.to require that the trial of these 
cases shall always take place, and in the 
fullest sense, in open court. This require­
ment must be insisted upon because there is 
no class of case in which the desire of 
parties to avoid publicity j. s  more widespread, 
m e r e  is no cxass of case in whien in particular 
circumstances, it can be so clearly demonstrated 
even to a judge that privacy in that instance 
would be both harmless and merciful.
Again, publicity goes far to prevent the trial 
of these actions, where one is superficially 
so much like another, from becoming stereo*- 
typed and standardized, so that the ability to 
dispose of them with a minimum expenditure of 
judicial time is even now, apparently, regarded 
in some quarters as the convincing test of 
judicial efficiency.
Moreover, the potential presence of the public 
almost necessarily" invests the proceedings 
with some degree of formality. And formality 
is, perhaps, the only available substitute 
for the solemnity by which, ideally at all 
events, such proceedings, especially where the 
welfare of children is involved, should be 
characterized. That potential presence is at 
least some guarantee that there shall be a 
certain decorum of procedure. If at other • 
public sittings of the Court it is the rule for
both judge and counsel to be robed, it is 
pessimi exempli.that for the- trial of an 
undefended divorce case the gown of ceremony 
should be discarded.^
The Supreme Court were of the opinion that the
petition and answer did.not contain such matters as by law
ought to be heard in fcameraT in a court room and held that
It is of the essence of justice that it 
should not only be done but that it should be 
seen to be actually done. Any act of secrecy,
1. Oviasu v. Oviasu [1973.] 11 S.C, 315 at p. 326*-327•
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however, desirable it might .seem, detract 
from the aura of impartiality., independence, 
publicity and unqualified respect which 
enshrouds "justice given without fair or 
favour". Its acceptance by the public at 
large, and the confidence it demands depend 
on these aura [sic] being strictly adhered 
to. These attributed [sic] have been con­
sidered so fundamental that they are enshrined 
in our constitution.^
The question how far justice in matrimonial 
relations should not only be done but be manifestly seen 
to be done, and how far the parties, or either of them 
should be entitled to claim a right to secrecy, is a diffi­
cult one. The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, which pro­
vides that jurisdiction thereunder should be exercised in 
open court, also provides that, where the court is satis­
fied that there are special circumstances that make it 
desirable, in the interests of the proper administration of 
justice, that the proceedings, or any part of them, should 
not be heard in open court, the court may order that any 
persons not being parties to the proceedings, or their legal
advisers, shall be excluded during the hearing of the pro*'
2ceedings, or part of the proceedings, as the case may be. 
What special circumstances would merit this procedure is not
1. Ibid,, p. 324; see Constitution-of the Federation of 
Nigeria 19§3, Ss. 22(1) and 22(3) and Order 25., Rule 3 
of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of the Western 
Region of Nigeria, 1959, which applied in the present case,
2. But see Federal Constitution, 1963> S. 22(3)(a) which 
provides:
(a) a court or such tribunal may exclude
from its proceedings persons other than 
the parties thereto in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, 
public morality, the welfare of persons 
who have not attained the age of twenty*- 
one years, the protection of the private 
lives of the parties or to such extent 
as it may consider necessary by reason 
of special circumstances in which 
publicity would be contrary to the 
interests- of justice;
2 4 7
stated in the Decree,'1' but there have been many divorce
cases where scandalous matters have been given in evidence
in open court to the embarrassment of the parties and
2
their families.
In comparison, a customary law marriage may be 
dissolved in relative secrecy. Even where a divorce is 
granted by a Customary Court, there is little opportunity 
for the proceedings to be reported in the national press, 
nor is the judgment liable to be made the subject of a 
precedent to be cited in future cases, unless an appeal 
is made to the High Courts.
There is evident need for separate divorce 
courts and a simple and less expensive procedure for 
obtaining a divorce, especially when both parties have 
conceded the fact that their marriage has broken down 
irretrievably. Greater privacy should also be given to 
divorce suits, provided that the administration of justice 
is not unduly jeopardised.
As will be seen shortly, the grounds for obtaining 
a divorce have been considerably liberalized. Much of the 
advantages of this liberalization will be lost if the 
expensive and cumbersome procedure for obtaining the divorce
1. See Apara v. Apara [1968] 1 ALL N.L.R. 24l where the 
Supreme Court held that fthe matter of custody of children 
of a broken marriage is important to the parties as well 
as to the community and not only should this be argued
in court but judges should in appropriate cases retire 
into chambers and discuss this fully with counsel [sic] 
on both sides and their clients before making a final 
order in court'.
2. See e.g. Okala v. Okala [1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R. 67; Somorin 
v. Somorin [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 101.
3. Cf. the special procedure available in England for the 
grant of decrees by mutual consent. Provided that there 
are no children of the family arrangements for whom had 
to be examined by the court under section 4l of M.C.A., 
1973a the Registrar would consider the papers (including 
affidavit evidence). If he was satisfied a decree was 
pronounced in open court by a judge. No personal attend*- 
ance or examination of the parties was required under this 
procedure, ~ See Practice Direction, 1975, 1 W.L.R, 159*1 • 
See also Cretney, Principles of Family Law, op. cit. , p. 
142. Such a procedure would obviously save costs - Beales 
v, Beales [1972] Fam, 210 at p. 223.
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is retained,
C . Grounds -for%divorce.
(1) Historical introd.u'ction,
Although now contained in a local enactment 
Nigerian statutory divorce law is a heritage from English 
law-. It may be of interest, therefore, to give a brief 
description of the background of English divorce law in 
order to trace the development of the law and to see how 
far the legal position of women has been enhanced by these 
developments.
The original sources of English divorce law lie in
Roman and Ecclesiastical law.'3"
The Church of England for centuries played the
most important role in shaping the ideas of marriage and
divorce in England, From the middle of the twelfth century
onwards, marriage and divorce were recognized as matters
exclusively within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts
2and the marriage law of England was the Canon law. A 
valid marriage, once contracted, could rarely be dissolved.
o
Before the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, judicial divorce, 
known as divorce a mensa et thoro, was no more than a form 
of judicial separation which relieved the petitioner of 
the duty of cohabitation with the respondent, but did not
1. For a short history of the practice and procedure in the 
Ecclesiastical*'Courts, see the 'historical introduction' 
in William Rayden, Law and Practice in Divorce and Family 
Matters in all Courts, 11th edit, by Joseph Jackson, at. 
al., (London: Butterworths, 1971); B.H. Lee, Divorce
Law Reform-in England, (London: Peter Owen, 1974) , pp. 3-21
O.R. McGregor, PIvorce in England: A Centeriar y Study, 
(London: Heinemann,'1957),’PP« 1 - 3 '
2. See Pollock and M a i t l a n d TheMlistory of English Law, 
op. cit. ,. pp. 387^385; Q,R~,k Me Gregor, Divorce in 
England, op. cit. , p. 1.
3. 20 and 21 Viet. C. 85.
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put an end to the marriage. Apart from death, dissolution
of a marriage, could only be effected by a private Act of
Parliament, Parliamentary divorce, known as divorce a
vinculo matrimoni, dissolved the marriage, and enabled
the parties to remarry, but the procedure involved was
cumbersome, and the expense 'sufficient to put relief
beyond the hope of most'.^ This type of divorce was only
2
obtainable on the ground of adultery.
Women were especially at a disadvantage because
of these stringent divorce laws. In most cases the wife
was financially dependent on the husband. In addition,
adultery alone would not suffice to obtain a divorce in the
case of a Bill presented on behalf of the wife: it also
had to be shown that the adultery was aggravated (for
example, bigamous or incestuous) or that her husband had
■3
committed an unnatural offence. Needless to say a wife
would be very unlikely to get financial support from her
4
husband for such a purpose.
If she only succeeded in obtaining a divorce a 
mensa et thoro on the ground of her husband's misconduct, 
such as cruelty or adultery, she was, in the words of Lord 
Lyndhurst, speaking in 1856 on the second reading of the
1. Bromley, Family Lawa op. cit.3 5th edit., p. 237.
2. For a full historical account of the history of Divorce 
in England, see First Report of the Commissioners Into 
the Law of Divorce, 1853 (the Campbell Commission). A 
brief account is contained in the Finer Report, Report
of the Committee on One-Parent Families, 197*1, Cmnd.5629, 
App.5, 00.' 91-96; see also Joseph Jackson, The Formation 
and Annulment of Marriage, 2nd edition, 1969, Chpt.2.
3. See T. v. T [1964] P.85; cf. Statham v. Statham [1959]
1 W.L.R. 8?2.
4. See J.E.G. De Montmorency, "The Changing Status of a 
Married Woman", Law Quarterly Review, No.l, 1897, pp. 
187-199, at p. 190: 'Forty years ago the vast majority
of women were indissolubly tied to their husbands, even 
though the whole world knew them to be both brutes and 
monsters'. He observed the great change from 1857 to 
when he wrote in 1897.
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Matrimonial Causes Bill ’ almost in a state, of outlawry1.'1'
The noble Earl observed that from that moment
She may not. enter into a contract, or, if 
she do, [sic] she has no means, of enforcing 
it. The law, so far from protecting, 
oppresses her. She is homeless, helpless, 
hopeless, and almost destitute of civil 
rights. She is liable to all manner of 
injustice, whether by plot or by violence.
She may be wronged in all possible ways, 
and her character may be mercilessly defamed; 
yet she has no redress. She is at the mercy 
of her enemies.2
The learned Earl asked:
Is that fair? Is that honest? Can it be 
vindicated upon any principle of justice, 
or mercy, or of common humanity.^
Many answered ’n o ’ to his question, including
John Stuart Mill who described marriage in England as fthe
only actual bondage known to our law1, and the mistress of
every house as"the only legal slaves remaining after the..4abolition of slavery.
The situation of the Victorian wife in this respect 
compares unfavourably with her Nigerian counterpart during 
the same period.
By the time of the reception of English law into 
Nigeria, however, divorce laws in England had been completely 
revolutionized by a series of acts, beginning with the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 • In addition to vesting the
1. Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords) Third 
Series, Vol. CXLII, col.4l0, 20 May 1856.
2. Ibid., col.410.
3. Ibid.
4. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, 1869, 
Everyman’s Library, 1974, p.225.
5. See above, Chapters IV-VIII.
6. In 1857 there had been in England, since the Reformation, 
317 divorces by Act of Parliament. In 1887, 7,321 
applications for divorce or judicial separation were 
successful, see Haydon’s Dictionary of Dates, 20th 
Edition, 1892.
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existing jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical courts, in a 
new statutory Divorce Court, the Act,, for the first time in 
English law permitted a marriage to be dissolved by 
judicial process. As before, adultery remained the only 
matrimonial offence regarded as sufficiently grave to 
justify the dissolution of a marriage, and the discrimina­
tory provision against women was retained. Whilst one 
act of adultery by a wife gave the husband the right to 
petition for divorce, she had to prove that his adultery 
was ’aggravated’. This she could do by proving that in 
addition to adultery,.he was guilty of bigamy, rape,
cruelty, or desertion for at least two years.^ It was not
2
until 1923 that the wife was allowed to petition for 
divorce on the ground of her husband’s adultery alone.
There were further amending Acts, particularly in 
1937 when the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937 was passed. The 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965 consolidated previous divorce 
legislation and was thfe last English Act applied in Nigeria 
in relation to divorce. In 1970, a local statute, the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree was enacted. This Decree now 
governs the dissolution of statutory marriages in Nigeria.
1. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, S.27. The Parliamentary 
debates in 1857 were largely concerned with the question 
whether a wife should be treated differently from her 
husband, see Hansard’s (H.L.) Debates (3rd Series) Vol. 
CXLV, col. 502. The justification for the discrimination 
were, among others that (a) ’it was possible for a wife
to pardon a husband who had committed adultery; but it 
was hardly ever possible for a husband ever really to 
parden the adultery of the wife.1 Hansard (3rd ser.)
Vol. CXLV, col.490; (b) the possibility of a wife
foisting spurious children on the husband, (c) the wife 
might infect her husband with a contagious disease. The 
fact that an adulterous husband could also infect his 
innocent wife was not considered.
2. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923.
3. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1950, Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963.
4. C.72, 17 Stats. 157.
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(2). Qrounds for divorce (p.re^l970).*
Prior to the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970,^ 
the only grounds on which a statutory marriage could be 
dissolved in Nigeria, were adultery or cruelty committed 
since the celebration of the marriage, unjustified desert­
ion for a period of at least three years immediately pre­
ceding the presentation of the petition, or (subject to
pcertain other conditions), supervening incurable insanity.
In addition, a petition could be brought in the 
case of the wife only, if the husband, since the marriage, 
had been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality.
The underlying principle of the divorce law 
previous to the Decree was that there should be a restriction 
on the availability of divorce, but at the same time, the 
law should not be so harsh as to lead to its disregard, 
encouraging the formation of illicit, if permanent, extra­
marital relationships. Thus a matrimonial offence by one 
party to the marriage was a prerequisite to a divorce. In 
addition, the other party must be relatively free from guilt
and justly aggrieved by the otherTs behaviour. Hence,
4 5 6 7connivance, condonation^and collusion were absolute bars'
1. Decree No. 18 of 1970.
2. See Matrimonial Causes Act 1965 (England), S.1(1).
3. M.C.A., 1965, S.1(1).
4. Connivance means consent to, or acquiesence in adultery 
committed by the other spouse: it is a bar based on the
principle volenti non fit injuria, i.e. one cannot complain 
of an act to which one has freely consented; per Denning, 
L.J., Douglas v. Douglas [1951] p. 85, 96.
5. Condonation is the reinstatement of a spouse who has 
committed a matrimonial offence, to his or her former 
matrimonial position with knowledge of all the material 
facts - per Sir J. Simon P., Inglis v. Tnglis [1968] P. 
639,651; Rosanwo v. Rosanwo tl96l] W.H.N.L.R. 297*
6. Collusion means an agreement or bargain between the parties 
whereby the initiation of the suit was procured, or its 
conduct provided for, see Mulhouse v. Mulhouse [1966] P.39«
7. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, S.30.
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to a petition, and the petitioner's own adultery, delay,
cruelty , desertion r or. conduct, .conducive to. adultery were
discretionary bars."*"
There was no possibility of obtaining a divorce
if the innocent party did not want one, and where both
parties were innocent, divorce could only be obtained by
2
resort to dishonest means by one or both parties. Hence, 
many marriages which had obviously broken down, retained 
the legal shell, because divorce was not possible. The 
law causes hardships, particularly to those who wished to 
remarry, but were unable to do so because an existing 
marriage could not be dissolved.
(3) The Modern Social Policy of Divorce.
The retention of a matrimonial offence as the 
basis of divorce law came under increasing attack in England 
after 1937. The principle that if a marriage had broken 
down, no public interest was served by keeping it legally 
in existence became increasingly accepted. It was argued 
that divorce should be available to either spouse when the 
marriage has irretrievably broken down: to insist on the
commission of a matrimonial offence lays stress upon the 
symptoms of breakdown rather than on the breakdown itself.
The introduction of this principle would have 
the effect of reducing the number of stable illicit unions 
where there was no foreseeable chance of the parties being 
able to marry, or of their children being legitimated, 
because the spouse of one of them refuses to release his 
or her partner, on account of moral scruple, financial 
advantage, or vindictiveness.
Not every one contributed to this view. Some 
people argued that the irretrievable breakdown principle 
would enable a party to take advantage of his or her own
1. Ibid., S.31.
2. Notably in the so-called Hotel cases, in which husband and 
wife agreed on a diyorce? and the husband would then arrange 
to provide evidence of adultery. See A.P.Herbert, Holy 
Deadlock, 193^; see also C.P. Harvey, ?0n the State of the 
Divorce Market * 16? M.L.R. 129 , esp. 131-132.
3. See Bromley, Family Law, op.. cit., p. 239.
2 54
wrong, and obtain a divorce against the will of an
innocent spouse. The wife, in particular, might suffer
serious financial hardship if such a liberal attitude to
divorce was taken. The most serious consequences said
to follow from the ready availability of divorce is that
this by itself creates ’a habit of mind in the people1
which weakens the security of marriage. The arguments of
Hume and Paley have been cogently summarised by Lord
Stowell in this much quoted passage:
The general happiness of the married life 
is secured by its indissolubility. When 
people understand that they must live 
together, except for a few reasons known 
to the law, they learn to soften by mutual 
accommodation that yoke which they know 
they cannot shake off, they become good 
husbands and good wives from the necessity 
of remaining husbands and wives; •••]_
The ’Morton1 Commission of 1956 took a similar
view. They considered that the ’root of the problem’ of
easy divorce was
a tendency to take the duties and responsibilities 
of marriage less seriously than formerly ... 
there is less disposition to overcome diffi­
culties and to put up with rubs of daily life 
and, in consequence there is an increasing 
disposition to regard divorce, not as the last
resort, but as the obvious way out when things
begin to grow wrong.«
The English Divorce Reform Act, 1969 was a 
compromise between these two conflicting views. The basic 
principles of the Act are:
(i) breakdown of the marriage should be the sole ground
for divorce, but
(ii) breakdown is to be inferred from the proof of one of a 
number of facts most of which are akin to the old 
matrimonial offences but with the addition of (a) two 
years separation (reduced to one year in the Nigerian
1. Evans v. Evans [1790], 1 HAG,CON.35, 36^-37•
2. (Morton) Royal Commission-on Marriage and Divorce, 
Cmnd.9678 (1956), par, 47.
3. 40 Stats. 768.
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Decree if the respondent, consents., or (b) five years 
separation (three years in Nigeria) if he or she 
does not.
The basic principles, with some modifications 
were adopted by the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree,
1970. The Decree has been criticized on the ground 
that ’there was no known public debate or group discussion 
of the policy behind, or the imports of the Decree before 
its enactment’, and that ’legislation which invariably 
touches the lives of many people in the country was shrouded 
with unnecessary secrecy’.^ - Another criticism is that
p
it is mainly based on imported foreign law.
While there can be no valid defence to the first 
criticism, especially when one bears in mind the public 
debate which preceded the enactment of the recent English 
divorce law, it is submitted that the central theme of the 
divorce law enshrined in the Matrimonial Causes Decree,
1970, is not entirely foreign-oriented. Irretrievable 
breakdown of marriage has always been the traditional 
ground for the dissolution of a customary law marriage, 
since the families of the spouses never agreed to a divorce 
until they were satisfied that reconciliation was no longer 
possible. This principle has now become a part of modern 
divorce law. The Decree makes irretrievable breakdown the 
only ground for the dissolution of a marriage, and this 
approximates more closely to divorce in customary and 
Islamic law, than the divorce laws it replaced. Divorce 
by mutual consent, or by unilateral desire to dissolve the 
marriage, is now possible for a statutory marriage, as it 
has long been in most systems of customary and Islamic law 
marriages. Viewed from this aspect, therefore, the Decree
1. Adesanya, Laws of Matrimonial Causes, op.: cit,, p. 2.
2. Ibid,, p. 36j see also A.B, Kasunmu, ’Matrimonial
Causes Decree, 1970: A Critical Analysis’, Nigerian 
Lawyers Quarterly, Vol.5, pp. 1-30 at p.l; and
Nigerian Journal of Contemporary Law, 1971, pp. 88-
212 at' p.' 88.--------------------------
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has introduced no startling innovations into. Nigerian 
traditional legal systems, and cannot be said to be 
entirely of foreign origin.
(F) Grounds for divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Decree3 
1970.
Section 15(1) of the Decree provides that a 
petition for a decree of dissolution of the marriage may 
be presented to the court by either party to the marriage 
upon the ground that the marriage has broken down irre­
trievably. The court hearing a petition for divorce shall 
hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably if,
but only if, the petitioner satisfies the court of one or
more of the following facts;
(a) that the respondent has wilfully and persist­
ently refused to consummate the marriage;
(b) that since the marriage the respondent has 
committed adultery and the petitioner finds 
it intolerable to live with the respondent;
(c) that since the marriage the respondent has
behaved in such a way that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with 
the respondent.
(d) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner 
for a continuous period of at least one year 
immediately preceding the presentation of the 
petition;
(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived 
apart for a continuous period of at least two 
years immediately preceding the presentation 
of the petition, and the respondent does not 
object to a decree being granted;
(f) that the parties to the marriage have lived 
apart for a continuous period of at least 
three years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition;
(g) that the other party to the marriage has, for 
a period of not. .less than, one year, failed to 
comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal 
rights made under this Decree;
(h) that the other party to the marriage, has been
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absent from the petitioner for such time 
and in such circumstances as to. provide 
reasonable grounds for presuming that he 
or she is dead.
The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, has been 
in operation in Nigeria for over eight years, and during 
this time, hundreds of divorce cases have been decided 
under its provisions. While there has been no significant 
divergence of judicial interpretation of some of the 
sections, there are a-few instances of judicial conflict 
arising from varying interpretations of certain provisions 
of the Decree. One such conflict of opinion has already 
been noted in connection with an independent action for 
maintenance under the Decree. It is not possible to discuss 
here all the provisions of the Decree relating to divorce,^ 
and the most that can be conveniently attempted in this 
thesis is to discussion of some of the problems of inter­
pretation which have confronted the Nigerian courts in 
divorce cases, and the attitudes different judges have 
taken in regard to particular issues especially relevant 
to the legal status of women. Significant changes in the 
law relevant to the legal status of women will also be noted.
In a few cases, decisions of the English courts 
in divorce petitions will be discussed,in order to compare 
the various attitudes which English judges have taken to 
the same or similar provisions. Such references are 
particularly useful as the Nigerian Supreme Court, the 
highest court in Nigeria, has not yet had much opportunity 
to give its own authoritative interpretation of some of 
the provisions of the Decree, corresponding to provisions 
of the English Act. Indeed interpretations of the English
1. For fuller discussions of the M.C.D.1970, see Adesanya, 
Laws of Matrimonial Causes, op.clt.; A.B. Kasunmu,
’The Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970: A critical assess­
ment’, Nigerian Lawyers Quarterly, Vol. V, pp. 1-30; 
also Nig. J. Contemp. Law, 1971, pp..88-212; Kariba- 
White, ’Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970: Comments on
Some Aspects of’, Nig. J. Contemp. Law, 1970; Nwogugu, 
Family Law in Nigeria, 1974•
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Appeal Court have not in many cases received confirmation 
from the House of Lords, the highest English Appeal Court. 
Although English decisions at any level are not binding 
on Nigerian courts, they have persuasive authority and 
continue to be frequently cited by Nigerian judges. 
Consequently, English decisions indicate the possible view 
which might be taken by the Nigerian Supreme Court when 
similar cases come before it.
(G) Problems of interpretation and reform.
(1) Divorce based on the ’sole’ ground.
The first question which needs to be answered is: 
are there several grounds, or only one ground for a divorce 
under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970. As previously 
seen, prior to the enactment of the Decree which came into 
force on 1 March, 1970, a divorce could be obtained on one 
or more of several grounds.'1' Has the Decree changed the 
law, and provided one ’sole’ ground on which a marriage may 
be dissolved, or has it retained the ’several grounds’, of 
its predecessors?
2
Adesanya submits that the Decree still provides 
’grounds’ rather than a ’ground’ for divorce, and he bases 
his submission mainly on the fact that, while the English
o
Divorce Reform. Act, 1969, used the phrase ’the sole ground 
on which a petition for divorce may be presented’, the 
Nigerian Decree omitted the word ’sole’ in the similar
1. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965, S.l.
2. S.A. Adesanya, Laws of Matrimonial Causes, op. cit.,
PP. 37-40.
3. This Act was repealed, but-was substantially re-enacted 
in the consolidating Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973.
4. Section .1, Divorce Reform Act, 1969.
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section. 15(1) of the Decree, which simply states ’the 
ground on which a petition for divorce may be presented’.
It is respectfully submitted that while the
word ’sole’ emphasizes the fact that there is only one 
ground for divorce * its omission from the Nigerian Decree 
does not permit an interpretation that there is more than 
one ground. The English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, a 
consolidating statute which repealed the Divorce Reform 
Act, 1969, has also omitted the word ’sole’ in its provisions,1 
and, like the Nigerian Decree, simply states ’the ground’ 
that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. Never­
theless, it is still the general view that there is only
2
one ground for divorce in England.
Adesanya also supports his contention that there 
are still several grounds for divorce, by the fact that
the marginal note to section 15 of the Decree mentions
’Grounds for dissolution of marriage’. The learned writer 
contends that marginal notes are ’helpful in resolving 
ambiguities or doubts’. This seems an example of looking 
for a problem to fit a solution. It is respectfully sub­
mitted that there is no ambiguity or doubt in section 15 
of the Decree which may be resolved by calling in aid the 
marginal note.
It is clear that there is only one ground for 
divorce under the Decree that is that the marriage has 
broken down irretrievably. Irretrievable breakdown, how­
ever, can only be established by proving one or more of the 
eight facts set out in section 15(2) of the Decree. The
position was correctly stated by Dosunmu, J. , in Williams 
4
v. Williams , where he said:
1. See Section (1(1) M.C.A., 1973.
2. See S.M. Cretney, Principles of Family Law, op. cit_., 
p. 118; Olive M. Stone, Family Law, 1977, p. 5; 
Bromley, Family Law, 1976, p. 244.
3. M.C.D., 1970, section 15(1); Egfcueje v. Egbueje [1972] 
2 E.C.S.L.R. 7^7.
4. [1970] Suit No. IAD/12/69, unreported decision of 1 
June, 1970, cited by Kasunmu in ’The Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, A Critical Analysis’, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
260
True it is that the new Matrimonial 
Causes Decree introduced some radical 
changes in the law of divorce, but a 
party must come within its four walls 
before he will succeed. It is not 
sufficient for him or her to say 'my 
marriage has irretrievably broken down 
and I can no longer live with my partner'.
The petitioner must establish the fact that the
marriage has broken down irretrievably by proving one or
more of the eight specified facts on which a court must
hold that the marriage has broken down.^ Although some of 
2
these facts resemble the former grounds for divorce, they
cannot be strictly regarded as grounds. They are conclusive
proof of the fact that a marriage has broken down irretriev-
ably. Nigerian courts have stated repeatedly, that the
sole ground for the dissolution of a marriage under the
4
Decree is the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
The factual situations which demonstrate the 
irretrievable break-down of a marriage under section 15 will 
now be discussed.
(2) Wilful and persistent refusal to consummate.
Wilful and persistent refusal to consummate a
1. Section 15(2) Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970. See the 
English case of Richards v. Richards [1972] 3 ALL E.R. 
693; where Rees, J., dismissed a petition for divorce 
because, although the petitioner had established that 
the marriage had broken down irretrievably, she had not 
established one of the facts required to prove break­
down. This judgment was delivered,although Rees, J., 
was well aware that in a further nine months the 
petitioner would almost inevitably succeed under the 
two years 'living apart' provision.-
2. For example, adultery under S.15(2)(b); desertion under 
15(2)(d).
3. See Omo-Ogunkoya v. Omo-Ogunkoya [197*1] 5 C.C.H.C.J.1057 
at p~ 106 0 .
4. See Omo-Ogunkoya v. Omo-Ogunkoya [1974] 5 C .C.H.C.J .1057 
Segun v. Segun L1975J 6 cTc.H.C.J., 773.
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marriage connotes a settled and definite unjustifiable 
decision not to consummate the marriage,^ which must per­
sist up to the time of the commencement of the hearing of 
2
the suit.
A marriage is said to be consummated if the
parties have sexual intercourse after the celebration of
the marriage,J even though one or both parties are sterile.
Wilful refusal is therefore refusal to have ordinary and
4
complete sexual intercourse.
What constitutes wilful and persistent refusal 
is a question of fact to be decided after consideration of 
the whole history of the marriage. There must be evidence 
that the petitioner has made persistent requests for sexual 
intercourse, and that these requests have been unreasonably 
refused by the respondent. What is unreasonable refusal 
is a question of fact to be decided by the judge in the 
particular circumstances of the case. Thus in Dolor v. 
Dolor-; the husband lived with the wife in Nigeria for two
1. Horton v. Horton [1947] 2 ALL E.R.871; cf. Potter v.
Potter [1975] 5 Fam.. 161, C.A.
2. Section 21, M.C.D., 1970; see Oladele v. Oladele [1972]
12 C.C.H.C.J.119; S. v. S. (otherwise W.)[1962]2 ALL E.R. 
816, C.A.; and S. v. S.[1954] 3 ALL E.R.736, where it 
was held that a wife's defect aired at the second hearing
of the petition was not wilful refusal but indecision to
see a doctor. Cf. Ogunmuyiwa v. Ogunmuyiwa [1965]2 ALL 
N.L.R.236, decided before 1970 where it was held that 
refusal must persist to the date of the petition.
3 . Intercourse before the solemnization of the marriage
will not suffice, cf. Dredge v. Dredge [1947] 1 ALL E.R.29.
4. See Baxter v. Baxter [1947] 2 ALL E.R.886, H.L.[1948] 
A.C.274 - refusal to have intercourse unless a contra­
ceptive sheath is used is not a refusal to consummate.
For a criticism of this decision see L.C.B. Gower, 
nBaxter v. Baxter in Perspective", 11 M.L.R., 176-195*
The decision overruled two decisions to the contrary,
Cowen v. Cowen [1946] P.36; and J. v. J.[1947] P.158, 
and was a topic of controversy for several years.
5. [1964]M.N.L.R.98; see also Owobiyi v. Owobiyi [1965]
2 ALL N.L.R. 200 ; there must be a request for sexual 
intercourse by the petitioner which is unjustifiably 
refused by the respondent.
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months after the celebration of the marriage before he 
left to study medicine in England. No sexual intercourse 
took place between the parties, and the husband explained 
to the wife that the reason for not wanting to have sexual 
intercourse with her was his fear of having children. He 
asked her not to worry, that everything would be alright 
after he had qualified. Two years later, the wife joined 
him in England, where the parties lived in the same house 
and slept on the same bed. The husband continued in his 
refusal to consummate the marriage. When the wife per­
sisted, bought contraceptives, and showed them to him, he 
!became annoyed and kept malice with her*. Eventually he 
left her in the house and went to live in another house.
The wife brought- a petition in Nigeria, on the ground of 
wilful refusal by the husband to consummate the marriage.
Rhodes-Vivour, J., held that, assuming that the 
reason given by the respondent to the petitioner after the 
marriage, and before he left for the United Kingdom, for 
not wanting to have sexual intercourse with her, was genuine, 
there was no reason why he should have continued with that 
same state of mind in the United Kingdom, a place with so 
many ’Family Planning Centres’, or places of that type.
In spite of the fact that he was a medical student, he 
did nothing to prevent the petitioner from getting pregnant, 
and took no step to consummate the marriage. He held that 
the respondent’s behaviour since the marriage constituted 
wilful refusal to consummate the marriage.^-
Wilful and persistent refusal to consummate a
marriage may be established within a short period of time
after the celebration of the marriage. For example, in
2
the recent case of Aluko v. Aluko, the parties were married
1. Dolor v. Dolor £1964] M.N.L.R.98 at p. 100.
2. [1975] 12 C.C.H.C.J. 2061. See also Kaur v. Singh [1972]
1 ALL E.R. 292, C.A.; Boggins v. Boggins [1966] C.L.Y 
4041 - husband who deserted wife before consummation of 
the marriage was held to have wilfully refused to 
consummate the marriage * see Famoriyo v. Famoriyo [1975]
2 C.C.H.C.J.253. Cf. Singh v. Singh [1971] 2 ALL E.R.828.
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on 3 August, 197^. From the 4th August to 8th August 1974, 
when the wife deserted the matrimonial home, she wilfully 
refused the reasonable requests of the petitioner to have 
sexual intercourse with him. The petitioner was a widower 
with three daughters, and a minister of religion. The 
reason given by the wife for her refusal was that she did 
not wish to live the secluded life of a minister, and she 
asserted that she was quite capable of having sexual inter­
course. A decree of dissolution of the marriage was granted 
to the husband on the ground of the wife’s wilful and 
persistent refusal to consummate the marriage.1
Under the pre-1970 divorce law, non-consummation
of a marriage was treated as a ground for a decree of
2nullity of marriage. A petitioner was therefore able to 
plead wilful and persistent refusal to consummate the 
marriage, or in the alternative, incapacity to consummate 
the marriage.^ Under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, how­
ever, while inability to consummate a marriage makes the
ii
marriage voidable, wilful refusal to consummate is treated
as evidence of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage,
5
entitling the other spouse to sue for divorce. This 
distinction may impose hardship on a petitioner, and 
involvesunnecessary expense and delay. For example, in 
many cases, it is difficult for a spouse to ascertain 
whether non-consummation of the marriage is due to wilful 
refusal, or incapacity to consummate the marriage.^
1. The divorce was granted within two years of the marriage; 
see further below, pp. 309-312.
2. See e.g. Ogunmuyiwa v. Qgunmuyiwa [1965] 2 ALL N.L.R.236; 
Akpan v . Akpan [1968] Suit No. W.D./12/67 of 27 July,1968.
3. See Fajemisin v. Fajemisin [1970] Suit No. 1/190/67 decided 
on 2 April 1970.
4. Section 5(l)(a).
5. Section 15(2)(a).
6 . The most cogent reason advanced by the English Law
Commission for the retention of wilful refusal to
consummate a marriage as a ground for nullity of the 
marriage, rather than one for divorce, was the petitioner’s 
uncertainty in some cases whether failure to consummate 
was due to impotence or wilful refusal - see Law Commission 
Report No.33, 1970, Nullity of Marriage.
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This fact was recognised in the English Law Commission’s 
statement:
[W]ilful refusal to consummate is in most 
cases the alternative allegation to impot­
ence as it is often uncertain whether the 
respondent’s failure to consummate is due 
to one cause or the other; the petitioner 
may not know whether the respondent refuses 
to consummate the marriage because he is 
unable to have sexual intercourse or because, 
though able to have sexual intercourse, he 
does not want to have it; in such cases the 
court must draw an inference from the evidence 
before it and it seems unreal that the relief 
granted to the petitioner - nullity or divorce 
- should depend in any given case on the 
court’s view as to which of the two reasons 
prevented the consummation of the marriage.^
This is especially so in the case of wife petitioners.
A petitioner, therefore, has to decide whether to petition 
for nullity, based on incapacity to consummate, or for 
divorce, based on wilful refusal, or whether to institute 
both petitions simultaneously. If the latter course Is 
taken, section 29 of the Decree provides that ’Where a 
petition for a decree of nullity of a marriage and a 
petition for a decree of dissolution of that marriage are 
before a court, the court shall not make a decree of
dissolution of the marriage unless It has dismissed the
2
petition for a decree of nullity of the marriage.
Practical expediency would seem to indicate 
that petitions based on non-consummation of marriage^ 
should be treated as grounds for nullity or divorce. This 
would obviate the necessity for dual petitions, since 
alternative pleas would be possible, as they were under 
the old law. The reluctance to accept wilful refusal to
1. See the Law Commission Report, No^33, 1970, Nullity of 
Marriage, para. 27(a).
2. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, S.29.
3. See the arguments for and against making wilful refusal
a ground for divorce in England, (Morton) Royal Commission, 
1956; Law Commission Report, No.33* 1970, Nullity of 
Marriage, paras. 26-28; see also The Church and the 
Law of Nullity of Marriage, 1955, pp. 34, 48.
265
consummate a marriage as a ground for the annulment of the 
marriage is that it offends against the principle that 
nullity is granted for some defect or incapacity existing 
at the date of the marriage, while wilful refusal is some­
thing that happens after the marriage.1 This argument 
ignores the possibility that incapacity to consummate a 
marriage may result after the celebration of the marriage. 
For example, the husband may sustain an injury in an 
accident occurring immediately after the marriage ceremony, 
which renders him impotent and therefore incapable of con­
summating the marriage. Nevertheless, he or his spouse 
may petition for nullity of marriage, even though his 
incapacity arose after the marriage. On the other hand, 
a party to the marriage may have formed the wilful intent­
ion not to consummate the marriage before the celebration
2
of the marriage. If this intention persists after the 
marriage, the other spouse may be entitled to a divorce.
(3) Adultery and intolerability
(a) Adultery
It has been seen that adultery has always been 
a ground for which a spouse may obtain a divorce. In fact, 
in the days of a divorce by private Acts of Parliament in 
England, and for eighty years of j.udicial divorce there, 
from 1857 to 1937, adultery was the sole ground for divorce.
1. See the Morton Commission* op. cit.* p. 89; Napier v. 
Napier [1915] P.184 at p. 1E9 .
2. Wilful refusal almost invariably results from a state of 
mind which dates back to the time of celebration of the 
marriage - Lord Hailsham, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 
(H.L.) 5th Series, Vol.318, col.941.
3. See above, p. 249.
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The Decree has retained adultery as proof that a marriage 
has broken down irretrievably.^
The Decree has not changed the criteria of
2
adultery. . Adultery in divorce relating to a statutory
marriage, unlike some systems of customary law (where mere
touching of hands may be construed as adultery) , is only
4
committed when there has been voluntary sexual intercourse 
between a husband, or wife, and a third party. Although 
intercourse need not be complete, there must be some degree
5
of penetration of the female organ by the male organ.
Proof of adultery.
It was the general judicial opinion that adult­
ery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, although the
standard of proof is not quite as high as is required in
6 7criminal cases. A number of cases' decided in Nigeria
before the enactment of the Decree had followed the decision
8in the English case of ’Ginesl v. Glnesi (which required 
the standard of proof in adultery cases to be approximated 
to the standard in criminal cases), and held that allegations 
of adultery in divorce cases must be proved beyond all
1. Section 15(2)(b).
2. See Lewis v. Lewis [I960] LL.R.215; Souza v. Souza [1975]
11 C.C.H.C.J., l86l.
3. See above Chapter VII, pp. 559-561.
4. Where a wife is raped, there is no adultery, Clarkson v. 
Clarkson [1930] 143 L.T.775; Sapsford v. Sapsford [1954]
P .394. Cf. Goshawk v. Goshawk [1965] 109 Sol.Jo.290 - a 
wife’s contention that she had not committed adultery 
because she was intoxicated by drink to such an extent that 
she was incapable of giving consent was not accepted.
5. Dennis v. Dennis [1955] 2 ALL E.R.51, C.A.[1955]P*153-
6. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, S.4(2). Gower v. Gower
[1950] 1 ALL E.R.804, C.A. Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones
[1951] A. C, 391; [1951] 1 ALL E.R. 124;Davis v. Davis [1950] 1 All./
    E.R. 40
7. See e.g. Lewis v. Lewis [I960] LL.R.215; Akinyemi v. Akiny-
emi [1963J 1 ALL N.L.R.340. See also S. 137(1) of the 
Nigerian Evidence Act.
8. [1948] P.179.
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reasonable doubt.1
Section 82 of the Matrimonial Causes Decree now
provides the standard of proof required in all matrimonial
causes, including proof of adultery. Section 82 states:
82(1) For the purposes of this Decree, 
a matter of fact shall be taken to be 
proved if it is established to the 
reasonable satisfaction of the court.
(2) Where a provision of this Decree 
requires the court to be satisfied of the
existence of any ground or fact or as to
any other matter, it shall be sufficient 
if the court is reasonably satisfied of 
the existence of that ground or fact, or 
as to that other matter^
Has the section changed the standard of proof required in
allegations of adultery in divorce suits? In Qkala v. OkalaJ
Agbakoba, J., stated that the Decree has Revolutionized
the law of Divorce in Nigeria’, and that as a result of
section 82,
the rule in Ginesi’s case, which required 
the same standard of proof as in a criminal 
case, is no longer a valid test, except in. 
so far as a Court might hold that it is not 
reasonably satisfied if it is not proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that the adultery 
was committed; but the Court’s view in 
such a case cannot be of general application.
He held that, although strict proof of a matrimonial offence
is necessary, strict proof is not a kind or type, but a
degree of proof. Strict proof is a degree of preponderance
1. The old law as set out in cases like Preston-Jones v. 
Preston-Jones [1951] A.C.391; [1951] 1 ALL E.R.124 
required the criminal burden of proof to be satisfied 
where there were allegations of adultery, but these were 
doubted by the House of Lords in Blyth v. Blyth [1966]! 
ALL E.R,524; and subsequently the Court of Appeal in 
Bastable v. Bastable [1968]3 ALL E.R.701, 704 tried to 
resolve the apparent conflict by adopting an intermediate 
test of requiring ’a degree of probability commensurate 
with the occasion’.
2. Section 82 lays down the standard of proof for all 
matters of fact in the Decree which require proof.
3. [1973]3 E.C.S.L.R.67.
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of probabilities, and if the courts exercise ’utmost care 
in balancing probabilities, and ensure that the evidence 
clearly preponderates to entitle the petitioner to a decree’, 
the court can be said, within the meaning of section 82 of 
the Decree, to be reasonably satisfied, not merely satis- 
fied.1
While the courts have recognized the provisions
of section 82 of the Decree, they have generally held that
2
adultery is such a grave matrimonial offence, that although 
its commission need not be proved beyond all reasonable 
doubt, there ought to be clear proof. Thus in Segun v.
•3
Segun, it was held that the evidence need not reach
certainty, but must carry a high degree of probability,
because of the seriousness of the charge.
Direct evidence of adultery is seldom available,
therefore, the courts may draw an inference that adultery
has been committed, if the facts proved are not reasonably
4
capable of being otherwise explained. Adultery is a
5
question of fact . What are the facts from which the courts 
may infer that adultery has been established? Mere proof 
of familiarity between the respondent and the co-respondent 
is net sufficient to establish adultery.^ If, however, there 
was opportunity for adultery to take place, in many cases,
1. See also Oke v. Oke [1971] Suit No. 1/156/70 unreported, 
19 April 1971.
2. cr. tne opinion of Milton, Tne Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce (.Everyman edition, 19 57 )* P* 276: " ... he who 
affirms adultery to oe tne highest breach, affirms the 
bed to be the highest of marriage, wnich is in truth a 
gross and boorish opinion how common soever-, ne was of 
the opinion that tne Canon law should regard spiritual 
and civil companionship, rather than carnal coupling as 
tne true oasis of marriage”
3. [1975] 6 C.C.H.C.J.773.
4. Beer v. Beer [1948] P.10.
5. Elumeze v. Elumeze [1969] 1 ALL N.L.R.3H.
6. Odulana v. Odulana [1971] Suit No. HD/14/69, unreported, 
Lagos, High Court, 8 Sept. 1971.
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the courts will infer that it did take place. Thus, in
Oseni v. Oseni,^ photographs which showed the respondent
wife and the co-respondent dancing close together; and
the co-respondent standing close with;his left hand around
the respondent who was in a seating position, were dismissed
as evidence of Tmere amorous familiarityf. But where the
petitioner, in the same case, gave evidence of finding the
respondent and co-respondent in a locked room, the court
held that there was opportunity for adultery to have taken
place, and consequently, inferred that it had in fact taken 
2
place.
On the other hand in Okafor v. Okafor, Oputa,
J., held that proof of adultery must be beyond reasonable
doubt.
4
In Qviasu v. Oviasu, the petitioner appealed
on the ground, inter alia, that the learned trial judge mis­
directed himself in law in failing to observe that Nigerian 
law in regard to the quantum of proof required to establish 
adultery, is not the same as in English law. Under Nigerian 
law, proof is established by the balance of probabilities 
on the evidence, whilst in English law, there must be proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court granted the 
appeal on another ground, but gave the following directions:
1-. £1972] 12 C.C.H.C.J,110.
2. See also Adeyiml v . Adeyimi £1969] Suit No. HD/32/68, 
unreported, Lagos High Court, 10 March 1969; Akinyeml
v. Akinyemi [1963] 1 ALL N.L.R.340; Oloko v. Oloko [1961] 
W.N.L.R.101; Lewis v. Lewis [I960] LL.R. 215.
3. £1972] Suit No. 0/6D/71, unreported decision of Onitsha 
High Court, 13 Nov. 1972; see also Souza v. Souza [1975]
11 C.C.H.C.J. 1867; in Odaje v. Odaje L1972] 10 C.C.H.C.J. 
97, on a charge of cruelty it was said: fA charge of
cruelty is a very serious charge to make and the court
has said over and over again that the party who makes it 
must prove it beyond doubt. It must be proved with the 
same degree of strictness as a crime is proved in a 
criminal courtf.
4. [1973] 11 S.C.315, P. 329.
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In order to., avoid future pitfalls we wish 
to emphasise that the provisions of the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 govern 
Matrimonial Causes in Nigeria. There is 
for example, provision for standards of 
proof - see Section 82 et seq - and English 
decisions should no longer be cited as 
authorities in construing provisions of 
our law dealing with standard of proof.
The provisions of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree are clear and can be easily construed 
under the known and settled principle or 
canons of construction.
The degree of proof required under the Decree is 
therefore left .largely to the discretion of the individual 
judge as to what constitutes ’reasonable satisfaction’, 
and whether he is reasonably satisfied in the particular 
case.
Other examples of circumstances in which the 
courts have held that adultery had been proved under the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree may be given.
(a) The husband, who had been living apart from his wife, 
visited her at night and found her with the co-respondent 
locked up in a darkened room. When the door was opened, 
as a result of his knocking, the wife was found sitting on 
the bed with only a wrapper thrown carelessly around her 
body, and the co-respondent’s shirt was not properly tucked 
into his trousers.^*
(b) The wife gave birth to a child whose father could not
2
possibly have been her husband.
(c) The woman cited was seen with the petitioner in his 
room, both of them sitting on his bed; and in Ogbete 
market walking hand in hand. It was also alleged that she 
was living in the official residence of the petitioner. The 
petitioner admitted that she was living there, but stated
1. See Adeyemi v. Adeyemi £1969] Suit No. HD/32/68 unreported
decision of Lagos High Court, 10 March 1969*
2. See Elumeze v. Elumeze [1969] 1 ALL N.L.R. 311; either
party to a marriage may now give evidence proving or 
tending to prove that the parties to the marriage did
not have sexual relations with each other at any particular 
time - M.C.D. Section 84. See Rone-Orugboh v. Rone-Orugboh 
£1973] 7 C.C.H.C.J. 80.
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that she was not living with him.^
(d) An Ibadan Premier Hotel receipt was held to be suffic­
ient evidence of adultery by the respondent with a woman
2unknown, at the Premier Hotel.
In the following cases, on the other hand, 
adultery was held not to have been proved to the reason­
able -satisfaction of the court.
(a) Information given to the wife in anonymous letters 
that her husband had committed adultery.
(b) Evidence that the co-respondent recently divorced his 
wife, and was often found with the respondent in her house 
after she left the matrimonial home. The wife admitted that
the co-respondent was her former boy-friend, but denied
4
that adultery had been committed.
(c) The petitioner gave the following evidence:
*The respondent is living with one Magdalene Onyeamara ... 
Magdalene in September last year gave birth to a baby girl*. 
Oputa J. held that these two facts were fleft hanging aim­
lessly*, and had not been sufficiently connected with the
5
respondent to prove his adultery.
(b) Intolerability
Adultery slmpllciter is no longer sufficient to 
justify the dissolution of a marriage under the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970. The petitioner must also find it 
intolerable to live any longer with the respondent as
1. Anoka v, Anoka £1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R.51.
2. Osibo v. Osibo £1975] 1 C.C.H.C.J.119. See also Odunjo 
v. Odunjo £196*1] LL.R.43; evidence of a will providing 
for the children of the respondent and the woman-
named admissible as evidence in corroboration of adultery.
3. Segun v. Segun £1975] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 773.
4. Afolabi v. Afolabi [19753 6 C.C.H.C.J.949.
5. Ibeawuchi v. Ibeawuchi £1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R. 56.
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husband and wife,1 The failure to state in the petition 
for divorce, the fact that the petitioner finds it intol­
erable to live with the respondent, has resulted in the
failure of numerous petitions on this ground, in the
2
Nigerian courts.
The question whether or not the petitioner
finds it intolerable to live with the respondent has been
held in some cases to be a subjective one: does this
petitioner find it intolerable to live with this respondent?
Provided the court is satisfied that the petitioner
actually finds it intolerable to live with the respondent,
whether his attitude in the circumstances of the case is
reasonable or not is irrelevant. Savage, J., in Soetan v.
Soetan and Anor, stated the position thus:
The words in sec. 15(2)(b) of the Decree 
1970 Tthe petitioner1 show quite clearly 
that the test is subjective. It is there­
fore the feelings of the petitioner that
matter and if he says TI can no longer live 
with my wife, I find it intolerable to do sof,
I do not see how the court could find that
this was not so.
A similar reasoning is found in many Nigerian,
1. M.C.D.1970, S.15(2)(b); Egbueje v. Egbueje [1972] 2 
E.C.S.L.R. 7^7; Okala v. Qkala [1973J 3 E.C.S.L.R.67; 
Ibeawuchi v. Ibeawuchi [1973] E.C.S.L.R.56; Oseni v.
Oseni [1972] 12 C.C.H.C.J.110; Labode v. Labode L1972]
2 C.C.H.C.J.107; Eyo v Eyo [1972J 2 C.C.H.C.J.121;
Agu v. Agu £1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R.452.
2. See Oseni v. Oseni [1972] 12 C.C.H.C.J.110; Labode v.
Labode L1972] C.C.H.C.J.107; Agu v. Agu [1972 2 E.C.S.L.R. 
452; Egbueje v . Egbueje [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R.747; Ajetombi 
v. AJetombi [1975] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 2065.
3. [1973] 4 C.C.H.C.J.71; Soetan v. Soetan [1973] 4 C.C.H.C.J., 
71, 79.
4. See Arinye v. Arinye [1973] 4 C.C.H.C.J., 81 at p. 83;
Labode v. Labode L1972] 2 C.C.H.C.J. [1972] LL.R.107;
Adebiyi v. Adebiyi [1970]; Eyo v. Eyo [1972] 2 C.C.H.C.J. 
121; Osibo v. Osibo [1975] 1 C.C.H.C.J. 119.
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and English cases. The subjective test was, however,
2rejected in Somorin y. Somorin, where Odesanya, J., stated
that ’subjective* used by Savage, J., in the above passage,
’is misleading when it is applied to the modern law of
divorce in Nigeria’. The learned Judge pointed out^ the
fact that the court in Nigeria, unlike under the English
Divorce Act 1969, has a discretion to dismiss a petition,
even if one or more of the facts in section 15(2) of the
Decree are established by evidence, under section 28 of the
Decree, which provides that the-Court may, in its discretion,
refuse to make a decree of dissolution of marriage, if,
since the marriage, the petitioner has committed adultery
that has not been condoned by the respondent, or, having
been so condoned, has been revived; or the habits of the
petitioner have, or the conduct of the petitioner has,
conduced or contributed to the existence of matters relied
upon by the petitioner. The learned Judge continued;
Under our law a petitioner who alleges and
proves adultery against the respondent may
find that he or she is not in the circum­
stances of. the particular case entitled to 
say that he or she finds it intolerable to 
live with the: respondent. If he is himself 
an adulterer ... he can only hope that the 
discretion of-the trial judge will be exer­
cised, in his favour. In my view it is a 
discretion which must be exercised in order 
to do justice.to the parties.^
This judicial reminder by Adesanya, J., that
there' are discretionary bars to a grant of divorce in the
Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970, is •opportune. Generally,
1. See Goodrich v. Goodrich [1971] 1 W.L.R.T142; • Pheasant 
v. Pheasant [1972J 1 ALL E.R.587 at-590; [1972] Fam.
202, at p . 207.
[1973] 10 C.C.H.C.J.103;
3. Ibid. , p.. 105.
4. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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the Nigerian courts, following the English decision in
Goodrich v. Goodrich,have been pre^occupied with the
subjective nature of, the test:"of intolerability, and have
disregarded the discretionary bars provided by section 28
of the Nigerian Decree, which are absent in the English
Divorce Reform Act, 1969. Becau&e of this, there are many
cases, in which a husband, himself guilty of adultery, was
nevertheless able to state successfully that he found it
intolerable to live with the respondent wife because of her
2adultery. Thus, in Bakare v. Bakare and Anor, the petit­
ioner had himself committed adultery prior to tne respond­
ent ? s. adultery on which he was, inter alia, basing m s  
petition. It was held that, in spite of his own adultery, 
the petitioner might well rind it mtoierauie ou u.ve witn 
tne respondent, in Labode v. Labode« Odesanya, J., stated 
the reason for such decisions:
. .. social reality m  wigena j.» such 
onat husbands orten rind lire mtoieraoie 
with a w u e  wuen uxiey themselves u u u n s n  
openly in adultery. As the test is subject­
ive the question is *What are the present 
feelings of the petitioner.'1
In very few or tne many cases where adulterous
husbands pleaded that they found it intoicrauie to live
with a wife who nan commitceu adultery, was any reference
made to the fact that the court had the discretion to deny
or grant a divorce when the petitioner had himself been
11
guilty of adultery. These decisions reflect the attitude 
ui customary law towards a wifeTs adultery. In most systems 
of customary law, a wife's adultery was regardeu as a crime, 
while adultery by the husband was disregarded.
1. £1971] 2 ALL E.R. 1340,
2. 11971] Suit No. HD/44/71, unreported, Lagos High Court,
20 Dec. 1971.
3. H972] 2 C.C.H.C.J. 107; [1972] L.L.R.107, at p. 111.
4. See S. 28(a) M.C.D., 1970; and Omo-Ogunkoya v. Omo-Ogunkoya
[1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J.1057, where S. 28 was considered.
5. See further, above, Chapter VII, p. 561.
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(c) .The: connectlonxb'etWe~en adultery and Intolerability
Another problem which has arisen in regard to the 
interpretation of section 15(2)(b), is the question of a 
connection between the adultery and the intolerability.
By section 15(2)(b), in addition to proof that the respond­
ent has since the marriage committed adultery, the petition­
er must also show that he or she finds it intolerable to 
live with the respondent. Must the petitioner have found 
life with the respondent intolerable as a result of the 
respondents adultery, or is it sufficient if the petitioner 
found life with the respondent intolerable for independent 
reasons! There are a number of conflicting decisions in 
both the Nigerian and English courts. If the section is 
interpreted literally, as was done in Goodrich v. Goodrich,1 
an English case, the petitioner may rely, not only on the 
adultery, but on any other matter, to show that further co­
habitation with the adulterous spouse would be intolerable.
In Goodrich v. Goodrich'1' the Court held that, to satisfy 
section 1(2)(a) of the English Divorce Reform Act 1969, a 
provision similar to section 15(2)(b) of the Nigerian Decree, 
it was not necessary for a petitioner to show that he finds 
if intolerable to live with the respondent in' consequence of 
the adultery. It is sufficient if the petitioner genuinely 
finds it intolerable to do so for whatever reason. The 
husband was accordingly granted a decree nisi because the 
wife had committed adultery (which he had condoned), and 
because he found it intolerable to live with her, since she 
had made unfounded allegations of cruelty against him and 
refused to be reconciled with him.
Goodrich v. Goodrich1 has been followed in many
2
cases in Nigeria. Thus, in Akwara v. Akwara and Anor, 
Odesanya, J., held that the petitioner’s finding it intoler­
able to live with the respondent could be due to reasons 
other than the respondent’s adultery. In this case, the wife
1. 11971] 2 ALL E.R,, 13^0.
2. [1971] Suit No. WD/33/71, unreported, Lagos High Court,
22 Nov., 1971.
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petitioner, who had been sent by her husband for a secret­
arial course in the TJnited Kingdom, returned to discover 
that the husband was living with the co-respondent as 
husband and wife. The respondent refused to allow the 
petitioner to live with him. After an attempted recon­
ciliation,. the respondent offered to allow the petitioner 
to stay in the matrimonial home, on the condition that she 
should share it with the co-respondent. The petitioner 
rejected this offer, and petitioned for dissolution of the 
marriage on the ground that the respondent had committed 
adultery, and that she found it intolerable to live with him. 
The court granted her petition, although it was clear that 
it was not the respondents adultery as such, but his 
proposition that she should share the matrimonial home with 
the co-respondent, that made it intolerable for her to 
continue to live with the respondent. The Judge said:
The first respondent has by his own act 
converted a monogamous marriage into a 
polygamous or a potentially polygamous 
marriage. The petitioner could not be 
expected to accept the arrangement pro­
posed by her husband, that is to share 
the matrimonial home with the woman cited.
The petitioner is therefore right to say 
that she finds life with her husband in­
tolerable in the circumstances.^
This literal interpretation of section 15(2)(b) has been
followed in a number of other Nigerian cases.
There are, however, some cases both in Nigeria
and England, where a contrary interpretation of the section
2has been adopted. In the English case of Roper v. Roper, 
Faulks, J., stated: * Common sense tells you that S.(1)(2)
Ca) £of the English Divorce Reform Act] means and in con­
sequence of the adultery the petitioner finds it intolerable 
to live with the respondentf. This decision was approved
1 . See e.g. Osibo v. Osibo [1975] 1 C.C.H.C.J.119•
2. [1972] 1 W.L.R.1314; [1972] 3 ALL E.R.668; Carr v. Carr
[197^] 1 ALL E.R.1193, C.A,
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in the Nigerian, case of Somorin. v. Somorin ,^ where it was 
stated that the intolerability of life with the respondent
2
must stem from, or be a consequence of, the proved adultery.
The English Court of Appeal has now determined 
that the petitioner need not show that he finds it intoler­
able to live with the respondent because of the respondents 
adultery. In Cleary v. Cleary, the wife, had committed 
adultery which had been condoned. The husband later 
petitioned for divorce, stating that he could no longer 
live with his wife, because ’there was no future for the 
marriage at all’. His petition was dismissed by the trial 
court. On appeal, it was held that the two facts [viz. 
that the respondent has committed adultery and the petition­
er finds it intolerable to live with the respondent] are 
independent, separate and unrelated. It was, however, 
held that the court must satisfy itself that the petitioner’s 
assertion that he finds it intolerable to live with the
respondent is true, and should not accept his ’bare assertion’
4to that effect. Roper v. Roper, and similar English
decisions, which adopted a non-literal translation, have
thus been overruled, The Nigerian Supreme Court has not
yet pronounced on the interpretation to be given to section
15(2)(b) of the Decree.
Of the two interpretations, the non-literal inter-
4
pretation adopted in Roper v. Roper is preferable; Cleary
1. [1973] 10 C.C.H.C.J. 103.
2. See also Okala v. Okala [1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R.69 at p. 72;
Agu v. Agu [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 452; E^o v. E^o [1972]
2 C.C.H.C.J. 121; Ibeawuchi v. Ibeawuchi [1973] E.C.S.L.R. 
56.
3. [1974] 1 ALL E.R. 498, C.A,; [1974] 1 W.L.R. 73; [1973]
117 Sol. J. 834. See also Anderson v. Anderson [1972]
117 Sol. Jo. 33.
4. [1972] 1 W.L.R,1314; [1972] 3 ALL E.R.668.
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1 2 v. Cleary s has been judicially criticised, and may yet
be overruled by the House of Lords, If the literal inter­
pretation of the section is carried to its logical con­
clusion, once the respondent has committed adultery, the 
petitioner is entitled to a divorce on any ground which 
makes it intolerable for him or her to continue to live 
with the respondent. Such grounds need not be based on 
the respondent’s conduct, and can include the petitioner’s 
love for another person. This seems contrary to the 
spirit of the Nigerian Decree which, although it liberal­
izes the ground for divorce, contains several provisions
4
aimed at promoting the sanctity of marriage. The fact 
that a petition based on section 15(2)(b) of the Decree 
is not subject to the two years bar, but may be brought at 
any time after the celebration of the marriage is a further 
disturbing factor.
5
In Oye v. Oye, the counsel for the petitioner 
in a divorce suit, submitted that, since the adultery was 
committed when the parties were already living apart, it 
could not be said that the adultery made it intolerable 
for the respondent to live with the petitioner. Odumosu,
J . , dismissed the submission as an ingenuous argument, but 
not a reasonable interpretation of the law. He held that 
whilst husband and wife are living apart, until a petition
1. [1974] 1 ALL E.R.498,C.A.
2. See Carr v. Carr [1974] 1 ALL E.R.1193 C.A. where a
differently constituted Court of Appeal from that
which decided Cleary v. Cleary, held that the 
construction of S. 1(2)(a) was questionable, but 
the Court was constrained by authority to follow 
Cleary v. Cleary.
3. In Cleary v. Cleary (supra), Lord Denning stated obiter: 
that a petitioner cannot rely on his own ’love for
another woman’ as leading him to find it intolerable
to live with the respondent.
4. See e.g. the reconciliatory provisions of section 28.
5. [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 494.
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is filed, the law must presume an intention of one of 
the parties to live with the other. During this period 
there is still a hope of reconciliation. Any adultery 
committed during the period lessens the chances of recon­
ciliation and so could be said to have made it intolerable 
for the innocent party to live with the guilty party.
(d) Damages for Adultery
Section 31(i) of the Matrimonial Causes Decree,
1970, states:
A party to a marriage, whether husband or 
wife, may, in a petition for a decree of 
dissolution of the marriage alleging that 
the other party to the marriage has committed 
adultery with a person or including that 
allegation, claim damages from that person 
on the ground that that person has committed 
adultery with the other party to the marriage 
and, subject to this section, the court may 
award damages accordingly.
The Decree has therefore abolished the common
■law discrimination against women, whereby a husband could
claim damages for his wifeTs adultery, but a wife had no
corresponding right to claim for her husbandTs adultery.
This fact has not been fully realised by some judges. For
example, in Shokunbi v. Shokunbi,1 W.A. Savage, J., found
as a fact that the woman cited, Omolara, was guilty of
committing adultery with the respondent husband. However,
he refused to grant the wife’s claim for damages. He said:
I am satisfied that the respondent committed 
adultery with OmoTara, but I am unable to 
award damages, for it is trite law that the 
woman with whom he committed adultery could 
not be ordered to pay damages.
It is amazing that this statement could be made
in July 1976, more than six years after the Matrimonial
Causes Decree, 1970>came into force. It is a glaring example
of the fact that many Nigerian Judges have largely ignored
•1. [1976] 7 C.C.H.C.J.1913, at p. 1919.
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the provisions of the Decree, and have, continued to apply
the law as it was before the enactment of the Decree.^’
2In Adenipekun. v. Adenipekun and Ezekoye,
Odumosu, J., noted the change in the law, but expressed
his disapproval of it. In considering a wife’s claim for
damages, against the woman cited for committing adultery
with her husband, he said:
This claim would not have been possible 
if it were based on the English Matrimonial 
law which was the law in Nigeria before the 
promulgation of the Matrimonial Causes Decree 
1970. For the English law only provided for 
an action in damages by a husband against a 
man who had committed adultery with his wife.
I would like to observe that our country has 
taken a retrograde step in making provision 
for a wife to claim damages against a woman 
with whom her husband has committed adultery.
The learned Judge did not state the reasons for
his opinion, but it is respectfully submitted that there
is no justification for his total rejection of a wife’s
entitlement to damages. In Adeyinka v; Godwin Ohuruogu,
the Nigerian Supreme Court held that ’damages against the
co-respondent are not awarded to punish him; they are
awarded to compensate the husband for losing the consortium
of the wife...’ It cannot be denied that the wife of a
statutory marriage has an exclusive right to the consortium
of her husband. The denial of her right to claim damages
if the consortium of her husband is lost, or impaired by
the adultery of the woman-cited with her husband, cannot be
defended. She ought to be compensated for the loss.
The reason why compensation by way of damages
1. See the comments of the Nigerian Supreme Court in this 
respect in Olu-Ibukun and Anor v. Olu-Ibukun [1974] 2
S.C. 41, and Oviasu v. Oviasu [1973-1 11 S.C. 315, 329.
2. [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 605; see also Anoka v. Anoka [1973] 
3 E.C.S.L.R. where damages against the woman-cited were 
not awarded because the wife cross-petitioned for 
judicial separation and not for divorce.
3. [1965] 1 ALL N.L.R.210; see also Mohommed v. Mohommed 
[1952] 14 W.A.C.A. 199.
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for adultery was denied to the wife under the common law 
was because of the quasi-proprietary interest which the 
husband had in his wife and her services at common law.
The Married Women*s Property Acts 1884-1892, have abolished 
this right. It would therefore be anomalous to confine 
compensation for adultery to the husband, since he now has 
no more proprietary interest in his wife than she has in 
him. ^
Whether the time is ripe for the total abolition
of the right to claim damages for adultery in Nigeria is
debateable. It is pertinent to note, however, that, unlike
England, where the right was abolished because claims for
2damages for adultery were rare, in Nigeria, damages for 
adultery are claimed from the co-respondent, wherever
“3
possible, in most divorce suits in which adultery is alleged.
The courts have laid down some criteria for the 
award of damages for adultery which may be briefly summarised:
(i) Where there is evidence that the marriage has broken
4
down before the adultery damages will-not be awarded.
(ii) The character and conduct of the spouses, especially
1. Parity between husband and wife in respect of damages 
for adultery was achieved in England by the abolition
of all awards of such damages, see Law Reform(Miscellan- 
eous Provisions) Act, 1970, Ss. 4 and 5 which implemented 
the recommendation of the Law Commission, No.25, Family 
Law, Report on Financial Provision in Matrimonial 
Proceedings, 19&9, paras. 92-102.
2. See the reports of the Law Commission, No.25, 1969,
Family Law Report on Financial Provision in Matrimonial 
Proceedings, paras. 99-102.
3. Out of 100 cases examined by the present writer involving 
alleged adultery of a wife, damages from the co-respondents 
were claimed in 83 cases. In many cases the damages 
claimed were exhorbitant, see e.g. Akapo v. Akapo [1972]
7 C.C.H.C.J.105, £2,000 claimed by plaintiff husband,
£200 awarded; Arinoye v. Arinoye [1972] 3 C.C.H.C.J.146, 
£.1000 claimed by the husband, a legal practitioner, no 
damages awarded; Sifo v. Sifo [1972] 1 C .C.H. C.J. 52 ,£5,000 
claimed, £100 awarded.
4. Adenipekun v. Adenipekun and Anor [1974] 4 E .C.S.L.R.605; 
Adeyimi v. Adeyimi I1969]2 ALL N.L.R.181; if the fact upon 
which the marriage is held to have broken down is not on 
the fact of adultery committed by the petitioner, damages 
cannot be awarded - Dekon v. Dekon [1976]10 C.C.H.C.J.2507* 
See also Evoroja v. Evoroja [1961] W.N.L.R.6; Adeyinka v. 
Ohuruogu L1955J 1 ALL N.L.R.210. ---------
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the respondent, are of importance in assessing the level 
of damages.^-
(iii) Damages awarded for adultery may be substantial,
o
but they should not be punitive or exemplary.
4(iv) Damages can only be awarded on a petition for divorce.
(v) A co-respondent or woman-cited will not be liable 
for damages if he or she had no knowledge at the time the 
adultery was committed that the respondent was married.
(vi) The Supreme Court has stated that in Nigeria a woman 
may be married without being married under the Marriage 
Act, and a man may have reasons to believe she was married, 
without thinking that she was married under the Act.
For damages to be awarded, therefore, it must be proved 
that the co-respondent knew, or had reason to believe that 
the petitioner^ wife was married under the Marriage Act.
It is submitted, with the greatest respect, that 
this view is unwarranted. While knowledge that the male 
respondent is married under the Act may be relevant in the 
case of the woman-cited, it is difficult to see why lack 
of such knowledge should relieve the male co-respondent of 
liability. In a non-statutory marriage, a wife is not 
regarded as having an exclusive right to her husbandfs 
consortium. In such marriages, however, the husband has an 
exclusive right to his wifeTs consortium. In all marriages 
in Nigeria, adultery by a wife is a grave matrimonial 
offence, and in most systems of customary law was formerly
1. Adeyemi v. Adeyemi [1969] 2 ALL N.L.R.181; Adeyinka v. 
Ohuruogu [1965J 1 ALL N.L.R.210.
2. Taiwo Williams v. Williams and Anor [1972] Suit No. HD/ 
19/71* unreported, 25 Feb., 1972.
3. Mohommed v. Mohommed [1952] 14 W.A.C.A.199*
4. Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970, S.31(1); See Aja v. Aja 
[1972]1 E.C.S.L.R.140; Rone-Orugboh v. Rone-Orugboh U973] 
7 C.C.H.C.J.80; Dekon v. Dekon [19T6]10 C .C.H.C .J .145.
5. Arinoye v. Arinoye [1972] 3 C.C.H.C.J.146.
6. But see Adeyinka v. Ohuruogu [1965]1 ALL N.L.R.210: the 
co-respondent must also have known that the respondent 
was married under the Marriage Act.
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a crime.1 Irrespective of the type of marriage of the 
woman respondent, therefore, the. co-respondent ought to 
know that he is committing a wrong, once he knows that 
she is married.
(vii) Where the adultery has been condoned or conduced
to by the conduct of the petitioner, damages will not be 
2
awarded.
(viii) No damages will be awarded for adultery committed 
more than three years before the presentation of the 
petition.
(4) The respondents behaviour.
Under section 15(2)(c) of the Decree, the 
petitioner may establish irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage, by showing that the respondent’s behaviour is 
such that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to 
live with him. Unlike the English Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973, section 16 of the Nigerian Decree enumerates certain 
situations from which, once established, the. court must 
hold that the respondent’s behaviour is unreasonable. 
Nwogugu asserts:
It is relevant to point out initially that 
some of the situations provided in Section 
16 are applicable to both the husband and 
wife, while others may apply only to a 
husband or a wife.^
1. See above, Chapter VII, p. 562 ; adultery is still a 
crime under the Penal Code Law, Cap. 89 Laws of the 
Northern Region of Nigeria, 1963 Revision, Ss.387 and 
3 8 8 .
2. See Qlutayo v. Qlutayo [1970] Suit No. I/96/69, unre­
ported, 20 Feb. 1970: ’the real import of condonation
is a conditional waiver of the right of the spouse to 
take matrimonial proceedings’. Cf. Ehigiator v. Ehigiator 
11966] 2 ALL N.L.R.169; Harrison-Obafemi v. Harrison- 
Obafemi [1965] N.M.L.R.466, Williams v. Williams [1966]
1 ALL N.L.R. 36.
3. Akapo v. Akapo [1972] 7 C.C.H.C.J.105.
4. Nwogugu, Family LawNin^Nigeria, 1974, p.l4l.
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This assertion is unjustified, as the Decree 
makes no such distinction. For example, under the Matri­
monial Causes Act, 1950, it was possible for a wife 
petitioner to obtain a divorce on the ground that her 
husband has, since the celebration of the marriage, been 
guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality,^ These grounds were 
not available to a husband petitioner, due no doubt to the 
fact that such acts were usually committed by men. The 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, has abolished this discrim­
ination, and the husband of a wife who has committed rape,
sodomy or bestiality (any one of which may be committed by 
2
a woman) is entitled to claim that her behaviour is unreason­
able, and that he cannot as a result be expected to live 
with her.
All the types of behaviour set out in section 16 
are equally applicable to a husband or wife petitioner, or 
respondent, although some behaviour may be more likely in 
the case of a husband. For example, section 16(c) of the 
Decree provides that if, since the marriage, the respondent 
has, within a period not exceeding five years, suffered 
frequent convictions for crime in respect of which the 
respondent has been sentenced in the aggregate to imprison­
ment for not less than three years, and habitually left the 
petitioner without reasonable means of support, the court 
must hold that such behaviour is unreasonable under section 
15(2)(c). A wife is more likely to need maintenance from 
her husband, than a husband is to need maintenance from his 
wife, but there is no reason why a husband petitioner, in 
appropriate circumstances, should not base his petition for 
divorce on this sub-section. An outstanding feature of the 
Decree is the fact that, so far as possible, it has assimi­
lated the position of husband and wife, and there is no 
distinction of liability to maintain between husband and
1. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, section 1(1).
2. If a wife has aided, counselled or procured another person 
to commit rape, she may be guilty as a principal offender 
in criminal law, see Criminal Code, Cap 42, Ss.7(b), 7(c) 
and 7(d).
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wife.^
The situations set out in section 16 as evidence
2of unreasonable behaviour are not exhaustive. Other facts
outside those set out in section 16(1) may be proved to
establish section 15(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Decree
1970« For example, cruelty is not denominated as a
matrimonial offence under the provisions of the Matrimonial
Causes Decree, but it comes within the ambit of section 15
(2)(c) of the Decree.^
The fact that the test of unreasonable behaviour
is objective necessarily connotes that the respondent's
4
behaviour must be of some degree of gravity. In Akponor v.
5
Akponor, it was held that such additional facts must be of 
an ’equally grave nature as of those in section 16(1)’.
The test whether facts outside of those set out in section 
16 are sufficiently grave to make it unreasonable to expect 
the petitioner to endure them, and to continue to live with 
the respondent Is an objective one, and is for the judge 
and not for the petitioner alone to decide. In Babalola v. 
Babalola , Savage, J., stated:
1. See Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, Ss. 70 et. al.
2. See Akponor v. Akponor [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J.,1047;
Johnson v. Johnson L1972]9 C .C.H.C.J .109•
3. See Udeh v. Udeh [1970] Suit No. E/ID/70, unreported, 
Enugu High Court, 24 July 1970; Oladetohun v . Oladetohun
[1971] Suit No. HD/111/70 unreported decision Lagos High 
Court.
4. In Oye v. Oye [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 494, the wife’s refusal 
to use her husband's surname, and other unproved allega­
tions of embarassing and humiliating conduct were held
to be not sufficiently grave to amount to unreasonable 
behaviour under S. 15(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, 1970.
5. [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 1047.
6. [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 110.
286
the question is not. whether the petitioner 
finds it intolerable to live with the 
respondent in the, circumstances narrated 
by her, but whether she can reasonably be 
expected to live with him.^
The courts have held that a variety of behaviour 
has satisfied the requirements of section 15(2)(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, e.g.
(a) unreasonable refusal of sexual intercourse, nagging,
the habitual intemperate drinking of alcohol and
inordinate sexual indulgence with various women,
2particularly housemaids, by a husband;
(b) indulgence in the practice of juju and charms by the
"3
wife of a Christian Clergyman
(c) the possession of native medicine, herbs and charms or
black juju, her practice of such cult to the annoyance,
distress and apprehension of injury to the petitioner,
4
by a wife;
(d) the proclivity of a wife respondent to draw a knife on 
the petitioner whenever there was a disagreement;
(e) refusal by a husband respondent to have sexual inter­
course with the petitioner on the ground that it was 
a useless expenditure of energy on a childless woman 
whose infertility was no longer in doubt, referring to 
the petitioner as if she were a man, accusations of
1. Ibid., 111; see also Osibo v. Osibo [1975] 1 C.C.H.C.J. 
119*123; Onokpasav v. Onokpasav [1975]8 C .C,H.C .J .1237;
Udoh v. Udoh [1970] N.M.L.R.33; Sogbetun v. Sogbetun [1972] 
10 C.C.H.C.J. 97.
2. Johnson v. Johnson [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J.94; see also
Gbajabiamila v, Gbajabiamila [1976] 1 C.C.H.C.J.
3. See Oladetohun v. Oladetohun [1971] Suit No. HD/111/70,
unreported Lagos High Court, 6 July 1971, where Adefarasin, 
J . , held that whereas the practice of charms or juju by 
one spouse, even though condemned or detested by the other 
spouse, could not amount to a matrimonial offence under 
the Matrimonial Causes Acts, 1950 and 1965, which prev­
iously applied in Nigeria, and that these practices do
not amount to cruelty under those Acts, but the practices
cam now be behaviour which a petitioner cannot reasonably
be expected to live with under S.15(2)(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
4. Johnson v. Johnson [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 94.
5. Akponor v. Akponor [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 1047.
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insubordination, laxity: and disrespect for the
respondent, usually accompanied by physical attacks.1
On the other hand, a single act of cruelty in
which the respondent husband beat the petitioner, pushed
her down, and locked her up in a room was held by Oputa,
J . , not to amount to the sustained behaviour pattern of
p
cruelty envisaged by section 15(’2)(c).
In Babalola v. Babalola, the petitioner gave
instances of the respondents conduct, and complained that
he often beat her without any apparent reason; that he
brought her mother in law to live with them in a one-roomed
apartment, and that the mother-inr-law took control of the
running of the matrimonial home. She added that this state
of affairs became so unbearable to her that it affected her
health,and she had to.leave the matrimonial home for her
parents’ home, where she had medical treatment. Savage, J.,
stated as follows:
The question is not whether the petitioner 
finds it intolerable to live with the 
respondent in the circumstances narrated by 
her but whether she can reasonably be expected 
to live with him. Merely telling the court 
that her husband beats her and her mother-in- 
law takes control of the running of the home 
without more seems to me insufficient. It is 
true that there is no express requirement 
for proof of injury or likelihood of injury 
to health under section 15(2)(c) of the 
Decree, it is my view that proof of such 
injury must always be highly relevant in 
determining what can be expected of the 
petitioner.
I cannot hold on the evidence that cruelty
1, Anakwenze v. Anakwenze [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R. 708.
2, Ibeawuchi v. Ibeawuchi [1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R.56. See also
Qkafor v. Okafor [1972] Suit No. 0/6D/71, unreported,
Onitsha High Court, 13 Nov 1972, Megafu v. Megafu,
[1972] Suit No. 0/7D/71, unreported, Onitsha High Court, 
13 Dec. 1972.
3. [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 110.
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has been proved against the respondent."^
It is respectfully submitted that this judgment 
overlooks a number of points;
(a) The court seems to have disregarded the statement of
the Supreme Court of Nigeria regarding proof of cruelty,
2
laid down in Williams v. Williams. In that case the
petitioner complained of constant nagging by his wife
which affected his health from time to time; unfounded
allegations of adultery against him by the wife which so
annoyed and worried him that on one such occasion he had
a motor car accident; and the fact that without his consent
she left him to care for the three infant children of the
marriage, in order to take up a scholarship in Germany.
There was no medical evidence. The trial Judge accepted
the husband*s evidence, but took the view that the husband
had failed to prove legal cruelty, because there was no
evidence to show that the wife's conduct ’had caused any
danger to the husband’s life, limb, or health (bodily or
mental), or that a reasonable apprehension of such danger
could arise from her conduct1, which the judge said could
only be proved by medical evidence. He dismissed the
petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court held:
Where a petitioner relies on actual injury 
in proof of cruelty, medical evidence, 
though desirable, is not indispensable; and, 
although no specific instance of violence 
is given, the court should consider whether 
on the entire evidence viewed objectively 
the respondent’s conduct in its cumulative 
effect caused or gave rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of danger to the petitioner’s 
health, bodily or mental.^
1. Cf. Afolabi v. Afolabi [1975] 6 C.C.H.C.J.9^9, where it 
was held that the'close association between the respondent 
and co-respondent stopped short of adultery, but was such 
conduct that the petitioner could not reasonably be expected 
to live with the respondent under Section 15(2)(c) M.C.D. 
1970, although the conduct complained of related to 
incidents after the respondent left the matrimonial home.
2. [1966] 1 ALL N.L.R.36.
3. Ibid. , pp. 4lr42.
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The Court held that the trial judge, in interpreting the 
term ’legal cruelty*, ’took too narrow and limited a view’, 
and that the wife’s actions, when taken together, amounted 
to cruelty.
As noted by Savage, J.,^ himself, the Decree
provides no express requirement for proof of injury, or
likelihood of injury to health. Such proof must therefore
be as laid down by the Supreme Court, before its enactment.
2
In fact it was held in-Udeh v. Udeh by Agbakoba, J., that 
the test of what'constitutes intolerable behaviour under 
section 15(2)(c) is lower than that required for cruelty,
’for evidence which might bring the conduct of the respondent 
within the section might fall short of cruelty under the 
old test.’^
(b) The learned Judge, in holding that on the evidence 
cruelty had not been proved against the respondent, has 
lost sight of the fact that what the Decree requires to be 
proved is not cruelty, but behaviour which makes it unreason­
able for the petitioner to continue to live with the respond­
ent. A husband who allows his mother to take control of the 
matrimonial home, against the wishes of his wife, may not
be guilty of legal cruelty; but to most modern Nigerian 
women, deprivation of the management of the household would 
constitute unreasonable behaviour, which would make it un­
reasonable for them to be expected to continue the marital 
relationship, since the wife is thereby rendered ineffectual 
in her own home.
4
(c) As previously noted, the test is objective: can this
petitioner reasonably be expected to live with this respondent?
1. Babalola v. Babalola £1972.] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 110 at p. Ill; 
see further, above, p. 285.
2. [1970] Suit No. E/ID/70 unreported decision of Enugu High 
Court, 24 July 1970.
3. See section 82 of the Decree which provides that a matter 
of fact shall be taken to be proved if it is established 
to the reasonable satisfaction of the court.
4. Cf. this with the test in section 15(2)(b) which the 
courts have held should be subjective, see above, pp.271-274
290
In the words of Olatawura, J,,
was. the. conduct of such grave and weighty 
nature as. to make cohabitation virtually 
impossible? In assessing the gravity of 
the conduct the court must consider the 
particular parties to the suit before it, 
and not ’ordinary reasonable spouses’.
... can this petitioner, with his or her 
character and personality, with his or her 
faults and other attributes, good and bad, 
and having regard to his or her behaviour 
during the marriage, reasonably be expected 
to live with this respondent?,
2The wife in Babalola v. Babalola, had lived in 
England, where a wife generally controls the domestic affairs, 
for a number of years. She must have imbibed the custom 
of the people to some extent, was educated, and working 
as a secretary at a fairly reasonable salary. Can she 
reasonably be expected to live with a husband who beat her 
often for no apparent reason, and forced her to share a 
one-room apartment with his mother who controlled the 
domestic affairs, although he was an engineer and earning 
a good salary and she herself was a wage-earner? The answer 
is certainly no, although it may not be so, if she had been 
an uneducated village girl whose husband could not afford 
to rent more suitable accommodation.
It has been stated that the fact ’that the 
respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with him is in very
1. Ash v. Ash [1972] Pam, 135; [1972] 1 ALL E.R.582; [1972]
2 W.L.R,3^7; see also Oladetohun v. Oladetohun (supra) 
Pheasant v. Pheasant [1972] 2 W.L.R.353; [1972] 1 ALL E.R. 
587; L1972] Family Law, 202; Carew-Hunt v. Carew Hunt 
[1972] Times, 28 June 1972, where it was stated: ’The 
court was not solely concerned with the state of relation­
ship between the parties.and no longer, except marginally, 
passed judgment on whether a person’s behaviour was right 
or wrong, good or bad. The court had to consider the 
marriage relationship and the impact of the respondent’s 
behaviour on that relationship” (per Ormrod, J.).
2. [1972] 11 C.C.H.C.J. 110.
3. Section 1(2)(b) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1973; S. 15(2)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
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simple language which is quite, easy, for a layman to under -
1 2stand*. Nevertheless, its interpretation by some Courts 
may cause results adverse to the policy of the new matri­
monial law - which is to enable the empty legal shell of 
marriage **to be destroyed with the maximum fairness, and 
the minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation! This 
policy can only be meaningful by the avoidance of hostile 
litigation which, under the old doctrine of matrimonial 
offence, led to unnecessary bitterness, and frequently had 
harmful effects on the children, who may love both parents.
The interpretation of the section seems to preserve the 
concept of breach of marital obligation with its corollary 
of guilt and innocence. One of the main aims of the Decree 
- the discouragement of protracted litigation - is thereby 
frustrated, and incompatibility of temperament of the spouses, 
in many cases the main cause of marital breakdown, is 
excluded.
(5) Living apart
Two of the most novel aspects of the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree 1970 are to be found in sections 15(2)(f) and 
15(2)(g). The first subsection provides that a court shall 
hold a marriage to have broken down irretrievably where the 
parties to a marriage have lived apart for a continuous
1. See Per Dunn, J., Livingstone-Stallard v. Livingstone- 
Stallard 11974] Fam. 4^ at p. 54, the learned Judge was 
critical of Ormrod, J . ’s test in Pheasant v. Pheasant 
[1972] 2 W.L.R.353s and expressed the opinion that the 
test formerly used in relation to constructive desertion 
under the pre-1969 law, and analyses of gravity of con­
duct were unhelpful when construing S.l(2)(b) M.C.D.1973*
See also O ’Neill v. O'Neill [1975] 3 ALL E.R.289,C.A. 
where the trial’30urt held that the spouses had taken 
each other for better or worse. On appeal, it was held 
that the facts had to be judged not by the language of the 
prayer book, but by the language of the statute - One of 
the wife’s complaints was that the husband failed to keep 
himself clean... She said he hardly ever bathed himself; 
the husband said he bathed once a week. The Judge made
a specific finding that the husband was a reasonably clean 
man.
2. The Nigerian Courts have mainly followed the line of reasoning 
in Ash v . Ash Il972]2 W.L.R.347 and Pheasant v. Pheasant 
(supra) see Irinoye V. Irinove [1972]3 C.C.H.C.J.145.
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period of at least two years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition, and the.respondent does not 
object to a decree being granted^ the latter simply 
requires that the parties have lived apart for a continuous 
period of at least three years immediately preceding the 
presentation of the petition.
The provisions are mandatory,'1' and do not involve
2guilt in either party to the marriage, as do the other 
* factual situations1 previously discussed. In effect, 
therefore, the provisions permit divorce by mutual consent
*3
of the spouses, and the unilateral divorce of an innocent 
spouse by repudiation. These two provisions are the only 
ones which really justify the claim that the sole criterion 
for a divorce is irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
They accord with the rationale of divorce under Customary 
law, in which irretrievable breakdown of a marriage may be 
evidenced by the spouses1 mutual consent to a divorce, or 
by the unilateral repudiation of a blameless spouse. How 
have the Nigerian courts interpreted these provisions?
The Nigerian courts have stressed the absence of 
any requirement of matrimonial fault under the two provisions. 
In Akioye v. Akioye  ^ it was held that the respondent must be
1. Tagbo v. Tagbo 11972] Suit No. O/ID/71.
2. See Ogunyemi v. Ogunyemi £197*1.] 11 C.C.H.C.J.1761; Omo- 
Gunkoya v. Qmo-Gunkoya £197*05 C.C.H.C.J.1057; Efanga v. 
Efanga [1973J10 C.C.H.C.J.117; Majekodunmi v. Majekoddunmi 
[1974J6 C.C.H.C.J.809; Tagbo v. Tagbo [1972] Suit No. 0/ID/ 
71, unreported, Onitsha High Court; guilt may be relevant 
where the respondent or petitioner asks for maintenance,
see Dekon v. Dekon [1976] 10 C.C.H.C.J.2507 at 2517*
3. S.15C2) (e) , M..C.D, 1970.
4. Ibid., 15(2)(f).
5. In Pheasant v. Pheasant [1972] Ormrod J , , stated that 
separation is ^undoubtedly the best evidence of breakdown, 
and the passing of time, the most reliable indication that 
it is irretrievable1; see also Adekunle v. Adekunle [1974]
5 C.C.H.C.J.1057.
6. [19-73] Suit No. CAW/90/71, unreported decision of the 
Western State Court of Appeal, 26 January 1973; see also 
Ogala v. Ogala [1973] 12 C.C.H.C.J.89, where it was held 
that it is wrong for the court to hold a post mortem on 
the cause of the parties living apart even when deciding 
issues relating to ancilliary relief; Johnson v. Johnson 
[1972] 9-. C.C.H.C. J. 109.
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shown to. be the cause of the break-up of the marriage by
his or her own. conduct. The trial court noted that if
this view was not accepted,
a petitioner who packs, out of the matrimonial 
home because she becomes pregnant for another 
man. can ask for the dissolution of her marriage 
after living apart from her lawful husband for 
a period of over two years in cases which
come under sub-section (e) if the husband does
not object or for three years in cases which
come under the ground in subr-section (f), 
whether the husband objects or not.
The court held, that the petitioner ought not to benefit from
her own wrong.^ This decision was reversed by the Western
State Court of Appeal, on the ground that the subsection (e)
confers no discretion on the courts, and that, unlike
desertion, which rests on the principle of matrimonial fault
alleged by the petitioner against the respondent, the section
provides for divorce as of right, once the constituent
elements of (1) living apart (2) for two years, and (3) the
respondent does not object to a decree being granted, are
established. Even though the living apart was due to the
respondents wrongful conduct, she could not be rightly
2denied a divorce.
Does Tliving apart7 involve both (a) a physical 
and (b) a mental element?
(a) Physical separation
The Decree provides that the parties to a marriage 
shall be treated as living apart unless they are living with 
each other in the same household. Some courts have inter­
preted this provision literally, and have held that mere
1. See the eloquent appeal to the House of Lords by the .{nonagen­
arian 3 former Lord Chancellor, Lord Simmons, that the House 
should follow ’the pattern of justice, decency, and honour, 
and refuse to the man who comes before you the benefit of 
his own wrong’ Hansard (H.L.) Vol.303a col.1300.
2. See also Majekodunmi v. Majekodunmi. {197^16 C .C.H.C.J .809; 
Tagbo v. Tagbo t19711 Suit No. O/ID/71 unreported decision 
of Onitsha High' Court, 10 Nov. 1971*
2 94
physical separation of the spouses is. enough to. constitute
living apart. The reason which may have caused the initial
separation is disregarded, Thus, in^ Wachuku v .W a c h u k u 1
Aguda, J. (as he then was), held that Tthe reasons for the
parties living apart from each other is irrelevant and does
not come into consideration once they live apart from each
other for at least a continuous period of three years.
The facts of the case showed that the parties had established
professional practices in different parts of the country.
The husband practised law in Aba, while the wife was a
medical practitioner in Ibadan. The husband visited the
wife occasionally, and as a result, the wife had twin
children, one of whom died. The husband ceased his visits
in December 1965> possibly due to the fact that in January
1966 there was a military coup in Nigeria, followed by a
civil war, which ended only in January 1970. The petition
was presented in May 1970. The Judge held that the Tliving-
apart1 provision had been satisfied in the circumstances,
and that unless the parties are physically living in the
same household, the Court must find that the parties are -
2
living apart from each other.
(b) Intention
Most Nigerian cases, following decisions in other 
Commonwealth countries, have held that mere physical separat­
ion does not constitute living apart.. In addition, there 
must be a severance of the marital relationship - a manifest­
ation by one of the parties of the intention to destroy the
■3
matrimonial consortium. In Osho v. Osho, the husband,
1. [1970] Suit No. 1/108/70, unreported, Ibadan High Court, 
30 July 1970.
2. See also .Maj ekodunmi v. Ma,j ekodunmi 11974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 
809. '
3. [1974.] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 829.
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with the wife’s consent,, left Nigeria in 1968 for further
studies in England, The wife joined him there for one
and a half months’ holiday in 1968, In her petition for
divorce, the wife alleged that their living apart commenced
in 1968 when the husband left Nigeria. Odesanya, J., held
that there was no evidence that any event occurred in 1968,
before or after the wife left England, which in any way
affected their consortium. He said:
This type of consensual living apart is 
certainly not within the living apart in 
either section 15(2)(e) or section 15(2)(f) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree. It Is 
not the living apart which can evidence the 
irretrievable breakdown of a marriage.
It is true that for the purpose of either 
section the parties to a marriage are 
treated as living apart unless the living 
apart has a definitely unfavourable impact 
upon the matrimonial relationship.^
The Court held that the parties’ cohabitation came
to an end only in 1971, when their physical separation became
hostile, and the petitioner instructed her lawyer to write
to her husband about their divorce.
2
In the English case of Santos v. Santos. the 
Court of Appeal has held that ’living apart’ only commences 
when one party recognizes that the marriage is at an end; 
until then the spouses are, in common parlance, ’separated’ 
rather than ’living apart’, by force of circumstances. Until 
that date the spouses are not ’living apart’, although they 
may ’be apart’. However, it is not necessary for the one 
spouse’s decision to live apart to be communicated to the 
other, and time begins to run automatically.
1. Ibid., p. 830.
2. [1972] 2 ALL E,R,246,C,A.; £1972] Earn. 247.
3. See also Akioye v. Akioye [1973] 1 W.S.C.A.51; a petitioner 
has to prove not only the factum of separation but also 
that he or she has ceased to recognise the marriage as 
subsisting^, and intended never to return to the other 
spouse.
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There were several reasons for this decision:
(a) There Is a stream of authority on analogous Australian, 
New Zealand, Canadian, and United States provisions, running 
uniformly and clearly in favour of regarding mere physical 
separation as not constituting 1 living apart’, Both a 
physical separation and a mental attitude on the part of 
one or both of the spouses are necessary. ' Provided that 
both spouses recognize the marriage as still subsisting, the 
marital relationship does not end,
(b) It was also stated that if mere physical separation was
required, absurdity^" would result when such definition of
’living apart’ is applied in conjunction with the section
requiring periods of living together up to six months in all
to be disregarded in calculating the period of separation,
2and whether it has been continuous.
(c) Another reason was that the policy of the Act is to 
assist in the maintenance of marriages other than those 
reduced to a mere shell. Divorce by consent simpliciter
is not permitted. Hence, it is necessary for most separation 
cases to receive careful judicial scrutiny, so as to ensure
3
that the stringent test of breakdown has been satisfied.
Many Nigerian decisions have adopted the view 
4
taken in Santos v. Santos that there must be an end to
1. See the comments of Sachs, L.J., in Souza v. Souza (supra) 
’Thus ... a man who came home on leave for less than 20 
percent of the two to two-and-a-half years immediately 
preceding the filing of the petition would be in a position 
to satisfy the court under head (d), even though he and his 
wife had been on excellent terms until they had a row on 
the last day of his last leave ... Unless - contrary to 
our view - the Act intended to permit divorce by consent 
simpliciter such a result would be absurd’.
2. S.2(5) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973* and S.17(2)
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
3. Per Sachs, L.J., in Santos -v. Santos [1972]2 ALL E.R.246,
C , A,; see also per Ormrod, J., in Pheasant v. Pheasant
[1972]1 ALL E.R.587, 589.
4, [197212 ALL E,R,246,C.A,
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consortium before the >living apart1 provision becomes 
operational.^ It is respectfully submitted that this view 
is unfortunate.
(i) The Australian and New Zealand decisions, held to be
2
’very persuasive’ in Santos v. Santos a involve the inter­
pretation of a similar but not identical provision to the 
’living apart’ provisions in the English and Nigerian law.
For example, the Australian Matrimonial Causes Act 1959,^ 
provided that ’the parties must have separated and there­
after must have lived separately and apart’ and ’there is
a
no reasonable likelihood of cohabitation being resumed’.
In the Australian Act, therefore, the parties must have 
(1) separated, (2) lived separately and apart, and (3) 
there must have been no likelihood of future resumption of 
cohabitation. Two of these requirements, (1) and (3) involve 
a mental element, while (2) does not. In the Nigerian Decree, 
and in the English Act, there is no mental element. The 
Decree states quite unequivocally that ’the parties to a 
marriage shall be treated as living apart unless they are 
living with each other in the same household’.
(ii) Many of the cases relied on by the Court in Santos v.
2
Santos3 and by some Nigerian cases, were decided long
1. See e.g. Ogunyemi v. Ogunyemi [1974]11 C.C.H.C.J.1761; 
Akioye v. Akioye [1973] Suit No. CAW/90/71 of the Western 
Court of Appeal; Agu v. Agu [1972]2 E .C.S.L.R.452; Ogunl- 
eye v. Ogunleye [197539 C ,C.H.C .J .1369; Famubode v. 
Famubode L1977J Suit No. ID/204 W.D./76 of 24 Jan. 1977.
2. [1972] 2 ALL E.R.246 C.A.
3. Section 28(m) Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959*
4. Cf. the provision of. the Australian Family Law Act, 1975,
S.48(2): ’a decree of dissolution of the marriage shall be 
made if, and only if, the court is satisfied that the 
parties .separated and thereafter lived separately and 
apart for a continuous period, of not less than twelve 
months immediately'preceding the. date of the filing of 
the application for dissolution of marriage’.
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before the introduction of the divorce reforms in England 
or Nigeria, when the sanctity of marriage received greater 
consideration than it now does. The spirit and policy of 
the new law may therefore he absent from many of these 
decisions,
(iii) The policy of the new divorce law is to assist in 
the maintenance of viable marriages, and not mere empty, 
sham unions. The Decree sets out simple, clear-cut evi­
dential guides which should not be complicated by unnecessary 
investigation into the mental state of the parties.^" A 
factual separation gives an easily identifiable guide
which is justified, when it is borne in mind that the Decree
provides several provisions aimed at a reconciliation of
2
the spouses before a divorce is granted.
(iv) The English Court of Appeal in Santos v. Santos  ^
decided that an uncommunicated intention to terminate the 
marriage suffices to satisfy the 1 living apart1 provisions. 
This interpretation affords the petitioner an opportunity 
to say he had formed such an intention at an earlier stage 
than he had in fact done, unless there is evidence which 
negatives such an assertion. For example, if he had written 
loving letters to the respondent which showed a contrary 
intention. In the absence of such evidence, it is difficult 
for the court to ascertain precisely when the intention to 
terminate the marriage was actually formed.
(c) Where the parties live in the same house.
Where the parties live in the same house, can they
1. In Qgunde v. Fadaviro ri972"l 8/9 S.C, at p.15, the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria stated that *A court of law must refuse to 
be let into construing a legislation clear in its own words 
and language by reference to extraneous matters of inference 
or supposed tendencies see also Mobil Oil (Nigeria) 
Ltd. v. Federal Board of Inland Revenue [1977] 3 S.C.53 -
’ the general rule for construing a statute is that where 
the words of a statute are clear -the court shall give effect 
to their literal meaning*.
2. In addition, in the Nigerian social context, the families 
of the spouses would have made efforts to reunite the 
parties, if reconciliation was possible or advisable.
3. 11972] 2 ALL E,R,246 C,A.
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be regarded as living apart?. This point received judicial 
attention in v. Abisuga^ . The parties were married
In London In 1965, and the marriage had never been a happy 
one. The husband gave a list of cruelties perpetrated by 
the wife which must certainly earn her a place in the 
honours list of husband batterers. Her acts of cruelty 
allegedly included ’ slapping him in the face on several 
occasions’, spitting on him more than twenty times during 
a seven-year period, inflicting several human bites on his 
person, and calling his parents wicked old devils. In 1967 
when the respondent was pregnent, she became so angry with 
the petitioner that she told him the baby she was expecting 
was not his child and called him ’a useless irresponsible, 
senseless, bastard, a nincompoop stinking idiot’.
Because of these and other numerous acts of 
cruelty, the petitioner claimed there was a decline in his 
health, and a doctor had to prescribe tablets for his nerves. 
Consequently, he stated that he could no longer continue to 
live with the respondent as his wife.
The respondent stated that at the time the 
petition was filed, they both lived together under the same 
roof. The petitioner claimed that since 1971, he had had 
no sexual intercourse with the respondent, who resided and 
worked in Ibadan, but came to the matrimonial home in Lagos 
at the weekends. At such times, she merely cooked for the 
children, while the petitioner’s cook prepared his meals.
The parties did not sleep together, and continued to have 
violent quarrels.
The respondent’s counsel submitted that, the 
petitioner knew that the respondent was quick-tempered, therefore/ 
maxim volenti non fit injuria applied; and that since the 
parties have at all times been living together, the facts 
relied upon by the petitioner should be disregarded under 
section 17(1) of the Decree. This subsection reads:
Where the petitioner alleges that the
respondent behaved in such a way that the
1. 1197^] 6 C.C.H.C.J, 819.
3 0 0
petitioner, cannot reasonably be. expected 
to live with him but the parties to the 
marriage have lived with each other for a 
period or periods after the date of the 
occurrence of the final incident relied on 
by the petitioner and held by the Court to 
support his allegation, that fact shall be 
disregarded in determining for the purposes 
of section 15C2)(c) of this Decree whether 
the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected 
to live with the respondent if the length 
I of that period or of those periods together
| was six months or less.
t
j In reply, counsel for the petitioner submitted
! that there had been no cohabitation, although the parties
J  had been living under the same roof.
| George, J., rejected the submission of volenti
' non fit injuria. Although he believed the evidence of the
i
| petitioner, and found that the respondent was an overbearing
[ and domineering woman, he held that the words used in the
j Decree is ’living together’ and not ’cohabitation’. As a
result he refused to pronounce a decree. He said:
I cannot pronounce a decree because of the 
reconciliatory provision of section 17(1) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree. This 
i case brings to the limelight the weakness
of the Decree which makes no provision for 
dissolution of marriages on the ground of 
cruelty simpliciter. What about the expected 
j provision for dissolution of marriages on the
ground of incompatibility of temperaments?
The Decree is silent on this. Are we to say 
| to incompatibles ’go and live apart for a
I period of three years, and come over here
I for judgment thereafter? ’
i ^
| A number of interesting points arise from this
! judgment.
I (i) The Decree does not expressly state what the position
I is to be if the parties have lived together for more than
| six months. Is the petitioner precluded from relying on
section 15(2)(c); or must he merely justify his continuing 
to live with the petitioner in excess of the stipulated 
■ periods? George, J.,’s, decision took the view that the
| petitioner is precluded from relying on section 15(2)(c),
! but this is by no means conclusive. In the English case of
| 1. Abisuga v. Abisuga 1197*06 C ,C,H.C.J .819•
I
i
!|
30 1
Bradley v. B r a d l e y W, petitioned for divorce under S.1(2)
(b) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (which is 
identical with section 15(2)(c) of the Nigerian Decree).
The parties had nine children (seven living with them). W. 
had two separation orders against H. for persistent cruelty, 
but she remained in the matrimonial home (a council house). 
She had no alternative but to sleep in his bed, and cook 
his meals. She even had sexual intercourse once, because 
she was frightened of what might happen if she did not 
submit. Her petition was dismissed. On appeal, it was 
held that the mere fact that W was living with H did not 
prevent her relying on section l(2)(b). it was stated that, 
it was fnot reasonable to expect her to live there, but
2albeit unreasonable, she has no option but to be there1. 
Megan, L.J., stated that section 2C3) [an identical section 
to 17(1) of the Nigerian Decreed, 'does not have the effect 
that, if W has continued to reside in the same household 
with H for a period of more than six months after the last 
act relied on by. her as showing that H Ts behaviour was such 
that she could not reasonably be expected to live with him, 
that necessarily produces the result that she must fail in 
her petition under S.1(2)(b)f The circumstances may 
justify her continuing to stay.
(ii) Of greater interest is the fact that George, J. , found 
that the parties 'were living with each other in the same 
household1, when the wife came home only at weekends, per­
formed no matrimonial services whatever for the husband, 
and most aspects of consortium had ceased.
The learned Judge said:
In reply the counsel for the petitioner 
submitted that there had been no cohabitation 
although the parties had been living under 
the same roof. In any case he submitted 
that the Respondent did not allege that they 
had been living together for six months.
1- H9733 3 ALL E.R.75Q.
2. Ibid. , p. 752, per Lord Denning, M.R.
3. Ibid., p. 753.
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A short answer to this is that in paragraph 
5 of the Answer the Respondent pleaded that 
she and the Petitioner lived together under 
the same roof up to. the time of filing the 
petition. Counsel laid great stress on the 
word ’cohabitation1 hut the word used by 
the Decree is ’living together1.
With respect, it is submitted that the words
used in the Decree are ’living with each other in the same
household’ and not ’living together’ as stated by George, J.
As a result of this mistake, the learned Judge did not
adequately consider whether the spouses were ’living apart’
within the meaning of section 15(3)*
The Decree p r o v i d e s ' a  husband and wife shall be
treated as living apart unless they are living with each
other in the same household’. In the interpretation of-this
provision, many cases^ have adopted the same test as was
ultimately accepted for the factum of desertion under the
old law. Hence, husband and wife are usually regarded as
living apart, even when they are living under the same roof,
2unless that living is in the same household. ’Household’ 
has an abstract meaning and ’essentially refers to people 
held together by a particular kind of tie’. In cases where 
the spouses continue to live under the same roof, the practical 
test applied is usually whether one party continues to pro­
vide matrimonial services for the other, and whether there 
is a sharing of domestic life. Hence they will not be 
’living apart’ if they share their meals and living accommo­
dation, even though they sleep in separate rooms,no longer
4
have sexual intercourse and largely live their own lives. 
Where, however, the parties had no contact with one another, 
although they continued to live at close quarters in a
1. See e.e. Santos v. Santos (supra), Mouncer v. Mouncer 
11972], 1 W.u.R.3'21, 323.
2. S'ee Mouncer v . Mouncer II972.] 1 W.L.R.321, I1972]l ALL
3• Santos v. Santos.(supra).
4. Mouncer v .' Mouncer [19723 1 w.L.B.321.
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council house with two bedrooms,; had not spoken to. one 
another; had no meals together; and the wife had performed 
no duties., for the hushand, although .'he had continued to 
contribute to her maintenance, Wrarigham J. held that the 
parties were not living with each other in the same house- 
hold.1
■ . . P
Fuller v. Fuller, Stamp, L.J., stated that
living with each other connotes ’. . . something more than
living in the same household ^ indeed the words ’with
*3
each other would otherwise be redundant” ’. It’ is respect-
4fully submitted that the spouses in Abisuga v. Abisuga 
were living in the same house but not in the same ’household’ 
nor ’with each other’.
(d) Living Apart for Two. Years
If the living apart is for two years it must be 
shown that the respondent does not object to a decree of
dissolution being granted to the petitioner.
6
In Famoriyo v. Famoriyo , the husband left for
Britain three'days after the celebration of the marriage.
The marriage was not consummated, and the agreement was that
the wife would join him in Britain in three months time.
A year later, he- suggested that the wife should join him,
not as his wife, but as the wife of his brother, and stated
in a letter;
If they need marriage evidence tell brother 
Akin or Mr. Ogunoye anyone can make a 
marriage affidavit in a Magistrate Court...
1. Hollens v. Hollens [1971] 115 Sol. Jo. 327; Hopes v. Hopes 
[1948] 2 ALL E.R. 920.
2. [1973] 2 ALL E.R.650.
3. Cf. Qduneye v. Qduneye [1976] 2 C ,C,H.C.J .439, where 
Agoro, J. held that' the relationship of husband and wife 
existed even though the parties never lived together under 
one roof in any matrimonial home. This decision is in 
accordance with the social reality of Yoruba marital
life where the spouses very often live apart from each 
other; see also-Abioye v .-Abioye [1972] 4 C,C.H.C.J.89.
4. [1974] 6 C ,C,H,C.J . 819,
5. Section 15(2)Ce) M.C.D.1970.
6, £1975] 2 C ,C,H,C,J , 253,
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The wife refused to. comply with this illegal suggestion,
and sued for divorce on the ground of two years- separation.
The respondent was served with the petition, and he filed
an acknowledgement of service, but did not file an answer.
Adefarasin, J., held that the mere fact that the respondent
did not contest the petition is not proof that he did not
object. He said':
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued 
that the mere fact that he does not contest 
the petition should mean that he consents 
to the order being made.
I do not agree with that. It is desirable 
that a party seeking dissolution under 
section 15(2)(e) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, should adduce some evidence of the 
consent of the respondent to a decree of 
dissolution being made unless the respondent 
by his or her answer to the petition should 
make a statement to that effect or he attends 
the trial and say so. The consent of the 
respondent should not be presumed.^
Similarly, Nwogugu writes:
A problem may arise where the respondent 
whose consent to a divorce is necessary 
suffers from mental illness ... Whether 
a valid consent is granted in such a 
situation depends on whether the respondent 
had the capacity to understand the nature 
of the consent and to appreciate the effect 
and result of giving it. The same test, 
therefore applies here as in determining 
whether an insane person has consented to 
a valid marriage ...
It is respectfully submitted that the learned
Judge and writer are mistaken in their . view that the
respondent must consent to a decree of dissolution being
made. Unlike the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973,
which states:
and the respondent consents to a decree 
being granted,^
.fehe requirement in the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree is:
.1. Ibid.
2. Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 161.
3. Section 1(2)Cd), Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973*
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and the respondent does not. object to a 
decree being granted^
There is an essential difference in the two provisions*
’does.not object1 is not the same as ’ consents’. Consent
involves the will, or the feelings, and indicates compliance
with what is requested. Consent can only be evidenced by
a positive action, and therefore can never be validly assumed.
’Does not object1 on the other hand, has two aspects, a
positive and a negative. Non-objection may be expressed
by a positive action, for example vocal or other outward
evidence of non-opposition, but it may also be evidenced
by a negative action when a positive action is required.
'Does not object’ can therefore be presumed from a negative
action. The original draft of the English Matrimonial
Causes Bill, 1973, simply required that the respondent should 
2
’not object’. The requirement was amended, however, before 
enactment, in order to provide greater safeguards for 
respondents, in that they must take some positive step before 
the marriage could be dissolved under this subsection.
It is submitted that, once the Nigerian respondent 
is served with the petition, it must be presumed that he 
does not object, if he fails to enter an appearance or to 
register his objection in any other positive manner to a 
decree being granted. His consent is not required. The 
English respondent, on the other hand, must give his consent. 
His failure to enter an appearance cannot be taken as evidence 
that he has consented.
■3
In Oghenevbede v. Oghenevbede , where the respond­
ent, in answer to the question, ’Do you intend to defend this 
case?’ answered, ’n o ’, it was held that her reply showed
1. Section 15C2)(e) M.C.D.1970.
2. ’What I cannot help knowing was originally in the Bill’, 
per Sir George Baker, P., in McGill v. Robson 11972] 1 
W.L.R. 237 at 238,
3. 11973.] 3 U.L.L,R. 104.
3 06
clearly that she did not obj.ect. .to the decree of dissolute
ion being granted. In Ibeawuchi" v. I b eawuchi^ Oputa J.,
held, however, that a petitioner relying on section 15(2)
(e) of the Decree must, in order to succeed lendeavour
to secure a more positive proof of the fact that the
respondent does not object to a decree being granted. The
learned Judge said-:
... under section 15(2)(e) two things will 
have to be established (i) the living 
apart and (ii) the consent of the respondent 
to the divorce showing that he does not 
object to a decree being granted. When the 
law requires consent it should be shown to 
be a true voluntary consent. In this case 
there is a complete lack of evidence about 
the consent of the respondent. Learned 
counsel for the petitioner did urge during 
his final address that the mere fact that 
the respondent is not contesting this 
petition should be taken as evidence (of 
consent) that he does not object to a decree 
being granted. I am not prepared to go that 
far. There may be so many reasons why a 
respondent may decide not to contest a 
petition, reasons not having anything to do 
with his objecting or not objecting to a 
decree being granted. It is my view that 
those relying on section 15(2)(e) will, to 
succeed, endeavour to secure a more positive 
proof of the fact that Tthe respondent does 
not object to a decree being g r a n t e d I  am 
not satisfied that mere inactivity on the part 
of a respondent offers that proof. I cannot 
grant this petition on ground three which 
also fails.2
Because of the difference between the wording 
of the English Matrimonial Causes Act and the Nigerian Causes 
Decree in certain respects, English precedents, if followed 
in Nigeria indiscriminately, may result in injustice. 
Fortunately, in this particular respect, the majority of 
Nigerian decisions favour the view that no positive action 
is necessary to provide evidence that a respondent does not
1. 11973] 3 E.C.S.L.R. 56“.
2. Ibid,, p . 60,
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object to. a decree being granted; . courts: have usually held 
that failure to. file an answer or to: defend the suit 
indicates non*-obj ection by the respondent.^
The effect of a cross^petition by the respondent 
has also been considered by the courts. Generally, it has 
been held that a cross-rpetition by the respondent cannot 
be taken as an indication that the respondent does not 
object to the decree being granted. It is submitted, 
however, that a cross^petition by the respondent, may be 
taken as evidence that he does object to a decree being 
granted to the petitioner, although he does not object to 
a dissolution of the marriage,
(6) Desertion
The Decree provides a number of other facts on
which a court may hold that a marriage has broken down
irretrievably. Thus the petitioner may be entitled to a
divorce where the respondent has deserted the petitioner
for a continuous^ period of at least one year immediately
2preceding the presentation of the petition. Desertion
3 4may be actual or constructive. Thus in Ogunde v. Ogunde
the respondent took the petitioner back to her motherfs
home, and left her personal belongings outside the matrix
monial home with a short letter which read*
Please your loads are ready for dispatch 
to your house. You may send someone to 
collect them. Safety is guaranteed until
1, S, 17(2) <&f the Matrimonial Causes Decree provides that 
in considering for the purpose of section 15(2). of the 
Decree, whether the period for which the respondent has 
deserted the petitioner or the period for which the 
parties have lived apart has been continuous, *no account 
shall be taken of any one period (not exceeding six months ) 
or of any two or more periods, (not exceeding six months
in all) during which the parties resumed living with each 
other, but no period during which the parties lived with 
each other shall count as part of the period of. desertion 
or of the period for which the parties to the marriage 
lived apart, as the case may be*.
2, Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, section 15(2.),(d).
3, See Johnson v. Johnson 119.7.2']. 11 C , C,K, C ,J ,94.
[19733 10 C.C.H.C.J.113; Segun v. Segun . H°75] 6 C.C.H,C,J ,773
3 08
7 p . m ,, 181 h Dec emb er 19 7 Q ,,
It was held that there could be no clearer case of con­
structive desertion, by the respondent,'1'
Desertion, was a ground for divorce under the 
pre-1970 matrimonial law and, unlike the * living-apart’
provisions of the Decree, it involves the matrimonial
2
offence doctrine,
C7) Presumption of death
A marriage is held to have irretrievably broken
down if the petitioner proves that the respondent has been
absent from the petitioner for such time and in such
circumstances as to provide reasonable grounds for presuming
that he or s^e is dead. The fact may be established by
proof of seven years continuous absence of the respondent
from the petitioner, and of the fact that the petitioner has
no reason to believe that the respondent was alive at any
time within that period, unless it is shown that the
respondent was alive at some time within that period. A
decree absolute under this procedure effectively terminates
4
the marriage even if the other party is still alive. In 
Nnoli v. Nnoli,^  the petitioner stated in 197*1 that his
1. See also Sion v, Sion [1969] 1 ALL E.R.759, C.A., where 
it- was held that unreasonable refusal of sexual inter­
course is a grave and weighty matter which can amount 
to constructive desertion if it drives the other spouse 
out of the home. Cf. Weatherley v. Weatherley [19**7] 1 
ALL E.R.563(H.L.) mere refusal of sexual intercourse
while cohabitation continued could not constitute desertion; 
and Oseni v. Oseni 11972] 12 C.C.H.C.J.110, 117, where 
the husband suggested that his field work had been affected 
by his wife’s refusal of sex, Dosunmu J. held that it 
should rather ’strengthen him in his spiritual devotion’.
2. See Odilli v. Odilli and Anor [1973] 3 E .C .S .L.R.62.
3. The English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, S.19(3) states 
that the period must be *seven years or more’.
4.-Nnoli v. Nnoli [197*0 Suit No. 0/5D/7** unreported,
Onitsha High Court ? 13 December 197**.
5. [197*0 Suit No, 0/5D/74 (supra).
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wife left him on 6 January 1955, and that he had not 
heard from her again. His efforts to trace her had all 
failed. Her father, too, had not heard from her. The 
Onitsha High Court held that she must be presumed dead, 
but stated that even if she was alive the marriage had 
irretrievably broken down. An order for a decree nisi 
was pronounced.
It is submitted that if, before the decree nisi 
was made absolute, the wife had appeared, the decree nisi 
should have been rescinded, as the Decree specifically 
provides that the court cannot hold that the marriage has 
broken down irretrievably, if it is shown that the other 
party to the marriage was alive at a time within the 
period of seven years immediately preceding the date of 
the petition.^
In view of the fact that a divorce may be 
obtained under the Decree after three years factual separ­
ation, the importance of this provision is considerably
2
less than the similar provision in the old law.
(H) Two years delay
No petition for divorce may be presented within 
two years of the date of the marriage, unless application 
is first made to a judge, who may permit the petition to 
be brought on the ground that refusal would impose except­
ional hardship on the applicant, or that the case is one 
which shows exceptional depravity on the part of the proposed 
respondent.
1. See also Gallacher v. Gallacher [1964] The Times, 9 June, 
1964; Manser v. Manser [1940] 4 ALL E.R.238; [1940]P.224, 
cases decided under the old law a decree nisi would be 
rescinded if the other spouse is still alive.
2, See Peacock v, Peacock 11958] P.230, C.A, See also 
Section 14Cl) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965.
3. Section 30 M.C.D, 1970.
3 1 0
Petitions based on the respondent Vs wilful and 
persistent refusal to consummate the marriage, his adultery, 
or the fact that since the marriage the respondent has 
committed rape, sodomy, or bestiality are excepted, and 
may therefore be brought before the expiration of two years 
without special leave.'*'
These exceptions represent a change from the old 
law, which is important, because many of the cases which 
were brought under this provision in the old law would 
have needed no permission under the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree, 1970, as the allegations in most cases included 
adultery,
What constitutes exceptional hardship or deprav­
ity is a question of fact. The courts have generally re­
fused to lay down general rules to fetter the exercise of 
their discretion, since the aim of the provision is to 
promote the preservation of the marriage. The stress is 
therefore on axeeptional depravity or hardship. In the 
cases decided before 1970, it was held that where there is 
nothing more than adultery with one person within the first 
three (now reduced to two) years of marriage, such adultery 
may be considered only as ordinary depravity. Where, 
however, the adultery was coupled with other matrimonial 
offences, which by themselves could not amount, to exceptional 
depravity on the part of the respondent, it could neverthe­
less amount to exceptional hardship imposed on the applicant.
2
In Majekodunmi v. Majekodunmi, Taylor, C.J., held that, 
lack of maintenance for the applicant and the only child 
of the marriage, refusal by the husband to live with the 
applicant under the same roof, coupled with his adultery 
resulting in the birth of a child by another woman, did not 
show exceptional depravity on the part of the proposed 
respondent, but they nevertheless showed exceptional hard-
1. Section 30(2) M.C.D,1970,
2. [19661 2 ALL N.L.R.28.
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ship suffered by the applicant.1
• ■ • 2
In Akere v, Akere 3 the applicant alleged 
adultery coupled with cruelty. The acts of alleged 
cruelty included inordinate sexual demands, made even when 
the applicant was in poor health and had just returned 
from hospital; physical violence, constant neglect and 
quarrelling. The proposed respondent had also infected 
the applicant with venereal disease, and had, in effect, 
turned her out of his home. He had committed adultery 
with three other women, which had resulted in the birth of 
a child to one of the women. Duffus, J., held that the 
allegations, if proved, would amount to exceptional hard­
ship and depravity.
Two important considerations in exercising the 
discretion are whether reconciliation between the parties 
is unlikely before the expiration of the two year period,
“3
and the interest of any children of the marriage.
The view is expressed that this provision con­
stitutes ’a useful safeguard against irresponsible or trial 
marriages and a valuable external buttress to the stability 
of marriages during the difficult early years. It therefore
helps to achieve one of the main objectives of a good 
t\
divorce law1.
However, the provision is unsatisfactory for a 
number of reasons:
(a) Although such a provision may be beneficial in England 
where to a greater extent marriage is an individual affair, 
its relevance in Nigeria is questionable. Before a decision 
to institute divorce proceedings is made, efforts to recon-
1. Cf. Bowman v. Bowman 119491 2 ALL E.R.127, C.A.; [19491 
P.3531 WTv, W, £1966] 2 ALL E.R. 889 119673 P. 291.
2. [1962] W.R.N.L.R, 328.
3. See S. 30(4) Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
4. ’Field of Choice’, para. 19; see also Morton Royal 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1956, Cmd. 9678, 
para. 215; ’Putting Asunder’, pp. 116-117 and para 78.
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cile the parties would have, been made, by their respective 
families, A compulsory waiting period can only prolong 
the agony of the applicant and produce added bitterness 
between the spouses,
(b) The provision seems to run contrary to the aim of the 
new- divorce law, which is to end marriages which have 
irretrievably broken-down, with the least amount of bitter­
ness, distress and humiliation. Subjecting the spouses
to two gruelling public exposures of their private affairs, 
in order to achieve a divorce, does not promote this aim.
(c) Financial hardship may be imposed on a wife whose 
marriage has broken down immediately after the wedding, but 
who needs maintenance from her husband for herself or any 
child of the marriage. Unlike the wife in England, she
is unable to claim maintenance unless she brings a suit for 
divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial separation, restitut­
ion of conjugal rights or jactitation of marriage. Since 
a suit for dissolution of the marriage within two years is 
denied to her, her only alternative unless the peculiar 
circumstances of the case justify a suit for jactitation of 
marriage, is to bring a suit for restitution of conjugal 
rights, which in many cases would be impractical if the 
marriage has truly broken down, or judicial separation 
which involves bringing a suit for divorce, after two years, 
in order to regain her freedom to remarry.
(d) The provision may have the effect of promoting illicit
relations, since the spouses may not be prepared to wait 
for two years before forming other relationships.
(I) The effect of the new divorce law.
A great deal of apprehension has been expressed
at the ease with which a divorce may be effected under the
provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, especially
under its 1 living^apart1 provisions, Oputa, J. , expressed
the main reason for the apprehension:
The facility and ease with which a 
dissolution of a marriage can be procured
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under Decree No. 18. of 1970 is. disturbing 
and 1 may add ominous .to:, the erstwhile 
compact unity, and permanence, of the African 
family and one wonders whether enough 
thought was given to. the effect and impact 
of this Decree on the social and moral 
structure of the African family^
With due respect, it must be pointed out that 
2
this sentiment ignores the customary laws of divorce, and 
disregards the social reality of life in Nigeria. Very 
few Nigerians contract a statutory marriage only. In most 
cases, persons who marry under the Nigerian Marriage Act 
combine it with a marriage according to their respective 
customary law. Comparison of the laws of divorce under 
customary law, and under the Matrimonial Causes Decree,
1970, shows that it is easier to effect a divorce under 
customary law than it is under the Decree. The stability 
of African family life has never been dependent on the 
difficulty of effecting a divorce. The stability of marriage 
in traditional Nigerian societies has been due mainly to the 
attitude of society towards the marital relationship.
This attitude has now changed. This is evidenced 
by the fact that no social stigma now attaches to a divorced 
woman, as it did in many traditional societies. As a result, 
the families of the spouses do not make strenuous efforts 
to reunite the parties when there is a breach, and in many 
cases, they may actively precipitate or encourage the breach. 
Many Nigerian women today marry with no intention that the 
marriage should last. The marital status is a prestige 
symbol which must be achieved at all costs, but once attained, 
the need or desire to retain it is not equally pressing.
1. -Agunwa v .Agunwa 119721 2 E,C,S.L.R.20,
2. See also the adverse comments of Egbuna, J . , in Ogbogu v. 
Qgbogu 11972] Suit No. 0/8D/71, unreported, Onitsha High 
Court, 13 April 1972; and Agbakoba, J., in-Nnebuwa v.
- NhebuWa .119731 Suit No, 0/ID/73 unreported, Onitsha High 
Court of 7 December 1973.
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Increasing marital instability, is an international phenomen­
on. The recognition of. this fact by most countries has 
resulted in a change in their divorce laws, so as to allow 
the spouses to end their marriage as peaceably as possible.
If the permanence of African marriage is threat­
ened, it is due to the. changing attitudes of Nigerian 
society and not to the ease with which a divorce may be 
obtained.
A casual reading of the provisions of section 15 
of the Decree might give the false impression that divorce 
is easy to obtain under the statute, but the various kinds 
of absolute and discretionary bars1 aimed at preventing 
divorce on demand, and the restrictive interpretations 
given to some of the provisions of the Decree by the courts, 
negative such a view. It has been seen that, even in cases 
where the marriage has irretrievably broken down, a divorce
2
has been refused by the courts for one reason or the other.
Of 115 divorce petitions heard in the Lagos High 
Court from March 1970 to December 1970, which were decided 
according to the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Decree 
1970, only 45 (39*1 percent) of them were successful.
This may be compared to the 73 cases heard in 1969, before 
the commencement of the Decree in the same court in 31 
(42.4 percent) of which a divorce was granted.**
There is evidence that the Decree has helped a 
few persons whose spouses had refused to divorce them under
1. See S. 17 Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
2. See e.g. Odaje v. Odaje [1972]10 C.C.H.C.J.100;
Abisuga v. Abisuga [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 819.
3. The provisions of the Decree came into force on 1 March 
1970, and it provided that a matrimonial cause instituted 
before the commencement of the Decree, but not completed, 
shall be continued and dealt with only in accordance with 
the provisions of the Decree. See S.1(1) Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970, Decree No. 18 of 1970.
4. Statistics compiled by the writer from details in the 
Divorce Register of the Lagos High Court.
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the old law, which made it .impossible .for an innocent spouse
to be divorced against his or her will, Such persons were
able to effect a divorce by relying on .the three year
’living apart’ provisions of the Decree. Begho 7. Begho,1
2and Majekodunmi v. Majekodunmi , are cases in point. The 
advantage here is that many of these spouses would be able 
to legalize their stable but illicit relationships with 
other persons the declared intention of the petitioner in 
Maj ekodunmi v, Maj ekodunmi , where the parties had been 
separated for more than forty-six years, had led entirely 
separate lives, and where the petitioner had children with 
other women, but had lived continuously for twenty-four 
years with the woman he proposed to marry. The wife, who 
had apparently committed no matrimonial offence, objected 
to the grant of a divorce. Adefarasin, Ag.C.J., held that 
it was not conducive to the public interest that men and 
women should be bound together in marriage the duties of 
which had long ceased.
Generally, the Decree has produced no flood of 
divorce cases, and can in no sense be regarded as a ’Casa-
15
nova’s charter’. Table 11:1 shows the number of divorce
1* [1970] Suit- No. W/53/70, unreported, Wani High Court,
31 July 1970.
2. [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 809.
3. Ibid., see also Adam v. Adam [1977] 4 C.C.H.C.J. 703*
4. Maj ekodunmi v. Maj ekodunmi [1974] 6 C.C.H.C.J. 809.
5. Lady Summerskill, a leading feminist referred to the 
English Divorce Reform Bill as ’Casanova’s charter’.
See the comments of Lord Stow Hill on the second reading 
of the Bill in the House of Lords, on 30 June 1969, ’This 
Bill has been described as a ’Casanova’s charter’ - an 
odd charge to level against the Archbishop’s Group... 
Casanovas do not bother with charters. If they did they 
would be grievously disappointed with the contents of 
this Bill, This Bill does not open the door to easy 
divorce. That door is wide open now under the existing 
law, and it would be hard to open it wider’.
TABLE 11:1
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DIVORCE PETITIONS BROUGHT IN THE LAGOS.HIGH COURT
Year Total Petitions Wife Petitioner Husband Petitioner
No. % of total N o . % of total
1964 41 20 48.79 21 51.21
1965 62 37 59.68 25 40.32
1966 53 32 60.38 21 39.62
1967 57 34 59.65 23 40.35
1968 65 43 66.15 22 33.85
1969 73 49 67.12 24 32.88
1970 115 63 54.78 52 45.22
1971 97 60 61.86 37 38.14
1972 132 79 59.85 53 40.15
1973 113 61 53.98 52 46.02
1974 121 73 60.33 48 39.67
1975 140
1976 144 - -
up to
29/9/77 83
Source: Compiled from 1 
the Lagos High
details in 
Court,
the Divorce Register of
petitions heard in the Lagos High Court from 1964 to 
27 July, 1977. It is seen that, apart from the years 1970 
and 1972, although there has been a fairly steady increase 
in the number of petitions brought, the rate of increase has 
not been high. The increase must also be counterbalanced 
against the fact that there has been a greater increase in 
the number of statutory marriages contracted. For example, 
the number of statutory marriages celebrated in Lagos in 
1973 was 1716. In that year, 113 divorce petitions were 
brought to the Lagis High Court, The number of divorce 
petitions was 6,58 percent of the number of marriages 
contracted. In 1975, the number of divorce petitions had
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risen to 140,. but the number of statutory -marriages. con~
tracted had also risen to 2306, The number of divorce
petitions was thus 6 percent of the number of marriages.
It is also relevant to note: that from the statistics given
in Table 11:1, wives are more commonly petitioners for
divorce than are husbands1-: in every year but one, wife-
petitioners outnumber husbandr-petitioners. In the years
1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1972 and 1974, sixty
or more percent of divorce petitions was brought by wives.
In 1970, 54.78 percent of divorce petitions was brought 
2
by wives.
6. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE BY DEATH
The death of either party to a statutory marriage 
automatically terminates the marriage. As a result any 
children subsequently conceived by the wife belong to the 
natural father, and the widow has no legal obligation to 
remarry any member of the deceased husband's family.
7. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summary
Many of the rights and duties of the spouses which 
attach to a customary law marriage do not differ significantly 
from those which pertain to a statutory marriage. Thus the 
spouses of both types of marriage have a duty to consummate 
the marriage, and wilful refusal to do so would be a valid 
ground for divorce in both types of marriages. Again? in
1, See Table 11:1; Cf. this with the position in customary
and Islamic law marriage where wives suing for divorce
are always more numerous than husbands petitioners.
2, This may be compared, to the position in England where 
petitions for divorce by wives constituted sixty percent 
or more of all petitions brought in 1971, 1972, 1973, and
1974. See'Civil Judicial Statistics Annual Report, 1974, 
Cmnd 6361, Table E.5.
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both types, of carriage the husband has a duty. to. provide 
his wife with living accommodation, and the spouses have 
a duty to cohabit with each other, although by mutual 
consent the cohabitation need not be under the same roof. 
Similarly, wives of both types of marriage may adopt their 
husband*s surname if they wish to do so. Any prohibitions 
in this respect, which may have been imposed by customary 
law, have been abolished by popular practice.
There are, however, certain important differences 
between the incidents of the different types of marriage 
which have been discussed in this chapter.
(a) In a customary law marriage the husband has an exclu­
sive right of sexual intercourse with his wife and may 
maintain an action for damages for a breach of this right.
This exclusive right is, however, denied to the wife. The 
spouses of a statutory marriage, both husband and wife, 
have an exclusive right to the sexual embraces of each 
other, and the wife of a statutory marriage is entitled to 
claim damages from a woman who infringes her exclusive right 
in this respect, whether or not the woman purports to be 
also a *wife* of the husband. This difference of course
is the natural result of monogamy, which is exclusive to a 
statutory marriage, and which represents the main differ­
ence between a customary law marriage and a statutory 
marriage.
(b) The rules of the affiliation of a child conceived 
during a statutory marriage differ from those of a custo­
mary law marriage. The fact of marriage does not ipso facto 
confer legal paternity on the husband of a statutory marriage. 
Either party may give evidence to prove that a child con­
ceived or born during the continuance of the marriage is not 
the natural child of the husband. In a customary law 
marriage, while the husband has an option to reject legal 
paternity of a child born to his wife during the marriage
on the ground that he is not the natural father, the wife, 
provided the.dowry.has not been repaid at the time of the 
child*-s conception, except where local legislation or the 
courts allow her to do so, may not challenge the legal
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paternity of her husband.,, even though there, is abundant 
proof that he could not be the natural father.
(c) The welfare of the child is the main consideration in 
awarding custody in both types of marriage at the present 
time. Many Customary Court judges, however, because of 
their attachment to the contrary provisions of traditional 
customary law, invariably award custody to the father, 
except where they are forced to observe local legislation, 
or fear that their decision may be overruled on appeal,
(d) Certain evidential and other rules which apply to the 
spouses of a statutory marriage are denied to the spouses 
of a customary law marriage.1
(e) The husband of a statutory marriage has a common law 
duty to maintain his wife. The existence of such a duty
is doubtful in the case of a customary law marriage, although 
it is an enforceable duty in Islamic law marriage. There 
is controversy, however, as to how far the wife of a 
statutory marriage can enforce this duty under the Matri­
monial Causes Decree, 1970, unless she brings a petition 
for the dissolution of the marriage or other ’matrimonial 
cause’, as defined by section 114(1) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree. The wife of a statutory marriage may pledge 
her husband’s credit for the provision of necessaries, a 
right also available to the wife of an Islamic law marriage 
but not to the wife of a customary law marriage.
(f) As far as the dissolution of a marriage by divorce is 
concerned there is an important procedural difference. A 
statutory marriage may only be dissolved by a decree of 
dissolution pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Extra-judicial divorces, which are possible in both custo­
mary and Islamic law marriages, are denied to the spouses 
of a statutory marriage,
Cg) Although the Matrimonial Causes Decree provides that
1. For example the.rules.of evidence relating to communications 
between the spouses during the subsistence of the marriage, 
see further, above, pp. 216-218.
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proof of irretrievable breakdown shall, he the only ground 
on which a divorce may- be obtained, a principle consonant 
with divorce under customary law-, to prove irretrievable 
breakdown, specific facts must be established, and most 
of these facts involve some measure of guilt in the 
respondent. The restrictive interpretations given by 
some courts to the provisions of the Decree have further 
derogated from the principle of irretrievable breakdown. 
Finally, the absolute and discretionary bars in the Decree, 
which prohibit the grant of a divorce decree in some cases, 
are incompatible with the principle of irretrievable break­
down, The result is that dissolution of a statutory 
marriage is more difficult to achieve than in the case of a 
customary or Islamic law marriage.
(h) Except in certain circumstances, a suit for the dis­
solution of a statutory marriage may not be presented 
within two years of the celebration of the marriage. No 
such bar exists in customary law marriages.
B. Conclusion
One of the avowed desiderata of the framers of 
the original marriage legislation was to elevate the legal 
status of women, especially In relation to certain incidents 
of customary law marriage.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the 
introduction of statutory marriage has directly affected 
the legal status of women who have contracted such marriages 
in Nigeria. Theoretically, the advantages of a statutory 
marriage are many, but most of these advantages are rendered 
nugatory in actual practice, for one reason or another.
The main reason seems to be the fact that a statutory 
marriage is almost invariably combined with a marriage by 
customary law, appropriately termed a >double-decker marriageT.
1. See James S. Head, *The Law of Husband and wife in East 
Africa<, in Integration of Customary and Modern Legal 
Systems in Africa, papers presented at the Conference 
held at Ibadan in.1964 and published in 1971, pp. 396-409 
at p. 397; see further, above, Chapter X.
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The .actual position of a wife of a *double^decker marriage’ 
does not differ significantly from that of a wife married 
under customary law alone,
Once a statutory marriage is contracted, as far 
as the marital rights and obligations of the spouses are 
concerned, so long as marital relations remain intact and 
the parties are living amicably, there is no discernible 
difference in the attitude of the spouses towards each 
other, in the two types of marriages. In other words, 
the fact that the marriage is a statutory one-, does not 
generally operate on the minds of the spouses so as to 
affect their behaviour towards each other. A husband prone 
to cruelty does not refrain from chastising his wife 
because he remembers that he is married to her under the 
Nigerian Marriage Act, He would administer punishment 
regardless of the type of marriage contracted.^ The 
catalogue of cruelties perpetrated by the spouses of 
statutory marriages, which is revealed by a study of the 
divorce cases, bears ample testimony to the fact that there 
is no discrimination of treatment according to the type of 
marriage.
The pattern of behaviour of the spouses, allowing 
for individual differences, conform to the pattern of marital 
life in their particular sector of the community, and not 
to the type of marriage contracted. An observer of family 
life in a village would be unable to discern the spouses 
of a statutory marriage from their marital conduct. A more 
valid distinction can perhaps be drawn according to the 
social status of the parties, The wife of a poor farmer 
who lives in a village, and is married under the Nigerian 
Marriage Act, is expected to behave, and is treated in the 
same manner, as her counterpart in a customary law marriage.
1, It should be noted, that although allegedly a husband in 
customary law is permitted to chastise his wife within 
certain limits, physical chastisement of a wife, regard­
less of the type of marriage is a crime under the 
Criminal Code Act, see Criminal Code Act, Cap 42, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958, S.351.
The educated, sophisticated wife of a Senior Civil Servant, 
on the other hand, whatever the type of marriage, contracted, 
may be able to enforce certain obligations on her husband, 
suitable to their social status. For example, she may be 
able to insist that her husband provide money for the 
maintenance of the matrimonial home without any contribution 
from her. But even here, caution must be exercised, 
because there is little difference between what is expected 
of an educated professional wife, and her less sophisticated 
sister in so far as marital duties and obligations are 
concerned.
In most cases, the spouses are not even aware of 
the different incidents attached to each type of marriage.
Two of the most obvious advantages of statutory 
marriages are that parental consent for non-minors, and the 
payment of dowry, are not necessary for the validity of the 
marriage. These advantages may, however, be rendered in­
effective by the insistence of Nigerian women on the cele­
bration of a customary law marriage, in addition to the 
statutory marriage. Although the celebration of a statutory 
marriage may act as a lever to force parents to consent to 
a customary law marriage, dowry is payable, and since there 
is no fixed national level, any amount may be demanded in 
most States. The woman who asserts her independence and 
contracts a statutory marriage without parental consent, 
and hence without payment of dowry, may lose the friendship 
and support of her family, an important factor in the 
Nigerian social context. She may also suffer a loss of 
social prestige, where no dowry has been paid on her behalf. 
Non-payment of dowry, as a result, may affect the stability 
of her marriage. The theoretical benefits conferred by 
the Marriage Act in this respect, are not as great as would 
be imagined, in practical terms.
Another illustration of the gulf between the 
theoretical provisions of the Marriage Act, and the practical 
application of those provisions, is in the sections of the 
Act aimed at protecting monogamy. Many men who contract 
statutory marriages under the Marriage Act subsequently
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purport .to. marry additional wiyes under, customary law, 
although legally the statutory marriage is monogamous.
The fact that such purported marriages are illegal, or 
that a wife can obtain a divorce on the ground of her 
husband’'s adultery with these ’wives’, is cold comfort 
to the wife, especially where she is of advanced years, 
and cannot hope to remarry, or has no substantial sources 
of maintenance. As will be seen later, the meagre sums 
given by the courts to divorced wives as maintenance do 
not justify the inconvenience and publicity involved in a 
divorce suit.
Children produced from such illegal marriages 
have been allowed by the courts to share in the intestate 
estate of the husband, in a few cases, thus frustrating 
the legitimate expectations of the wife and her children.
If the husband contracts a purported* marriage under the 
Marriage Act, or any other statutory marriage, although 
such a purported marriage is void, the ’wife’ and children 
of the void marriage are entitled to claim maintenance 
and other financial benefits from the husband under the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970*
In the present state of the law, even though a 
wife of a statutory marriage has a right to be maintained 
by her husband during the marriage, she may not be legally 
able to enforce this right except by the dubious method of 
pledging her husband*s credit, unless she institutes an 
action for divorce, restitution of conjugal rights or other 
’matrimonial cause’ as defined by the Matrimonial Causes 
Decree.
Similarly, a wife of a statutory marriage is. 
entitled to claim maintenance from her husband after a 
divorce. The level of maintenance awarded to a wife in 
Nigeria, as will be seen later, is unrealistic and bears 
no relation to the actual cost of living, and in most cases,
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no relation to. the. earning capacity of her. husband, The 
prohibitive costs-: of a divorce s-uit. expended in order to 
extract such meagre sums of money- discourage wives from 
instituting divorce suits. In many cases, the costs of 
bringing the action awarded by the courts, usually against 
the husband, do not represent the real costs involved, and 
in such cases the wife is left out of pocket.
The wife of a statutory marriage also faces the 
possibility of maintaining her husband after a divorce.
Many husbands do ask for such ancilliary benefits in their 
divorce petitions, although there seems to be no reported 
decisions where a divorced wife was ordered to pay maintenance 
to her husband.
If the wife of a statutory marriage wishes to 
divorce an undesirable husband, she may find a real obstacle 
in the prohibitive expense involved in securing a divorce.
The option of dissolving the marriage extra-judicially is 
not available to her, even where the husband consents to a 
divorce. On the other hand, the alleged Tsecurity of tenure1 
of a statutory marriage, at best only lasts for three years, 
since three years separation entitles the husband to a 
divorce whether the wife consents or not.
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CHAPTER- XII 
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN
1. General Introduction
Two declarations of the United Nations provide an 
appropriate starting point for a discussion on the property 
rights of Nigerian women in relation to marriage.
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the United Nations’ 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
reads
Without prejudice to the safe^-guarding of the 
unity and the harmony of the family, which 
remains the basic unit of any society, all 
appropriate measures, particularly legislative 
measures shall be taken to ensure to women, 
married or unmarried, equal rights with men 
in the field of civil law and in particular
(a) the right to acquire, administer, enjoy, 
dispose of and inherit property, including 
property acquired during marriage,^
Similarly, the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations, noting that the legal systems of many countries
result in a subordinate status of the wife in family matters
of fundamental importance and that under numerous legal
systems women are, during marriage, deprived of important
personal and property fights,
recommends that governments
(a) Take all possible measures to ensure 
equality of rights and duties of husband 
and wife in family matters
(b) Take all possible measures to ensure to 
the wife full legal capacity, the right to 
engage in work outside the home and the right, 
on equal terms with her husband to acquire, 
administer enjoy and dispose of property^
1. United Nations, Secretariat, Human Rights: A Compilation
of International Instruments (Pub,E .73)5 CNew York 19) _____
2. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Resolution 
5Q3D« (XVI), 736th Plenary Meeting, 23 July 1953.
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The allegedly Inferior proprietary rights of African 
wives, especially under customary law, have been the subject 
of adverse criticism by many writers, and have largely con­
tributed to the low status assigned to African women by 
observers of African family life. Indeed, the nature of the 
legal control exercised by women over their property, part- 
i icularly the products of their own labour and any income which
! may accrue from them, is a valuable index of their status in
| any society.
[ Property rights of the spouses during marriage may be
I important in certain circumstances; for example, in the case
j of a creditor who seeks repayment of a debt contracted by
| either spouse. But generally speaking, so long as the marr­
iage relationship is unimpaired, rights in matrimonial pro­
perty are largely of academic interest. If the spouses are
! living together happily in the matrimonial home, it is of
[
j little practical consequence whether the house or its contents
belong to one, or other of the spouses. As was observed by 
the English Law Commission in its Working Paper on Family 
Property Law:
; While a marriage is happy, the home will normally
be used for the benefit of the family irrespective 
of who owns it. But when a marriage breaks down,
I it becomes important to the spouses to know the
extent of their rights in relation to the home.^
In most cases, the property of one spouse is used by the
other without much concern as to the legal ownership.
Individual ownership is less emphasized in most traditional
! African society than it is in European society. Many items
of property, especially land, are thought of in terms of
2collective rather than individual ownership,
| The need for precise definition and formulation of
1. The Law Commission, Published Working Paper, No.42, Family 
Property Law, 26 Oct., 1971 * p. 335 par. 1.2. The Working 
Paper is now replaced by The Law Commission, (Law Com. No. 
52) First Report onxFamily Property: A New Approach, H.C.
22 May 1973, '
2, See further, below, p, 335.
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rights in property, as between the spouse to a marriage, 
normally arises either when the marriage breaks down before 
the death of one of the spouses, resulting either in separ­
ation or divorce, or when one of the spouses dies. Disputes 
over marital property rights may engage the attention of 
the courts after a separation or divorce, but in the 
Nigerian context, most often when one spouse dies. The 
ownership and enjoyment of property then become prime 
considerations.
The three systems of marriage laws operative in 
Nigeria have different rules pertaining to the property 
rights of wives which show interesting variations.
The topics considered in the following two chapters
are:
1. the nature and ownership of property in Nigeria;
2, the property rights of wives in each type of marriage
during the subsistence of the marriage;
3. the property rights of wives on separation or divorce;
4, devolution of property on the death of one of the
spouses ^ succession.
The first three topics will be discussed in this chapter, 
and the fourth in the chapter which follows,
2. The Nature 6f Property Rights in Nigeria.
It is necessary to indicate briefly the nature of 
property rights which exist generally in Nigeria, in order 
to give a clearer understanding of the rights which may be 
held by the spouses. Such an understanding is especially 
important in relation to the law of succession.
It is convenient to discuss property rights in two
stages:
A. types of property;
B. rights in property.
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A. Types of property
English law classifies property as ’real’ and
’personal’, while many continental legal systems adopt the
Homan method of classification of property as ’movable’ and
’immovable’. Most writers on customary property law in
Nigeria have adopted the Roman system of classification of
2
propertyj rather than the English system. The several 
subjects of proprietary rights under customary laws are 
more conveniently accommodated under a division of property 
into immovable and movable. Since the concept of property, 
and the rights of a person to acquire and deal with property
are defined in terms of customary law principles, the
■3
classification of property into immovable^ and movable 
property will be maintained here. It should be noted, 
however, that although this division is convenient when 
discussing the customary law of property> the Islamic law of 
inheritance makes no distinction between the various types 
of property: movable and immovable, realty and personalty,
ancestral and self«-acquired, all make up a single entity -
1. See Crossley Vaines, Personal Property, 5th edit, by E.L.G. 
Tyler and N.E, Palmer, (London: Butterworths, 1973), pp. 
3^18; Robert Megarry and H.W.R, Wade, The Law of Real 
Property, 4th edit. (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1975), 
pp. lOr-12, In Roman law things were classified, inter 
alia, as immovable (res immobiles or res soli), and movables 
(res mobiles), and the division exists in modern times in 
most continental systems of law; see also Re Hoyles [1911]
1 Ch. 179 at p. 185.
2. See e.g. Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession in Eastern 
Nigeria, 1966, op_. cit. , pp. 10-11; G.B.A. Coker, Family 
Property Among the Yorubas, 1958, 1966, op.cit. , p. 39; 
Ajisafe, Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People, op. cit. , 
p. 8; Obi, The Ibo Law of Property, 1963, op. cit., p.30.
3. S.3, Interpretation Act, Cap 89, Laws of the Federation, 
provides that ’immovable property or "lands” include land 
and everything attached to the earth or permanently 
fastened to anything which is attached to the earth and
all chattels real’. See also the corresponding provisions, 
in the laws of the various states. Cf. the definition of 
’land’ in S.2 Property and Conveyancing Law 1959, of the 
former Western State of Nigeria.
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the estate of a person.1
2
(1) Immovable property.
Immovable property includes land, trees, crops, and 
buildings. Pledges and leases held on these forms of pro­
perty are also classified as immovable.
Land is the most important category of immovable 
property and will be treated further in the discussion on 
ownership of property. Trees included in immovable property 
may be economic trees, such as palm, kola, rubber, orange 
or other fruit trees, and timber. The nature of agricult- 
ural crops has already been noted.
Leases and pledges of land and economic trees, have 
long been recognised under customary law in most parts of
Nigeria. Leases have now been extended to buildings to
4
a large extent, in all parts of the country.
Buildings in the traditional society were mainly
for habitation, and were relatively simple in structure
and design. Equiano, the Igbo writer who was captured
from Igboland during the eighteenth century and taken to
England as a slave, in his memoirs, describes the traditional
houses of his people thus:
These houses never exceed one storey in height.
They are always built of wood or stakes driven 
into the ground crossed with wattles, and neatly
1. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, 1971* op. 
cit., p. 2, Pyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 1949* op.
cit., p. 226; see also the observation of Sir John Beaumont 
in Sardar Nawazish All Khan v. Sardar Ali Raza Khan [1948]
73 I.A.,62 at pp. 773 79; Pyzee Cases, op. cit., 342.
2. ’Immovable property’ means land, and land ’includes any 
building and any other thing attached to the earth or 
permanently fastened to anything so attached but does not 
include minerals’; S.l8(l) Interpretation Act, 1964.
3. See above, Chapter I, pp. 126-127.
4. See Elias, Nigerian Land Law, op. cit. , Chapter 12; B.O. 
Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, (Enugu, Nigeria: Nwamife, 
Publishers Ltd., 1972), Chapters 9 and 10.
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plastered within and without ... Houses 
so constructed and furnished require but 
little skill to erect them. Every man 
is a sufficient architect for the purpose.
The whole neighbourhood afford their 
unanimous assistance in building them and 
in return receive and expect no more recom^- 
pense than a feast.^
Many of these traditional houses are still to be 
found in the rural areas of Nigeria, especially in the 
Northern States. They are, however, rarely seen in the 
main towns, and may be entirely replaced in some parts 
of the country, for example, Onitsha, In the inland town 
where most indigenes of Onitsha live, there are no thatched 
houses. Information solicited about the absence of such 
houses in Onitsha revealed that the last two remaining 
thatched houses there were destroyed during the Nigerian 
Civil War, and had never been rebuilt. It was, therefore, 
surprising to find that there are many thatched houses in 
Calabar. It may be remembered that Calabar was one of the 
first places penetrated by Europeans, and 'it is now the 
capital city of Cross River State, Informants say that 
the reason for the relatively small number of modern houses 
in Calabar is due to the fact that before the creation of 
States in Nigeria, indigenes of Calabar tended to work and 
live away from home. As a result, they built modern houses 
in the places where they lived and worked, rather than in 
their homeland. There has been a reversal of this pattern, 
evidenced by the number of modern buildings which were in 
the process of construction at the time field-work was 
conducted in Calabar.
Dwelling houses built of concrete, several storeys 
high, and elaborate in design, are a common feature in all 
parts of Nigeria at the present time. The ambition of 
every modern Nigerian man is to own a splendid residence in 
his own village or town, regardless of what he may own else­
where. The number of such ’palatialT houses which exist
1. Equiano, Equiano’s Travels, op, cit., p. 6,
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even in the smallest village, sometimes providing an incon­
gruous contrast with the surrounding thatched buildings and 
the general landscape, testifies to the fact that for many, 
such ambitions are fulfilled.
(ii) Movable property.
Movable property in traditional society was relative­
ly limited. It included:
(a) livestock - such as pigs, goats, cattle, poultry, and 
dogs;
(b) household furniture, utensils etc. - these were simple 
in structure, relatively few in number, and in most 
cases locally made;
(c) tools and weapons, implements of husbandry, such as
hoes, axes, and shovels, fishing boats and other
fishing gear, articles of trade, articles of defence 
such as firearms bows and arrows;
(d) wearing apparel and ornaments (in many parts of the
country women were forbidden to wear clothes;1 wearing 
apparel therefore consisted mainly of items of jewelry, 
especially ivory and coral beads; jewelry was important
p
for both men and women);
(e) money, known in different parts of the country as
manillas cowries or rods; money was not extensively 
used, and before the advent of Europeans trade was 
relatively unimportant.
1. See Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, 1921, op_. cit. , 
p. 90; ’the men always put an embargo on feminine 
apparel and until recently have deliberately barred the 
use of clothing’; see also Meek, The Northern Tribes 
of Nigeria, op. cit., Vol.l, p. 40; some groups in the 
North ’refuse to allow their women to wear any type of 
clothing at all, on the ground that if the women wore 
clothes they would become beautiful and be desired by 
men of foreign villages’.
2. They were, however, mainly worn by the kingly and chiefly 
classes; see Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 
Vol. III.
3. For forms of property in the traditional society see 
Mary Kingsley, West^ African Studies, op. cit., pp. 439 
et al.
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The range of movable property has increased consid­
erably in modern Nigeria. The most remarkable change, 
perhaps, is the emphasis placed on the importance of money. 
Movable property now includes money, which may be money in 
the bank or other savings institution, such as thrift clubs;1 
employment benefits in the form of superannuation or 
pensions; stocks, shares or other investments; luxurious 
cars and other vehicles; valuable items of household 
furniture, clothing and jewelry. In short, movable pro­
perty in Nigeria today, does not differ essentially from 
such property found in any European society, although it 
may be more unevenly distributed among the population.
The difference in the types of property owned in 
the traditional and modern society is of special importance 
to the legal status of women in general, and to married 
women in particular. To deprive a married women of the 
legal ownership of a few simple household articles, two or 
three pieces of cloth, or simple items of jewellery she 
may possess, is very different from denying her rights to 
the varied and expensive items of movable property which 
she may now accummulate before, or during a marriage. 
Similarly, it imposes no great hardship, and occasions no 
substantial injustice, if a wife is deprived of inheritance 
rights in her husband*s thatched house, or of the right to
1. Thrift clubs are known among the Igbos as isusu; among 
Eket Ibibios as osusu; and among the Yorubas as esusu; 
'Esusu is a universal custom for the clubbing together 
of a number of persons for monetary aid. A fixed sum 
agreed upon is given by each at a fixed time (usually 
every week), and place, under a president; the total 
amount is paid over to each member in rotation. This 
enables a poor man to do something worthwhile where a 
lump sum is required. There are laws regulating the 
system*. See Johnson, The History of the Yorubas, op. cit., 
p. 119. Also Fadipe, 0£. cit. , p. 137; it is interesting 
to note that an identical custom obtains in Guyana, where 
it was probably taken by the slaves from West Africa. In 
Guyana the system is known as 'box* among the local 
people.
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inherit the other few simple items of property he may have 
owned in traditional society. A similar house could be 
built elsewhere (land was not in short supply), in one day, 
at no cost, other than, perhaps, the provision of a meal 
for the people helping to build the house. The position 
is different when a widow is deprived of rights in the 
matrimonial home costing several thousands of nairas, to 
which she has invariably contributed indirectly, and, very 
often, directly as well. Many Nigerian wives are expected 
to maintain the matrimonial residence, while their husbands 
finance the building of a home in the husbands r native 
villages or towns. In addition, Nigerian husbands now own 
cars, money in the bank, and other expensive movable pro­
perty.
These differences in the type of property owned by 
Nigerians around the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
and in contemporary society, are of fundamental importance, 
and will be elaborated further in the next chapter.
B. Rights in ownership of property
(i) Introduction
It is necessary first of all to define ownership.
As used herein owpership may be summarised as the totality 
of rights and powers that are capable of being exercised 
over a thing. These rights and powers include *the right 
to make physical use of a thing, the right to the income 
from it, in money, in kind or in services, and the power 
of management, including alienation1.1 'The real essence 
of ownership,' says Nwabueze, ?lies in the power of 
alienation ; it connotes essentially the totality of the 
rights of disposal over a thing. The right of disposal 
is not only the most conclusive but also the most valuable
1. Frederick H. Lawson, Introduction to the Law of Propertya 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 195B), p .
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incident of ownership
To identify the right of alienation with ownership
is especially important in dealing with Nigerian property
law. ’Ownership’ in the context of village property termin-
2
ology is a nebulous affair. This fact is quite evident to 
any researcher who attempts to find out from a village 
community the rights of individuals or groups in property. 
Very often an emphatic assertion of ownership is made.
Further questioning, however, as to whether the ’owner’ can 
dispose of her property as she wishes, reveals that all the 
’owner’ possesses is a right of user, usually for life. The 
essential right of alienation, which differentiates owner­
ship from other property rights, is, especially in the case 
of women ’owners’, very often lacking. As Lord Cohen ob­
served while delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in
Q
Enimil v, Tuakyi,
It seems clear from the authorities ... that 
the term owner is loosely used in West Africa, 
Sometimes it denotes what is in effect absolute 
ownership; at other times it is used in a 
context which indicates that the reference is 
only to rights of occupancy ... This looseness 
of language Is, their Lordships think, due very 
largely to the confused state of the land law 
in West Africa as it now stands. As appears 
from the report made in 1898 of Rayner C.J. on 
Land Tenure in West Africa which was cited by 
Viscount Haldane delivering the judgment of 
this board in Amodu Tlj ani v. Secretary Southern 
Nigeria  ^ there' has been introduced into the 
native customary law, to which the notion of 
individual ownership was quite foreign, concept­
ions and terminology derived from English law.
In these circumstances it is not surprising 
that it is difficult to be sure what is meant in 
any particular case by the use of the expression
owner.c 
o
1. Nwabueze, Nigerian Land^Law, op. cit., p. 7.
2. See Leith-Ross, African Women, op. cit_. , p. 102; C.K.Meek,
Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and the
Cameroons (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957)a 
p. 163; Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking 
Peoples. op. cit., Part I, p. 126.
3. 11952] 13 W.A.C.A. 10.
4. [1915-1921] 3 N .L.R,[1921] 2 A.C.399.
5. Enimil v. Tuakyi [1952] 13 W.A.C.A.10, at p. 14.
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Ownership of property in Nigeria may be vested in 
a community, a family or an individual. Although the main 
concern of this chapter is individually owned property,
’family property’ is such an important feature of Nigerian 
property law that no account of rights in property can be 
readily appreciated without reference to the institution 
of family property. Accordingly, the nature of family 
property, and contrasted with individual property, will be 
briefly indicated.
tfc
i
[ (ii) Family property
i
| The subject of family property is vast and fascinat­
ing. Unfortunately only a brief account can be given here,
j but there are excellent books and articles on the subject.*^
| The property of the family is any type of property,
the title to which is vested in the family as a corporate
|
entity. Although all types of property may be the subject
i
of family property, it is in relation to land that the
2system is best appreciated.
Of all the indigenous institutions existing today in
! Nigeria, none is quite as important as land tenure. Theoret-!
' ically, land belongs not to man, but to God. Human beings
Ii
1. See e.g. Coker, Family Property among the Yorubas, 1966, 
op. cit.; B.O. Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op. cit., 
esp. Chapter 3; Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 1971, ojd. cit. , 
Chapter 5.
2. There was a broad distinction between land rights in the 
Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria. In the North, 
all land was held under the Land and Native Rights Pro­
clamation, 1910 (as re-enacted in Land Tenure Law, 1962), 
in trust for the people, by the State. Its disposition 
was under State control, and no title to the use and 
occupation of land was valid without the consent of the 
State (formerly Governor). In the South, lands were not 
under the disposal or control of the State. Most of the 
lands were held by lineages and families. But see the 
recent Land Use Decree, 1973, Decree No.6 of 1978.
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merely have use of the land.1 But the use of the land is
not only for the living. Land belongs to the ancestors,
and it is envisaged that it will also be used by future
generations yet unborn, This idea was most forcefully
put by a Nigerian Chief thus:
I conceive that land belongs to a vast 
family of whom many are dead, few are 
living and countless members are still 
unborn.^
Early acquisition of land was accomplished by
settlement of virgin land. This could be achieved either
by a group or by an individual. Land could also be
acquired by conquest of weaker peoples and appropriation
of their land. Some of the land acquired may be allotted
for the general use of the community, and such lands are
h
usually referred to as communal land.
Most of the land acquired by a group of people was 
allotted on a family basis, a portion of land being given 
to the head of each family. On the death of the founder 
of a family his individual portion of land became the family
1. See E.S, Craigwell Handy, ’The Religious Significance of 
Land’, Royal African Society, 1939, Vol.38, pp. 114-123; 
Meek, Land Tenure, op. cit. , p. 129; Meek, Land Law 
and Custom in the Colonies, op. cit. , p. 162; Green,
Land Tenure in an Ibo Village, op. cit. , pp. 5 and 6.
2. per the Elesi of Odegbolu, before the West African Lands 
Commission in 1908 - see West African Land Commission 
Report, 1948, p. 183; cf, the views of Mary Kingsley:
’In West Africa there is not one acre of land that does 
not belong to someone, who is trustee of it, for a set 
of people who are themselves only the tenants, the real 
owner being the tribe in its past present and future 
state, away into eternity at both ends’. See Mary Kingsley, 
West - African^Studies, 1899, ojd. cit. , p. 438.
3. See Mora v, Nwalusi 11962] 1 ALL N.L.R.681; Amata v. 
Modekwe~[1954], 14 W.A.C.A,581.
4. See Nwabueze, 0£. cit, , pp, 26-74, for a description 
of the nature of communal land,
5. Lord Lugard, Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 
op. cit. , pp. 2 80 et al.
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property of his descendants.^
The term ’family* here used may designate the small
unit referred to as the ^nuclear* family, comprising a man,
and his wife or wives, and children, and probably a few
dependents, who live with him. It may also mean the
extended family defined by Green as
a group of closely related people known by a 
common name and consisting usually of a man 
and his wives and children, his sons1 wives 
and children, his brothers and half-brothers 
and their wives and children and probably 
other near relations.g
The extended family may be thus a very large unit, consisting
sometimes of thousands of people, for example, the Amobi
family of Ogidi, and the Oloto family of Lagos,
Whatever may be the size of the family, the legal
rules relating to family property are the same in any one
community, and may be briefly summarised;
(a) The family has a separate identity which is not affected
by the demise of existing members or the arrival of 
3new ones,
(b) Each member of the family has an equal interest,, but
not a separate property in the family property, which
4cannot be disposed of inter vivos or by will.
(c) The interest of each member of the family in family
property is neither strictly usufructuary in the Roman
sense, nor can it be equated with tenancy in common
5
or a joint tenancy according to English land law.
1. R,W, James, Modern Land Law of Nigeria, Olle-Tfe, Nigeria 
University of'Ife Press, 1973), p. 22; Elias, Nigerian "■
Land Law, op, cit,, p. 117J 'Chairman- L.E.D.B. v. Sunmonu 
L1967J L,L7TT,2 0T “
2. Green, Land Tenure in an Ibo Village, 1941, o j d . cit. , p. 3-
3. The family, however, is not a distinct legal entity 
capable of being sued or of suing in the courts of law, 
Ekwuno v, Ifejiaka £19803 5 F.S.C.156.
4. See Taylor v, Williams [1935] 12 N.L.R.67; Oke and Anor 
v * Oke and Anor. £1974] 3 S.C.l; [1974] 1 ALL'N.L.R.443; 
Johnson and Ors. v. Macaulay and Adu [1961] 1 ALL N,L,R.
743; Ogunmefun v. Qgunmefun and Ors. [1933] 10 N.L.R.82; 
Davies v. Sogunro and Ors £1936]'13 N.L.R.15*
5. See Jacobs v. Oladunni Bros. £1935] 12 N.L.R.l; George and 
Anor v. Fajore [1939J 15 N.L.R.l; Lewis v. Bankole [1909]
i n .l .r .b t :
339
(d) An individual member cannot legally dispose of family
property.^ The title of a member, however, is not
merely possessory, nor is he a life-tenant of his 
2holding.
(e) The offspring of a member of the family cannot be
lightly disinherited from his own share by the surviving
members of his own family,
(f) In the past family property could not be sold under
any circumstances. Individual ownership of land was
4unknown to customary law of many communities.
(g) Family property may now be sold,or otherwise disposed 
of, provided the consents of all principal members of
R
the family are given to such disposal. Partition of 
family property may be effected by mutual consent 
of the members, or by order of a court.
(iii) The family house
A special word is necessary about the concept of the 
family house in customary law. A family house in Yoruba
7customary law was described by Carey, J. in Coker v. Coker 
as follows:
1. A. Caulrick v. Harding [1926] 7 N.L.R. 48; Adagun v..
Fagbola [1932] 11 N.L.R.110; Miller Bros, v. Ayeni [1924] 
5 N.L.R.40; Balogun v. Balogun and Ors"! tl943] 9 W.A.C.A.
78; Chairman L.E.D.B. v. Ashani and Ors.[1937] 3 W.A.C.A.
143.
2-. Nwabueze, :Nigerian Land Law, op. cit. , p. 160.
J. "Lewis v. Bankole [lWSQ 1 N.L.R.82; Att.-General v. Holt
[1915] A.C.599s [1910] 2 N.L.R. p.l.
4. Aganran v. Olushi and Ors. [1907]1 N.L.R.66; Adeniji v. 
Disu L1958] 3 F.S.C.104.
5. Bee Thomas v. Thomas and: Anor [1932]l6 N.L.R.5; Ricafdo 
v. Abal 1192617 N.L.R.58: Sule and Ors. v. Ajisegiri
[1937313 N.L.R.147. Cf. Lewis v. Bankole [1909J 1 N.L.R. 
82 at pp. 96-98 and 103-104; See also Elias, Nigerian 
Land Law, op. cit., pp. 125-130.
6. Johnson v. Onisiwo [1943] 9 W.A.C.A.189; Onasanya v. 
Shiwoniku [I960] W.R.N.L.R.166; See Nwabueze, op. cit., 
pp. 40-49.
7. [1938]l4 N.L.R.83.
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A family.house ... is a residence which the father 
of a family sets apart for his wives and children 
to occupy jointly after his decease. All his 
children are entitled to reside there with their 
mothers, and his married sons with their wives 
and children. Also a daughter who has left the 
house on marriage has a right to return to it on 
deserting or being deserted by her husband. No 
one has any chargeable or alienable interest in 
the family house. It is only with the consent of 
all those entitled to reside in the family house 
that it can be mortgaged or sold. Generally it 
is the residence occupied by the person creating 
the family house that is nominated as such.^
Precise rules relating to the rights in a family house vary
from community to community, but the above passage is an
accurate description of the general nature of a family house.
(iv) Individual property
Individual ownership of land was virtually unknown
in traditional society in Nigeria. There is abundant
2
evidence of this fact in all parts of Nigeria. The land 
allotted to families may be further allocated to various 
members of the family for their individual use, but in 
traditional society no individual could alienate his 
portion of land, nor did he become absolute owner of it.
Temple, reporting on land tenure in Sokoto Province
in 1908, says:
Unless I am greatly mistaken, the one cardinal 
feature of native custom with regard to the tenure 
of land is that under no possible conditions can 
a private estate exist. The essential basis of 
native custom is that the freehold of land belongs 
to the section of the population that has conquered 
and is in possession of that land ... and as far as 
the native rights in land are concerned, I cannot
1. Coker v. Coker [1938] 14 N.L.R.83, 86.
2. See e.g. Cyril Punch, TLand Tenure and Inheritance in 
Yoruba*, Appendix Y, in Great Benin ..., Ling Roth, 1903, 
op. cit. , p. xxi., who maintains that the non-existence 
of individual ownership, and inalienability of land by 
sale, are almost universally expressed by natives who 
are willing to give an opinionT, although the writer 
himself believes that fthe theory of individual owner­
ship being contrary to customary law probably Originated 
about fifteen years ago * .
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find that any radical difference exists between the 
customs obtainable in the pagan and in the Mohammedan 
States, There is no individual in Northern Nigeria 
who can, I believe, say, 1 according to native law 
and custom say this piece of land belongs to nie?.^
Similarly, M.R. Menendez, C.J., reporting on land
tenure in the Central and Eastern Provinces of Southern
Nigeria, in 1908, admitted that a native occupier in Lagos,
Tmay at the present time mortgage his interest in land
with a right of redemption unlimited in point of time’,
but he categorically noted that
In the other Provinces of Southern Nigeria, so far 
as I know this power does not exist. Every member 
of a community appears to be entitled to an allot­
ment of as much land (within reason) as he requires, 
and the conditions attaching to his tenure suggests 
that he is entitled to hold use and enjoy his allot­
ment as a licence in perpetuity, - subject only 
to the reversionary conditions above mentioned 
under which (inter alia) there is denied to him the 
power of alienation, the exercise of which would 
indicate individual ownership.2
These statements may be compared with those made by Nigerians
regarding land tenure in Nigeria, For example, in Ajose
"3
v. The Queen*s Advocate, Efunde and Ors. Chief Faro of Ojora, 
who was deposed by Governor Glover in 1864, for attempting 
to enforce his control over land contrary to the established 
law, in his evidence as a white-capped Chief, gave evidence 
which led Smallman, J., to conclude that tenure of land
1. Percy Girouard, Memoranda on Land Tenure and Land Revenue 
Assessment in Northern Nigeria, P.R.O. Africa (West)
C.0.879, No. 906, May 1908, par. 22.
2• Ibid., Appendix III, Land Tenure in the Central and
Eastern Provinces of Southern Nigeria, by M.R. Menendez,
9th January 1908.
3. [1892] unreported decision of the Supreme Court of the
Colony of Lagos, see C,0.879, No. 906, op. cit.,
delivered on 14 July 1892 cited also in Amodu Tijani v. 
Secretary, Southern Provinces [1921] 3 N.L.R.39*
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.among the Yorubas represented merely the right to the 
beneficial use of the land. All the Assessors in Shango- 
tola v. Idowu and Yaro^1 decided in 1903, gave similar 
evidence.
2
In Amodu TiJani v. Secretary, Southern Provinces,
the Privy Council noted:
... the notion of individual ownership is 
quite foreign to native ideas. Land belongs 
to the community, the village or the family, 
never to the individual... This is a pure 
native custom along the whole length of this 
coast, and whenever we find, as in Lagos, 
individual owners, this is again due to the 
introduction of English ideas.^
Today, individual ownership, not only in Lagos, but 
in all parts of Nigeria, is so prevalent, that the fact that 
it is a modern innovation is often lost sight of. The point 
is of special importance in relation to the property rights 
of women in modern Nigeria, and will be referred to in 
future discussions. It may be noted here, however, that 
because the law has been drastically changed, it is not 
often realised that land was not previously individually 
owned, nor was it previously sold. The alleged incapacity 
of women to own land could therefore not have arisen, since 
individual ownership of land did not exist, and sale of 
land was unknown. Under customary land tenure, land was 
owned by the community, the village or the family, never 
by the individual, male or female.
Individual property is usually self-acquired. Sarbah
1. 11903] unreported decision of the Supreme Court, Lagos,
decided on the 29 July, 1903, before E.A. Speed, actg.
C.J., see C.0.879, No.906, op. cit.
2. 11921] 3 N.L.R.21, 3 N.L.R.50, [1921] 2 A.C.399*
3. 3 N.L.R.50 at pp. 59-60; per Lord Haldane, quoting 
Raynor*s Report on Land Tenure in West Africa, 1898.
Cf. Speed, C.J., in Lewis v. Bankole [1908] 1 N.L.R.81 
at p. 83; 'It is perfectly well known that by strict 
ancient native law all property was family property'. 
See also Sunmonu v . Disu Raphael [1927] A.C.881;
Larki v. Amokor and Ors. L1933J 1 W.A.C.A.323*
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defines * self-acquired' property, thus;-
Property is designated self-acquired or 
private where it is acquired by a person 
by means of his own personal exertions; 
without any unremunerated help or assistance 
from any member of his family; or without any 
advance or contribution from the ancestral or 
family possessions of his family.^
Property may now be acquired by an individual by
2
means of outright purchase, or by partition of family
property. Leases of land and buildings from the States,
or from private individual property. As early as 1909,
Speed, Actg., C. J., said:
The institution of communal ownership has 
been dead for many years and the institution 
of family ownership is a dying institution...^
Nwabueze, in his admirable book, Nigerian Land Law, notes 
that fso prevalent is individual ownership today, that it 
appears to predominate over communal ownership [including 
family property] in the more sophisticated urban centres'.1* 
Several factors have contributed to this change in 
traditional ownership,and to the new commercialization of 
land. Among these may be mentioned the penetration of 
European economic and social ideas; the need of governments, 
companies and individuals for land on which to build 
churches, schools, shops, offices and houses, and industrial­
ization, which, in particular, has attracted people from
1. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, 1904, 3rd edition, 1968, p. 
89. See also Tsetsewa v. Acquah and Anor.[1941] 7 W.A.C.A. 
216.
2. See Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria 
and Cameroons, op. cit., pp^ 216-221, for a description 
of sale of land in the early twentieth century.
3. Lewis v. Bankole [1909] 1 N.L.R. 82
4. Nwabueze, op. cit. , p. 35; see also M.I. Jegede, 'The 
Changing Features of Family Ownership of land in Nigeria',
N.-L. J . , No.5, 1971, P* 19 at pp. 20, 21; Amodu Tijani v. 
The Secretary, Southern Provinces [1921] 3 N.L.R.50;
Oshodi v. Balogun L193^J 4 W.A.C.A.l; Jegede v. Ey.inogun 
[1959J 4 F.S.C.270 at pp. 272-273.
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different parts of Nigeria to the. urban centres, thus 
contributing to the scarcity of land, and consequently to 
the soaring prices of land in those areas.^
3. Property rights'during marriage .
A. Introduction.
There are three possible regimes under which matri­
monial property is usually held.
(i ) The unity of property
Under this system, sole control of all property of
the spouses, ante-nuptial, as well as post-nuptial, vests
in the husband. This was the system which operated under
the English common law, whereby all the wife’s personal
property, and also her income, vested in her husband on
marriage. During the continuance of the marriage, therefore,
the wife ’could possess nothing, alienate nothing, nor
2
bequeath anything’. The principle was another manifestation 
of the legal unity of the husband and wife described by 
John Stuart Mill as ’the doctrine that what is mine is 
yours, but what is yours, is not mine’. Until fairly 
recently, an English wife was totally incapable of devising 
either land or chattels without the direct assent of her 
husband, or a waiver by him of his rights in all her
1. See Lucy Mair, Anthropology and Social Change, 1969, 
op. cit. , p. 48; Meek, Land Law and Custom in the 
Colonies, p. 159; Handy, op. cit., pp. 118-119. A 
small plot of land, (100’ x 50’) in Onitsha Waterside 
area is sold for as much as N50,000, and the cost of a 
similar plot may be higher than this in certain parts 
of Lagos, at the present time.
2. Montmorency, ’The Changing Status of a Married Woman’, 
1897, op. cit. , p. 194.
3. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection-of Women, 1869, op. cit.,
p. 263.
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property.
The unpractical nature of such a principle, as well 
as its obvious injustice to wives aroused public opinion 
during the nineteenth century, expressed in writings and 
campaigns,1 with the result that the system was abolished 
in 1882.2
(ii) The separate^property system
The injustice of the fiction of unity gradually
led to what Lord Justice James in 1877 called ’that blessed
■3
word and thing, the separate estate of a married woman ’.
The system involved complete separation of the property of 
the spouses. The Married Women’s Property Act, 1870, pro­
tected the wife’s earnings from her husband. This Act was 
later repealed by the much more comprehensive measure, 
the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, which broadly, put 
husband and wife on a footing of equality as regards property. 
What a man owns before marriage, and subsequently acquires, 
is his alone; what a woman owns before marriage, and subse­
quently acquires, remains hers alone. Under a regime of
strict separation of property, marriage has no effects on
4
the property rights of the spouses inter se; and the wife’s
1. See Francis Power Cobbe, Criminals, Idiots, Women and 
Minors: Is the Classification Sound?, 1869; Mill, The 
Subjection of Women, l8693 op. citT, Erna Reiss, Rights 
and Duties of English Women: A Study in Law and Public 
Opinion (Manchester, Sherratt and Hughes, 1934).
2. Montmorency notes that contrary to what is stated in the 
textbooks - that the doctrine of separate property came 
into existence during the reign of Queen Elizabeth - the 
conception of separate estate may be traced back to much 
earlier days: and that there are suggestions of such an 
idea in Bracton and in the Year Books, 0£. cit. , p. 194.
3. See Montmorency, 0£. cit. , p. 194.
4. There are minor exceptions, e.g. under S.17 of the 
Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, for settling disputes 
between husband and wife concerning the ownership and 
possession of property; the Act does not apply where a 
woman was married before 1883 (so long as that marriage 
still subsists) as regards property acquired by her before 
that date, unless it was held for her separate use in 
equity, S.4(1)(a); but it seems unlikely that any property 
in Nigeria is still excluded in this way from the operation
of the Act.
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legal Insubordination was replaced by *a principle of 
perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the 
one side, nor disability on the other*.^
(iii) The Doctrine of community property
2
Several American States, as well as some Continental 
countries; operate a system of Community of property*.
There are different systems of community of property, or 
of gains or accountability, to which attach precise rules, 
but generally, all property acquired by both spouses during 
the marriage (and sometimes also ante-nuptial property) and 
before the institution of divorce suit is usually held 
jointly by the spouses. The system is built on the idea of 
marriage as a partnership in which husband and wife work 
together as equals, and the wife’s contribution to the joint 
undertaking, which may be solely in the form of running the 
home and looking after the children is regarded just as 
valuable as that of the husband in providing the home and 
supporting the family.
While the marriage subsists the husband is invariably
“5
the manager of the joint property, although ideally the 
community property should be administered by husband and 
wife acting together.
When the marriage is dissolved, either by divorce 
or death, the community property is usually shared equally
1. J.S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, 1869, P« 263.
2. See B. Bodenheimer, *The Community Without Community 
Property*, California Western Law Review, No.8 , 1971, P«
381; Inger M. Pederson, *Matrimonial Property Law in 
Denmark*, 28 M.L.R., 1965, pp. 137-153.
3. For e.g. in seven out of the eight community property 
States - Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisana, Nevada,
New Mexico and Washington, although the property is shared, 
the husband has the conclusive right to manage and control 
the estate - see *Women*s Legal Rights in 50 States*, 
McCalls, Vol.98, Feb. 1971, PP• 90-95; Only Texas has 
eliminated this inequality by amending its community 
property law to provide: *each spouse shall have sole 
management, control and disposition of that community 
property which he or she would have owned if a single 
person* - Texas Rev. Civ. Stats. Art. 4621.
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between the spouses.^
The property rights of women in each type of 
marriage in Nigeria will be examined, in order to see the 
type of property regime which governs the rights and 
liabilities of wives in each type of marriage, and how far 
the wives* property rights accord with the standards set 
by the United Nations Declaration,
B, Customary Law Marriage
(i) Introduction,
Women*s rights over property in Nigerian traditional 
societies, are obscured in a welter of conflicting state­
ments made by different writers, and in the equally con­
flicting statements made by informants who were interviewed 
during field-work. When these conflicting statements are 
sifted, however, the picture that emerges definitely reveals 
that among the large majority of communities, women, 
including married women, were not debarred from holding 
movable and immovable property.
It is important to remember that personal property 
in the traditional society was severely limited in range 
and quantity among the ordinary people. The property that 
was generally owned by a married woman included the few 
household utensils given to her by her family, on the
1. For the arguments against, and in favour of the adoption 
of community property in English matrimonial property 
law see the Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage 
and Divorce 1956, Cmd. 9678; members of the Commission 
were unable to reach agreement on whether it would be 
desirable to introduce into English and Scots law 
community of property between husband and wife. Twelve 
members considered it undesirable to introduce community 
of property, even as a limited measure confined to the 
matrimonial home or to the furniture. Seven members 
were of the view that the concept has much to commend it, 
as an effective and practical expression of partnership 
in marriage, but differed as to the extent to which the 
system should be adopted. Of the seven, three members 
would confine it to the matrimonial home and the furniture, 
and one to the furniture alone; see further 0 Kahn-Freund, 
TMatrimonial Property: Some Recent Developments* 22 M.L.R. 
1959, pp. 241-272.
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occasion of her marriage; her personal jewellery and
ornaments, and her own farm products, such as yam-seeds,
etc. There is evidence that generally a woman always
had full capacity to own such property before marriage.
After marriage, separate ownership was retained, whether
the property was taken to her husband’s home, or not.
As long ago as the early eighteenth century, Bosman, with
reference to the whole of the West African Coast, noted:
Married people here have no community 
of goods; but each has his or her own 
property.1
Similarly, Mary Kingsley, who travelled widely in
West Africa during the latter part of the nineteenth century
says emphatically:
Betwen husband and wife there is no community 
in goods under native law; each keeps his and 
her separate estate^
These statements may be compared with that made by Talbot
more than a century later and with reference to the whole
of Southern Nigeria. He says:
Among all tribes the wifefs property is 
exclusively under her own control and can 
never be touched by her husband; she leaves 
it to whom she likes, usually to her daughters 
or sons, but sometimes to her own relatives.
Since women do the greater part of the trading, 
they are often wealthier than the male members 
of the household, especially in ornaments, 
clothes, flocks and herds.^
Among the Ekois, he noted that women’s property rights were
very strictly guarded by native law, and that Ta man may not
even use his wife’s or daughter’s cooking pot or pan without
4
her permission’. The property rights of women in the whole
1. Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of 
Guinea, 1705, op. cit., p. 202.
2. Kingsley, West African Studies, op. cit. , p. 377*
3. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, Vol. Ill, pp. 455 
and 678.
4. Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush, 1912, p. 98. See also 
Partridge, Cross River Natives, 1905, p. 255.
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of Nigeria and the Cameroons- are positively stated by Meek,.
who seems to have no doubt whatever as to a womanTs legal
capacity.to acquire and enjoy rights and interests in land.
He notes that
A woman may own land in her own right - 
land which she had acquired before marriage 
by her own money or by inheritance or gift.^
With reference to the Northern tribes of Nigeria, he
similarly says:
Women in general have the same rights of 
enjoyment and disposal of property as men...^
It may be stated, therefore, that a Nigerian woman in the
traditional society had the legal capacity to own all types
of property, a capacity which was not lost by a contract of
marriage. This was the general position, and while it may
apply to an entire group, for example, the Yorubas, the
principle of female ownership of property, especially of
land, was by no means universal. A closer look at the
position among the various Nigerian communities is therefore
indicated. The position among (i) the Yorubas, (ii) the
Igbos, (iii) other communities, will accordingly be
examined.
(ii) The Yorubas.
It is an indisputable fact that a Yoruba married 
woman always had legal capacity to own and dispose of all 
types of property, including land. In fact, the legal 
status of a Yoruba married woman was, in this respect, 
superior to that of the English married woman before 1882.
As was previously stated, and will be elaborated later, 
the latter was absolutely debarred from owning most items 
of property.
The capacity of a Yoruba woman to own land and 
other property, is evidenced by the fact that she had an
1. Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and 
the Cameroons, 1957 3 P» 186.
2. Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 281.
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equal right with her brother to inherit property from her 
father, and other relatives. Of course, in the context of 
the traditional society, where a woman transferred residence 
when she married, and her children became members of her 
husband1s family rather than her own, any established 
enforceable equality of rights between male and female 
members of a family would be of limited practical effect. 
Moreover, where farming is primarily a male activity,1 and 
where no alienable individual right is recognized (as none 
used to be), the female rights would be regarded as less 
important. However, this is not to deny^the existence of 
the right.
Of the ancient system of land tenure among the
Yorubas, Ward Price asserts:
It was not contrary to customary law to grant 
land to women, or even children. It was done 
rarely however. Nearly every woman was married 
and shared what her husband possessed; but if 
it happened that a woman, with means to build 
or to cultivate, was in need of land for the 
purpose, it could be granted to her on the same 
terms as if she were a man. If she was a wife 
her husband could not claim to have any right 
over the property, but her son or her daughter 
could inherit some or all of it.g
A similar statement about Yoruba wives was made by
Punch. He noted that
Daughters as well as sons inherited farm land.
If a person owns many farms they would be 
'divided among his children. The eldest son 
would take the biggest ... Young children and 
daughters unable to farm the land, would not 
take possession of their portions. The elder 
brother would possess in trust for them. A 
daughter married to a man from another tribe 
would inherit, and if the husband took up his 
abode with the tribe, he would continue in 
occupation of his wife's land, provided there 
were no children. In event of children they 
would inherit the mother's land, but they also 
would have to reside and be members of the
1. Yoruba women do not usually engage in farm work, see 
above, Chapter I, p. 130.
2. Ward Price, Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces, 1939, 
p. 29; see also Ellis, The Yoruba-Speaking Peoples, 
1894, 0£. cit. , p. 177; ’••• the property of a wife is 
always separate and distinct from that of her husband1.
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tribe.1
The capacity of the Yoruba married woman to own
2property has not changed in the modern society, and her
right to own land, and other types of property, as well as
her right of equality in regard to inheritance rights,
have been recognized in various decisions of the Nigerian 
-3
courts.J
4
In Abike v. Majotegba and Anor. a a case decided in 
197^, the respondent sued the first appellant (his wife), 
and the man with whom she was alleged to have committed 
adultery, for damages. The action succeeded before the 
trial Customary Court. The appellant appealed to the High 
Court. Agbaje, J., held that an action for damages for 
adultery cannot lie against a wife under customary law. He 
said:
The status of a wife under Native Law and 
Custom is a little removed, if at all, from 
that of a chattel. This being so, it is 
evident that the wife under Native Law and 
Custom cannot have private income or property 
of her own. In such circumstances one wonders 
where the money with which she will settle any 
damages for adultery against her will come from.
1. Cyril Punch, Land Tenure and Land Inheritance in Yoruba, 
Appendix V in Ling Rothfs Great Benin: Its Customs Art 
and Horrors, 1903, p. xxiii. Cf. C.W. Rowling, Report on 
Land Tenure in Ondo Province, Sessional Paper, No.5 of 1952, 
p. 32; who cites cases from Akoka and Oka (Yoruba) to show 
that ’Customary law forbids a woman inheriting any real 
property from either parent or husband1, and concludes 
’Women do not own land: there is no exception to that rule’.
2. See e.g. Marris, Family and Social Change in an African City,
1961, p.53; !A wife’s profit from her trade is her own and
she spends it mostly on her personal needs, her children
and in helping her own relatives’; see also N.A. Fadipe,
The Sociology of the Yoruba, 1937 (1970) edit. p. 88;
Ekundare, Marriage and Divorce Under Yoruba Customary Law, 
1969, p.24.
3. See e.g. Johnson and Ors. v. Macaulay and Anor [1961] 1 ALL 
N.L.R.743; Oshilaja-and Anor. v. Oshilaja and 0rs.[1972]10
C.C.H.C.J.11; Salako v . Salako and Ors. [19653L.L.R.136;
Taiwo and Anor v. Taiwo and Anor.[l956]3 F.S.C.80; Williams 
and Anor v. Facade and Anor [1971]2 U.I.L.R.477.
4. [1974] Suit No.AB/5A/74, unreported decision of July 5, 1974,
see Nigerian Law Journal, No.9, 1975, P* 154.
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The learned Judge cited no authority in support 
of the proposition that a wife under Yoruba customary law 
cannot have private property or income of her own. It 
should be noted that although the Married WomenTs Property 
Law which gives full legal capacity to wives of a statutory 
marriage does not apply to customary marriages in the West, or 
Mid-Western States, this statute does not change Yoruba 
customary law. It is respectfully submitted that the learned 
Judge’s view is based on an inadequate knowledge of Yoruba 
customary law.
(iii) The Igbos.
The property-owning capacity of Igbo women cannot be
stated with precision. The customary law in this respect
seems to range from one extreme to another, in different
Igbo sub-groups. The most positive statement of the property
rights of Igbo women comes from Meek. He says of a wife
among the Igbos.
If she brings with her from her own home a 
supply of seed-yams, the product of those seed- 
yams is her own, and if she leaves her husband 
she can take her yams with her. Goats dogs and 
fowls brought from her own home remain her own 
property. Any money she makes by her own 
efforts (e.g. by trading or selling part of her 
farm produce) belongs to her entirely. Many 
wives in fact are richer than their husbands, 
and cases occur of wives supporting the husbands 
instead of husbands supporting the wives. In 
former days many women owned slaves; and rich 
mothers, instead of fathers might provide their 
sons with wives.1
It is appropriate to note here that the contribution 
of Igbo women, noted in the above passage by Meek, has not 
changed in modern society. More and more Igbo women are 
providing, not perhaps wives, but, more importantly, education
1. C.K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe., ,op. .cit.. . 
pp. 202-203. Cf. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria. 1921, 
op. cit. . p. 93; ’The only possession that can really be 
labelled as the property of a wife are her waterpot, market 
basket and calabash, together with her cooking utensils, 
and all the vegetable called koko (edde).’
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for their sons ^ and for their daughters too - instead of 
their husbands doing so. The Rt. Hon. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
the former President of Nigeria, and Owelle of Onitsha, 
recently reminded the people of this fact, when writing on 
the crisis occasioned by the recent controversy between 
the Onitsha community and the former Administrator of the 
former East Central State, over the ownership of, and the 
allotment of stalls in, the Onitsha market. The dedication 
of Zik’s book on the crisis was as follows:
1 Dedicated1
to our Mothers, Wives, Sisters and Daughters, 
whose maternal instinct and inherent diligence 
enabled them to utilise markets to husband 
their resources and educate their brood who, 
ironically, allow their talent and power to be 
used to deprive Onitsha womanhood of this . 
ingredient of cultural identity^
Meek!s statement of the capacity of Igbo women,
married or unmarried, to own property, is supported by
Nwabueze, who says of the Igbo woman:
She occupies a very inferior position in the 
social structure. This does not, however, 
reflect on her capacity to hold land outside 
the context of community or family land. She 
is perfectly competent to acquire land in her 
personal capacity by purchase, gift, pledge or 
otherwise.^
Similarly, Obi states:
Before marriage, a woman can purchase land in 
her own name. She can also take a lease of a 
plot at a rent, take a pledge or have a piece 
of land "shown to her" ... A married woman can 
own land personally, and this in her husband1s 
life-time. This is a common phenomenon among 
elderly women with grown-up children and among 
younger but childless wives ... whoever 
actually makes use of the land, ownership is 
in the woman who purchased it or obtained it on
1. Nnandi Azikiwe, Onitsha Market Crisis, (Nsukka, Nigeria, 
Zik Enterprises Ltd. 1976).
2. Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op. cit., p. 171*
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pledge, lease, etc . ^
Statements to the same effect are made of the
2
property-owning rights of Igbo wives, by other writers.
There are, however, some Igbo communities where it
is alleged, that women were not allowed to hold land. For
example, Green, writing about women in the small Igbo
village of Umueke Abgaja, asserts positively:
Women do not own land. The village is an 
exogamous unit and a woman after marriage 
lives in her husband’s village.^
The meaning of this statement is not quite clear.
Obi interprets it to mean that women have no legal capacity 
4
to own land, but the writer may have merely stated a 
positive fact' - that women in Abgaja did not in fact own 
land, in which case, womenfs incapacity to own land cannot 
be deduced from her statement. The statement, therefore, 
cannot be taken as an authority on the legal incapacity of 
Igbo women generally, or of Abaja women in particular, to 
own land.
1. Obi, The Ibo Law of Property, op. cit., pp. 70-71; Obi, 
Modern Family Law, op. cit_. , p. 257; ’a married woman 
has legal capacity to acquire, own and dispose of 
property in her own right and in her own name, under 
customary law’. Cf. Gloria Anyaegbunam, Sociology of an 
Ibo Village Group: A Case Study of Ogidi Town, B.S.C. 
dissertation, University of Nigeria, p. 40, ’"if a woman 
wants to acquire land she does this through her husband 
or her children and when she dies such land is owned by 
her husband if he is alive or jointly by her sons; Ania- 
golu, ’Aspects of Customary Marriage’, 0£. cit., p. 115.
2. See e.g. Esenwa, ’Marriage Customs in Asaba Division’, 
op. cit. , p. 73; Meek, Land Law and Custom in the 
Colonies, op. cit. , p.159 ; Uchendu, ’Concubines Among 
Ngwa Igbo’, £2.. cit. , pp. 187-188.
3. Green, Land Tenure in an Ibo Village, op. cit., p. 7;
Green, Igbo Village Affairs, op. cit. , p. 34; see also 
Thomas, Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples, 
op. cit., Part IV, pp. 136-140.
4. See e.g. Obi, The Ibo Law of Property, op. cit_. , p. 69; 
Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 1971> p. 133.
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A clearer statement of the incapacity of Igbo women 
to own land is contained in the Customary Law Manual of 
Anambra and Imo States, published in 1977. Referring to 
the right to own freehold land, the Manual states:
(1) Any adult male has a right to own free­
hold land.
Local variations - In Abakaliki and Izzi 
Divisions individuals do not own freehold 
land.
(2) Married women (whether living with their 
husbands or separated from them) and widows 
do not own freehold land.
Local variations - Such women may own freehold 
land in Aba, Afikpo, Arochukwu, Bende, Idemili, 
Njikoka, Nkwere, Nnewi and Northern Ngwa 
Divisions, Nsukka Division excluding Nsukka 
Town where the general rule applies) Ohaffia, 
Onitsha, Orlu, Oru and Owerri Divisions^
The Manual lists a total of thirty-nine Divisions as
existing in the two States. It seems, therefore, that in at
least twenty-five Divisions, married women were not allowed
to own land. In twenty Divisions, an unmarried adult woman
2
was similarly incapable of owning land.
The Manual further states in section 322:
(1) Where a woman acquires moveable property
while she is married, such property belongs 
to her exclusively, but like her own person, 
is subject to the overall control of her 
husband...
(2) Where a woman acquires immovable property, 
(land, buildings and economic trees) while 
she is married, such property belong [sic] 
to her exclusively but, once again are [sic] 
subject to the overall control of her husband. 
Moreover, the wife has no right to dispose of 
such property in any way whatever without the 
prior consent of the husband.
(3) A married woman must first obtain her husband*s 
consent before she can give away any property 
she acquired during marriage (movable or 
immovable) to any person other than her child 
either in her life-time or by will.
1. The Customary Law Manual, 1977a p.8.
2 . Ibid., p . 8.
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Section 323 of the Manual provides;
Property, whether movable or immovable, 
acquired by a married man does not become 
the common property of himself and his wife 
or wives. A married man does not require the 
consent of his wife or wives before he can 
dispose of any property movable or immovable 
which he acquired while married. It makes no 
difference that he acquired such property 
with the help of his wife or wives.
There are no local variations to the laws as stated
in sections 322, and 323* These laws, therefore, apply to
all communities in Anambra and Imo States, and affect
millions of women in these two States. The laws stated in
the Manual purports to be ’current well-established customary
laws as ascertained in the course of field research carried
out. over a period of five years1, by a team of law officers
appointed by the Government of the then East Central State.
Customary law in Nigeria is treated in the Superior
Courts as a matter of evidence, and section 58 of the
Evidence Act provides;
In deciding questions of native law and custom 
... any book or manuscript recognized by natives 
as a legal authority [is] relevant.^
The fact that the laws contained in the Manual purport 
to be the laws accepted and recognized by the various commun­
ities as binding on them, coupled with the fact that the work 
was prepared under a Government directive, give the Manual 
sufficient status to be regarded by judges, both in Customary 
Courts and in the Superior Courts, as an authority on Igbo
1. Evidence Act, 19^5> Cap 62, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958. See Adedibu v. Adewoyin [1951]13 W.A.C.A. 
191; West African Court of Appeal held that Mr. Ward 
Price’s Memorandum of Land Tenure in the Yoruba Provinces, 
a detailed study by a former administrative officer was 
not of sufficient eminence to warrant its citation to 
the court as an authority. Cf. Suberu v. Sunmonu [1957]
2 F.S.C.33.
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Customary law.^ The above provisions in the Manual are, 
therefore, important, and call for comment.
Before discussing the validity of the substantive 
provisions set out above, it may be pertinent to point out 
two relevant facts relating to the procedure adopted for 
the ascertainment of .the laws stated in the Manual.
Thirty-nine Divisional Law Panels, comprising 
natural rulers, Administrative Officers, community leaders, 
barristers practising in their Divisions, former members 
and presidents of Customary Courts, and other persons, etc. 
(whether literate or not), were set up. Questionnaires 
calling for information on the law relating to the subjects 
covered by the Manual were distributed to the Law Panels.
The Panels consulted members of the communities, and in 
most cases they submitted written answers to the question­
naires. These written answers were tested and recorded in 
subsequent recording sessions by the Law Panels, under the 
Chairmanship and guidance of the Commissioner for Law 
Revision and his Law Officers.
(a) Of the 463 members of the 39 Divisional Law Panels,
which were set up in the various Divisions, only two members,
one in Aba Division, and the other in Abakaliki Division,
2
were women. All other members of the Panels were men.
One wonders why where was such a poor representation of 
women on the Law Panels in communities where a relatively 
large percentage of the women are educated. The poor female 
representation does not inspire confidence in the impartial­
ity of the laws stated.
1. See Adeseye v. Taiwo [1956] 1 F.S.C.84; Suberu v. Sunmonu 
[1957J 2 F.S.C.3T; Oyekan v . Adele [1957J 1 W,L.R.«7b at 
882, where books written by individuals were relied on
by the Courts, although the books had not been put in 
evidence; cf. Adedibu v, Adewoyin [1951] 13 W.A.C.A.191*
2. See The Customary Law Manual, op. cit. , Schedule I,
pp. 374-365 for a list of the members of the Divisional 
Law Panels, and Recording Sessions held.
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(b) Of the 104 persons personally interviewed by the 
present writer in Onitsha, only two-of them had any knowledge 
of the work undertaken by the Commissioner for Law Revision 
and his team. Both persons who knew about the project had 
been members of the Law Panel in Onitsha Division. In 
Nsukka, none of the interviewees had heard of the project 
either. Individuals from other Divisions who were asked 
about the project were similarly ignorant. One wonders 
how many members of the various communities were actually 
consulted.
With particular reference to the laws relating to 
the legal capacity of married women to own land or other 
property, as stated in the Manual, and as set out.above, 
the following observations should be noted:
(a) It is doubtful whether any community or State has
the legal authority to deprive a sane adult Nigerian woman
of her capacity to own land, or any other kind of property,
to the same extent as a man can, in view of the ’Fundamental
Rights’ provision of the Nigerian Federal Constitution 1979 >
which prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex.1 The
Constitution has the force of law throughout Nigeria, and
where any other law is inconsistent with its provisions,
the Constitution prevails and that other law is to the
extent of the inconsistency void. Any customary law which
incapacitates women, but not men, from owning property is
2
consequently void.
(b) The statement of the laws in the Manual which 
deprives a married woman of the right to own property, 
movable or immovable, and of her right to dispose of such 
property without her husband’s consent, is misleading in 
that it takes no account of the Married Women’s Property 
Act, 1882. The.customary law, in this respect, is incompat­
ible with the provisions of the Married Women’s Property Act
1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) 
Decree 1978, S.39(a)•
2. Ibid., Ss. 1(1) and 1(3).
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1882, which is a statute of general application in Anambra 
and Imo States. The provisions of the Manual as such are 
not enforceable by the court s. 'L
(c) Similarly, the customary law as stated in the 
Manual, which purports to deprive married women of testa­
mentary capacity to dispose of their individual property.
is incompatible with section 3 of the Wills Act, 1837, a
2statute of general application in the two States.
(d) If the customary laws as propounded in the Manual 
were enforced, it would result in great injustice to women, 
and defeat the expectations of many men. For example, in 
all Igbo communities, daughters are generally given no
3
inheritance rights in their fathers1 intestate estates.
Many fathers defeat this principle of customary law by 
making wills providing for their daughters. Such provisions 
may be in the form of land, houses, money or other forms 
of property. A father’s intention would be defeated, if 
his married daughter has no capacity to own the property he 
has devised to her, or her disposal of such property is 
subject to the consent of her husband.
(e) Finally, and perhaps most important, the laws as 
stated in the Manual are contrary to the actual practice 
of the people. It is doubtful whether any Igbo community 
today prevents women from owning land. This certainly is 
not the practice in Onitsha. There are numerous cases of 
married women owning lands and houses in Onitsha. Informants 
denied that such a law ever existed there. It was admitted
1. See further above, Chapter II, pp.182-183; for the 
development of this argument see below, p. 371 et_ al.
2. See further below, Chapter XIII, the provisions of the 
Wills Act in this respect is amended by the Married 
Women’s Property Act, 1882.
3. But see Esenwa, op_. cit. , p. 8l, who notes that among the 
Igbos of the Asaba District, the law has now changed and 
Nowadays, owing to our contact with the white man, all 
children have equal claims to their father’s property, 
and where he dies intestate legal steps are always taken 
to see that each of the children has his or her due 
share’.
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that women do not inherit land from their fathers, but 
there never was, nor is there now any customary law which 
prevents them from purchasing land. In Nsukka, informants 
stated categorically that a married woman can own all types 
of property,1 and can dispose of it without their husband’s 
consents.
The law as stated by Obi, Nwabueze, and other 
writers to the effect that Igbo women have full legal 
capacity to acquire, and dispose of property without 
restraint, provided they were sole owners of the property, 
correctly represents the current customary law among the 
Igbos.
(iv) Other communities.
In many of the other communities, women had legal
capacity to own all types of property. The property rights
of Hausa women are stated by Palmer:
No native woman is by custom in manu of 
her husband. She inherits, acquires, and 
disposes of property as a femme sole.^
Among the Edos, the position is a little less precise.
Among the Edos of Benin, a woman’s property is said to
include cattle, trees, and slaves, as well as household 
3
utensils. The right of a Benin wife to own property was 
stated by Dapper in the early seventeenth century. He 
asserts:
The husband takes all the property which his 
wife has left, for himself, without leaving 
to the children anything, but what their 
mother had given them during her life-time.
This statement shows that the wife in Benin customary law
had legal capacity to own property, and to dispose of it,
at least to her children, during her life-time. It is not
1. The present writer was allowed to purchase land according 
to the customary law, of Nsukka.
2. See African (West) CO 879a No. 906, Memoranda on Land 
Tenure and Land Revenue Assessment in Northern Nigeria, 
by Sir Percy Girouard, Colonial Office, May 190b, App.
IV, para. 6.
3. Roth, Great Benin, op. cit. , Chapter IX, p. 97.
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certain whether the right of the Edo-speaking woman to own
property extended to the ownership of lands. Of the
Northern Edos, Bradbury states:
Women have no rights in land, but may obtain 
plantations by purchase, gift, or by paying 
labour to plant and work them.
It is not clear what the writer means by this inconsistent
statement, but he admits that the information concerning
rights to land among the Etsaka [Northern Edo] is somewhat
confused*.1
Among the Ibibios, it was stated that women had no
2rights under customary law to own land in Eket, but such a 
law is no longer operative there, since the present writer 
was shown lands and houses belonging to women, and the 
Customary Court cases examined in the Eket Customary Court 
files recognized the legal capacity of women to own land, 
although they may not inherit land from their fathers.
The Efik Ibibio women, however, like the Yorubas, have 
always had full legal capacity to own all types of property, 
and indeed, like the Yorubas, also inherit property from 
their fathers. Marriage has no effect on their property 
rights. Many cases were recorded in the Calabar Customary 
Court involving claims by women to -the ownership of land.
In some communities,even movable property of a 
married woman under the traditional customary law belonged 
legally to her husband. This was the position among the 
Idomas as described by Armstrong. He states the position 
thus;
1. Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit. , p. 107.
2. Information gleaned from interviewees in Eket.
3. When Mary Slessor wanted land to erect a Mission house, 
she could not acquire land, according to the law of 
Calabar since she was a European, but she was able to 
acquire it in the name of "Jean and the other girls’* (her 
domestics and helpers) and then to give the Mission a 
perpetual interest in it, see Livingstone, Mary Slessor 
of Calabar, 1918, op. cit. , p. 223. The land and the 
houses she built in Calabar are still owned by the 
Mission.
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The property which a married woman acquires 
does not belong to. her but to her husband . ..
Since women in Idoma, as in many parts of 
West Africa are enthusiastic traders, they 
amass considerable property during their 
married life. This may be in the form of 
money, clothing, and even houses built to be 
rented. All property acquired by a wife as a 
result of successful trading is regarded as 
belonging to the husband, and when he dies it 
becomes part of his estate, to be divided 
equally among his sons, or amongst his brothers 
if he has no sons.^
Summary:
A review of the existing literature on the property 
rights of Nigerian women married according to customary law 
reveals an inconsistent pattern. Whilst among most commun­
ities, for example the Yoruba, a clear doctrine of separate 
marital property existed, among quite a few other groups, 
the principle of unity of title was practised, and this 
involved absolute ownership by the husband of all his wife’s
property, movable and immovable. Community of property,
2
which is found in some parts of Southern Africa, seems to 
be unknown among Nigerian communities.
Summing up the position, it may therefore be stated 
that under traditional customary laws in Nigeria:
(a) most Nigerian married women had legal capacity to own 
movable property;
(b) the majority of married women could also have owned 
land and other immovable property;
1. R.G. Armstrong, ’Intestate Succession Among the Idoma1, 
in Studies in the Laws of Succession in Nigeria, edited 
by Duncan M. Derrett, 1965, p. 224-225; See also 
Alvin Magid, Men in the Middle: Leadership and Role Conflict 
in a Nigerian Society (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1976) , p . 33• Cf. the Ghanian case of Quartey v. 
Martey [1959] G.L.R.377 where it was held thafj rby custo­
mary law it is the duty of a man’s wife and children to 
assist him in the carrying out of his duties of his station 
in life. The proceeds of that joint effort, and any pro­
perty which the man acquires with such proceeds, are by 
Customary law the individual property of the man,not the 
joint property of all’. Contrast the recent Ghanian case 
of Abrebesh v. Karr and Ors [1976] 2 G.L.R.46.
2. See H.J. Simons, African Women: Their Legal Status in 
South Africa, 196b, pp. 16b-172.
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(c) in some communities married women were debarred from 
owning land;
(d) in a few communities, all property, movable and immovable 
acquired by a married woman legally belonged to her 
husband.
(v) The effect of the. Married Women’s Property Acts, 1882- 
1893.
The position of a wife married according to customary
law in regard to the ownership and disposal of property has
been revolutionized by the reception of English law. As
previously stated, before l87o\ the position of the English
wife under the Common law was little better than the position
2
of the Idoma wife as stated above. The ’doctrine of unity’
operated to place most items of the wife’s property in the
legal ownership of her husband.
The common law position was changed by the enactment
of a series of statutes which effectively deprived the
English husband of his stranglehold on his wife’s property.
The Married Women’s Property Act 1882, the most important
Act of the series provides:
A married woman shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Act, be capable of acquiring, 
holding,and disposing by will or otherwise, of 
any real or personal property as her separate 
property, in the same manner as if she were a 
femme sole, without the intervention of any 
trustee.^
Similarly section 2 of the Act expressly provides:
1. The Married Women’s Property Act 1870 provided a number of 
exceptions to the common law rule, e.g. it provided that 
specified types of property acquired by the wife, such as 
her earnings, stocks and shares, money in the bank, etc. 
should be deemed to be held for her separate use. The Act 
was repealed by the Married Women’s Property Act 1882.
2. See below, p. 369.
3. Section 1(1) Married Women’s Property Act 1882.
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Every married woman who marries after the 
commencement of this Act shall be entitled 
to have and to hold as her separate property 
and to dispose of in manner aforesaid all 
- real and personal property which shall belong 
to her at the time of marriage, or shall be 
acquired by or devolve upon her after marriage, 
including any wages, earnings, money, and 
property gained or acquired by her in any 
employment, trade, or occupation in which she 
is engaged, or which she carried on separately 
from her husband, or by the exercise of any 
literary, artistic, or scientific skill.
The effect of these sections was to free married
women from all incapacities in relation to the holding and
disposal of property to which they were subjected under
the common law.
The Married Women’s Property Acts satisfy the
criteria of statutes received into Nigeria, as previously
noted,^ under the general reception of English law. The
p
Act of 1882 has been applied in many cases in Nigeria. 
These cases, however, all involved statutory marriages, and 
it seems to be taken for granted by legal practitioners in 
advising their clients, and indeed by legal writers, that 
the Married Women’s Property Acts only affect the wives of 
a statutory marriage. Thus one learned writer on property 
law states:
The English Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, 
as amended in 1894 and 1893, is a statute of 
general application in force in England on the 
relevant date and therefore applied in Nigeria 
to women married under the Nigerian Marriage 
Acts, until its application was prohibited or 
varied by local legislation.^
1. See above, Chapter II, p. 195.
2. See e.g. Ogedegbe v. Ogedegbe [1964] LL.R.209; Egunjobi 
v. Egunjobi [197^]4 E.C.S.L.R.; Asomugha v. Asomugha 
[1972]12 C.C.H.C.J.91.
3. See O.R. Marshall, ’A Critique of the Property Legislation 
of Western Nigeria’, Nigerian Law Journal, Vol.l, No.2, 
December 1965, pp. 151-172 at p. 162; see also Park, 
Sources of Nigerian Law, op. cit., pp. 33 and 51; Obi, 
Modern Family Law, op. cit. , pp. 260 and 266-267.
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The writer was. referring to the former Western Region where 
the English Married Women’s Property Acts were replaced 
by a local statute, the Married Women’s Property Law, 1958, 
which substantially re-enacted the provisions of the Married 
Women’s Property Act, 1882.
It is respectfully submitted that there is no 
justification for limiting the application of the Married 
Women’s Property Act, 1882, to women married under the 
Nigerian Marriage Acts. The Statute applies to all wives 
of a statutory marriage, whether they were married under 
the Nigerian Marriage Act or not. The property rights of 
women married according to customary or Islamic laws are 
governed by the provisions of customary or Islamic law 
respectively. In so far, however, as these provisions of 
customary or Islamic law are incompatible, either directly 
or indirectly, or by implication, with the Married Women's 
Property Acts, such provisions are not enforceable by 
Nigerian Courts. This is due to the fact that customary 
law (including Islamic law) only applies in Nigeria in so 
far as it is ’not repugnant to natural justice, equity and 
good conscience or incompatible with any law for the time 
being in force'.^ ’Any law' includes a statute of general 
application.
2
In the recent case of Adesubokan v. Yunusa, a Moslem 
from Kwara State died leaving property in ZaMa, and in 
Lagos. He purported to make a will under the Wills Act, 1837, 
a statute of general application in the Northern States.
This will offended Islamic law in that it deprived his heirs 
according to Islamic law, of the shares to which they were 
entitled under the Maliki Islamic law operative in the 
Northern States. The trial Judge, Bello, J., held that a 
Moslem of the Northern State of Nigeria is entitled to 
make a will under the Wills Act, 1837, but that he had no 
right to deprive by that will any of his heirs who were
1. See above, Chapter II, pp. 182 et_ al.
2. [19731 3 U.I.L.R.22.
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entitled to share his estate under Islamic law. The 
Wills Act does not restrict a person’s power of testation 
while Moslem law does. On appeal to the Supreme Court, 
it was held that the Islamic law, which favours equal 
distribution of property, despite the existence of a valid 
will, violates section 3 of the Wills Act, 1837, under 
which a testator can dispose of his property as he pleases. 
The Supreme Court stated that section 3^(1) of the Northern 
States High Court enjoins the High Court to observe and 
enforce the observance of every native law and custom which 
is not incompatible either directly, or by implication with 
the Wills Act 1837, and that the Islamic law which the 
trial Judge applied in the case was incompatible with the 
Wills Act, since the definition of native law and custom 
in Northern Nigeria includes Islamic law.
It is submitted that, in so far as the customary 
laws of any State, except Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, and Bendel 
States,^ deprive married women of the capacity to acquire, 
or hold separate property, or to dispose by will or other­
wise of such property, or which provide that such property, 
ante-nuptial or post-nuptial, shall belong to, or be con­
trolled by her husband or anyone else, are incompatible
with sections 1 and 2 of the Married Women’s Property Act,
2
1882, and are consequently unenforceable.
The Married Women’s Property Acts do not apply in 
Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, and Bendel States. The Married Women’s 
Property Law, 1958, originally enacted in the Western 
Region but which now applies to these four States provides:
1. Since 1972, the Lagos State (Applicable Laws) Amendment 
Edict, No.11 of 1972, makes applicable within Lagos State, 
the Wills Law, 1959, W.R.L.N. 1959, Cap. 133 of the 
former Western Region of Nigeria. The Lagos State has 
not, however, adopted the Married Women’s Property Law, 
1958 of the former Western Region. The Married Women’s 
Property Act, 1882 therefore applies in Lagos State.
2. See further, below, p. 377.
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Nothing in this Law shall affect the 
capacity, property or liabilities of any 
persons married solely in accordance with 
the requirements of customary law.^
Women married according to customary law, including 
Islamic law only, in these four States are therefore un­
affected by the Married Women's Property Law, 1958, nor 
are they affected by the (English) Married WomenTs Property 
Act, 1882. Their capacity to acquire, hold and dispose 
of property depends entirely on customary law. But it 
has been seen that Yoruba customary law recognizes the 
right of a married woman to own separate property. The customary 
laws of most of the other communities in those four States 
also allow women to own separate property. The position is, 
therefore, that the large majority of women married accord­
ing to customary law have full proprietary capacity.
C. Islamic Law Marriage
Under Islamic law, there is a complete separation 
of property of husband and wife.
According to classical Islamic law theory, a Moslem 
wife is entitled to her separate property during the marriage.
All the property given to her by her parents, or other 
relatives, which she takes to her husband1s home, remains 
in law her absolute property, over -which she has full 
control and free disposal. Her husband has no right to 
dispose of any of her property, including her mahr (dower) 
without her consent. No distinction is made between the 
two kinds of property. The same rule applies to movable and
1. Cap 76, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 
Revision, S.1(2); see also Cap 98, Laws of Bendel 
State, 1976, S.1(2).
2. See Shiekh M.H. Kidwai, Woman: Under Different Social and 
Religious Laws (Buddhism!, Judaism, Christianity, IslamT^
197&7 P •151* See also J.A. Ibrahim, 'The Muslims in 
Malaysia and Singapore: The Law of Matrimonial Property', 
in Family Law in Asia and Africa, edit, by J.N.D. Anderson, 
196b, p.182; Abdur Rahman, Institutes of Mussalman Law, 
op. cit., p. 114, art. 206.
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immovable property,^ however acquired.
The Maliki school of Islamic law, however, which
as previously noted operates in Northern Nigeria, prevents
a married woman from giving away gratuitously, more than
one-third of her property, without the consent of her 
2
husband. It may be said, therefore, that a Moslem wife
in the Northern States, legally owns only one-third of
the property she possesses, since her power of alienation
of the remaining two-thirds is restricted by law.
There is evidence, however, that as far as movables
are concerned, Moslem husbands do not ordinarily interfere
with their wives’ attempts to dispose of their property,
and most wives enjoy full ownership of their personal
property such as money, clothes, jewels, household utensils, 
3
etc. As far as land is concerned, there is an open 
divergence among Moslem communities, between the concept
4
of Islamic law, and the actual practice observed. Most 
Moslem groups observe customary law in relation to land, 
rather than Islamic law, and this results in women being 
deprived of land ownership in many cases. This aspect will
1. See Mulla, Principles of Mohamedan Law (India, Tripathi 
Ltd. , 17th edition, 1972), par. 51T
2. 1 Property (mal) in Islamic law is anything which a 
Muslim can legally own, whether a corpus or usufruct.
In the eyes of the Sharia there are certain things 
which are not considered as property because they are 
unlawful to Muslims, for example, khinzir, i.e. swine 
flesh, wine, musical instruments, etc., see Muhammad 
Yahaya, ’The Legal Status of Muslim Women’, op. cit. , 
p. 1, at p. 16.
3. See Muhammad Yahaya, ’The Legal Status of Muslim Women 
in the Northern States of Nigeria*, Journal of the Centre 
of Islamic Legal Studies, Vol. 1, No.20, p.-l. at p. 17*
4. See Charles Henry Robinson., Hausaland, or Fifteen Hundred 
Miles through the Central Soudan, 18963 P* 206.
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be dealt, with further in the next chapter- which deals with 
inheritance.
The capacity of the Moslem wife to acquire, hold 
and dispose of property is, as under customary law, now 
affected by the Married Women*s Property Acts, 1882-1893, 
which are also statutes of general application in the 
Northern States. A married woman has full capacity to 
acquire, control and dispose of all items of property 
without interference by her husband, and the restraint 
imposed by Maliki law on her legal capacity to dispose 
of any part of her property is not legally enforceable.1
D. Statutory marriage
Under the English common law a husband gained seisin
of all freehold, and in most cases, copyhold lands, which
his wife held at the time of the marriage, or acquired
during coverture, and was entitled to the rents and profits
derived from them. The wife had no power to dispose of
her realty during the marriage. All the wife*s other
property, whenever acquired, also belonged to the husband,
and he had absolute power to dispose of them inter vivos.
In the case of pure personalty, he could also dispose of
them by will. The only exception to this rule applied
to the wife*s clothing and personal ornament suitable to her 
2
rank. The wife could not dispose of her personal clothing 
and jewellery during the marriage, but the husband could 
dispose of them during his life-time, although he could 
not deprive her of them by bequest, and on his death they 
became her property and did not form a part of his estate.
1. See further, below, p. 377.
2. Her so-called *paraphernalia*.
3. See Bromley, Family Law, 1976, p. 429-434; for fuller 
accounts, see Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England Book I, Chapter 15; Albert Venn Dicey, Lectures 
on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in 
England During the Nineteenth Century. 2nd edit. CLondon: 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1962), p . 371-398.
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The common law position was drastically changed by
the Married Women’s Property Acts 1870-1893* The Married
Women’s Property Act 1882, provides that any woman marrying
after 1882, should be entitled to retain all property owned
by her at the time of the marriage as her separate property
and that, whenever she was married, any property acquired
by a married woman after 1882, should be held by her in the
same way. It also enacted that
A married woman shall ... be capable of 
acquiring, holding, and disposing by will 
or otherwise, of any real or personal property 
as her separate property, in the same manner 
as if she were a feme sole, without the inter­
vention of any trustee.
Since 1870, therefore, the basic principle of English 
law is that marriage has no effect on the spouses property 
rights: in the words of Viscount Dilhorne in Gissing v. 
Gissing,^ ’There is not one law of property applicable where 
disputes as to property is between spouses or former spouses 
and another law of property where the dispute is between 
others’♦
The Married Women’s Property Acts 1870-1893, as
previously noted, qualify to be received into Nigeria under
2
the general reception of English law, and have been applied 
in a few cases involving a statutory marriage. In the West
and Mid-Western States, the relevant Act is the Married
4 5Womens Property Law, 1958. In Egunjobi v. Egunjobi,
Agbaje, J., stated that the Married Women’s Property Law of
the Western State ’is an exact reproduction of the Married
Women’s Property Act, 1882’.
1. [1971] A.C.886 at p. 889.
2. See above, Chapter I.-
3. See Egunj obi v. Egunj obi [1974] 4 E .C.S.L.R.552; [1964] 
L.L.R.209* Asomugha v. Asomugha [1972]12 C.C.H.C.J.91; 
but see the discussion below, p.
4. Cap, 76, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 
Revision.
5. [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R.552.
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It has already been submitted that except for the 
Western and Mid-Western States, the Married Women*s Property 
Acts apply to all married women regardless of the type of 
marriage.'*' From the foregoing the general statement may be 
made that the matrimonial property regime which operates in 
the whole of Nigeria, with a few possible exceptions in 
the Mid-Western States is the ’separate property’ system.
E. A conflict of laws
(i) Introduction
The conflict of laws produced by the existence in
Nigeria of three different, and often conflicting systems of
marriage laws, has been previously noted. One such conflict
was noted in connection with the monogamy provision of the
Marriage Act which conflicts with the provisions of customary
2and Islamic laws under which a man may practise polygamy. 
Another conflict, which will be discussed in the next chapter, 
and which is of vital importance to the legal status of 
Nigerian women, concerns the inheritance rights of a widow
■5
in the estate of her deceased husband who dies intestate.
Both of these conflict of laws problems have received the 
attention of the Nigerian courts to some extent. A conflict 
of laws which has not apparently been the subject of much
judicial, nor indeed of academic comment, revolves around
the applicability in Nigeria of the Married Women’s Property 
Act, 1882.4
The issue is of vital importance to women’s status 
in view of the superior property rights the statute gives to
1. See further, below, pp. 363-369.
2. See above, Chapter X.
3. See below, Chapter XIII.
4. 45 and 46 Viet., C.75,
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married women, compared with those given under Islamic law, 
and some systems of Nigerian, customary law. Several questions 
arise; is the statute applicable in Nigeria; is it applicable 
only to spouses of a statutory marriage, or does it also 
apply to spouses of a customary or Islamic law marriage;
| is the whole statute applicable, or is the application in
Nigeria limited to certain sections?
I
(ii) The application of the Act in Nigeria
!
| The vital question here is whether the Married Women!s
j Property Act, 1882, is a statute of general application in
!
| Nigeria. This depends on whether the statute was
(a) a statute of general application in England;
(b) in force in England on the first day of January, 1900.1
[
There seems little doubt that the statute satisfies
I 2
the above criteria. In addition, however, the statute can
be in force in Nigeria so far only as the limits of the local
jurisdiction and local circumstances permit. By this
provision not every Act which is of general application in
England is automatically in force in Nigeria. Brett, P.J.
has expressed the principle as follows;
i
! The court would be free to hold that local
I circumstances do not permit a statute to be
in force if it produced results which were 
manifestly unreasonable or contrary to the 
intention of the statute.^
As to whether the Married Womens Property Act, 1882 
I satisfies this latter criterion, it is pertinent to note that
I the same learned Judge pointed out that the widespread
1. High Court Law, Cap. 49, Laws of Northern Region of Nigeria, 
1963 Revision, S. 28 ; there is a similar provision in the 
other High Court Laws, see above, Chapter II, p. 195.
2. See Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, op. cit.3 pp. 18-36.
3. High Court Law, Cap 49, Laws of the Northern Region of 
Nigeria, 1963* Revision, S, 28.
4. Lawal v, Younan E1961] 1 ALL N.L.R. 245 at p. 257.
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existence of polygamy in Nigeria would raise the. issue, most
acutely if the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882,. ever fell
1 2 to be considered. Indeed Park, in his excellent book,
The Sources of Nigerian Law, lends some support to the dicta
of Brett, L.J, In discussing the application in Western
Nigeria of the English Married Women’s Property Act, 1882,
he says:
Before 1959, though the point was never expressly 
decided in a court, that Act was probably in force 
in the Region as being a statute of general 
application in England on January 1, 1900. It 
was, of course, quite inappropriate to many 
Nigerian situations, particularly polygamous 
marriages, but under the rules as to internal 
conflict of laws the Act would have no effect in 
relation to such marriages, and therefore was 
probably not excluded on the grounds that local 
circumstances would not permit its being in force 
,.. simply to enact the terms of the English Act 
would have had disastrous effects, for it would 
have resulted in its rules applying to all 
marriages in the Region, whether monogamous or 
not.
It is difficult to appreciate what the writer means 
when he states that the Act is ’inappropriate to many Nigerian 
situations, particularly polygamous marriages’. There seems 
to be no logical reason why the Act should be more appropriate 
to a monogamous marriage than to a polygamous marriage, since 
the most important provision of the Act is securing to a 
married woman the capacity to acquire, hold and dispose of 
her separate property in the same manner as if she were a 
feme sole —  a capacity already possessed by most Nigerian 
women who are married polygamously under customary law. It
1. Ibid.,
2. Park, Sources of Nigerian Law3 op. cit.., p. 51; see also 
p. 33. ’If the Act was held to be in force in the juris­
diction, the rules of internal conflicts would operate in 
such a way that it would only apply to women married mono- 
gamously under the Marriage Act (Cap 115), and perhaps not 
to all of them. It would certainly not apply to women who 
had contracted polygamous marriages under customary law.
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has been seen that most Nigerian married women have full 
capacity under customary law to acquire, hold and dispose 
freely of, separate property without intervention from their 
husbands.*^ Yoruba married women, especially, have the same 
rights in this respect as unmarried Yoruba women. Conse­
quently, the application of the Married Women’s Property Act, 
1882, in the former Western Region of Nigeria would have
resulted in no significant changes, at least as far as Yoruba
2
women are concerned.
Although admittedly, the application of the Statute
would result in a change of the customary law in the few
communities which deprive married women of.full property
rights, the change cannot be regarded as ’a disastrous effect’
or manifestly unreasonable so as to oust the application of
the Act under the reception provision.
It is submitted that the Act satisfies the criteria
of the reception provision, and as such- is a statute of
general application in those States which have not ousted
-5
its application by local legislation. Indeed, the courts 
have by implication recognized the application of the Act, 
and in many decisions have declared a married woman capable 
of suing, or of ’being sued either in contract or in tort
4or otherwise, in all respects as if she were a feme sole’,
1. See above ,pp347-363 •
2. Cf. the position in Akan customary law, see A.N. Allott,
"The Effect of Marriage on Property in the Gold Coast",
5 Int. and Comp. Law Quarterly, 1956, pp. 519-533 at p.532.
3. See above, pp. 366-367.
4. This is implicit in the fact that all married women, irres­
pective of type of marriage contracted are permitted to
sue and be sued in contract and in tort in the Superior 
Courts of Nigeria; cf. the Ghanian case of Abbapesiwa v. 
Krakue [1943]9 W.A.C.A.,l6l where the West African Court of 
Appeal held that under the Married Women’s Property Ordi­
nance, 1890, Cap.131, Laws of Ghana, 1951 Revision, an 
Ordinance based on the English Married Women’s Property Act, 
1882, a husband and wife are legally capable of being 
partners in a business, and that a woman can trade 
separately from her husband.
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in relation to third parties and her separate property. In 
not one of the numerous cases in contract or in tort brought 
by or against married women in the Superior Courts of Nigeria 
has the capacity of the woman to sue or be sued been in any 
doubt.
(iii) Is the Act applicable to married women subject to 
customary law?
The consensus of opinion seems to be that the Married
Women’s Property Act, 1882, applies to wives of a statutory
marriage even in cases where such wives are subject to
customary law. The view of Park in this respect has already
been noted. Similarly, Obi asserts:
A married woman’s ’English’ law capacity to acquire 
property and to possess property of her own is 
governed by statute law, once more the Married 
Women’s Property Act, 1893.^ By section 3 of this 
Act, as re-enacted by the Western Regional Parlia­
ment: ’... a married woman shall (a) be capable
of acquiring, holding and disposing of any property ' 
... in all respects as if she were a feme sole.^
The writer confines the application of the Act to
spouses of a statutory marriage but gives no reason for
so doing. The cases in which the Married Women’s Property
Act 1882 has been applied in Nigeria have similarly failed
2
to justify its application. In Ogedegbe v. Ogedegbe, the 
respondent opposed his wife’s application for possession of 
the matrimonial home on the ground that the Married Women’s 
Property Act 1882 did not apply, and that the procedure laid 
down in the Sheriffs and Civil Process Judgments (Enforcement) 
Rules should have been followed. Adedipe, J., rejected this 
contention. After reviewing several authorities where 
similar applications under section 17 of the Married WomenTs 
Property Act, 1882 had been entertained by the English courts, 
the learned Judge said:
1. Obi, Modern Family Law, op. cit. , p. 258; see also 
Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, op. cit.,
p. 201.
2. £1964] L.L.R.209.
I hold that this, application was properly 
brought under section 17 of the Married 
Women’s Property Act,. 1882,. and that the 
applicant is entitled to occupy four rooms 
in the new house built by the respondent 
at No. 36 Aje Street, Yaba.^
The learned Judge did not address his mind as to
whether the Act applied in Nigeria, and if it did, under
what provision; whether as a statute of general application,
or under section 4 of the State Courts (Federal Jurisdiction)
2
Act, which provides that the jurisdiction of the High Court 
of a Region in relation to marriages, and the annulment and 
dissolution of marriages and other matrimonial causes shall 
be exercised in conformity with the law and practice for the 
time being in force in England,
There is no statutory guidance, save only as regards 
intestate succession to the property of spouses, under 
section 36 of the Marriage Act (which applies to the Colony 
only), as to the effect of a statutory marriage on the 
property and other rights and liabilities of spouses subject 
to customary law. Judicial opinions, as noted later, are 
conflicting and reveal two main views:
(a) spouses subject to customary law who contract a statutory
marriage are removed entirely from the ambit of customary
law and their personal relations are governed for the most
4
part by the received English law (the general law).
1. Ibid,, p. 212,
2. Formerly cited as the Regional Courts (Federal Juris­
diction) Act, Cap. 117j Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1958 Revision. The section has been repealed by S.115(2) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
3. See further, Chapter XIII, pp. 456-460.
4. See Cole v. Cole [1898] 1 N.L.R.15 at p.23; where Griffith, 
J., stated that the parties to a statutory marriage and 
their offspring were clothed ’with a status unknown to 
native law’. See also Re Of00 [1926] Div.Ct. 1926-29, 84 
overruled in 1961 by Coleman v . Shang [1961] 2 ALL E.R.
406, P.C.; [1959] G,L.fc,39d, C.A,
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(b) customary law continues to govern the personal relations
of the spouses except in so far as a statute, expressly or
by necessary implication provides otherwise, or the
particular transaction is unknown to. customary law.^
If the first view is followed the Married Women*s
Property Act automatically applies to wives of a statutory
marriage, If, however, the second alternative is preferred,
there seems no justification for the automatic application
of the Act to spouses of a statutory marriage who are
subject to customary law.
It has been argued elsewhere in this thesis that the
second approach as stated above, represents a more rational
view of the law, and that customary law applies to the spouses
of a statutory marriage, who are subject to customary laws,
except in so far as these laws have been altered by statute.
The question remains as to whether the property
rights of Nigerian married women under customary law has
been altered by any statute. It has been previously noted
that customary law is applied in Nigeria provided such law
... is not repugnant to natural justice equity 
and good conscience, nor incompatible either 
directly or by Implication with any law for 
the time being in force, and nothing in this
law shall deprive any person of the benefit of
any such native law and custom,
p
In the recent case of Adesubokan v. Yunusa, the 
Nigerian Supreme Court held that a rule of customary law 
which is incompatible with a statute of general application 
in Nigeria, in the particular case, the Wills Act 1837, was 
unenforceable by Nigerian Courts. In other words the 'law 
for the time being in force1 include statutes of general 
application received into Nigeria.
1. See Coleman v. Shang, ibid.; Smith v. Smith [1924]5 
N.L.R.105.
2. [1968] N.N.L.R.97.
378
(iv) Is the Act applicable in Its entirety?
In addition to the substantive provisions of the 
Married Women’s Property Act, there is also a procedural 
provision.Under the Act, no husband or wife shall be entitled 
to sue the other for a tort. Section 17 of the Act, however, 
provides a summary procedure available to. either spouse, in 
any question between husband and wife as to the title to, or 
possession of, property. Most of the cases in which the Act 
has been applied directly have involved the application of 
section 17 of the Act.^ The parties in these cases have all 
been spouses of a statutory marriage. It is not readily 
apparent whether the spouses of a customary or Islamic law 
marriage can take advantage of this procedure in view of
the provision in the High Court laws. For example, the High
2Court Law of the former Northern Region, section 17(1)(b) 
provides that the High Court shall not exercise original 
jurisdiction in any matter which ’is subject to the juris­
diction of a native court relating to marriage, family status, 
guardianship of children, inheritance or the disposition of 
property on death*.
To sum up the argument it may be stated that the 
Married Women’s Property Act 1882, satisfies the criteria for 
the reception of a statute of general application, and the 
better view is that it is a statute of general application^ 
although it has not been specifically accepted as such by 
the court.s. The statute has been applied m  several cases 
involving spouses of a statutory marriage, The Act snouia, 
however, onry ue applied jlH tne case of spouses subject to
1. See Ogedegbe v. Ogedegbe [1964] L.L.R.2Q9.; Osomugha v. 
Osomugha' L1972].12 C,C.f{.C. J.91; Edet v. Edet Ll96^67] 
10 E,N.L.R.90•
2. Cap. 49, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 Revision.
3. See Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, op. cit., p.51; 
Nwogugu, Family'Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , p, 73; Obi, 
Modern Family Law, O p . cit. , p . 258 ,
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customary or Islamic laws, when such customary or Islamic 
law is incompatible with the provision of the Act, regard*- 
less of the type of marriage involved,
4. Property rights on divorce or Separation
A. Customary law marriage
Having established the fact that in most systems of 
customary law in Nigeria a woman has the right to own 
property before her marriage, and that her ownership of such 
property is unaffected by the fact of her marriage, it is 
safe to say that in customary law, the matrimonial property 
regime which prevails, is the separate property doctrine, 
whereby each spouse owns his or her own property during the 
marital relationship.
The next question which has to be considered is what 
property is a married woman entitled to take away from the 
matrimonial home when a divorce or separation occurs.
It may seem as a logical conclusion that a married 
woman who is entitled to own property before and during her 
marriage cannot be prevented from removing such property 
from the matrimonial home when she is leaving it, but this 
has not always been the case in some traditional societies.
(i) Among the Yorubas
As far as the Yorubas are concerned, a divorced wife
is entitled to remove all her property, acquired oefore and
during the marriage. Bowen says of the Yoruoa wile:
If divorced without a cause, she takes up all 
that is hers and returns to her relatives and 
friends. If divorced for adultery, she or 
her family are obliged to refund the dowry to 
the husband. Further than this he has no claim 
on her property. Even during the continuance of 
the marriage relation, the woman is sole owner 
of her property and her earnings.^
1. T.J. Bowen, Central Africa: Adventures and Missionary 
Labours in Several Countries in the Interior of Africa, 
1849 to 1856, 196b, p. 305.
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This is also the position among some of the other communities.
The position described by Bowen still obtains among 
the Yorubas, and this is so, regardless of the type of 
marriage contracted.^ The wife is absolute owner of all her 
property, even in cases where the property has been bought 
with funds derived from her trade, the original capital for 
which was provided by her husband.
The effect of divorce on property rights among the 
Yorubas only relates to certain property directly connected 
to the marriage itself. The position in relation to the
2return of dowry on a divorce has already been dealt with.
Other gifts, which traditionally had to be given by the 
bridegroom to the bride on the occasion of the betrothal 
and marriage, were also refundable. The Marriage, Divorce, 
and Custody of Children Adoptive Bye-Laws, adopted by the
-3
various District Councils, now limit the amount refundable.
If gifts are given to the Yoruba wife by her relations, or
by her husband or his relatives, absolute ownership in them
is vested in the wife, and she has free disposal and control
over all such items of property. On a divorce she is free to
take them away with.her.
It is usual for a Yoruba husband to provide his wife
with capital, which might be in the form of cash, or raw
products, to be sold for cash. The husbandTs contribution
4
is often augmented by the wife from her own resources.
1. See Fadipe, op. cit., p. 88; E.O. Ekundare, op. cit., pp. 
24-25.
2. See above, chapter VIII.
3. For the provision of the Ibadan District Council Marriage 
Divorce and Custody of Children Bye-Laws 1965 in this 
respect, see above, chapter .VIII, 'Any person who demands 
more than £22..10 dowry and betrothal presents, shall be 
liable on conviction to a fine of £10, or, in default of 
payment to imprisonment for -two months with hard labour,' 
section 3(1).
4. A Yoruba wife may have accumulated money from several 
resources: e.g. from her share of the dowry paid on her
behalf, from the cash gifts given to her by her relatives 
and also by her husband and his relatives on the occasion 
of her marriage, as well as from pre-marriage trade which 
she may have carried on - see Fadipe, o£. cit., p. 156.,n.l.
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Yoruba women have a reputation for trading, and often, 
the insignificant starting capital of sometimes less than 
£1, may soon be built up into a prosperous trade, involving 
thousands of pounds capital. The profits from any trade 
she indulges in belong exclusively to her and, except 
where the husband has loaned her some capital on the 
expressed understanding that it should be repaid, he has 
no claims on her capital, or on the profit she makes in her 
trade Z1
(ii) Among the Igbos.
The position with regard to the Igbo wife again
cannot be stated with precision, as it can for her Yoruba
counterpart. As usual, the law varies radically among
various sub-groups, giving rise to conflicting statements
by various writers. For example, Basden, writing about
divorce in 1921, says of the Igbo spouses:
Should the husband be the aggrieved party he 
orders her to leave the house, or promptly 
drives her out, at the same time throwing her 
cooking pot and one or two other personal 
articles after her. This procedure constitutes 
permanent divorce, and the action of the husband 
will be upheld by native law. The wife, so 
treated, is deprived of all property and also 
of her children; indeed neither ever were hers.
Her only possessions are her cooking pot, market 
basket and a few other small articles pertaining 
to the domestic side of the house.2
Obi, on the other hand, gives a different view of the property
rights of a divorced Igbo woman. He says:
When a woman leaves her husband or is sent 
away by him pending a formal dissolution of 
the marriage, she is entitled to take away 
with her all her personal effects as well as 
any movable property which she brought to the 
matrimonial home or acquired during coverture 
by her own exertion in her own time or purchased
1. Information collected from market women in Ibadan.
2. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op. cit. , p. 77*
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with her own money (and, of. course, any gifts 
made to her for her. own separate, use by her 
blood relations or friends.^
The position as stated by Basden receives some 
measure of support from the Customary Law Manual of Anambra 
and Imo States. Among some communities, all the property 
of a married woman, including ante-nuptial property brought 
to the matrimonial home legally belongs to the husband in 
the case of divorce. Such property may include even the 
clothes worn by the wife at the time of the divorce, regard­
less of who initiates, or is responsible for, the dissolution 
of the marriage. The Customary Law Manual does not state 
the general law of the Igbos in this respect, but gives the 
individual laws of the various Divisions. Only seven out 
of the thirty nine Divisions in the two States listed in the 
Manual, allow a divorced wife to remove property she acquired 
during the marriage with her own money or energy. In two 
of these seven, she has to share some of her property with 
the husband. Three Divisions deprive her of everything 
except the clothes she was wearing at the time of the divorce,
while Oru Mbanasa in Anambra Division, E t ’ Etiti, Ukwa and
2
Onitsha Divisions deprive her even of those. She is thus 
left in the same state as when she came into the world - 
naked. In Aba Division she could take away nothing at all 
if the divorce was caused by her fault.
As previously noted, the Manual asserts that these 
statements of law represent the law as currently practised 
in modern society, and that they are effective today. If 
these statements represent the current law, there can be no 
more glaring example of the wide divergence which may exist 
between law in theory and law as practised by the people.
The Customary Law Manual lists Onitsha Division as one where 
the wife is deprived of even the clothes she was wearing at 
the time of the divorce. The practice, at least in Onitsha
1. Obi, Modern Family Law in Nigeria, op. cit. , pp. 370-371*
2. See Customary Law Manual, 1977* 0£. cit. , pp. 308-312.
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town and its environs, is radically different..
As previously stated,^ an Onitsha wife is usually 
given a considerable amount of property, including land, by 
her natal family, and indeed by her whole village, when she 
is taken home to her husbandrs house on the occasion of her 
first marriage. The land comprised in such property, unless 
specifically stated by her parents to the contrary, legally 
belongs to the husband, and may be inherited by all his sons 
including those from other wives. Today, parents who make 
gifts of land to a daughter on the occasion of her marriage, 
ensure that such lands are conveyed to the daughter herself. 
In relation to other items of personal property, or land 
acquired by the wife before, or during, the marriage by her 
own efforts, and paid for with her money, these belong 
entirely to the wife when there is a divorce. In many cases, 
a departing wife also leaves with some of her husband1s 
personal property, as evidenced by complaints made by 
husbands to the Social Welfare Department, although she is 
not legally justified in doing so. Very few husbands, if 
any, will attempt to assert their traditional rights (what­
ever they may have been) to their divorced wife's property. 
Any such attempt, regardless of the type of marriage con­
tracted, will be severely criticized, and the man will be 
ridiculed by the community, especially if the divorce is 
not due to the wife's fault.
Evidence from individuals indicate that among other 
Igbo communities, whatever the law was traditionally, women 
are now free to remove all their movable property from the 
matrimonial home, and are fully entitled to any immovable 
property, personally owned, which is not situated on their 
husbands1 family lands. In this respect, Obi!s statement 
given above, correctly represents the modern Igbo law 
relating to the rights of a divorced woman to her self­
owned movable property.
1. See above, Chapter VI.
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Obi, however, makes a further statement about the
land rights of a divorced woman. In order to assess.this
statement it must be given fully. He says:1
The question of a wife’s right to her landed 
property (i.e. buildings, economic plants and 
the land itself) is more difficult to state 
with any degree of precision. This is because 
here we are faced with two conflicting but 
fundamental principles of customary law. The 
first is that a person is entitled to the fruit 
of his labour even where this takes the form 
of an improvement to another’s land, provided 
only that the improvement was effected with the 
consent of the landowner in the first place.
On this principle, then, a divorced wife should 
be entitled to the continued use and ownership 
of what was her landed property during the sub­
sistence of her marriage. The other principle 
is that non-resident strangers cannot own permanent 
rights or interests in landed property if they 
have no intention of establishing any other legal 
relationship with the local community or any of 
its members. On this principle, a divorced 
woman, being now a non-resident stranger in her 
ex-husband's community (she has to be a stranger 
in the vast majority of cases on account of the 
rule relating to exogamy), could not retain her 
rights over her landed property in these circum­
stances. Happily, this dilemma never presents 
itself to the courts because the woman concerned 
always disposes of all her landed property before 
the marriage is dissolved. Even where she is 
driven out of the house by the husband or his 
family, she still can alienate such property: 
for though separated from the husband, she is 
not divorced until the bride price has been repaid 
or the marriage otherwise judicially dissolved.
The woman and her family will not unnaturally 
play for time in a situation like this; and if, 
realising this, the husband resorts to court 
action to obtain divorce, the inevitable delay 
entailed in litigation would afford the woman 
all the time she needs at least to give the 
property away if she cannot or will not sell it.
In any case, she (or her family) can always apply 
to the court for time in which to straighten out 
her property rights: the courts are not favourably
disposed towards property-grabbing husbands, and 
so will almost certainly grant the time prayed 
for in these circumstances.
1. Obi, Modern Family Law in Southern Nigeria, 1966, pp. 
371-372.
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The statement does not give sufficient facts to 
permit adequate analysis. For example, the pertinent facts 
of how the * landed property’ of the wife was acquired is 
not stated: was the land acquired by sale, or gift, or 
was it simply ’ shownT to her by her husband for the purpose 
of planting her domestic and other crops? Similarly, 
from whom the property was acquired, is also not stated; 
was it acquired from the community, the family, or from 
the husband’s individually owned land? These and other 
questions are important in assessing the wife’s rights.
The passage, however, deserves comment in so far 
as it gives the impression that a woman can own land which 
belongs to her husband’s family, or community, but she 
cannot retain such land when she is divorced.
If a wife acquires a portion of land from her 
husband, his family, or his community, by sale, she cannot 
be legally deprived of her title to such land on divorce.
If she builds a house on the land, her legal title to the 
house is similarly protected. This legal title extends 
usually to any economic trees which are on the land. She 
may not wish to live close to her husband or his family 
after the divorce, but this is not to say that she cannot 
legally retain her ownership. Subject to express provisions 
in the terms of sale of the land to her, her legal right 
of alienation would similarly be unrestricted. Most 
communities, and many families, now sell land to non­
members of the community or family. There is no justific­
ation for the statement by Obi that ’non-resident strangers 
cannot own permanent rights or interests in landed property 
if they have no intention of establishing any other legal 
relationship with the local community or any of its members’. 
Instances abound in all parts of Nigeria now where non­
resident strangers have acquired land from a community 
by purchase, and have built houses on such land for rental 
purposes only.
There is no reason to exclude the wife of a member 
of the community or family from purchasing such lands if 
she has the financial means to do so. In most cases, her 
close relationship to the sellers would secure better terms
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for her than would be given to. a stranger. The possibility 
of her children inheriting the purchased land would not be 
lost sight of, and since such children would be members of 
the community or family, a sale to her would almost be 
tantamount to a sale to a member of the community or family.
If, however, the land is owned by the family, and 
the wife is merely given permission to build a house, or 
to plant economic trees on it, different rules of law 
apply. In such a case, permission does not invest the 
wife with legal title to the land. At most, the wife would 
be considered as a member of the family, and the cardinal 
principles of family land would apply. Her right in such 
land can be no greater than that of a member of the family, 
and in most cases it would be much less. Individual members
of a family cannot alienate family property which has not
1 2 been sold to them, or partitioned, without the relevant
consents of the family, since the totality of their
4
interest does not amount to ownership of the property.
As was previously stated, and as will again be demonstrated 
when inheritance rights are dealt with, a member of the 
family has merely a right to share in the enjoyment of 
family property during his life-time. Accordingly, any 
attempted alienation by an individual member of the group, 
without the relevant consents, is an attempt to give away 
what he has not got, and is ineffective to pass the legal 
title. It is, therefore, evident that a wife's power of 
alienation of family land which she has been permitted to
1. Ashodi v. Oloje [1958] L.L.R.l.
2. Balogun v. Balogun and Qrs. [19^319 W.A.C.A.78;
Chairman, L.E.D.B. v. Ashani and Qrs. [1937U3 W.A.C.A.143.
3. Jegede v. Eyinogun [1959] 4 F.S.C.270; Ashodi v.
Balogun [1936] 2 ALL E.R.I632 [1936] 4 W.A.C.A.l;
Buraimo v. Gbamgboye [1940] 15 N.L.R.7.
4. Adagun v. Fagbola [1932] 11 N.L.R.121; Miller Bros, v.
Ayeni [1924] 5 N.L.R.40; Jacobs v. Oladunni Bros. [1935] 
12 N.L.R.l.
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use by the family is similarly restricted.
Obi’s statement that ’even where she is driven out
of the house by the husband or his family she can still
alienate such property1, does not apply to the family land
on which the house is built. Improvement to family land
does not confer legal title on the member of the family
effecting the improvement.1 If the land is improved by the
erection of a house on family land, ownership of the land
2
on which the house stands remains in the family, unless the 
member had been given the land outright, or had purchased it 
from the family. Although a member has the right to occupy 
the house he has built on family land with the consent of 
the family, he cannot sell the house without the consent of 
the family, for such a sale involves alienation of the family 
land on which the house stands. In Omolowun v. Olokude, 
a member of the family was allowed to build a house on a 
portion of family land. The house was later sold to the 
defendant who rented it to tenants. The family sued to 
recover possession of the land and house, and it was held
that when a member of a family had built a house on family
land,
a purchaser of his interest, either from himself 
or through a court sale, could only acquire the 
right to demolish the house and remove the 
materials; the purchaser could not as against 
the family assert a right to use and occupy the 
house which was on family land.
1. Shelle v. Asajon [195732 F.S.C.65 at p. 67; ’Family pro­
perty does not cease to be so because a member of the 
family has improved it1, per Jibowu actg. F.C.J.
2. Bassey v. Cobham and Qrs. [1924] 5 N.L.R.90; reclaiming 
swamp land does not confer any special property in the 
land reclaimed on the individual who reclaims it as 
against the corporate title of the family.
3. [1958] W.R.N.L.R.130; see also 0dunlam v. Soroyewun, 
[1949] unreported decision, 21 July 1949; cf. Onwusike v. 
Onwusike [1962] Suit No. 0/81/59, unreported decision of 
Onitsha High Court; ’the right of member to occupy a 
house he built on family land does not entitle him to 
take rents from tenants in the house without accounting 
for such rents’.
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A recent Supreme Court decision, however, indicates 
that the rights of a spouse who has built a house on the 
family land of the other spouse, do not extend to an un­
restricted right of alienation of that house. He or she 
has no more than a right of user during his or her life, 
and on his or her death, the house reverts to the whole 
family, and is subject to the usual rules pertaining to 
family property.
In Oke and Anor v. Oke and Anor,^ the testator died 
in I960, having devised to the defendant, his son, the 
house in which he had lived and died. The land on which 
the house was bui.lt had been allocated to the testator’s 
wife, who was the plaintiff’s mother, by her father. The 
plaintiff’s mother permitted the testator, her husband, to 
erect a house on the site of her allotted portion, and both 
of them lived in the house until the testator’s death. The 
question then arose as to whether the testator, who was an 
Urhobo man, could devise the house by will to the defendant, 
who was the testator’s son by another woman, or whether 
the Itsekiri customary law of the plaintiff’s mother, 
which incidentally is the same as the Urhobo law of success­
ion, should govern the succession, so that the eldest son 
of the testator should alone inherit the house in which the 
testator had lived and died.
p
The defendant contended that the Wills Law, 1958,
1. [1974] 3 S.C.l; [1974] 1 ALL N.L.R.443; cf. Jallow v. 
Jallow [1957] 2 W.A.L.R.64; a Gambian case, where the 
maxim qulcquid plantatur solo v solo cedit, was applied 
to defeat the claims of a husband who had built'on his 
wife’s land with her consent, see below, p. 400 ;
There is a conflict of opinion whether the principle 
applies in customary law, see Santeng v. Darkwa [1940]
6 W.A.C.A.,52 - a house built on family land by a member 
of the family does not become family property under Akan 
Customary Law [Ghana] and Okoh v. OTotu [1953] 20 N.L.R. 
123. See further, Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, 1972, 
pp. 3-6.
2. Cap 133, Laws of Western State, 1959.
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of the former Western State., which operates in the Mid- 
Western State, gave the testator testamentary capacity to 
devise the house to him as he should choose, and that 
the transaction was, according to the Customary Courts 
Law of the Mid-Western State, governed by English Lav;.
Elias, C.J.N., delivering the judgment of the 
Supreme Court, held that customary law, and not English 
law or the Wills Lav;, governed the succession to the 
estate of the deceased testator, and that accordingly, 
the plaintiff was entitled to the house-, as the eldest son 
of the testator under the Itsekiri/Urhobo customary law.
That section 3 of the Wills Law makes the testamentary 
capacity of a testator subject to any relevant customary 
law, and in any case, deals only with the devise of a ’real 
estate’ an interest unknown to customary law. The Court 
held that neither could the plaintiff’s mother make an 
absolute gift of her portion of family land to her husband, 
the testator, nor could the latter alienate whatever 
interest he might have in the house to anyone other than 
his first son.^
Prom this judgment it is clear that the testator was
not the beneficial owner of the house with an absolute
2
right of disposal. Consequently, he had no right to dis­
pose of the house by sale during his life-time, nor by will, 
to anyone who was not entitled to succeed to it under the 
rules of customary law pertaining to the particular society. 
This is the normal rule pertaining to family land which is 
unpartitioned. No individual member may alienate his 
interest in family land, for his interest is not
■1. The son’s right is one, not of inheritance but of his 
membership of his mother’s family, see Sogunro-Davies, 
v. Sogunro and Qrs. [1929] 9 N.L.R.79.
2. See Bankole and Qrs. v. Tapo [1961] 1 ALL N.L.R. lMO - 
a father’s allotment of a portion of his individually 
owned land to a grandson divested the property of its 
character of family property after the death of the 
father.
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absolute.1 The principle is, by this judgment, extended 
to fixatures on the -land, when erected by a non-member of 
the family.^
Prom this it follows that if a wife builds a house 
on her husband’s family land, and a divorce ensues, she 
has no beneficial interest in the house which she can 
dispose of at will to a non-member of her husband’s family.
The next question is: what is the right of a wife
to economic trees and other crops planted by her on her
husband’s family -land when the marriage ends in divorce?
A member of the family may plant economic trees on family 
land with the family’s consent or acquiescence. The 
growing crops or trees,under customary law, becomes the 
individual property of the member who planted them, and
2i
he has full rights of alienation by sale or otherwise. In
view of the provision in the Interpretation Act, 1964,
1. See Taylor v. Williams and Anor [1935] 12 N.L.R.67; a 
testatrix cannot dispose of an undivided share in family 
property by will even to her own son; see also Ogunmefun 
v. Ogunmefun and Qrs. [1931] 10 N.L.R.82; but see Ode- 
Joke v . John Holt Ll‘942] 8 W.A.C.A. 152 where it was held 
that a member’s right of residence in a family house is 
attachable, as well as transmissible.
2. See Erikitola v . Alii and Qrs, [1941] 16 N.L.R.56; and 
Akeju v. Chief Suenu and Qrs, [1925] 6 N.L.R.87; a slave 
of Onikoro family could not alienate family land without 
express authorisation. It should be noted that under
the Interpretation Act, 1964, ’land’ includes any building 
and any other thing attached to the earth or permanently 
fastened to anything so attached’ - section 18(1). See 
also the Ghanian case of Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974]
1.G.L.R.110 where it was held that a member of a family 
who built a house on family land had only a life-interest 
in the house with no alienable interest which he could 
dispose of by will. Contrast, Larbi v. Cato [1959]G.L.R. 
35; Ansah v. Sackey [1958] 3 W.A.L-.R. 325; Amoabimaa v. 
Okyir [1965]G.L.R.59, pp. 63-74.
3. Okoh v. Qlut-o and Qrs [1953] 20 N.L.R.123*
4. See Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession, op. cit., 
p. 23.
5. No. 1 of 1964, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.
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that ’land* Includes any building and any other thing 
attached to. the earth or permanently fastened to anything 
so attached, a wife who plants, on her husband’s family land 
has no legal right to remove trees or anything permanently 
attached to the land. In the absence of direct legal 
authority it submitted that a divorced wife has no right 
to remove or to sell the crops she planted on her husband’s 
family land, without the family’s consent.'*'
Obi states that t.he ’dilemma’ of a wife being pre­
vented from retaining her rights ’over her landed property 
... never presents itself to the courts because the woman 
concerned always disposes of all her landed property before 
the marriage is dissolved.’ While this statement may be true 
with reference to minor crops planted on her husband’s family 
land, the fact is that modern Nigerian women rarely build 
houses on land belonging to their husband’s family. The 
more frequent, practice is for them to build on land owned 
by their natal family, or on land acquired by purchase.
What the position is when a woman builds on land 
individually owned by her husband, or contributes substantially 
to a building erected by her husband, will be considered later 
when dealing with the position under statutory marriage.
(HI) Among other communities.
Among most other groups^ where the ’separate’ system 
of property operates, a wife is entitled to remove all 
property absolutely owned by her, both ante-nuptial and post­
nuptial. She has no claim on divorce to her husband’s
property, nor in some cases, to property that she acquired
2
from him or his family.
1. See the Gambian case of Jallow v. Jallow [195712 W.A.L.R. 
64; see further, below, p. 400.
2. See Forde, Peoples of the Nlger^Benue Confluence, op. cit., 
p. 99p Bradbury and Lloyd, The Benin Kingdom, op. cit.,
p. 98.
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The societies where all property acquired by the 
wife legally belongs to. the husband, allow the wife to remove 
only the property which the husband permits her to remove.1
It must be emphasized, however, that whatever the 
traditional law in this respect may have been, the modern 
practice in most communities is that a divorced wife is 
entitled to remove all items of property she can identify 
as legally belonging solely to her, and acquired by her own 
efforts.
A more difficult question arises when property is 
purchased jointly, or when the husband buys things for the 
wifeTs personal use, for example, clothes, jewelry, or a 
car, or for the use of the family as a whole - furniture, 
domestic utensils, etc. In most cases customary law gives 
her no right to remove such articles purchased by her 
husband. No cognizance is taken of a wife’s contributions 
to the acquisition of property that is not expressed in 
terms of money. Domestic labour entailed in the rearing of 
children, or management of the home, are not taken into 
consideration in the distribution of marital property. In 
other words, a strict separation of property between husband 
and wife is the general rule. Community property, under 
which property acquired by either spouse is legally owned 
by both spouses during the subsistence of the marriage, and 
is shared equally between them if the marriage is dissolved 
by divorce is unknown to Nigerian customary law.
(iv) Right of a wife to remain in the matrimonial home.
2
It has been seen earlier, that in most societies,
1. See e.g. the position among the Idomas, where on a divorce 
the wife’s property is shared equally between the spouses - 
Armstrong, ’Intestate Succession among the Idoma1, op. cit., 
p. 227; cf. Thomas, Anthropological Report, on the Ibo- 
Speaking Peoples, op. cit. , Part IV, p. 137*
2. See above, Chapter VIII, pp. 536-544.
393
a wife married according to. customary law has a legal right, 
and indeed, a legal obligation, to live in the house provided 
for her by the husband. Traditionally, a separate house was 
built for each wife for her exclusive use and occupation.
This was the practice in all communities, almost without 
exception.^ The right of each wife to a separate accommod­
ation, is to some extent, recognized by Governments. For 
example, houses built for occupation by members of Parlia­
ment, and in the Northern States, for senior civil servants, 
are invariably built with wings so as to accommodate each 
wife in a separate block.
Pressure of land space in the urban areas forced
a change in the type of houses now being built; and the
prohibitive costs involved in building a modern house have
necessitated a change in this pattern of a separate house
for a wife. It has been replaced by the allotment to a wife,
or to each wife in a polygamous family, of a room in the
2
husband’s house.
What is the right of a wife to remain in such room, 
or house, as the case may be, provided for her by the husband, 
when she is divorced? Two cases illustrate the right of a 
wife to such room or house. Although both cases involve the 
devolution of property on the death of the husband, the 
principle, nevertheless, applies equally to a case of divorce 
during the husband’s lifetime, as is evidenced by the obiter 
dicta of the judgements.
The first case, Okeke v. Okonkwo  ^ concerned the
1. See Partridge, Cross River Natives, op. cit., p. 255; 
Mockler-Ferryman, Up the Niger, op. cit~. , p. 37; Ward, 
Marriage Amon^ the Yoruba, op. cit. , p. 38, Meek, Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, op. cit., p. 196; Galletti, Baldwin and 
Dina, Nigerian Cocoa^ Farmers, op. cit., p. 75; Tremearne, 
The Tailed Head Hunters, op. cit. , p. 137-
2.. In the rural areas where thatched houses are still in use, 
a wife may continue to. be given a separate, house. In some 
cases two or more wives share a-modern concrete, house, 
while the husband reserves another house .for his. exclusive 
use.
3. [19621 Suit No. 0/37/62, unreported decision,. Onitsha 
. High Court.
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customary law of the people of Amabia, an Igbo town in 
Anambra State. The plaintiff in this case, claimed a 
declaration of title to a pareel-of land called ogbolodo 
or mkpuke , being the apartment of the plaintiff’s grand­
mother, built by his grandfather for her, according to the 
custom of the society. In establishing the legal right 
of his grandmother to the house built for her by her husband, 
the following evidence was given as correctly representing 
the customary law of the people.
The object of a husband who carves out an 
apartment for his wife from his compound is 
to give her some degree of privacy. It does 
not make it her own separate property in the 
sense that she can sell the small piece of 
land where the small house is built. She can 
live there as long as she remains his wife but 
if she happens to leave the man during his 
life-time, he can give the compartment to 
another woman.
Kaine, J . , in the Onitsha High Court, accepted this 
evidence. He held that a wife could not pass to her children 
what she had not got, that is, the absolute ownership over 
the property, and that even on the death of the paterfamilias, 
the ogbolodo remained intact as family property. All an 
individual has is ’the right of occupancy, or in other words, 
usufructuary rights, and not absolute ownership to the 
exclusion of the other children1. He held that the possessory 
right which the plaintiff had over his grandmother’s ogbolodo, 
if at all he had any, was not such as to warrant a declaration 
of title to it which would make him an absolute owner to the 
exclusion of all the other children.
The other case was declaratory of Yoruba customary 
law. In Oloko v. G i w a the defendant took possession of 
certain property in Lagos on the allegation that it had been 
part of his deceased father’s property. He. claimed that- his 
father had, during his life-time, allotted to. each of his 
wives a separate house or room (which was not proved and was
1. 11939] 15 N.L.R.31*
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doubted by the court)., and that the property, in dispute 
had been allott.ed to the wife who was the mother of the 
defendant. The plaintiff sued on behalf of himself and the 
other children of the deceased father for recovery of 
possession of the property.
An expert witness gave evidence to the effect that 
when a husband builds separate living houses or rooms for his 
wife, the house or room of each wife belonged to her and was 
inheritable by her children, and in default of issue, by her 
natal family. Graham Paul, J . , commenting on this evidence 
said:
I have heard a good deal of nonsense talked 
in the witness box about Yoruba custom but 
seldom anything more ridiculous than this.
Even the defendant’s Counsel himself had to 
throw over this witness and I do not really 
blame him for that.
It was held that no such custom as that alleged by the 
defendant existed in Yoruba customary law, and that an allot­
ment of a house or room by a man to each of his wives did 
not vest the house or room so allotted in the wife as her 
separate property, and that on his death, such houses or 
rooms became part of the real property left by him.
In both Yoruba and Igbo customary law, therefore, a 
wife has no ownership of the house her husband gives her to 
live in during the marriage, and on divorce she has no 
enforceable legal right to remain there against the wishes 
of her husband.
There is no evidence that the customary laws of the 
other Nigerian communities are contrary to this.
When the spouses live in a house owned by the wife, 
the husband similarly acquires no legal title to it, and 
he has no right of occupation after a divorce.
B . Islamic law marriage
In accordance with the doctrine of separate property 
of husband and wife which is recognized by Islamic law, 
when a Moslem wife is divorced by her husband, she is
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legally entitled to remove all her separate, property from
the matrimonial home. This includes property given to her
by her husband before and after the marriage. If her dower
has not been paid, it becomes immediately repayable, and
can be enforced by an action in court. The Koran advises
husbands to be generous to their divorced wives. Thus it
provides in Sura II, verse 2 31
... when ye divorce women, and the time for 
sending them away is come, either retain 
them with generosity, or put them away with 
generosity.
and again in Sura LXV, verse 6.
Lodge the divorce whenever ye lodge, according 
to your means; and distress them not by putting 
them to straits.
When a divorce is instituted by the wife, however, 
she may have to give the husband a considerable portion of 
her property in order to secure her release from the marital 
bonds.1
If contentions arise between husband and wife con­
cerning furniture, or other movable property, and if there 
is no proof as to who is the owner of the different articles, 
then the question should be decided according to local 
custom. The wife will be awarded those objects which are 
generally used by women, - jewellery, female clothes, 
ornaments etc. - the ownership of which she claims on oath.
Of the other objects commonly used by both spouses, the 
husband is awarded those which he claims on oath to be his 
own. Similarly, if the husband declares on oath that some 
objects commonly used by women were bought for his own use,
2and not for his wifeTs, such objects shall be awarded to him.
A wife is not legally entitled to. any of her husband^s
1. See below, Chapter IX, pp. 86-89.
2.. See Ruxton, Maliki Law, op. cit_. , pp. 116-117; see also 
Ma Khatun v. Ma Bibi 1193-3.1 A.I'.R. (Allahabad), 206, 209, 
in Moslem family law there is a presumption that household 
furniture belong to. the husband.
397
property when there is a divorce, and like customary law, 
maintenance of a divorced wife is unknown to Islamic law.1
C. Statutory marriage
It has been noted that the separate property doctrine
2
applies to the spouses of a statutory marriage. Marriage 
does not affect the ownership of property vested in either 
spouse at the time of the marriage. Similarly, property 
acquired by either after the marriage, with money belonging 
solely to him, or her, will remain the separate property 
of each spouse. Consequently, when a divorce or separation 
occurs, either spouse is entitled to claim property which 
is exclusively his or hers.
In addition to this, however, a statutory spouse has 
other proprietary rights and obligations.
The proprietary rights and obligations of the wife 
of a statutory marriage, when the marital relationship is 
disrupted either by separation or divorce, are governed 
principally by two statutes:
(i) the Married Womenfs Property Acts 1882-1893;
(ii) the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970.
(i) Married Women?s Property Act, 1882.
o
The Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, section 17, 
provides:
In any question between husband and wife as 
to the title to or possession of property,
either party ... may apply by summons or
otherwise in a summary way to any judge
of the High Court of Justice or (at the option 
of the applicant, irrespective of the value 
of the property in dispute) to the judge of a
1. See further, below, p. 414.
2. See above, p. 345
3. 45 and 46 Viet. C.75; 17 Stats. 116.
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County Court .of the district,, for an. order, 
and. the judge "may make such order with 
respect to the property in dispute as he 
thinks fit”.
When this section is invoked, the court has a wid’e 
discretion as to the enforcement of the proprietary or 
possessory rights of one spouse against the other spouse.
The jurisdiction must, however, be exercised judicially.
It was claimed that this gave the court ’a free hand to do 
what is just1 in all the circumstances, ignoring the strict 
legal rules governing the title to property.^ The House of 
Lords in England has recently denounced this view as here­
tical: ’no Parliament of that era could have intended to
put a husband’s property at the hazard of the unfettered
p
discretion of a judge (including a county court judge)’.
The section is invoked mainly in two circumstances:
(a) Disputes as to title to property
(i) Joint property
When parties to a marriage acquire property, they 
rarely contemplate the collapse of the marriage, and their 
respective rights in such property are seldom discussed, 
let alone defined. When the marriage breaks down, however, 
difficult questions as to ownership may arise. A wife may 
have contributed her labour, money and expertise in building, 
or purchase of land which is conveyed (as usually is the 
case in Nigeria), in the name of the husband only. The 
spouses may also have bought furniture, cars, and other 
items of property with the joint contribution of both 
parties. Has a spouse the right to claim any part of such 
property, or does the property belong exclusively to. the
1. See Hine v. Hine [1962] 1 W.L.R.1126; Appleton v. 
Appleton [1-9'65] 1 W.L.R.25.
2. Pettittv. Pettitt' [1970] A.C.777, 793, per Lord Reid.
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spouse in whose name the .legal title is. vested.?
Either spouse may. claim a share in such property by
instituting proceedings under section 17 of the Married
Women*s Property Act, 1882,^ Proceedings may be brought
under this section, regardless of the responsibility of the
2applicant for the breakdown of the marriage. Such proceed­
ings are quite different to divorce proceedings, and if 
proceedings under section 17 have been commenced, they can
be continued, notwithstanding that the marriage has since
q
been resolved by a decree absolute of divorce.
4
In Egunjobi v, Egunj obi, the parties were married 
•in 1969. Before the marriage, the husband had acquired a 
piece of land on which he commenced a building. The building 
had reached lintel level before the wife took over super­
vision of the work, and made various financial contributions 
estimated at S‘1,170, towards the completion of the building. 
She also contributed financially to the purchase of some 
furniture for the house. The husband's contribution, less 
the value of the land and blocks was 82,169.90. In 1972 
the marriage broke down, and in 1973, the decree nisi was 
made absolute. The wife applied under section 17 of the 
Married Womenfs Property Act, 1882, for a declaration that 
she was entitled to an equal share in the property, or in 
the proceeds in the event of a sale., and in the furniture 
enumerated in her application.
Agbaje, J., held that the husband and wife had both 
made substantial financial contributions towards the building, 
and the law would impute to them an intention to create a 
trust for each other in respect of the building, and for
1. Asomugha v. Asomugha £19723.12 C.C.H.C,J.91.
2. Wilson v. Wilson £19633 1 W,L,R.601, C.A.
3. Egunjobi v. Egunj obi £197*0 E , C .S .L.R. 552 .
4. £197*0 ** E .C.S.L.R. 552.
400
the same reason both, parties had beneficial interests in 
the furniture which was found by the. court to be purchased 
jointly by them. On the facts of the case the. court held 
that the wife was entitled to one-third share in the house 
and to a half share in the furniture purchased jointly.
As far as the joint building is concerned, it is 
interesting to compare this case with Jallow v. Jallow,^ 
a Gambian case which came on appeal to the West African 
Court of Appeal in 1957* The plaintiff was the divorced 
husband of the defendant. Prior to the divorce, the husband 
and wife occupied land which had belonged to the wife alone 
before the marriage. During the marriage, the husband and 
wife had erected buildings on the land, the cost of these 
being met from joint funds to which they each contributed.
After the divorce, the husband claimed from the defendant 
half the value of the buildings. The West African Court 
of Appeal held that the rule qulcquid plantatur solo, solo 
cedit is displaced only where one person builds on the land 
of another, and the latter, as a result of his laches, is 
debarred from asserting his own interest. Where the builder 
is conscious of the defect in his own title, but neverthe­
less builds on the land of another, he may not avail himself 
of this exception, and the fact that the relationship between
the parties is that of husband and wife makes no difference 
2
this rule.
It would appear that the same result would have been 
reached by an application of the rule as to the pre-sumption 
of advancement between husband and wife, in the latter case.
If the wife alone provides the purchase money for property 
which is put in her husband’s name, or makes an investment in 
her husband’s name, unless there is actual evidence to the 
contrary, the husband is regarded as holding the property or
1. 11957.] W.A.L.R. 64..
2. See the Ghanian case of Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974]
1 G.L.R. 110, where it was held that
£c,(4) In order to exclude the application of the maxim 
quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit in respect of lands 
held under customary law, it must be established that:
(a) The owner of the land either consented or granted 
leave and licence or in the alternative, he had acquiesced 
in the construction of the building so that it would be in­
equitable to permit him to claim what was on the land and 
which he had not built, and
TP/nr>+-.^  nnnti miPfi
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Investment as a trustee for his wife. On the other hand, if 
a husband purchases.property or makes an investment in his 
wife’s name he is presumed to intend a gift to his wife and 
the presumption of advancement operates to give her prima facie 
the beneficial interest in the property. Precisely the same 
rules operate if both provide the money. If the property is 
conveyed into the husband’s name alone, he will hold it on trust 
for them both, and each will be entitled to a share proportionate 
to the contribution. If, however, the property is conveyed into 
the wife’s name alone, the husband will be presumed to have made 
a gift of the whole of the property to her.'1’ The presumption
2in both cases is rebuttable, but the facts in Jallow v. Jallow
would hardly have amounted to a rebuttal of the presumption.
2
The principle applied in Jallow v. Jallow was not
q
considered by Agbaje, J., in Egunj obi v. Egunjobi.J The learned
Judge relied on the two House of Lords’ cases of Gissing v.
4 *5Gissing and Pettitt v. Pettitt and other cases. He said:
I am prepared to treat the supervision of the building 
operations at Quarry Road by the wife as a direct con­
tribution by her to the building. This type of work, 
supervision of building operations, is, in my view,
(Footnote cont’d. from previous page)
(b) The persons who erected the building or cultivated the 
farm were strangers to the land on which they had built or 
farmed.
There should^howevei^be no extension of the non-applj cability 
of the maxim to cover cases like the instant one where the 
person constructing the building was himself a member of the 
family owning the land. Adu v. Sarkodee Addo, Court of 
Appeal, 31 March 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C.59 
cited. Asseh v. Anto [1961] G.L.R. 103, S.C. distinguished. 
Quaere. It was doubtful whether in the light of the firmly- 
established customary law relating to rights retained by mem­
bers of family in respect of family land which they had re­
duced into occupation, it would be safe to extend the non­
application of the maxim to cover such situations without 
creating an unwarranted innovation into this well-established 
principle
1. See Bromley, Family Law, 1974, p. 447, et al. Mercier v.
Mercier [1903] 2 Ch. 9B-, C.A. and Silver v. Silver [1958]
1 ALL E.R. 523, C.A.
2. [1957] W.A.L.R. 64.
3. [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 552.
4. [1970] A .C . 777.
5. [1970] 2 ALL E.R. 780, H.L. [1971] A.C. 886.
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of a substantial type such as a contractor would 
normally be engaged to do ... I am also prepared 
to treat a spouse who contributes to the building 
of a house on the land which is owned by the other 
spouse, as in this case, on the same footing as a 
spouse who contributes to the purchase of, or to the 
payment of mortgage instalments on the house standing 
in the name of the other. If I am wrong in this view,
I am prepared to treat the contributions of a wife to 
the building of a house on the land belonging to the 
other as expenses towards the capital improvement of 
the land...
The Judge concluded that the various contributions of
the wife, her financial contribution, as well as supervision of
the building, amounted to a substantial contribution by her.
He continued:
And when I apply the principles of law which I have 
enuciated [sic] above, this substantial contribution 
raises the inference of a trust. The law imputes to 
the husband an intention to create a trust for her 
in respect of the building at Quarry Hoad, Abeokuta.^
2
The decision in Egunj obi v. Egunj obi, is important, in
view of the fact that many wives in Nigeria supervise, as well as
make contributions to, the building of their husbandfs houses.’
There is no legal bar to a wife married under customary
law, which denies her a share of any of her husbandTs property
to which she has made substantial contributions, taking advantage
of section 17 of the Married Women’s Property Act, 1882.
The presumption that if husband and wife both provided
part of the purchase money for property which is in the
husband’s name, he will hold as trustee for them both in the
proportions to which they provide the purchase money was
4expanded in Rimmer v. Rimmer to one that if both husband and 
wife had subscribed, however unequally, to the purchase of 
an asset in the name of one of them only, the legal owner
1. Egunj obi v. Egunjobi [1974] 4 E.C.S.L.R. 552, at p. 561.
2. Ibid.
3. See above, pp. 375-377.
4. [1952] 2 ALL E.R. 863; [1953] 1 Q.B. 63, C.A.
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would hold the asset, for. them both in equal shares. Such
a principle could, in some, cases.,, lead to. great injustice,
as it would give a spouse who had contributed, very little
to the asset, an equal share. It can be described as an
attempt to smuggle through the backdoor a system of
community of property, with reference to the matrimonial
home. . Fortunately, such an approach was limited by the
decisions of the Eouse of Lords in Pettitt v. Pettitt,^
2and particularly in Gissing v. Gissing where it was con­
demned in the words of Lord Reid: S h e  high-sounding
brocard equity is equality has been misusedr.
(ii) Separate property
Under section 12 of the Married WomenTs Property Act, 
1882, a wife can institute a civil action against all 
persons, including her husband, for the protection and 
security of her separate property, but neither husband or 
wife may sue the other for a tort.
*3
In Asomugha v. Asomugha, the husband instituted a 
divorce suit. Before the issue of the Directions for Trial, 
the husband applied by summons pending suit for the release 
to him of his personal effects including his lecture notes, 
books, dresses, shoes, wig and gown, certificates and pass­
ports which he claimed were in the custody of the respondent 
wife. Counsel for the respondent wife contended that the 
court had no jurisdiction, since the applicants summons 
was in the nature of a claim in detinue which is a tort.
Odesanya, J . , noted the bar against actions for 
tort between husband and wife under the Married Women!s 
Property Act, 1882, but held that although the husband
1. [1969] 2 ALL E.R,385, H.L.; [1970] A.C.770.
2. 11971] A .C , 886,
3. [1972] 12 C.C.H.C.J.91.
........................................................... 404 .
could not take advantage of section 12 of the Act to 
recover his property, from his wife, he was entitled to do 
so under section 17 of the Married Women's Property Act, 
1882, which was available to either spouse. The husband 
had not applied under any section of the Married Women's 
Property Act. The learned Judge, however, treated his 
claim as an application based on section 17 of the Act, 
on the ground that the section is purely procedural, 
providing a very useful summary method of determining 
between husband and wife questions of title and the right 
to possession of property. He stated that he would not 
'allow procedural rules to occasion injustice'.
It is respectfully submitted that, although the 
Judge's sentiment on the administration of justice is 
laudable, its application in this particular instance is 
a little less so. Not having examined the merit of the 
husband's case, it was premature for the Judge to state 
that injustice would be occasioned if the husband was made 
to observe the correct procedure by bringing his action 
under section 17. Failure to observe the correct procedure 
may also result in injustice.'1' Although the procedure 
under the Married Women's Property Act, 1882,. is summary, 
an applicant nevertheless ought to state that he is basing 
his claim on the Act, and specify the section or sections 
on which he depends. The intention to institute proceedings 
under the Act should not be imputed to him by the Court, 
nor should an action for the tort of detinue be translated
1, For example, the Court has more extensive powers, under 
section 17 than it has in a common law action in tort..
"Under section 17 the intention is that in the innumerable 
and infinitely various disputes as to property which may 
occur between husband and wife, the judge should have a 
free hand to do what is just. The discretion is no way 
fettered, though it must be exercised judicially", per 
Denning, J . , (as he then was) H v. H [1947] .63 T.L.R.645* 646. 
Although the Judge^s discretion has-been limited by 
Pettitt v, Pettitt. I 1969] 2 ALL E.R, 385 H,L,[1970] A.C,
77q , a judge still'has wider powers under the s.ecti.on 
than in a tort for detinue.
........................................................... 405  .
by the Court into, a claim, under the Act..
(b) Disputes as to. possession of the matrimonial home.
The concept of the matrimonial home has been pre­
viously discussed.'1' The wife of a statutory marriage has 
a right to live in the matrimonial home provided by her
husband, and the husband has a duty to provide such a home
2
according to his means and status in life. So long as the 
right of consortium exists between the spouses, both are 
entitled to reside in the matrimonial home, regardless of 
whether the legal tittle or the beneficial interest belongs 
to the wife alone or/the husband alone. The right of both 
spouses to occupy the matrimonial home is subject to a 
reasonable standard of behaviour, and the court has juris­
diction to restrain one party (usually the husband) from 
entering the matrimonial home if his or her conduct justifies 
such a course, but the jurisdiction would be exercised with
care especially where it involves breaking up the matri- 
■3
monial home.
4In Jones v. Jones, the wife moved for an order 
restraining the respondent from entering, residing, or 
living in the matrimonial home, part of the estate of her 
deceased father, on the ground that the respondent husband 
threatened to injure or kill her, and had to be
1. See Chapter VII, above, pp. 536 et_ al.
2. Jones v. Jones [1959] L.L.R.69.
3. Ibid.
4. [1959] L.L.R.69; cf, Shipman v. Shipman [1924] 2 Ch.l40, 
146, C.A.; Gorulnick v. Gorulnick [1956]' P.47, C.A.;
Gurasz v. Gurasz [1970] F7TTT
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bound over by the magistrates to keep the. peace and be of 
good behaviour for twelve months because of his conduct.
The respondent challenged the title of the petitioner to 
the matrimonial home, and alleged that the property was not 
devised to her, nor had she an Tabsolute interest in the 
property*. Onyeama, J . , held that the legal title of the 
petitioner to the house was not the overriding consideration 
in determining whether or not to grant the application. 
Following Boyt v. Boyt, ^ he held that the court will restrain 
one spouse from forcing his or her society upon the other, 
and from other acts of molestation. The application was 
granted.
In normal circumstances, however, regardless of
sole ownership of the matrimonial home by one spouse, both
parties have the right to occupy the matrimonial home:
It is a consequence of the mutual right and 
duty of spouses to receive and render consortium, 
that if one is the sole owner of the dwelling 
house which constitutes the matrimonial home, 
that spouse is not allowed to treat the other 
as a stranger there. Moreover, if the home is 
owned by the husband, the wife normally has an 
additional reason for not being treated as a 
stranger: namely her right at common law to be
. supported by him according to his means.2
But what of the position when the marriage breaks
down? Two problems may be involved here: first, to determine
1. [1948] 2 ALL E.R.436, C.A.; see also Short v. Short [I960] 
3 ALL E.R.6, C.A. Compare the English case of Jones v . 
Jones [1971] 2 ALL E.R. 737, C.A. (husband ordered to 
leave the house with his mistress whom he had installed 
there, although there was no threat to the wife's 
physical safety.).
2. J.C, Hall, Sources of Family Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 19b6),'p. 115; see also National 
Provincial Bank Ltd, v, Ainsworth [1965] A,C.1175.
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the beneficial ownership, of the matrimonial home, and 
secondly, to. determine whether one party, has a right to 
reside in a matrimonial home to. which he or she has no 
title.
(c) Ownership of the matrimonial home
English law knows no marital community of property. 
Property purchased by one spouse with his or her own money 
presumptively belongs to that spouse to the exclusion of 
the other. Attention has already been drawn to the equitable 
principles of a resulting trust, and advancement-, which may 
be applied to disputes as to ownership of property between 
husband and wife. These principles also apply to disputes 
between husband and wife as to the ownership of the matri­
monial home, and need not be repeated here.^
(d) Right to reside in the matrimonial home
A series of modern English cases .have established 
the principle that if the husband has deserted the wife, 
she is entitled to continue to reside in the matrimonial 
home, even though the legal title is vested in the husband; 
her right to do so is, as against him, analogous to an 
irrevocable contractual licence, and it can only be lost 
either by her misconduct, or by order of court, or by 
divorce, though it is not lost by a judicial separation.
The only reported Nigerian case on this point seems 
to be Ogedegbe v. Ogedegbe, decided in 1964. The wife in 
this case brought an application under section 17 of the 
Married Women’s Property Act, 1882 , for an order of possession 
of the matrimonial home. The applicant and the respondent, 
who were husband and wife, lived at a house in Yaba, The 
respondent deserted the applicant and moved to another
1. See above, pp. 398 et_ al.
2. .[1964] L.L.R.2Q9.
house. The applicant remained in the matrimonial home, 
lived in one of the rooms, and let out three other rooms 
for which she collected rents., while the respondent 
collected the rents of the remaining rooms. The respondent 
demolished the matrimonial home for the purpose of re­
building it, and the applicant was forced to quit the house. 
After the house was rebuilt,. the respondent let out the 
whole house, and provided no alternative accommodation for 
the applicant. The applicant applied for possession of 
the whole house, pursuant to the provision of section 17. 
Adedipe, J . , held that the tenants to whom the entire 
building was let out by the respondent had no better right 
to occupy the house than the applicant, and that the 
application was properly brought under section 17 of the 
Married Women’s Property Act, 1882. The Judge cited with
approval many English cases, notably Bendall v. McWhirter,^
2
and Street v. Benham, in which it was held that the wife
had an irrevocable right to remain in possession of the
matrimonial home solely owned by her husband. In Erington
v. Erington, Denning, L.J., (as he then was), held that
the wife in such a case was a licensee with a special
right - under which the husband cannot turn her out except
by an order of the court, and in Bendall v. McWhlrter
the same learned Judge declared;
The authority which is thus conferred on her 
is an authority to stay in the house until 
the court orders her to go out. This authority 
flows from the status of marriage coupled with 
the fact of separation owing to the husband’s 
misconduct ... She may perhaps sublet some of 
the rooms so as to help keep herself.^
1. [1952] 1 ALL E.R.1307; [1952] 2 Q.B.466, C.A.
2. [195^] 1 ALL E.R.532.
3. 11952], 1 ALL E.R,149.
4. Ibid., Cf. Thompson v. Earthy [1951] 2 K.B.598, in which 
Roxburgh J. expressed a'contrary decision which was 
eventually vindicated by the House of Lords in National 
Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth [1965] A.C. 1175, which 
over-ruled Bendall v, McWhirter and similar decisions.
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These cases,, and a series, of. others, had laid down 
the rule that a deserted wife could enforce her right to 
remain in the matrimonial home of which her husband was 
the beneficial owner, not only against him, but also against 
anyone claiming through him, other than a bona fide pur­
chaser for value of a legal or equitable estate or interest 
without notice of her claim. Indeed,in Street v. Benham,^ 
Lynskey, J., stated that if the rule was otherwise
It would mean that a guilty husband could 
transfer the house into the name of his new 
mistress and then get her to evict his 
innocent lawful wife from the matrimonial 
home. No civilised community could tolerate 
such a cynical disregard of the married state.
Equity demands that the succession in title 
should be in no better position than the 
husband.2
The validity of the 'deserted wife's equity' was 
eventually considered in 1965 by'the House of Lords in
"3
National Provincial Bank Ltd., v. Ainsworth. The husband 
had deserted his wife (the respondent) and left her and 
their children in the matrimonial home which he owned. He 
then incorporated his business into a company and conveyed 
both the matrimonial home and his place of business to the 
company, which then charged both properties to the appellant 
bank to secure a loan. The loan was not repaid and the 
bank, as mortgagee, claimed possession of the properties 
charged. The wife set up her 'deserted wife's equity1, but 
it was unanimously held that her defence must fail, and that 
a claim for possession of the matrimonial home from a genuine 
purchaser of the premises from the husband cannot be defeated.
Although these English cases are not binding on 
Nigerian courts, they have persuasive authority, and if 
followed, a deserted Nigerian wife would not be entitled to 
claim possession of the matrimonial home of her husband from
1. [1954] 1 ALL E.R.532..
2. Ibid.
3- [1965] 2 ALL E.R. 472, H.L.[1965] A.C.1175
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a genuine purchaser. The situation envisaged by Lynskey, J., 
as stated above is therefore possible, although a mistress 
might not be regarded as a genuine purchaser.
Under the common law, apparently, a husband could not 
claim to remain in possession of the matrimonial home after his 
wife left, if the home belonged to her. The right to occupy 
the home after separation is, at common law, part of the right 
to be supported.^
(ii) The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970»
In proceedings under the Matrimonial Causes Decree, 
1970, the court may by order require the parties to the marriage, 
or either of them, to make, for the benefit of all or any of the 
parties to, and the children of, the marriage, such a settle­
ment of property to which the parties are, or either of them
is, entitled (whether in possession or reversion) as the court
2
considers just in the circumstances of the case.
Although this provision can be useful in a number of 
cases, it has not been frequently utilised by the courts in 
giving a divorced wife any part of property belonging solely 
to her husbandjor of property jointly owned by the parties.
In Qkala v. Okala, Agbakoba, J., found that the respondent 
wife had made significant contributions to the marriage, 
and had also contributed financially to a house built by 
the husband. Although he refused the wife!s prayer for 
maintenance, he held that the wife was entitled to a 
lump sum payment under section 73(1) of the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree, 1970. The wife was given N500.00. Whether 
this sum represented her financial contribution to the
1. See the Law Commission Working Paper, No. 42, op. cit.,
PP* 34-35, par. 1.3; Rawlings v. Rawlings [1964] P. 393, 
4l6, C.A. Cf. Bedson v. Bedson [1965] 2 Q.B. 666, C.A.;
See also Jones v. Challenger [1961] 1 Q.B. 176. Until 
the court has ordered him to go, or until decree absolute, 
he is not a trespasser: Morris v. Tarrant [1971] 2 W.L.R. 
630.
2. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, section 72(1).
3. * [1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R. 67.
411
building of the. house,, or whether it was. for maintenance,
was not stated.
In Anoka v. Anoka,'1 the matrimonial home was built
by the joint efforts of the parti.es. The Judge disregarded
entirely the contribution of the wife towards the building
of the matrimonial home. Although the husband, a senior
inspector of education, was found guilty of adultery, the
wife, a staff nurse, was given no maintenance, nor any
sum for her financial contribution to the building of the
2
matrimonial home.
5. Rights of maintenance after a divorce 
A. Customary Law.
The maintenance of a wife during the subsistence
of the marriage, while the parties are living together, has
■5
been discussed in previous chapters. This section
examines the wife’s right of maintenance after the marriage
has broken down by separation or divorce.
One of the few principles of law which is of
universal application in the customary law systems of the
various Nigerian communities is that a divorced wife is
not entitled to maintenance for herself, from her husband.
If she retains custody of minor children, the husband has
a duty to maintain these children, but no maintenance is
due to the wife herself once the marriage ends.
4
In Adeleke v. Hannah Yinka, the plaintiff, who had 
obtained a divorce from her husband married according to
1. [1973] 3 E.C.S.L.R.51.
2. See Eyo v. Eyo [1972] 2 C .C.H.C .J .121 where although the 
husband’s gross income was stated as N26,460.00, and the 
Judge believed he was earning more than that, N400.00 
maintenance per month, instead of a lump sum was awarded.
3. See above, Chapters VII, IX, and XI.
4. [1976] Suit No. M/559/76, unreported, Customary Court, 
Grade B, Mapo Ibadan, 5 Nov. 1976.
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customary law,, applied for maintenance for herself and the
only child of the marriage. The Judge of the Customary
Court Ibadan, with reference to the plaintiff*s claim for
her own maintenance allowance, declared:
Payment of such an allowance to a divorced 
woman is contrary to Native Law and Custom.
It is also against natural justice, as a 
divorced woman is at liberty to remarry 
to another man immediately the marriage is 
dissolved in the court and it is the duty 
of the new husband to maintain her.
The Judgefs perception of natural justice may have
been coloured by the fact that Yoruba women usually remarry
after a divorce, and that they are entitled to their separate
property during the marriage, and after a divorce. But the
idea of a husband maintaining his divorced wife is entirely
unknown to Nigerian customary law in traditional society,
even in those communities in which all the property of a
wife legally belonged to the husband. Indeed, it could not
have been otherwise in the social context of traditional
societies.
Contrary to the views of some writers that a wife 
in customary law traditionally had a right to maintenance 
from her husband during the subsistence of the marriage, 
the view has been advanced elsewhere in this thesis1 that, 
strictly speaking, no right of maintenance as known to the 
common law of England existed in traditional customary law. 
The husband in farming societies had a duty to allot his 
wife a portion of land for her separate use, or allow her 
to interplant her crops among his. From the yield of these 
crops, in most societies, she had a corresponding, duty 
to supply all other foodstuffs such as fish, oil, peppers, 
and other condiments to savour and augment the yams which 
her husband usually gives her. In non-farming communities, 
the husband had a duty to give her trading, capital at the 
beginning of the marriage. With the profits made from 
this capital, she is expected to feed and clothe herself
1. See above, Chapter VII, pp. 585-589.
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and her children, and often her husband, when he is in need.
When the marriage ends in divorce, there is no right
of maintenance which could continue after the divorce.1 In
most cases, the divorced wife returns to her natal family,
and the land allotted to her by the husband would either be
shared among the other wives or given to a new wife. For
all practical purposes the marriage is ended.
In the modern Nigerian society, the traditional rule
has remained unchanged in this respect, and a divorced wife
has no legal right to demand maintenance from her divorced
2husband under customary law.
The wife of a statutory marriage, at least in theory, 
has the common law right to be maintained by her husband, 
but as shall be shown later, the attitudes of High Court 
judges are conditioned by the customary law approach to 
the maintenance of a divorced wife and is typical of the
•3
following statement by Agbakoba, J., in Okala v. Okala:J
I am unable to reconcile the traditional 
Nigerian concept of the absence or non­
existence of marriage (call it dissolution) 
with the principle of maintenance, and it is 
now becoming evident in spite of statutory 
provisions, that contemporary judicial 
thought even in England is mobilizing towards 
a new and larger view that maintenance ought 
not to be ordered after a decree of dissolution 
save there are very strong reasons to compel 
a contrary course.^
1. Compare the position among the Bamenda of Cameroons 
where the husband is entitled to claim food for sub­
sistence from his divorced wife for as long as the dowry 
has not been refunded, see Kaberry, Women of the Grass- 
fields, op. cit. , p. 145.
2. Kasunmu and Salacuse, Nigerian Family Law, 1966, p. 195.
3. [19731 3 E.C.S.L.R.67, 73; see the comments of 
Thompson, J . , in Akinsemoyin v. Akinsemoyin [1971] N.M. 
L.R. 272 at 275.
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B. Islamic law marriage
The.rights of a wife married according to Islamic 
law, with reference to maintenance after divorce, are not 
essentially different from those of a wife married accord­
ing to customary law.
During the marriage, the maintenance of the wife 
and children is a primary obligation of the husband.1 
When a divorce occurs, however, although the husband 
continues to have a legal obligation to maintain his 
children who are left in the custody of the wife, generally, 
he owes no such duty t o .the wife herself.
If a wife is repudiated by a revocable divorce,
her husband has a legal.duty to maintain her during her
idda, but once the divorce becomes irrevocable, he is
absolved from his legal duty to maintain her. Under
classical Islamic law, if a divorced woman is pregnant,
she has the right to be maintained by her husband until
2
the birth of the child. This practice is seldom followed 
in the Northern States, at least not in Maidugari, although 
the duty is recognized, and is stated to be in the interest 
of the unborn child. Many cases are recorded in the 
Social Welfare Department, of pregnant, divorced wives com­
plaining of lack of maintenance by their former husbands, 
and in most cases, fathers of the unborn children.
1. See above, Chapter IX; see also Vesey-Fitzgerald, op. cit., 
p. 95.
2. See Mulla, Principles of Mahomedan Law, op. cit., par.279; 
Bailee, Digest of Moohummudan Law, op. cit. , Bk. 6, Chpt. 1, 
p. 450; Hamilton, Hedaya, op. cit., Vol. 1, Bk. 1, Chpt. 15, 
pp. 145, 146; Cf. Moulvi Khan Bahadur, Mahomedan Law 
Relating to Marriage, Dower, Divorce, Legitimacy and 
Guardianship of Minors According to the Soonness, ("Calcutta, 
Thacker Spink and Co., 1895), P • 273, 303-311; rA woman
who is observing her iddat on account of divorce is 
entitled to maintenance, and residence, whether there 
has been one divorce or (two or) three divorces, whether 
the woman is pregnant or not1; par. 1660, p. 303; see 
also Vesey-Fitzgerald, 0£. cit., pp. 53 and 95; fIn 
Maliki law the divorced wife is not entitled to 
maintenance except in the case where she is pregnant.*
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This seems to. be an example, of the triumph of 
traditional customary law over Islamic law,1
C . Statutory marriage
(i) Introduction
The husband of a statutory marriage may be liable
to maintain his wife after the parties have separated, or
the marriage has been dissolved by divorce. The maintenance
rights of the wife while the marriage still subsists has
2been dealt- with in the last chapter. This section 
discusses the maintenance rights when a divorce suit has 
been instituted, or the parties have been divorced.
The liability of a husband of a statutory marriage 
to maintain his wife after the breakdown of the marriage 
has created a degree of hostility in the Nigerian community. 
As previously seen, both customary and Islamic laws deny 
the wife the right of maintenance once the marriage has been 
dissolved by divorce. The right of maintenance given to 
the wife of a statutory marriage, especially after a divorce 
is therefore foreign to Nigerian customary marriage laws. 
While it is the subject of envy by wives married under 
customary or Islamic laws, it contributes to the reluctance 
of Nigerian men to contract- marriages under the Nigerian
Q
Marriage Act.
h
Udo Udoma, J., (as he then was), in Coker v. Coker,
1. The Syrian Law introduced a bold innovation when it pro­
vided that a wife who had been repudiated without just 
cause might be awarded compensation from her former husband 
to the maximum extent of one year’s maintenance, see Coulson, 
Islamic Surveys, op. cit., p. 209.
2. See above, chapter XI.
3. See Stanley Childs, ’Christian Marriage in Nigeria’, 16 
Africa, 1946, pp. 238-246 at p. 245.
4. Suit No. WD/19/1961, unreported, Lagos High Court, 7 
January 1963* See also Qkafor v. Okafor [1971] Suit 0/6D/
71, unreported, Onitsha High Court.
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voiced the sentiment of many Nigerian men as expressed in 
opinions to the present writer, in the following observ­
ation :
It- is almost unprecedented in this country 
for a wife having divorced her husband to 
turn round and seek maintenance from the 
same husband. The very idea of maintaining 
a wife after divorce appears to me to be 
foreign to the African conception of marriage 
and divorce. A situation like the present 
cries aloud for distinct Nigerian rules.
The right of a divorced wife of a statutory 
marriage to maintenance, may be illusory, rather than 
real, and in actual fact, she may not be in a better 
position than the wife of an Islamic or customary law 
marriage, as far as maintenance after divorce is concerned. 
The wife’s failure to get the full benefit of her right of 
maintenance may be due to a variety of causes, for example, 
the prohibitive cost of bringing an action to enforce it, 
or fear of inciting the hostility of a small community 
opposed to court actions between husband and wife. But 
not a little of the wife’s failure to get adequate mainten­
ance is in many cases due to the attitude of Nigerian 
judges to maintenance of a divorced wife, as illustrated 
by cases analysed below.^
(ii) Maintenance as an ancillary relief
Whatever may be the rights of a wife of a statutory
marriage in Nigeria to enforce the payment of maintenance
2as a separate and independent action, there is no doubt 
as to her right to claim maintenance as an ancilliary relief 
in a petition for divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial
1. See A.B. Kasunmu, ^Economic Consequence of Divorce: A 
Case Study of Some Judicial Decisions in Lagos’ in Law 
and the Family in Africa, edit, by Simon H. Roberts, 
(The Hague, Mouton, 19^4), pp. 129-143.
2. See above, Chapter XI, pp. 226-239.
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separation,, restitution of conjugal rights or jactitation 
of marriage.
The power of the. court to order the payment of 
maintenance to either party of the marriage may be exercised 
at two different stages in a matrimonial proceeding. 
Maintenance may be given
(i) during the pendency of the suit; and
(ii) on completion of the proceeding for the principal 
relief.
Before the commencement of the Matrimonial Causes
Decree, 1970, payment of maintenance made before the final
determination of the suit was known as alimony pendente lite
(alimony pending suit). It. was a temporary measure aimed
at alleviating the position of a destitute wife. Permanent
alimony was available after a decree of judicial separation
or an order for restitution of conjugal rights.
Both these financial orders may be distinguished
from maintenance which was awarded after the dissolution of
a marriage. In the New Zealand case of Lodder v. Loader,1
Salmond J., distinguished matrimonial payments thus:
Alimony properly so called, is the financial 
provision made by a husband for his wife while 
the marriage relation continues to exist. It 
is either interim or permanent alimony. Interim 
alimony is the provision made pendente lite, 
whether in a suit for divorce, judicial separation, 
or otherwise. Permanent alimony is the provision 
made after a decree of judicial separation, the 
parties still remaining husband and wife. 
Maintenance, on the other hand, as opposed to 
alimony, is the provision made by a man for a 
woman who was formerly his wife ...
2
The Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, which now 
governs maintenance rights of spouses of a statutory 
marriage, does not preserve this traditional distinction in 
nonclamenture, and all financial orders under section 70
1- [1923.] N.Z'.L.R. 786 at 788.
2.. No. 18 of 1970.
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are Indiscriminately referred to as maintenance, orders.
The Courts, however, invariably adhere to the old terms.1
With reference to maintenance, the Decree provides
that
*marriage* includes a purported marriage 
that is void, but does not include one 
entered into according to Muslim rites 
or other customary law.2
An order for maintenance can therefore be made in 
favour of, or against, parties to a statutory marriage, 
which is void. Reference has already been made to the 
anomalous position to which this provision gives rise. A 
party to an illegal *marriage* under the Marriage Act may 
be entitled to maintenance, while the wife of a valid 
customary or Islamic law marriage is not.^
It is important, to note that the Matrimonial Causes
Decree, 1970, has effected complete equalization of liability
h
to maintain between husband and wife. Either spouse may be 
ordered to pay maintenance to the other spouse, and the 
* children of the marriage*. The phrase Tchildren of the 
marriage* is widely defined and includes:
(a) any child adopted since the marriage by 
the husband and wife or by either of them 
with the consent of the other;
(b) any child of the husband and wife born 
before the marriage whether legitimated 
by the marriage or not; and
(c) any child of either the husband or wife 
(including an illegitimate child of either 
of them and a child adopted by either of 
them) if, at-the relevant time, the child
1. See Olu^Ibukun and Anor v. Qlu-^Ibukun [1974] 2 S.C.41.
2. Section 69.
3. See above, Chapter XI.
under
4. Cf. the position at common law and/the English Matrimonial 
Causes Act, 1965, applicable in Nigeria prior to the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970,. where a husband was 
entitled to maintenance from his wife, only if she sought 
judicial separation or dissolution on the ground of the 
husband*s insanity section 15.
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was ordinarily a member of the household 
of the husband and wife.^
The Decree has thus made radical changes in 
relation to the category of children liable to be maintained 
by either spouse when a marriage breaks down. Whether or 
not one spouse has accepted the child of the other spouse 
as a member of the family is a question of fact.2 Although 
in many cases the agreement of the spouses will be inferred 
from the fact that they lived together with the children 
as a family, in the absence of an explicit agreement, the 
inference from their conduct must be clear and unequivocal.
A person can be deemed to have accepted a child as a member 
of the family only if he has full knowledge of the relevant 
facts at the time.^
In Teriba v. Teriba, the petitioner claimed mainten­
ance and custody of the children of the marriage. The 
paternity of all the children, except child R., was admitted 
by the respondent. It was proved that when R was born, the 
respondent paid the hospital bills, performed the naming 
ceremony, and treated it as his own child, until twenty-four 
months later t/hen the petitioner confessed that the child 
belonged to another man. On the question as to whether the 
respondent can be said to have treated the child as a child 
of the marriage, Aguda, J., held:
In my .view before a child can be properly 
regarded as a child of the family, all material 
facts and circumstances relating to the child 
must be known to both the wife and the husband 
and any fraud practised by one party on the 
other which is in respect of some material 
particulars of-the facts and circumstances 
relating to the child must vitiate the consent 
of the other party accepting the child as a 
child of'the family.
1. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970*'S.69.
2. See Bowlas v. Bowlas .[1965] 3 ALL E.R.40 C .A. [1965]P.450.
3. R. v. R. 1968, 2 ALL E.R. 608, I1968J p.4l4.
4. [19703 Suit No. 1/211/67, unreported decision of 27th 
February 1970, see S.A. Adesanya, Laws of Matrimonial 
Causes, 1973, p. 209.
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A similar decision was given in the English case of 
R. v. R .1 where a husband who believed that his wife’s child 
was his, discovered five years later from documents he dis­
covered, that it was not,, was held not to have accepted the 
child as a child of the family.
2
But m  Egwuonike v. Egwuonike, where the respondent 
did not repudiate the child he claimed was not his for four­
teen years, and gave no evidence to indicate that his know­
ledge of the child’s alleged illegitimate status was recent, 
he was held to have had accepted the child as a child of the 
family, and was therefore liable to maintain her.
Although an order for maintenance may be made in 
favour of a husband as well as a wife, and a few husbands 
have actually claimed maintenance, there seems to be no 
decided case where a wife in Nigeria has been ordered to 
maintain her husband. This is due to financial realities 
rather than to legal absolution. With the growing affluence 
of Nigerian women, the possibility of a wife being ordered 
to maintain her divorced husband cannot be entirely ruled out
(iii) Quantum of maintenance
The courts have absolute discretion in determining 
the quantum of maintenance awarded to a spouse. The Matri­
monial Causes Decree, 1970, provides that the Court, in 
making a maintenance order as it thinks fit shall have regard
to the means, earning capacity and the conduct 
of the parties to the marriage and all other 
relevant circumstances.
1. [1968] 2 ALL E.R.608; [1968] P.4l4; approved by Lord
Denning, M.R. in Re L., [1968] 1 ALL E.R. 20, 25-26, C.A. 
[1968] P. 119; and by Stirling, J. in B. v. BY and F . 
[1968} 3 ALL E.R. 232; [1969] P.37. See also Kirkwood
v. Kirkwood [1970] 2 ALL E.R. l6l.
2. [1966] N.M.L.R.147; [1966] 2 ALL N.L.R.l; see also
Caller v. Caller [1966] 2 ALL E.R.734; [1968] P.39•
3. See Kasunmu, ’Economic Consequences of Divorce1, 0£. cit. 
p. 132.
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Nigerian, courts, generally, have shown reluctance
to award realistic maintenance to a discarded wife, and
the modern tendency seems to be to abolish maintenance of
divorced wives by judicial decree. For example, in
Akparanta v. Akparanta1 , Agbokoba, J., stated that
... the modern trend is that obligation 
to maintain a wife ceases with a decree 
of dissolution.
He refused to grant maintenance to the wife, although 
she was earning only £396 per annum, while the husband’s 
salary was £2,000 per annum, and the husband himself admitted 
in his pleadings and evidence, that he had three children 
with one Bernadine, and still lived in adultery with her.
Similarly, Oputa, J., noted that section 70 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, gives a court the discretion 
as to whether or not to make a maintenance order, but 
observed:
Since it is the trend under the Matrimonial 
Causes Decree to facilitate the dissolution 
of marriages, a wife/petitioner eager to 
have all links with her husband broken should 
not keep alive any financial link with a man 
she no longer regards as her husband, a man 
who no longer owes her any marital obligations 
including the obligation to maintain.
Why should there not be a complete dissolution, 
including the dissolution of all erstwhile 
financial bonds and obligations?2
A similar attitude was portrayed by Ogbobine, J.,
who, after awarding the wife/petitioner in Achugbue v. Achugbue,
1. [1972] 1 E.C.S.L.R.779 at p. 789.
2. Okafor v. Okafor [1970] Suit No.E/l4D/70, unreported decision 
of Enugu High Court.
3. [1971] Suit No. UHC/21/70, unreported decision of Ughelli 
High Court, 26 November 1971; see also Adeleye v. Adeleye 
[1974] 6 C.C.H.C. J. 827.. Contrast David v. David [1958] L.L.R. 
85; Dawodu v. Dawodu [1974] 5 C ,C.H.C.J,617; maintenance 
does not only mean the food a wife puts in her mouth ...
It does not mean mere subsistance. William v. William [1976]
3 C.C.H.C. J. 805. Contrast' S'omorin v. Somorin [1974] 5 C.C.H. 
C.J. 613; and Re Borthwick. 1949 I ALL E.R. 427 at 475. 
’Maintenance cannot' mean' mere subsistence’; and Hakluytt 
v. Hakluytt [1968] 2 ALL E.R.868.
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the paltry sum of £2 per month, added that Its payment was 
to cease *if she remarried, lived with any other man, or 
had a child by any other manT.
Account is rarely taken of the conduct of the 
parties to the marriage as directed by the Decree, when 
considering the level of maintenance. The decisions are 
often conflicting and show no consistent pattern, but a 
few cases will amply illustrate the general attitude. For 
example, the Decree, as well as the old law, enjoins the 
court to have regard to the conduct of the parties to the 
marriage.1 In many cases, so far as the conduct of the
man is concerned, this element is disregarded.
2
In Anaje v. Anaje, the wife sued for a decree of
judicial separation on the ground that the husband brought
another woman into the matrimonial home who could get male
issues for him, since she had only one girl. Her counsel
asked for one-third of the respondent husband1s earnings of
£1,500 per annum, as permanent alimony, and cited authorities
to show that she was entitled to it. Kaine, J., said:
I am of opinion that it is difficult to apply 
this principle to many African homes. I do not 
think that the African woman is so expensive to 
warrant it.
It is even in the interest of the African woman 
that such a heavy amount should not be paid to 
her because she is living in a society where 
the relations and kinsmen of the husband have 
not learned to mind their own business.
He awarded the wife £12.10 per month for her maintenance and
£5 per month for the maintenance of the only child of the
marriage. No mention was made as to the relevance of the
conduct of the husband in regard to the amount awarded.
Kaine, J.?s statement above can be compared with that of
Barry, J., in the Australian case of Davis v. Davis and
1. See section 70(1)•
2. 119651 Suit No, 0/9D/1963, unreported decision of Onitsha 
High Court decided on the 20.th. September ,1965 •
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Wissing.^
... if a man of means irretrievably 
destroys the reality of a marriage, and it 
appears that he .contemplates marriage with 
another woman whom he prefers to his wife, 
the court should ensure that he pays to the 
spouse he is repudiating whatever, having 
in regard to his means and his conduct towards 
her, and her conduct towards him, is fair, and 
reasonable, recognizing that he is pursuing 
his own gratification in disregard of the 
obligations he undertook^
It is not suggested that a wife should be enriched 
by the immoral or perfidous conduct of the husband, but 
there is no reason why she should be at a disadvantage 
either because of it.
A similar disregard of the husband's conduct is 
evident in the case of Ehlgiator v. Ehigiator, where the 
parties, having lived together for many years as husband 
and wife, got legally married under the Marriage Act in 
1958. There were four children of the marriage before the 
husband left in 1959 for the United Kingdom to further his 
studies. Before he left Nigeria, his salary as a Grade 2 
teacher was £19.10 a month. He worked in England to pay 
for his education, but occasionally remitted money home to 
his wife for maintenance. On his return home, he drove the 
wife away from the matrimonial home, because he was in love 
with an English woman he had brought home with him. He 
consistently refused to take the wife back, in spite of all 
her pleadings, although he could find no fault with her.
His salary on his return was £804 per annum. The Judge 
found that the respondent was guilty of wilful neglect, 
adultery, and desertion, and that for no just cause he wil­
fully neglected to provide reasonable maintenance for his
1. 11963.1 5 P.L.R.388.
2. Ibid., p. 392.
3 . I1966] N.M.L.R. .372;. £1966.] 2 ALL N.L.R. 169.
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wife. In deciding what was reasonable maintenance to which
the deserted wife was entitled, Begho, J., said:
What is reasonable maintenance for the wife 
must be interpreted against the background 
of the standard of life which the husband 
previously maintained before he and the wife 
parted. Since the return of the husband from 
the United Kingdom he has not lived with the 
wife to give her what is generally referred 
to as ’ senior service ’ standard. What the 
court can consider reasonable or adequate is 
the amount of money which today can give her 
the same standard of life she was used to when 
the husband was a Grade 2 teacher earning £19.10 
a month in 1959 > before he went to the United 
Kingdom.^
What would have been the wife’s standard of living had the
husband not deserted her should have been a pertinent
consideration. In the English case of Le Roy-Lewis v.2
Le Roy-Lewisa an increase in the husband’s income since 
the parties ceased cohabitation was regarded as relevant 
if the wife would have reaped the benefit of them had the 
spouses still been living together.
Although no account was taken of the husband’s con­
duct in awarding maintenance to the wife in the above case
in Akparanta v . Akparanta» a wife was deprived of alimony 
pendente lite3 because of her alleged adultery. This case 
may be compared with the attitude of the English courts as 
exemplified in Wachtel v. Wachtela where the wife deserted 
her husband, and admitted she had formed a relationship with 
a member of the opposite sex, although she denied adultery. 
Nevertheless, she was awarded £1,500 maintenance and £6,000
1. Ehigiator v. Ehigiator [1966] N.M.L.R.372 at p.377; [1966] 
2 ALL. N.L.R. 169" at p. 177.
2. [1954] 3 ALL E.R.57; [1955] P.l.
3* [1970-1971] E.C.S.L.R. 104; see also Arinoye v. Arinoye 
[1972] 3 C.C.H.C.J. 146; Oseni v. Qseni [1972] C.C.H.C.J. 
110.
£1973] 1 ALL E.R. 829, C.A.; £1973] Fam. 72; see also 
Harnett v. Harnett [1973.1 2 ALL E.R.* 593.
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lump sum, representing nearly one^third of the matrimonial 
home.
6. Summary
The matrimonial property regime which predominates 
in Nigeria is the separate property regime.
Married women in most systems of customary law have 
full legal capacity to acquire, own, and dispose of all 
types of property, including land. Their husbands have no 
legal rights to control the disposal of property to which 
the wives are absolutely entitled, either during the marriage, 
or when there is a divorce. The earnings of a wife, in 
these societies, are also subject to no restrictions by the 
husband, and belong to the wife entirely.
Women married under Islamic law also have full 
legal capacity to own property separately from their husbands, 
but a husband has the legal right to control his wife’s 
disposal of two-thirds of her separate property, although 
this right is seldomly enforced in the Nigerian Islamic 
communities.
In a few societies, women married under customary law 
are denied the right to own movable property, and more often, 
cannot own land. In some cases, although they can own land 
or other property, the right of control or disposal of such - 
property resides in the husband during the continuance of 
the marriage. When there is a divorce, the husband is 
legally entitled to claim all, or some', of his wife’s separate 
property. She has no claim on any of his separate property 
property to which she may have made financial contributions, 
but legal ownership of which is vested in his name.
Under the Married Women’s Property Acts, a married 
woman is capable of acquiring holding, and disposing of her 
separate property, without the intervention of anyone, 
including her husband, during the marriage, or after a 
divorce. The Statutes apply to all wives of a statutory 
marriage, as well as to wives of a customary or Islamic 
law marriage, where the customary or Islamic law is incon­
sistent with the provisions of the statute. The Married
Women’s Property Acts do not apply to the Western or Mid- 
Western States. In those States, an almost identical
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statute to the Married WomenTs Property Act 1882, has been 
locally enacted, but this local statute does not apply.to wives 
of a customary or Islamic law marriage.
Where property is jointly owned by the spouses, either 
husband or wife may apply under the Married WomenTs Property 
Act, 1882, for an order to enforce his or her proprietory 
rights. This does not apply to spouses married under customary 
or Islamic law in the Western of Mid-Western States.
The wife of a customary marriage has no legal right 
to remain in a matrimonial home provided for her use by her 
husband when a divorce ensues, nor is she entitled to be 
maintained by her husband after the divorce, or when the parties 
have separated because of a disagreement. On the other hand, 
the wife has no legal obligation to provide her husband with 
food or any. other help which she may have given to him during 
the marriage, once the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
The divorced wife of an Islamic law marriage has no 
legal right to remain in her husband’s home, or to be main­
tained by him, once the period of idda has been observed.
The wife of a statutory marriage may have the right 
to remain in the matrimonial home, even, where it is solely 
owned by her husband, unless he has made adequate alternative 
provision for her. She also has the right to be maintained 
by him after a divorce. She has a corresponding duty to 
maintain her husband, after a divorce, in appropriate cir­
cumstances.
Because of the attitude of most Nigerian judges to 
maintenance of a divorced wife, the right of a divorced wife 
to be maintained by her husband is more apparent than real, 
and in actual fact the wife of a statutory marriage may be 
no better off than the wife of an Islamic or customary law 
marriage once a divorce occurs, as far as maintenance rights 
are concerned.^
1. See e.g. Arinye v. Arinye [1973] 4 C.C.H.C.J. 81, at p. 
87; Akinsemoyin v. Akinsemoyin [1971] N.M.L.R. 272 at 
275; Odulata v. Odulata [1970J Suit No. AB/20/J0, unre­
ported, cited in Akinsemoyin v. Akinsemoyin: ’A lady 
who earns £1,032 per annum should be able to maintain 
herself’.
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CHAPTER XIII
Rights of Succession
"Of him whose wife is not deceased, 
half the body survives. How then 
should another take his property 
when half of his person is alive"
1. Introduction
The rule that a widow does not inherit her 
deceased husband1s property obtained, not only in Hindu 
law as the above quotation from the Laws of Manu indicates, 
but in other traditional societies in many parts of the 
world. The right of succession in a deceased husband*s 
property is one of the most important aspects of the 
legal status of married women, especially in African cus­
tomary law marriage where the traditional rule still 
applies, and a widow is deprived of the rights to inherit 
her deceased husband’s intestate estate.
In Nigeria, intestate succession to the estate 
of a married person generally depends on the type of
marriage he or she has contracted. The intestate estate
of Nigerians who are subject to customary law is governed
by the customary law which pertains to his particular
community. If the intestate contracted a customary
marriage only, in the case of the husband, his customary
law continues to govern the devolution of his property,
but the devolution of a married woman’s property, provided
a customary marriage only is contracted, is governed by the
customary law of her husband’s community, in most cases.
In the Northern Emirates, the intestate estates 
of Moslems, at least in theory, are governed by Islamic 
law, which as far as the widow’s rights of inheritance are 
concerned, are basically different, and as shall be seen,
more beneficial to women.
1. Manu: Dayabhaga, Chapter XI, sect. 1, verse 130, as 
quoted by Markby, Elements of Law, op.cit.,p.373.
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If, however, the deceased, and in some cases even 
his parents, contracted a statutory marriage, his or her 
intestate estate is governed, not by customary or Islamic 
laws, but by the general law which is derived from the 
English laws of succession.
The principles as set out above are reasonably 
clear, but complications arise because, as previously noted, 
many spouses combine a customary marriage with a statutory 
marriage, and the rules governing the conflict of laws 
produced as a result are far from clear.^ It is therefore 
very difficult to ascertain precisely the rules which govern 
any particular case.
Laws of intestate succession to the estate of a
deceased husband in almost all system of customary law,
contrary to the principles of the general law which favours
the wife and children of the deceased, deprive the widow,
and, in a few cases, especially in matrilineal communities,
2
even the children of the marriage. Udder Islamic law, the 
wife or wives and children of the deceased get specified 
shares in the deceased*s estate, but the share of the 
widow, in most cases, is less than it would be under the 
general law. Consequently, there is a conflict in the rules 
governing the different types of marriages, with the widow 
of a customary marriage faring less well than her counter­
parts married according to Islamic law or under statutory 
law. As noted previously, the' problem is further com­
plicated by the fact that many Nigerians who contract a
1. See above, Chapter XI.
2. See Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession in Eastern
Nigeria, op.cit.,pp.lbQ-lb?; Laryll Forde, 'double 
Descent Among the Yako", in African Systems of Kinship
and Marriage, edit, by A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll
Forde op.cit.,pp.310-311; "sons should expect very 
little from their parents. A man may obtain a gun or 
cutlass that was his father*s; the rest will be claimed 
by his father *s'brother or sister*s son. See also 
Nsugbe, Ohaffia: A Matrilineal Ibo People,op.cit.,
pp.86-94; See Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration 
in Nigeria and the Cameroons, op.cit., p.179, for 
details of matrilineal communities in the Northern State 
of Nigeria, and their laws of succession.
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statutory marriage also contract a customary marriage.
The rules governing succession in such cases are far 
from clear, and judicial decisions have added further to 
the complication, as will be apparent from the discussion, 
with conflicting judgments upon similar facts.
Conflict of laws also exists with reference to 
the rules of testate succession, due to the fact that 
under the general law, the testator has unrestricted rights 
to dispose of all individually owned property which he 
possessed at the time of his death, while under customary 
and Islamic laws, his capacity in this respect is subject 
to various restrictions.
The uncertainty produced by these conflicts of 
laws are of vital importance to the status of women.
Succession may conveniently be discussed under 
the following headings:
(I) intestate succession in each type of marriage;
(II) testate succession;
(III) the problems created by the conflict of laws;
(IV) the widow?s right to letters of administration
2. Intestate Succession
A. Customary marriage
The estate of a Nigerian who dies intestate sub­
ject to customary law, and who has contracted a customary 
marriage only, is governed by the customary rules of 
succession applicable in his particular community.
The rules of intestate succession under Nigerian 
customary systems have almost as many variations as there 
are ethnic groups in the country, and variations within the 
same ethnic group, especially among the Igbos, are quite 
common.^ For example, many societies, such as, the
1. See Nwakamma Okoro, "Integration of the Customary and the 
General (English) Laws of Succession in Eastern Nigeria", 
in Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in 
Africa, University of ife , Institute of African Studies 
(Ile-Ife, Nigeria. Africana Publishing Corporation,1971), 
pp.243-257 at p.242; see also Mudiaga Odje, Laws of 
Succession in Southern Nigeria with Special Reference to 
the Mid-Western Region, Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of London, 19U5, pT£o.
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Yoruba and Efik, grant inheritance rights in all types of.
property to male and female children of the deceased, to
the exclusion of other blood relations.^ In other societies,
2
certain blood relations share with the deceased1s children.
In most communities, female children are excluded from in-
heritance rights in their deceased fathers* estates, all
property, especially immovable property, being given to 
4
males only. In yet other societies, the eldest male child 
alone inherits, although he usually has the obligation to
5
cater for the needs of younger siblings. From these rules, 
it can be seen that there is no common practice with regard 
to customary laws of succession in Nigeria.
The only universal rule which, almost without any 
exceptions, obtains in the Nigerian customary laws of 
succession is that a wife does not inherit her deceased 
husband*s intestate estate. It is remarkable to find 
such uniformity in the customary laws of so many peoples 
with different origins, histories and customs. Indeed the
1. See e.g. Oso v. Ikusedun [1976] 4 C.C.H.C.J.1113; Taiwo 
v. Lawani and Anor.119&11 1 All N.L.R. 703; Salami v.
Salami 11^57 1 W.&.N.L.R.10; Adeseye v. Taiwo 11936]
1 F.S.C.84; Sule and Ors.v. A.jisegiri [193?] 13 N.L.R.
146. This rule also applies among some matrilineal 
societies e.g. Ohaffia, see Nsugbe, op.cit.,pp.88;
Customary Law Manual, 1977, op.cit.,p.103, par.160(b).
2. See Forde, Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence, op. 
cit.,p.65, among the Igbirra of Okene, succession is by 
a younger full brother, unless the deceased*s eldest 
son is senior to him; see also Fadipe, The Sociology
of the Yorubas, op.cit.,pp.140-141.
3. See e.g. among the Igbos, Customary Law Manual, op.cit., 
p. 103; Uboma v. Ibeneme [1967! F.N.L.R., £51; Nwauwa v. 
Ugor.ji and Anor. 11963 1 Suit No. HOW/68/63, unreported, 
Owerri High Court, 25 Sept. 1965, where it was held that 
daughters are not entitled to inherit their father*s land 
except that given to them by him during his life-time; 
see also Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.»
p p .282-283; Uboma and Ors.v. Ibeneme and Anor.11^671
F.N.L.R. 251.
4. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit.,pp.100-101. This is
the general rule among the Igbos, but there are exceptions.
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued
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exclusion of a widow from direct inheritance rights (as 
opposed to rights of inheritance through, her children) in 
her deceased husband*s property is found in many other 
traditional societies elsewhere in Africa.*'"
In Nigeria, the rule applies irrespective of 
the services the widow may have rendered to her deceased 
husband, or of her contributions, financial or otherwise 
to the accumulation of his property.
Footnotes 5 and 6 continued....
5. See e.g. Benin customary law; Ogiamien v. Ogiamien [19671 
N.M.L.R. 245; Ehigie v. Ehighie |19611 All N.L.R.845; 
no child other than the eldest surviving male child of a 
deceased intestate who has duly performed the burial 
ceremony has the right to inherit; in the absence of 
male issues the right passes to female issues. See 
R.A.I. Ogbobine, Material and Cases on Benin Land Law 
(Benin City, 1974); see also Bradbury and Lloyd, The 
Benin Kingdom, op.cit.,p p .46-47: Among the Ibibios 
generally, the eldest son also inherits to the exclusion 
of other children, see Forde and Jones, op.cit.,p.75; 
cf. E.jiamike v. E.jiamike [1972] 2 E.C.S.L.R.ll; and 
Ngwo and Nwodei v. Onye.jena [1965] 1 All N.L.R. 552.
6.See L.E.D.B»v.Tukuru and 0rs.fl965l L.L.R. 155; Seberu v. 
Sunmonu,fl9571 2 F.S.C.55; see also Ward Price, Land 
Tenure in the.Yoruba Provinces, op.cit.,p,15; Customary 
Law Manual, op. cit. ,p.H2; cf. Nwugege v. Adigwe and Anor. 
[193^] 11 N.l TR~i34, where it was held that on the death 
of a married woman, movable ante-nuptial property brought 
to the husband*s home, as well as property acquired sub­
sequently by a married woman, after her death is in­
herited by her husband or his family. Cf. the position 
among the Yoruba - Johnson and Ors. v. Macauley and Anor. 
[1961] 1 All N.L.R. 7^ -3; see further, Nwabueze, op.cit., 
pp.389-392; Odje, Law of Succession in Southern Nigeria, 
op.cit.tp.291; Roth, Great Benin, op.cit., p.97;
Egharevba, Benin Law and Custom, op.cit.,pp.58 and 76; 
Esenwa, "Marriage Customs in Asaba District*' op.cit. ,p.80
1. See e.g. Ghana matrilineal societies where persons trace 
descent in the direct female line from a common remote 
ancestress; Amarfio v. Ayorkor [1954] 14 W.A.C.A.554, 
wives do not inherit from their husbands; see Bosman, 
op.cit.,p.202 "On the death of either man or wife the 
respective relations come and immediately sweep away all, 
not leaving the widow or widower the least part thereof..." 
cf. N.A. Ollenu, "The Law of Succession in Ghana", in 
Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in 
Africa, op.cit.. pp.294-510 at p.502. See also H.F.
Morris, "The Law of Succession in Uganda", in Integ­
ration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa, 
op.cit.,pp.510-525» at p.513, but note the recent develop- 
ments in regard to succession, see Report of the
footnote 1 continued........
The position of the Nigerian widow in this respect, 
is not unlike the position of the English wife who, because 
of the present English doctrine of separate property, is 
prevented from taking any share in her divorced husband1s 
property. Lord Simon of Glaisdale summed up the position of 
the latter thus:
"The cock can feather the nest because he does not have 
to spend most of his time sitting on it. In the 
generality of marriages the wife bears and rears 
children and minds the home. She thereby frees her 
husband for his economic activities. Since it is 
her performance of her function which enables the 
husband to perform his, she is in justice entitled 
to share in its fruits".^
Customary law gives no part of the deceased hus­
band’s estate to his widow, despite the fact that, unlike 
the average English wife who seldomly undertakes paid 
employment, especially when the children are young, the 
contributions of the Nigerian wife to the marital relation­
ship invariably extend far beyond her domestic and child­
bearing services.
In the former Western House of Assembly in 1950, the 
Member of Ijebu Province, speaking on a: "Proposed Scheme 
to Provide Pensions for Widows and Orphans of African 
Officers”, is reported as saying:
"What I wish to say is that in African society as 
it stands today, there is hardly any woman that 
can be called a widow in the ordinary sense, 
because as soon as the officer dies, she either 
goes to the brother or one of the relatives of the 
officer, or she goes to another husband. In that 
case she is going to be chased, and the usual dowry 
collected from her. I do not think that any Native 
Court has ever decreed that part of the property 
of a deceased man should go to his wife. It is not 
done here, and so I quite agree that if any benefit 
is going to be enjoyed at all it should be passed
Footnote 1 continued....Commission on Marriage, Divorce and 
the Status of Women, (.Government PrinterT Entebbe, 19bt); 
see also H.F. Morris, "Uganda: Report of the Commission 
on Marriager Divorce and the Status of Women" [1966] 
J.A.L. pp.3-7; Taylor, op.cit.,p.228.
1. Sir Simon of Glaisdale, in an address given to The Law 
Society [1965] 62 Law Society Gazette, 345, "With All My 
Worldly Goods”, as quoted by Lord Denning in Wachtel v. 
Wachtel [19731 2 W.L.R.366 at p.374, see also Pettitt v. 
Pettitt [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966 at 987; [1970] A.CTTTTaf 
p.881, per Lord Hodson.
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to the children of the deceased. If a man dies, and 
leaves no will, or there is disagreement about the will, 
his property is shared among his children and relatives.
I do not think it is ever shared with any wife or wives, 
so I join with those who say that the property of the 
deceased officer should go to the children and not to 
the wives"
This opinion expresses the general position of a 
2
widow in customary law. The principle has been upheld in
3numerous court decisions, and in Oshilaja v. Oshilaja,
Odesanya, J., noted:
"The customary law that a widow cannot inherit her 
deceased husband!s property has become so notorious 
by frequent proof in the courts that it has become 
judicially noticeable".
It is submitted that the exclusion of widows from
inheritance rights in their deceased husband*s property is
the greatest injustice in which women married according to
customary law are now subject. The degree of injustice is
heightened by the fact that in some societies it is alleged
that all the property of a married woman legally belongs to
her husband. In strict law, therefore, on the death of her
husband, her property belongs to his inheritors in such
communities
Various reasons have been advanced for the
exclusion of widows from inheritance rights in their deceased
husband1s intestate estates.
5
Berkeley, J., in Sogunro-Davies v. Sogunro and Ors.
opined that a wife was deprived of inheritance rights in her
deceased husband1s estate because:
"in an intestacy under native law and custom, the 
devolution of property follows the blood. There­
fore a wife or widow, not being of the blood has 
no claim to any share".
1. Report of Debate, Western House of Assembly,16 December, 
1950; see C.W. Rowling, Land Tenure in Ijebu Province 
(Government Printer, Western Region, Nigeria, l$5&),p.38.
2. See generally, Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit., 
p.313; Suberu v. Sunmonu, 119571 2 F.S.C.35; Nezianya and 
Anor.v. Qkagbue and Ors. fl9631 ..1 All N.L.R.35^; Bascom,
The Yoruba of Southwestern Nigeria, op.cit.,p.46; Fadipe, 
op.cit.t p.143; Nwabueze, op.cit.,pp.389-392; L.E.D.B. 
v.Tukuru [1963] L.L.R.155.
3. [1972] 10 C.C.H.C.J. 11 at p. 16.
4. [1929] 9 N.L.R. 79 at p.80. Footnote 5 continued.....
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It is respectfully submitted that this reason is
untenable..- In most societies in Nigeria, a husband inherits
the property-of his deceased wife when there are no surviving
children,"** and in some societies, he interits even when there
2
are surviving children of the deceased wife. Yet in those
3
societies, his wife does not inherit from him.
Nwabueze admits that inheritance of a wife*s 
property by her husband in default of issue contradicts the 
general principle that devolution follows the blood, but he 
submits that the inconsistency is explained by the fact that 
marriage has the effect of transferring the wife to the 
husbandTs patrilineage by virtue of the dowry paid on her.
As Anderson points out in another context, "what is sauce
5
for the goose is sauce for the gander"; if her transfer to
Footnote 3 continued....
5. [1929] 9 N.L.R.79, at p.80; see also Nwabueze, Nigerian
Land Law, op.cit. ,p.391; Odje, Law of Succession in 
Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,p.270.
1. e.g. in Aba, Abakaliki, Arochukwu, Orlu and many other 
Divisions in Imo and Anambra States, a married woman*s 
house, failing sons,is inherited by her husband, see 
Customary Law Manual, op.cit.,p.161, par.237(1)(a); see 
also Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit.,p.391; see 
Nwugege v. Adigwe 11934 1 11 N^L.R. 13^, in relation to 
ante-nuptial property.
2. In Onitsha, Udi, Mbano, Nkwerre, Enugu and other Divisions 
in Anambra and Imo States, a married woman*s house is 
inherited by her husband exclusively, see Customary Law 
Manual, ojD.cit. ,p.161, par .237(1) (b); Meek, Northern 
Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.,p.283; Talbot, Peoples of 
Southern Nigeria, op.cit.,p.685; Nwogugu, Family Law in 
Nigeria, op.cit.,pp.315-314.
3. See Nezianya and Anor. v. Okagbue and Anor. ["19631 1 All 
N.L.R. 352.
4. See Nwabueze, op.cit.,p.391.
5. J.N.D. Anderson, "Islamic Law in Africa; Problems of 
Today and Tomorrow" in Changing Law in Developing 
Countries, edit, by J.N.D. Anderson, 1968), p.175.
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his patrilineage allows the husband to inherit from his 
wife, then by virtue of such a transfer, she should be 
allowed to inherit from him.
The fact is that there are many cases where persons, 
unrelated by blood ties, are allowed to inherit in customary 
law. For example, in some communities, a stranger who per­
forms the burial rites of a deceased person is entitled to 
inherit from him. This is expressed in the Ishan (Edo) 
maxim.
"Ono to Olinmin ole yan Uwa,f which means f,He who
performs the burial ceremonies owns the house and all
therein.^ An adopted son is also entitled to inherit from
2
his adopted father in many communities. Slaves could also 
3
inherit. Moreover, many husbands and wives are related by 
4blood. Nevertheless, the widows in such cases are also 
prevented from inheriting their deceased husbands* property,.
The true reason for the rule that wives do not 
inherit their husband*s property must be sought elsewhere.'
5
In Suberu v. Sunmonu, Jibowu, F.J., rejected the
decision of the Lagos High Court which awarded the property
of a deceased husband to his two surviving widows. The
learned Judge said of the judgment in the lower court:
"His judgment in favour of the widows could not be 
supported even by Counsel for the plaintiffs as it 
is a well settled rule of native law and custom of 
the Yoruba people that a wife could not inherit her 
husband’s property since she herself is, like a 
chatel [sic] to be inherited by a relative of her 
late husband” .g
1. Mudiaga Odje, Law of Succession in Southern Nigeria,
op.cit.,p.163; see also Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit., 
p.320, a similar rule operates among Awgu (Igbo) community.
2. Onwuka and Anor.v. The Abiriba Clan Council [1956]
1 E.R.N.L.R.17; Re Alayo v. Tunwase,11946 1 18 N.L.R.88.
3. See Dabiri v. Gbajumo [1961] 1 All N.L.R.225; Alaka v.
Alaka and Anor 111904 | 1 N.L.R.55; Nwabueze, op.cit., 
pp.171-174.
4. See further, Chapter V, pp.408-411.
5. [1957] 2 F.S.C.33.
6. Ibid., p.34.
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It is thus in the context of the law of succession 
that the remarkable idea is raised that married women are 
themselves items of property: yet this idea is a popular
one in Nigeria. Indeed, some writers attempt to classify 
married women. Thus Coker classifies them as immovable 
property:
"...among the Yorubas of Nigeria, the wives of a man 
also constitute part of his immovable property, and 
the fact that they continue to be attached to the 
family even after his death demonstrates clearly that 
they are part of his immovable property. They are of 
course a type of property that could only be inherited 
by the male members of the family".^
Basden, on the other hand, classifies married women as
2
"personal property", and Lloyd puts them into the category
3
of "self-acquired property".
However, the notion that wives are a category of 
property is legally insupportable for the following reasons:
(a) as far as the evidence shows, in Nigerian customary 
laws, a husband never had that freedom of disposal 
over his wife which, as seen previously, is the real 
essence of ownership. He could not kill^ or sell her 
with impunity. He could not marry her to anyone else. 
It is therefore evident that the essential legal 
element of ownership was absent in the husband and
5
wife relationship;
1. G.B.A. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas, 2nd 
edit., (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1966), p.39.
2. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria, op.cit.,p.32; Meek,
Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe, op.cit.,p.323; 
Nwugege v. Adigwe and Anor.|1934| 11 N.L.R. 134.
3. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law,1962, reprint 1964, p.295; see 
also A.B. Ellis, West African Sketches,1881, p.40, who 
places women in the same category as houses, goods, etc; 
and Mary Kingsley who states that "women and slaves con­
stitute the wealth of an African"; Mary Kingsley, West 
African Studies, op.cit.tp .438; Tremearne, op.cit..p.2^6.
4. See e.g. Talbot, Tribes of the Niger Delta, op.cit.,p.297; 
"A husband who killed his wife was guilty of murder, but 
not, according to the statement made to me, a woman who 
killed her husband".
5. See further, above; Chapter VI, p.500.
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(b) a wife is not permanently attached to her husband.
No law compels her to remain with him. She could 
desert him whenever she wished to do so. The hus­
band’s only legal remedy was a right to a refund of 
dowry paid in respect of his marriage to her;
(c) similarly, a widow is not permanently attached to her
deceased husband’s family. Jobowu, F.J., admitted
that ,fa widow who does not wish to be inherited,
could free herself from that obligation by refunding
the dowry paid on her to her late husband’s family” .^
As Odje correctly notes, ’’the heir of the husband has
no proprietary right over the widow. His right in
this connection cannot be put any higher than that he
is entitled to take her as wife provided she gives her
2
consent and blessing to his proposal” . The heir may 
be entitled to a refund of dowry if the widow exercises 
her option and refuses to marry any member of his 
family;
(d) a wife is a person in law. African tradition imposed 
a position of subordination on the wife, but she was 
not devoid of legal rights: 2ie also had legal 
obligations, which show that she was a legal person
and not a res,- an item of property;
(e) Yoruba women always had the legal capacity to own
nearly all types of property which could be owned by
4their male counterparts. This capacity for ownership 
obviously refutes any suggestion that they are items 
of property, since if it were otherwise, the ridiculous 
situation in which ’property owns property” would exist. 
Obi correctly submits that an ”Ibo wife is not a
5
chattel and never has been”. It is respectfully submitted 
that the Yoruba wife, or any other Nigerian wife is not
1. Suberu v. Sunmonu [1957] 2 F.S.C.33, at p.34; see also
Meek, Law and Authority..., op.cit. p.321.
2. See Odje, op.cit.tp .269.
3. Meek, Law and Authority...,op.cit.tp p .320-321.
4. See above, Chapter XII, pp.349-352.
5. Obi, Ibo Law and Property, op.cit.tp.l86.
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treated by customary law as property, and should not be 
classified as such.
The.third reason advanced for widows being 
excluded from inheriting any part of their deceased hus­
b a n d ^  estate is that a widow is inherited by a member of 
the deceased husband*s family, and thus all her needs are 
catered for - the so-called doctrine of ”widow-inheritance”. 
This institution has been referred to previously,^ but it is 
probably necessary here to describe its operation in the 
modern society.
(1) ** Marriage by Sue cession **( fywidow-inheritance **)
The term f*widow inheritance” has been adopted by
Europeans and others to describe the process whereby the
widow of a deceased husband marries a member of his family
- in most cases his son, brother, or other male relative.
The term ”widow-inheritance” is a misnomer, since as shown 
2
above, the widow is not a chattel, and cannot be inherited. 
What the deceased husband*s heir inherits is some of the 
rights arising from the payment of dowry in respect of the 
widow, by the deceased husband. By virtue of his inheritance 
of these rights, the deceased husband*s heir has a right to ■ 
be considered as a prospective husband of the widow. The 
widow has an option to choose the member of her deceased 
husband*s family she wishes to marry her, subject to his 
consent, or to marry a non-member of the family. If the 
latter option is exercised, the deceased*s heir has a 
right to claim a refund of the dowry paid in respect of 
the widow with reference to her marriage to the deceased. 
This is the sum total of the inheritance rights of the 
deceased*s heir with regard to the widow.
Although the system of marriage by succession, 
or "widow-inheritance” obtains in many Nigerian communities,
1. See above,Chapters III and VIII.
2. See further, Chapter VIII, pp. 682-683.
3. See Meek, Law and Authority, op.cit., p.323; Laromeke
v. Nekegho and Anor.11958 1 3 W.A.L.R. 306.
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it is by no means ‘universal. Ames, J., in Re Estate of
Agboru.ja, ^  1949, regarded the system-as a sort - of African
economy for providing maintenance for the widow on the
death of her husband, and as such he was of the opinion
that it was equitable and fair "where those who follow
the custom are pagans and not Mohammedans or Christians11.
The learned Judge was obviously impressed by the fact that
2the custom was allegedly widespread. Undoubtedly the 
exigencies of life in traditional societies made such a 
system desirable. It ensured that most widows had a 
reasonable certainty of entering into a recognized marital 
union. Their interests were probably best secured in 
traditional society by placing them under the protection 
of a son or other male relative. Romantic love was not a 
prominent feature of traditional marriages, and there is 
evidence that such marriages were quite successful in the 
past.
A particular example of one such happy marriage 
was recorded in Onitsha during field-work. The surviving 
widower was an old man. Several other interviewees had 
mentioned him as an example of a man who had married his 
fatherfs wife. It was not quite clear whether his father 
had actually lived with the girl before his death. The 
widower, when interviewed, seemed rather sensitive about
t
this fact, and the point was not pressed. It was admitted 
by all concerned, however, that the girl whom he had married 
had previously been his fatherfs wife, and that he married 
her after the fatherTs death. They lived together very 
happily for more than forty years, and had many children.The 
wife had died ten years previously, and his children were 
anxious for him to remarry in order to secure someone to 
care for him in his old age. The widower, however, refused
1. [1949] 19 N.L.R. 38; cf. Laromeke v. Nekegho and Anor. 
[1958J 3 W.A.L.R. 306; see further Chapter 11, p.lb4.
2. Elias, Nigerian Land Law, 4th edit., 1971, op.cit.tp.l95; 
cf. Manu, who declares that the levirate, an analogious 
system "is only fit for cattle"; see Maine, Dissertations 
on Early Law and Custom, op.cit.,p p .100-108; Bowen, 
Central Africa, op.cit., p .305.
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to remarry, because of his love for the dead wife. The 
couple had had such a perfect relationship that the old 
man refused to replace her.
• Most of the evidence collected, however, points 
to the fact that the system as it operated in traditional 
society, has now broken down. There are many young men 
today who are willing to take the beneficial assets of the 
deceased, but who refuse to shoulder the responsibilities. 
Not many educated men who inherit their brotherfs or 
father!s property would be prepared to marry his illiterate 
wife or to maintain his children. If the wife is fairly 
young (and after the Nigerian Civil War there are many young 
widows), she will need, not only certain incidents of 
marriage, for example, maintenance, but also physical love, 
and the feeling that she is accepted fully as a wife.
The late Justice Ibekwe, former Solicitor-General 
of the Federation of Nigeria, in a lecture delivered in 
Nsukka in 1974, said:
"the system had provided cohesion and integration 
within the various communities where it applied, 
and was the most stabilizing factor in those 
communities, helping to keep the family blood pure 
and intact".
He, however, admitted that there were many Nigerians who now 
find it difficult to appreciate this rule of customary law 
of succession:
"To be frank, I should loathe to think that anyone 
would ever call upon me to inherit any of my father’s 
wives, even if I were the eldest male in the family. 
And I do not think I am an exception in this regard. 
Who, in this audience, would like to inherit his 
father’s or his brother’s wife? I can almost hear 
some of you saying ’God forbid” ’.^
Nobody in the predominently male audience indicated that
they would be willing. In many cases, even where they are
willing, they may be legally incapable of doing so, since
2
they may have already contracted a statutory marriage.
1. Dan 0. Ibekwe, "Conflict of Cultures and Our Customary - 
Law, in African Indigenous Laws, edit, by J.O. Elias,
et.al., op.cit., p.303.
2. See above, Chapter X, pp.133-140.
The result is, that many widows who should- have 
been married by members of their deceased husbands1 families 
remain unmarried. Consequently,they are deprived of the 
right to inherit their husbandTs property, and yet they 
cannot compel the heirs to marry them, or.provide for.their 
maintenance out of the property. In many cases, especially 
in the urban areas where the sale of land and houses has 
now become commonplace, they are even deprived of a home.
Obi asserts that with regard to the family house 
(obi) among the Igbos, "unless the heir ultimately gets 
married to the widow he cannot go into possession till the
widow has died or otherwise ceased to be the deceased*s
1 2 widow". This rule does not apply in many Igbo societies.
The Customary Law Manual states:
"A widow, even if she has no son, has a right to 
live as a member of the family in her late husband’s 
compound till she remarries or dies. But the family 
has power to remove her for persistent bad conduct".^
This seems another way of saying that the widow’s right to 
occupy her deceased husband’s house is dependent on her 
ability to gain the goodwill of his heirs. A similar anom­
alous statement was made in Nezianya and Anor.v. Qkagbue 
l±
and Ors. in relation to the right of a widow in Onitsha 
customary law where it was said:
"It would appear that the essence of possession of the 
wife in such a case is that she occupies the property 
or deals with it as a recognized member of her husband’s 
family and not as a stranger; nor does she need express 
consent or permission of the family to occupy the 
property so long as the family made no objection to 
her occupation” .
1. Obi, Ibo Law of Property, op.cit.,p.173; see also R.W. 
James, Modern Land Law in Nigeria (Ile-Ife, Nigeria: 
University of Ife Press, 1973), p .48.
2. See Customary Law Manual, op.cit., p.148 for exceptions 
to this rule.
3. Customary Law Manual, op.cit. tp.l48t par-.225(1); see 
also Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit., p.313.
4. [1963] 1 All N.-L.R. 352.
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The.confusion is further reinforced by the additional 
statement that
"The widow has a right to occupy the building or 
part of it, but this is subject to good behaviour” .
If the widow has the legal right cf occupation, 
it is difficult to see why this legal right should be subject 
to any objections made by the deceased husband*s family or 
to their opinions of her good behaviour.^"
(11) A widow’s right of maintenance
A widow’s right of maintenance by her husband’s
successor is similarly uncertain. Okoro asserts that her
late husband’s successors are obliged in law to maintain 
2
her. Certain questions, however, arise. For example, if 
she is not married to any member of the deceased’s family, 
and several members succeed to his property, who is res­
ponsible for her maintenance? Is her maintenance to be 
borne by them equally? If not, in what proportion is it 
to be borne? What is the level of maintenance to which 
she is entitled? Must the level depend on the successor’s 
economic position, or that of her own husband? The 
difference can be very great in these modern days. Is the 
right of maintenance dependent on the amount of property 
left by the deceased, or is the successor obliged to main­
tain the widow or widows out of his own resources? If the 
deceased left many widows, but little property, this would 
result in an unreasonable burden being placed on his 
successor. All these questions are largely unresolved.
The widow’s right of maintenance by the heir of 
her deceased husband has not been established in the 
Superior Courts, although there are certain dicta which 
indicate that she has such a right. There is a difference 
of opinion among writers, and those who maintain that she 
has such a right in law do not cite legal authorities to
1. The rule that a widow’s right to remain in her deceased 
husband’s house is subject to her ’’good behaviour” 
operates in some Ghanian communities and has been 
recently criticised by Wiredu, J., in Amissah-Abaidoo v. 
Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110 at 131, see below, pp.446-447.
2. Okoro, The Customary Laws of Succession in Eastern 
Nigeria, op.cit.,p.1^1.
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support their statements. The better opinion, and one which 
accords with the evidence collected during field-work, is 
that the widow has no legal right of maintenance by her 
deceased husbandTs heir which can be enforced in a court 
of law. If the widow has maintained good relations with the 
family, depending on the reputation of the family, she is 
certain to be looked after by members of the family after 
her husband1s death, even from their own resources.
Neglect of a widow who has contributed to the general wel­
fare of the family would be considered a blot on the good 
name of the family, and might deter other women from 
marrying into the family. Women in Nigeria still marry 
into a family because of its reputation and status. For 
example, a young wife in Onitsha who came to report to a 
member of her husband*s family that she had been given no 
maintenance by her profligate husband, was asked why she 
had married him, since she knew his propensity for drink 
and riotous living. She retorted that she had not married 
him as such, but rather his family, the wealthy members of 
which she expected to cater for her needs. She ended by 
saying that she would never have dreamed of marrying her 
husband if it were not for the reputation and wealth of 
his family. This case illustrates the need for a family to 
act in such a way that the future marriage prospects of its 
members are enhanced, and taking care of a widow would 
certainly be to its credit.
On the other hand, the widow who has a bad 
reputation among her husband*s family would be given little 
consideration, and in many cases, would be virtually cut off 
without the proverbial penny, since there is no legal duty 
to give her any portion of her husband*s property or to 
maintain her.
In actual fact, there are many widows today who 
are deprived of maintenance by their husbands* heirs, even 
in cases where such heirs have inherited a substantial 
amount of property from the deceased.^ This is one result
1. See Dan Ibekwe, "Conflict of Cultures1*, op.cit. ,p.3Q6.
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of the growing individualism, and the increasing disregard 
of traditional practices, which made certain, systems 
laudable.
Social Welfare Officers report numerous cases 
of neglected widows, especially among the Igbos. Unfortunately, 
precise statistics cannot be easily given due to the fact that 
these cases are not tabulated separately in Social Welfare 
reports, but are invariably included with cases of neglected 
wives. In Mbano Division, where widow neglect and maltreat­
ment are recorded separately, out of 249 matrimonial cases 
recorded for 1974/1975, 25 involved complaints by widows 
whose deceased husbands1 relatives had taken all their 
property, but failed to maintain them.^ In Mbaise Division
in 1975, out of 200 matrimonial cases there were 27 com-
2
plaints by deprived widows.
While interviewing a fairly old widow in Onitsha 
the interpreter was asked to enquire from her whether she 
was being maintained by her deceased husband’s family. The 
interpreter thought that there was no need to ask this 
question, since she, as a member of the husband’s family, 
was sure that the widow was being looked after by the 
family. On the insistence of the present writer that the 
widow should be allowed to speak for herself, the widow 
loudly and vehemently claimed that she was not being main­
tained by anyone, and that if she and the other widow and 
their infant children, had depended on the deceased’s 
relatives they would have certainly starved; no member, had
given them a penny since the husband’s death, nearly ten 
3years ago.
1. See Annual Report, Mbano Division, 1974/75, included 
in the Report for Owerri Zone, ref. 0WZ/SW/27/S1/75.
2. See Annual Report, Mbaise Division, 1975.
3. See Anyakwo (suing by his next friend v. Anyako
[1974J Suit No. 0/71/1974, unreported decision of 
Onitsha High Court decided on 28th Oct. 1974, where an
infant applied for appointment of a Receiver of his
deceased father’s property on the ground that his 
uncle gave his mother and himself none of the rents
to be collected from the deceased’s estate, many years 
after his father’s death.
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In another case which involved a prominent 
Onitsha family, the widow was ejected from her deceased 
husband*s home as soon as he died. Her two female children 
were retained by the family. The deceased had been 
previously married and had grown-up children who had 
bitterly opposed his marriage to the widow, many years 
his junior, and younger than some of his children. In 
addition, she was not a native of Onitsha, and the husband 
in his life-time had been very indulgent towards her, and 
this apparently had added to the family*s disapproval of 
the union. It was alleged that as a result of the familyfs 
treatment, the widow was exhibiting signs of insanity, and 
was a burden on her natal family who were contemplating 
court action against the deceased husbandfs family if no 
private settlement could be reached, since allegedly, the 
widow had no hope of remarriage.
Apologists of the system whereby widows are 
excluded from inheritance rights in their deceased husbandfs 
estate, argue that, although the widow does not inherit 
directly, she inherits by virtue of her sons, and in some 
communities by virtue of daughters also. This argument 
ignores the pertinent fact that the widow may have no 
children, or no children who survive her deceased husband.
In the context of Nigerian contemporary society, where 
there is increasing individualism, and the collapse of 
the extended family system; where sons living in Nigeria 
have not visited their mothers for ten or more years, it is 
unwise for a widow to be forced to depend on her children, 
or her husbandfs children.
The widow*s right to inheritance, if dependent 
on her children, may be intentionally defeated. For 
example, the heirs may decide to sell the family property 
and share the proceeds, or they may effect a partition of 
the property, in which case each person*s share becomes 
individual property liable to disposal by will or otherwise. 
The widow cannot legally prevent the heirs from taking 
either course. The widow*s right to inheritance through 
her sons may also be defeated inadvertently by operation
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of! law. Take, for instance a hypothetical case where H, 
married according to Onitsha customary law, dies intestate 
leaving a widow, a son, two daughters, and a considerable 
amount of immovable property. Under customary law, the son 
inherits everything. The son marries under the Nigerian 
Marriage Act in Ibadan, where most of his father!s property 
is also situated. The son dies intestate, leaving his 
widow and one child. As will be seen shortly, his widow 
and child are entitled to inherit all his individual 
property, including that inherited from his father,(since 
he is the only heir, the property is inherited as individual 
property), to the exclusion of his mother and sisters. The 
case is even clearer where the son sells his fatherTs 
property and buys other property with the proceeds. His 
mother and sisters have no share in such properties if he 
marries under the Nigerian Marriage Act and dies intestate 
leaving a widow and children.
The plight of the Nigerian widow who has been 
deprived of inheritance rights in her deceased husband*s 
property, has not received due attention from the Superior 
Courts in Nigeria.
In the recent Ghanian case of Amissah-Abadoo v. 
Abadoo~*~ the property rights of a widow received extensive 
treatment, and Wiredu, J., after a review of several 
authorities, held that customary law recognized not only 
the rights of the children but also those of the widow to 
live in her deceased husband*s self-acquired house during 
widowhood. Where the deceased lived in a family house with 
his wife and children, the widow and the children had no 
interest save a right of occupation "subject to good 
behaviour". With reference to the limitation of the rights, 
the learned Judge observed:
1. [1974] 1 G.L.R.110; see also Halmond v.Daniel [1971]
Sar. F.C.L. 182 at pp.182-183 and contrast Swapim v. 
Ackuwa r18881 Sar. F.C.L. 191 and Kwakye v. Tuba I" 19611
G.L.R. 535. .
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"The injustices and hardships created for children 
.and widows by tacking, the phrase "subject to good 
behaviour" as.a limitation to their rights to reside 
in houses.which their deceased fathers and husbands 
respectively die possessed of, irrespective of how 
they came by such property, have been ignored indis­
criminately in the past to the detriment of the 
children and widows. The conduct of the family flowing 
from this neglect must be frowned upon as behaviour not 
countenanced by customary law and called for an urgent 
need for a more'realistic and practical reappraisal of 
this aspect of the customary law in view of the fast 
social changes in the country caused partly by the high 
rate of inter tribal marriages and partly by the 
development of money economy which has provided other 
modes of acquiring-wealth"
The situation of a Nigerian widow of a customary 
marriage calls for urgent legislation aimed at ensuring 
that she receives adequate provision in the distribution 
of her deceased husband1s intestate estate.
B. Islamic law marriage
In contrast to the customary law wife who does
not inherit directly from her deceased husband, the wife
of an Islamic law marriage is a Koranic heir, and she is
entitled to a share in her deceased husband*s property,
2
whether he dies intestate or not. The size of her share 
depends on whether the deceased left any children or agnate 
grandchildren.
The Koran provides:
"And your wives shall have a fourth part of what ye 
leave, if ye have no issue; but if ye have issue, 
then they shall have an eighth part of what ye leave 
after paying the bequests he shall have bequeathed 
and debts".^
1. Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [1974] 1 G.L.R. 110.
2. See generally, Ruxton, Maliki Law,op.cit.,pp.373-397, 
Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit.t p.41; 
Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, op.cit.t p .403 et.al., 
esp. p .403.
3. Rodwell, The Koran, op.cit.,p.sura IV, verse 14; see 
also Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit., 
p.41; Fyzee, op.cit.,p.4Q3»
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The customary law of succession in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, not unlike customary law in Nigeria, was designed 
to keep property within the family. Women, wives as well 
as daughters, were consequently excluded from all inheritance 
rights in their deceased husbands1 or fathers1 estates. The 
basis of the Koranic provision was as follows:
”The wife of Sa*d b. al-Rabi came to the Prophet 
with her two daughters and said:
”0 Prophet these are the daughters of Sa*d b.al-Rabi. 
Their father died a martyr fs death beside you in 
battle. But their uncle has taken Sa'd’s estate and 
they cannot marry unless they have property” . After 
this the verse of inheritance was revealed and the 
Prophet sent for the uncle and said to him: ”Give 
the two daughters of Sa*d two-thirds of the estate, 
give their mother one-eighth and keep the remainder 
yourself”
The widow Safd !s case embodies the essence of the
changes introduced under Islam into the customary law of
ancient Arabia with reference to inheritance by women.
Under Islamic law, the widow inherits one-quarter of her
husband*s estate which is available for distribution among
the heirs, if the deceased has no children or agnatic
descendants. If there are children or other descendants,
the widow*s portion is one-eighth. The wife*s portion is
a collective one in the case of polygyhous unions. Two or
more surviving wives share equally in the one-quarter or one-
eighth of the estate, as the case may be. This may be
compared with the share of the husband in his deceased wife*s
estate. He receives one-half of it if there are no children,
and a quarter if there are, and since polyandry is forbidden
2
in Islamic law, he shares these portions alone. There is 
therefore no equality of inheritance rights between husband 
and wife in Islamic law marriage, but at least the wife is
1. This version of the Prophet*s decision appears in al- 
Mughni of Ibn Qudama, VI, 166, see Coulson, Succession 
in the Muslim Family, op.cit., p.29
2. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit., 
p.41. ---
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sure that some portion of her deceased husband*s estate
will be given to her. -
Unfortunately, the evidence of practice among
the Northern Nigerian Moslems communities reveals that
in most cases, while a deceased husband*s movable property
may be shared according to Islamic law,^ in the case of
2
land and houses, customary law prevails. Palmer, reporting 
on inheritance rights among the Hausas, early in the century, 
noted:
"The Native Courts observe the customary law with 
regard to land as far as it is a subject of 
inheritance, that is to say, as far as prior rights 
to user can be inherited. In theory, as regards 
the order of succession and questions between would-be 
inheritors inter-se the Moslem law is administered if 
the parties are Moslems; native customary rules of 
succession, if they are not. In practice, however, 
great diversity prevails between different courts, 
and courts at different times give conflicting 
decisions...The fact that frequently, on a change 
of Alkali or Seriki, large migrations occur, is often 
due to his being known as enforcing Moslem law with­
out regarding the customs of Maguzawa [pagan Hausa] 
or Kityu (pagan Fulani). The best native authorities 
supported, I believe, by considerable authority in 
Moslem legal textbooks, hold that ’custom* in matters 
of inheritance marriage, etc., should be regarded.
But at present the whole subject is ruled by 
individual caprice".
The fact that inheritance to land in actual
practice is governed mainly by customary law, rather than
3
Islamic law, is attested by later investigators. There is
1. See Alhaji Hassan and Mallam Shuaibu: A Chronicle of 
Abuja, translated and arranged from Hausa by Frank Heath 
(Lagos: African Universities Press, 1962), p.64.
2. See H.R. Palmer, Inheritance among the Hausa, in 
Memoranda on Land Tenure and Land Revenue Assessment 
in Northern Nigeria by Sir Percy Girouard, African 
(West) C.0.879, No. 906, Appendix IV.
3. Ibid., Meek, The Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit.,
p .282, "in Muslim communities inheritance of real property 
and fixtures is bound up with the customary system of 
land tenure, and is, in consequence, governed bf 
customary law, while that of personal property is subject 
to the provisions of the Muslim Sharia"; M.G.Smith,
"Hausa Inheritance and Succession", in Studies in the 
Laws of Succession in Nigeria, edit, by Duncan M.
Derrett, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
pp.245-246; C.W. Michie, Notes on Land Tenure in the 
Northern Districts of Zaria Emirate in C.W. Cole,
footnote 3 continued
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some evidence that women, including wives, are given
inheritance rights in land in a few areas.^ The principle
of customary law in the North, as in other parts of Nigeria,
was that land should be kept in the family. Succession was
therefore confined exclusively to males, and a widow did not
inherit lands or houses from her husband. Application of
customary, rather than Islamic law, thus robs the Moslem
widow of her divinely allotted rights of inheritance.
Yahaya Muhammad notes that women are now given
inheritance rights in Northern Nigeria in areas where houses
are sold, and that the Sharia Court of Appeal has reversed
many decisions concerning land suits, some of them appeals
of women who had been deprived of their rights of inheritance
2
of land or houses.
It was not possible to ascertain with any degree
of certainty the extent to which Kanuri Moslem women in
Maiduguri inherited houses or lands from their deceased
husbands. Women interviewed were all well versed in their
3
Koranic rights, but concrete evidence of practice was
difficult to obtain. One interviewee asserted that property
of all kinds is shared among children and wives according to
Moslem law, although there is nothing to prevent a family
from agreeing that there should be no sharing, and that
everything would be owned in common, with the eldest brother
4
assuming the position previously held by the father.
Footnote 3 continued .... Report on Land Tenure in Zaria 
Province (Kaduna: Nigeria, Government Printer), p.68;
See also Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in 
Nigeria and the Cameroons, op.cit.tp .163.
'1. See Smith, op.cit.,pp.269-272; Muhammad Yahaya, op.cit., 
p. 19.
2. Muhammad Yahaya, op.cit., p.19.
3. Cf. Southern Moslems of whom it is said "Probably many 
of those who profess Islam are not even aware of the 
rules of inheritance their code prescribes - see Rowling, 
Land Tenure in I.jebu Province, op.cit. t p.47.
4. Cole reports that the influence of Islamic law on native 
customary inheritance of rights in land is particularly 
pronounced in Bornu, and in the vicinity of the cities 
of Kano and Sokoto - see Cole, Report on Land Tenure, 
Zaria Province, para. 15.
451
Generally, it seems that most widows do not 
assert their.rights to a share of their husbands* land 
or houses, since Kanuri women continue to remarry at all 
stages of their lives. Old women are often married by 
younger men who cannot afford the prohibitive costs of 
marrying a very young, previously unmarried, girl.
If the widows assert their rights and are 
prepared to take court action to enforce them, the courts 
in Bornu State will apply strict Islamic law.
The general position is that the inheritance 
rights of a widow married according to Islamic law are 
much better than those of a widow of a customary law 
marriage so far as movables are concerned. In relation 
to land, however, their rights are the same. They do not 
inherit lands and houses left by their deceased husbands, 
at least in practice, although they are legally entitled to 
a specified portion.
C . "Statutory" marriage
(1) Introduction
The wife of a statutory marriage is more 
fortunate in terms of succession rights to her deceased 
husband*s property than her counterparts married according 
to customary or Islamic laws. The precise rules governing 
intestate succession in a statutory marriage vary to some 
extent in different parts of the Federation, but generally, 
all the wives of a statutory marriage are given some share 
in the estate of their deceased husbands, including his 
lands and houses, which he could legally have disposed of 
inter vivos, or by will.
It has been previously seen,^ that under 
customary law the wife does not usually inherit any of her 
husband*s property, and in some societies, notably matri- 
lineal societies, the deceased*s children are also excluded
1. See above, p . 430.
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from inheritance rights.'*' The lack of succession rights
of a widow, and in many cases of children, to their
deceased husband*s and father*s property respectively,
under customary law, was a primary consideration of the
framers of the Marriage Ordinance, 1884. The missionaries
were particularly disturbed by the fact that in some
societies the right of succession was allegedly given to
"the sister and nephew,to the exclusion of the wife and
legitimate children", of the deceased. Such a practice was
described by the Rev. A.W. Parker, Superintendent of the
Wesleyan Societies in the Gold Coast as an "eye-sore to
the Missionary, who in it beholds his endeavours to raise
the moral and social position of the sons and daughters
of the country nullified", by judges who enforce such laws.
He was of the opinion that the deceased*s wife and children
2
should be given preferential treatment.
Before 1884, the devolution of property among 
Christians and non-Christians was governed by the customary 
law of the deceased. In 1882, Sir Samuel Rowe, Governor 
of the Gold Coast Colony, prepared a Bill in which he tried 
to introduce statutory laws of succession in the terms of a 
Marriage Ordinance. Section 2 of the Bill provided as 
follows:
"The offspring of parents duly married in accordance 
with such Christian ritual shall be declared to be 
legitimate and entitled to all such rights in respect 
of succession to property, as if their parents had
1. See C.O. 879-20, Dispatch No. 120, Enclosure 2, which 
sets out the essentials of a customary marriage, and 
the effect the Marriage Ordinance 1884 would have on the 
devolution of property in various societies in the Gold 
Coast (now Ghana); e.g. at Dixcove, it was stated that 
the eldest nephew always succeeds to all property, 
including the wives and children of the deceased. This 
was also the law at Secondee. Fadipe notes that 
according to traditional Yoruba law the principal 
beneficiaries of a deceased person are his mother*s 
children, male and female, his own children have no 
right to his property.
2. C.O. 879-20, Dispatch 441, Enclosure No. 10, dated
24 May, 1879, Rev. A.W. Parker to District Commissioner, 
Elmina, p.216; see further Appendix II, Chapter X, 
pp.125-127.
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been married according to native law, any native law 
or custom to: the contrary notwithstanding"^
Persons who.were married by Christian ministers,
but who had not gone through any of the customary forms of
marriage, were regarded as not being married by the native
population, who excluded them from inheritance and other
rights. It was to remedy this state of affairs that the
Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council. It was
intended to confer inheritance rights on the spouses and
children of a Christian marriage, but the inheritance
2
rights were to be in accordance with customary law. This
Bill was withdrawn after its first reading in the Legislative 
3
Council.
Chief Justice Bailey proposed that the Statutes 
of Distribution as obtaining in England should be made to 
apply to the deceased husband1s personalty, while the 
realty should devolve on the eldest son, with provisions 
for annual payments, and portions to the wife and children, 
charged on the estate by way of dower. Such a provision, it 
was thought, would "form the greatest if not the only induce­
ment to non-Christian natives to contract marriages legal
Zj.
under the Ordinance". It was the opinion of Acting Chief 
Justice Jackson that giving the wife and children rights 
in succession on an intestacy "would do much to improve the 
low position women at present occupy, and further the cause 
of education".
The Earl of Derby, in his amendment of Mr.
Woodcock*s draft Ordinance, proposed that a succession clause 
should be inserted in the Marriage Ordinance, 1884. His
1. Ibid., Dispatch No. 200, Enclosure No. 9. From Adminis­
trator Moloney to the Colonial Office, transmitting 
copies of the "Marriage Ordinance" which had passed the 
first reading..
2. See Ibid..Sir S. Rowe to Colonial Office, dated 31 July, 
1882 explaining his reasons introducing the.Bill to 
Council.
3. For the history of this Bill see further, above,
Chapter X, p.122 and Appendix II, pp.125-127.
4. See C.O. 879-20, Enclosure 5 in No.18; Acting Chief 
Justice Bailey to Administrator Moloney, C.M.G. dated 
29 Aug., 1882, p.222.
5. Ibid..Dispatch No. 122, 22 March, 1883, p.224.
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proposal was not universally acceptable. There were many
who objected to any change in the customary laws of
succession. For example, Administrator, F. Evans, objected
to ’’any interference with the ancient and old established
customs of the Natives’1, on the ground that it was desirable
to avoid creating by law a state of things which ’’would be
productive of constant trouble and irritation”.^ Others
objected to the amalgam of a law relating to the descent of
property with one regulating the formalities requisite to
2
constitute a marriage. According to one critic, such a
procedure was not "artistic”, especially in a country where
the descent of property is regulated without any regard
3
to marriage at all.
In spite of these objections, Lord Derby’s 
proposal was effected. Section 36 of the present Nigerian 
Marriage Act is the result. It provides:
”(1) Where any person who is subject to native law or
custom contracts a marriage in accordance with the 
provisions of this Ordinance, and such person dies 
intestate, subsequently to the commencement of this 
Ordinance, leaving a widow or husband, or any issue 
of such marriage; and also where any person who is 
the issue of any such marriage as aforesaid dies 
intestate subsequently to the commencement of this 
Ordinance ; the personal property of such intestate 
and also any real property of which the said intestate 
might have disposed by will, shall be distributed 
in accordance with the provisions of the law of 
England relating to the distribution of the personal 
estates of intestates, any native law or custom to 
the contrary notwithstanding: Provided that -
(a) where by the law of England any portion of the 
estate of such intestate would become a portion of 
the casual hereditary revenues of the Crown, such 
portion shall be distributed in accordance with the 
provisions of native law and custom, and shall not 
become a portion of the said casual hereditary 
revenues; and
(b) real property, the succession to which cannot by 
native law or custom be effected by testamentary 
disposition, shall descend in accordance with the
1. Ibid.. Dispatch No. 120, 21 April, 1885., p.83.
2. Ibid.. Enclosure 3 in No. 29, p.244.
3. For other criticisms of the rights of succession in 
the Marriage Ordinance, 1884, see C.O. 879-20,
pp.205, 208, and 213.
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. provisions of such native law or
custom, anything herein to the contrary notwith­
standing .
(2) Before the registrar of marriage issues his
certificate in the case of an intended marriage, 
either party to which is a person subject to native 
law or custom, he shall explain to both parties the 
effect of these provisions as to the succession to 
property as affected by marriage.
(5) This section applies to the Colony**" only.
The succession clause in the Marriage Act was 
born in conflict, and throughout its existence conflict 
has attended its interpretation. Many of the problems which 
arise, as will be seen later, are due to the fact that 
section 56 of the Marriage Act applies only to the Colony, 
and this leaves a vacuum with reference to the other parts 
of Nigeria, except in those places which previously were 
parts of the former Western Region. Even with regard to the 
Colony, the Act is not precise,and the circumstances under 
which Section 56 becomes applicable in the Colony is far 
from clear.
1. For definition of the Colony see The Colony of Nigeria
Boundaries Order in Council, 1913, Laws of the Federation 
of Nigeria, 1958, p.219 - Colony of Southern Nigeria. The 
definition of the territory which may now be considered 
as the "Colony'1 is far from clear. Before 1967, the 
consensus of academic opinion is that the "Colony" meant 
the Federal Territory of Lagos, - see Nwabueze, Nigerian 
Land Law, op.cit.,p.4Q5; Park, Sources of Nigerian Law, 
op.cit.tp.58; Obi, Ibo Law of Property,op.cit.,p.£ll; 
Odje, op.cit.,p.58. The former "Colony"became a part 
of Lagos State in 1967, see schedule to the States 
(Creation and Transitional Provisions) (Amendment)
Decree, 1967, No. 19 of 1967; see Nwogugu, Family Law 
in Nigeria, op.cit.,p.289. By the Lagos State 
(Applicable Laws) Edict. 1968, No. 2 of 1968, Schedule 2, 
The Administration of Estates Law, 1959, was no longer 
applicable to those parts of Lagos State where it had 
applied previously, and Section 56 of the Marriage Act 
presumably applied to the whole of Lagos State. The 
Lagos State (Applicable Laws) Amendment Edict, No. 11 
of 1972, S.4(2) has altered the position in Lagos State, 
by applying the Administration of Estates Law, 1959, to 
the whole of Lagos State from 1 May, 1972. Although the 
Edict did not specifically repeal or refer to section 56 
of the Marriage Act, the latter is to be regarded as 
repealed by implication, since succession is exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of the States legislatures, see 
Administration of Estates Law, 1959, Cap.2, Laws of 
Lagos State, 1978.
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The. position with regard to statutory rules of 
succession in the different parts of the Federation will 
now be examined.
(11) The Colony (previously the Federal Territory of Lagos)
For section 56 of the Marriage Act to apply, a
marriage under the Act must be celebrated in Lagos. This
is evident from the fact that if either party to the 
marriage is subject to customary law, the Registrar, prior 
to the issue of his certificate, is required to explain to 
both parties, the effect the marriage will have on their 
succession rights. This provision,which was specially
inserted to ensure that the intended spouses had full
knowledge of the legal effect of celebrating a marriage 
under the Act, does not apply to marriages outside of Lagos.
Are all marriages celebrated under the Act in 
Lagos within the section, regardless of where the immovable 
property affected is situated, or where the deceased was 
domiciled at the time of death? It is submitted that the 
rules of private international law will be followed in 
such cases. In Zaidan v. Mohssen,^ the Supreme Court held , 
that Nigerian law as the lex situs, applied to the devolution 
of the immovable property of an intestate domiciled in 
Lebanon, situate at Warri, and that Nigerian law for this 
purpose meant the laws of the Mid-Western State of Nigeria 
of which Warri formed a part.
Movables are governed by the law of the domicile
2
of the deceased at the time of death. It seems safe to say, 
therefore, that section 56 will apply if the marriage under 
the Act is celebrated in Lagos, and in the case of immovables,
1. [1973] N.M.L.R. 427; [1973] All N.L.R.86; see also the
Ghanian case of Youhana v . .Abboud [1974] 2 G.L.R. 201; 
cf. Gamson v. Wobil and Kra v. Wobil [1947] 12 W.A.C.A.
181, where it was held that internal conflict of law did
not arise, since the personal law of the deceased upon 
which succession to her estate should be determined is 
fixed, being attached to her at birth, therefore the 
pure Fanti law of succession which prevailed at her 
place of birth applied, and not the customary law of the 
place where the property she left was situated.
2. In the Matter of the Estate of Edward Anfu Whyte T19461 
18 N.L.R.76.
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the property was situated in Lagos, or in the case of 
movables, the deceased was domiciled in Lagos at the time 
of his death. This involves a consideration of the law of 
domicile, which is itself not free, from doubt.
Prior to 1970, there were conflicting decisions 
as to whether there was a single Nigerian domicile or a 
separate domicile for each Region (later State).^ The 
Matrimonial Causes Decree of 1970 provides that a person 
domiciled in any State of the Federation is domiciled in 
Nigeria for the purposes of the Decree. Whether a single 
Nigerian domicile will similarly be adopted in the application 
of section 36 has not been judicially decided. It is possible 
for State and Federal domiciles to exist concurrently for 
different purposes in a Federation.
The salient points in connection with section 36 
of the Marriage Act, relevant to the discussion, briefly 
stated are:
(I) the section applies only to Lagos in the circumstances 
stated above;
(II) by virtue of the section, the customary law of
succession was changed so as to give a widow married
under the Act a share in her deceased husband1 s
2
intestate estate, movable and immovable;
(III) the widow (or widows) of the issue of a statutory
marriage to which section 36 applies, whose husband
dies intestate, is given a similar right irrespective
of whether such issue is himself married under the
■3
Marriage Act, or under customary or Islamic law.
This provision has been criticized as an unwarranted
4extension of the English laws of inheritance.
1. See further Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit.,
pp.95-100; and above, Chapter % I .
2. See Oke v. Adesanya and Anor.f19741 6 C.C.H.C.J.681;
Taylor v.Taylor 11960 | L.L.R.286, children acknowledged 
by the deceased before the statutory marriage entitled to 
share under s.36 of the Marriage Act.
3. See In Re Somefun and Williams [1941] 7 W.A.C.A.156.
4. See Odje,"Law of Succession in Southern Nigeria,”
op.cit., p.98.
458
.Its■operation may result in.an advantage to one spouse. 
For example, ¥, the child of a statutory marriage within 
the ambit of section 56, marries H, whose parents were 
married according to customary law. ¥ and H are married 
"according to Yoruba customary law, and ordinarily, are 
not entitled to share in the intestate estate of a 
deceased spouse.^* If ¥, predeceases H, however, as a 
result of section 56, H would be entitled to a share 
of W !s intestate estate. But if H predeceased ¥, she 
would not be entitled to a share in his intestate 
estate, her rights being governed entirely by customary 
law;
(IV) it would appear from decided cases that where a
deceased intestate was married under the Marriage Act, 
but dies leaving a widow (or possibly widows) of a 
subsequent customary marriage she (or they) would be 
entitled to claim in the distribution of his estate 
under section 56. It is certain that the architects
X
of the Marriage Ordinance 1884, never intended to
benefit the widow of a customary marriage in this way,
since they hoped that the rights of succession given
to a wife and children of a statutory marriage would
encourage people to contract such marriages. Odje
4describes the decision of Coleman v. Shang, where it 
was held that the widow of a customary marriage was 
entitled to claim in the distribution of the intestate 
estate of her deceased husband under the Marriage Act 
of Ghana, as none of the valiant attempts at judicial
5
manipulation".
1. In Yoruba customary law the intestate estate of a married 
woman is inherited by her children, see Johnson v. 
Macaulay and Anor.f19611 1 All N.L.R. 745.
2. See e.g. Coleman v. Shang [1959] G.L.R. 590.
5. No. 14 of 1884.
4. [1959] G.L.R. 590.
5. See Odje, op.cit.,p.98.
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(V) the Marriage Act provides that the intestate: estate 
of the deceased should be distributed in accordance 
with the provisions of the law of England relating 
. to the distribution of the personal estates of 
intestates."^" The law of England on intestacy has 
undergone several changes. There is a conflict of 
opinion as to the effective date of reference to
p
English law. For example, in Re Estate of Odula.ja,
the reference date was stated as being 1884, whereas
in Johnson v. United Africa Company, the view was
expressed that the date should be 1914, when the
present Marriage Act was enacted. The year 1900 is
also mentioned as being the latest date for the
4general reception of English law into Nigeria. The 
point is important since, if either 1900 or 1914, is 
the operative date, widows can claim the benefit of 
the Intestates Estates Act, 1890, whereas it would be 
excluded if 1884 is chosen. In all cases the Statute 
of Distribution 1670 - 1685 would apply. The 
Intestates1 Estates Act 1890, is especially bene­
ficial to widows. The better opinion seems to be that 
1914 is the relevant date.^
. v. Phillips & Ors.f19751 5 U.I.L.R. 
rs.v.~Bakare 11974 I b C.C.H.C.J. 675.
1. See Osho and Ors 
516; Idowu and O
2. [1958] 15 N.L.R. 15.
5. In Taylor v. Taylor [1954] Suit No. 127 of 1954, the
West African Court of Appeal held that the Adminis­
tration of Estates Act does not apply in Nigeria - see 
Elias, Land Law, op.cit.,p.216.
4. See above, Chapter II, p. 195.
5. 15 Stats., 52.
6. See Johnson v. United Africa Company [1956] 15 N.L.R.15; 
see opposing views of Nwabueze, op.cit.,pp.415-417; 
Okoro, op.cit..pp.172-175; Re Estate of Odulaja [l§64: 
L.L.R.108; Kasunmu and Salacuse, op.cit.,pp.£66-267; 
Coker, op.cit. ,p.279; A.B. Kasunmu, 11 Intestate 
Succession in Nigeria”, Nigerian Law Journal, 1964- 
1965, Vol. pp.50-58..
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(VI) under the Statutes of Distribution 1670-1685, the 
widow takes one-third of her deceased husband’s 
estate (personalty only), if he is survived by issue. 
In default of issue, the wife is-entitled to one-half 
absolutely. Under the Intestates’ Estates Act, 1890,"^ 
if the deceased husband had no issue who survive him, 
the widow is entitled to the entire estate, real and 
personal, if the total value does not exceed £500.
If the estate exceeds this amount in value, she is 
entitled in addition to a charge upon the estate for 
£500 with interest from the date of the death of the 
intestate, until the amount is paid.
(VII) in all cases under section 56, English law applies to 
the distribution of movables and immovables.
(VIII) property which the deceased intestate could not dis­
pose of by will is not affected by section 56. Con­
sequently, unpartitioned family property in which the
2
deceased had an interest is excluded.
(Ill) Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Bendel and Lagos States
Intestate succession in the States which were 
previously parts of the former Western Region of Nigeria,
3
is governed by the Administration of Estates Law, 1959, 
which is modelled on the English Administration of Estates 
Act, 1924.^ In 1972, Lagos State (Applicable Laws) Amend­
ment Edict made the Western Region’s Administration of 
Estates Law, 1959 applicable within Lagos State. Section 
49(5) of the Administration of Estates Law, 1959 is similar 
to section 56 of the Marriage Act. It provides:
1. (55 and 54 Viet.C.29).
2. See Daniel v. Daniel [1956] 1 F.S.C.50.
5. Cap 1, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1959; 
see also Cap 2, Laws of Bendel State, 1976.
4. 15 Stats.58.
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■ "Where any person who is subject to customary law
contracts a. marriage in accordance with the provisions 
of the Marriage Ordinance and such person dies intestate 
after the commencement of this Law leaving a widow or 
husband or any issue of such marriage, any property 
of which the said intestate might have disposed by 
will shall be distributed in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law, any customary law notwith­
standing” .
The significant features of this Law are:
(I) it does not apply in cases where the death occurred 
before the commencement of the Law;*^
(II) unlike section 36 of the Marriage Act, the Adminis­
tration of Estates Law, 1959 applies only to persons 
who were themselves married under the Marriage Act;
(III) the Law does not apply to the intestate estate of a 
person subject to customary law, who marries 
according to such law. Customary law in this con­
text includes Islamic law. The Law was held not 
applicable to the intestate estate of a Moslem man
domiciled in Lebanon, who died leaving immovable
2
property situated in Bendel State;
(IV) both movable and immovable property devolve in the 
same manner;
(V) the rights of a surviving spouse, whether husband or 
wife, are the same in similar circumstancesj
(VI) the law centres on the nuclear family, and if any 
member of that family survives, the deceased*s other 
relations are excluded. The surviving spouse and 
issue or issues are entitled to the entire estate.
If the deceased left no issue, but a surviving spouse, 
the surviving spouse alone excludes all claimants to 
the deceased*s estate more remote than the deceased*s 
parents, or brothers or sisters of the full blood
3
and their issue.
1. Section 1(2).
2. Zaidan v. Mohssen [1975] 11 S.C.l; [1973] All N.L.R.86; 
see also, Youhana v. Abboud [1974] 2 G.L.R. 201.
3. See further, Nwabueze. on.cit.. pp.415-417.
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(IV) Eastern and Northern States
Unlike the Western, Bendel, and Lagos States,
there are no statutory provisions governing the effect of
a statutory marriage on the customary and Islamic laws of
inheritance in the Eastern and Northern States. The
Marriage Proclamation, 1907,1 which, prior to 1914 applied
in the Northern Protectorate of Nigeria, although similar
to the Marriage Ordinance 1884, was entirely different in
relation to the section on inheritance rights. Section 37
of the Proclamation provided:
"Where any person who is subject to native law and 
custom contracts a marriage in accordance with the 
provisions of this or any other law relating to 
marriage or has contracted a marriage prior to the 
passing of this Proclamation which marriage is hereby 
validated, and such person dies intestate, any real 
and personal property belonging to such person shall 
be distributed in accordance with Native Law and 
Custom and not in accordance with the law of 
England”.
Before 1914, therefore, the application of
succession law in the Northern States was unaffected by a
statutory marriage. The Marriage Proclamation 1907, was
repealed by the Marriage Act, 1914 and the operation of
section 36, was restricted to the Colony. It is obvious
that the intention of the legislators of 1914 was that the
succession laws were not to be affected by a statutory
marriage except in the Colony.
It has been seen, however, that even in the Colony,
section 36 does not cover all possible cases of succession.
For example, it does not cover the case where an intestate
deceased, domiciled in the Colony, contracted a statutory
marriage outside Nigeria and left property within the Colony.
Such a situation occurred in the well-known case of Cole v.
2
Cole, where the intestate estate of a native of Lagos, 
domiciled in Lagos, who had contracted a marriage according 
to Christian rites in Sierra Leone, was claimed by his widow
1. No. 1 of 1907, Laws of the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria.
2. [1898] 1. N.L.R. 15.
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on behalf of her lunatic son, and by his brother as 
customary heir. The crux of the matter was whether English 
law or customary law should be applied. The customary law 
claim of the brother was accepted by the trial court. On 
appeal, however, the decision was reversed. Griffith, J., 
compared customary marriage and Christian marriage. He held 
that a Christian marriage imposes on the husband duties and 
obligations not recognised by native law, and that in fact, 
Christian marriage clothes the parties and their offspring 
with a status unknown to native law. The application of 
customary law to the intestate estate of a deceased spouse 
of a statutory marriage would, the learned Judge held be 
"contrary to the principles of justice equity and good 
conscience”. He reasoned thus:
”¥ere such a contention to hold good then an educated 
native Lagos gentleman - may be a doctor, or a 
barrister, or a clergyman, or a bishop (for there 
are all such) - marrying an educated lady out of the 
Colony and coming to reside permanently in Lagos 
would have his estate subject to native law- in case 
he died intestate, his widow being required by a 
strict undiluted, native law to act as wife to her 
brother-in-law in order to obtain support. ...I am 
of opinion that this is a case in which the Court 
ought not to observe the native law of inheritance”.^
The common law of England, under which the eldest 
son, whether he is a lunatic or not, is the heir, was 
applied. As a result, the son was declared the heir of the 
deceased, and the widow was held entitled to dower and to 
one-third of her husbandfs personalty.
Although the learned Judge, with respect,erred in
2
some of his observations as to Yoruba customary marriage,
1. Ibid., pp.22-23.
2. For example, the learned Judge observed: ”It is a con­
sequence of the loose tie of the native marriage that 
by strict native law a manTs eldest brother on his 
motherfs side inherits. The brother is part of the man’s 
family. The wife and her children are part of the wife’s 
family”. The Yorubas are patrilineal peoples, and 
although children have certain rights in their mothers’ 
family, they belong to, and inherit mainly from their 
fathers* family; see Idewu v. Hausa and 0rs.Tl936l
13 N.L.R.96; Taiwo v. Lawani [i9&lj 1 All N.L.R. 703.
footnote 2 continued
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the logic of. his decision is incontestable in law and in 
fact, and illustrates' the" gravamen of the contention 
relating to the so-called "wife inheritance". The decision
has been criticised, both judicially,^and by academic
2 • 
writers, but it has not been overruled so far as it deals
with the choice of law in succession cases.
The decision was utilized in a case in one of the 
Eastern States, where there are no statutory rules governing 
the effect of a statutory marriage on the customary and 
Islamic laws of succession. In Re Emodie, Administrator- 
General v.Egbuna and Ors. an Igbo, lived and died intestate 
in the Protectorate. He left property, movable and immovable 
in the Protectorate. He also left a widow whom he had married 
in the Protectorate, under the Nigerian Marriage Act, but no 
children of the marriage. He was survived by a brother, a 
sister and an illegitimate daughter. The deceased*s estate 
was being administered by the Administrator General, who 
brought an action to decide whether the personal estate 
should be distributed in accordance with English law or with 
customary law. It was argued by the respondents that, as 
section 36 of the Marriage Act only applied to the Colony, 
the personal estate should be distributed in accordance with 
customary law.
Footnote 2 continued Nwabueze notes that this system
of cognatic descent is not of universal application 
throughout Yorubaland, and is limited to certain 
communities only, e.g. Ijebu and Ondo, see Nwabueze, 
op.cit., p.383. Talbot, Peoples of Southern Nigeria, 
op.cit.,Vol.Ill, p.678; cf. Lopez and Ors.v. Lopez and 
Ors"! fl9241 5 N.L.R. 47 at p.50.
1. See Smith v. Smith [1924] 5 N.L.R. 102 and 104; obiter 
Dicta in Onwudin.joh v. Onwudin.joh [1957] 2 E.R.L.R.l.
2. See Okoro, ojd .cit.,pp. 186-190; A.B. Kasunmu, "Intestate 
Succession in Nigeria", 1, Nigerian Law Journal,1964-65 
pp.50-58 at p.56; Nwogugu, op.cit.,p.298; J.W. Salacuse, 
Birth, Death and the Marriage Act: Some Problems in 
Conflict of Laws", 1 Nigeria Law Journal,1964-65, pp.59- 
72, pp.65-67.
3:. [1945] 18 N.L.R.1.
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The Supreme Court rejected this contention. In 
a judgment given by.Ames, J., it was stated as follows:
"Because section 56 of the Marriage Ordinance applies 
only to the Colony, it does not follow that the 
opposite, so to speak is the law in the Protectorate.
It only means that one must look elsewhere than this 
section for guidance on this point...
I do not think it necessary to look very far. It 
seems to me that the principle enunciated in the 
well-known case of Cole v. Cole (1) covers the point".
The learned Judge gave an additional reason, which is pertinent 
to the discussion, in support of the principle enunciated in 
Cole v. Cole. He said:
"Native law and custom sometimes recognises relation­
ships which English law would not recognise but 
would regard as illegitimate if the parties have con­
tracted a Christian marriage. Such illegitimate 
relatives would not be recognised by this Court 
during the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Could it be said to be just and equitable and a 
matter of good conscience that such relatives should, 
be recognised as soon as one of the parties to the 
marriage dies, whenever the local law and custom is 
of this kind"?^
It was directed that the estate should be distributed 
according to English law.
2
The principle enunciated in Cole v. Cole has been
5applied in many other cases.
5. Testate Succession
"What is a testament? It is the 
expression of the will of a man who 
has no longer any will, respecting 
property, which is no longer his 
property: it is the action of a man
no longer accountable for his actions 
to mankind; it is an absurdity, and 
an absurdity ought not to have the 
force of law” .
Bulwer*s Historical Characters.^
1. Ibid., p .2.
2. [1898] 1 N.L.R.15.
5. See e.g. Adegbola v. Folaranmi [1921] 3 N.L.R. 89; Coker 
and Ors. v. Coker and Ors.11945j 17 N.L.R.55; Olympio 
and Qrs.v. Oluwole and Anor.fl968l N.M.L.R.469;
Gooding and Anor.v. Martins [1942" 8 W.A.C.A.108; 
Haastrup v. Coker [1927] 8 N.L.R.68.
Footnote 4 continued..........
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A. Introduction
A will or testament is the machinery whereby a 
person in his lifetime can direct how his property is to 
devolve after his death. A will takes effect only from 
the date of the death of a testator. By a will a testator 
may dispose of his individually owned property so as to 
exclude those persons who would have succeeded to it under 
the applicable rule of intestacy which governs his particular 
case
A will may be made under any of the three systems
2
of law operative in Nigeria, viz., customary law, Islamic
3 4law^ or the general law. In traditional society, a
customary law will was usually oral, since customary law
knew no writing, and was invariably in the form of a
voluntary oral declaration in the presence of responsible
and disinterested persons, including members of the family.
It is usually made in immediate expectation of death.
According to Hausa customary law, an oral, or nuncupative
Footnote 4 continued....
4. Vol.l, p.114 as quoted by William Markby, Elements of 
Law considered with Reference to Principles of General 
Jurisprudence, op.cit., p.386^ .
1. See generally Brian Harvey, The Law and Practice of 
Nigerian Wills, Probate and Succession (.London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1968); Nwabueze, Nigeria Land Law,op.cit., 
pp.418 - 429; see Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, op.cit., 
pp.290-292, for an account of actual practice among 
some Yoruba communities; Coker, Family Property Among 
the Yorubas, op.cit., p.247.
2. See A,joke v. Plate,ju [1962] L.L.R.137; Nelson v. Nelson 
[1932J 1 W .A .C .A .2151 Ayinke v. Ibidunni 119391
4 F.C.S.280; see also Elias, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit., 
pp.203-204; Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit.,p.380; 
Coker, op.cit. ,p.248; cfT Lloyd, **Yoruba Inheritance 
and Succession”, in Studies in the Laws of Succession 
in Nigeria, edit, by J. Duncan M. Derrett (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), pp.139-173 at p.165.
3. See Apatira and Anor.v. Akanke and Ors.\1944] 17
N.L.R.149; Ayoola and Ors.v. Folawiyo and Ors. 
8 W.A.C.A.39; George v. Administrator General 
21 N.L.R.83.
1942] 
>952 J
4. Wills Act 1837, s.3; Wills Law, Cap.133, Laws of 
Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 Revision, s.3.
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will made before members' of the deceased1s family is 
generally observed whether the testator be male or female,^ 
and this position obtains in many other systems of customary 
law.
Freedom of disposal, even of individually owned
property, may, however, be restricted in some customary law
systems. For example, among some Igbo communities, there
are certain items of property which a man has no power to
dispose of by will. There are his interest in any family or
commercial property, his compound, including the Obi, his
ofo, and those items of property to which his eldest son or
eldest daughter is entitled as special shares, on his 
2
intestacy. Similarly, it seems, a married woman cannot 
legally dispose of her lands or houses by will under customary 
law.
Under Islamic law, a person can dispose of only
4
one-third of his net estate by will, which may be oral or 
written, but property can only be given to persons other 
than the heirs whose rights to two-thirds share of the 
estate is legally protected against testamentary dis-
5
position.
1. See Palmer, "Inheritance Among the Hausa", op.cit., 
para. 3; see also Coker, Family Property Among the 
Yorubas, op.cit., p p .247-235; Obi, Ibo Law of Property, 
op.cit.,pp.206-208.
2. Customary Law Manual, 1977, op.cit.,p.l43» par.218; see 
also Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit.,pp.420-421; 
Okoro, op.cit.,ppT?8-81.
3. Customary Law Manual, op.cit.,pp.201-203; Meek, Law and 
Authority, op.cit.,pp.523-324; Obi, Ibo Law of Property, 
op.cit. .pp. 3 $ Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit., 
pp.420-421; cf. Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit., 
p p.308-309.
4. The net estate are the assets available for distribution 
after the payment of the funeral expenses and debts, see 
Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit.,
p. 235.
5. This rule is confined to the Sunni schools, and its pur­
pose is allegedly to prevent interference with the precise 
balance between the claims of the various relatives 
established by the laws of inheritance. The rule is
said to avoid the enmity which might arise among the 
heirs as a result of the preferential treatment of one 
of their number by the deceased’s will; see Coulson, 
Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit.. p.239.
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Under the statutory provisions, a testator 
may dispose of his individually owned property without 
restraint. This principle conflicts with both customary 
and Islamic laws which, as previously noted, place certain 
restrictions on testamentary capacity.
B . Testamentary capacity
(1) Customary law
Under most systems of law all adult persons have
capacity to make a will, either orally, or in contemporary
Nigeria,in a written document. The power of a married woman
to make a valid will, however, was severely restricted in
some societies, especially in relation to immovable property.
This was the natural consequence of her legal incapacity to
own or dispose of property during her life-time. For example,
the Customary Law Manual,1977 states:
!t267. Gift of landed property by will -
(1) Married women - A married woman has no right to 
dispose of her land, house or economic tree by 
will.
Lotial variations - A married woman has this right in 
Edda clan and Afikpo town in Afikpo Division, Idemili 
and Mbaise Divisions. In these places, however, the 
woman has to confine her gift to her own children or, 
if she has no children to members of her husband*s 
family1*.^
A similar restriction is imposed on divorced women, widows
living with their husbands1 families, or widows who have
left their deceased husbands* families but have not repaid
the dowry paid with references to their marriages, and even
2
on adult unmarried women.
A man, on the other hand, whether married or not, 
has full testamentary capacity to dispose of his property 
subject to the following exception:
1. Customary Law Manual, op.cit.,pp.203-204, par.267(1).
2. Ibid.,pp.204-205.
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"218. Property not disposable by will. - There are 
items of property which a man.has no power to 
dispose of by will. These are his interest in 
any family or communal property, his compound 
including the obi, his ofo and those items of 
property to which his eldest son or eldest 
daughter is entitled as special shares on his 
intestacy"
There is thus a clear discrimination against women,
in these customary laws, a discrimination which also obtains
2
in many other communities. As earlier seen, such provisions 
are contrary to section 39 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 
1979, and they also conflict with the provisions of the 
Will's Act 1837, as amended by the Married Women1s Property 
Act, 1882.
(11) Islamic law
Generally speaking, Islamic law does not dis­
criminate against women with reference to testamentary 
dispositions. A Moslem man or woman may dispose of his or 
her property by will subject to the one-third rule:
"Bequests which, singly or collectively, exceed in 
value one-third of the testator*s net estate - i.e. 
the assets available for distribution after the 
payment of funeral expenses and debts - are ultra 
vires to the extent of the excess portion” .^
This rule is common to all the schools of law. 
According to Maliki law, however, which, as previously
noted, generally applies in the Northern States, a woman
does not acquire legal capacity to deal with her property
until she has consummated her marriage, and two qualified
witnesses have testified that she is a prudent person capable
of managing her own affairs. Moreover, it has been seen
1. Ibid.,p.145, par.218.
2. See e.g. among some ethnic groups in the Northern States 
of Nigeria; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, op.cit., 
p.283. Roth, Great Benin, op.cit.,Chapter IX, p.XIX.
3. Section 3.
4. Section 1(1).
5. Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit., p.235, 
Fyzee, op.cit,, pp.559-363.
6. See above, Chapter XII.
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that under Maliki law, a wife may not dispose gratuitously 
of more than one-third of her property without the consent 
of her husband. A Moslem wife's freedom to dispose of her 
property by will under Maliki law is therefore restricted 
to this extent. Where, however, a wife makes a testamentary 
bequest which is ultra vires due to the lack of her hus­
band's consent, the bequest may be validated by the hus­
band's subsequent ratification. Bequests to an heir are 
not valid.^
These rules, which are peculiar to Maliki law, 
also discriminate against women, and thus infringe the 
constitutional provision of the right to freedom from dis­
crimination.
(Ill) Statutory provisions
Wills can be made in English form. Such wills are
2
governed by the Wills Act, 1837, as amended by the Married
3 4Women's Property Act, 1882, and by the Wills Law, 1958
which only applies in Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Bendel and Lagos
States.
The introduction of English testamentary laws has 
changed the incapacity to make a will or to dispose of 
individually-owned property without restraint, imposed by 
customary and Islamic laws. Every sane adult Nigerian is 
now legally capable of making a will disposing of his or 
her individually-owned property in accordance with the
5
statutory laws of succession stated above.
1. See Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family, op.cit., 
p.247 and generally, fryzee, op.cit.,p.366.
2. 7 Will. 4 and 1 Viet. C.26; 39 Stats. 856. In Thomas 
v. De Souza, [1929] 9 N.L.R.81, it was held that "the 
English Wills Act,.1837 is a statute of general 
application in Nigeria, see also Adesubokan v.
Yinusa [1975], 3 JJ.I.L.R. 22.
3. 17 Stats. 116.
4. Cap.135, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959 Revision.
5. Adesubakan v. Yinusa [1975] 5 U.I.L.R.22.
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With special reference to women, it may be noted 
that the English Wills Act, 1837, did not give testamentary 
capacity to a married woman, in contradistinction to a 
woman feme sole, who had full testamentary capacity under 
the Act. When the equitable concept of separate property 
was extended to the legal doctrine of separate property 
by the Married Women*s Property Act, 1882, a married woman*s 
power to dispose of her property by will was likewise 
extended, so that her testamentary incapacity remained only 
with respect to property acquired by her during coverture 
before 1883. The Married Women*s Property Acts, as well as 
the Wills Act 1837 are statutes of general application,^ and 
apply to all married women irrespective of type of marriage, 
except married women in Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Bendel and Lagos 
States.
The Married Women*s Property Law, 1959, which
2applies in Oyo, Ogun, Ondo and Bendel States, gives tes­
tamentary capacity to married women, but, as previously 
noted, the Married Women*s Property Law, 1959, does not 
apply to women married solely according to customary law 
(and presumably Islamic law). But the Wills Law, 1959, 
which applies in these States, unlike the Wills Act 1837, 
does not exclude married women from making valid wills. The 
position therefore is that all married women in these States 
have full testamentary capacity.
Since 1972, the Wills Law, 1959,applies' in Lagos
3
State, and under this Law all married women have full 
testamentary capacity.
All Nigerian sane adult women, therefore, have 
full testamentary capacity, Islamic or customary law to the 
contrary notwithstanding.
1. see Ogedegbe v.Ogedegbe [1964] L.L.R.209; Egun.jobi v.
Egun.jobi Tl974l 4 E.C.S.L.R.552: Osomugha v. Osomugha
[1972J 12 C.C.H.C.J. 91; Thomas vTfie"Souza [1529]
9 N.L.R.81. Yinusa v. Adesubokan [1968] N.N.L.R.97.
2. See further, above, Chapter XII, p. 366.'
3. See Chapter XII, p.366, n.l.
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Customary or Islamic laws which impose res­
trictions on the free disposal of individually-owned 
property by will are incompatible with the Wills Act 
1837, the Married Women1 s Property Act, 1882 and the 
Wills Law, 1959. They have also been declared repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience in a few 
cases.^
2
In the recent case of Adesubokan v. Yinusa, 
the trial Court held that a Moslem of the Northern State 
of Nigeria was competent to make a will under the Wills 
Act 1837, but that he had no right to deprive by that will 
any of his heirs who were entitled to share his estate 
under Islamic law. On appeal, it was held by the Supreme 
Court that the Islamic law which favours equal distribution 
despite the existence of a valid will, violates section 3 
of the Wills Act, 1837, under which a testator can dispose 
of his property as he pleases. The Court held that section 
34(1) of the Northern States High Court Law enjoins the 
High Court to observe and enforce the observance of every 
native law and custom which is not incompatible either
3
directly or by implication with the Wills Act 1837, and
that the Moslem law which the trial Judge applied in the
case was incompatible with the Wills Act, since the
definition of native law and custom in Northern Nigeria
A
includes Moslem law.
l.See Akuonyeume and Anor.v. Ogbanje [1964] Suit No. 0/98/1963, 
unreported, Onitsha High Court, 2 Nov. 1964.
2. [1975] 5 U.I.L.R. 22.
3. Contrast Rotibi v. Savage [1944] 17 N.L.R.77, where it 
was held by the Owerri High Court that the phrase "any 
law for the time being in force” in s.16 of the 
Protectorate Courts Ordinance, 1935 had reference only 
to local enactments. Compare the Supreme Court Act, 
s.17(1), Cap.211, Laws of Nigeria, 1948 Revision.
4. See also Okoro, op.cit.,p.226; Contrast Nwabueze who 
asserts that there can be no question of any customary 
limitation upon the freedom of testation being invalid 
for incompatibility with the Wills Act, 1837, since 
only incompatibility with a local statute can render 
such limitation invalid, - Nwabueze, op.cit., p.420.
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In Akuonyeume and Anor.v.. Ogban.je,^ a case 
decided in Onitsha High Court in 1964, the plaintiffs 
claimed as executors named in the last will of the deceased ■ 
testatrix, to a grant of probate in solemn form. The 
defendant, a grandchild of the testatrix1s deceased husband, 
entered a caveat on the ground inter alia, that the testatrix 
could not dispose of the land which she had devised by will, 
since she had no capacity to dispose of it according to 
customary law, as she had not refunded the dowry paid by his 
grandfather when the latter married her. Kaine, J., found 
that the land in question was acquired by the testatrix after 
her husband*s death and was therefore not her husband*s 
family property. The testatrix had devised the land to her 
own children. The Judge held that the testatrix could deal 
with the land as she wished, and that although customary 
law may have applied to the property had she died intestate, 
it could not apply when she made a will. The learned Judge, 
it is respectfully submitted correctly observed:
’*I agree with Mr. Umezinwa [counsel for the plaintiffs] 
that if the Native Law and Custom would prevent a 
woman from dealing with property which she acquired 
with her own sweat, it would be repugnant to natural 
justice and good conscience, and therefore it should 
not be allowed to operate, in accordance with section 
22 of the High Court Law of Eastern Nigeria, and to 
be given effect by this Court**.
It is not possible to give details of the law of 
testate succession under the Wills Act 1837, within the
context of this thesis, but the following pertinent points
may be briefly noted:
1. [1964] Suit No. 0/98/1963, unreported,Onitsha High
Court, 2 Nov. 1964; see also Okoye v. Okoye and Ors. 
[1976] Suit Mo. 0/171/72, unreported, Onitsha High 
Court, 8 April, 1976 where Nnaemeke-Agu, J., held 
that the alleged customary law of Otolo Nnewi by which 
a father could not distribute his property by will to 
his younger children in disregard of the elder ones, 
and of his Okpala [head of the family], if it existed, 
was contrary to all the authoritative.pronouncements 
on the point and unenforceable.
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(I) . Under section ,18 of the Wills. Act, 1837, every will
made by a' man or woman is revoked by his or her subsequent •
marriage.^ All types of marriages are included under this
section, but section.15 of the Wills Law, which provides
for the revocation of a will by a subsequent marriage,
2
expressly excludes marriages under customary law.
(II) A gift to the. testator*s wife, provided this was 
obviously the testator*s intention, will take effect in 
favour of a woman with-whom the testator is living as
3
husband and wife, even though they are not legally married. 
The beneficiary must not have witnessed the will.
(III) A testator may, by a valid will, dispose of all his 
immovable and movable property. He may not, however, dis­
pose of his interests in family property which has not been
4partitioned.
(IV) Unlike the present English law, there is no legal
provision which prevents a man or woman from disposing of
all his individual property by will, even though this would
leave his or her spouse, children and dependent relatives
5
entirely penniless.
C . Testamentary provisions for widows
A Nigerian can make provision for his wife, daughter 
or other relatives who may be deprived of any, or a sufficient 
share in his intestate estate, by making a will in accordance
1. See Bromley, Family Law, op.cit. ,pp.605-605; a decree
of divorce or nullity does not affect a will made during 
the marriage, see the recommendation of the Morton 
Commission (1956 Cmd. 9678), pars;1187-1191, to the 
effect that in such a case a gift to, or appointment in 
favour of, a former spouse should lapse unless the 
-testator expressly directs to the contrary.
2. For a criticism of this provision, see Obi, Modern Family 
Law, op.cit.t pp.276-278.
3. See Re Brown [1910] 26 T.L.R. 257; Re Smalley T19291 
2 Ch.112, C.A. .
4. See Oke and Anor.v.Oke and Anor.[l974] 3 S.C.l; Davies 
v. Sogunro and Ors.11956 | 15 N.L.R.15; Ogunmefun v. 
Ogunmefun and Ors.[1931 ] -10 N.L.R.82; Taylor v. Williams 
and Anor.r1955 1 12 N.L.R. 67. .
5. Cf. the English Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act, 1975, 45 Stats.495; see also Bromley, 
op.cit.,pp.622-656; Unger, ’The Inheritance Act and The 
Family", op.cit.,p.215.
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with the Wills Act 1837 (or the Wills Law, 1959 in those 
States where it applies).‘ It has been- seen thait, with the 
exception of Islamic law under which a wife may inherit 
some part of her deceased husbandTs property, a wife married 
under customary law does not inherit any property from her 
husband, and in most communities, daughters are likewise 
excluded. To what extent do husbands and fathers make 
provision for such wives and daughters in their wills?
It is a known fact that Nigerians generally are 
reluctant to make wills.^ It is difficult to estimate, 
and account for the unpopularity of wills, as numerous 
factors may contribute to this result. Thus, apart from 
the character of the law of intestate succession, the dis­
tribution of wealth, the incidence of family property, 
and the character of matrimonial law, the expense of making 
wills, the complexity of the rules relating to formalities, 
proof and interpretation, and the high rate of illiteracy 
in Nigeria must be considered. Much of their reluctance may 
be due to the fact that in customary law, wills take the 
form of death-bed dispositions. Making a will when a person 
is in good health therefore creates the illusion of impending 
death, and may be regarded as tempting the Gods. One
interviewee who suspected that her church marriage may be
2
invalid under section 33 of the Marriage Act, and as a 
result she would have no share in the intestate estate of 
her husband, declared her determination to see that her
1. See Okoro, op.cit.,p.64; Childs, "Christian Marriage in 
Nigeria”, op.ci4:., p.246. There is evidence of the un­
popularity of wills in other societies, see e.g. Maine, 
Ancient Law, op.cit.. p.244: ”in France at moment, 
the heads of families generally save themselves the 
trouble of executing a will”, confirmed by the recent 
observations of Amos and Walton, Introduction to French 
Law, quoting Josserand, Cours de Droit Civil Possitif 
Francais 1930, that ”in 19^8 about four-fifths of all 
successions were intestate”. See also J. Unger,”The 
Inheritance Act and the Family.” Modern Law Review. 1943, 
pp. 215-228a t p.217; Cretney, Principles of Family Law. 
op cit.,p.294; The privilege of freedom of testation is 
exercised comparatively rarely: only 24 percent of a 
representative sample of husbands and 10 percent of 
wives had made wills...”
2. See above, Chapter X, p;l45.
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husband went through another ceremony in the Registrars 
office, which would validate the marriage, but she 
rejected the idea that he could make a will leaving her 
a share of the property to which she had contributed the 
greater part, but which was entirely in his name. She said 
that it would be very cruel to make such a suggestion to 
him, as it would imply that she was desirous of his death.
The Registrar of Calabar High Court stated that 
the total number of wills submitted to the Probate Registry 
of the High Court in Calabar was not more than fifty. When 
it is realised that the Wills Act, 1837, was introduced as 
early as 1900, in Nigeria, and that Calabar Division had a 
projected population of 300,973 of whom 147,476 were aged 
20 and above in 1971, it can be appreciated that very few 
people make wills. There is no reason to believe that 
people in other parts of the country with the possible 
exception of Lagos follow a different practice in this 
respect.
The question still remains, however, how far do 
people who make wills provide for their spouses or children? 
The present writer examined 66 wills at the Probate Registry, 
Lagos High Court. The contents of these wills were- very 
interesting. Not only were they illustrative of the 
attitude of Nigerian husbands towards making provision 
for their wives, but they gave great insight into marital 
relationships, and demonstrate the fact that the English 
law of intestacy, whereby widows inherit a large share of 
their husbands1 property is not popular with most Nigerian 
husbands.
Of the 66 wills examined, one was made by a woman. 
Thirty six of the men had one wife only when the will was 
made, and four had three or more wives. In only two cases 
were wives given any property absolutely, except small sums 
of money. In one of these cases, the wife was made joint 
executrix, and was given most of the husband*s property, 
including rents from family property due to him. In the 
other case, the wife and children were given equal shares 
in all personal property, and the wife was given a life
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interest in all real property, the remainder to the children. 
It is worthy of note that this testator was illiterate.
The -general tendency in the other wills was to 
give the widows as little as possible, and to deprive them 
even of that in the case of remarriage. For example, one 
will contained the following provision:
"I devise my family house on trust for the occupation 
of my three wives now living with me. From the rents 
collected my senior wife should be given £3 monthly, 
the second wife £2 monthly, and the third wife £1.10 
monthly for life. I direct that should any of my said 
wives remarry, or desire to take a husband, or keep 
a new friend, then such wife or wives should forthwith 
leave my house and her monthly allowance shall cease11.
This testator died leaving a number of landed 
properties. He devised a large area of land at Itori town 
to his niece, and another land to his son, while the 
remainder of his property was to be held in trust for the 
benefit of his eleven children.
Similarly, another testator provided:
"Any of my male children and wives are permitted to 
live at the rear of my house at No. 30 Little Road, 
provided that no wife of mine shall enjoy this 
privilege if she shall remarry".
He too left a large amount of property to his 
children, except one "daughter Adefwora who shall have no 
share whatever in my real, personal or residual property” . 
Nothing else was left to hi's wives. Another will gave the 
wife £30 as an outright gift, and the right of occupancy 
to her room, but she was to be "dispossessed of her room 
unless she remained chaste” .
Such meagre provisions merit no comment if the 
will reveals the hostile attitude of the testator towards 
his wife. For example, where a testator directed his 
executors
"to pay out of my estate, a sum of £10 only to my wife
.Madam Abigail Ojuolape as her bequest and only share 
of my estate, and no more no less. By doing this I 
have deliberately left out her name from all other 
shares and privileges and she is conscious of the 
reason I have done so".
It was evident that the wife had done him some 
wrong, real or imagined. Similarly, where a testator directed
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that his wife Emily should immediately evacuate his house . 
on the occurrence' of his death, his resentment of his wife's 
presence in his house is obvious. No imagination is 
necessary to interpret the feelings of a testator who made 
the following provision:
,rI have by my will made no provision for my wife 
Rachael in as much as she has been adequately 
provided for by her earnings as a principal of a 
school upon salary £1,260 in 1969. Since this 
woman has been so cruel to me, deserting me for 
no just cause at my hours of need and poverty 
barely three years after our marriage, in May 1951, 
and have tried even though unsuccessfully in 1964 
to get the marriage dissolved in a petition 
brought by me, Suit HD/9/64, I feel justified in 
leaving her the sum of £5 which is more than she 
deserves” .
In cases where there is such open hostility on 
the part of the husband,one would not expect a widow to be 
given much, if anything. But many widows for whom the 
testators profess love and gratitude, fare little better.
For example, a will contained this provision:
”1 direct that if my good natured wife Madam Rabiatu 
Olabiwonno has no issue for me, she be given the sum 
of £10 for her honest services to me during my 
lifetime. My thanks to her for her honest deeds".
The testator gave £5 to his other wives, including a wife
who had left him, if she returned to him before his death,
"if not her £5 should be deleted, and any new wife added".
But the bulk of his large estate was devised to his five
daughters, and one son, and a large property was given to
a brother and his children. This will was made in 1972
when £10 could not maintain someone for a month, much less
a life-time. Rabiatu did not get much for her honest deeds!
Most of the property in the wills examined was 
given to the children of the testator, especially the 
daughters. Very often, daughters were given a larger 
share, to the detriment of sons. In quite a few cases, the 
testator excluded the spouses of his children from inheriting 
his property.. An example of such a provision is provided 
by the following provision in a will:
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"I direct that all gifts to my daughters and sons 
^should be free from all matrimonial engagements 
and should under no circumstance be inherited by 
any person claiming to be the wife or husband, 
legally, or otherwise of any of my daughters or 
sons. Any daughter or son dying without issue, 
his interest shall merge in my estate for the 
benefit of my other children, grandchildren or 
great grandchildren”.
One testator provided that his eldest son "should 
not take dowry in the traditional way” when his twin 
daughters marry, and that none of his debtors should be 
sued. The first provision seems strange, since the testator 
was a Chief, the Aihioba of Benin, whose duty it is to up­
hold traditional law. It would have been interesting to 
know his reasons for the provision.
The point of immediate relevance of this thesis, 
however, is that deceased husbands do not make adequate 
provisions for their widows in their wills, even where they 
leave a considerable amount of property, and their wives 
have been helpful and faithful.
Under English law at present, the deceased1s 
spouse or a former spouse, that is, a person whose marriage 
with the deceased was dissolved or annulled during his life­
time by a competent Court, and who has not remarried, is 
entitled to apply to a court for reasonable maintenance out 
of the e s t a t e T h e r e  is no such provision in Nigerian law.
4. Problems of Conflict of Laws
The effect of a statutory marriage on the customary 
and Islamic laws of succession portrays some of the conflicts 
inherent in a legal system where two or more distinct types 
of marriages co-exist. Most of the problems arise from the 
fact that there are no statutory provisions governing the 
choice of law in succession in some parts of the country. 
Judicial decisions are conflicting, and as a result, it is 
impossible to state with any degree of certainty whether
1. See s.25(l) Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act, 1975, 45 Stat.,493.
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English, or customary law (including Islamic law) governs 
the intestate estate of a person, subject to customary law, 
who has contracted a statutory marriage which is not
governed by section 36 of the Marriage Act^ or section
2
49(5) of the Administration of Estates Law, 1959.
This section attempts to examine briefly some of 
the conflicting theories and decisions, in order to make 
some contribution to the solution of the problem.
3
A convenient starting point is Cole v. Cole . As 
previously seen, this case decided that in such circumstances 
English law should be applied. This decision was followed 
and extended in later cases. The theory inherent in these 
decisions is that the law of intestate succession of a 
person subject to more than one type of law is determined 
by the type of marriage he contracts. That is, there is an 
important nexus which should not be disregarded, between the 
law of marriage, and the law of succession. The intestate 
estate of a person who marries according to customary law 
should not be distributed according to English law.
Similarly, the intestate estate of a person who contracts a 
statutory marriage, which entails rights and obligations 
patterned on English law, should not be distributed in 
accordance with the customary law. of succession, since some 
of its incidents are incompatible with the status of a 
statutory spouse.
This viewpoint . has been criticised by writers 
who see succession and marriage as two independent and 
unrelated institutions. Thus Okoro says that the "law of 
succession is a separate body of law, quite distinct from 
the law of marriage. The law of succession deals mainly 
with the distribution of a deceasedfs property, and to a 
measure the discharge of some of his obligations", whereas
1. Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1958 Revision.
2. Cap.l, Laws of Western Region of Nigeria, 1959 Revision.
3. [1898] 1 N.L.R.15.
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"the law of marriage regulates the relationship 
■^between husband and wife in their lifetime. It-, 
imposes on them matrimonial rights and duties". 
Therefore,the learned writer argues:
"a wife’s right in her husband’s intestacy, where 
they exist, arise from the fact that the law of 
intestate succession provides that a wife should be 
entitled and not from the fact of marriage itself".^
Nwabueze has correctly pointed out that:
"this argument involves the fallacy of treating 
rules of law as belonging to watertight compart­
ments. The law is one organic body of rules, 
operating within a more or less consistent frame­
work and its compartmentalisation is no more than 
a device of convenience to facilitate its exposition 
and study".^
In fact, marriage is a relationship which is central
to many other legal institutions, which in turn determines
rights to succession. For example, legitimacy, in nearly
all legal systems in Nigeria,is dependent on whether the
child’s parents were married at the time of its conception,
and this fact alone, in many systems,admits the child of the
wife to inherit the husband’s property, although there may
be no blood relationship between him and the child. It is
not paternity which admits such children to succession, it
4is marriage.
Coker correctly sums up the position when he
states:
"It is generally supposed that there is no status
of illegitimacy in native law and custom: this,
however, is not correct, for there is a status of
illegitimacy as opposed to that of legitimacy.
The latter entitles the subject ipso facto to succeed 
to property; the former disentitles the subject from 
so succeeding, unless his rights are ’legalised by 
an acknowledgement of paternity’. Generally speaking
1. See Okoro, 0£.cit.,pp.182-3; see also the submission of
Shyngle, who argued on behalf of the respondent in 
Cole v. Cole [1898] 1 N.L.R.15 at p.17, that the "status 
of marriage does not necessarily affect succession; see 
also Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas, op.cit.,
pp.287-288.
2. Okoro, op.cit.,p,188.
5. Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit., p.407.
4. See further, Chapter VII, above, pp.
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• a child born in wedlock is legitimate from birth, 
whereas an illegitimate child can only be legitimated 
if he was duly acknowledged by his father".^
. The role of marriage in the choice of law of 
succession cannot be fully realised when there is only one 
type of marriage in any society. Where there are two or 
more types of marriages entailing different legal incidents 
and status, rights of succession may often depend on the 
type of marriage contracted. This fact can be illustrated 
from customary law where instances abound, but two will 
suffice to support the contention.
Okoro correctly states that "among the Ijaw it
is important to know the type of marriage entered into by a
person’s parents, as this determines the family in which a
2
person may succeed to property". By this statement the
learned writer has demolished his own argument that
marriage and succession are independent and unrelated
institutions. Among the Ijaws there are two types of
marriages, the iya ("big dowry"), and the igwa ("small
•3
dowry") marriage. Each type of marriage among the I jaw 
involves different rights, and imposes different liabilities 
on the spouses. As a result, the type of marriage determines 
the inheritance right of the wife and children of the
marriage. Okoro sums up the position thus:
"The iya marriage is more expensive than the igwa 
marriage. The children of the former marriage 
belong to their father’s family and their mother 
belongs to her husband’s family. It is in this 
family that she and her children have succession 
rights and are succeeded to as well. The children 
of the igwa marriage belong to their mother’s family 
and their mother too belongs to her father’s and not 
to her husband’s family during the marriage. She and 
her children have succession rights in and are 
succeeded to by her father’s family. In determining 
succession rights among the Ijaw, it is therefore 
essential to know the family to which a person 
belongs"
1. Coker, on.cit.. p.266.
2. Okoro, op.cit., p.149; see also Meek, Land Tenure and 
Land Administration in Nigeria and the Cameroons,
op.cit.,p.179, n.4; Nwogugu, family Law in Nigeria, 
op.cit., p.315.
3. See above, Chapter III, pp.254-257.
4. Okoro, op .cit. ,p.149; see also Bride Price Committee, 
Report, p .34. Footnote 4 continued........
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In determining succession rights among the Ijaws, 
it is therefore essential to know the type of marriage con­
tracted by the spouses. The type of marriage determines, 
not only the succession rights of the spouses and their 
children, but also of their fathers, brothers, and other 
relatives
Similarly, the inheritance rights of the issue
of a person who contracts a levirate marriage and a non-
levirate one depend on the type of marriage contracted by
their parents. For example, A contracts a levirate marriage
with B, his deceased brotherfs wife, and a non-levirate
marriage with C. The children of A and B will inherit from
the deceased brother, whereas the children of A and C will
inherit from A. In other words, A*s children1s rights of
inheritance are dependent on the type of marriage A con-
2tracted with their respective mothers.
There are some societies where rights of succession 
are independent of marriage. For example, among the Fanti 
of Ghana, where the eldest son of a man!s sister inherits 
all his property, regardless of whether he is married or not, 
or the type of customary marriage he contracts. This 
situation invariably applies among matrilineal societies, 
where affiliation of children and inheritance rights are not 
usually dependent on marriage. But matrilineal societies 
are relatively few in Nigeria, and in any case, reference to 
these societies cannot substantiate a general statement that 
the law of succession is entirely independent of the law of 
marriage in Nigeria.
Footnote 4 continued Temple, Notes on the Tribes. . .
of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria, op.cit., p.230;
As a result of the conflict of interests in the two 
types of Ijaw marriages * with reference to succession 
and other rights, Ijaw fathers are reluctant to give 
their daughters1 hand in an "iya" marriage.
1. Okoro, op.cit., p.150.
2. See further, above, Chapter VIII, p.681.
3. See Daryll Forde, "Double Descent Among the Yako", in 
African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, edit, by 
Radcliffe-Brown and. Forde, op.cit.,pp.310-314; Nsugbe, 
Ohaffia: A Matrilineal Ibo People, op.cit.,p .86-92.
Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration, op.cit.,
p.179.
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It is respectfully submitted that the theory 
inherent in Cole v. Cole,^ and the cases which followed 
this decision is the correct one, and that the distribution 
of the intestate estate should be in accordance with the 
type of marriage contracted.
Some judicial decisions have accepted the basic 
premise of Cole v. Cole and other similar decisions,^ 
that English law applies to the intestate estate of persons 
subject to customary law, who have contracted statutory 
marriages. They, however, insist on the flexible approach, 
in the absence of a specific statutory provision. In the 
application of English law, full cognizance must be taken 
of the intention and expectations of the parties, as por­
trayed by their manner of life,standard of education and 
social position. This theory, aptly termed the "manner of 
life" approach, was adopted in Smith v. Smith^ a case 
similar in facts to Cole v. Cole-; The husband had con­
tracted a Christian marriage in Sierra Leone; he died 
intestate in Lagos, leaving a house there. He was survived 
by his wife and three children. The children and their 
mother lived in the house after his death, in much the same 
way as they had done when he was alive. After the death of 
the widow, the children continued in residence, until a dis­
pute broke out and the only son claimed exclusive right to
the house. The daughters brought an action for partition 
of the property, based on customary law. The son resisted 
their claim on the ground that since the deceased had
1. [1898] 1 N.L.R.15.
2. [1898] 1 N.L.R. 15.
3. See Adegbola v. Folaranmi [1921] 3 N.L.R.81; Haastrup v.
Coker 11927 I 8 N.L.R. 68; Gooding and Anor.v. Martins
8 W.A.C.A.108; Coker and Ors.v. Coker and. Ors.
1943 17 N.L.R.55; Olympio and Anor.v. Oluwole and Anor.
1968] N.M.L.R.469.
4. [1924] 5 N.L.R.102.
5. [1898] 1 N.L.R.15.
485
contracted a Christian marriage, based on Cole v. Cole,^
he, as the eldest son, was heir at law, and as a result
exclusively entitled to the house under English law.
Van Der Meulen, J., rejected the argument that 
2
Cole v. Cole laid down a general principle that English
law of succession must apply in all cases of intestacy
where the deceased had contracted a statutory marriage.
He held that the fact that a man had contracted a marriage
in accordance with the rules of the Christian Church may
be very strong evidence of his desire and intention to have
his life generally regulated by English law, but it is by
no means conclusive evidence. He concluded that the fact
that the deceased, when he bought the house, had probably
intended it to be a family house, and the fact that after
his death, the family had treated it as such, as sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption. He said;
"I have seen the parties in Court, and, although 
the defendant has had some little education to 
qualify him to be a clerk, it would I consider be 
most inequitable to hold that the affairs of people 
such as these should be strictly regulated in 
accordance with the principles of English law”.5
Cognizance was thus taken of the appearance and education
of the inheritors, totally irrelevant considerations, in
deciding whether English law or customary law should be
applied.* Fortunately, justice was done in this particular
case since all the children shared the house, but if the
parties had been Igbos, instead of Yorubas, the daughters
would have been excluded.
L\
In Ajayi v. White, the fact that the deceased 
wife of an "educated Reverend gentleman” might have been 
illiterate herself, and might have known nothing about
5
English law, since she left no will, was enough evidence
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Smith v. Smith [1924] 5 N.L.R. 102 at p.105.
4. [1946] 18 N.L.R.41.
5. Most educated Nigerians do not in fact make wills; 
see further above , pp. 475-479.
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: to. justify the application of customary law to her intestate 
estate.
Salacuse has remarked that
11 ....in a country such as Nigeria where a person*s way 
of life very often includes elements of the European 
and traditionally African in varying proportions, one 
can easily imagine the enormous and almost insoluble 
evidentiary problems which could confront a judge 
required to decide whether a deceased*s manner of 
life was such to warrant the application of customary 
law’*. 1
The "mode of life" and "standard of education"
tests have been largely discredited as totally unacceptable
2
and inappropriate. It is obvious that they can lead to 
great injustice and incongruities in certain cases. For
example, if pursued to their logical conclusion, the in­
testate estate of a person married according to customary
or Islamic law to one wife only, and who has attained a
high standard of education and social standing,and adopted
an English way of life, would be 'distributable according /to
3
English law.
Most of the criticisms directed against the choice 
of English law to govern the intestate estate of deceased 
spouses of a statutory marriage, who are subject to customary 
law, centre around the fact that in English law, the wife 
inherits some part of her deceased husband*s intestate estate, 
whereas in customary law she is excluded entirely. Thus Obi 
gives as an example of the iniquities which might result from 
the application of English law, the possibility of a widow 
who inherits practically every penny of her husband*s dis­
posable estate leaving the family and remarrying without
4honouring certain familial obligations of the deceased. Such
1. Salacuse, Birth, Death and the Marriage Act, op.cit.,p.65.
2. Ibid.,p.65 et.al; Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, op.cit., 
p7508.
3. See Bolajoko v. Layeni [1949] 19 N.L.R.99, where Rhodes J. 
rejected a claim that English law governed the intestate 
estate of a person who had never contracted a Christian 
marriage, on the ground that it revealed a gross 
ignorance of the law.
4. See Obi, Ibo Law of Property, op.cit., p.218.
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a possibility, however, is not confined to widows,, and may 
apply equally in. the case of widowers who have inherited. • 
their deceased wife*s property by virtue of the application 
of English laws. English laws of succession applicable 
in Nigeria may be more beneficial to a widower than to a 
widow.^
It serves no useful purpose to cite isolated 
examples, rare within Nigeria*s social context, where 
individuals may take advantage of a rule of law, to justify 
its abolition. The exclusion of widows from inheritance 
rights in their deceased husband*s intestate estate is 
incompatible with the social attitudes of modern society.
5. The Administration of Estates
The administration of the estate of a deceased
person is a function known to both customary and English 
2
law. If the deceased has not appointed an executor, 
administrators are usually appointed by the courts to 
administer and .' distribute the estate to persons entitled 
to inherit. Where the deceased contracted a statutory 
marriage, or made a will in English form, his estate will 
usually be administered according to English law. In such 
cases, the widow of the deceased usually has priority to 
a grant of letters of administration, since more often than
3
not she is one of the principal inheritors.
The right of a widow of a statutory marriage to
administer the estate of her deceased husband has long been
4
recognized in Nigeria. Where the widow has been married
1. For example, on the death of a wife intestate her hus­
band, if he survives her, is entitled to a life interest 
in the whole of her real property, both legal and 
equitable, in certain circumstances. This right,known 
as curtsey^is not available to a surviving widow; see 
further, Nwabueze, op.cit.,p.413.
2. See Nwabueze, Nigerian Land Law, op.cit.,p.429; Odje, 
"Integration in the tf’ield of the Law of Succession in 
the Mid-Western Region of Nigeria'*, in Integration of 
Customary and Modern Legal Systems in Africa (lle-Ife, 
Nigeria, University of Ife Institute of African Studies, 
1971), p.277; Meek, Northern Tribes of Nigeria, o p .cit.. 
p.285.
3. See Re Ata (deceased[l930] 10 N.L.R.65; Taylor v. Taylor 
rI960 ] L.L.R.286; Bolaji v.Akapo [1968] N.M.L.R.203
footnotes 3 and 4 continued..........
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according to customary law, however, the position is far 
from clear and there are conflicting decisions'. Customary 
law follows English law in making the right to administer 
the estate dependent on the right of inheritance to it.
In customary law a wife does not inherit her deceased 
husband*s property on an intestacy. As a result,it has 
been held in several cases that the widow of a customary 
law marriage cannot administer her deceased husband*s 
estate. Butler Lloyd, J., in the case of In Re Ata,~*~ 
noted:
"The grounds on which the English Courts have usually 
preferred the widow are quite inapplicable to a 
system of polygamy and the word widow should, I 
think, he construed as meaning the widow of a 
Christian marriage".
More explicit reasons for the exclusion of widows
of a customary law marriage from administration of their
deceased husbands* estates were given in the case of
2
Aileru and Ors. v. Anibi The defendant*s uterine brother 
died leaving minor children of four mothers married to him 
under customary law. All the widows were allotted to members 
of the deceased*s family, but three of them left the men to 
whom they were allotted and took other husbands. The fourth 
widow, who was allotted to the defendant, remained with him. 
The defendant applied for letters of administration to the 
deceased*s estate. The three widows, as next friend of
their children, entered a caveat against the defendant*s
application. Jibowu, J., noting that the children were all 
issues of polygamous marriages according to native law and 
custom "which treats their mothers like chattels to be 
inherited on their father*s death", declared:
Footnotes 3 and 4 continued....
3 ........Administrator General v. Coker. [1942] 16 N.L.R.111.
4. See Re Ata (deceased) ["1930] 10 N.L.R.65; Aileru and Ors.
v. Anibi 119521 20 N.L.R.46.
1. [1930] 10 N.L.R.65, at p.66.
2. [1952] 20 N.L.R.46; Cf. Rafatu Morin and Ors. v.
Yewande Soyemi [1973] 3 U.I.L.R.428, at p.430; where it 
was held that normally a surviving spouse is entitled to
a grant solely or with some other persons depending on
her beneficial rights, but that the claim of a spouse in
a polygamous setting are not so strong as they would be
under the Marriage Act.
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"Under native law and custom widows cannot administer 
jthe estate or their' husbands! In my view that is 
the first objection to a grant of letters of adminis­
tration to the four widows of the deceased in this 
case".
The Judge gave as additional objections the fact 
that the widows were illiterate, and therefore not in a 
position effectively to discharge the duties of an 
administrator, and that they were not living together and 
therefore could not work together. The fact that they had 
not brought the action in unison, as the fourth widow did 
not consent to her name being used in the action, was also 
an objection to the grant being given to them. The over­
riding objection, however, seemed to be that they had not 
"the same status under native law and custom as wives of 
marriages under the Marriage Ordinance".
Some of the criteria used to exclude the widows 
were unjustifiable. It is respectfully submitted that the 
illiteracy of the widows was not a rational ground for their 
exclusion. Male applicants are not excluded from adminis­
tration of an estate because of their illiteracy. Moreover, 
many illiterate widows of a statutory marriage have been 
granted letters of administration.
The principle that the widow of a customary 
marriage cannot administer the estate of her deceased hus­
band has been followed in other cases.^
There are many cases, however, in which the court
did not act on such a principle. Thus Wickliffe, J., in the
2case In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Asaboro, 
appointed one Comfort Asaboro, the widow of a customary law 
marriage, as one of the two administrators of the estate of
1. See e.g. Obi and Anor. v. Obi and Anor.f19741
Suit No. E/£lM/73 unreported decision of the.High Court 
Enugu, decided on 6 Feb. 1974, where the partiality 
principle was applied to justify the refusal of a grant 
to one of the widows of the deceased and the member of 
the family to whom she had been allotted. See also 
Tapa and Anor. v.Kuka [1945] 18 N.L.R.5; Bolaji v.
Akapo L1^68 | N.M.L.R.203; Ejiamike v. Ejiamike and Ors. 
[1972] 2/E.C.S.L.R.ll.
2. [1974] 1 W.S.H.C.41; Cf. Akanmu v. Abike [1971] Law 
Notes,& Review 1971, No. 1, p.6.
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her deceased husband. In the recent case of Oshila.ja and
• Anor.v. 'Oshila.ja and Ors?" Odesanya,- J., said:'
”The first defendant in the present case is an . 
educated woman. I think Yoruba sentiment would 
now frown upon the idea of the exclusion of this 
loyal and industrious wife from the administration 
of the intestate estate of her deceased husband” .
The Judge accepted the evidence of Oba Adekogbe,
that in Yorubaland a woman married under native law and
custom could administer the estate of her deceased husband
as compatible with the principle of "natural justice,
equity and good conscience” . This decision was a
particularly just one in view of the fact that the widow
was the joint owner of the money, the real properties, and
2
stock in trade left by the deceased.
It is difficult in the context of present day
Nigeria to justify the exclusion of wives of a customary law
marriage from the administration of the estates of their
deceased husbands, especially where there is only one widow,
or where relations among the widows are cordial and no
interests would be jeopardised.
The decisions which exclude widows of a customary
marriage from participating in the administration of their
3
deceased husband*s estates are illogical irrational, and 
based solely on the erroneous conception of a wife of a 
customary marriage as being an inheritable chattel, because 
presumably dowry has been paid on her behalf. The absurd 
situation therefore arises in which an illiterate wife of
1. r19721 10 C.C.H.C.J.ll, see also George and Anor. v. 
Fa.jore [1939] 13 N.L.R.1 and Re Whyte [19^6] 18 N.L.R.70.
2. See also Administrator General v. Coker [1942] 16 
N.L.R.Ill where a mother acting as guardian of her 
eleven year old child, was made joint administratrix 
as against the plaintiff, even though the mother had 
been divorced from the deceased.
3. See e.g. In Re Ata (deceased) [1930] 10 N.L.R.65, ”The 
ground on which the English courts have usually 
preferred the widow are quite inapplicable to a system 
of polygamy and the word widow should, I think, he con­
strued strictly as meaning the widow of a Christian 
marriage”, per Butler Lloyd, J. He refused to grant 
letters of administration to the customary law widow, 
but accorded a grant to the deceased*s sister. See also 
Martin v. Henshaw [1935] 12 N.L.R.40.
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a statutory marriage is adjudged competent to administer 
her deceased husband*s estate,^ but a university graduate 
who is the widow of a customary marriage is not. . The 
absurdity becomes more apparent when a woman who may be 
granted letters of administration to the estate of.a 
deceased relative is adjudged incapable of administering 
her husband*s estate to which she may have made significant 
contributions.
More important, the decisions are not in 
accordance with the current practice in many parts of 
Nigeria, for example Onitsha, where competent women are 
chosen to administer a deceased person*s estate in 
preference to less competent men. The decisions are also 
apparently not in accordance with the practice of many 
probate registries. For example, of 34 notices of pros­
pective grants of letters of administration advertised in
2
a national Nigerian newspaper, the letters of administration 
were to be granted as follows:
15 grants to the widow and another male person in each 
case;
3 grants to the widow and other female persons;
2 grants to the widower and another person;
2 grants to the widow only;
1 grant to two widows (of the same husband) only;
8 grants to males only;
2 grants to .females only, (not widows);
1 grant to the mother and brother of the deceased.
Only three of the thirty-four deceased persons 
were women.
From this evidence it seems clear that widows are 
usually and rightly granted letters of administration to 
their deceased husband*s intestate estates. The exclusion 
of widows from the administration of their deceased husband*s
1. The present writer has advised a few such widows who had
been granted letters of administration to their deceased
husband*s estates.
2. Daily Star. 5 November, 1977, p.10.
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estate solely on the ground that, they are women or that 
they are widows of a customary marriage, patently infringes 
the right of freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
sex,^ since neither men generally, nor widowers of 
customary marriages, are so excluded.
6. Summary and Conclusion
A. Summary
Because of the wide divergences in the property 
rights of Nigerian wives under the various types of 
Nigerian law, it is difficult to summarise briefly the 
legal status of women with reference to property. The 
property rights of married women depend to a large extent 
on the type of marriage contracted. Generally speaking, a 
woman who is married under customary law has the least 
legal rights, and in some societies the wife of a customary 
marriage suffers severe discrimination in her legal 
capacity to acquire, own, or dispose of property, especially 
immovable property. With the notable exception of the 
Yorubas and a few other societies where women, including 
married women, have full legal capacity, equal to that of 
men, to acquire, own and dispose of their separate property 
without restrictions, most traditional Nigerian societies 
deprive a married woman of the right to own or to dispose 
of property. All property acquired by the wife is legally 
vested in the husband, and the wife cannot dispose of it 
inter vivos or by will, except with the consent of her 
husband.
In nearly all societies,including the Yorubas, a 
widow is deprived of inheritance rights to the estate of her 
husband if he died intestate, although in many societies her 
husband inherits her property if she predeceases him
1. See s.39 of Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978, and further, Chapter II, 
p .148.
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whether she leaves children or not. In most cases her 
testamentary capacity is severely limited.
Under Islamic law, the wife has a legal right to 
acquire and own all types of property. However, she cannot 
dispose gratuitously of more than one-third of her property 
without the consent of her husband, inter vivos or by will.
The widow of a marriage under Islamic law is 
entitled to inherit one-eighth of her husbandTs intestate 
estate if the husband dies leaving a child or an agnatic 
grandchild. In the absence of a descendant the widow 
inherits one-quarter of the intestate estate. However, in 
the case of polygamous marriages the wifeTs share is a 
collective one, and all wives are entitled to the one- 
eighth or one-quarter of the estate as the case may be. The 
husband cannot by will deprive the wife of her right of 
inheritance.
The husband on the other hand is legally entitled 
to one-quarter of his wife’s intestate estate if she left 
descendants, and in the absence of descendants he inherits 
one-half of her estate. She cannot deprive him of his 
right of inheritance by disposing of her property by will.
The wife of a statutory marriage is in the most 
favourable position. Her legal rights with regard to the 
acquisition, ownership and disposal of property are almost 
identical with those of her husband. She also has an 
equal right to a share of his intestate estate, as he has 
to hers. Either spouse can make a will depriving the other 
spouse of his or her rights of inheritance.
As far as property rights are concerned, the 
introduction of the Married Women’s Property Acts has 
revolutionized the position of women married according to 
customary law in some societies, and to a lesser extent, the 
position of wives under Islamic law. Under the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1882, which applies to all married 
women-in Nigeria, (except in Ogun,1 Ondo, Oyo and Bendel 
States where they are excluded, if they contracted a cus­
tomary or Islamic law marriage, by the Married Women’s 
Property Law, 1959), married women are capable of acquiring,
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holding and disposing by will or otherwise of all types of 
property, which a man can-legally acquire, hold or dispose ' 
of.
Additionally, the recent Land Use Decree, 1978, 
makes no distinction on the ground of sex to the rights of 
occupancy to land recognized under the Decree. Coupled 
with the right of freedom from discrimination on the ground 
of sex which is now entrenched in the Nigerian Con­
stitution, it is doubtful whether the discriminatory 
provisions of Islamic law and some systems of customary 
law are legally enforceable.
B. Conclusion and recommendations
From the above summary it may be said that 
generally, the legal status of Nigerian women with reference 
to rights to acquire, hold, or to dispose of property com­
pares favourably with men!s rights in these respects. The 
law is in accordance with the actual practice of the people 
in most communities. Women now assert their rights to own 
and dispose of their self-acquired property, without res­
triction from their husbands, and this tendency will increase 
as more and more women become educated and active in the 
modern economy.
The inheritance rights of women, however, are 
far from favourable, with regard both to intestate and 
testate succession. Many women contribute to property 
which is invariably vested in the husband’s name. In many 
cases,this is due to the fact that the wife has little or 
no education and less knowledge of the law. If her husband 
predeceases her, unless he has made adequate provision for 
her in a will (a rare event), she is dependent on the good­
will of her children or her husband’s relatives who 
inherit his property. This may be the case even where she 
is married under the Nigerian Marriage Act, since the law 
is uncertain and judicial decisions are conflicting.
The sanctions which operated in the traditional 
society to forcetbe deceasedfeheirs to take care of a widow 
no longer obtain, and remarriage of a widow by a member of
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the deceased*s family is relatively rare in contemporary 
Nigeria. The widow, may not like the person chosen by the 
family to remarry her, and yet this is often the only 
means by which she can benefit, from property which has been 
accumulated with her help. She may be given a choice - 
Hobson*s choice - to be inherited, or abandon all her 
claims on the family.
In view of all these considerations the following 
reforms are suggested:
(1) The property rights of women should be made to
accord with the principle of equality of rights 
which is entrenched in the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979.
(2) In accordance with the principle of equality of
rights between men and women as embodied in the 
Constitution State,Governments should take steps
to abolish existing discriminatory laws and customs.
All aspects of the law which contribute to the low 
status of women, or which lead to women being 
regarded as property that could be bargained for 
or "inherited" should be abolished, or at least 
rendered legally ineffective. These include, 
principally, the payment of dowry as a legal 
essential of a marriage and the refund of dowry as 
the sine qua non of a valid divorce.
The law whereby widows are inherited by male members
of the deceased husband1s family should be abolished. The
widow should be given a real choice of spouse and this can 
only be done by changing the law of intestate succession 
so as to enable the surviving spouse to inherit some portion 
of the deceased spouse!s estate.
The present situation whereby a person is legally 
free to dispose of all his or her property by will without 
making adequate provision for a surviving spouse or spouses, 
or other dependants should be amended so that adequate 
provision can be ordered by a court where it is just and 
equitable to do so. In this respect the English Inheritance 
(Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975,'*' which
Footnote 1 on next page
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came into force on 1 April, 1976 provides some useful 
.guidance* Under the Act, the deceased*s wife or' husband, 
a child of the deceased including his illegitimate - child, 
any person whom the deceased had treated as the child of 
the family in relation to any marriage to which he had at 
any time been a party, and any person who was being main­
tained, either wholly or partially by the deceased immediately 
before his death, for whom reasonable provision had not been 
made by the deceased1s will or the law relating to
intestacy (or the combination of both), are entitled to
2
apply for an order for maintenance.
1. 45 Stats.493; this Act repealed the Inheritance Family
Provision Act 1938, the Intestate Estate Act, 1952 
and other relevant legislation, and replaced them by a 
new and comprehensive code.
2. See the recommendations of the English Law Commission 
which examined the whole question of family property 
law. Law Commission (Law Com. No. 52) First Report on 
Family Property,op.cit.; Law Commission (Law Com.No.51) 
Second Report on Family Property: Family Provision on 
Death, 31 July, 197^; see further. Bromley. Family T a w , 
op.cit.,pp.622-635.
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v CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION.
"Women do wrong to complain of 
the inequality of man-made laws; 
this inequality is not of man!s 
making, or at any rate f!it is not 
the result of mere prejudice, but 
of reason”.
| Jean-Jacques Rousseau."^
1. Introduction:
In the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made 
to collect and collate available evidence relevant to the 
legal status of Nigerian women in relation to marriage and 
family life, reinforced by the findings of field-work con­
ducted for the purpose of this research in selected diverse 
areas of Nigeria.
Women!s status in the formation, incidents, and 
dissolution of marriage, as well as their rights to property 
during marriage and on its termination in each of the various 
legal systems in Nigeria, have been examined in some detail.
The main focus of the study centered on the com-
2
parison of the legal status as defined of husband and wife 
in marriage in contemporary Nigerian communities. In order 
to appreciate the present position, and to develop proposals 
for future legislative reforms, however, reference was made 
to the legal status of women in traditional communities. 
Comparisons with the legal status of women in other countries, 
especially English women, at various periods of their cultural 
develooment have also been an important part of this study.
The main objects of this short concluding chapter 
are to assess the evidence relating to women1s status, and 
to indicate areas of the law where reform is needed. However,
a vital preliminary question arises: how does one assess in
1. Emile, Trans, by Barbara Foxley (London: Everyman1s 
Library, 1976), p.324.
2. See further, Chapter I, p.102.
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general the status of women in any given society?
Anthropologists, have used varying measuring rods 
for determining whether women's status is high or low.
Thus, Ortner"^ speaks of the three factors by which women's 
position in society can be measured, and sums them up as:
" (1) elements of cultural ideology and informants'
statements that explicitly devalue women according 
them, their roles, their tasks, their products and 
their social milieux less prestige than are 
accorded men and the male correlates;
(2) symbolic devices, such as the attribution of 
defilement, which may be interpreted as implicitly 
making a statement of inferior valuation;
(3) social-structural arrangements that exclude women 
from participation in or contact with some realm 
in which the highest powers of the society are felt 
to reside".2
Lowie correctly warns that great caution must be 
exercised in summing up the status of the female sex in a 
given society. He observes:
"The conditions involved in the relations of men and 
women are many-sided and it is dangerous to overweigh 
one particular phase of them. Least of all should 
excessive significance be attached to theory. Theory 
may and does affect practice, but often only in 
moderate degree...it is important to ascertain what 
customary or written law and philosophic theory have 
to say on feminine rights and obligations. But it is 
more important to know whether social practice conforms 
to theory".^
The committee which reported on the status of 
women in India admitted the difficulty in assessing women's 
status:
"...the status of women in the Indian context cannot 
be defined simply. General concepts like equality, 
role differentiation, legal, social and political 
rights, dependency or independence, are not applicable 
to all sections of our population".^ .
1. Sherry B. Ortner, "Is Female to Male as Nature is to 
Culture?" in Woman, Culture and Society, edit, by 
Michelle Z. Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere (.Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1974),pp.67-87 
at p .69.
2. See also Janet Zollinger Giele, "Introduction: The Status 
of Women in Comparative Perspective", in Women: Roles and 
Status in Eight Countries, edit, by Janet Zollinger Giele 
and Audrey Chapman Smock (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1977)f P •4; Martin King Whyte, The Status of Women in 
Preindustrial Societies (Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), pp.27-48.
3. Lowie, Primitive Society, on.cit., p.179.
Footnote 4 continued.......
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To assess the legal status of Nigerian women is 
no less difficult'. Wolfe and Witke note that the status 
of women is elusive,^* while Kaberry points out that any 
attempt fTby a. series of .anthropological or moral arithmetic, 
to decide whether the position of women in general is high 
or low, or good or bad is...likely to prove profitless” .2 
No attempt is herein made to sift the relevent 
evidence in order to accord Nigerian married women a 
definite rung on the fictitious ladder of women1s status, 
which, as Read correctly notes, is ’’essentially - a subjective 
assessment of numerous and complex factors” .^
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold.
(1) It attempts to consider, from the data analysed above, 
certain vital questions:
Do Nigerian marriage laws measure up to the United 
Nations Charter, anchored in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, and in the equal rights of men 
and women; to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which with reference to marriage asserts the principle 
of non-discrimination and proclaims that everyone is 
entitled to the rights and freedom set forth therein 
without distinction of any kind, including discrimination 
on the grounds of sex.^ More importantly, for the pur­
pose of this thesis, do Nigerian marriage laws conform 
to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979 which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of
Footnote 4 continued.....
4. India, Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, Towards 
Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of Women
in India,(Delhi, 1975), p.7.
1. Margery Wolf and Roxane Witke, Women in Chinese Society 
(eds. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p.l.
2. Kaberry, Women of the Grassfields, op.cti.,p. vii.
5.Read, ’’Women’s Status and Law Reform”, op.cit. ,p.215 ; see 
also.Martin King Whyte, The Status_of' women in Pre­
industrial Societies; Princeton University Press, 1978.
pp.10-11.
4. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 505D. 
(XVI) of the Economic and Social Council at its 736th.
Plenary Meeting, 25 July, 1953, art. 16.
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sex in the content or practical application of any law 
in force in Nigeria?^
(11) This conclusion also examines the possible future role 
- of law in advancing, women*s status in marriage and 
ensuring that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom 
from discrimination is a reality in fact.
2. Have Nigerian Women Equal Status in Marriage?
To answer this question it is proposed to review 
briefly the legal evidence of women*s status in the various 
types of marriages discussed above, with reference to 
particular legal issues of the greatest significance to 
women * s status.
The legal status of Nigerian women in traditional 
societies is complex and intricately interwoven into the 
social fabric of the various societies; it is derived from 
a number of social factors, of which, as shown by the fore­
going discussion, the most significant are:
(i) polgamy;
(ii) child-betrothal and child-marriage;
(iii) forced marriage;
(iv) the requirement of parental consent for the validity 
of a woman*s marriage;
(v) the payment of dowry (marriage consideration) as a 
legal essential of a valid marriage, and its-refund 
as an essential of a valid divorce;
(vi) particular legal incidents of marriage, for example, 
property rights in some communities, in which women 
suffer discrimination;
(vii) divorce laws which discriminate against women; and 
(viii) inequality with reference to rights of succession to 
■ property.
The legal status of women in contemporary Nigeria
/
is further complicated by the application of Islamic law
1. See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, 
S.39.
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among the substantial proportion of Nigerians who are 
Moslems, and by the introduction of statutory monogamous 
marriage and English law, entailing different, and often con­
flicting rights and obligations, on the spouses. The con­
flicts produced by monogamous marriage are two-fold.
(.1) There is a conflict of legal principles, an obvious
example of which is the practice of polygamy, which is
1 2 permitted under customary and Islamic laws, but prohibited
where marriage is contracted under the Nigerian Marriage Act,
or in monogamous form outside Nigeria.
Another example of conflict of principles is in the
law of succession: under customary law a wife is deprived of
any right to inherit from her deceased husband*s intestate
estate;^" under Islamic law, she is given one-quarter or one-
5half (depending on whether the intestate left issue or not)p 
while under the general law the wife of a statutory marriage 
and her children have exclusive rights of inheritance in her 
deceased husband*s intestate estate.^ The conflicts are com­
pounded by the practice among Nigerians of combining a 
statutory marriage with a customary marriage, (a "double-
7
decker marriage1*).
(11) There is a conflict of jurisdiction. As previously 
noted, jurisdiction in most matters of marriage and family 
life depends on the type of marriage contracted. There is 
a rigid dichotomy of jurisdiction between a customary or 
Islamic law marriage on the one hand, and a "statutory marriage1* 
on the other. The High Court Laws of the States generally 
provide that the High Courts shall not exercise original
1. See further, above Chapter IV.
2. See above, Chapter IX, pp. 23-37.
3. See above, Chapter X, pp. 127-135
4. See further above, Chapter XIII,pp.430-447
5. See above, Chapter XIII, pp.447-451.
6. Ibid., pp. 4-57
7. See further, Chapter X, pp.155-164.
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jurisdiction in any cause or. matter which is subject to the
jurisdiction of a Customary or Area Court relating to marriage,
family status, the guardianship of children, or the inheritance
or dispo.sition of property on death.1 On the other hand, the
Matrimonial Causes Decree has conferred exclusive jurisdiction
in matrimonial causes on the High Courts of every State in
2
the Federation. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria extends this dichotomy in jurisdiction to the
appellate level. Customary Courts of Appeal and Sharia Courts
of Appeal for any State that requires it may be established to
deal with matters relating to customary and Islamic law
■3
marriages respectively, with further appeals to the Federal
L\.
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria. In the
case of a statutory marriage, appeal from a High Court is
heard by the Federal Court of Appeal directly and further by
5
the Supreme Court.
Because the types of marriages are not kept strictly 
separate in practice (a combination is legally permissible),^ 
conflicts arise^not only in jurisdiction, but in substantive 
law, which cannot be readily solved by reference to the law. 
Judicial attempts to resolve the conflicts are themselves 
conflicting, which add to the general confusion. An example 
of this conflict arises where a woman contracts a customary 
marriage by payment of dowry, and also contracts a statutory 
marriage, the validity of which is unrelated to the payment 
of dowry. The question whether a judicial decree of 
dissolution of the statutory marriage dissolves the customary
1. See e.g. the High Court Law; Cap.52 of Lagos State, 1975 
Revision, s.11(2); High Court Law, Cap.49, Laws of 
Northern Region of Nigeria, 1963 Revision, s.17; High 
Court Law, Cap.44, Laws of the Western Region of Nigeria, 
1959 Revision, Proviso to s.9(1).
2. See Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, s.2.
5. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) 
Decree, 1978, ss.245 and 240 respectively.
4. Ibid.,ss.223 and 224; see also s.2iy.
5. Ibid.,s.219.
6. Marriage Act, Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1958 Revision, s.351(1).
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marriage also, even though the refund of dowry, a legal 
essential for a valid divorce under customary law, has not 
been made, has not yet been authoritatively decided by the 
Nigerian courts.^
(,111) Lastly, but by no means least, there is a conflict 
between the law as expounded by academic legal writers and 
as adopted by the courts, especially the superior courts, and 
the law actually practised by the community, a conflict 
which is central to the assessment of women*s legal status.
Is women*s status to be assessed according to the strict law, 
which even when it is definite on points, is totally unknown 
by the average Nigerian woman, or according to the practice 
of the people? A relevant example concerns the affiliation 
of children. Many judicial decisions favour the affiliation 
of a child to its natural father, whereas in many communities, 
a child is affiliated to the man who has paid dowry with 
reference to its mother at the time of its conception, regard­
less of who the actual genitor may be.
These conflicts obviously affect adversely the legal 
status of women in the modern society.
The significant factors affecting women*s position 
will now be briefly summarised.
U )  Polygamy
Polygyny, under which a man may be married to two
or more women at the same time, is legally recognized by both
2 3customary and Islamic laws (although in theory a Moslem
husband is limited to four wives at any one time, plus one
or more concubines). Women may only be married to one
husband at a time.- The practice of polyandry which was
traditionally permitted in certain communities in some parts
1. See further, above Chapter X.
2. See further, above, Chapter IV.
5. See Chapter IX,pp.28-37.
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of the Northern States, has been abolished by local legis­
lation.’^ Where marriage is contracted under the Marriage
2Act polygamy is prohibited.
Although the available evidence shows a decline 
in the incidence of polygamy in some parts of the country, 
its incidence is still significant in other parts of the 
country^ especially among wealthy Moslems in the Northern 
States.
The recognition of polygyny, but not polyandry, 
as a legal institution in Nigeria obviously discriminates 
against women, and conflicts with the freedom from discrim­
ination on the grounds of sex enshrined in the Nigerian 
Constitution, and also with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
(11) Child-betrothal and child-marriage
There is no general legislation prohibiting child- 
betrothal or child-marriage, although there is some local 
legislation which attempts to prohibit the practice.^ Child- 
betrothal and child-marriage were widely practised in 
previous generations. In the overwhelming majority of 
traditional Nigerian Societies, the first marriage of an 
adult woman was almost unknown, although in most cases 
cohabitation with the husband was postponed until puberty, 
usually evidenced by the girl*s first menstrual period.
There is evidence of a considerable reduction in 
the instances of child-marriage in contemporary Nigeria, 
but the practice still exists to some extent among most
1. See e.g. Declaration of Borgu Native Law and Custom 
Relating to Marriage and Divorce, N.A.L.N. 52 of 1961, 
s.6, which provides: r!(l) There shall be no statutory 
limit to the number of wives a man may have at one time.
(2) It shall be an offence for a woman to have more than 
one husband at a time11. See further, above Chapter
IV.
2. Marriage Act, Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
1958 Revision, ss. 27 and 35; see also ss.47 and 48.
3. See further, above, Chapter IV, p.345, Table 4:2.
4. See Chapter IX, pp.28-37.
5. See further, above, Chapter V, pp.386-392 and Chapter IX, 
pp. 45-46.
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communities. The disadvantages of child-marriage, especially 
where cohabitation with the husband commences before puberty, 
are many - for example, it reduces the opportunity for girls 
to be educated, but the most important adverse effect from 
the point of view of women1s legal status in marriage, is 
the opportunity it provides for forced marriages,or at 
least for marriages in which the (child) bride*s consent 
can hardly be genuine.
(Ill) Forced marriage
There is evidence of forced marriage in many
traditional Nigerian societies. Child-betrothal and child-
marriage invariably give rise to forced marriage, as very
often the girl is too young to appreciate fully the true
nature of the marriage contract, even though she may formally
consent to the union.
There is no general legislation which specifically
prohibits forced marriages,^ but a marriage under the
Nigerian Marriage Act is void if contracted after 1 March,
1970, if the consent of either party to it is not a real 
2
consent. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has confirmed other 
«
judicial decisions that a marriage contracted without the
brideTs consent is void.and infringes the right of freedom
3
of association enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution.
Although there is evidence of forced marriages
occurring in contemporary Nigeria, with the gradual
reduction of child-betrothal and child-marriage, and the
l\
increase in the number of educated women, forced marriages 
may eventually disappear from the Nigerian scene.
1. There are a few local authority bye-laws which provide 
that a marriage is not valid unless the woman concerned
consents to the marriage, see e.g. the Declaration of Idoma 
Native Law and Custom relating to Marriage and Divorce, 
N.A.L.N. 63 of 1959, which provides that ,!No woman shall 
be married unless she consents to the marriage". 
Infringement of the law is an offence. See also the 
Nasarawa Local Administration (Declaration of Afo 
Native Marriage Law and Custom) Order, 1972, B.P.S.L.A.L.N. 
19 of 1972, s.2(b).
2. Matrimonial Causes Decree, 1970, Decree No.18 of 1970,
s .3(1)(d).
3. See Osamwonyi v. Osanwonyi [1972] U.I.L.R. 527.
4. See further, Chapter I, pp.103-124.
5. See further, Chapter V, pp.436-447.
(IV) Parental consent
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Consent of the woman1s father is generally 
necessary irrespective of her age for a marriage under
customary law, if the marriage is contracted by payment of 
dowry, and under Islamic law as practised by the Moslem 
communities in Northern Nigeria. Parental consent for the 
marriage of an adult male is not essential for a valid 
customary marriage under either customary or Islamic law. 
Parental consent is necessary for a statutory marriage where 
either the man or woman is under the age of twenty-one years, 
although a marriage contracted without parental consent is 
not rendered invalid.
The requirement of parental consent for a woman*s 
marriage fetters her freedom of choice of a spouse, since her 
father or other legal guardian has an effective veto against 
anyone whom she chooses. It may also lead to forced marriage, 
since the girl, rather than remain unmarried, may feel 
obliged to accept the man chosen for her. The option of con­
tracting a statutory marriage when she becomes a legal adult 
at twenty-one years of age may not be practicable: for 
example, her prospective bridegroom may refuse to contract 
such a marriage. Although there is need for parental consent 
when a woman is very young, the retention of parental con­
sent for the validity of the marriage of a woman beyond the
age of twenty-one is unsupportable. It infringes the 
freedom of association granted under the Nigerian Constitution, 
as well as the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of sex. It is directly contrary to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
(V) Payment of dowry
The widespread payment of dowry as a legal essential 
of a valid customary marriage is one of the chief factors 
which adversely affect the legal status of Nigerian women in 
marriage. Many other adverse effects, for example, affiliation 
of children to a man who is not their natural father, can be 
traced to the retention of dowry as an essential of a valid 
customary marriage.
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There is evidence of a significant increase in the 
level of dowry payments in some societies, and. legislative 
attempts to peg the payments at a reasonable level have been 
generally ineffective. The system has deteriorated to such 
an extent in some areas that it can justifiably be referred 
to as ’*wife-purchase” .
(VI) Incidents of marriage which discriminate against women
There are certain legal incidents of customary and 
Moslem marriages in which women suffer discrimination. In 
customary law, the most relevant example is adultery. Before 
the introduction of English law, in most customary law systems, 
a wife’s adultery, but not the husband1s, was treated as a 
criminal offence. Although a wife’s adultery, generally, is 
no longer regarded as a crime (except in the Northern States 
where any extra-marital intercourse is a c r i m e a  wife’s 
adultery is still regarded as an odious '’offence” and it 
attracts degrading penalties, including beating which in at 
least one recorded case resulted in the death of a wife.
Under Islamic law, a woman may be subjected to
seclusion which deprives her of her freedom of movement and 
2
association. The practice of idda also discriminates against 
women, since it curtails a wife’s freedom to remarry 
immediately she has been divorced, whereas no such restriction 
is imposed on a divorced husband.
(VLL) Divorce
The divorce laws, especially with reference to 
Islamic law, discriminate against women. While a Moslem 
husband can divorce his wife in theory, and often does 
divorce her in actual fact in some parts of the Northern 
States, indiscriminately, by the mere statement, "I divorce 
thee” uttered three times, or ”1 divorce thee irrevocably”
1. See Penal Code Law, I960, Cap.89, Laws of the Northern 
Region of Nigeria, 1965 Revision, ss.387 and 588; see 
further Chapters VII, p.565 and IX, p.3^.
2. See further, Chapter IX,pp.59-67.
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once only, the Moslem wife is severely restricted in her
freedom to divorce her husband even in cases where a divorce
is justified.*^* Under customary law, although a wife*s
freedom to divorce her husband is unrestricted in theory
the requirement of refund of the dowry, without which a
divorce is not legally valid, severely restricts her freedom
in fact. The husband, on the other hand, is unrestricted
2
in his freedom to effect a divorce in law and in fact.
The wife of a statutory marriage who wishes to 
divorce her husband is restricted by the high cost of divorce 
actions in the High Courts of Nigeria at the present time. 
There is no simple and inexpensive procedure under which a 
divorce may be effected, even where both spouses mutually 
agree to the divorce being granted. In a "double-decker1 
marriage, a wife faces the liability to refund the dowry 
paid with reference to the customary marriage?as well as 
the need to obtain a judicial decree of divorce after pur­
suing a successful action in the High Court, either of which 
alone may well* be beyond her financial capacity.
(VIII) Women!s property rights
Womenfs property rights, especially in the field 
of intestate succession, are particularly restricted. In 
some customary law systems a married woman has no legal 
capacity to own or dispose freely of property she has 
acquired by her own labour. Such property legally belongs 
to her husband and is subject to his control. On the other 
hand, her husband is unrestricted in his capacity to acquire 
property over which his wife has no control, and which he may
1. See further, above Chapter IX, pp. 88-89, and pp.98-102.
2. See further above, Chapter VIII, p.562; see also the
Nasarawa Local Administration (Declaration of Afo Native 
Marriage Law and Custom) Order, 1972, B.P.S.L.A.L.N.
19 of 1972, s.7(2) under which a divorced woman may be 
prevented from remarrying for more than two years; and 
s. 10(2) which provides that in divorce proceedings 
instituted by a wife, dowry shall be refunded to the 
husband within one month of the Court!s order to repay,
"and if payment is not made within this period' the court
may order her to pay to the husband additional compen­
sation of one pound for every month or part of 
a month thereafter until the full payment is made”.
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dispose, of freely inter vivos or by will.^
With reference to succession, in almost all
customary laws, a wife cannot inherit her husband's property
or any share of it.if he dies intestate, although she may
have made significant contributions, such as providing labour
in building a house, to the acquisition of the property. In
many communities, under customary law, a husband inherits
his wife's property if she dies intestate, whether or not
2
she leaves children.
A widow of a customary marriage in most societies
has to refund the dowry paid by her deceased husband on the
occasion of her marriage before she can remarry, unless
she marries a member of the deceased's family. But she
cannot compel any member to marry her,or to maintain her,
even in cases where the family inherits all the deceased's
property. Even her right to remain in the matrimonial home
is at best dependent on her "good behaviour", an imprecise
and anomalous term which underlies a situation in which the
■3
widow's position may be liable to abuse.
Islamic law also discriminates against women in 
regard to property rights. According to one learned jurist, 
a woman with reference to rights of succession is treated 
by Islam as "half a man".
The wife of a statutory marriage is in a better 
position with regard to rights to property and rights of
5
inheritance, although conflicting judicial decisions have 
created uncertainty in the laws.^
The deficiency in women's property rights has been
7
remedied to some extent by legislation' but discriminatory 
principles, especially in the law of succession, still 
remains.
1. See further above, Chapter XIII,pp.468-469 and 474-479.
2. See further Chapter XIII,pp. 450-447.
5. See above, Chapter XIII, pp. 458-447.
4. See further Chapter XII,pp.569-371.
5. See further Chapter XIII, pp.451 et.al.
6. See-Chapter X H I m  pp.479 et.al.
7. Eor example, Married Women's Property Act, 1882^and Wills 
Act, 1857, see further Chapter XII.
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From this brief.summary of the legal status of 
married women, it is evident'that Nigerian women-do not 
have equal rights with men in relation to marriage under 
customary and Islamic laws. Since the overwhelming majority 
of women marry under one of these two systems of law, 
women1s legal status in marriage generally is determined by 
these laws, which as seen discriminate against them in several 
ways. This has been the traditional position, and although 
there has been a measure of change in certain respects, 
women1s legal status in marriage still falls far below the 
standard advocated by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the Constitution of Nigeria, 1979.
3. Proposals for Reform
Granted that Nigerian women do not have equality 
of rights in marriage and family life, the next question 
which arises is: is it necessary, or even advisable in the 
interest of women themselves and the society as a whole, 
that women should have equal rights and duties with men in 
the marital relationship? Scholars have shown that from 
the earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing 
to the value attached to her by men, combined with her 
inferiority in muscular strength), was found in the state 
of bondage to some man. The subjection of women to men 
being a universal custom, any departure from it is never 
comprehended and if suggested it appears unnatural.^
One argument used to maintain the status quo in 
relation to the laws of marriage is that women themselves, 
especially African women, are happy in this state and do 
not desire or seek for change. In this connection, Mill 
notes how difficult it is to apply rational arguments to 
attitudes that have been deeply-rooted in human beings, 
especially when these attitudes are supported by reliance 
on God and nature. Women generally, and African women in 
particular, will not rebel,for they have been conditioned
1. See Mill, The Subjection of Women, op.cit., p.230.
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to their state.since their earliest times, and in many cases 
they know no other.
Thus the Minister of Internal Affairs in Rhodesia
noted:
fTThe question of emancipation of African women is a 
very complex and complicated one. The present 
position is that 99 percent of African women would 
find legal emancipation of that nature quite 
intolerable11. ^
Rousseau asserts:
!,But for her sex, a woman is a man; she has the same 
organs, the same needs, the same faculties. The 
machine is the same in its construction; its parts, 
its working, and its appearance are similar. Regard 
it as you will the difference is only in degree".£
If Roussea is correct in this hypothesis, then
why is it that most women in Nigeria would like to become
men? The women interviewed for the purpose of this thesis
were asked the following question:
"If you were given an opportunity to be reborn with 
a free choice of sex, which sex would you like to 
be born as:
(a) male
(b) female.
Give reasons for your answer".
Only 4 out of 186 women expressed a desire to be 
reborn as a female, and strangely enough, three of them were 
Kanuri women who were in seclusion, the fourth being an Igbo 
woman of about sixty years of age, who gave as her reason 
the fact that she had always regretted not having been 
educated; if reborn as a woman she stated that she would be 
educated, and would thus be able to do all the things she 
had been prevented from doing because of her lack of 
education. The reasons given by the other women are varied 
and interesting, but the sum total of the reasons given was
the women*s view of the superior position of men in Nigerian
society.
1. See African Digest, 1968, p.128.
2. Rousseau, Emile, op.cit., p.321.
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The desire of African women generally to be men 
rather than women was commented on by Kingsley in the late 
nineteenth century. She said:
"There is no doubt a certain idea among the Negroes 
that some souls may get a rise in status on their 
next incarnation. You often hear a woman saying 
she will be a man next time, a slave he will be a 
freeman, and so on".-^
The higher status men occupy in African society, 
although women*s status has improved considerably, has not 
been entirely changed by the progress of time. The desire 
of Nigerian women to be men because of the superior status 
assigned to them is best illustrated from the answers given 
by the youngest age group who contributed to this research. 
Primary School children from several areas were given a 
composition in which they were asked to imagine that a 
fairy had given them the opportunity to be reborn, but this 
time they were free to choose whether they would be male or 
female. They were asked to give reasons for their choice.
The children*s answers were extremely interesting, 
and collectively, give a useful picture of marriage and 
family life in their particular society. It is not possible 
to give details of their answers here, but of the 46 boys and 
32 girls from two Primary Schools in Enugu who wrote the 
composition, 44 boys and 49 girls wished to be reborn as 
males. Among the reasons given for this choice were **in 
many families boys are preferred to girls, mothers cry and 
fathers turn away their eyes when a girl is born’*; "boys 
are given better education than girls, women’s education 
ends up in the kitchen"; "a boy can be head of state as our 
Head of State is"; "most community chiefs and leaders are 
men"; "where men and women gather together only men can 
break kola-nuts in ceremonies and other customs"; men do 
not have to take maternity leave or suffer the disadvantage 
of pregnancy"; "a man is the head of the family and rules 
the house"; men do not have to leave their father’s compound 
or change their names"; "even if a man is ugly, if he has
1. Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, op.cit., p.492.
514
money he can marry a beautiful woman and make beautiful 
children”; ”in the Bible it is said that Adam'came first 
before Eve,'that is why men are stronger than women”;
”girls face an uncertain future, unlike the boys, the fear 
of not getting children and the uncertainty of getting 
husbands which means everything to them”; men can marry two 
or more wives, but a woman cannot even marry one”; "according 
to custom, as a man, if my father dies, the eldest male will 
take his property, a girl gets nothing”.
These are only a few of the many reasons given by 
the children, but they all show the privileged position which 
the Nigerian male is considered to enjoy in contemporary 
Nigerian society. Most important, however, is the fact that 
the answers of both the women interviewed, and the girls 
who wrote the composition, reveal that they are aware of 
the better legal and social status of Nigerian men, which 
if given the opportunity, they would wish to enjoy.
However true the assertion of the Rhodesian Minister 
quoted, that African women would object to a change in legal 
status, may be for African women in Rhodesia, it does not 
seem equally true of Nigerian women, who are now beginning 
to assert their rights, and to challenge the legal and social 
structure which deny them rights granted to their male counter­
parts. The absence of organized feminine liberation move­
ments in Nigeria should not be taken as evidence that 
Nigerian women are satisfied with the superior legal position 
enjoyed by men generally. The struggle for equality need not 
take the form of physical confrontation. Nigerian women are 
presently occupied in improving their economic and 
educational status, which would eventually lead to equality 
of legal status in actual practice.
What can law do to improve the status of women, 
in relation to marriage, which is basically a very personal 
relationship?
The function of law as a vehicle of social reform is 
limited. No regulation, however good, can ensure a happy 
marriage, or equality of treatment of women in the marital
relationship, but law is a potent factor in influencing
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public opinion, and sets a standard upon which people can 
pattern their behaviour.
Nigerian society has changed from its traditional 
pattern; in many cases Nigerian customary and Islamic laws 
remain unchanged, so that there is a disparity between legal 
theory and actual practice. New economic conditions, growing 
individualism, and a change from the social pattern of large 
extended families to smaller nuclear families necessitate a 
change in family laws if women are to be adequately provided 
for.
One of the purposes of this research was to gain 
information as to what role society thinks Nigerian women 
ought to play in the future. Answers collected indicate that 
most people consider that the legal status of Nigerian women 
is relatively good, but that it can be improved, and that 
total equality, as far as is physically possible, should be 
the ultimate goal.
With the answers given in mind proposals for reform 
in particular aspects of the law relating to marriage have 
been proposed throughout the thesis. A brief reiteration of 
the main proposals will not, however, be amiss here.
The following reforms are suggested:
(I) Legislation specifying a national minimum age for all 
types of marriages in Nigeria should be enacted, and it is 
recommended that such age should not be lower than sixteen 
years for males and females. It is realised that child- 
marriages would not be entirely eliminated by legislative 
fiat alone, for culture and religious pressures are still 
strong in many areas, but legislation in this respect, 
together with the increased educational opportunities for 
women provided by the Federal Governments Universal Free 
Education, would help considerably in the reduction of 
child-marriage.
(II) Forced marriage at any age should be completely 
abolished by legislation throughout the Federation, and in 
all types of marriage, including marriage according to 
Islamic law. A statutory marriage contracted without the 
real consent of either party is void at present. This 
provision should be extended to all types of marriage.
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(III). . To protect young people from rash decisions which 
may be harmful to their best interests, parental consent 
for a person under the age of twenty-one should be retained. 
Parental consent should not be necessary for the validity
of the marriage of any person, male or female, who is aged
twenty-one or above. This principle should apply not only
to statutory marriages, but to all types of marriage.
Reference may be made here to the Report of the Commission
on the Law of Marriage and Divorce in Kenya, 1968^ and the
draft Bill it prepared for the reform and integration of
2
Kenya*s law relating to marriage and allied matters.
(IV) The payment of dowry should be rendered legally 
ineffective. The payment of dowry or other monetary con­
sideration to the bride*s parents, by or on behalf of the 
bridegroom, should no longer be a legal necessity for a 
valid marriage of any type contracted in Nigeria, neither 
should the refund of money or property given in this respect, 
be essential for a valid divorce.
No action, whether in contract or otherwise, 
involving the payment or refund of dowry should be enter­
tained by Nigerian courts. This recommendation is in line
1. Recommendation No. 20. par. 98 reads:
!,While we think parental advice is always desirable, 
regardless of age, we do not think it would be 
reasonable to make parental consent a legal require­
ment where a person is over 21 years of age. We think 
it a proper requirement up to that age, even thougn 
we are recommending that 18 should be the age of 
majority. We see nothing illogical in this. A
person of 18 may well be old enough to enter into
ordinary contracts but marriage is a very special 
kind of contract which may affect the whole course 
of a person*s life, and one which calls for maturity 
of judgement more than intelligence**.
2. See the Bill of the Law of Matrimony Act, 196, s.25:
'25.(1) A person who has not completed Requirement of 
his or her twenty-first year shall, not- consent 
withstanding that he or she shall have 
attained the age of majority as pres­
cribed by the Age of Majority Act 196 . 
nevertheless be required, before marrying 
to obtain the consent -
(a) of his or her father; or
(b) if his or her father is dead of his or
her mother; or
footnote 2 continued
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with.Tanzania1s Law of Marriage Act, . 1 9 7 1 ^  under which a
marriage may be valid notwithstanding failure to comply
2with any custom regarding dowry or exchange of gifts.
(V) Cohabitation is not a legal essential of a valid 
statutory marriage. Similarly, it should not be a legal 
essential of a valid customary marriage. Cohabitation 
should be treated as a matter of evidence of a valid 
marriage.
(VI) At present a system of central registration of all
statutory marriages celebrated in Nigeria exists. Customary
marriages, on the other hand, are registrable locally, but
Zj,
registration is not compulsory, in some communities, and 
many customary marriages remain unregistered, and con-
5
sequently difficult to prove, when the occasion arises.
The system of central, compulsory registration should be
Footnote 2 continued....
(c) if both his or her father and mother died before he 
or she attained the age of eighteen years, of the 
person who was his or her guardian immediately before 
he or she attained that age. 
but in any other case, or if all those persons are dead, shall 
not require consent.
(2) Where the court is satisfied that the consent of any 
person to a proposed marriage is being withheld 
unreasonably or that it is impracticable to obtain 
such consent, the court may, on application, give con­
sent and such consent shall have the same effect as if 
it had been given by the person whose consent was 
required by subsection (1).
1. Act No. 5 of 1971.
2. See Read, "Marriage and Divorce in Tanzania”, [1972] J.A.L. 
op.cit., p.29; See also Ghai, "The New Marriage Law in 
Tanzania", op.cit.,p.lQ4 "The White Paper said that many 
young men are not able to marry because they do not have 
enough money or livestock to pay the dowry demanded by the 
girl's family..«As a result young couples elope and then 
live together as husband and wife even if they are not 
properly married". Cf. the position in Nigeria, see 
Bride Price Committee Report, op.cit.
3. See Marriage Act, Cap.115, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 1958 Revision, s.30.
4. See e.g. the Local Government Law, Cap.79, Law of Eastern 
Nigeria, 1963 Revision, ss.84 and 90, which authorizes 
local authorities to make bye-laws for the registration 
of customary law marriages within their jurisdiction.
footnotes 4 and 5 continued
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extended to all types of marriages. Comparison can be 
made with Tanzania*s Law of Marriage Act, 1971, which 
provides for the recording of all types of marriages, by 
whatever form they are contracted in a single system of 
registration under the control of the Registrar General.*^
(VII) A husband should be liable for the maintenance of his 
wife in all types of marriage, not only during the subsistence 
of the marriage, but in the discretion of the judges and where 
necessary after a divorce has been granted. A wife whose 
husband cannot provide for himself should similarly be liable 
for his maintenance.
(VIII) The procedure for obtaining a divorce from a statutory 
marriage should be simplified. Uncontested divorce suits 
could be heard in Magistrates Courts, thus relieving the 
pressure of work in the Higher Courts. Procedure for divorce, 
and grounds for divorce, should apply equally in cases of 
divorce by either husbands or wives. Once a marriage of any 
type has broken down irretrievably, a divorce should be granted 
to either spouse.
(IX) Equality of property rights between husband and wife 
should be the cardinal principle of Nigerian matrimonial 
property law. A wife should be given a share in her husband*s 
property if she has contributed to its acquisition or improve­
ment; or if she has made significant contribution to the
Footnotes 4 and 5 continued....
4....Most of such bye-laws already made do not make regis­
tration compulsory. Cf. the Registration of Marriages 
Adoptive Bye-Law Order, 1956, W.R.L.N.4 of 1957, under 
which registration of a customary law marriage is com­
pulsory; see generally Nwogugu, Family Law in Nigeria, 
op.cit., pp.54-56.
5. See e.g. Agongo v. Aseleke and Ors. [1967] N.M.L.R.21;
Lawall v. Younan [1961J W.N.L.R.245; Abisogun v. Abisogun
L1963] 1 All N.L.R.237; Ibokwe and Anor. v. U.C.H.Board 
of Management [1961] W.N.l .k .173. See also Kasunmu,
"Proof of Polygamous Marriage in Nigerian High Courts”, 
Journal of Int. and Comp. Law. 1969, PP-27 “
1. See Read, "Marriage and Divorce in Tanzania", op.cit.,
pp.29-30.
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general welfare of the family during the subsistence of the 
marriage. '
(X) In all types of marriage, the surviving spouse should 
be given a share in the intestate estate of the deceased 
spouse, and there should be no discrimination in this respect 
between husband and wife.
(XI) The present position whereby a husband or a wife could
dispose of his or her property by will, leaving his or her
spouse and children destitute, should be remedied by a
provision enabling a court in its discretion to order the
payment of maintenance for a surviving spouse who needs such
maintenance, and for the dependent children of the marriage.^
2
The Nigerian Constitution, 1979 has set the frame­
work for a revolution in relation to equal rights for the 
Nigerian women. It provides:
,!39.-(l) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, 
ethnic group, place of origin, religion, sex or 
political opinion shall not, by reason only that 
he is such a person -
(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the 
practical application of any law in force in 
Nigeria or any executive or administrative 
action of the government to disabilities or 
restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of 
other communities, ethnic groups, places or 
origin, sex, religion, or political opinions 
are not made subject; or
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the 
practical application of any law in force in 
Nigeria or any such executive or administrative 
action, any privilege or advantage that is not 
accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other 
communities, ethnic groups, places of origin, 
sex, religion or political opinions”.
The above suggestions for legislative reforms should 
go a long way to making the revolution a reality in fact as it 
now is in law.
1. See further, above, Chapter XIII,pp.495-496.
2. Federal Republic of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978 
Decree, No. 25 of 1978, s.59(1).
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